Resolution Of A Fundamental Dilemma:  The Treatment 
Of Value In The Deontological-Pragmatic Controversy

Introduction

	Among philosophers today, in a world influenced by Western Philosophy, there would appear to exist often, amid other defects, either one of two mistaken points of view, namely, that philosophy is either a creative artform unique to the personality of its practitioner, or, a scientific-like pursuit that should be exercised with a rigour equal to that thought to be found in the field of mathematics. The latter prejudice can be traced back to the days of the Ancient Greeks. The former prejudice is more a present day phenomenon with its acceptance that the world is treated as a construction of our own making with no absolute grounds for the critical exercise of an absolute determination of truth-value, factuality, interpretation, verification, reality, etc.	
	For the lay-person the world of conversation and other forms of discourse has a similar division or fracture running from one side to the other, namely, the belief that anyone, merely seated and scratching their heads, can be philosophical with a minimum of effort, or, with a fraction more of enterprise the philosopher should be able, with some further scratching about through the debris of their communications or ruminations, to majestically pontificate about the nature of the world and in the process be able to resolve the problems found by people in their living in this world.
	It is my belief that philosophy is a transcendent blending of an art and a science and can be reduced to neither one nor the other, moreover, genuine philosophers are meta-philosophers, i.e. those people who specialty is helping people to create their own critical understanding of the world in all its existential richness and serendipity. A fascination for the world and its acceptance as an impenetrable mystery is not lost but, that accepted, a way through this world is charted with some degree of thoughtfulness and receptivity to the nature of the relationships that we find ourselves immersed in with all the responsiveness and responsibility to be found therein. This degree of concern is fostered in the belief that the phenomenal world can be mapped without this mapping removing us in equal measure from an experiential appreciation of this world in all its existential delights and insights, rather, on the other hand, it opens us up to a world of value that allows us to find meaning and meaningfulness in the course of our daily lives. It must be pointed out, however, that the very tools we work with in the world in some obtuse manner, although indeed sometimes with a brutal frankness, mirror the nature of the world from the point of view of the nature of our work therein. In this regard meta-philosophers are no more, or no less, innocent of this charge and although their programme cannot be regarded as pristine or non-contaminated by such an influence the quality of their work is to be judged in more systematic terms of reference, namely, in terms of successfulness, adequacy, appropriateness, degree of consistency, richness of mutual correspondence, coherence, effectiveness, power of prediction, integrity, etc.
	Through an excessive preoccupation with the cognitive and the material our world today has become a place of disenchantment, a desert of despair for those who can find no depth of meaning in its fabric and with desire to find no value other than in the possible use or exploitation of what they find to hand.
	With shallow speculation or a superficial manner in our reflections we soon find ourselves in the historical fields of interminable controversy, and then find ourselves taking a variety of stands, digging in to affirm or deny a variety of positions too well attested to need the addition of our newly acquired and barely, ill-formed support. In this paper I would like to present one such division, alas, all too close to the surface not to have a profound effect on our behaviour but which for all that is essentially non-problematic for the natural person who escapes these marshes of deception and who sets out to live, intuitively, their life well with out thinking too much about how to enact such a possibility. However, if it is our ambition to be philosophical, and we accept the hard work entailed, then let us set about this difficult task with the degree of attention necessary to dispatch this objective in as successful a manner as possible and in such a fashion as to reap the rewards of our efforts allowing us in the process to live in this world and find therein a home that we can find ourselves, to some degree or other, being-at-home-in. This task cannot be an impossible one, already our language rests on a body of knowledge that attests to some degree of systematic successfulness so let us dig into such a richness of resource and plant those seeds in this soil that will bear a fruitfulness for us to find an enjoyment in, allowing us in the process to eventually reap the practical produce of our hard won endeavours.

In The Facing Of A Dilemma

	What can the person do when facing a possible dilemma that they find confronting them? A number of stratagems archetypally present themselves if we were to philosophically think about this type of situational experience. On a number of occasions we must have reached a cross-road, metaphorical or geographical, and wondered about which path to chose? What choices in general terms of reference might present themselves to us as possible avenues for our decision making? First, we could ignore the whole dilemma and hope it either goes away or resolves itself. Second, we might decide to accept and take up one of the possibilities, either with reason or no good reason, that we might find to have been equally attractive. Then, thirdly, we might try to follow up all or a number of those possibilities as apparently presented to us, either with reason or no good reason, in a preferential sequence, one after another tracing out the ramifications of that particular stage in our choice and then retracing our path back before moving onto the next stage of our progress, and, perhaps along the way or at the end of this criss-crossing of our choices, reflecting upon the relative merits of this type of campaign and its variety of opportunities so transiently tasted . Lastly, more in keeping with the first possibility, we might decide to take some other course of action and follow up an approach that seemingly has no relationship to the dilemma whatsoever. Whereas the first possibility was a course of inaction this last possibility is a course of action that in its intention is unrelated to the nature of our dilemma but which in time might assist us in re-facing this apparent dichotomy previously circumvented successfully or unsuccessfully. These four possibilities should be remembered when we move through this paper for they all have their place in our passage through this world and some relevance for the meta-resolution to be presented for adoption and therein, as practical possibilities, to be noted by implication in this paper.

