Being And Value:
A Phenomenology Of The Experience Of Value

Synopsis of Paper

	This paper is a phenomenological investigation of the experiential nature of value, a theme, that in my opinion, underlies a considerable proportion of conscious motivation. It is my belief that the formation of value is a deeper stratum in the psychology of the individual in their social environment than the superficial manifestation of observable forms of conditioning and their allied processes of drive reduction, and other simplistic mechanisms, etc. It is without doubt central to the nature of the person as a person that they seek value, some form of meaningfulness in their lives, a question and a quest not properly investigated in a pseudo-scientifically treated psychology. 
	Throughout this paper there will be various allusions made to the philosophy of Heidegger, some of the more important references will be explicated while others will be merely left hinted at. The overall thrust behind this paper is to come to an understanding as to what is the essential nature of value and how, armed with this knowledge, we can incorporate this insight into our worldly day-to-day-existence discerning in the process a possible difference, or contrast, between the derivation of authentic value and inauthentic value. In this latter task we shall attempt to see what coincidence and merit the Heideggarian concepts of authenticity and inauthenticity might have with the apparent consequences of the overall direction taken in this paper?
	To structure this investigation I shall in turn take three aspects of meaning that seem to be able to be extracted from the root-term of value, namely, the sense of the valuable, the sense of evaluation and the sense of validity. Along with the various consequences that seem to be able to be drawn from this analysis we will be led into an investigation of the phenomenon of value-seeking and the obtaining or realization of value and the relationship this has for the being and the quality of the being of that individual as an individual person in the world. In this last phase of our investigations by implication the health and well-being of the individual will come under our examination to see if we can make any relevant conclusions and proposals in this regard?

									Noël Tointon,
									Macquarie Univesity.

Being and Value: A Phenomenology of the Experience of Value

	This paper is a phenomenological investigation of the experiential nature of value, a theme that in my opinion underlies a considerable proportion of conscious motivation. It is my belief that the formation of value is a deeper stratum in the psychology of the individual in their social environment than the superficial manifestation of observable forms of conditioning and their allied processes of drive reduction, and other simplistic mechanisms, etc. It is without doubt central to the nature of the person as a person that they seek value, some form of meaningfulness in their lives, a question and a quest not properly investigated in a pseudo-scientifically treated psychology. 
	Throughout this paper there will be various allusions made to the philosophy of Heidegger, some of the more important references will be explicated while others will be merely left hinted at. I make no claim to be a Heideggerian scholar and would quite happily leave this task to others more capable of interpreting this philosopher's work. Moreover, the overall thrust behind this paper is to come to an understanding as to what is the essential nature of value and how, armed with this knowledge, we can incorporate this insight into our worldly day-to-day-existence discerning in the process a possible difference, or contrast, between the derivation of authentic value and inauthentic value. In this latter task we shall attempt to see what coincidence and merit the Heideggarian concepts of authenticity and inauthenticity might have with the apparent consequences of the overall direction taken in this paper?
	To structure this investigation I shall in turn take three aspects of meaning that seem to be able to be extracted from the root-term of value, namely, the sense of the valuable, the sense of evaluation and the sense of validity. Along with the various consequences that seem to be able to be drawn from this analysis we will be led into an investigation of the phenomenon of value-seeking and the obtaining or realization of value and the relationship this has for the being and the quality of the being of that individual as an individual person in the world. In this last phase of our investigations by implication the health and well-being of the individual will come under our examination to see if we can make any relevant conclusions and proposals in this regard?

I. Value as Found in the Sense of the Valuable

	In this section I would like to briefly examine four types of valuable objects or states of affairs, namely, the discovery and robbery of a cache of golden artifacts, a priceless painting, the importance of sport and finally the value of an esteemed friendship.

