Meditations On The Simulation Of Value

	In this paper a series of meditations will explore the nature of simulated value, the nature of the relationship between the simulation of reality and the reality of that simulation and the means open to the person in the world as to how they might differentiate the former state of affairs from the latter. The first half of this paper will investigate various situations of simulation while the second half will attempt to phenomenologically differentiate these apparently parallel types of phenomena. 

I 	 A Series of Meditations on the Simulation of Value

1.	The Personal Delusion

	Once, some time ago, I met a lady who was a patient in a psychiatric hospital who, that particular day, believed she was a horse. Unfortunately for her she was extremely overweight and was terrified that she was being entered in the Melbourne Cup, due to run in a few days time, because she believed, quote, "my little legs won't take me." She was obviously in a state of distress, tears streamed down her cheeks and to all obvious purposes appeared to believe in the veracity of her predictions, namely, that she was a horse, that she was being entered in this year's Melbourne Cup which was about to meet and that her little legs would not take her very overweight condition. It was pointed out to her that she had only two legs, that horses have four and that therefore she could not be a horse. But alas to no avail, ostensively the woman appeared to believe in her fantasy and the impending predicament therein entertained.
	Although adamant that she was a horse yet some of the features of herself as a person were transferred in this delusion. She was a horse, she would affirm, but like the body of this person who made this absurd claim she continued to see herself as having small short legs and as being very overweight. In these two regards her self-appreciation was extremely accurate. One is reminded in this respect of the Taoist anecdote of the man who dreamt he was a butterfly who on waking wasn't quite sure whether he was a person dreaming that he a butterfly or a butterfly dreaming he was a man? In both states the image of a person as a male enters both alternatives, albeit, as a real person and as a dream person. It is also an interesting phenomenon to observe that when questioning these people, who voice these preposterous claims and their delusional systems, that they become visibly uneasy when the logic of their claim is shown not to accord or harmonize with reality using no more than an analysis of their very own speech reports. Although, equally, we must not expect to beat them using logical argument. You cannot win when you argue with their psychosis, inevitably they will get round by some means or other to restating their initial premises. However in an obvious state of inner uneasiness they will often vehemently deny the import of your logical demonstration and/or in no uncertain terms tell you to remove your doubting self from their presence. In this latter aspect I am reminded of one patient who was convinced he was Louis the 14th, the Sun King, and when asked if he could speak French quite quickly and imperiously told me "it was none of my (expletive deleted) business" and it was obvious to all that my audience was now terminated. 
	It would be my contention, therefore, that however deluded the person is as to the value of themselves as they come to evaluate themselves as persons in the world in their heart of hearts, or mind of minds, they still knew quite well the real truth of their predicament. One way of confirming or demonstrating some residual insight was to ask the following type of question - "if you were in my shoes and had just listened to what you had just told me would you be somewhat skeptical perhaps?" Often such skepticism was evinced indicating there was some form of recognition that all was not as stated, that in essence their perception of self in this world recognized in a detached manner a number of self-created discordant features.
	In the next meditation I want to examine the case of a simulated bank hold up. 

2.	The Simulated Bank Hold Up

	Imagine if you would it was your intention to simulate, and only simulate, a bank hold up. You proceed to your bank of choice and with a very good reproduction of a hand gun go about the whole affair as if it were the real thing. You hand the teller a note that this is bank hold up and I am sure people are not going to stop to think is this person simulating a bank hold up or is a real bank hold up in progress? If appearances suggest the real thing then people are going to act as if it were the real thing. In the process people could have heart attacks, get shot by armed guards and the person simulating the hold up might themselves be heroically wrestled, placed in an effective hold and parted from their reproduction firearm, perhaps injured or worse. On the other hand they might succeed too well and find themselves leaving the bank with a considerable sum of money. For how long is the simulation to continue? With a successful get away might not the simulator reconsider whether the whole affair was a simulation or not?
	For some variations on this theme let us suppose some of the following events occurred during the simulation of this bank hold up. Let us imagine the note handed to the teller reads that this is a simulation of a bank hold up? Is the teller going to believe this note when they find a gun pointing menacingly at them. I doubt it very much. 
	Perhaps the person leaves a note with a friend to the effect that their hold up is only a simulation for x reason. However the damage has been done, people were inconvenienced or worse, and it is a role of the courts to recognize intentions to deceive whether good, bad or indifferent. On this subject I am reminded of a court case in my own home town where an elderly gentleman used a sausage strategically placed about their person under their long rain coat in such a manner calculated to give offense to the elderly ladies of a genteel disposition walking about the township. It was true that no offending part of the person itself was on display but it was also obvious to the judge that it was the intention of this man to deceive female folk in to thinking that such was the case. Consequently the courts treated the simulation of the offense as if indeed it was executed in fact and his sentence was arranged accordingly. Likewise the existence of a note stating the intention to deceive would not of itself lessen the gravity of the offense. Moreover, how do we know that the note itself is not part of the general deception planted there as an escape route should the whole affair go awry. Throughout the affair in its preparation, execution and consequences we would, it would appear, have no way to safely and quickly differentiate the reality from the simulation? In a sense, in hindsight, we might suspect that reality seems to seep over into the field of the simulation and vice versa. Indeed, we have the confrontation of the reality of the simulation and the simulation of the reality to contend with without the permanent presence of an absolute and self-apparent boundary between the same.
	Let us examine the following variation. Suppose the hold up went successfully but then the apparent thief some hours later returned the proceeds of this robbery with a note to the effect that the whole affair was in truth merely a deception. How would we know, given such facts, that the robbery was indeed a simulation and that the return of the proceeds was not an unplanned response to a feeling guilty on the part of the thief? Can we ever recover the true intentions of one person by some other? For a phenomenologist whose whole profession revolves around the stated intersubjective orientated investigation of phenomena do we have here an objection that strikes at the very heart of phenomenology?

