Methods 
In The Practical Application Of A Transcendental Philosophy 
For A Phenomenological And Existential Realization Of Value

Introduction

	In this paper I shall attempt to give our phenomenological investigations of value a practical direction and to this end a theoretical framework will be developed to assist us in this important task. A phenomenological examination of value would have little point if our only objective was its pure non-applied philosophical analysis. In this world of chaos and the ever present crisis a path must be charted and cleared in order to help us preserve and improve the quality of life and enrich the nexus of relationships in the culture associated with that experience of value. It is the primary objective of this paper to seek those guidelines that best help us in the discovery and realizatiom of value. What task could claim to have more importance? What life could be lived, whether in a religious frame of reference or in a non-religious frame of reference, without some form of value-creation and recognition, ongoing re-evaluation and transformation? 
	It would be my suggestion that what value can be found in evidence in our lived experience in this world is in direct measure to the degree our lives are lived as an existential process of self-realization through some form of relational unfolding that realizes the potential of that process. This reflects and is facilitated, I believe, by the degree to which we can psychically center ourselves in a process of gestalt integration and re-integration of our being in the midst of this personal dimension of the intersubjective-transcendental world of life or life-world. But for us to appreciate and realize, through some form of critical self-reflection, the potential of this transcendental dimension to our being there is necessitated our experiential recognition of just such an aspect immanent and transcendent to the natural surface expression of our daily lives. Do the fishes of the sea realize that they swim in a sea of life, for if they do they then must have the psychological apparatus to appreciate this same world of the sea around them? In a like manner our appreciation of this transcendental dimension necessitates at least our indirect psychological appreciation of the same and hence the sense of the transcendental must also include this experiential aspect that realizes this ground and horizon of being that allows us to both live in and appreciate this world of value and all meaning and meaningfulness therein entailed. From this it follows that a philosophical methodology that directly allows us to phenomenologically appreciate phenomena must also assist us, at least indirectly, in our appreciation of this trans-phenomenal transcendental world of being and value. In other words in a phenomenological suspension and reduction of lived experience the transcendental dimension itself must come before the horizon of our appreciation otherwise the former would have no meaningfulness for us! What has no sense has no meaning for us, and what has no meaning for us effectively has no existence for us. In this light, or rather darkness, the sense of the transcendental would then be for us not non-sense but no-sense, i.e. as that without sense. But as the transcendental as a concept hopefully enters into meaningful philosophical experience, as the immanent ground and transcendent horizon of experience, it follows that in some particular sense or other this ground and horizon must also have a recognizable experiential form. Otherwise our immersion in the transcendental sea of being would pass us by as unrecognized.
	Our recognition of the transcendental accepted let us apply those phenomenological methods that are claimed to facilitate our insight into the transcendental world of phenomenological being or essence. In order to do this we are informed that we should commence with an act of transcendental suspension. Then having subjected our experience to a state of suspension where all value judgments as value judgments are put out of action, bracketed, etc. we then follow with an act of transcendental reduction in order to expose the distinctive essential character of the phenomenon under investigation assuming all phenomena are distinctively structured in experience to some degree or other. In a language that superficially differs little from common discourse the imputations given to various value judgments are disconnected, neutralized, put aside, and allowed only to present themselves as reports that stress an essential makeup expressed in this non-evaluative mode of reporting. To demonstrate this method to ourselves let us follow through an example situation in order to understand some of the ramifications and limitations of this technique. Let us examine a person, say ourselves, involved in giving a phenomenological description of their current activity of perceiving this world. In the defining of their reflections let us note the following attempt to do this in as complete a manner as possible.

	"It seems apparent to my sense of self that I perceive a series of representational-like states that involve an apparent experience of the world, the perception of a bowl of apples, a pen in my hand, a half-written letter, an open book upon the table... I realize that there is also the entertainment of a perceiver of this series of object-like states, namely, myself as an empirical perceiver... I perceive the functioning of an empirical-like sense of self by a transcendental-like sense of ego..."

	In order to be complete in our act of perception subject to phenomenological scrutiny every act of perception necessitates the apparent construction of an appropriate perceiver...? It would appear, as a consequence, that our phenomenological report can not be complete, can never be completed.
	In the following hypothetical situation a person attempts to define their sense of essential self as a person in this world.
	They make,  for the sake of an example, the following phenomenological(-like) report...

	"I am regarded by myself as a male person, aged 90 years of age, medium frame, interests include reading, philosophy, parachuting, cultivator of vegetables, owner of a red sports car, one horse, three mice and one cat, currently doing a phenomenological act of self-description, currently noting my act of currently doing a phenomenological act of self-description, currently noting my just having noted that I am currently doing a phenomenological act of self-description..."

