The Presuppositions of a Contemporary Psychology - Introduction

	This paper has its origins in the footnotes to a text with the same title and has been written as an introduction to the same. In order to give my research in this field of psychology (the psychological appreciation of phenomena) a broad overview I will limit myself to five linked monographs on the following topics of  “Intentionality,” “Gestalt Fields,” “A Topography Of  Mental Illness”, “Authenticity” and “Simulation.”

	To make my five topics more palatable, at least to begin with, I will introduce each one with the device of a brief story with its embedded metaphor as a point of visual introduction, with a certain moral or set of morals to be drawn in the wake of its exposition.

1.   Intentionality

	On a low sand dune I can see someone in the far distance walking along the edge of the surf. Behind me I can see the red and brown sweep  the desert landscape reaching back to the horizon with undulations no higher than those of the blue and white waves in front of me. In between I can feel this shimmering silvery thread of the tide-line upon which another mortal hovers in a delicate and dangerous balance with the fierce forces of nature barking unleashed upon these sunburnt shores...

	Intentionality is like that person walking along the shore. Intentionality is the intending towards an object, the intentional object. That person has made a decision to walk in this direction towards that point on the landscape. Without the deliberations of that decision being made they might as well be paralysed in a state of total inaction. The moving of one foot after the other in a certain direction must be deliberately intended in the apparent necessity of an intention adequately formed and adequately performed. 
	The by-products of acts of intentionality are texts.  ‘An excess of intentionality produces, and re-produces, texts!’ like those footprints left upon the sand, e.g.
	Along this ‘silvery thread of the tide-line’ can be found a set of footprints belonging to this person seen ‘in the far distance.’ This apparent intention to walk from a to b leaves itself imprinted upon the fabric of the world, among other things, as a set of footprints.
	Although a ‘text’ in a classical sense is language of some form traced out on the surface of the world in a certain manner I would like to extend the limits of that definition of a text to include ‘the imprinting of any intentional state of affairs, intended or unintended, upon the texture of the world.’ Thus, in accordance with this wider definition we must include texts like paintings, photographs, non-verbal forms of communication, buildings, footprints, fields, holes dug in the ground, etc., etc.
	It is from an excess of intentionality that activity of textual deposition can issue forth. This excess in being directed gives that act of intentionality its apparent intensity, and its apparent ability to impress itself upon the texture of the world. Moreover, the deposition of a text is always multi-modal, i.e., in a series of parallel texts; those texts being deposited both concurrently and prospectively in an approximate accordance with the intensity and the quality of the formation of that intentional act. Let me illustrate this multi-modal productivity of the intentional act.
	The person wandering along the beach leaves a set of footprints, may be a scattering of debris or other matter like pieces of food, drink containers, drops of sweat, a trail of scent that could be detected by a dog, etc. The soles of his shoes, or feet, are worn down. A microscopic dusting of clothing lint is invisibly floating upon the breeze. Perhaps a landscape painter notices this passing soul and decides to put them into their painting at that very instant or some months down the track. Perhaps a photographer is present. Or a poet or short story writer remembering just that moment and re-producing it in a more classical text. Then that walker themselves has memories of just that stroll along the beach, just as myself, the observer also has similar traces laid down in their labyrinthine halls of the memories of times past. In an excess of intentionality many texts in parallel are laid down and deposited intentionally and unintentionally, concurrently and prospectively!
	We notice this individual leaving a trail of footprints. The footprints can be seen and can be looked at closely. This trail of imprints is a text. But, surely, this individual too as seen walking in front of us is just as much a text in its own right. Is there any real ontological difference between ‘that trail of footprints’ and ‘that person leaving behind them that trail of footprints as seen by us?’ Surely it is my intention to interpret what I am seeing, be that a set of footprints,  that figure walking along the beach, that same figure making a trail of footprints along the beach, etc.
	For an intentional act to be noticeably imprinted it must be adequately formed and adequately performed. Imagine the sun is beating down on that person and they are starting to suffer from sunstroke. Their intentionality starts to waver and in turn this is reflected in this trail of footprints; assuming we understand why that trail is no more following a straight line. No longer is there the same excess of intentional deliberation and perseverance in the form of the ongoing preservation of that intention in the ongoing re-production of that overall intentional act. They loose consciousness and the intention for the moment is lost, and all textual deposition likewise appears to cease.
	Suppose our hapless traveller revives and feeling very thirsty decides he must find water, and find water very soon. Unfortunately his consciousness is cloudy and mistakes the shimmering mirage of water in the distance desert for fresh water, wandering off into that desert on this mistaken quest. There is an intention, an intention directed towards this shimmering mirage in the mistaken belief that it is water. In a like fashion the intentional object need not exist for the intender to have an intentional act directed towards this non-existent entity. Note, however, that the act of seeing the mirage as a promise of water is not non-existent for that person who sees it and believes it to be real. The mirage is an intersubjective phenomenon that may be or may be not mis-interpreted and to that extent certainly has an existence for the perceiver of that mirage. As a phenomenon of perception the mirage is just as much a simulation as the perception of real water. However, in our engagement with ‘real water’ there is a greater richness of overall modal interaction, one of these modalities being the ability to truly relieve our thirst, etc. Our intentional activity finds itself reflected in the resolution of our choice and choices, effectively, through the resolute suppression of all other choices. But, let us note that an intentional act cannot be absolute in its intentional expression, only adequate or inadequate in the formation and performance of that intention. The intention is formed, the intention is performed, in effect the intention is simulated. Our awareness of this intention implies that there can be no absolute formation and performance of it by virtue of the fact that in our consciousness of this act, for it to be ‘intended’ in the first place, it is necessary that the intentional act  itself be in turn an intentional object, that our attention cannot be absolutely directed towards that intentional object pure and simply. Consciousness necessitates that in parallel, correlative acts of reflection intentional acts can also be treated as intentional objects, and vice versa.

	Thus to sum up we can make the following points in regards to this discussion just had on the topic of intentionality:

1.	Intentionality is an intending towards an intentional object.
2.	The intentional object need not exist.
3.	The intensity of that intentional act is dependent upon its excess of deliberation and the clarity of the direction of its intending.
4.	From an excess of intentional activity we get a deposition of textuality.
5.	That textual deposition is multi-modal, concurrently and prospectively.
6.	That the satisfaction of our intentional act is realised when the necessary modal richness of that intentional object is adequately met.
7.	That intentional deliberation is reflected in the resolute suppression of all other choices.
8.	That an intention cannot be absolutely definitive in its intention, only adequate or inadequate in its formation and performance.