3.	Simulation of Sleep

	Let us assume it is our role as a nurse to observe the sleeping behaviour of our patients. It is an observed fact that often in depression and other psychiatric disorders there are recognizable and distinctive disturbances of sleep whose patterns of disturbance are both symptomatic and diagnostic of their associated disorder. We are asked by a doctor to observe the sleeping pattern of a particular patient who also is a diabetic. The doctor's provisional diagnosis is unclear and in order to help differentiate a definite diagnosis from a number of current possibilities he asks for your cooperation in this observation. The doctor somewhat despairs of ever being able to differentiate their diagnosis in regards to this particular patient and so asks for your careful observation in this matter. On such information he will no doubt be more able to detail is general plan of treatment.
	First we note that the ward is relatively quiet and that the patient is comfortable, etc. on retiring. An hour later and in passing we look carefully to see if this patient is in fact asleep or is awake or only pretending to be asleep. They look rested, their eyes are shut and they appear to be asleep. They might even be gently snoring. We mention their name ever so softly and ask them if they are awake? We find no answer is made to our whispered request. Perhaps they really are awake, simulate a mild case of snoring and have no intention of letting us know the real state of affairs? We could connect them to a machine and get them to push a button every quarter hour to signal that they are awake. However it might well be that they wish not to cooperate in this monitoring. Then again such a device might actually be counter-productive to them getting a normal night's sleep in the patient's determination to stay awake and demonstrate this self-apparent fact of their existence.
	As a nurse we find ourselves looking ever closer and closer to the behaviour of our subjects (and controls). To determine whether this particular patient, who is a severe diabetic is asleep or pretending to be asleep, is merely asleep or in a state of coma we decide to use a sharp pin and administer it, the patient's permission having already been obtained by the doctor for this procedure should the occasion appear to necessitate it. The patient wakes up ruling out a potentially comotosed condition. However, how do we know that the reality of our observations and tests conducted were not effectively in the hands of the patient themselves and in the appearance of waking they merely simulated an awakening, e.g. On all counts as things appear to stand the possibility forever arises that we cannot absolutely differentiate an act of sleeping from the simulation of an act of sleep, be able to differentiate a genuine act of awakening and the simulation of an act of awakening?

4.	The Nervous Actor - The Nervous Character

	In a dramatic scene calling for the actor to simulate anger the question could be asked "are they angry?" Most people might say, if they were seeing a good actor, that all apparent anger was only being simulated. However, I am sure that if a particular emotion is repeated often enough, even if only simulated to begin with, that in the final analysis it would begin to pervade the personality regardless of original intentions? But what measures can we put in play to determine this discrimination that would informs us as to where the personality of the actor begins, and ends, and as to where the personality of the character as that character begins, and ends.
	Consider the following situations with a theme similar to the above, namely...

1.	A nervous actor in a non-nervous role,
2.	A nervous actor in a nervous role,
3.	A non-nervous actor in a non-nervous role,
4. 	A non-nervous actor in a nervous role.

	How are we to differentiate these four possibilities? Might it be the case that a nervous actor is not a good actor? Then I have heard it said in converse form that without some degree of nervous energy, and the harnessing of this raw energy, the actor would be a poor actor, someone rather mechanical and non-convincing in their character portrayal.
	A similar situation presents itself in the midst of a play or film that is itself dealing with the lives of actors and actresses and where it is implied or explicitly stated that one or more of the characters is a poor actor. Does the situation arise that in simulating a poor actor the actor realizes a poor performance of someone that cannot act? In effect undermining the quality of their own performance? Or can the really good actor simulate a bad actor with great skill without our feeling that this person cannot act at any level of their performance? No doubt a similar question arises in the type of puzzle that states that "if an actor is thinking about their acting whilst they are acting are they a good actor or merely good at thinking about being a good actor, etc?" A parallel situation would seem to arise in the case of a fisherman preoccupied in their thinking about their catching of a fish to find that that fish has had more than enough time to get away in the meantime? Being authentic seems to imply a spontaneity, sensitivity and non-manipulation of the relational situation to hand. Let me tentatively define authenticity as our  being or doing what is to hand spontaneously, without cognitive-discursive deliberation or prejudgment, in such a manner that is in keeping with the nature of the relational situation as it finds itself manifested in the world. Such openness and sensitivity would appear to demand a certain equal degree of ongoing absorption and detachment on our part in our attention or concentration along with the degree of selflessness that goes hand in hand with such an existential attitude? But let me develop this point elsewhere and continue in these meditations on the simulation of value.

