The "Dream of Reality" 
versus 
the "Reality of the Dream"-
A Phenomenological Resolution of the Problem of Existence 

	The Problem of Existence for modern philosophy has had an articulate and exemplary presentation in the ostensively lucid philosophy of Descartes, in particular as formulated in his Meditations. One of the challenges this philosopher offers us is the reconsideration of the Problem of Existence:- how do we know we exist or that the world about is real, or put another way, how do we know we might not be just dreaming? 
	In this paper I shall try to adopt a phenomenalistic approach to widen the terms of reference in our dealing with such a complex question. In this manner I hope to prepare the ground for our being able to extricate ourselves from the very dilemmas that would otherwise bedevil our reflections as has been the case previously in the criticism of Descartes' solutions and the historical criticism of such criticisms. By phenomenalistic is meant an Husserlian approach that attempts to essentially describe the phenomenon or phenomena as presented to conscious experience under phenomenal investigation. In our investigations here the subject matter for such essential description is our ability to make judgments of an ontical nature, i.e. our ability to discern the existential status of the phenomenal reality that we find ourselves presented with in our natural everyday existence. That we have such an ability would not be disputed by any sensible practical person operating in a natural mode of everyday existence and it is as philosophers that such an ability is made the subject of our phenomenalistic investigations. In essence we will however, in distinction to the skeptic or psuedo-skeptic, seek to determine how such a state of affairs is possible rather than whether such a state of affairs as reality and our ability to determine such actually exists.
	First let me recount to you the following amusing short story, a true incident that happened to me when I was a student in New Zealand. In reality more often than not it is the unexpected that happens, reality is rich with existential novelty that would seem to allow it to transcend a mere causal determinism. In this world the trivial quite by chance is often allowed to produce consequences far beyond any expectations that might be thought to reasonably follow upon such seemingly innocent events.
	A number of years ago, in the second year of my attending a university, I happened upon the good fortune of inheriting a flat and being determined to ensure a civilized climate to pursue my studies, in comparison to the previous year, decided to interview prospective flatmates with this prospect in mind. I put a notice to this effect on the notice board and having no telephone requested that they put their telephone number if possible or some address where I could contact them. The next day I reviewed my notice and found a small number of applicants, one of whom was named Pat. I jotted down her telephone number and duly rang her. A male voice answered the phone and was most puzzled and anxious as to who I was and to why his wife was seeking a flat to live in. I returned to the notice board and relooked at the telephone number Pat had supplied to find it had been crossed out and a second number put in its place. Rang this second number and in talking to this person Pat, who became one of my flatmates, found out that by some accident she had got the telephone number of the place she then was currently staying at completely wrong and by some sheer accident of fate had supplied a number at which another Pat did live at. Amusing as this incident was to us to this other Pat such an event could not have been more of an unwelcome occurrence and explaining this happenstance to her husband was not an easy task to begin with.
	Now I have just related to you an event that apparently happened to me a number of years ago. Let me ask you at this point the almost rhetorical question how do you know that this incident actually happened, that what has just been related to you is true?
	Whether this event actually happened or not has little relevance but the question just posed has considerable philosophic merit. Having asked this question let me attempt to describe some of the procedures we might adopt in our coming to grips with this type of determination.
	It would probably be natural at first to assume that as I have stated this event did occur to myself that this statement of my direct personal involvement would guarantee the truth of my account. Assuming some integrity on my part and seeing no obvious reason for my telling a tall story without much thought most of the people who heard my account, if not all, would just uncritically accept it as having indeed taken place as related. This type of situation reminds me of the position a collector finds them self in when confronted by a dealer who is trying to sell this person one more object for their collection. The collector faces the situation where either they have the knowledge to know whether they are being confronted with a fake or the real thing or whether they must find themselves at the mercy of the dealer them self who professes such insight and hopefully the honesty to appraise and proclaim the nature of this fact or otherwise. Often the collector when confronted by a rare specimen may know what it is suppose to be but through not being exposed to similar specimens of its type is in no position to know whether the object is genuine or not. Under such circumstances they may well have to rely on the ability and integrity of the dealer whose pronounced appraisal can not truly escape the financial reward of the impending sale. Without a well established provenance or the object actually telling us otherwise the collector is then dependent upon the dealer and what intuition they, as a collector, may have into the whole affair. Much of our commerce with the world is conducted on such a level of trust and for most purposes this can be found to work quite adequately. Under such circumstances that dictate the need for more caution we would usually enquire into the ability and integrity of the recounter of such events or promoter of such objects. 