A Generalized Description Of This Fundamental Moral Dilemma

	The point of this paper is not to definitively describe this controversy and elaborate its subtleties and many variants but rather to introduce a general description of the same and then continue to demonstrate an attitude that allows us to effectively transcend the presentation of this moral dichotomy and the potential it has for moral rigidity, moral paralysis or moral chaos consequent upon its apparent intellectual and logical bankruptcy. Put simply, we are to ask ourselves is our ethical response to a process of moral decision making in a certain ethical situation to be discovered in an intuitive sense of ethical duty or to be calculated in some form of utilitarian pragmatism? On one hand we have a form of moral absolutism and on the other a form of moral relativism. With respect to the former it could be restated as a certain action or situation of type x necessarily implies as my duty the performance of an appropriate ethical response of type a, or possibly type b, or c, etc. With respect to the latter position it could be restated as a certain action or situation of type x has calculated as an appropriate ethical response of type a, or possibly type b, or c in such a manner as to directly benefit the doer of the action and/or the sufferer of the action or to indirectly benefit a social environment with or without limitations on the extent of that society. Broadly speaking we are dealing with the contrast between acts of duty or calculated acts of benefaction. Let me note at this point that the sting of this controversy resides in the fact that in our an exercise of our relatively superficial philosophical reflection we should find merit in both opposing camps hence the tendency for moral rigidity, paralysis or chaos if we affirm one and only one position, or if we find ourselves frozen in a state of inaction, or if we find ourselves entering indecisively upon a course of action without a definite plan of action pre-developed in our intentions. An absolutist position assumes that we possess some faculty or ability to intuit or recognize what is essentially our duty to act in a certain manner. The relativist position assumes that we have to hand some form of calculus that allows us to estimate the teleological impact or consequences of various courses of action and that from an evaluation of these possible response pathways we would or should adopt the most beneficial course of action. Of course the question can be asked beneficial to whom or to what? Under the latter position can be subsumed various forms of utilitarianism, pragmatism, teleological ethics, consequentialism, etc. For convenience these can be subsumed under the appellation of pragmatism.
	With respect to both types of positions we could also adopt some form of situationalistic ethic if the integrity and uniqueness of the situation or relationship was considered a more important factor in the ethical process than the mere type of action involved. Spelt out this might be neutrally stated as a non-predetermination of response with respect to a certain type of action (or inaction) in the uniqueness of a certain situation (whose essential description might involve factors, a, b, c, d, etc.) in which the moral process of response might be intuited or calculated to be considered as essentially unique (however much certain moral rules might suggest themselves from reflection upon an occurrence of similar responses if elicited). My position in regards to this controversy is, to begin with, neutral although later I will suggest a way of transcending this dilemma that will also involve the apparent adoption of these four attitudes or approaches to the resolution of a dilemma as previously suggested. Ultimately I would like to sketch out a type of situational responsiveness that is pre-calculated in its preparational research but spontaneously intuited in its apparent appropriateness and I will argue that moral judgment is normally conducted along this natural channel of approach when it is not subjected to the distortions of a superficial or unbalanced philosophical selectivism.
	In order to illustrate the contrast between these two aspects of our dilemma let me recount the following anecdote. In this particular paper I would like to point out again that I am not concerned with an examination of various typologies of utilitarianism or pragmatism nor subtleties in the ramification of a deontological position, rather, it is more my interest to resolve this type of dilemma through a phenomenological appreciation of the natural act of judgment and develop a method for the practical application of the transcendental suspension and reduction in the practice of moral or ethical resolution.