5.	The Simulation of the Genuine

	A situation that has confronted me on a number of occasions is the determination of the genuineness of some antique or antiquity. Often I know what the object is meant to be but through no direct acquaintance with genuine examples of this category of artifact I am find myself left in a position of not being able to immediately decide one way or the other. More often than not my knowledge extends no further than the information that this type of artifact has been in a number of quarters subjected to some degree of reproduction. How are we to determine the difference between the fake and the real thing? What if a fake oil painting is executed so well in period materials as to fool the so called experts? Not only is this painting executed in authentic materials in an `authentic' style but the successfulness of the work as a work of art is very much admired. Numerous books eventually note the importance of this piece and as far as the art-world is concerned it is and must be genuine. The particular owner of it, whether a person or an institution, would be extremely proud of their acquisition and give it the pride of place in the display of their collection. Its successfulness is so great that many people would loose face if the micro-signature of the faker was to be detected and brought to the attention of this art-world. To all purposes as thing presently stand this painting is now very much a part of that art-world and being as good as the real thing would it make much difference if it was eventually caught out and its true identity revealed? In all current considerations the painting is taken to be genuine and as a genuine work in that associated genre it takes on the appearance of proudly taking its place as if indeed it were a genuine piece. Being accepted at apparent face value it has become by virtue of the successfulness of its intentional manufacture to be an exercise in deception in the art-world that it must present itself as a genuine work of art in this world of art. That being the case it makes little difference at the moment in our treatment of it, as to whether it was genuine or not, and that being so it may as well be genuine. Of course if this deception is to be discovered then its simulation would be recognized as a simulation in value to be, alas, more admired no doubt for the artistry of its faking than for the originality of its presentation as an instance of a work in the style of...
	Sometimes this element of the non-genuine or the not genuine is discovered in one or two of our friends in a circle of friends that we might find ourselves associated with. All appearances have suggested in the past that our apparent friend x is indeed someone with integrity and who participates in acts of apparent friendship with all the personal affection and authenticity that would be expected from such a good friend. Little did we realize that their motives were neither transparent nor concerned about ourselves as their friend. Their concern was neither with us nor, more correctly, the relationship or relational situation. A great loss is felt when it comes to our realization that the real motives of this so called friend were primarily with their own self-interests or the interests of someone else for whom they worked as agents. In that moment of insight into the intentions of that other person we now come to re-evaluate this simulation of friendship for what it was, namely, a fake friend going through the motions of a friendship but actively seeking their own direct or indirect self-interest or advancement.

6.	Do Witches Exist - The Magic of Appearance?

	If we were to ask someone the apparently simple question "do witches exist?" how would we interpret their answer? What meaning would be ascribed to either an affirmation or a negation? If they said "yes" would this mean that they believe witches exist or that they believed that there exist some people who believe they are witches leaving open the question as to whether they were real witches, self-deluded witches or people attempting to practice as witches or that any of the former did once exist? If they said "no" would that mean no real witches, no self-deluded witches, no people attempting to practice as witches or that none of the former ever existed? A complex question like this should deserve our full presuppositional analysis.
	However, for the sake of convenience and for the sake of argument let us accept that the person questioned believes in real witches, that they believe that they currently exist, and that they themselves believe themselves to be a witch having been chosen or nominated, or so they believe, by their mother, by their cat, by dark forces, by The Dark One or by whomsoever. It would seem to follow that if for you a certain phenomenon exists, and that belief is practically unshakable, then for you that phenomenon does exist. It is probable that some of the witches burnt at the stake in those orgies of killings that took place in European history, much to its shame, actually believed they were witches and that having been exposed recognized the fate that society then meted out to this type of persons. Then others, caught up in the terror of the interrogation in conjunction with peer group pressure came in time to perceive themselves as witches if for no other reason than they must have been in order to deserved the terrible fate that had now inescapably fallen upon them. Their extracted confession merely legitamizing this barbaric exercise of public opinion which, more often than not, was being manipulated by a minority for the political and religious ends of allied fraternities. Confession merely sped up the arrival of the inevitable punishment terminating the torture, euphemistically known as relaxation, that was to extract their necessary confession. Of course the so called witches themselves, usually women, did not benefit much from the actual confession extracted from them but it would be used as confirmation for society that in their midst this dreaded phenomenon was in existence but yet, at the same time perhaps, being controlled by the powers of these righteous concerned folk who have made it their task to combat these forces of darkness and at the same time turn it to their own benefit and the benefit of other factions who profited in these power games? 
	The point that I would like to make in this argument is that if a certain phenomenon exists for you, and those around you, and various signs are given as evidence for this interpretation, then for you, and those around you, that hold this same point of view that evidence then reinforces the conviction then that phenomenon does in truth exist. This is an important point in phenomenology for we must first suspect that a certain phenomenon exists, seek its evidence, in order to more closely examine its appearance or presence, and v.v. At the end of the day if that phenomenon does exist then for you that phenomenon exists as an imputed fact in this world regardless of its ontical status as an actual fact in the world. If witches exist for you then witches must exist in your vision of the world! In the light of this problem we can ask ourselves the disturbing question, for the phenomenologist, as to how they might establish a distinctive type of phenomenon when the very evidence given or found to establish the same is also necessary to establish the very existence of that phenomenon? Is the phenomenon of the-world-there-for-us nothing more than an interpretation of a series of distinctive appearances, an interpretation of a series of interpretations?
	If reality is little more than a re-interpretation of an interpretation can we maintain an appearance-reality distinction at any level in our philosophical investigations?
	When we observe a professional magician we expect to be hoodwinked into believing certain situations to be not as they are made to seem or to be as they are made to seem not... We interpret reality in a natural fashion and then find ourselves holding a different or contradictory opinion? The assistant enters the trunk, its locked and then before our very own eyes it appears to be sawn in half. Then miraculously the illusion is then undone, the trunk unlocked and the assistant is found to be able to emerge intact.
	Is such magic nothing more than a re-interpretation of an interpretation, and the undoing of that trick, when and where applicable, nothing more than a re-interpretation of that re-interpretation, etc? Are we left with merely interpretations, or i.e. appearances, and if that is the case what philosophical meaning through contrast can we give these interpretations or appearances. To this end what would be non-appearances, non-interpretations, i.e. those limitations that give our sense of appearance or an interpretation the sense of being an appearance, or an interpretation and thence an intimation of reality, or being that better interpretation which more effectively represents that which is real? Let us now meditate upon our series of meditations in order to clarify the general phenomenon of our experiencing a simulation of reality to be a simulation of reality.

