Metaphorical-Intentionality: A Phenomenological Examination (Of The Interpretation Of Analogical Language)

	A psychiatric patient once told me that when he woke up that morning he thought he was a telephone box. My immediate reaction to this statement was to think that this person was indeed quite crazy. However, a few moments later, I tried to put myself in his place and asked myself why this patient, who was very intelligent, should think along such picturesque lines? Intrigued, I asked him why he should make such a strange statement? In his answer he told me that he was receiving many long distance telephone calls, an equally strange response which on the surface only further reinforced the import of his first statement. Then it dawned on me that on waking he was having auditory hallucinations, in the form of hearing voices, and rationalized this anomalous experience in the creative fashion just recounted.
	In trying to understand the intentional meaning that promoted this patient's `text' we needed to understand the metaphors central to his text and the manner in which these particular metaphors were being used. A careful listening to this conversation and some skillful questions should elicit what, if anything, this person was trying to communicate both, one must presume, with himself and the listener. Unfortunately when we are dealing with a text whose author, or authors, are not in a position to be politely interrogated we must seek some other form of approach in order to more deeply, and perhaps adequately, interpret that text. It would seem reasonable to believe that in order to critically evaluate a text of some form or other we are going to have to phenomenologically understand the textual use of metaphor and how metaphor in general function. The following exposition has this ambition in mind but I must confess that my efforts in this undertaking must be regarded as only the first few steps in this direction.
	In the first section of this paper I will examine a slogan, formulated by myself, that sees our doing philosophy as the critical exercise of metaphorical processes. Next, I will examine the nature of intentionality as I would wish to redefine it. Third, I will examine, in my own fashion, the nature of metaphor in the light of this previous discussion on the subject of intentionality. Lastly, I will draw various conclusions that I believe might have some relevance for the interpretation of analogically oriented language.

1.	Philosophy Through The Critical Exercise Of Metaphor

	Could philosophy be provisionally characterized, in ideal terms of reference, as the manipulation and critical exercise of metaphor(-ical structural-functions). 
	What exactly would be entailed in such a formula? Let me briefly outline what I believe would be the general nature of, and the main implications stemming from, this type of proposal.
	What is apparently not under focus in such a formula are, first, processes of naming, and, second, direct descriptions of those objects, or states of affairs, so named. What would be involved, as I would envisage it, is the use of a metaphorical language and the rules for the critical exercise of this language. These rules, or grammar, would be in effect a second level of metaphors whose influence would selectively manipulate and interpret the interaction of metaphorical structural-functions operating on this first level of overt metaphorical exhibition; an overall process intended by the author, or authors, of that text to communicate some form of meaning, or sense, via that particular form of textual behaviour that constituted that text. Defining text as any form of behavioral deposition, or trace, whose purpose appears to be reasoned through a process of deliberation, i.e., imprinted by a process of intentional directedness. 