The Clash Between Deontological And Pragmatical Approaches

	In the manufacture of a product or the construction of some vehicle or building, etc. the question of the degree of risk or breakdown in the involved process and/or product is often unavoidable. A deontologist would be more inclined to seek minimal risk whilst a pragmatist might investigate various tradeoffs in terms of time, space, money, effort, energy, etc. The following anecdote should illustrate this point.
	There is a well know case study in the American legal fraternity and philosophical circles that concerns itself with the various consequences of bad engineering design in one of the product lines of the Ford Motor Company. It came to be known beforehand, by that company, that the placement of the gasoline tank in the Ford Pinto created the possibility of fire when this particular type of vehicle was struck in a rear-end collision. But it was calculated that it would create an additional expense to protect the gasoline tank from this hazard, and multiplied by the number of Pintos being manufactured, the cumulative cost of modifying the design of the fuel tank would be a sizable cost to the Ford Motor Company. After several rear-end collisions occurred and produced loss of life because of the ensuring fire, a lawsuit was filed against the Ford Motor company. In the pretrial discovery process an internal memo revealed that the management had calculated the possible liabilities resulting from the faulty fuel tank design and weighed this cost of improving the design of the car and removing the defect. Management had calculated that 180 burn deaths and 180 serious burn injuries would result in liabilities to the company of around $50 million. Improving the defective design was estimated to cost $11 per vehicle. On a total projected run of twelve and a half million vehicles, the cost of the improved design would be $137 million. On a strict cost-benefit analysis, corporate management decided not to improve the defective design. This corporate attitude so outraged the jury that they awarded punitive damages of $125 million.
	The first point I would like to note is that in manufacturing or construction, often in the spheres of architecture or engineering, e.g. the calculation of risk involves an estimation of the critical conditions necessary when that particular product or process reaches a point of most probable failure to perform in the manner intended. It may be disheartening to know that bridges, buildings and dams, e.g. are built to stand up to a certain range of conditions and that once those conditions are surpassed product or process failure is either practically guaranteed, or, to be possibly expected. A bridge, e.g. may be built to withstand 200 km. winds but not 300km. winds. The additional cost of ensuring the bridge stands up to the latter conditions might be considered an unnecessary cost in the light of environmental expectations. Nevertheless, product failure is built into the product/process with almost as much intentional determination as it design. Hence the design must carry with it a certain degree of risk. What accounts as an acceptable risk? Is this a question for the designer or the user of the product, should the cost-accountants be allowed to determine this type of question? Obviously monetary considerations must play some part in the decision making and its in recognition of this bias that the role is often given to or taken by governments to set and enact a workable series of standards to ensure a professional and a more balanced compromise in these endeavours. In essence calculation is an important ingredient in the dialectics of this type of decision making process.
	A second point to bring to our attention is the reaction of the jury to this type of incestuous consorting between engineers and cost-accountants. Obviously the jury saw itself operating in a deontological mode and felt that it was their duty to award punitive damages against the company for not doing its proper and fit duty to the general public. A world of difference appears between these two camps. A gulf of separation appears to be in place that would seem to offer us no means for allowing us to compare their various criteria and modus operandi. On one hand we have an absolute insistence on duty and on the other the necessity of a calculus to predetermine maximum benefit in the light of actual cost and possible consequences with respect to various courses of action. It could be argued, in an analysis of this anecdote, that the company more correctly failed only in the way it set its terms of reference for this particular calculation and that by not factoring in public-legal opinion and the consequences of good will, etc. it manifestly failed in its calculations. And yet we too are horrified at the mercenary approach adopted by this company and must ask ourselves is doing our duty an important aspect in private and public morality? Accepted in the affirmative then we must continue to ask ourselves what exactly is implied in a deontological mode of moral or ethical analysis? Being human, it would appear, cannot therefore be all calculation? In what manner do we intuit, if that is the case, our course of duty? What exactly is a sense of duty or is doing one's duty merely wider terms of reference in our moral calculations developed in us, promoted and reinforced through our parental and social conditioning?
A Critique Of Absolute Ethical Value