A Phenomenological Meditation Upon The Simulation Of Reality

1.	The Personal Delusion

	The phenomenologist deals, either directly or indirectly, with phenomenal presentations. An appreciation of such necessitates their interpretation and this interpretation is conducted either formally or informally. By formal is implied their description and public expression through the form of some text whether written down or merely recited or announced. In this latter mode the phenomenologist is effectively an interpreter of a text rather than an interpreter of their own non-textual performance. To this extent public phenomenology is effectively a question of hermeneutics. 
	In the interpretation of phenomenal material the approach the phenomenologist decides to bring to this material is as important as the critical procedures adopted that form the foundations of the phenomenological method. The phenomenologist must refine both their critical methods and approaches to the task to hand in the light of each other balancing both the science and the artfulness of their pursuit. To do this the phenomenologist effectively subjects their critical phenomenological methods themselves to the scrutiny of a phenomenological investigation and it is through this approach that the phenomenologist establishes and preserves the transcendental nature of their overall investigation, refining in the process both their theoretical and practical methodologies. Through a sympathetic appreciation of the nature of their investigations to hand they will come, hopefully, to adopt the most productive form of approach in the pursuit of each particular applied phenomenological investigation. This refinement is, or should be, mutual and this degree of mutuality in the thematization of our method and approach establishes the degree of criticality in our overall phenomenologically conducted investiga-tional process.
	This textual presentation and interpretation of the phenomenal presentation cannot be construed at this stage as being phenomenologically conducted but that re-presented as the material for a phenomenological examination, in effect such material is already constituted before our investigations are to be conducted. The task of the phenomenologist is to re-constitute this pre-phenomenological investigational constitution and therein come to some degree of essential understanding as to the both the significance of that examined and its place in the world. Through such an investigation the phenomenologist must question both the integrity of their material and the integrity of their reflections. In a dis-integration of the psyche the associated gestalten brought before the conscious awareness are so constituted in such a manner as to reflect this degree of overall gestalt integration or disintegration. In order to appreciate these phenomenal presentations and/or their textual instantiations we must  be in the possession of the necessary degree of psychic integration in order to subject such appearances to the necessary degree of depth which in turn necessitates the necessary degree of psychic detachment or transcendental distance. Without this necessary degree of adequate transcendental detachment our very existence would be like going to the theatre and watching the performance there as if it were the real thing and not merely the simulation of some possible world.
	In the state of psychosis there is some disturbance, according to my analysis, in the manner information about the world, ourselves and the relationship between these two poles is organized and processed. To a certain degree, reflecting the severity of the psychosis, this material suffers a lack of depth for the person so disturbed. Presentations become more appearances to be interpreted at face value. Fantasy ceases to seen as fantastic and perceptual reality looses that hard edge where our own wishful thinking is enjoyed but not mistaken for being present even if presented to the person by the person as if it were present. Through a lose of depth the manner or mode of presentation itself becomes confused or lost. On the other hand we must also recognize various processes at work that will attempt to compensate in counter-reaction for such a lose of gestalt integrity. Although some considerable degree of integrity may be lost (unless consciousness is completely shattered as in deep sleep, coma or in death) some degree of awareness must persist as to what degree reality is actively being simulated. When the person is not in touch with such an ability we are inclined to perceive them, rightly or wrongly, as being in a state of psychosis or similar. However, this does not imply that our powers to appreciate the reality of phenomena, i.e. their synthetic and contextual integrity, is completely potentialized or de-actualized. We must remember that in our questioning of the psychotic and allied states of mental disturbance some degree of depth must persist in their appreciation of their phenomenal presentations, i.e. some degree of transcendental  distance must persist however ineffective its contribution in the living of their life in this world.
	The point of this observation, re fluctuations in the degree of integrity in our gestalt organization of consciousness, is to realize that the degree of psychic-gestalt integration present will equally be found reflected in our consciously entertained gestalten. That it is only with an adequate degree of integration can the necessary depth be brought to the subject of our investigations. Both the presentation of that material and the quality of our reflections on that material will reflect this degree of psychic integration. That without an adequate degree of depth or transcendental distance our investigations will not be able to differentiate between the reality of any simulation and the simulation of a particular reality. To this extent psychosis and dreaming are on par except for the fact that one is conducted in a state of wakefulness and the other in a particular state of sleepfulness. In this light the quality of the presentation will reflect this degree of integration present and possibly the degree and type of of compensation that might also be at work? In this regard we can review the delusional system as reflecting the activity of a compensatory mechanism that attempts to re-create value in a psychic world being subjected to a simultaneous loss in coherence and in value.
	As a consequence of this observation the phenomenologist must ensure there is no unaccounted loss of integrity in both the material presented for investigation and the manner in which that phenomenological reflection is to be conducted. A close attention to the integrity of the interpretation presented should reveal this state of psychic integrity. The ability to differentiate the simulation of reality from the reality of the simulation allowing us to assume that sufficient gestalt powers of discernment are present.
	To be able to separate the simulation of reality from the reality of the simulation necessitates at least a certain adequate degree of transcendental distance and it is through this depth brought to bear upon such presented situations that our phenomenal investigations, either non-textually or textually re-presented, can be treated as like an appearance capable of being re-interpreted. As long as the mind is capable of presenting such an integrated appearance to itself is it able to that extent realize, in theory at least, the nature of that presentation as a presentation. All acts of phenomenological examination involve the investigative re-constitution of this prior synthesis. Re-constitution being seen in the light of the approach adopted for the process of this phenomenological re-constitution.