	In asking what motivated me to make this proposal that describes philosophy as the manipulation of metaphor let me note the following observations in this regard.
	As a phenomenologist I observed myself conducting various thought experiments, eidetic variations and reflections on miscellaneous topics, but, which in their communication, involved the cooperation of various metaphors or forms of analogy. It seemed that what was to be hopefully shared in communication was the unraveling of a series of metaphors by which means an analogued process of provoked insight was to be induced. In effect the phenomenal situation was to be analogued; reconstructed via a process of re-simulation. That in much the same way I observed science was conducting itself when not directly involved in processes of measurement and experimentation, although, I might add, processes of measurement, etc., themselves were using a higher order of metaphorical manipulation and depiction (e.g., analogically treating `temperature variations' as the differential `length' of a column of fluid, etc.). In a similar fashion I observed various breeds of philosophers attempting to `model' their various fields of expertise and in the process developing the terms of reference of their particular grammars. Moreover, I came to the conclusion that an aesthetic text was also involved in a non-literal use of metaphor and that, in turn in its own way in accordance with its adopted style, the communicated depiction of such intentional directedness involved a similar manipulation of metaphor that through processes of provocation and resolution established the aesthetic nature of that text, and, the nature or flavour of our textual relationship with that instance of text.
	Becoming more extreme in this matter dare I suggest the possibility that processes of denotation and description are but truncated processes of metaphorical manipulation either identifying such a process or a series of processes, or, evocatively analoguing the nature of the metaphorical complex under examination whether being analogued, described (using a repertoire of essential, non-controversial, evocative structural-functions) or just short circuiting the reconstruction of these types of processes in their entirety by naming its manufacture of sense through an association of a name with the reference of its metaphorical mapping and its psychic placement in such a differential schema. That in effect a name is associated with a distinctive intentional process of metaphorical differentiation, and, that the evocation of that name induces through association the recall and/or re-investigation of such a process. This process of naming simplifying our manipulation of such complex states of affairs allowing us to create and entertain even more complex states of affairs which in turn can be named, described in closer detail, etc.
	As might be gathered from this brief exposition it would be correct on your part to envisage that I perceive an intimate relationship between intention and metaphor, indeed, that all intentionality is exercised through the use of metaphor. Conversely, that all metaphor is usually exercised `intentionally,' i.e., with a sense of purpose to some degree or other. In the next section of this paper let me recount my vision of intentionality and, then, in the following section, deal with my phenomenological interpretation of the textual phenomenon of metaphorical language. Finally, let me combine both areas of research in my formulation of a general hermeneutic approach to an interpretation of the textual use of analogical language. Or put more simply, initiating the development of a methodology that will help us to apparently understand how we actually go about interpreting the textual use of metaphor.