	These days it is unfashionable to even just mention duties. Under these apparent circumstances any emphasis or stress upon the same is often to quickly invite a reaction that marks you out for the back-benches. Undue emphasis has been placed upon freedoms or rights and, it would seem, a loss of balance has been lost in this regard?
	It is natural in the world of human interaction and its realm of reciprocity to exchange gifts for obligations and vice versa. There is the saying "never something for nothing", or to that effect, and although some of the best things in life appear to be free still they occur in the context of human interaction which by necessity, through the very meaning of what is involved in being in a state of interpersonal interaction, must take place in association with some form of gift-giving/receiving. Whether we exchange kind words or a smile, share a thought or relay some form of communication, whether we are paid, make a promise, continue a conversation or just feel under some form of an obligation still the act of being in a state of interaction demands some form of reciprocity, moreover, by its very nature reciprocity can never be one way if that relationship is in a personal sphere of operation. We cannot initiate and or maintain a personal relationship, as a personal relationship, with an unconscious person (or with a person who for some reason or other is not entering into a state of interaction or reciprocity). Only as a potential person could the possibility be entertained which only goes to prove this point. We can interrelate with the body of an unconscious person being ourselves an embodied person, in a state of physical interaction, as witnessed by various wards in our hospitals, but our interaction with that person as a person is only as a potential person, or as having been an actual person, which as I have stated merely proves this point that a personal interaction is an interaction between two people as two persons in a state of current reciprocity. Should the reciprocity come to an end then the fact of the relationship also comes to an instantiated termination. A relationship also comes to a state of cessation if reciprocity is equalized in the same moment of time, as in e.g. when we completely pay off our bills to some tradesperson whose interaction with us is as a tradesperson. 
	Now I have entered into this anthropological preamble to state the probably obvious, namely, that duties and rights should be seen as more or less reciprocal elements in a state of human interaction and that it is unnatural to entertain either one without the other. By duties we could substitute the word obligations but either term needs to be qualified by what reference is made to the relational fact of to what or to whom this obligation is made, i.e. on whose behalf is this duty as an obligation entertained? I would like to short circuit this problematic area in our philosophical consideration by first making the observation that people tell us that they take on an obligation or carry out a duty through the feeling they have for a relationship with themselves, with God or the Gods, for the sense of the other, with humanity, for the love of a friend or a relationship or an institution, etc. Secondly, this series of relationships can be collapsed and reconsidered in the light of the general nature of a relationship. By this stratagem we can translate duties as obligations to the nature and being of the relationship being entertained. By these means we could report someone as saying they are entertaining various duties they feel towards some person or persons, divine or otherwise, because of their involvement with a sense of some person or person, divine or otherwise, through the medium of their relationship with some person or person, divine or otherwise. By our re-direction of the sense of obligation to the being of the relationship we circumvent the impossibility of some person or persons having a relationship with a non-existent party. So by these means if someone feels a sense of duty to whatever, because they believe in God or whatever, then the being of the whatsoever is quite irrelevant to our treatment of the obligation as an obligation (to some sense of the personal). In other words I am treating the sense of obligation as correctly given, existentially, to the being or facticity of the relationship itself regardless of the true ontological nature of that relationship in its instantiation in the world, in this world of life or life-world. This simplification can now make our analysis of the process of obligation that much easier. Duties and rights are now seen as the property of the relationship and therefore correctly not something had, given, or shared by the parties (existent or non-existent) in that relationship.
	I believe, or hope, that it would not be too controversial to say that a sense of duty is felt by the person in a certain simple bi-polar or complex multi-polar relationship. That in effect a certain party in a process of human interaction (monopersonal, interpersonal or transpersonal) experiences a sense of duty, that as an experience the person somehow can experience the phenomenon of being dutiful, i.e. obligating or being under a possible obligation to some party or other in that relationship. In other words the point of my analysis is to indicate that this sense of obligation is experienced in the experience of that relationship. Moreover, this sense of obligation is in fact an expression of the facticity of the relationship if our understanding of the nature of a relationship takes into account the existential fact that a relationship is the ongoing resolution of the relational dissonance, or i.e. what ever is relatively and relevantly dissonant, in the environment of that relationship. Implicit in this account is the ability of the person to experience the relational nature of a relationship as a relationship, recognize what is relatively dissonant in that relationship and realize the ongoing resolution of that relevantly dissonant aspect of the relationship. In this concern of the relationship for itself a sense of duty is manifested and either acted upon or not acted upon in such a manner as to effect or to not effect a satisfactory state of ongoing resolution of that dissonance in the metaphorical body of that relationship. In this account we must also remember that complete, inadequate or incomplete and non-complete forms of resolution all effectively terminate the historical instantiation of that relationship.