1. The Allure of Gold

	Imagine, if you would some grave robbers have illegally excavated a tomb filled with beautiful gold artifacts and images. Under the cover of darkness they finally make their break in and undiscovered make off with a horde of golden objects. Fearful that selling these objects will direct the authorities back to them they smelt all this beautiful workmanship down into the form of anonymous gold ingots.

	In this example, although some considerable degree of value is lost through smelting, the value of the gold intrinsic to those objects is preserved. We can ask ourselves why gold is considered valuable? No doubt a very long list of reasons will be presented in response to this question although I doubt any one of these replies would initially produce an essential or relevant answer to this puzzle? E.g. I have tried this question out on a number of friends and some of the answers have included the fact that gold doesn't corrode, its shiny, its natural scarcity, use as a form of currency, etc.…

2. The Value of Artistic Artifacts

	Imagine if you would an extremely valuable painting hanging in the board room of a very wealthy corporation. Now as it happens a group of people have taken an exception to the products or processes of this commercial giant and set out, through revenge or a desire for publicity, to destroy this work of art. From among themselves they choose an old innocent-looking grandmother thinking that if this person was to be caught they would probably not send her to jail. She takes the lift, tells the security guard she, as a shareholder, has come to see her painting and in front of it simulates a mild attack of angina asking the guard to get some water for her medication which she has with her. Then springing to action she takes her razor blade out and quickly shaves the entire surface of this rather small oil painting, rushes for the lift and manages to leave the building just as this terrible deception becomes discovered. 

	This priceless painting has now been reduced to a small pile of priceless paint flakes, a pile of dust with little intrinsic value. It appears that in the matter of a few seconds millions of dollars of value has been destroyed quicker, and more thoroughly, than the collapse of shares on any stock market.
	In the example of gold we found we could reduce the object to its basic constituent and find ourselves left with something still considerably valuable. In this example this type of reduction, or vandalism, completely reduces the painted work of art to something else, some state that is neither artful nor valuable. As to a superficial enquiry into the value of art and the value of one piece or genre in comparison to some other we would no doubt be left with more controversial considerations than the number of people presenting such proposals. Let us therefore at this stage avoid taking this topic too far and move on to consider our third example.

3. Establishing the Value of Sport

	Imagine in this third example, if you would, a golf match. A group of doctors have taken the day off to basically relax and socialize. Obviously they enjoy having a friendly game of golf and the value they set upon this activity must compensate for the financial cost of a day's work lost doing so.

	What value has a sporting activity? Again if this question is posed more often than not an answer would be given that doesn't seem to adequately account for the nature of the enterprise. Playing golf may be healthy but people still enjoy watching professional matches on the television. Perhaps the challenge of the game or the desire to win are more important? Perhaps these challenges can be enjoyed vicariously? Let us now introduce our fourth example.

4. Enjoying the Company of a Much Valued Friend

	In this last example of something considered valuable imagine if you would two friends going to some considerable trouble in their going about of their meeting of each other, the first having a very long distance to travel, and the second spending a good part of the day preparing a very elaborate meal for the two of them to partake that evening.

	Under the circumstances a meal in a restaurant might have been more convenient, then, a telephone call might have saved them both some considerable period of time during that day. In a relationship what is it that is valued?

	In these four examples of the valuable, value sought by the person, can we determine a feature essential to each one that might satisfactorily answer the general question "in the variety of things considered valuable what is it that might be held in common that makes that which is considered valuable valued?"