	In both examples I have attempted to show that if the phenomenologist wishes to be complete in their essential reporting they must effectively fail because at some point or other an element of the recursive will sooner or later enter the description leaving it forever open or non-closed. Even the determination of what is essential, i.e. distinctive, relevant and characteristic is problematic and in practice needs a holistic appreciation in order to see whether the addition or subtraction of these potential features make an essential difference to our investigations and the nature of that under investigation. Then, through an interaction between the relatively essential and the non-essential we must question whether we can draw a sharp line of demarcation between the essential and the non-essential? Moreover, contextual or environmental features will also to some extent help determine the nature of those essential features in the light of our investigation along with the role of the observer themselves if the nature of the interaction of the observer is of relevance in those investigations.
	The moral to be extracted from this limitation placed upon our being in this world is that we can never define ourselves, in sequential or vertical terms of reference, in a complete manner. A complete synthesis of this reductive information is therefore an impossibility even though for the needs of necessity provisional summation can and is performed more often than not in a non-problematic form. 
	The same type of logical impossibility confronts us when we seek a complete clarification of our essential constitution. Moreover, the further we de-contextualize that region we wish to investigate the more removed is it from having meaning, being meaningful for us. Does this criticism of the reductive method successfully attack some of the fundamental ambitions of the phenomenologist, namely, e.g. their quest for absolute essential foundations. Could we meaningfully expose those reputed foundation using an extreme reductive methodolgy? My tentative reply to this problem is that foundations are retrospective fictions progressively thematizes through the repetitions of our reflections upon our experiences. As artifacts in the structure and enstructuring of our conscious experience they manage to exert a virtual power and influence over the entire fields of our psychological being as a person in the world. Moreover, through the progressive enrichment of our overall psyche these essential foundations are progressively crystallized and given the definitive definition that once brought to our attention upon further experience, and its reflective appreciation, merely adds to the quality (or detail and sub-detail) of our discernment.
	Such a reply recognizes the relative virtuality, and discreteness, of essences but also accepts their power to influence and stabilize our phenomenological research along with the general non-problematic integrity imparted to the formation of natural experience. An absolute reductive analysis would destroy these fictitious entities, however, a transcendental reduction merely exposes the distinctive essentiality present in the presentation of the form recognized in its essential recognition. This recognition, given adequate thematization, is through the resolution of those factors in the relationship, as a field of distinctive relational interaction, that resolve those tensions between dissonant-consonant material ensuring the experiential formation of an ongoing resultant of that experience-type. This type of experience, through the uniqueness of the relational situation, is, in its totality of presentation, experienced as relatively unique, discrete and pure in type. Uniqueness is imparted through the uniqueness of the relationship experienced, discreteness manifests itself through the distinctive psychological impact of that process of resolution in the realization of that overall resultant whilst its purity is thematized through the distinctive enstructuring processes of the psyche as a foundation for the experience of that type of experience. At the psycho-epistemological level at its greatest level of intellectual meaningfulness is imparted an essentiality in keeping with the same. This structure imparts the logical nature of the essential description whilst the totality of the psyche is correctly imparted to the totality of its phenomenological being, albeit, from the point of view of the investigation entered into. Thus foundations are present but not in a progressive atomistic presentation. The illusion of foundations is a progressive phenomenon although the potentiality of essential construction is correctly a priori to its thematization. Although we see the movie on the screen in the picture theatre in reality the reality of the images are contained on the film in the camera and no minute reductive analysis of the screen itself in the context of this projection will reveal the true underlying manner of its presentation. Although the imagery is seen on the screen we should not look for its essential reality at this level of analysis. What structures the images seen on this screen is the film or video. Although these structural differentiations of essence are correctly a priori it is only through the progressive thematizational enrichment of the appropriate field that these potentialities can be extracted and brought forward as a distinct and clear artifact of our conscious lives. As entities of our consciousness that assist an informative contrast and function in their related fields of consciousness. Moreover, as all these different fields have only a limited independence in the overall unity of mind it follows that all constructions of consciousness in some manner reflect all these diverse fields in the psychological makeup of those construction which thus, in turn, reflect the parallel structures and hierarchical stratification in the process functioning of the mind. In a sense the ostensive logical nature of a conscious presentation is a superficial phenomenon that in its depths and horizons reflects the essential structuralization of that formation of consciousness. In doing so it presents itself from the point of view of that essential distinctiveness pre-determined through the function of its greatest intended sense of presented meaningfulness. Thus a perception is treated as a perception, an emotional feeling is presented as an emotional feeling, a judgment is presented as a judgment, etc. Without this sense of intentional characterization or localization the mind would be neither able to perceive a thought as a thought of a particular type nor discover its own sense of presence or integrity. Consciousness is an emergent phenomenon that correctly draws no final distinctions between the phenomenal intention and the object-state intended, between psychic fields and the corresponding senses of psyche, between the senses of the subjective and the intersubjective, between the senses of subjective and objective and intersubjective and objective.
	In an act of phenomenological reflection the phenomenologist endeavours to discern the characterization or structure of that distinctive type of phenomenon they are currently investigating. As a distinctive presentation in its own right it must still present itself as a distinctive type of conscious phenomenon. For the phenomenologist the the assumption is made, as a necessary presupposition, that consciousness is distinctively structured and that this structure is the same for all persons, i.e. universal. Thematization of this structure is however a progressive affair through our exposure to, and our reflection upon, our experiential passage through this world of life or life-world. Some degree of stability in the enstructuring of consciousness is assumed by the phenomenologist and that their degree of intersubjective successfulness in communication as phenomenologists in turn acts as a guarantee for such a philo-
sophical venture. The actualized delineation of this stability in essential structure is treated as the scientific province of phenomenolgy whilst, on the other hand, the creative manner this structure is demonstrated should, more correctly, be treated as an artform and not as a science. 
	In this paper I would like to develop an insight into how the present moment is able to be metaphorically entered for it is there, I believe, that a practicalization of value can be and is entered into. To be able to do this necessitates my phenomenological examination of present time consciousness. Moreover, it is through an examination of the process of phenomenological reflection itself that this insight will be best developed.