2. The Simulated Bank Hold Up

	To some degree, by virtue of the fact that a simulation is itself a reality in this world, albeit as a simulation, that the reality and the simulation can seep over into each others' realm of being or regional space. How de we determine then one from the other? My simple reply to this question would involve the following provisional observation, namely, as appearances can be interpreted so too can appearances be re-interpreted. To determine one state from the other necessitates in effect our closer attention to the processes and content of the presentation itself or its textual instantiation and our appreciation of the manner or mode of that presentation through an examination of its context of introduction. By following more closely upon the presentation itself and its context given enough time and research we should be able to arrive at a satisfactory solution in this regard.
	Let us reflect upon the following situation. Suppose a film is being shot with a sequence being done in a real bank. This sequence involves a hold up scene which is just about to be shot. On this particular day you happen to be working as usual next door to the bank. You now take your lunch break and as you need to go to the bank you choose the branch next door. As you walk there you are thinking about the complexity of banking that needs to be performed. First make a withdrawal, then pay the mortgage and the bankcard, then arrange some foreign money to be sent overseas, etc. At the side entrance to the bank you are met by two security guards. They notice you are wearing the security pass of your firm and not reading it too closely, mistake it for one of theirs. This particular bank happens to be for this hour closed but you wander on in not realizing this fact. You sit down at the nearest vacant desk to fill in your various forms, etc. Suddenly three masked bank robbers enter shooting, pointing their guns at the ceiling. You are told in no uncertain terms to lie on the ground and not move. You quickly do so, terrified. You wonder why the lights in the bank are rather hot? After five minutes of this high drama you then hear a voice yell "cut". Another voice congratulates the robbers on their performance and you then realize that you accidentally entered a film set. You rather sheepishly go over to the teller and ask "is the bank not open after all?" The producer of the movie overhears you and then quickly realizes he needs your cooperation for the next scene involving the exit of these three bank robbers. 
	In your continuing to experience this tableau a point was realized that allowed you to better appreciate what actually was taking place. In the same way the movie producer comes to a reappraisal of the previous scene's shooting to realize that a key body in the crowd scene would be missing in the next scene's take and asks if this poor passerby might stay on for the shooting of this next scene, for a small fee of course. Our reluctant and shy actor gives their assent and this time, although not a real actor, will attempt to act whereas in the previous scene his response to the reality for him was in no way simulated.
	The moral of this anecdote is that as we can never find the reality behind appearances we can only come to better appreciate the nature of those appearances and the nature of the context that presents those appearances. In like measure the phenomenologist, or the hermeneutic interpreter, can take only what is presented and the context of that presentation to account in the execution of their research. The nature of our investigation reflecting the manner of our examination and the type of approach we adopt in the development of this examination.