	All too often people consider that which is valuable to operate on the lines of the gold model, that that which is valuable is so because there is some materially intrinsic feature that ensures this evaluation. However the destruction of the oil painting that was a recognized masterpiece, in our second example, would dispose of this avenue of approach in our search for the general properties, or dimension, that would ensure a positive evaluation. However, we are still left with the idea that that which is valuable can be cashed out through some equation, in tune with market forces, that would allow us to re-express a sense of worth in some financial form, e.g. in dollars. Such a materialistic conception of worth runs rampant in our language, we might even say of a friend, e.g. "that they were worth their weight in gold." 
	In our third example we opened up the question as to "what value might be found in the activity of sport?" An off the cuff solution that sport is good for the health hardly accounts for the fact that in most spectator sports more people watch than participate. Moreover, much of the financial support for and profit from the sporting event is generated through its audience participation. On a simplistic level of analysis many types of sport involve either the getting of some object or ball, or similar, or the participant or participants to or beyond a certain point and that often there is an easier and less silly way of arranging or agreeing as to how they should arrive at this target. Intrinsically the activity involved in a particular sport often has little or no economic merit, or evolutional competence, except that which could be attached to general fitness or military expertise.
	In our fourth example value written in terms of intrinsic worth, artistic merit, entertainment value can be conceivably dismissed. A certain person's friend might not possess a car, e.g. or could be poor, be quite ugly and possess no sense of the aesthetic, possess no entertainment value and in spite of all these disabilities still be considered a valuable friend. When pushed for a reason for this I find most people seem to arrive at the same approximate solution, namely, that the being of the person is enjoyed for their own sake, or better, that the development of the relationship is essentially its own reward. I would propose the simple solution that the valuable is considered valuable because it corresponds to a certain need in the person, that value is essentially centered in a personal dimension. 
	In Heideggerian terms of reference this element of the personal dimension, or the person-in-the-world, is taken into account in the term Dasein. In a phenomenology of value our investigations are not going to get off the ground without our taking this aspect of the person into account. No stubbornly held pre-conception of intrinsic material self-worth will allow us to progress in this task. Indeed, our whole endeavour at this level would be subject to a complete undermining through the discovery of counter-examples. 
	Imagine, e.g. a gold digger in the middle of a dry desert gladly trading a bag of gold nuggets for a large barrel of water now held to be more precious and then trading some water for a bowl of rice or a few pieces of dry stale bread if he hadn't eaten for a number of days.
	Indeed, the phenomenon of value necessitates the personal dimension of the individual in a socially perceived world. Surely, from a purely physical or materialistic perception of the world perceived at the level of elementary particles atoms of gold have little intrinsic difference from atoms of paint or atoms of water or atoms of food, etc., etc.
	This automatically brings us to ask what experiential structures are involved in a process of value-evaluation?

II. The Experiential Structures Involved in Evaluation

	The derivation of value would appear to involve some form of judgment or evaluation along with all the process machinery involved in such an exercise of the human intellect. To simplify this task necessitates our being able to formulate an essentially clear and distinct appreciation of the dynamics of judgment in general and with respect to the judgment of value in particular. To facilitate this endeavour let me propose the following provisional scheme in the hope that its utility is found to be capable of discharging this task. Central to this consideration is an examination of the process of judgment itself and the nature of the relationship borne by judgment to the rest of the epistemological and ontological structures that appear to constitute the experiential totality of the person(s)-in-the-world or Dasein(s). This task can be considerably simplified by noting the contribution of the following points or observations.
	Firstly, all judgments necessitate adequately prepared conceptual matter as a necessary prerequisite for an adequately conducted process of judgment.
	Secondly, all processes can be treated ideally as going through three historical phases or stages, namely, pre-conditional, conditional and post-conditional to the exercise of the judgmental activity.
	Thirdly, mental processes can be viewed in both a dynamic-process orientated point of view and/or a static-objected orientated point of view, but preferably a balance should be entertained that takes both aspects into account.
	Fourthly, no type of mental process can occur in a vacuum and that this necessitates the utilization of the appropriate mental background or horizon and the prior adequate development of the same to ensure its effective operation.
	Lastly, all ideally treated mental products or processes distinguished must equally be accommodated, and vice versa, in the context of the totality of the mind in order to gain a significance that has a relevance to the nature of experience as it is had and reflected upon.
	In this paper I shall consider only some of the aspects implicated in this list just mentioned in order to construct an elementary model of the process of judgment. 