Aspects of Phenomenological Reflection

	Once all preconditional research and goal setting is pre-defined the act of phenomenological reflection itself is a skill naturally present in the daily functioning of the mind. However, as a discipline in the exercise of reflection the philosophic skill required to adequately perform this process of critical reflection is perhaps only obtained through examples given to us to examine and through the practice necessary to realize a reflexively semi-automatic -like instantiation of its technique. In other words the exercise of such an ability can be treated as a skill along with all the ramifications and associations entailed in such a concept.
	Our access to the value of the phenomenological investigation is, I believe, through the exercise of the transcendental suspension. Husserl tells us that in the act of transcendental phenomenological suspension (all) value judgments are to be suspended. It is the nature of reflection for us to find there not only an intentional object-state but also an intentional redirection towards the process of the reception or constitution of that object-state itself. By constitution is meant the constructive nature of the process of consciousness in its interaction between a sense of the world and a sense of self. By re-constitution is meant the re-synthesized process of a pre-phenomenological constitution subjected to some form of reductive analysis or treatment. Thus in phenomenological reflection re-constitution recognizes the reductive treatment of a process of constitution and its synthetic re-constitution. Common sense would suggest that analysis presupposes the pre-existence of a process of synthesis. On the other hand synthesis presupposes the prior existence of an analytical process.  We might ask ourselves, therefore, as to which came or must come first, analysis or synthesis? To safely extricate ourselves from this interminable historical controversy we must quickly invoke a third party, namely, the pre-existence of intentional material already to hand which is also available not only for our inspection but also for our reductive analysis and synthetic reconstitution. Now the question can be asked how do we find our access to such a territory for our phenomenological reflection and investigation? Put quite simply access is there for us when pre-conditional pre-conditions are fulfilled, (e.g. motivational thematization, adequate essential and functional research, adequate non-transcendental-psychological development and cognitive and affective equilibrium) and, with an equal importance, when the mind enters in upon a state of transcendental suspension. The door to our entertaining the genetic constitution of a distinct process of intentional pre-development is through a process of transcendental suspension. This type of reflection involving, as already stated, a process of intentional redirection towards the metaphorical heart of our investigations facilitated through a suspension or bracketing of all types of value judgment.
	What types of value judgment are there? There is, e.g. economic value, monetary value, academic value, survival value, artistic value, religious value, personal value, etc., etc. In effect there would appear an infinity of forms each one with some degree of  difference in definition for all the people entertaining as they must in their own manner effectively the same category, either broad or narrow in intent in the total spectrum of our thought? To circumvent this natural diversity of apparent forms of value let me return to a previous definition noted in this paper concerning the nature of constitution. It was stated that constitution resulted from the interaction between a sense of world and a sense of self. It would appear from a reading of Husserl's writings that for him constitution resulted from the original interaction between the I and the world and that this description can and must be conducted in transcendental terms of reference, meaning i.e. with reference to a transcendental ego and by extention a transcendental world constituted by the former. But a similar problem arises, as with the controversial priority of synthesis or analysis, as to who or what is the constituter and the constituted. Polar relationships of mutual constitution cannot be correctly bi-polar, I would claim, but rather three cornered in their fundamental genesis. Although apparently dyadic in their outward presentation the silent presence of a third party is necessary, acting as a middle ground for the appearance or manifestation of an apparent duality and its differential co-relative thematization in identity. So in rewriting this fundamental or archetypal transcendental relationship we must look for a third participant and decide as to which party is this third party. Treating this transcendental dimension as the life-world, i.e. the relationship between the transcendental ego or life and transcendental world as world and the nature of the relationship between them as symbolized by the use of the connecting hyphen it might be thoughtful to consider the world through its sheer mass, in its metaphorical sense, as this absolute ground, this necessary third party, for identificational differentiation in which case we must search for something else that can  oppose and contrast the sense of a transcendental ego. Surely this must arise through its intentional powers to intend some form of an object-state as the prospective recipient of this intentional act. Thus we are left with the following three parties, namely, the transcendental ego, the intentional object-state and the neutral third party of an absolute world or the absolute world of being. For simplicity let us refer to them as ego, object and world. Now as all forms of meaning, and by implication value, are constituted and all forms of phenomenal presentation are likewise constituted it follows that all forms of value must involve this archetypal structure between the miscellaneous senses of ego, object and world. In this light we can now see all forms of value as constituted by the nature of this relationship and subtleties in this relationship as constituting subtleties in the world of miscellaneous forms of value. Moreover, by different degrees of emphasis or through reproduction of facets of this relationship and their interaction less fundamental, but distinctive, forms of value might be accounted for. In this manner I have adopted this theoretical pattern of reasoning in order to re-propose the following primary forms of value...