	Now in a critique of duties, and of the absolute value of doing ones duty, a number of controversial consideration arise. In the context of this paper I would like to raise the following. How do we experience a sense of duty or obligation, how do we know whether our experience of duty is a genuine experience of duty, how do we know how our duty is to be realized and how do we know if that realization of our duty is a genuine realization of our duty? Essentially we have here active and reflective forms in the experience and evaluation of doing our duty. Fundamentally we are considering matters of authenticity, as opposed to being inauthentic, and I have dealt with this aspect of the experience of value elsewhere. For convenience we could state that being authentic is being in tune with the nature and being of the relationship currently to hand in such a manner as to assist this ongoing resolution of dissonance necessary to the historical being of that relationship. In other words we might like to translate doing our duty as being authentic to the needs of the relationship.
	Now herein lies a problem. How can we experience our sense of duty, assuming such a phenomenon is a distinctive phenomenological entity for investigation, without some form of calculation, without some form of analysis, inspection, investigation, exercise, evaluation, retrospectivity, etc? It is in this regard that we must ask ourselves in what way the process of doing ones duty might differ from a consequentialists analysis of the same situation? Obviously a consequentialist is concerned more with an emphasis upon ends rather than upon means. It would be correct to say that ostensively a deontologist's emphasis is or should be upon means, namely, the exercise of the doing of ones duty but need that be exclusively upon means at the expense, or partial expense, of ends? No doubt the practical deontologist must have some awareness of the possible consequences of their actions or inactions if only in their consideration of the situation that they decide to effectively suspend this considerable proportion of their appreciation of that ethical situation as their ethical situation to hand. Indeed, in their associated consequentialistic calculations they are often only too aware that they effectively bracket those aspects of their considerations and at some personal and/or material expense in doing so. The benefit to be gained from such sacrifice is to be directly gained, if their is some form of benefit, from the sheer act of doing ones duty itself. Again we must ask ourselves is this self-satisfaction or pride in doing ones duty merely another form of consequential benefit desired and/or realized in the performance of this act of non-consequentialistic intent? Or is such secondary gain merely by the way and something correctly not to be desired for itself and in such a manner as to subvert this desire to do ones duty? I ask these questions merely to raise these criticisms but don't wish to directly answer them as I personally believe our terms of reference are here too limited to do adequate justice to an existential situation of introspection that has to it either a deontological or a consequentialistic or pragmatic bias in emphasis.
	A major criticism of either position is the question, and its mirror image, of whether an act of doing ones duty can be accomplished without some form of calculation, and, whether it is possible to calculate and in an act of calculation arrive at a solution in an act of calculation that would give an intentional direction to our dutiful activity?
	One method for the determination of ones duty through an apparent act of reason was the use of the categorical imperative as proposed by Imannuel Kant.
	Let us suppose, as a definition of the categorical imperative, that doing or not doing an activity of type x by a certain person or party p in a certain defined type of situation s is wrong if if everyone was to go about this particular type of act in the same manner it would not allow one person or party to successfully enact this process of x.
	Let me illustrate this policy for dutiful action with the following example. Let us suppose that you wish to borrow from the bank a certain sum of money. Now let us suppose your intention is not to repay this loan. Is such behaviour right or dutiful? Needless to say banks qua banks would cease to exist under such an environment if everyone's intention was not to repay their loans? 
	But a problem with this policy is that from the generality of the collective situation it does not correctly follow that this rule should dictate action in a particular instance. Moreover, each and every situation cannot be boiled down and rendered with exactly the same essential form consequently other rules might interfere in the correct dutiful appraisal of that unique situation. So, perhaps with some qualified justification, we should regard such a rule only as a possible guide for action or inaction in that appropriate type of situation and correctly no more than that. The meta-question then can now be re-asked how does the deontologist perceive the intuitive process of doing ones duty? If they believe such an ability does exist then they must answer, perhaps in phenomenological terms of reference, how such a process of reflection is enacted and acted upon? Moreover, it should be brought to our attention in what manner consequential considerations should or should not be brought to bear upon our dutiful appreciation of the ethical situation theoretically in general terms of reference and practically in a particular instance or type of instance? It would appear that our philosophical suspicions in this regard would suggest that somehow or other deontological matters and questions of a consequentialistic nature are closely inter-linked and that, therefore, pragmatic influences should be taken into account in a workable or practical deontological philosophy?