2.	The Phenomenological Nature Of Intentionality

	In the natural attitude it is normally valid to talk about being in the world (as `a part' of this world and never `apart' from it). However, in a transcendental phenomenology such a discussion is not just inappropriate but outrightly inapplicable. Being correctly senseless in its formulation such an apparent task cannot even get started although the illusion of such a task is understandable when we allow our natural attitude to infect and contaminate the passage of our transcendental reflections.
	In its place we must perceive the World as a polarity, as a pole of intentional directedness; something that can be aimed for but never arrived at. In a similar fashion intentional Objects and transcendental Egos must likewise be treated as polarities in the intentional thematization of cognitive consciousness. Such treatment automatically stems from the adoption of a centrally placed transcendental suspension and it is by such an entrance that a phenomenological attitude is transformed and takes on a non-exclusive transcendental complexion. Transcendental investigations being concerned with the intentional configuration of phenomenal constitution in terms of its meaning and meaningfulness hence its trans-phenomenal, trans-constitutional and trans-intentional terms of reference; such terms of reference never being completely divorced from their phenomenal subject matter.
	Treated as a metaphor we might like to talk about ourselves as being thrown into the world in the phenomenological manner as described by Heidegger with all emphasis on our being thrown rather than our arrival in a world of phenomenal being. We might also like to talk about our being immersed in a subjective world of Ego and an intersubjective world of Egos, as our being thrown before the path of intentional Objects. As a metaphor our non-literal treatment of the same should also see us seeking to redress the imbalance set up through the use of such analogical language by the invocation of the opposite and equal process, namely, our being withdrawn, or disengaged, detached, extracted from the world and equally removed from the play of intentional objects and subjects, etc., without our absolute removal from this sense of world. It would seem to be the unceasing task of the transcendental phenomenologist to have to continually re-trace their path backwards in order to re-instate the balance that maintains this state of transcendental suspension that in turn allows the phenomenologist to take this transcendental turn (along with the promise of transcendental insight that is to flow from the process of such re-flection).
	In transcendental reflection upon a certain domain of intentionality our appreciation must now focus upon the correlativity between process and content and all noetic-noematic correlativity entertained therein between these poles of Object and World, World and Ego (as the transcendental pole of subjectivity), Ego and Object. Under these terms of reference we should realize that all sense of objectivity is subjectively discerned in a contextual field, or world, appropriate to the discernment of the type of relationship that engages us in such intentional activity and its appreciation. A relationship, like all relationships, that is entertained, on one hand, between the same type of object, and, on the other hand, a relationship that must be engaged between different objects and never the self same object. This asymmetric symmetry, or symmetrical asymmetry, is the character of all real relationships. There can be no real relationship between exactly identical objects, that in effect would be as an object identical with itself in all respects. This does not rule out asymmetrical self-relationships in which one aspect of an object is entertained in relationship to some other aspect of that object or state. But let us not be fooled and seduced by shortsighted logicians who maintain that the appearance of equality establishes a symmetrical form of identity. Intentionality by virtue of its metaphorical directedness is the expression of this asymmetry experienced as present in (our experience of) all relationships. Although the field of that intentional presentation establishes a fundamental form of symmetry between the interacting facets of a relationship it is the asymmetrical forces at work in this field that establish its intentional directedness. Let me illustrate this concept of asymmetry.
	A mother loves her child. The symmetry in this relationship is the field of love established between these two transcendental subjects. That mother could not love that child if that child was an object that could not be loved implying that both objects must be transcendental subjects. However, the `love that the mother has for the child' is not symmetrical, in shared response, with the `love that the child has for its mother.' Reciprocity is necessary for a relationship but can never be equal or symmetrical in a real relationship. Now the intentional activity entertained by the mother directed towards the child is not equal, and can never be identical, to the intentionality entertained by the child for its mother.
	An implicit consequence of this concept of asymmetry is the necessity for logic to be written in at least a tacit tri-modal form. A relationship does not devolve from an identical object implying at least two objects or facets in an act of relationship. Moreover, the act of relationship itself necessarily involves the symmetrical medium of a field upon which that asymmetry of interaction is to discharge itself as a relational fact in that world. Hence all bi-modality is correctly tri-modal (although it might be further argued that the presentation of a field itself involves the pre-establishment of a prior field, etc., with the implication that all logic is correctly multi-modal and dialectical in its manifestation as an experiential phenomenon for investigation).