2.   Gestalt Fields

	Imagine we are at the pictures, its a packed house and we are watching the latest production of a famous science fiction producer. In front of us we have the screen, what is seen on the screen. Behind us is the projector and beside us is the rest of the audience...

	Intentionality does not occur in a vacuum. There is the intentional object, its context of an intentional field, the sense of an intender or intentional perceiver. Moreover this sense of an intentional ego appears to co-exist in a world of life in the company of other egos in a host of overlapping interrelationships. The formulation of an adequate intentional philosophy, in the light of this complex pattern of  mutual correlative reciprocity, must recognise the implication of its involvement in a gestalt field, indeed, in a set of gestalt fields in order to adequately account for the interaction of these various facets.
	In this theatre we would not want to sit too close to the screen. On the other hand we would not want to be too far from it either. Here a happy medium is called for. During the course of the screening we come face to face with the intentional object intended to be that focus of attention during that part of the film. Each scene is set in a certain context and it is the skill of the director, producer and editor, etc., to help us notice and interpret where each scene is effectively set, etc.
	In a similar fashion the intentional object is set in an intentional field. The intentional object gains its meaning by the contrast that is mutually set up between it and its field of involvement. Between these two facets of the field a state of mutual correlativity and reciprocity is set up. The object of interest under focus being the effective intentional object and that is defined as being both like and not like that field of context. The object in the foreground is seen as not in the background, and vice versa. But at the same time that field of interaction between foreground and background is seen as a certain type of field, e.g., a visual field, or a conceptual field, a field of memory, etc. 
	Because the intentional object cannot be seen just as an intentional object with out the involvement of an appropriate intentional field, and vice versa, it implies that correctly these facets are polar, i.e., as  polarities that cannot be entertained separately in their own right. As a consequence we must ask ourselves ‘could the intentional object ever be reached if as a polarity it could never be reached both theoretically and practically?’
	We know some intentional objects can never be met. We can describe Father Xmas to children who may or may not know such an entity does not exist. But as adult we all know that this person is an imaginary person. As an intentional object we can account for the fact that we can describe him. But how do we account for our meeting with an intentional object that can be met when the intentional object as a polarity could never be realised and, therein, met? I will try to resolve this issue in the last monograph of this paper titled “Simulation.”
	Also implicated in this process of mutual correlativity between the intentional object and the intentional field must be the involvement of an intentional perceiver. As a polar relationship similar considerations must be in play. This sense of self is mutually defined in and through its relationships with the polarity of the intentional object and the polarity of the intentional field, namely, in effect, as that which is equally ‘not-an-intentional-field’ and ‘not-an-intentional-object.’ This ‘sense’ of self being as an ‘intentional’ sense of self.
	In this light how do we account for our meeting with an intentional sense of self when as a polar fiction it could never be met with. Suffice to say, for the moment, that as a fiction, as a ‘simulation,’ this sense of self is met with by ourselves, and, through this simulated ‘sense of self’ the ‘sense’ of ‘the other’ is also simulated, and vice versa. 
	Hence in our analogy of the film screening we would be forced to consider not only the screening of the film to be like an illusion but also ourselves, the screen upon which this world is seen, the projector and the audience. And if everything is as a simulation, or illusion, how then could we account for the fact that the audience can eat popcorn in a box if held in their hand but the popcorn advertised on the screen could not be approached and eaten? Well, we must be patient as, all shall be revealed, as intimated, at the end of this paper.
	Like the Husserlian noetic-noematic correlation a similar set of processes can be invoked between these three polar parties of the intentional ‘object’, the intentional ‘context’ or ‘world’ and the corresponding sense of ‘intentional self’ or ‘ego’. The same type of intentional interrelationship can also be invoked between other ‘intentional senses of self’ or ‘egos’. That the relational space between all four polar parties in effect constitutes a world of life, namely, in transcendental terms of reference, the ‘world-of-life, or, ‘the life-world.’
	Now let me look more closely at the nature of the interaction that appears to occur between these various intentional polarities.
	I propose that between the senses of ‘ego’, ‘object’ and ‘world’ we have in effect a ‘hermeneutic circle’ around which texts are thematised and deposited, re-thematised and re-deposited, etc. Concentration of our attention upon the object in effect constitutes a form of analysis with its emphasis upon ‘parts’. Conversely our attention directed towards the sense of the background field, or ‘world,’ delivers an interest upon the synthetic, the sense of the ‘whole’. Our interest upon our own sense of ego-involvement in that-to-hand allowing us to enter this chicken-and-egg like situation without the need to obviate and circumvent an infinite regress. The resonance between these three polarities in effect simulating a field of meaning, and our further reflections upon this field of meaning allowing us to experience it as a field of ‘meaningfulness’.
	This hermeneutic circle not only operates between the parts of a text and the totality of that text but also between that text and the general field of  other texts as a meta-textual field wherein from the synthetic, contextual, hermeneutic point of view we can determine considerations of meaning, meaningfulness, form, genre, definitions, meta-textual instructions and points of commentary inserted in that text, the successfulness or otherwise of translations, etc., etc. That no text, classical or non-classical in aspiration, in deposition could be formulated and appreciated without due deference to this field of the meta-textual. This polarity of the meta-textual, coincident with this sense of the contextual field, or ‘world’ implies the necessary existence of a hermeneutical element in our appreciation within this-world-of-life. On the other hand the polarity of the ‘object’, as a ‘text’, implies in our critical involvement with this polar facet, the orientation of the phenomenological with its emphasis upon the description of the essential, etc. This phenomenological emphasis in our research being conducted through the use of ‘metaphor,’ whereas, on the other hand, our hermeneutical research is in effect primarily ‘rhetorical’ in interest in the sense of how the metaphorical constitution of the text is being manipulated, etc.
	