	The process of evaluation is, I believe, a more complex form of judgment and that although the basic underlying dynamics of the judgmental process are the same we should discriminate, on one hand, between judgments of identity, value and utility and, on the other hand, judgments that treat the successfulness, or otherwise, of some other prior judgmental process. Judgments of identity basically tell us what we are dealing with and are the seed requirements for judgments of value which in turn are the foundation for the consequential on-flowing utility of the same. When we look at a painting, e.g., we find ourselves discriminating the presence of a visual artwork and that various patches of colour and shape might be translated into symbolic-like representations of objects, ideas or emotional states, etc. At this relatively primitive level of judgment our cognitive conceptual machinery investigates the logically translated correspondences discovered between various proposals, e.g. perceptual states and a lexicon of pre-formulated identificational classifications. We see an apple and we find the shape, the colour and context of our perceptual frame of reference, etc. would allows us to make this equation between that proposed and our repertoire of linguistic-classificational habits. We have already learnt to discern apple-like states of affairs and we make the appropriate connections or correspondences. At this level we could formulate a correspondence theory of truth determination. However, if we are interested in questions of existence or factual-status, beauty, morality or questions that relate to a sense of value we enter a more complex state of judgmental activity, a field of processes that now primarily concern themselves with considerations of field coherence, harmony, integration, etc. It would be my position in this regard that considerations of value would now necessitate a coherence theory of truth determination. Once questions of identity are discerned a more complex state of judgmental activity is entered into, namely, processes of value evaluation and that flowing from this judgments of utility would as a consequence be allowed to flow on when considerations move to an even more complex level, a level that would involve the formulation of a pragmatic theory of truth determination. Underpinning all processes of judgment would be the necessary thematization of conceptual constructs that allow this movement from the relative simplicity of identification to evaluation to utilization. 
	I have outlined, with some reluctance, these three levels in the hierarchical organization of the judgmental process because when we deal with questions of authenticity and inauthenticity we will be forced to take these structural and functional distinctions into consideration.
	As I have just intimated questions of value consider the coherence of a value proposal in a world-constructed-by- ourselves-for-ourselves, without doubt in a world or dimension of dasein.
	In such a realm we have already pre-determined that gold is useful as a means to the possible realization of certain ends desired by the individual and their society (hopefully without subverting the accumulation of gold as an end in itself).
	Through our exposure to a world of art we find that certain works of art are found to be intrinsically more aesthetic than others and, hopefully, they remain to be primarily esteemed purely in that light and not pre-judged and contaminated by considerations of prestige, status, demonstration of power, ideological information and control.
	In such a realm of experience we can find ourselves enjoying the presence of competition in sport, or similar, as an expression of the human will realizing and resolving the tensions undergone directly, or vicariously, in the unfolding of the event.
	In a world of interpersonal relationships we can find ourselves enjoying an expansion of our horizons and therein the consequential increasing effectiveness of our being along with its concomitant sense of increased freedom.
	Essentially a realm of value is discovered and recognized through our educational exposure to instances of the same. The degree of value being the determination of the degree of coherence discerned in a certain pre-identified state of affairs. Under this umbrella definition we could treat the determination of existence, factual-existence, as the degree of coherence discovered in a certain identified state of affairs and its relationship within the integrity of our overall world-view. Aesthetic determination would discern the degree of harmony within the ambit of a certain artwork or natural state of affairs in the light of our exposure to a world of art and natural aesthetic experience. Ethical determination would then be those considerations that center on the coherence of means and ends exercised by one or more individuals, as agents, in their relationship to themselves and a world of the other. I would propose that all forms of value would then fall into these three broad categories of the factual, the aesthetical and the ethical being respectively underpinned by the structure of that experiential coherence discovered or revealed in our current world-view, that coherence discerned internally to a certain state of affairs and that relational coherence discerned between ourselves and others.
	To discover whether I am correct or incorrect in this approach would, I believe, necessitate a critical phenomenological investigation into the more apparent and less concealed aspects of the experiential phenomenon of judgment. However, the direction adopted in this paper is an attempt to illuminate the phenomenon of value and not judgment per se.
	One obvious aspect revealed in a mature value-judgment, as in completed acts of judgment in general, is the manifestation of a sense of validity, a presence that has a seal of its own authority stamped upon it and which, under normal circumstances is treated, upon some degree of reflection, as being self-evident. As a response to the powerfulness of this appeal our world-view is changed accordingly and, under normal conditions, behaviour appropriate to such decisive forcefulness is put in place. Unless, of course, there is a conflict present in our system of values that lets other value determinations compete for our attention. The bitterness of most ethical controversies would seem to lie in just this fact that everyone agrees with all the principles at stake but disagree in how they discount or promote particular strands or sequences of value in certain types of situations.