1.	Thematical value through object-object interaction,
2.	Aesthetical value through object-ego interaction,
3.	Ethical value through ego-ego interaction,
4.	Pragmatical value through ego-world interaction,
5.	Ontical value through object-world interaction,
6.	Trans-thematical value through world-world interaction.

	Of course at the most fundamental level interaction must involve all three parties and cannot be reduced to the mere presentation or appearance of two. As a consequence it follows that all forms of value must have the same transcendental structure implying that all forms of psychological-transcendental value, i.e as in the psychological formation of processes of judgment, must also have the same dynamics and mechanics, i.e. the same process-content. Then it also follows that all forms of judgment must have the bias of one of these six aspectival-forms and that all forms of judgment are effectively judgments in value. I would like to add here the following qualification that value must cease to be value to that degree it ceases to be the immediate product of an act of judgment, or to that degree the judgment is ill-formed, through conceptual distortion in pre- or post-judgmental forms of cognitive treatment. Thus we can conclude that all forms of value have the same transcendental basis in both non-psychological and psychological senses of the term transcendental and that value is value to that extent that the process of judgment remains in process.
	In our consideration of the process of phenomenological reflection and its processes of phenomenological judgments it follows that correctly this process could not be merely the relationship in our investigations between an act of transcendental suspension and transcendental reduction. Such a reduction that exhibited a description of its essential constitution could not come into play if it were to remain and act purely as a process of reduction. A third participant must be in play and that must be a process of constitution, or rather re-constitution, in order for the process of descriptive reduction to be exercised and made effectively communicable both to the phenomenologist themself conducting the process of phenomenological reduction and to the meaningful examination of other phenomenologists interested in the work of the former. Re-constitution because a process of constitution is to be re-constituted in order to allow the phenomenologist to arrive at a meaningful comprehension of their reductive reflections. For the phenomenologist what is to hand is that which has already been subjected to a process of constitution being that already constituted. In their re-constitution of this already processed material there is the hope that an adequate essential understanding will allow a re-constitution that effectively mirrors that constitution that was subjected to such reduction. An isomorphism between the constitution and the re-constitution in our transformation from one to the other necessitates the adequate critical exercise of those processes or procedures that might promote and guarantee the same. In some sense if we were to assume that if given all the necessary pre-conditions, conditions and post-conditions the act of judgment was to automatically follow then we might just consider such a critical state of affairs as possible both in theory and in practice. No doubt certain phenomenologist might claim either hard or soft versions of the same. Essentially, however, if re-constitutional products and processes are to mirror their constitutional prototypes the line of demarcation itself between an act of constitution and re-constitution cannot be rigidly insisted upon and maintained in its distinctiveness. The stability of memory and the intersubjectivity of communication both must point to such an isomorphic state of affairs as being not only obtainable in theory but also, more importantly, in practice?
	Thus we could define the dialectical, possible phases of transcendental-phenomenological reflection as suspension, reduction and re-constitution. Of these three parties it would be natural, in the light of this paper, to ask ourselves which one is effectively the neutral silent grounding third party? As the third party is that which is to hand or that which allows us to gain access to that which is already constituted, it would be reasonable to assume that the act of transcendental suspension would be the correct candidate for this title? Indeed this must be the case. Reduction necessitates that which is to be reduced and that which is re-constituted necessitates that which is to be constituted as the re-constituted. Therefore neither one of these two phases could apply for this task of neutrality (as defined under these phenomenological terms of reference although dialectically any point on this analogical triangle could be re-defined in a neutral manner to the other two points or phases with a corresponding shift in the meaning of that neutrality). It is with this important insight that we can gain our experiential entrance to present time consciousness wherein the activity of a process is to be entertained, whether this entertainment be it be phenomenologically or non-phenomenologically inspired. Thus let us investigate the phenomenological characteristics of an intentional act of transcendental suspension in order to exhibit the necessary criteria for the satisfactory exercise of the same.