	To sum up let me note the following points:

1.	There is a mutuality of definition realised in the reading of a text through the correlative reciprocity developed between these polar fictions of the object(s), world(s) and ego(s).
2.	There can be no absolute demarcation between the polar constituents of an intentional field.
3.	The intentional object under these terms of reference can never be absolutely realised.
4.	In a similar fashion world, worlds, ego and other egos can never be absolutely realised.
5.	The space between these polarities constitutes ‘a’ life-world,’ and whose transcendental possibility 	is constituted by ‘the’ life-world.
6.	The overall relationship between these polarities, in effect, constitutes a hermeneutic circle.
7.	Phenomenological research concentrating on the metaphorical constitution of the object-polarity.
8.	Hermeneutical research concentrating on the rhetorical dimension of the world-polarity.

3.   A Topology of Mental Illness

	In many ways the mind appears to be structured like a skyscraper with many levels, and rooms therein, with their associated functions all maintaining some degree of virtual autonomy within the overall framework of this ‘constructed totality.’ However, in illness of some form or other, this degree of autonomy appears to break down is much the same way like that of a tightrope walker who is able to ride a unicycle, juggle a few balls, play a mouth organ and hoot a horn under each armpit all at the same time whilst, in the process, starting to loose their balance. Should they loose their balance a little they might only drop one of those objects. Loose their balance a bit more they might loose all those objects while they are tightrope walking. Loose their balance even more and they indeed might well fall off that rope itself. Should they be about to launch themselves over the Niagara Falls and fall off before starting to cross the actual chasm they may well be able to get back onto that rope and start over again, much like a person recovering from sleep (le petit mort). On the other hand to loose their balance completely once over those falls may well spell the end of such a comic-tragic act much like death itself when it visits each and everyone of us!?

	The point of this simile is that in illness we have an autonomous location within the embodied psyche where that particular type of  illness is situated or appears to be situated. However, if that illness is severe the effects of that illness start to radiate beyond that semi-autonomous region of that embodied psyche to effect other regions of the psychic-embodiment and ultimately our entire sense of psychic well-being. Hence in a topology of  illness in general, and in mental illness in particular, we should note the primary location of an illness, then, if any, its secondary spheres of influence, and, finally, how the whole psychic sense of embodiment is effected and disrupted by that particular disease (through this tertiary sense of dis-ease).
	In this light I would like to briefly propose the following provisional schema in relation to a topology of mental illness:

1.	Neuroses:	a.   Functional: Maladjusted behaviour, phobias, etc.
			b.   Structural:	Anorexia, obsessive-compulsive disorders, some 								forms of panic attacks, etc.

2.	Psychoses:	a.   Organic:	Physiological, e.g., brain tumours, dementias, 								intoxication, poisoning, dt’s, etc.
			b.   Affective:	Agitated Depression/Agitation, Depression, Mania.
			c.   Cognitive:	Catatonia, Paranoia, Hebephrenia.
			d.   Judgmental: Sociopathy: Political, Object and Passive types.

	Our Affective, Cognitive and Judgmental forms of psychosis mapping disturbances in polar gestalt function along the following lines:

Ego

Archetypal Configuration of the Gestalt Field

Object						World

Political Sociopathy

Judgmental Disturbance

Object Sociopathy					Passive Sociopathy

Catatonia

Cognitive Disturbance

Paranoia					Hebephrenia

Agitated Depression

Affective Disturbance

Depression					Mania

	A ‘neurosis’ is ‘a psychologically expressed illness with a complete, integrated insight into both the existence of that condition and the nature of its manifestation,’ whilst a ‘psychosis’ is ‘a psychologically expressed illness with a fragmented, diminished degree of insight into both the existence of that condition and the nature of its manifestation.’ A ‘functional neurosis’ is essentially ‘a maladjusted process of learning that can be undone with appropriate forms of re-learning.’ On the other hand ‘structural neuroses’ can be more severe than functional neuroses and involve ‘a physiological malfunctioning.’

	‘Organic psychoses’ are ‘physiological malfunctions that affect the sensory-motor levels of the psyche and/or all higher organisational structures built thereupon.’

	I would like now to concentrate on the three forms of psychoses titled Affective, Cognitive and Judgmental, namely, psychotic disorders of mood; forms of schizophrenia; and forms of psychopathy more often dealt with under the headings sociopathy, personality disorders, etc.
	In a tripartite psychology of the Affective, the Cognitive and the Judgmental these three levels of pyschic organisation are to be seen as being superimposed upon each other in that order starting with the Affective which itself is superimposed semi-autonomously upon the Sensory-Motor level of our psyche, etc. The Affective concerns itself with focalised impressions, e.g., pain, and a global sense of mood. The Cognitive imposition deals with perceptions and their correlative conceptions. The Judgmental concerning itself with acts of judgmental discrimination primarily located in six fields of judgment, namely, the Essential, the Aesthetical, the Ethical, the Pragmatical, the Hermeneutical, and the Factual. These details, and other aspects of the psyche, will not be discussed any further in this paper. What I would like to discuss instead is how a dysfunction at the poles of our tri-polar gestalt fields can be invoked to explain and qualify our three sets of psychoses as charted, namely, Agitated Depression/Agitation, Depression, Mania, etc. Let me briefly outline this position.
	Out three poles archetypally correspond to an orientation towards Ego(s), Object(s) and World(s). Possible forms of dysfunction can only take the form of a relative exaggeration of function, or dysfunction, at or near one of these poles, two of these poles or all three of these poles.
	Without giving reasons, from a lack of time, let me just state that a dysfunction at the Ego-pole, or some such relative exaggeration of activity, on the Affective level of the psyche results, it would appear, in a state of agitation or agitated depression. Similarly a dysfunction at the World-pole results in a state of mania. While at the Object-pole dysfunction seems to realise a state of depression (without agitation). Dysfunctions at two of those poles producing hybrid states of disorder.
	On the Cognitive level I believe schizophrenic phenomena of a catatonic, hebephrenic or a paranoid character can be mapped upon dysfunctions of the Ego, World and Object poles respectively.
	On the Judgmental level it is my belief that we can map what I call political sociopathy, passive sociopathy and object sociopathy respectively on the poles of the Ego, World and Object. Extreme dysfunction of the same realizing a criminal sociopathy, or psychopathy.
	In a political sociopathy there is an enjoyment in manipulating processes effecting others, hence the title. There appear to be long term ambitions of a political nature but effectively there is only an emphasis on the current manipulation of others (often masquerading behind bona fide political objectives and methods).
	In a passive sociopathy the person takes an inauthentic pleasure and sense of self-value in their desire to be manipulated by others.
	In an object sociopathy people manipulate situations and other people for the sole purpose of an instant gratification through the acquisition of objects desired as pleasurable.
	Let me make the following observations. First, psychotic phenomena are rarely clear cut in typology. Schizophrenia, in its more manifest phases, is often accompanied by an affective agitation which, with medication, often transforms itself into an accompanying state of depression; a fatal combination in someone whose insight into their illness is in the process of returning without the semblance of a complete remission and without adequate community-based support structures. What is important here is to make up to date observations of a primary, secondary (and tertiary) nature in order to prioritise the treatment program and adopt appropriate modifications therein. 
	Second, disruption of a circadian rhythm seems to be involved and in a manner proportional to the severity of the psychotic illness. So in a depressed person we often see the events normal to one day spread over the space of two or three. E.g, sleeping badly one night and sleeping better the next, eating meals one day and not eating the next, etc. 
	Penultimately, I would like to note that I have had reservations about the concept of the neurotic, discounting much of the Freudian world-view. It is possible, however, that it involves an inversed circadian rhythm disturbance to that as found in psychotic disorders. E.g, the person wanting six meals a day instead of three, wanting to sleep twice a day, etc. In other words the space of two or three days, etc., is spread over the extent of one day (?). Overall there appears to be here an element of mere repetition and this observation will be remarked upon in the next section of this paper.
	Lastly, it should appear obvious that health is maintained in a state of equilibrium, a state of chaotic equilibrium that engages the full range of mechanisms already in place for the ongoing adaptation and restoration of our sense of well-being. That the person is usually aware, on self-reflection, of this sense of embodied atunement and can report directly or indirectly on the extent this sense of psychic integration is present, is absent or has returned. Indeed, doctors on starting an interview with a patient often ask just such a question if such information has not already been volunteered by the patient. Moreover, such a question is often rhetorically asked when people who know each other re-meet (different cultures distinctively dictating how we should reply to such a question).