	As already stated this asymmetry has been identified with the intentional directedness, which, moreover, I would further perceive as the focus upon an intentional object as entertained in that act of noesis. As intentional objectivity is a pole of directed intentional activity it stands to reason that it can never be given in itself as an entity purely in itself. I.e., intentional objectivity can never be an `object.' Objectivity merely indicates an act of intentional focus. Hence an intentional object can never `be got at' or `arrived at.' On the other hand intentional objectivity might find some form of fulfillment if certain preconditions are `met along the way.' Indeed, the pre-prescribed reality of that object, or state, as a presentation would be manifestly reinforced by the extent to which those pre-conditions are met. Such a state of affairs being reinforced in a multi-modal context wherein the involved cooperation of a series of modalities can be established. That to a certain extent the reality of an intentional object, ego or world is determined by how successfully that focus of concern cuts across the primary modalities that establish our sense of being a being thrown into this intersubjective social-world. The quality of this richness of cross-relationships reinforcing, or undermining, our confidence in the spontaneity of our naive, natural determinations as to what appears to be real in this everyday vision of the world.
	Another way of perceiving this inherent tri-modality of intentional constitution is to adopt a gestalt perspective along the following lines. The determination of an intentional object necessitates a field of determination in keeping with the proposed nature of that type of intentionality. However, the nature of this bi-modal relationship between an intentional object and its corresponding aspect of the background field, or horizon, could not be appreciated without a third point, or pole, of involvement, namely, a transcendental ego whose assumed nature is in keeping with the nature of that gestalt field and its object of focus. Hence this argument attempts to establish tri-modal conditions through the implication of a transcendental Ego, transcendental Field (or World) and transcendental Object.
	Now to short circuit this discussion I would like to propose the following observation that each one of these three ideal moments is, I believe, entertained in a relatively characteristic fashion. That the sense of the transcendental Ego is experienced through a transcendental act of suspension, that transcendental Objectivity is experienced through a transcendental act of reduction, and, that the sense of a transcendental World (as the collection of all possible intentional fields that could be entertained) is conducted through the auspices of a transcendental act of synthesis. However, in order to differentiate this latter act from a Kantian act of transcendental synthesis (which itself is not unrelated) I shall refer to the same as an act of transcendental reconstitution in that the phenomenal experience is, more or less, reconstituted and allowed to simulate its own process of simulation (perceiving all constitution as being continually re-simulated through the conjunction of processes of retention and protention with an emphasis upon the synthetic nature of the latter). It is with this schema in mind that I hope to examine the phenomenon of our experience of metaphor. To conclude let me detail the transcendental nature of this collective relationship between Ego and suspension, Object and reduction, and, World and reconstitution.
	To summarize I would like to define a transcendental suspension as put into effect when there is a global suspension of a world thesis along with a suspension of all forms of value judgment. Moreover, there is also put into effect an intentionally entertained balance between noematic `content' and noetic `process.' In my opinion a pre-informed state of transcendental suspension is also put into effect when a state of balance is spontaneously entertained between transcendental processes of `analytic' reduction and `synthetic' reconstitution. 
	Transcendental reduction as an orientation is established in our transcendental reflection when we impose, after the imposition of a transcendental suspension, an analytical, retrospective focus of attention upon distinctive, relatively essential structures of consciousness. These evocative structures once thematized and named are generally treated as non-controversial. This experience of phenomenal essences, relatively `essential' states of consciousness, can be clarified through acts of eidetic variation and generally constitute, in accordance with my understanding, our powers of categorical intuition. Such structural-functions are revealed in acts of reduction, reduction only needing to proceed to that level of experience that reveals these distinctive facets of the human social constitution, such as, e.g., redness, colour, love, pain, time, space, self, cause, will, etc.
	In contrast to transcendental reduction we have transcendental reconstitution wherein the synthetic unity of a phenomenon is prospectively re-simulated in experience. Moreover, such synthesis in turn reinvests its associated field of determination with an increased degree of gestalt richness which in turn reinvests further processes of simulation therein with a greater degree of thematizational clarity. Re-constitution is put into effect through a deconstruction of analytical-reductive mapping of evocative structures. Through a state of structural deconstruction a re-simulation of the total phenomenon is allowed to return to a process of re-functioning simulation. Analysis concentrating its attention on structure, whereas, on the other hand, reconstitution returns our attention to the simulated functioning of that integrated complex of evocative structures. Needless to say such simulation, in accordance with this picture as painted, is essentially metaphorical in complexion.