	We would also take into account the context of such a dissertation or promotion for if we were present at some convention or conference for tall stories or their like, e.g. then the ability and integrity of the recounter would be quite naturally heavily discounted as a factor in our consideration or for that matter that such a consideration is appropriate in the first place.
	Another step would most likely involve our investigating the components and their relationship to each other that go to make up the total situation. Our being able to cast doubt or discredit upon some facet of this situation may well place a considerable shadow over the total enterprise. In the account I related to you there were a series of ostensive facts, e.g. my being a student, inheriting a flat, having a flatmate by the name of Pat, her making a mistake in the telephone number of the place she was staying at, that there should be a second Pat residing at the place whose telephone number coincided with the wrong telephone number, etc. Should you be able to find fault with any one of these more essential facts then considerable doubt could well be cast over the truthfulness of this story of mine.
	So far therefore I have considered the facets of a guarantee made by a guarantor, the context of the account in its being related to an audience and the essential components that make up the vital content of that related account. Suspect any one of these three facets and the total account becomes suspect.
	At this point let me shift this question around and ask how do I know that this event actually happened, that the account related is true?
	Phenomenologically it would seem apparent that our memory records the existential or ontical status of the event as it was experienced and recorded for our memory to recall or recognize at a later point in time. Moreover it is obvious, on reflection, that the mere act of seeing in itself is not itself adequate grounds for believing. Mere sight alone cannot guarantee the fact that we are not being made subject to some sensory defect, or an imaginary act of the mind, or the contents of a dream-state, or some other misrepresentation mental or environmental in origination. In making some type of judgment we must be in a suitable position to be able to appreciate that type of state of affairs being so judged. This ability to appreciate the ontical status of perceptual-like states of affairs implies that their existential status can not be determined at the level of the sensory but on some level of intellection that by nature must be trans-perceptual in psycho-epistemological organization. If we were to entertain a dream of vivid realistic detail as things stand no act of mere looking in that dream would be able to determine for us that we were merely dreaming. Indeed such processes of determination, and for that matter all types of judgmental processes, must involve a perspective of appreciation that is trans-perceptual in psycho-epistemological orientation and organization. Moreover, the same argument applies equally to conceptual thinking also. Our conceptual ideas as concepts (that attempt to conceptually appreciate perceptual-like states of affairs) cannot by themselves give us, and guarantee, the determination of their corresponding ontical status. It would appear therefore that all forms of natural judgment must involve trans-perceptual and trans-conceptual modes of conscious thinking, i.e. the fact that all acts of judgment must be essentially transcendental in psycho-epistemological organization. What is at stake here, as I stressed before, is not that we can exercise such discrimination but how! Indeed it would seem that not only can we perceive certain states of affairs but that we can also perceive our perceiving of those states of affairs, i.e. appreciate the manner in which we intuitively arrived at our judgments, recognizing that under normal circumstances that we do reach realistic and pragmatically successful conclusions about the world.
	Somehow embedded in the presentation of a phenomenal appearance subjected to a process of ontical determination is the ability to recognize the effective ontical status of that under investigation. Encoded in the very presentation of the appearance itself is the nature and degree of its ontical impact.
	In order for us to recognize and appreciate the particular merit of an appearance, and as no meaningful mental exercise can be conducted in a semantic vacuum, it would seem to be necessary phenomenologically to postulate that the preconditional content of a judgment be introduced into the midst of an appropriately relevant field of context for our being able to do this which in this case of ontical determination would be, by direct implication, of such a nature as to allow us to determine the ontical status of that under review.
	Taking into consideration this aspect of an ontological field of determination and our previous three facets of a guarantor/guarantee, a field of context and potentially verifiable interrelated essential content as a set of essential facts we might now ask ourselves what type of relationship these four dimensions possess with respect to each other? In order to facilitate this investigation within the confines of this paper for the sake of convenience let us simplify this complex interaction along the following lines....