A Phenomenological Examination of Transcendental Suspension

	The question should perhaps be first asked how can we phenomenologically examine a general or specific act of transcendental suspension when in order to do the same we must be in possession of such knowledge? 
	My reply to such a charge is that as the process of judgment parallels a process of phenomenological reflection, through the fundamental necessary presence of an invariant transcendental mechanics and dynamics, as previously argued for, it follows that an examination of one would essentially parallel the other in this aspect of our investigations. Hence some appreciation of an act of judgment should, if conducted on a deep enough level of analysis, reveal the relevant structures, and processes of enstructuring, in this regard. 
	In the light of this argument so far what tentative conclusions might we reasonably infer. Obviously such an examination must take place in present time consciousness. Then, those conditions that assist in the performance of this type of philosophic task must also be recognized along with an appreciation of what pre-conditional and post-conditional influences bear upon or result from such esoteric considerations. Fortunately, such a programme appears already to be partially in place. The definition of this entrance, as an act of suspension, itself signals an important clue in this regard, namely, that the act of suspension is also an act of psychic balance, as a psychological process conducted in an ongoing state of dynamic psychic equilibrium.
	In the act of transcendental suspension all value judgments are to be suspended, i.e. entertained without an assent or denial given to their ostensive claims. Claims are not negated with assent turning into denial, etc. or v.v. Rather, all reports are taken at face value as phenomenal presentations minus their trans-presentational evaluational considerations. In this regard a fine balance is entertained between all forms of value affirmation and negation. Neither alternative is accepted nor denied but a profound state of balance is entertained. In other words all forms of judgment are stalled, prepared or re-prepared for an act of judgment without allowing this act of judgment to start. In hovering over this suspended ground we are in effect, however, preparing for the sudden uncontrollable spontaneity of a judgmental process to make for us an affirmation or negation in the light and adequacy of our research conducted to date. Effectively the judgment is postponed until such a point is reached that it must commence and answer us but in doing so it then does so without the manipulation of an egotistic intervention that would otherwise distort the process of judgment. Besides this neutralization of egotistic intervention, the sense of ego is not absent but rather passive, there is a sense of profound balance within and between all levels, and overall, in this structuring process of consciousness. In a phenomenological description of a process of judgment we should observe this inherent balance in the process and content of an act of judgment. On prescriptive grounds the psychic re-orientation towards the act of judgment necessitates a shift in attention from cognitive calculation and preparation to a state of dynamic equilibrium between the parties as one finds oneself pre-entering into the spontaneity of the act of judgment. However, the nature of the relationship between the cognitive and the psychic level of judgment, i.e. the psychological-transcendental level in epistemological-psychological functioning is such, by the very nature of its intentional evaluation, that it cannot find itself removed from this territory of pre-cognitive preparation. The act of judgment must possess a cognitive ground to judge and thus the act of judgment must maintain a state of dynamic equilibrium between the conceptualization of the cognitive and the deliberating ability of the trans-conceptual aspect of judgment. Moreover, this delicate state of ongoing balance is in effect throughout the psyche in order it can cognitively entertain states of pain or pleasure, perceptual-stimuli or motor-responses, etc. and at the same time be in a position to appreciate the same. This delicate balance is one pre-condition for the act of judgment to take place. As an explanation we must realize that in the same manner as intentional analysis points out, that a thought process must have a thought-content, an intentional object to which it is directed towards, the intentional act of judgment necessitates an object to be judged in the situation of an active process of judgment. This dialectical balance must be maintained: no content to be judged - no process of judgment, no process of judgment - no content that could be considered as the material for judgment. Hence a state of psychic balance must be in evidence for an intentional act of judgment to take place either at our apparent instigation or on behalf of the process of suspension. In reality all judgment necessitates this profound state of psychic balance put in place in an attitude of suspension, the spontaneity of an act of judgment being only marred by external influences like an inadequacy in pre-conditional research, improperly formulated framing of judgmental questions, lack of motivational incentives, loss of overall gestalt functioning and the serious distortion of direct egotistical intervention. It is my thesis that by the very means that we allow ourselves to enter into a process of judgment it is by the very same means that we allow ourselves to enter the existential richness of present-time- consciousness. If that be the case, or not, let us now look at the nature of this transcendental suspension in order to appreciate what is entailed in our theoretical existential entering of the present moment in accordance with this thesis.
	The only non-formal difference between an act of reflection and an act of transcendental phenomenological reflection is that with the former we are dealing with a process of constitution whereas in regards to the latter we are dealing with the re-constitution of a prior process of constitution. However, even in the preservation of our concentration in an act of conscious appreciation of an intentional object the constitution of that intentional object must be in a process of continual re-constitution in order to maintain itself before our conscious awareness for the duration of that act of intentional intent. Further, the intentional intent behind the deliberate act of appreciation must itself be in a process of re-constitution. However, for the sake of clarity, let us assume a passage of time has elapsed between its original constitution and its later isomorphic re-constitution. 