3.	A Phenomenological Treatment Of Metaphor

	At last I am now in a position to examine the phenomenological nature of metaphor in the light of this model that perceives the transcendental determination of an act of intentionality through these three moments of transcendental suspension, transcendental reduction and transcendental reconstitution,  which, in effect, constitutes a transcendental-hermeneutic circle. A hermeneutic circle on both the levels of the intentional object itself vis-à-vis a determination of its parts and vice versa, and, the relationship between the intentional object in its integrity vis-à-vis its associated field of presentation and vice versa.

	The following interesting observation can be made about the functioning of metaphorical material. A metaphor may suggest `that something is like p' it, at the same time, cannot be identical with p if it is to operate under the operation of is like rather than is. That being the case we are then forced to the conclusion that a metaphor operates along the following lines:

	That something x is both like p and not like p.

	An observation to this effect has been discussed by Ricoeur and called a référence dédoublée or split reference. To make this bi-modal functioning of the metaphor more clear let me discuss the following example.
	If we were to say `the world is like a dream, or an illusion,' let us ask ourselves what, as a series of possibilities, might be meant by such a pronouncement? For a start if like meant is we would have the following equation:

	By `the world is like a dream' is meant: that the world 	as a dream is equal to a world which is just a dream.

	Such an absolute identity is only informative of the nature of the medium that allows the illusion of a state of such pseudo-interaction between x and p. As previously argued a symmetrical relationship is not a true relationship, cannot be properly formed in intentional terms of reference. Obviously a metaphor ceases to function as a metaphor in a literal perspective. Moreover, if the appearance of an absolute identity is to be proposed in natural consciousness such cannot be made the province of an adequately pre-prepared transcendental investigation.
	We might like to be somewhat arbitrary in this process of comparison and just state that:

	x is more or less similar to p 

	On the other hand if we treat the metaphor along the following lines...

	x is like p `and' x is not like -p

	...then we have, if a state of balance is in play, to all practical purposes, a state of transcendental suspension. However, that being the case, we then might ask how it is possible for a metaphor to actually be able to exert its shadow of influence if it is locked up in this apparent state of paralysis? In answer to this question we must now read the metaphorical structure in the light of a transcendental reduction, perceiving the metaphor to act as a transcendental reduction in its evocation of analogical meaning besides functioning in and through the apparent invocation of a transcendental suspension.
	As a phenomenologist we might like to investigate the nature of dreams as ordinarily understood, to some extent or other, by the literate population that might use, or understand the use of, this metaphor of `the world is like a dream.' For a start they might like to list the features that appear to be usually subsumed under this concept, e.g., that dreams are not always clearly formed, easily subject to change, discovered not to be real on awakening, perceived only when we sleep, generated in fantasy, non-substantial in content, as having a content that only resembles the relatively real world experienced in periods of wakefulness, etc.
	We might say that phenomenologically a dream p appears to consist of, either partially or completely, a series of facets a, b, c, d, e, etc. Then if we were to say `x is like p' we would only mean that x has a partial likeness to the phenomenon of dreaming, having a correspondence only with some of those facets generally associated with our experience of dream states. The problem now arises as to which of these relatively essential features, named when evoked, is actually being referred to directly or indirectly. By what mechanism can our metaphor refer to only some facets of this phenomenal state of affairs treated as a metaphorical image?
	To answer this last question we must again move on and now investigate the nature of metaphor under the light of our third moment of transcendental reconstitution. Metaphor as a structure (or i.e., as a structural-function) can only be appreciated when it is introduced and examined in a metaphorical context, i.e., in a metaphorical field. If such a field was to be pre-determined then our metaphorical structure could have certain key aspects of it highlighted in such a manner that our use of that metaphor is now so constructed as to highlight certain pre-selected features of such an image. E.g., if our text has pre-selected `the non-substantiality of dream imagery' as an important aspect of this phenomenon then the use of this metaphorical imagery would be so constructed so as to take up this bias, as perceived in the phenomenon of the dream, and apply this facet to the constitution of that which is being compared to a dream. I.e., in this case, we would be duly informed that the (substantiality of) the world is like the non-substantiality of the contents of a dream state. In other words the metaphorical bias of the field allows the use of the metaphorical image to make certain comparisons at the expense of other possible comparisons. Moreover, this pre-determination of the metaphorical field allows us to use the chosen metaphorical imagery, under normal circumstances, without too much difficulty in such a fashion, if properly prepared, that is easily communicated and relatively non-controversial. In effect our metaphorical field is subjected to a state of bias that allows the author's intent to become relatively transparent in their use of such metaphors as chosen and selectively pre-determined. We might say that the explicit first order metaphor is subjected to an implicit second order of selective metaphorical treatment in order to make sense of the metaphorical language as proposed in the text under examination.
	This rather mundane exposition so far would seem to fail in at least one important respect, namely, to account for the power of the metaphor and/or the collective power of a series of metaphorical structures. Let me redress this defect in my account under an analysis of the concept of provocation as results from the juxtaposition of a combination of evocational structures. However, let me conduct this supplement in the next, and last, section of this paper in which I outline the important hermeneutical consequences that can be drawn from this phenomenological exposition as developed to date.