	First, let us partially collapse the distinction between a context for the situational presentation of content and the content itself. In ontical determination there must exist an intimate equivalence between these two aspects. In an imaginary situation real content can not be introduced except indirectly from a real context. Conversely in a real situation imaginary content cannot be introduced except indirectly from an imaginary context. Although this is an oversimplification through the fact that neither real nor non-real contexts can be purely entertained and that elements of mis-interpretation can be unsuspectingly introduced it still follows that for all practical purposes the ontical merit of content will reflect the ontical status of the context in which it is initially introduced. With this fact in mind both the content and the context can be considered simultaneously hence context-content.
	A second simplification can be made in the relationship between the guarantor/guarantee and the ontical field of determination. A guarantee necessitates some person who acts as the guarantor so let us consider only our own direct realization of the ontical merit of some phenomenal situation under investigation. As the guarantor is in effect an effective ego or agent involved in the appreciation of ontical merit we can also conveniently collapse this distinction, under the circumstances presented by this paper, to merely seek the kind of relationship involved in ontical determination between a field of ontical determination and that of the context-content under investigation.
	With these two simplifications carried out we are left with an investigation into the nature of the relationship between the context-content and the field of ontical determination. Let me outline what I believe are some of the essential-phenomenal features of this important relationship.
	Put simply the field of ontical determination must act as a background for the appreciation of the existential merit of the context-content. With this sort of model in mind a number of points can be made. First, there must exist some sort of affinity between the context-content and this background of ontical determination in order for them to enter into some sort of possible interrelationship. Second, paradoxical as it may sound initially, there must also exist the possibility for this context-content to in some way differ form from this particular background field of context otherwise we would be in no position to realize whether the context-content was either coherent with or discordant from this field of arbitration. Like the needle in the haystack however difficult it would be to find the possibility remains that this task would still be possible. On the other hand if we were to search for a particular needle in a stack of needles then our task would be impossible if that particular needle could not be differentiated from that heap of needles. A context-content situation judged to be ontically real is metaphorically like a needle finding itself at home on a pile of needles. On the other hand if a piece of chaff is placed in front of that pile of needles its differences can be made to stand out giving us the discomforting realization that this particular item is discordant with this field of activity and hence not in immediate harmony with it. Put metaphorically when we don't feel at home in the world with some presentation we come to doubt its existential validity. When the disharmony of a particular appearance is entertained we become skeptical and suspend or doubt the manner in which an appearance initially announces itself, and in our seeking for a resolution of this dissonance we inspect the presentation more deeply finding relief only when we come to a point that allows a reintepretation of the presentation to once more feel concordant with our-being-in-the-world.
	Treated in a static mode this field of ontical determination would be none other than the collective accumulation of all exemplified affirmative existential judgments either performed by that individual as the guarantor or accepted as guaranteed. Like some museum of memories if an item for consideration was to come before it and be found a pre-established niche waiting there for it then the coherence of that item in the embrace of that taxonomy of existential classification would be enough for that institution to accept that such an item in type has the potential for ontical affirmation. However in this static frame of reference the possibility alone cannot establish the actuality of that item (even though neither pure potentiality nor pure actuality in truth, I believe, could be either recognized or entertained). This process of evaluation that establishes and determines ontical actuality must therefore be conducted in a dynamic mode of ontical appreciation. This static background wherein we appreciate the existential probability of a type of object in its potentiality must be none other than the-world-as-we-have- come-to-know-it, whereas, in distinction to this static frame of reference, the dynamic aspect to this field of ontical determination must be in effect the-world-as-we-come-to-live-within-it, i.e. the life-world.
	In the dynamic appreciation of the ontical status of a particular state of affairs a complex process of appraisal must take place that investigates the construction of that item under investigation realizing the genetic constitution of the reality of that proposal. No proposal could be dismissed as unreal but the context and/or the content of that proposal could be realized to be deficient if it fails to cohere within this field of determination both statically and dynamically. E.g. a unicorn image coming before the mind's eye would be dismissed as a fabrication produced from the non-existentially established union of horses and horns. On the other hand the existential richness of a real horse image would dictate its ontical affirmation through the fact that its genesis proceeded through the powers of our perception rather than through an exercise of our relatively poverty stricken imagination.