	Already we have contrasted the act of essential reduction to the revelation of the constitution of the phenomenon in an ordinary process of reflection. It follows that in phenomenological reflection the essential reduction of a process of pre-phenomenological constitution result through its re-synthesis in its re-constitution. In both cases, whether in judgmental reflection or phemomenologically conducted reflection, it was argued that the necessary neutral third party was that of suspension. 	
	Thus these two sets of three moments could be seen to be and treated, respectively, as a judgmental or pre-phenomenological circle and a phenomenological circle. For the sake of completeness if we were to include an historical sense of time we might add the retrospective pre-phenomenological reduction and the prospective post-phenomenological (re)-constitution to effect an existential circle. As stated previously our entrance to these various circles is through the moment of suspension. By what phenomenological characteristics can the act of suspension be set up and/or recognized? Can we claim a direct and deliberate act evoked through our own initiative in this respect? My thoughts, or rather suspicions on this matter, would more incline me to think that only indirectly can we do this by removing from an act of focal consciousness those tendencies in intentional processes or content that, otherwise,  would allow the process to effect itself, i.e. by removing those features that impede the initiation and performance of this process.
	As suspension is conducted in a state of profound ongoing dynamic equilibrium it might be reasonable to infer that as a pre-condition for the initiation, exercise and maintenance of a state of suspension would be the pre-instantiation of the same conditions. If we liken this process of immanent equilibrium to the lowest point in the swing of a pendulum we might like to consider the following two methods for the arrival of our passage through this mid-point. We can, in analogical language either continue or accelerate the upward swing of the pendulum knowing that once it reaches it highest point it will return and pass through this mid-point. On the other hand the direction of the swing could be reversed and by these means made to arrive and pass through this mid-point that much quicker. Applying to both models we could also adopt the concept of dampening the swinging of the pendulum in order to stay closer, and for a longer period, to the mid-point of these cycles. Lastly, we could apply an equal and opposite pendulum in tandem with the first so that the combined vector of the two pendulums, the pendulum and the anti-pendulum, cancel each other out effecting a period of overall equilibrium to the system involved. Using all four models of acceleration, reversal, dampening and parallel coupling to our list of analogical procedures we might like to construct the following methods for the realization of the suspensional moment in our own reflections, being approached in either an informal pre-phenomenological manner or a formal phenomenological manner in this regard.
	Through thematic thematization, and its various processes and levels of essential reduction, we might like to accelerate our attention to the thematized nature of the specific or general nature of our investigation in order to provoke an element of reversal in the nature of our interest. 
	Then, once we have mapped the essential nature of our research we might like to neutralize the same through the application of the opposite flavour to that entertained in our essential investigations. So if we are more concerned with a perceptual state of affairs then let us neutralize the same with an emphasis now on its cognitive conceptualized treatment.
	Using our model of dampening we might like to more keep our emphasis on the process of the interaction between the essential flavour of our research and the overall medium in which this (level of) differentiation can occur. By more closely centering our attention on the matrix in which we can differentiate and recognize the essential flavour of our investigations we more naturally allow the mind to keep its attention on this natural inherent underlying state of equilibrium.
	Lastly, by the deliberate addition in a dialectical paralleling of that which opposes and neutralizes the essential flavour of our research we allow ourselves to approach an area of concentration that has all the hallmarks of a natural state of suspension wherein for the duration of that period of time we can maintain the continual re-constitution of that under investigation.
	By these means the mind might allow itself the luxury of believing it can set up the pre-conditions for an act of suspension on the transcendental level of psychological functioning? Somehow the mind, amid its sea of chaotic fluctuation, in continual acts of suspension, is doing this all the time and our recognition of this state of affairs in a state of reflection might allow us to progress further in our ambitions to actually initiate a state of dynamic equilibrium along these lines?
	By ensuring those pre-conditions, and the relative removal of those counter-pre-conditions, that increase our overall sense of gestalt integration we should find such a skill is naturally advanced, more as a matter of reflex, etc. To this end the promotion of gestalt integration is effected through ensuring that all relatively lower levels in the enstructuring of the psyche are effectively in a relaxed state of ongoing dynamic equilibrium. Affective balance necessitates a relaxed state of interrelationship and the removal of sudden influxes of stimili. Cognitive balance necessitates a one-pointedness in our concentration. Both affective and cognitive equilibrium are reinforced when the disinterested interest of our reflection is matched, without effort once initiated, by a process of interested disinterest. No doubt when our investigations discover a territory of concern that yields a greater degree of existential rapport than that initially invested that we can then look forward to a period of self-sustaining equilibrium. With the same type of feeling that we find in our receptiveness towards good art can we start to relax in this affair and realize the value generated in our ongoing reflections upon this re-constituted territory of essential being. The greatest degree of primary value generated realizing a greater intensity of value in that field of associated primary value. So in this regard paintings, e.g., realize aesthetic value, friendships, e.g., realize ethical value, etc.
	At this point in this paper let me make the following digression in order to discuss, and interrelate, the topics of translational motion, the transformation of potential energy into kinetic energy and v.v and deliberate acts of decision making.