	To sum up let me note the following points:

1.	A topology of mental illness, as outlined, appears to be a fruitful possibility for investigation.
2.	Such a topology being grounded in a succession of gestalt fields.
3.	Dysfunctions in polar activity in those gestalt fields accounting for phenomenologically distinct variations in psychotic phenomena.
4.	Such dysfunctions being uni-polar, bi-polar and tri-polar in orientation.
5.	Our observations noting primary, secondary and tertiary forms of dysfunction in this typology.
6.	Priority in treatment and care being given to primary dysfunction, then secondary dysfunction, etc.
7.	Severity of illness is usually matched in the severity of circadian dys-rhythms as noted.
8.	That a state of health is essentially maintained in a state of chaotic equilibrium and is duly noted in self-reflection and in reports that directly or indirectly allude to the same.

4.   Authenticity

	Most of us have some idea what being authentic means in our day to day lives. Essentially it is our operating in good faith with ourselves and with one another. That said could ‘authenticity’ be expressed in words? Being a fundamental state of affairs, a fact of existence for most people, can it really be put into words, need it be put into words? How could we describe what it is like to see to a blind person? Perhaps through the use of analogies, or a discussion that tells the blind person what it is not, we might be able to attempt this seemingly impossible task? Given such difficulties let me attempt the following analogy.
	A child is hungry. We know this child likes apples and we proffer a delicious red one. Spontaneously the child is a picture of happiness, the child is authentically happy, and without doubt that person who gave the apple finds some happiness too in the happiness of that child. 
	Do we not have here a model for what it means to be authentic - the spontaneous, full-flowing harmony between means and ends, between our inner world and our outer world of expression as we stand before our selves and, if present, the presence of the other?