4.	A Transcendental-Hermeneutical Treatment of Metaphor

	To begin with we can perceive the metaphorical aspects of the text as effectively centered in a series of transcendental suspensions. In the use of a metaphor the implicit non-existential assertion(s) of that metaphor is/are just as important, if not more so, than the apparent existential assertion(s) indicated through the comparative placement of that metaphorical process.
	Secondly, a metaphor is, through the selective pre-determination of a metaphorical field, able to focus upon certain relatively essential evocational structural-functions intersubjectively embedded in the natural-phenomenological account of that imaged phenomenon. It being another role of the hermeneuticist to determine and list these non-controversial features.
	 An obvious inference following on from my second point to be drawn from this analysis is that the prime occupation of the hermeneuticist must be to attend to these two, or more, levels of metaphorical functioning and phenomenologically describe the general nature of their interrelationship as it would appear to be so constituted for our textual appreciation. In this process determining which features as listed under our second point are either to be stressed or not focused upon, and, the degree of bias these features would appear to hierarchically possess in this regard. A close reading of that text, commentaries upon that text, the immediate and related literary background to that text also helping us to determine the interaction between these overt and covert metaphors in operation in that text.
	The hermeneuticist should also look at the implicit and explicit relationships between metaphorical structural-functions on the same level of overtness and covertness. In this regard the juxtaposition of evocational structures is inspected in order to investigate the provocative nature of those asymmetrical relationships and the provocatively directed nature of those processes of resolution as possibly erected in that text or as would be tacitly implied in its conventional reading. The provocative juxtaposition of essential-evocational structures being provocative on two counts. Firstly, by way of the relative degree of dissonance introduced into that overall text treated in its passages of non-dissonance as a consonant background field, and, secondly, through the provocative power of those relatively dissonant interactions to suggest, through processes of accommodation with that background field, natural pathways for the resolution of that dissonance. This two edged sword of provocative power exhibiting the style, and successfulness, of that text to formulate and discharge this resolution of textual dissonance created through the clashing and accommodation of metaphorical simulation, modeling, mixing, overlapping, paralleling, etc. Noting also the repetition of similar patterns of provocation used to reinforce the apparent display of authorial intentions. An analogy that might illustrate this double nature of provocation can be found in the image of the bull-fighter and their red cape. First, the red colour of the cape is, in itself, provocative to the already enraged bull. Second, the way the cape is skillfully handled by the bull-fighter determines just where the bull is going to end up in his charge towards this flashing red mass. The challenge for the matador is to get the bull to pass as close as possible past their person without sustaining any form of injury in the process. In a similar fashion provocation both deliberately provokes and decisively directs and determines the manner of its resolution, apparently in accordance with the intentions, or so it would seem, of the author or authors of that text. Such a model, however, does not imply that our intentions, in terms of their structural-content and the functional-manner of their resolutional realization, is completely transparent to either the author, or authors, or, their audience.
	Lastly, the hermeneuticist also needs to note other facets of the text other than evocative and provocative structures. E.g., noting to what degree evocational structures, fragments of text, are provocatively re-written or overwritten  through processes of revocation (rather than mediated through accommodation).
	E.g., noting the vocative nature of titles in so far as the text is to be addressed, how it addresses us, how it introduces and comments upon its vocation and style of vocation, etc. 
	E.g., noting the convocational pressure of other surrounding texts to provocatively induce certain re-readings. 	
	E.g., noting possible invocational pressures to induce certain additional re-readings supplementary to ostensive superficial readings through association with a literary background either conventionally close to that text or less proximate to the same although presented with enough repetitive, or internal, evidence to suggest such invocational allusions to those other texts and/or their associated hermeneutic conventions.
	Finally, I would like to stress again that this programme just sketched out applies to all meta-levels of overt/covert metaphorical structural-functioning. This format focusing upon key metaphors at work in the text along with a tentative reconstruction of the implicit metaphorical context that appears reflected in that text under hermeneutical examination. An examination, moreover, that can never allow any text to be purely reduced to the level of a mere literal interpretation by virtue of the fact that intentionality, through its metaphorical functions, cannot be solely translated under analytical terms of reference. In other words experience cannot be sequentially rendered down and moulded in a uni-logical verbally-oriented account except provisionally. To go beyond such natural limitations can only set in place a process of self-deconstuction that, in turn, will inevitably re-reveal its non-verbal roots as a simulated phenomenon constituted-by-us-for-us.