Translational Motion Versus Non-Translational Motion

	One of the pre-occupation of the Enlightenment was with the scientific subject of motion. In an inspection of the natural world two sorts of motion were observed, namely, translational motion and non-translational motion. In regards to the former it was noticed that objects translated their motion to other objects when involved in a collision or a series of collisions. With respect to the latter they noticed that objects seemingly initiated motion, or changed their speed, acceleration or direction without an apparent translation of motion or influence in the first place from some other object. It was noticed that among the latter could be subsumed the motor behaviour of people. Someone suddenly changes direction, stops or starts after being stationary, all seemingly at will. Effectively the will of the person concerned appears to place itself above the mechanical laws of an apparently fully determined nature. 
	An apparent resolution of this problem presents itself in the distinction made between potential and kinetic energy and the transformation of one into the other. However this retranslation of the problem appears to leave a residual doubt in the form of how an act of decision making is entered into. If a new action x by a person p necessitates a decision d to do x then how is this decision to be arrived at? If a decision d is put into action what decides that this decision should be put into effect? If we were to invoke a a decision dd (double d) in order to activate decision d might this in turn necessitate a decision ddd (triple d) in order to activate decision dd... with an infinite regress as a result that would on the surface paralyze all decision making? 
	One solution to such a problem might be to claim that an intentional action might need a decision being made on its behalf but as the decision itself is not an action it  therefore is in no need of such an arrangement as a cause, or at least a physical cause? Indeed, an unconditioned state of affairs could be tentatively invoked. If all causes are caused then the first cause must be itself the cause of itself. If all decisions are un-caused then decision making is an act of the unconditioned. However, a residual element of doubt and suspicion may well remain? Amid the chaos of conflicting interests and levels of interest in the mind the problem remains how such an assembly of disparate forces could cooperate and be mechanically productive in its vicarious and variable passage through this world - all seemingly enacted with reasonable deliberateness by and on our behalf?
	The thought had occurred to me, in the writing of this paper, as a model or analogy to work with, that if motion was translated within the confines of a circle, perhaps a perfect circle, with no lose of energy due to friction, drag, etc., then the model of translational motion could be made to re-apply. Moreover, as the present moment could be seen to consist of three dialectical moments or phases our three circles of the pre-phenomenological, phenomenological and the existential could be similarly constructed. 
	As a refinement we could double or replicate the metaphorical being of this circle and pulse the energy on its translational circuits equally in two direction. Depending where our two opposite travelling pulses coincide we could cause it to present itself with six primary forms of energy states and three pure forms of maximum wave reinforcement. Maximum wave reinforcement promoting present-time activity at the suspensional node, retrospective-retroactivity being promoted at the reductive node and prospective-synthetic activity being promoted at the (re-)constitutional node. As things would stand in this model the total energy could be considered as zero so that in a sense creation is the creating of nothing from nothing. Moreover, a model for decision making could be elabourated through the manner these circulating pulses are pitched in speed and/or phased. If all motor action and responses of the human repertoire are matched with their exact and equal opposites we might wonder how a specific motor pattern or engram could be decided upon in its dis-inhibition without activating the opposing motor response or paralyzing the former.
	Then the picture could be further refined to include interacting circles of a tri-partite structure (as witnessed e.g. in the generation of our six primary forms of value, from transcendental form, as mentioned in this paper). It is interesting to note in this regard colour perception, quark models, the structure of the basic atom (protons, neutron and electrons) all seem to mimic this tripartite structuralization. Moreover, as insisted upon all apparent bi-polar phenomena must also be treated in a tri-polar translation. Coupled with string theory and bootstrap models
we find ourselves presented with an elegance in retrospective foundational fictions in the enstructuralization of our world of life or life-world at all levels in our philosophic appreciation.
	Now let me end this digression by bringing the point of this exercise to the fore. In perceiving present-time and present-time-consciousness as circular in the confines of the moment, and assuming time to be a series of relatively discreet moments, then we can ask ourselves what possible consequences this type of model might have for our theoretical and practical understanding of the practicalization of value?

On the Momentary Nature of Value Creation, etc.