3.	The Simulation of Sleep

	In the observation of someone seemingly asleep we should find ourselves armed with a reasonable wealth of self-experience and other-experience in the determination of just such a matter. Indeed, normally each day we spend some time in a state of sleep and often witness the same phenomenon in the daily life of others. Not that all people sleep the same but, from experience, it is my belief that if all other things be equal the way people sleep overall often appears to be much the same from one period of sleep to the next. On the other hand if someone wishes to appear to be asleep they present themselves as they think you would find them if they were asleep. Perhaps the personality of the person is revealed when they do sleep? One thing is sure, however, given a lengthy period of time, say a week, the person must go to sleep and therein be observed on various occasions during this interval as to how they would normally appear to sleep when they do go to sleep. Of course we could monitor their brain patterns, respiration patterns, eye-movements, etc. Such closer observation merely reinforcing the stability of this phenomenon of the apparent sleep of others. Through a recognition of this inner necessity in our daily lives we find ourselves allowed to speculate that some of our observations of others are going to involve for them periods of real sleep. People that complain about a lack of sleep are often unreliable in their evaluation of this repeated phenomenal occurrence. They either have a misconception about how much sleep they should have, need or deserve, or, report a poor quality of sleep often adding a statement as to how they feel or felt upon awakening. Thus in this regard we must note a distinction between an objective quantitative assessment and a subjective qualitative assessment of sleep. It is for the individual themself, or some other person, to work out a relationship between these two facets of practically the same phenomenon. If we were having a conversation with someone and it is late at night and we find them going to sleep on us, or have indeed gone to sleep, we find the nature of our relationship with them changes. It is through this change in our interaction with them that we are entitled to believe that the other person has entered some other state of being or at least recognize a change in state in the nature of the relationship. In a simulation of sleep we are met with a change in the nature of our interaction with them. On closer examination we should find ourselves eventually in a position of being able to determine with some considerable degree of accuracy whether the apparent state of affairs is simulated or not, or at least allowing ourselves to just wait and let the reality of the phenomenon more or less establish itself. In this regard we look for some degree of stability in the general or local expression or presentation of that particular phenomenon. It is in this relativity of stability that a particular phenomenon is observed as that particular phenomenon, repetition of this state of affairs reinforcing our convictions in this regard.

4. 	The Nervous Actor - The Nervous Character

	On going to the theatre we find ourselves witnesses to a performance of an actor that is superb in that particular role. A friend who accompanies us to this performance, knowing this actor reasonably well scoffs and says "but he is like that in real life. He is not really acting he is just being himself." How are we going to determine if this actor is a good actor? As an actor can one just be oneself in the enactment of the play? Could a character be exactly the same as oneself? Obviously good acting in one role does not make a good actor. A good actor is someone who can accomplish a number of roles successfully. A successful actor is someone who can simulate a number of roles successfully. How does the actor simulate a role and what criteria allow us to evaluate the successfulness of that simulation?
	As in the case of the fisherperson who thinks about catching a fish and finds their discursive behaviour puts them at a disadvantage so likewise in the art of simulation thinking about the process of simulation might well, on the lines of this model, also put the actor or actress at some disadvantage. It would seem therefore that some spontaneity is called for in the artful performance of our intentional activity in this world. Such an appearance of spontaneity can not be just thought up. On the other hand intentional activity must to a certain extent be thought or intended? How do we resolve this apparent conflict between deliberation and spontaneity?
	It would seem that any artist as an artist must maintain some degree of transcendental distance in the creation or re-creation of their artwork or the artwork of someone else. The audience to a performance in their review of this artwork as an artwork must maintain likewise. We do not see the audience rushing for the exits in the battle scenes in some play, hiding under their seats or jumping up onto the stage to prevent some horrible murder from being simulated. Then again we note that in moments of high drama our concentration intensifies, our pulse increases, we might start to sweat, etc. All in all there is a contest between the illusion of reality and the reality of the illusion. Resolution of this contest is experienced, dependent upon the aesthetic quality of the play or artwork, in an aesthetic mode. We enter into the spirit of the simulation just as, no doubt, the good actor or actress must do likewise. 
	When we witness a very serious boxing match I find, and perhaps others might agree with me here, that the appearance of the match often ceases to seen as like a simulation or a series of appearances. We come to vicariously experience the pain of these two combatants and the illusion of a simulation is hard to maintain. On the other hand I find, and again others might agree with me here, that a staged wrestling match is more often that not like a piece of theatre with a considerable degree of simulation that cannot disguise the fact that a considerable degree of pain may well enter the performance. Either way we think we can come to some understanding as to the real intentions of the participants of this type of drama we may have just witnessed.
	Transcendental detachment or distance is exercised when a dynamic equilibrium is put in place between all conscious facets of our investigations. Focusing on some perceptual element, some emotion or pain, some idea or association, etc. all disestablish in equal measure to that degree of focus our degree of judgmental focus placed upon our entertainment of that situation to hand. In effect to that degree we entertain pre-judgmental judgment to that inverse degree are we able to enter an open state of judgment. Without a transcendental suspension of all forms of value we will find ourselves to that degree incapable of forming a true and satisfactory judgment of that situation to hand. Thus in reality the stipulation that a transcendental suspension must be in place before a process of phenomenal reflection can properly take place is none other than a recognition of the parallel psychological dynamics in the process of judgment. A transcendental suspension is exercised in present time consciousness through a dynamic equilibrium of all non-transcendental facets of the psyche. On the other hand the time consciousnesses of transcendental reduction and transcendental reconstitution are in effective respectively retrospective and prospective in intentional time-direction. Transcendental reconstitution seeing both the re-constitution or re-synthesis of that phenomenal state of affairs and its re-instatement in the world of lived experience. This sense of re-instatement being experienced along pragmatic lines through a sense of teleological harmony or consequential unfolding in harmony with, or appropriate to, that particular phenomenal state of affairs in its related environment. In essence artful simulation in tune with its environment is conducted through an ongoing transcendental suspension allowing for both the spontaneity of judgmental responses to appear and their being at the same time intentionally structured (through essential transcendental reductive analysis and transcendental re-synthesis and contextual re-instatement). An act of simulation committed with a degree of egoistical detachment, rather than with the distance of a transcendental detachment, cannot in the final analysis be conducted in good faith nor be other than superficially successful. A closer examination should expose both its superficial charm and its true one-sided non-existential intentionality. 