	Most of us know the difference between being authentic and not being authentic, it is just that we overlook that difference most of the time. This difference being essentially between a ‘looking over’ and an ‘overlooking.’
	The child likes apples. That child likes that apple. Here there was no simulation of happiness, no dissimulation. What you see is what you get, or rather, what you see is what you have, nothing more and nothing less.
	‘Authenticity’ is an important concept in psychology because it is not only an indicator of psychic health but, in my opinion, is also a means whereby the person can rediscover some form of restoration, in the process re-discovering an existential sense of self-value, a sense of positive self-worth. Often, in people with a mental illness, and in people without a mental illness too, I have seen all too visibly the evidence of a desperate search for some sense of positive self-worth, a sense of self-value that allows the fullness of the individual to shine forth as if without effort. Instead we find the shattered remains of projects that sought such an authenticity in self-re-evaluation through a non-existential transformation of the inauthentic. Let me elaborate in some detail on this concept of ‘the existential transformation of the relatively inauthentic.’
	The ‘experience of authenticity’ appears to me to be experienced as ‘the realisation of an intense feeling of harmony wherein all aspects of the psyche are felt to be in a full conformity with the situation to hand from the perspective of that relationship itself.’ To sketch out how I think this type of atunement is realised let me explore further this idea of the hermeneutic circle as incorporated in a gestalt field as mention earlier in this paper.
	The hermeneutic circle being, in metaphorical terms of reference, a circle we have two ways to travel around its circumference. From an object focus on parts to a global interest on wholes at the World pole, and vice versa. Now if these two pathway directions find themselves in a state of conformity, have at their core a sufficient degree of isomorphic invariance, we are given to feel that we might actually have an appropriate and proper understanding of that under reflection between these poles of analytic and synthetic styles of investigation; styles as noted previously as ‘phenomenologically’ and ‘hermeneutically’ oriented respectively. An authentically oriented experience realising this degree of conformity not only on a cognitive level of awareness but also on affective and judgmental levels of awareness, moreover, this conformity is also experienced as existing between these three levels of the Affective, the Cognitive and the Judgmental. In effect we also have a vertical hermeneutic circle between these levels of psychic organisation where harmonious states of authenticity are not only ‘felt’ but ‘thought’ and ‘realised.’
	This analysed intuition accepted it implies that the Affective also parallels the World-pole or mode, the Cognitive parallels the Object-pole or mode and the Judgmental parallels the Ego-pole or mode. These three modes also have their own distinctive sense of time, namely, respectively, a future orientation, a past orientation and a present orientation. The existential meeting of all three in a harmonic state of authenticity realising ‘an existential sense of time,’ namely, a sense of ‘the ongoing present’ in distinction to an historical sense of the present as the junction between a past past and a yet to be realised future.
	These poles of the World, Object and Ego can also be analysed along the lines of the three moments that constitute the experience of that which is harmonic, has harmony, along with the three distinctive types of repetition that collectively constitute those experiential instances of  authenticity.
	In music there is the formula that ‘harmony involves preparation, dissonance and resolution.’ I interpret preparation as involving the creation of a background of conformity that is experienced as a state of consonance. This is easily achieved through processes of ‘mere repetition,’ repetition of what is experienced as relatively the same, e.g., a row of whole-tone notes. Now the introduction into this field of conformity of anything that is experienced as different is experienced automatically as dissonant. E.g., the introduction of a half-tone note. Dissonant structures are two-faced in that they must have some similarity with their background field of consonance but at the same time different enough to be experienced as dissonant. In the example given of ‘a row of notes’ whole-tone notes and half-tone notes are experienced as musical notes in a scale. On the other hand the introduction of a half-tone note is automatically experienced as different, as dissonant. And this tension set up between consonance and dissonance is relative. We could, if we wished, reverse the ratio between these notes and have individual whole-tone notes introduced into rows of half-tone notes. Then the whole-tone note would be experienced as relatively dissonant. Dissonant structures in effect being processes of repetition that are not in absolute conformity with that of mere conformity set up in the background field of consonance. Instead we have a veering away from mere conformity with the introduction of a sufficient degree of change for it to be noted as effectively dissonant. A repetitive processes of relative non-conformity that I call a process of ‘sheer repetition’ in recognition of the excitement generated by veering away from the mere conformity of the consonant. And how is a state of resolution realised? By virtue of the fact that the dissonant structure has features that are still in conformity with those found in the background field of mere conformity. By some operation that re-reveals those consonant roots the dissonant structure is harmonically reintegrated back into that overall field. In our example of the whole-tone notes and the relatively dissonant half-tone notes the imposition of scales, and our relative conformity to the same, allows us to re-integrate those dissonant half-tones. The skilful composer finding other devices to achieve the same type of effect.
	To reinforce those harmonic processes the author of a text repeats those same types of patterns of resolution. The appearance of intent being reinforced by the repetition of those patterns, or tropes, that get repeated. This type of repetition being called by myself  a process of ‘bare repetition’ in that the same formula in its bare essentials appears to be repeated. The superficial analysis of a ‘good’ poem, a poem that works well as a poem, should easily demonstrate those processes of bare repetition at work. Processes of bare repetition are with us everywhere. For example, the successful signage of a shop would most likely be found to semiotically reinforce the intent of the management by processes of bare repetition. This reminds me of the following anecdote about a business near where I live that recently folded up. In the window, and in the rest of the shop, were tables with various tea-pots, mugs, cups and saucers, various other containers filled with miscellaneous types of tea. The shop had very little signage. Nothing actually told you whether this shop was selling pieces of tea-equipment, a variety of teas, actual cups of tea with cakes for refreshment, or, all of the above. I found this shop uncomfortable to enter because one did not know what to expect of these premises and, I dare say, the general public would have felt the same way. The shop was always empty of people, potential customers that might have given you some clue as to the actual purpose of these premises. Needless to say I believe this lack of semiotic reinforcement was one of the main factors that contributed to the failure of this business.
	The musical formula for harmony as previously alluded to can now be rewritten in the following form: “preparation involving the creation of a consonant background is realised through processes of mere repetition. Dissonance is introduced through processes of sheer repetition, with a state of resolution being realised through processes of bare repetition that reintegrate those dissonant processes back into that background field of consonance. The author making their intent understood through processes of bare repetition wherein similar patterns of resolution are repeated.”
	Quite simple really! Unfortunately the plot thickens when we realise that each one of those three dialectical moments also involves a particular type of suspension. But rather than muddy these waters further let me say that when all three suspensions are entertained in a state of balance a transcendental suspension is truly put into full effect and that from its awesome embrace a state of authenticity is realised, a state of harmony that appears to spontaneously and appropriately flow from an effective appreciation of the situation to hand. That the re-instantiation of a such a process in effect existentially transforms the inauthentic, non-existential material, being worked with in the field of that relationship to hand. And that through such a process therapeutic consequences can be realised for the person regardless of their state of health. Hence the importance placed upon this section of my exposition.
	Lastly, I would like to note that it is my belief that neuroses, psychoses and disorders of personality (judgmental psychoses) are effectively disorders that involve defective states of suspension. 
	In a neurotic disorder the person is literally ‘trapped’ in a suspension that is centred on processes of mere repetition. In this regard neurotic patterns of behaviour, e.g., obsessive-compulsive behaviour, bulimia, anorexia nervosa, phobias, etc., are repetitive processes that don’t have introduced an element of relative variation. 
	On the other hand in a psychotic disorder the person is literally ‘trapped’ in a suspension that is centred on processes of too much change.
	Certain personality disorders leaving the person literally ‘trapped’ in a suspension centred on processes of bare repetition wherein childish patterns of response become pathologically habitual. 
	Suspensions, of whatever kind, are metaphorically left when they in turn become suspended. Moments of authenticity expressing our freedom in this regard from all forms of suspension individually and collectively.

	To sum up let me note the following points:

1.	In authenticity there is an appreciative ‘looking over’ of the inauthentic.
2.	Authenticity is the existential transformation of the relatively inauthentic.
3.	The degree of authenticity present reflects the relative health of the individual.
4.	The degree of authenticity present in our relationships reflects the health of those relationships.
5.	The degree of authenticity present is discovered in a comparative state of self-reflection.
6.	The harmony of authenticity is realised through appropriate forms and processes of preparation, dissonance and resolution.
7.	Metaphorically trapped in a certain type of suspension realises its own type of mental 	disturbance.
8.	The transcendental suspension of the transcendental suspension gives us the realisation of our own existential freedom.