A Critique Of Relative Ethical Value

	Whereas deontological value is treated as absolute, i.e., tentatively let us say, definitive, invariable, valid and/or appropriate to the dutiful expectations or demands of the being of the relevant relationship of involvement, consequentialistic value can be treated as relative, i.e., tentatively let us say, non-definitive, variable, non-inherently determinable in ethical truth value, and/or appropriate only to the situation and context of the relationship. Absolute value can be seen as fixed and fully determined prior to the the fact of the ethical situation itself and the necessary act of duty associated with the same, whereas, relative value is given its determination (or re-determination) at the same time of its evaluation or, later, on retrospection? Moreover, an emphasis in the former is with means and the latter with ends or the teleological consequences expected to develop in or from the treatment of that approach adopted in that ethical situation of involvement.
	When we consider non-deontological utilitarian or pragmatic and/or consequentialist terms of reference a number of philosophical problems present themself for the meta-ethitician and for the person who wishes to practicalize such a philosophical stance. Among others three major problematic areas should receive our attention, namely, what terms of reference should be adopted for our investigations, theoretical or practical, and, how does an act of calculation cease to be a mere act of calculation and become a responsible act of judgmental appreciation, and, how do we appreciate the possible merits of our responses? Must we not pre-judge the situation in order to erect the most appropriate pre-determined terms of reference for our enquiry? Then, once our pre-determined terms of reference are chosen, how do we move from a sequential act of calculation to the very active being of judgment itself. Further, how do we retrospectively determine the appropriateness of our situational response or responses given that various judgments have been, or are being, enacted upon effecting our critical ability to evaluate possibilities and conclusions that did not come to some form of pre-determined fruition?
	When does an act of calculation cease to be an act of calculation and become an act of judgment? 
	Let us briefly reflect upon, in as much as we can, and in a phenomenological mode, an act of calculation involving the sum of two large figures. Let this act of addition involve the sum of 1,234 and 2,345. In a sequence of mini-calculations we eventually arrive at the sum of 3,579. Now the first observation I would like to bring to your attention is the fact that once the judgment is effected our calculation is then in a state of cessation, moreover, it might seem obvious that once we cease to calculate, having adequately prepared our territory and satisfactorily entered the same, that then and only then can the judgment arise. As the act of calculation is sequential in its organization and this processing is done in real time it follows that an act of judgment can not be simultaneously enacted with a temporally determined act of calculation? One is either calculating or one has arrived at a judgment and although obviously related they more or less exclude each other in terms of their temporal being. The apparent exception to this, in the case of an indistinct or tentative judgment, effectively reestablishing this principle, in so far as the degree of indecisiveness of judgment is in inverse proportion to the decisiveness in the termination of the act of calculation in the indistinct light of that pre-judgmental calculation. Other phenomenological characteristics that appear to be implicated in the process of calculation cum judgment is, under normal and adequate conditions, the apparent spontaneity and self-apparent obviousness, validity and appropriateness of the judgment and its sense of effectiveness as a possible judgmental response. That the very act of judgment is terminal and relatively complete, and only if the judgmental response itself is made the object of some meta-judgmental reflection that immerses the previous act of judgment into the process of some meta-calculation can we say it continues to possess the characteristics of a process. Moreover, the arrival of the judgment is relatively spontaneous and therefore in itself cannot phenomenologically be, directly, the sequential unfolding of a process of calculation. We have here an association between two logically and phenomenologically distinctive mental events that although somehow interrelated cannot be equated (without some form of adequate qualification and accommodation). 
	The problem still remains, although only perhaps a philosophical one, as to how we can perceive an act of sequential calculation effecting, as it does, a relatively spontaneous product of judgment that in itself is not undergoing, as a judgment, a process of calculation (unless the relative successfulness, or otherwise, of the previous act of judgment is itself now subject to a process of an evaluation). It would seem that it is through the suspension of the act of calculation that the facticity of the judgmental response might possibly arise!?
	Other problems concern the terms of reference for our evaluation and how we might measure the actual or possible successfulness of our judgmental responses? Utilitarian criteria for the terms of reference are notoriously controversial. Are we to consider only our own benefit, or the benefit of some others, or all others (dead, alive and not yet born), or the facticity of the relationship itself or some or all other relationships directly or indirectly involved? Why should one person sacrifice themselves, or be sacrificed, for the welfare of a number of others? What benefit is there in this sacrifice to the victim of the sacrifice? On the other hand our intuition, especially for the philosophical novice, finds itself easily gravitating in some measure to some sort of utilitarian position, consciously or unconsciously. This stance is almost the unwritten blood of socialism and the sacrifices its asks of, or inflicts upon, its dependents as its adherents and executives exercise its various programmes in the fields of law, welfare, government, architecture, transport, entertainment, etc. Perhaps the current tendency to stress rights and freedoms, in keeping with the democratic spirit of our times, is inherent in this type of bias on the relativity of the situation rather than on its phenomenological fundamentals essential to that particular situation (and situation type?)?
	The key to a resolution of these various problems and puzzles, I believe, lies in a phenomenological analysis of the activity of judgment and in the general manner the process of judgmental pre-calculation is enacted (assuming a common phenomenological form underlying all `acts' of judgment). Although it is not appropriate in the terms of this paper to do justice to this subject in the confines of these last few pages let me select some relevant aspects for our consideration (from another perspective not considered elsewhere in other papers on the subject of value, etc.).