5.	The Simulation Of The Genuine

	In a like fashion the determination of a fake, whether in the form of a fake antique or a fake friend, etc. must be developed along the same lines as our evaluation of an act of simulation. Essentially this is conducted through adequate information and a correct process of reflection, an unprejudiced exercise of judgment, i.e. transcendental- phenomenological reflection. Such an examination necessitates an adequate degree of perspective which is pre-developed through an exposure to that which can act as a standard of authenticity in our discernment. Such discernment, in the field of art and antiquities, establishing the connoisseurship of that particular person. To a certain extent the person comes to experience the authenticity, or the degree of simulated authenticity, of that under current examination. 
	To determine the authenticity of an appearance, or series of appearances, we must enter into the spirit of those presentations. To do that we must put ourselves in a position to experienced not only their apparent manifestation but also their mode of presentation. However, the reality behind the appearance is correctly a myth. Phenomenal presentations are all we have to deal with. Only through a closer examination that experiences their constitution through the simulation or re-simulation of that constitution can we find ourselves in a position to live through such an experience that will allow us to evaluate this dimension of intentional authenticity or authenticity in our intentions. In our reflection upon that experience the necessary depth is gained to determined the authenticity of that re-constituted in our experience.
	In essence the act of phenomenal reflection mirrors the psychological process of judgment itself. In its phenomenological refinement we can discern three equally weighted moments although the acts of phenomenal reflection or judgment themselves are entered only through an act of transcendental suspension wherein all pre-judgments, all forms of value are bracketed, made inoperative, temporally paralyzed. Through the ongoing equilibrium preconditional to such a moment the mind is allowed to review previous judgments, entertain new ones in the light of the approach adopted for this task to hand. Once established transcendental reduction in conjunction with transcendental re-constitution and its transcendental synthesis and transcendental re-instatement will allow us to examine the roots of that phenomenal presentation. To a certain extent the world can be viewed as a simulation or as a simulation of a simulation dissolving that fine line between the reality of the illusion and the illusion of reality. In this light both the simulation and the simulation of a simulation, etc. meet on equal grounds in terms of phenomemnal reality but acquire their degree of authenticity through the closesness that the phenomenal manifestation has to its roots constituted and enacted in and through the life-world, that personal dimension of dasein that grounds and horizons the world of the phenomenal presentation. The spirit of authenticity allowing the phenomenal presentation to speak for itself in our transcendental reflection upon the same. This speaking for itself occuring when the moment of re-constitution is given an equal weighting with these other two moments of transcendental suspension and transcendental reduction (especially in its aspect of transcendental re-instatement wherein through its open development the phenomenal presentation is given its place in the world and therein its meaning and meaningfulness).