5.   Simulation

	Suppose in the dead of night whilst walking home you happen to find a large suitcase full of one hundred dollar bills what would you do? 
	This day dream of mine has prompted me to explore a number of possibilities in my imagination. Let us explore the following scenario.
	Suppose we think we would be right in believing that no one could possibly have seen us walking away with that suitcase and that we make a decision to keep and spend that money. What way would be the best way of going about this task?
	I have a lawyer friend and jokingly ask them what they would do if they had some excess drug money. His suggestion was that it should first be laundered and then placed in an overseas bank account. That a number of overseas banks and agents, for a commission of between 15-20%, would do just that. 
	These suggestions are put into practice. Then I place a large amount of this laundered money in a credit card and on the internet trade in stocks and shares on the overseas exchanges, in the process making for myself a huge fortune.
	I occasionally spend a little of that money telling friends that I won it in a lottery ticket bought overseas when I was on holiday. Winning enough to comfortably retire on.
	Just after having laundered all the money I find a letter in a compartment just under the lid of the suitcase. This letter states that this money was to be swapped for proceeds in smaller bills of the same amount as contained in this suitcase. The letter stated the money was all forged, that it was a very good forgery as yet undetected by the authorities with no notes having the same combinations. To prove the point that this money was forged the letter contained ten one hundred dollar bills all with the same serial numbers with a note attached stating that these were not to be circulated. 
	I later decide to send each one of these notes to a different charity through the mail thinking it a shame such ‘good money’ couldn’t be used for a good cause, or more correctly, ten good causes.