A Phenomenological Description Of Judgment

	What is judgment? Obviously judgments are made. As a type of mental process judgments must be conducted in real time and yet as previously suggested the delivery of the end result of an act of judgment appears to be effectively spontaneous and only initiated with the suspension of an act of calculation. One of the criticisms made by the deontologist about their pragmatic brethren is that they calculate, are calculators, and the negative connotation of this expression is drawn or implied. Calculation is seen as a sequential process involving mini-judgments (which in turn must also involve their own mini-suspensions?). The process of calculations would appear to demand an act of judgment central to its process-being but on the surface the act of calculation qua calculation would appear to demand the cognitive manipulation of concepts of an interrelatable form. This form is either common to the parties present or relatable through some kind of transformational isomorphism.
	Now for interaction to take place it would appear to involve a reciprocal exchange of information between the parties concerned. By what means can this information be exchanged? Can we make some analogical parallels with the reciprocity of gift-giving/receiving necessary in human interaction?
	Let us for the sake of convenience suppose we have a hypothetical relationship being mentally entertained between two conceptual parties. In what form could reciprocity take place in this relational space that involves these two participants? Let us assume that this exchange involves some form of communication, packages of data, transmitted and received between and by these two parties. Now some of the preconditions for this exchange would appear to involve a number of necessary factors? Let me note the more obvious and more essential facets in this mutual hypothetical transmission and reception that I believe necessary for this process of relational communication. First, a common medium must be established for this process of communication. Second, information must be sequentially encoded in this medium. Third, this encoded encapsulation of information must be transmitted and then received through a synchronicity or paralleling of interaction. This latter point demands some form of recognition and synchronization by the second party if only in the terms of reference necessary for this process of relational communication and comprehension. Fourth, this informational data itself must be in a state of interrelationship with the medium of transmission. Last, a reversed process of de-encoding, anti-sequentialization, must be undergone in order to cognitively receive this information as information. Once this information is retrieved and recognized as such the process of communication now comes to a conclusion with a recognition of the nature of the relationship undergone at least actively by the second party. The implication being that the process of appreciation involved in the recognition of informational transfer itself cannot be sequential but essentially parallel to the process of encoding/de-encoding.
	The medium for communication could be likened to a wave of a certain frequency or frequency pattern. Information is encoded in this wave without destroying the essential character of this wave as the medium of transfer. Then on the reception of this medium the fundamental pattern of the wave is then extracted to reveal the informational elements encoded therein. These informational elements as informational elements themselves need to be interpreted in some form of informational context or contrast which in itself is effectively a meta-medium to the original medium. Implicated in such a hierarchy of encoded patterns is the parallelization of processes of sequentialization and anti-sequentialization. The point being made in this analysis suggesting that parallel-like processes are simultaneously underpinning processes of sequentialization, that in effect parallel-like judgmental processes are simultaneously related to and underpinning processes of sequential-like calculation. That in a sense judgment is the inverse or reverse of calculation and vice versa.
	An important point to make is that informational transfer is asymmetric in a similar fashion to the giving and acceptance of a gift and/or obligation in human reciprocity. An identical simultaneous exchange of data would or should lead to a canceling of that informational exchange, a process that would expose only the medium itself in its nakedness to the full stare of our inspection. On the other hand some degree of intentional synchronicity, but not necessarily temporal synchronicity, is necessary to ground that informational exchange. Hence our ability to read books and the ancient inscription of long lost civilizations that no longer can physically talk to us in the flesh.
	As discussed in a previous paper, it was argued all higher epistemological or psychological functions in the hierarchically structured psyche necessitate the balance, i.e. suspension, of all lower processes in this overall process of appreciation. Under such conditions relevant or essential components could interact equally in a state of ongoing harmony and enter into processes of reciprocity or interaction necessary to establish the facticity of that relationship. These essential components could be treated as the relevant informational elements vital to the performance of this act of interaction. In a phenomenological investigation, in an act of suspensional balance, these essential components in the metaphorical body of the relationship can be allowed to freely interact without some form of external distortion or influence, be able to be virtually dissected from such a medium and also be allowed to effect a merger or summation in the form of a resultant much in the manner that forces can be vectorized. These three phases or aspects can be seen to parallel the phenomenological expressions of the transcendental suspension, transcendental reduction and the transcendental constitution or re-constitution of the meaning and/or meaningfulness of that relationship under investigation. By reconstitution is implied the ability of the investigator to reproduce, given the same essential pre-conditions, the resultant interaction, or judgment, on retrospection.
	I would maintain, in summing up this analysis, that these three moments of suspension, reduction and constitution or re-constitution are not only the dominant hallmarks of an act of judgment but also the important phases undergone in an act of phenomenological investigation and that between the two there is very little difference other than in the sophistication of the intentions directing this process of appreciation. The point of this identification implying that if we were to subject an act of ethical appreciation to the scrutiny of our phenomenological discernment we should arrive at an understanding that realizes the necessary cooperation between acts of pragmatic-like evaluation or calculation and apparent spontaneous parallelization of acts of judgment in all their spontaneity and sense of completion. In effect, it is my firm belief, that a critical phenomenological appreciation of ethical situations and the moral judgments therein executed, consciously or unconsciously, should reveal the necessary co-presence of spontaneous deontological intuitions and sequential acts of calculation (as pre-judgmental material in cognitive form subject to all the degrees of suspension necessary to finalize an act of judgmental discernment). To use a metaphor deontological and pragmatical tendencies are like the parallel tracks of a trainline with each track being necessary for the train to safely arrive at its destination. Superficial logical analysis is the wedge that drives a rift between these two aspects of the judgmental psyche in its epistemological construction and its only through a more dialectical-like appreciation that the damage and distortion of such a dispute can be subjected to a process of rectification or i.e. resolutional overcoming.
	In a later paper I shall discuss a practicalization of a philosophy that deals with processes of transcendental phenomenological suspension, reduction, and re-constitution. Like confronting the different directions that could be taken at a crossroad we can note the role played by these four attitudes for the resolution of a dilemma as discussed in the introduction to this paper. 