	As our perception of micro-temporal duration is limited by the very limitations imposed upon our consciousness, and the very nature of our interaction in this world, it follows that in essence time must be in effect be momentary in its construction and reception by mind. I.e. the very limitations of the process of appreciation impose this effective or virtual discreteness on the continuum of that process or state of consciousness whether visible or invisible to its self-appreciation or apperception. It follows that as the moment cannot be further reduced in temporal consciousness that all laws can in effect be broken as long as before the initiation of the next moment all infractions or infringements in that moment are undone before the initiation of the next. 
	Moreover, work in this paper is suggestive of the experiential fact that present time consciousness is entered, if only metaphorically, though an act of suspension. It was further argued that suspension was characterized by, and induced to re-occur, through a state of profound ongoing dynamic equilibrium. The consequences of these positions and their theoretical integration having the following consequences and implications for our phenomenological and non-phenomenological appreciation.
	Balance is always interactive, moving either towards or away from a state of apparent equilibrium. That through various stratagems appropriate to the situation to hand the individual person can put in place a state of productive equilibrium or at least establish the pre-conditions for the same although, correctly, the emergence of a hierarchically structured consciousness implies that this fact of equilibrium is already  well represented to some degree or other beneath the current level of maximum conscious engagement. This maximum level of engagement establishing the external semblance of intention.
	Equilibrium is probably best induced by removing those features that prevent the same rather than an instantiation of those factors that would ensure that state if it were at all possible for us to do that.
	Equilibrium is profound in the sense that all levels, and interaction between levels, must enter a state of ongoing equilibrium in order for the emergence of that desired state of affairs. Otherwise our desired procedures must collapse through a lack of balanced dialectical interaction necessary for the initiation, thematization and adequate realization of the same.
	An implication for the on-going practical realization of value is that as it is created in and on a momentary basis it follows that value is value only through its continuous continual re-creation or re-constitution and that all processes of value creation, recognition, evaluation and transformation must take this into account. Without an existentialization of our conscious being, and by implication, our total psychic environment must find an equal involvement in this process of practical value creation (and recreation), we cannot nor could not enter into a process of value realization.
	As a consequence of this environmental involvement it should be realized that all agental interaction is also to be treated on the same par as our relatively internal psychic environment. That in effect we are to each person an extention of them and that they be the same to us in this regard, however, with this limitation that this perspective takes place from our own particular point of view. Only through an openness therefore to this openness of being, this clearing of being beyond the subjective, intersubjective and objective, can value be realized in this life-world, this world of dasein.
	But this world is always a world-of-value-for-us! We are always presented with some degree of value whatever the degree of inauthenticity or authenticity may be present. As value in some form is ever present in this stream of consciousness the task of an authentic existence in this world is to transform this value into an existential stream of meaning and meaningfulness not only for ourselves but also for others. Our concept of the existential circle could be of usefulness to us in the light of this predicament and suggests its extension through and intersubjective-existential circle. Through an enlarging of the retrospective-reductive boundaries and the prospective-reconstitutional boundaries, and entered through the moment of general suspension, all value can be induced to flow when the very conditions discussed in this paper are practicalized, put into effect in some manner or other. No doubt this is a learning process and our existential skills need to be brought to our attention, if not more so, that all the other skills the world has on offer for us to develop should we be willing to humble ourselves and learn.
	As a final point to make it might appear obvious by now that the very conditions that ensure the initiation and performance of the transcendental suspension are the same conditions that ensure our entry into a meaningful world of existential value. Moreover, as the transcendental suspension, considered in a psychological mode, is structured pre-logically, logically (both analytically and synthetically) and trans-logically, an absoluteness of situational value is presented to us and that this value is realized through those processes of reduction and reconstitution that develop the fruitfulness of our suspensions. In a sense when we give up all direct egotistical intervention in our processes of judgment, in the very second that we can do this selfless act of value-suspension, the discernment of value spontaneously presents itself to us with all the richness of retrospective appreciation of the situation to hand and with a full prospective appropriateness of the activity, or more correctly, non-activity, necessary to be performed forthwith. Such a paradox that in giving up all forms of judgment we find ourselves in a process of judgment whose clarity and distinctness, whose appreciation and appropriateness can never be equaled under those current conditions of the present circumstances to hand. Let us cease to judge lest we find ourselves unable to judge! Through such an openness to value let us enter this world of life that in truth has never really left us that therein we may discover a world of existential meaning and meaningfulness ever-present to the serendipity of our ongoing discovery of ourselves-as-persons-in-this-one-world-of-life, in this living presence of a world of value, this world that moment by moment remains our true home in this world!

						Noël Tointon,
						Sydney and Leura, 24/6/90.

Appendix I - Various Tripartite Circles

1. The Pre-phenomenological Circle or Judgmental Cicle

				Suspension	

		Reduction			Constitution

2. The Phenomenological Circle

				Suspension

		Reduction			Re-constitution

3. The Existential Cicle

				Suspension

	Retrospective-Reduction  Prospective-Constitution

4. The Intersubjective-Existential Circle

				Suspension

Intersubjective-Retrospectivity
					Intersubjective-Prospectivity