	What am I trying to say in this imaginary anecdote?
	For a start, even though the money was forged it functioned as if it were authentic. In a similar state of affairs the money was transformed into electronic figures in a bank account. Then some of it was transferred to a credit-card account to be transferred to some other account to pay for those share transactions. Not only was that money transformed into electronic binary dots and dashes, as luck and skill would have it, it was even multiplied manyfold. In effect money was being simulated throughout all those transactions.
	Even when I knew that money was forged I set about using it, albeit this time not on my behalf.
	That being the case we may well ask what need is there for real money in the form of physical bills, forged or unforged, when financial transactions can be made without this form of cash in hand? We may well answer for the sake of convenience. But we then might add that a suitcase of money, even using one hundred dollar bills, was not that much of a convenience for those drug-money launderers who lost their cargo of fake banknotes. Moreover, with a similar attitude to small change most shop keeper are just as horrified to have purchases made and paid for in bundles and bundles of notes. 
	In a similar fashion we may well ask what need is there for us in our adventures in our passage through this the world to consider all things met and experienced as either real or virtual. With the aftershocks of the savage postmodern dismantling of the representational theory of reality, and it’s associated modernistic attitudes, if all is simulated, constructed in consciousness what need do we have to consider some experiences as real and others as unreal when as simulations we should consider everything to be a simulation and nothing more. Certainly not as a simulation of a certain state of affairs that in itself is not being simulated, for what access do we have to determine that this state of affairs is as it is other than through its simulation as a simulation. Not having such access to verify this impossible state of affairs, that ‘a certain simulation is as it would be if it were not simulated,’ all such considerations and discussions thereupon must be dismissed as speculation and treated accordingly!
	The consequences of just such a critique, through various forms of postmodern criticism, are now starting to seep more vigorously into our cultural awareness with an increasing emphasis being placed on new attitudes and practices, in effect, marking out the advent of a Contemporary era. 
	But before I discuss the nature of this transition and its effects on our re-interpretation of psychological phenomena let me first outline how ‘reality’ is to be appreciated in this new perspective. Just how do we determine if a certain simulation is more real, or valid, than some other? Can we still use such a language? Surely in a dream if an apple were to be simulated what difference would their be between that ‘apple’ and an apple I could eat and with which I could successfully satisfy my hunger?
	To answer that question let me state that what should not be in dispute is the fact that those apples are all simulations. That understood this type of question is then asking ‘are all simulations the same.’ To paraphrase it we might say ‘all apples are equal but are some more equal than others.’
	With this phenomenological attitude to hand, we must now ask ourselves with what modalities are we engaged with when we deal with a particular apple presentation in comparison with some other apple presentation? Well, in vivid dreams all dream apples can all be seen, touched and tasted but even though a dream apple might seem to postpone our sensations of hunger, in our embodiment as a person in this world, this world-of-life, dream apple do not effectively remove those pangs of hunger in the long term, What else might we say, in the form of general observations, that would allow us to declare in our every day appreciation of the world something to appear more real than some other similar type of appearance?
	‘Real’ apples, those simulations that successfully satisfy our need for sustenance, are also usually seen as existentially richer in their manifestation as a simulation. Each modality is engaged with a greater degree of vividness, relatively more modalities are engaged and the horizon of those events when engaged also allow us to further enter that modality with a greater degree of exploratory fruitfulness, if I might be allowed to use that pun. Usually those modalities engaged can also be intersubjectively appreciated. Those more satisfactory simulations come with better life-histories, more often than not. We find those richer experiences as usually cohering more successfully in our overall appreciation of the world and find our general genre (meta-textual) expectations being met and matched. That such evidence for those more successful simulations stands up better in the courts of every day experience. That our interaction with those relatively more successful simulations in effect often need less work for us to successfully engage with them and more often deliver an excess of textuality. Lastly, just as our walking figure deposits more than a pair of tracks in the sand the presence the observation of parallel textual trails can also be used to reinforce the veracity of our interpretations leading us to believe some interpretations of certain simulations are more useful to us than others.
	Our prejudices, as pre-judgments, allow us to face that simulation to hand and recognise it as being of that type of simulation. However, it is only through a suspension of that prejudice that the simulation is allowed ‘to speak’ and therein reveal its constitution as laid down in consciousness from its point of view. Can there be other points of view if everything in intentional experience is a simulation constituted in our own consciousness and our own consciousness alone?
	If we were to thoroughly research phenomenologically the developing intentionality of a child as they grow up in this world-of-shared-experience we should realise that the child learns to see through other eyes in other to see through its own. Every intentional object entertained is entertained as a ‘text’, the thematizing of the object realising itself as a text. Now a text is always interpreted in terms of the conventions of its meta-textually oriented genre expectations and those expectations are  primarily pre-determined for us intersubjectively. The sense of the other can never disappear from our thoughts however much we may appropriate meta-textual genre expectations from others and then restamp them for our own use.
	Let me continue in this same vein. The hermeneutic circle as previously outlined not only involves this correlative passage between the thematization of ‘analysed’ texts and their matching the ‘synthetic’ totality of meta-textually oriented genres but also involves the introduction of a sense of self in this onward enriching circularity wherein the intentional object is thematized and ‘in effect’ read. This sense of self in turn is developed, thematized and read against this background of a correlative textual-metatextual interrelationship. And how is this sense of self experienced? In states of authenticity, quite rightly, as a ‘non-text,’ in the pure spontaneity of the present moment the sense of self is read through the reading of that textual-metatextual correlation. This act of self-reading is therein experienced as ‘non-textual,’ moreover, the suspension of all three facets of the textual, meta-textual, and non-textual realises the direct simulation of the ‘not-textual.’ I would argue that it is in this state of the ‘not-textual,’ the pure, open simulation of the text, that allows us to directly experience the simulation of reality and the reality of that simulation. The life-word is a one world metaphysics, therein all experience is had as if touched in one world albeit from its own point of view. Tables are then seen as tables with all the manifestations of tableness from what ever position seen in a set of possible points of view. The relationship we have with that table can also be seen from its own point of view through that relationship just as all our relationships with others are also relationships seen from their unique points of view too. An experience, when properly conducted, through the appropriate existential transformation of that simulated material, also allows us to read the ‘text of the other’ as a ‘person,’ as a person to some extent like ourselves. A reading that treats ourselves as ‘non-texts,’ allows us to read that sense of the other also in its existential non-textuality, realising therein the nature of that being engaged with as a person or what ever else it might be interpreted to be through the direct medium of that simulation (e.g., divine, inhuman, a computer, an image on a television screen, a portrait in a painting, etc.).
	In the-one-world-of-the-life-world there is only a world of simulation, nothing existent in and through itself. The simulation is only a simulation of a simulation, an interpreted ‘retention’ of a vision of reality. Nothing more and nothing less! When existentially engaged authentically in those phenomenological terms of reference we then deal directly with both the simulation of that reality and the reality of that simulation. What are the philosophical, psychological and cultural ramifications of such a position?
	The increasing emphasis being placed upon this sense of simulation has slowly infiltrated our vision of the world. Under a postmodern critique of modernity, and all contained therein from previous eras, and in a positive counter-response to its negative nihilism, the era of the Contemporary is starting to walk towards the center of the stage. With what apparel does this relatively new actor present themselves for all to see, in what role can we recognised this thespian interloper?
	Numerous, but not many, voices from the past have declaimed this role of the Contemporary vision usually without success, to be met with a variety of responses, from an air of non-concern or non-comprehension to outright hostility. To conclude this paper let me briefly outline what consequences the critique of the representational perspective, and its entailed modernistic attitudes, have in the dissemination of a shift in culture towards this era of the Contemporary.
	For a start the sense of the contemporary is rooted in a recognition of an existential sense of the authentic present as opposed to an historical sense of the present (as the mere conjunction of the past and future) hence the use of the expression ‘contemporary’ (which also happens to be a happy coincidence as many cultural commentators are also using this same term, with a capital ‘C’ to express some sense of where we might be heading in a post-Postmodern era). 
	In psychological forms of appreciation there is a trend towards accepting the simulation as stated as having meaning in and of itself without the need to de-code the ‘appearance’ as referring, or deferring, to some other non-simulated condition beyond itself. What is stated is stated with intent, it is said, it is not said on the behalf of the subconscious or any other state of affairs beyond the simulated being of that person making that utterance. It has meaning, a meaning and meaningfulness to be discovered in its own relational terms of reference. Not a representative meaning ‘recreated’ for us, but, a meaning ‘re-created’ and ‘re-presented’ that gains its meaning through the very act of re-presentation itself and its processes of  repetition therein.
	In this light we find a more open acceptance and understanding of difference. Having understood our commonality it is then our differences that make that engagement interesting, even perhaps exciting. In this spirit of tolerance the multi-cultural world comes into its own and lends its charter to every person to re-created their senses of self-identity and their overall sense of self-identity as they feel fit, within appropriate limits, and to find some degree of acceptance in the simulation of this complex and richer sense of identity. 
	In this same spirit psychological illness is better tolerated and accepted on its own terms before patterns of intervention and transformation are mutually entered into by what ever variety of methods are to hand and are collectively chosen.
	Philosophically we have a shift towards the existential, phenomenological and hermeneutical appreciation and resolution of philosophically treated concerns. In the process old dichotomies of mind and body, idealism and realism, rationalism and empiricism find themselves translated out of existence and new problems come to the fore, e.g., what role does repetition play in existential, phenomenological and hermeneutical types of analysis, what is value, what does being authentic entail, by what means can we existentially transform our relationships with others and what therapeutic processes are released or assisted by such practices, etc, etc?
	Culturally, forms of interaction take on a theatrical-like role with the simulation engendered being constructed by the audience on the same par, to varying degrees, as that entertained by artists, performers, interpreters and critics. Audiences will demand and are demanding to be recognised as participating in the creative process if only virtually. The eyes of portraits will now watch you, cartoons will talk to you as if you are talking to them, various different ontological types of reality will be allowed to collide or overlap, the world will be a world of colour again (in a post-postmodern minimalism) and once more local cultures can regain their virtual sense of identity, and their languages, and all the fashion and changes to be found contained therein, etc. In the political arena people must be granted the right to become more involved, rightly and wrongly, with an acceptance that, more often than not, the spirit will arise appropriately to the challenging situations to hand; with the dispersing of real autonomy without hegemony, and, with higher levels of participation without a loss of identity.

	To sum up let me note the following points:

1.	If we treat the world as a phenomenon simulated and constituted in consciousness and have no need  to refer to a ‘that which is not simulated’ then why bother to invoke the same.
2.	Through modern and postmodern critiques of the representational theory the advent of a Contemporary era is being ushered in.
3.	This Contemporary era is influencing the formation of all cultural activity, the contemporary re-formulations of psychology included.
4.	The simulation of reality dispenses reality and dispenses with reality.
5.	Through a balance and suspension of the textual, meta-textual and the non-textual the simulation of the not-textual is realised.
6.	Essentially, pragmatic considerations determine the effective reality of a simulated state of affairs.
7.	That it is from successful states of correlativity between the sense of the intentional object as a text, the sense of the intentional world as a meta-text and the sense of the intentional ego or egos as a non-text that the not-textual nature of the simulation is realised with a full sense of reality.
8.	Hence the direct nature of all our relationships, albeit from ‘their’ and ‘our’ own points of view, in this ‘one’ world-of-life.
Conclusion

	In this exposition I have placed an understanding of intentionality as central to our psychological enterprise. 