	Such transcendental appreciation of the genetic constitution of an ontical proposal necessitates the collective process integration of all the complex sub-strata that go into making such a determination. Without this aspect of adequate integration, or synthesis, the object or state of affairs itself would be unable to be presented as such an object or state of affairs. Indeed transcendental insight itself necessitates a greater degree of psycho-epistemological organization than that which pertains to the cognitive levels of perception and conception, the latter levels of epistemological organization being the raw material for the former. It is in a recognition of this aspect of gestalt-liked integration that we can enter into a resolution of the Problem of Existence and in particular those facets that find themselves involved in the question as to whether we are dreaming or not?
	It is a phenomenological fact that the relevant field for the appreciation of a particular state of affairs must itself be richer in structural detail than any particular state of affairs placed before it or within it. This fact can be derived from the fact that the field is the sum interaction of all states of affairs that have entered within it not only as a sum but also as an integrated collection of all the possible relationships that would entail from the virtual interaction of all those imputs. Moreover a field itself cannot be generated from a mere source but through the interaction of that source and all other possible source-like entries into that field. A field is a nexus of interaction materialized from the point of view of those sources appreciated within it but for all that something that cannot be reduced to the material-like level of a source except provisionally. With this information to hand we can deduce the following observations.
	The degree to which items of context-content subjected to our powers of ontical appreciation are gestaltly integrated give us an indirect measure of the gestalt integration present in our exercise of such appreciation. When our transcendental powers of appreciation are adequately integrated we naturally find ourselves in an intellectual position to appreciate the ontical merit of those presentations put forward for that type of determination. Moreover those items put forward for evaluation will reflect this advanced level of psychic integration and because of that condition will appear as real through the richness of their existential presentation. Non real presentations will demonstrate their non-ontical status through a diminished coherence in our world or their lack of existential-like vividness or flesh through their relatively diminished degree of integration and definition. 
	Put in a more concrete fashion we can note that when our psycho-epistemological powers are sufficiently integrated we are put in a position of being able to determine the ontical merit of those gestalten subject to ontical investigation through transcendental appreciation. On the other hand an inadequate degree of gestalt integration reflects itself in the relative poverty of our imagery, etc. for investigation. In the context of our dreaming we can state that very realistic-like imagery implies an advanced level of psychic integration along with the ability to recognize that our imagery is not real but constructed through the powers of our imagination, memory, etc. On the other hand when our powers of integration are diminished and we are no longer in a transcendental position of being able to appreciate the ontical merit of our imagery then that imagery will reflect this relative degree of poverty and will thence manifest itself with a sense of diminished reality appearing as unreal or surreal. Put quite simply imagery that appears real implies that we are in a position to know its ontical status whereas non-integrated or disintegrated imagery implies a corresponding lack of reality. Realistic-like imagery entertained in a dream for all its realism can not fool our transcendental powers of ontical determination and we have only to attend to the detail of such a presentation to find that this degree of vividness would be more apparent than manifest.
	Ontical determination is a type of value judgment on a similar par to ethical and aesthetical judgment. Just as the concept of harmony is a key word in these two latter pursuits so too does it also manifest itself in the realm of ontical judgment. I believe that from a transcendental point of view there is no difference between these three types of evaluation. Only from a non-transcendental point of view can we find essential differences that will allow us to naturally differentiate these three forms of evaluation. Basically ethical interaction has an emphasis on the participation of the ego in the world whereas the aesthetic interaction with the world has the emphasis on the object or state under aesthetic investigation. In ontical judgment the emphasis is shifted from both the object or state and the sense of ego to the gestalt background against which both of these two conceptually-perceptually orientated aspects are entertained. More correctly this background is the background of all backgrounds, the collective psychic unity of all mental frames of reference that allows the collective sense of self to operate within or against the same. Each level of consciousness presents both a corresponding background (subject to a focalization of content) and a corresponding sense of self (through the projection of the unity of that background or field). At the psychological level of judgment there exists a transcendental sense of self in juxtaposition with a corresponding sense of a transcendental background. However although these various levels of background along with their corresponding senses of self can be treated in some form of philosophical isolation in truth their can be no distinctions without accommodation and as the sense of mind along with the unity of its psycho-epistemological organization is the ultimate accommodation we are forced to realize the necessary interdependence of all mental fields upon each other in the very manifestation of a-conscious-agent-living-in-this-world.