6.	Do Witches Exist - The Magic Of Appearance?

	As just implied we must come to experience that fine line between reality and illusion, between the fake and the genuine artifact or friend, etc. not as a dichotomy but as a contrast between the illusion of reality and the reality of the illusion, i.e. between detachment or absorption (or the absorption of detachment and the detachment of absorption). In experiencing the re-simulation of this phenomenal state of affairs under investigation we seek not to come face to face with some hidden reality but to enter into the spirit of a simulation that allows us to transcendentally taste, to transcendentally touch, to transcendentally see, etc. that which is to hand. However, all this being the case, and letting us be allowed to assume the existence of this parallel state of affairs between the psychological mechanics of a judgment and an act of phenomenological reflection, how are we to determine whether witches actually exist in our world of lived experience. How, when the very evidence for this specie is also used to establish the distinctive presence of this type of phenomenal presentation can we disentangle the interpretation of that evidence from the existence of that phenomenon as separate from the existence of that evidence? 
	It might be said that "those women that live alone with black cats are witches." Now what evidence do we have that is independent from that interpretation that might allow us to argue seriously for such a connection? What else can we do but more seriously investigate the interpretation of this so called phenomenon?
	One approach might involve our weighting various proposals and counter proposals. This idea of discounting the appearance and its various interpretations still needs to be anchored. Mere speculative association, however consistent and systematic, cannot establish an existential stability in the establishment of this phenomenon to be as interpreted. The mere equation e.g. between witches and those women that live alone with black cats does not give us a real representation of what the term witches is more fully meant to imply, e.g. a women who casts spells, etc. On the other hand a mere list of denotations and connotations cannot by definition or fiat establish the so called  interpretation of this phenomenon let alone the reality of that phenomenon. Between these various definitions a circle of meaning and meaningfulness must be generated to add to our stock of associational understandings. What would count as evidence in this investigation, what predictions could be made, how would a circle of meanings anchor this whole enterprise?
	In this life-world or world of dasein what we find already constituted for our phenomenal reflections is a world of lived experience, relationships, patterns of involvement, etc. From the midst of this razor sharp divide between the self and world, between the self and others a world of phenomenal simulation is extracted, however, as this extraction is from the basis of an already constituted relationship it must be implied that those phenomenal realities can only be provisional. Even the reality of these pre-phenomenologically constituted relationships cannot be extract from the world of lived experience, i.e. life-world, except provisionally regardless of the degree of demonstrated phenomenal stability that can be pointed out. In the final analysis such separations must be artificial however useful such segregated terms of reference. On the other hand our provisional analysis can and should demonstrate a relative stability in general or local regional considerations on both an objectively, subjectively and intersubjectively orientated structural basis.
	In our realization that relationships themselves are provisional fictions we must come to the conclusion that all phenomenal presentations, whether non-simulated, simulated or the simulations of simulations, etc. are by their very natures simulations of reality that can only be simulated. In the final analysis we can only differentiate between a relative simulation and a simulation of a simulation on pragmatic grounds; in provisional terms of reference that note general and regional stability, additional evidence that relatively anchors our interpretation, relative consistency, predictive ability and overall existential richness. In a world that is more a world of magic the only true differentiation that might be able to be correctly made is in terms of the existential richness in the impression made by that pragmatically discriminated representation. In essence the richer the phenomenon in its presentation the greater the impact that presentation will have in its presentation. Moreover, such richer phenomena will be able to stand up to a greater depth of closer scrutiny that through the suspension of pre-judgmental judgment, i.e. transcendental suspension, allowing us to more easily investigate phenomenolgically the essential structure of its constitution. Such analysis being entertained hand in hand with its transcendental synthesis and transcendental re-instatement in this world of life, this world of dasein, this absolute dimension of the personal and inter-personal.

Conclusion

	How de we know that today's particle accelerators and their evidence for elementary particles are not just as suspect as yesterday's witches? To what extent are these artifacts of our intellectual discrimination created in and through the very processes of discrimination we setup for ourselves? What meaning and meaningfulness can there be in such a world of phenomenal presentations that can only be open to an interpretation, interpretations of interpretations, etc. 			
	That the world may well be a simulation of a simulation should be of no real concern to us. In our depths of suspension, reduction, re-synthesis and re-instatement what we find works for us must indeed work for us. In our discrimination let us merely attend more closely to these artifacts of our lived consciousness that the more rich, stable, consistent, predicted, evidential presentations can be given a greater range of pragmatic acceptance and power of impact. In truth what works for us works for us! Let us therefore more closely scrutinize our phenomenal presentations and discover a depth in their presentation that therein we may be able to provisionally differentiate the reality of the illusion from the illusion of reality! Even though all phenomenal presentations are equal in terms of their phenomenal reality authenticity is realized in those phenomenal presentations that are allowed to coincide with their roots in this life-world, this world of lived experience. Through such coincidence intentions can be found to match the presentational being of the phenomenon under review. When all is said and done the simulation of reality as in perceptual states of awareness and the simulation of a simulation of reality as in the theatre are equally real but only equal in authenticity when the presentation of the phenomenon matches its intentional construction in a spirit of openess, spontaneity, transcendental suspension, etc. In this going back to our roots we not only return to the transcendental foundations of our phenomenal being but we also return to the cultural roots of our being in this world as a person in a personal dimension with personal relationships already constituted there for us. 
	In our openess to this world of lived experience we experience that authenticity of being that knows no discrimination as to whether it is a simulation of reality or a simulation of a simulation of reality, etc. In this spontaneity of being the reality of the simulation and the simulation of reality coincide without cancelling each other and in this depth of presentation the simulation is accepted as a simulation and the simulation of a simulation is accepted as a simulation of a simulation, etc. In such a state the phenomenal presentation is transparent in its presentation or enactment and its reception or re-simulation. In this synchronicity between the constitution of the relationship and its re-constitution a richness of meaning and meaningfulness is manifested that allows us to discern the simulation as a simulation and the simulation of a simulation as a simulation of a simulation, etc. and to realize at the same time the authenticity of the phenomenon as it presents itself in and through the culture of the life-world as a world of lived experience. 

				Noël Tointon, Sydney and Leura, 3.8.90.