	Earlier in this paper I promised to deal with (a resolution of) the problem of the intentional object. I have in mind here, actually, two problems. 
First, there has been a long historical debate, in a number of traditions, both East and West, as to the nature of the intentional object. Does it exist with an image or is without an image? My reply to that, in the light of this schema of the psyche as outlined in this paper is that an act of judgmental discrimination entails, among other things, a transcendence (through a complex set of suspensions) of the cognitive level or aspect wherein the sense of the image as an image and the ‘sense’ of the image as a concept are both formulated and simulated in cognitive consciousness. So the answer is a “yes” a “no” and a “does not apply.” Its objectivity must have been focused upon, its sense must have been thematised, and, the cognitive must be transcended in order for the cognitive ‘material’ of that thought to be appreciated by us, as qua ‘cognitive,’ in that act of judgmental discrimination.
	Second, in the light of these three polarities, as put forward by myself as constituting the gestalt nature of the intentional field, because those polarities are impossible to reach, and therein their distinctive forms of thematization are impossible to obtain, correctly those polar ‘forms’ are fictitious. Clearly they have an intentional direction, as the means to an end, but not an intentional end. Therefore the senses of  the intentional object, the intentional background, or world, and the intentional ego, and by extension all intentional egos, do not exist. Meaning, and meaningfulness, is relationally generated between these three poles on the cognitive level as constituted in consciousness. But to say the world of life is metaphorically like a dream, as this type of picture would superficially seem to suggest, is not to say that the lifeworld and all contained therein ‘is’ literally just an illusion! In the metaphorical-like simulation of reality there is simultaneously a dispensing of reality and a dispensing with reality. No longer is the world an ‘appearance’ because direct contact is being made, has never been lost, in this one-world-of-life. As the ‘simulation of a simulation’ there is no simulation of that which is not a simulation. But as all acts of simulation are entertained from a certain perspective, point of view, we regain our autonomy as agents in this world-of-life.
	Let me make this type of position a little bit more palatable. When we read a novel, one that is well written and very exciting it has our undivided attention and in our imagination the characters and scenes seem to have a life of their own. We seem to forget we are reading. The moment we remember “we are reading a novel” is the very moment that we cease, in the meantime, to read that novel. In an act of reading there is an (existential) sense of the non-textual, where the text appears to offer no resistance as a text before that reader. I would argue that when the sense of the textual, the meta-textual and this sense of the non-textual are in a state of balance and effective suspension we enter the realm of the ‘not-textual’ wherein acts of discrimination can be realised. It is in this state of judgmental appreciation that the virtual space of the text is played out. It is in a memory of this totality of the text, once read, that we can question the reader and ask them, did you enjoy this text, what was its basic themes, what did it have to say if anything, etc. Otherwise this type of calculation, if it were a sequential calculation in cognitive consiousness, would necessitate our reading that text again, and again, and again without ever being able to leave that calculative stage of reasoning. 

	In this paper I then argued that the mechanics of the intentional act take place within a gestalt field. I described the gestalt nature of that field as tri-modal, as tri-polar in orientation, and as taking place as if in a hermeneutic-like circle. 

I then argued that exaggerated differences in those modal polarities induce sonsequences that finds thenselves manifested in distinctive types of mental illness although in practice such fine distinctions are not perfectly adhered to by virtue of the semi-autonomous nature of these different modes and aspects within this topology of the psyche. Cultural overlays upon this schema, along with others factors, individually colouring the unique complexion of each person in this world-of-life. 

In the fourth monograph on “authenticity” I argued that the person learns to enter into an increasing authenticity of engagement with the world through an existential transformation of the relatively inauthentic. By ‘inauthentic’ I do not mean ‘non-authentic’ in the sense that the simulation has no authenticity what so ever. Rather, through an ongoing process of transformation authenticity is purified, is allowed to manifest itself and speak with its own voice.

 In the last monograph I argued that the increasing recognition of the world as a simulation, not as an appearance of some underlying reality, though an ongoing critique of the representationalist point of view, is progressively introducing us to the existential sense of the contemporary as it, I have speculated, is being unfolded in an era of the Contemporary. 
	It was suggested in my anecdote about the fake banknotes that as money, in effect, was already being simulated that there was no need, other than for reasons of habit and convenience, to have the physical presence of money, in the form of bills, in the first place. The analogy was then drawn that our understanding and passage through the world, and the currency of experience to be had therein, had no need for it to be cashed out in terms of reference other than those that are simulated or relatively virtual. That, essentially, pragmatic considerations help us to determine what was or is to be considered as ‘real’ in common parlance. That this shift towards the phenomenological, hermeneutical and existential treatment of the world was being ushered in in a contemporary transition in culture (both on the level of the international and the re-invigoration of relatively more local levels of aspiration). 

	I have suggest that phenomenologically the presuppositions of our appreciation of the world are to be examined both individually and collectively in order to give this psychology its apparent (transcendental) grounding. In the topology of the schematising and mapping of cultural consciousness as outlined pathological and therapeutic consequences are to be explored. In an existential understanding of authenticity the role of simulation is to be seen as a touchstone for the transformation of meaning and meaningfulness to be discovered and realised therein, hallmarks that characterise the advent of a Contemporary era and find themselves reflected in contemporary artefacts such as theatre; television programs, e.g., a new generation of cartoons; other visual art-forms; new forms of political expression; new attitudes towards science and culture, and, shifts in the way of doing philosophy and formulating  key concepts in the theory and practice of psychology as briefly indicated and discussed in the confines of this paper. 

		Thanking you for your patience I now look forward to your contemporary criticism of this very controversial paper (which in essence forms an introduction to my understanding of psychology and the role to be played by the philosopher in helping them to articulate such an enterprise).
									Noël Tointon, 6.6.99.