Conclusion And Postscript

	In this paper I have attempted to phenomenologically understand the nature and power of analogical language. In outlining this process I have demonstrated how metaphors are implicit transcendental suspensions, inhabit selectively pre-determined metaphorical fields that control the phenomenological highlighting of evocative structures held in parallel with that being analogued. Moreover, the nature of metaphor to occupy the intentional space of an open hermeneutical circle also suggests that the interaction of these three intentional moments of suspension, reduction and reconstitution helps to thematize the intentional meaning set up to be communicated through such devices not that we can claim to be dogmatically correct or absolutely definitive in this process of exposition. And lastly, in our deconstructive re-tracing back of our steps made in a reductive direction in this overall process of hermeneutic comprehension it should be realized that we don't so much undermine the nature of this process of exposition but rather strengthen our dialectical, multi-modal appreciation of that text in all its richness, or poverty, of realized stylistic subtlety and literary grace. This existential richness, when and where present, after its own nature, then delivers the written, imprinted `character/s' of that text back into an outspoken, ongoing, speaking voice of depth and inner resonance that is able to interrogate us in our interaction with it, and therein, within its embrace, helps us to bridge this now artificial chasm between the underworld of `writing' and our living encounter with our daily world of `speech!' The point at which this `breach/barrier' between speech and writing breaks down and is overcome is precisely at that point of transcendental suspension successfully engineered by that text and in this task the metaphor is pre-eminent. (The) metaphor(-ical aspect of textual devices) simultaneously invites us to enter the transcendental dimension of that text, to savour the flavour of its existential richness, and, immediately, at the same time, assists us to return to this world of phenomena along with such insights into the meaning and meaningfulness of that text that allows us to meet a simulation of the intentional force of that original act of creation. In an act of re-creation we become its new author in a roll-call that is able, as a transcendental possibility, to transcend time and space, to transcend the boundaries between cultures and to transcend the very semblance of a distance between different transcendental agents. Such is the creative power and freedom of metaphor! An asymmetrical power that can critically provoke the transcendental illusion of an `inherent' sense of hermeneutical objectivity correlative with its simulation of an intersubjective intentional subjectivity!  An explosion of textuality in an act of communication that transcends the phenomenal boundaries of its deposited trace; the shadow of a shadow and an echo of an echo in reverberation with the resimulation of itself!
	The reconstitutional power of the metaphor embedded in a text is realized paradoxically at that very point in time when the text is no longer being `read.' Intentionality is not just a left-brain, verbally dominated exercise of our cognitive powers but a process that realizes a state of adequate thematization when calculative processes of a sequential, analytic nature are counter-balanced by their entertainment in a parallel state of experiential totality, i.e., in a state of simulation or rather re-simulation. In such a light the apparent division between `speech' and `writing' can be seen more as a charade, or a false barrier, when confronted by the apparently separate worlds of the verbal and the non-verbal. However, in this paper I have attempted to show how these two domains of the reductive and the reconstitutional are entered through a state of transcendental suspension entertained through the reciprocal balance self-engineered between those analytical processes of reduction and synthetical processes of reconstitution. That collectively these three processes constitute the circular orbit of an hermeneutic(al) circle, an overall process whose center needs no illusion of substance, merely the presentation of a phenomenon that is brought to our attention through the assistance of various aspects of the metaphorical process. A process that constitutes the appearance of our intentionality and which directly allows us to intentionally confront those appearances as those simulations which, through protention, are continually re-simulated-there-by-us-for-us. 
	Hence I would conclude that there is an intimate relationship between metaphor and intentionality and that to a certain extent intentionality is metaphorically exercised and simulated (and vice versa).

						Noël Tointon, 
						    Sydney (12/4/92), 12/9/92.

Appendix I 

Transcendental-Phenomenological-Hermeneutical Circle

Tr. Ego
Tr. Suspension

*

*                        *

     Tr. Object				 Tr. World
   Tr. Reduction				    Tr. Reconstitution
(Analytically oriented)             (Synthetically oriented)