Conclusion

	Like the train running safely along the parallel tracks laid down for it we can see how in this dilemma between the deontologist and the pragmatist that both intuition and calculation must simultaneously go hand in hand although each aspect is, in a certain sense, also the inverse or reverse of the other. To appreciate the constitution of a judgment its content has to be simulated or re-constituted and this necessitates an unraveling, or reduction, and a re-assembly, or re-constitution, of the essential elements in that relational space of involvement (those essential elements receiving their essentiality only in terms of what is relevant to that relationship or in an appreciation of that relationship). To effect these stages of specific emphasis necessitates our passage swinging backwards and forwards more in one direction and then more in the other, etc. until the process is brought to the finality of its apparent completion or conclusion.
	No doubt in certain types of ethical decision making an emphasis could be placed more on one direction than on the other. E.g. in engineering construction pragmatic concerns might more naturally dominate the proceedings, whilst, in a close inter-personal relationship deontological criteria should perhaps be more allowed to establish the ongoing integrity of that relationship in keeping with the nature or spirit of that relationship?
	Then, in those situations where we do find an intense conflict between deontological and pragmatic considerations perhaps we should more sit back and do nothing in the hope these matters naturally resolve themselves as is often the case for the natural person living in this world of life or life-world. Perhaps the postponement of our decision making might allow us to clarify our pragmatic territory pre-conditional to the spontaneity experienced in the revelation or insight of the judgmental response in its appropriate appropriation of the ethical situation to hand. Moreover, the delivery of judgment is given to us in a suspension of calculation and in a suspension and balance of all other facets other than judgmental considerations. By suspension must be meant a bracketing of all value-judgments whether they be ethical, existential or ontical, aesthetical, pragmatical, thematical or trans-thematical, etc., or, a neutralization of any undue emphasis given pre-judgmentally to those essential factors necessary for our appreciation of the situation to hand.
	Lastly, sometimes dilemmas should be seen for what they often are, namely, logical divisions and exercises in divisiveness that stand in no need of direct action other than in our relative active non-action. Indeed, in our moving on through life an acquired richness of being obtained through our digestion of our experiences, i.e. subjected to self-critical existential reflection, eventually allows us to better appreciate and face the dilemmas that all too frequently thrust themselves upon us. Often, however, this visitation is unwittingly at our request or invitation through some form of logical exclusitivity, although, I might add, the recognition of the dilemma as a dilemma is itself a step halfway along the road of resolution that allows us to contemplate a possible overcoming of the same. It would be my contention that through its formulation a question asked is already half answered. In this regard let us attempt to just define those areas of our existence that are currently problematic for us, and for others, that in the goodness of time, in a state of suspension, having maintained our faith and the resignation of our struggle, we find as our reward that these things naturally come to resolve themselves for us. 
	Therefore we should be, and remain, receptive to the spirit of those relationships we enter into in the hope that they be not too harsh in their evaluation of us in all our imperfection and perfection, show us the path that leads us to their fulfillment and, therein, their valuation of us as persons deserving of concern and care. Happily let us experience the caresses of our relationships as they put us in touch with a world of serendipity and discovery, a world of revelation and insight. In effect allowing us to re-experience an immaterial world of value superimposed upon the re-presentation of this world of the material with all its limitations in time and space, and restrictions of causality and ego. Through the investment and re-investment of such patience, tenacity and receptivity naturally present in our relationships the world again becomes or, rather, is seen to remain, an existential world for us of enchantment pregnant with unlimited value, meaning and meaningfulness.

	    	    Noël Tointon in Sydney and Leura, 3/6/90.

Appendix I

Deontological				  Pragmatism/Utilitarian

Sense of duty.				  Sense of utility. 

	(religious/social/personal/political/institutional).

Inclined to deal in absolutes.  Relativity/relativism.

Generally its own reward.	  Ensures reward external to 								  ethical event.

Intutitional				  Consequential/evaluative 
									calculation.

Recollection - through		  Re-evaluation of 				exposure to situation types                  calculation.
plus interpretation.

Consistency re situation-	  Inconsistency re situ-						type.	         	ation, situationally									dependent.

Valued for self-feeling		  Valued for other-feeling			in re-evaluation.          		in re-evaluation.
	
Potential sacrifice of self.	  Potential sacrifice of 												other.

Principles seen as basic,	  Principles not seen as 			essentially treated.		basic, existentially 										perceived.

Appendix II - Four Attitudes In Response To A Dilemma

1.	Accept one options but deny other option(s).
2.	Accept both/all options.
3.	Deny both/all options + inactive non-action.
4.	Deny both/all options + active non-action.

Note: The phenomenological response is that of suspension.