	Having begun this paper with an anecdote let me finish it with the following anecdotal-like parody in order to bring out this point that the transcendental dimension and the non-transcendental dimensions are dependent upon each other in order for there to be a mind that can entertain the concept of reality and the concept of its own reality in this world.
	Once there was a philosopher who dreamt that they were a normal natural everyday person who was not to be bothered by the artificial play of subtle sophistry and intellectual thinking. However, on awakening, the "philosopher" got the better half of this individual who in reflection could not decide whether they were a philosopher dreaming they were a person or a person dreaming they were a philosopher. 
	You see philosophers are not "real people" because of the way they try to see "people seeing the world" is not personal in orientation. Such behaviour is twice removed from such a dimension being conducted not only from an intersubjective trans-personal perspective but also in general essential terms of reference. Yet, however transcendentally orientated a philosopher may be in their philosophical reflections, the fact of the matter is that everyday perception must also recognize the necessity for the acceptance of a natural phenomenalistic approach that accepts at apparent face value those phenomenal-presentations-as they-unfold-themselves-in-the-world-before-us in order for the natural person to enter into any form of judgment and understanding as to what confronts them in the first place. Judgment necessitates that which is to be judged! Without a personal perspective the philosopher would have nothing to reflect upon.
	Now as it happened this same philosopher would sometimes go off to sleep dreaming they were a natural everyday person, however, the "philosopher" would again get the better of them and they would be made to have this disturbing nightmare that they were a philosopher, an entity who is compelled by some force or other to confront reality in all its wonderful mystery, majesty and terrifying complexity. 
	This poor individual, sweating profusely at the thought of the immensity of this task in front of them, after awakening and with much scratching of the head suddenly had the realization, in a vivid flash of intuition, that there could be no absolute or real difference between the philosopher who reflects and the everyday person who accepts the way things came to present themselves. Somehow people know "what is the case to be the case" and for them the whole question of existence is simply unproblematic. Yet, when we give ourselves over to some adequate degree of reflection, it cannot but help escape our attention that existence, or for that matter non-existence, cannot be directly perceived per se but that for all that we still "know" the real from the unreal, the "reality of the dream" from "the dream of reality". For the philosopher who goes one step further and reflects upon their reflection should find, or so it should seem, that the experiential appearance of a transcendental ego as an ego that enters into acts of judgment and the conceptual-perceptual ego are, and must be, one and the same thing. Even though their respective points of view are different, i.e. transcendental and non-transcendental, these two facets must coincide and depend upon each other for their  apparent individual functioning. That in truth there can be no inner absolute difference, only a difference in perspective. That in our continual flight through and from this world we find ourselves in we are both naturally "philosophers" and "persons". To have our feet in the mud of existence means we must be immersed in this world. Then for us to be able to reflect upon this world the implication can be drawn that we must also be able to stand back from it through some form of natural spontaneous philosophic-like appreciation. In no way is the world in practice merely accepted on its sheer face value for it is already philosophically and transcendentally pre-interpreted for us. Our relatively unproblematic appreciation of this world of meaningfully pre-structured appearance implies a natural cooperation and harmony between these two particular facets or poles embedded in our consciousness that allow us, on one hand, to immerse ourselves as persons in the world and, on the other, to release ourselves through the natural exercise of a philosophic transcendental-like detachment. This absorbed detachment permits us to appreciate the reality of the contents of this world as they comes to confront us through this world. From this double perspective the "dream of reality" and the "reality of the dream" can be disentangled enough to allow us to escape like butterflies from this dilemma of existence that would otherwise cocoon us forever within its knotted confines.

				Noël Tointon, 
				Macquarie University, 4/9/87 (9/8/87).