III. Value as Experienced Through the Sense of Validity

	Finalized judgments come with a sense of validity stamped upon them, in a package with a guarantee attached that states the judgment arrived at was considered confirmed. When previous judgments are successfully recovered and re-entertained we rediscover this seal of approval. In the same manner value judgments appear to possess their own self-evident degrees of authority. In a phenomenology of value at some point or other we are going to have to face the question of authenticity - the validity of the judgment, the validity of the judgmental process and the validity of the self as an agent involved in the  constitution or reconstitution of this process?
	We could imagine, through the form of an analogy, that one form of checking or re-authentication might parallel the supervision of production along a conveyor belt in a factory. Imagine that 5kg jars of tea need to have a button pushed 5 times in order to fill this size caddy with the appropriate amount of tea. Now it would be easy for a quality inspector to see at a glance that these conditions were being fulfilled. Too much tea would see it being spilled over the top of the caddy whereas conversely too little tea would leave too great a space left in the container. In a like fashion one could argue that memory reconstitutes a particular judgment and like looking back along a conveyor belt checks a certain sequence to see if it conforms to standards already thought pre-set.
	
	So far we have looked at value as that found in various senses of the valuable, acts of evaluation and argued for degrees of self-evident validity. A fourth strand might be found in the sense of valour, an existential-like act of honest bravery wherein the person is prepared through some form of commitment to strongly defend the ground they have chosen to stand upon. 
	At this point in time I would like to attempt to identify some of those features that collectively create a sense of authenticity in an act of judgment, promote that judgment, donate to the act of evaluation a sense of propriety, appropriateness, purpose and resolute positivity.

IV.  Authenticity versus Inauthenticity

	Using the artificial device of historically dividing a process into its pre-conditional, conditional and post-conditional phases I would like to note the following possible influences on the authenticity or inauthenticity of a judgmental event.

1. Pre-conditional Considerations

	Under pre-conditional considerations we could note the following root conditions necessary for the valid performance of a judgmental process, something we attempt practically all the time in the daily passage of our conscious lives. 

	Firstly, to enter into a satisfactory process of judgment or evaluation we must adequately inform ourselves as to the essential situation to hand in the light of our current objectives. This must not involve ourselves in an over attention to an accumulation of trivial detail but as our entering into an involvement that focuses on those essential features, those relevant aspects that could alter the nature of the outcome under investigation. To exercise an adequate judgment one must be adequately informed.
	Secondly, an appropriate judgmental response necessitates an adequate pre-exposure to the nature of our endeavour. This involves our reflection upon previous efforts and a rectification of distortions pre-evolved in this regard.
	Thirdly, an insurance that adequate conceptual translation and identificational processes are brought to fruition.
	Collectively these three pre-conditional points constitute our seeking only those details relevant to the case to hand, ensuring that our previous efforts collectively treated as a background field in this endeavour are effective and not too distorted and, finally, that all last minute details are adequately thematized in their conceptualization. 

2. Conditional Considerations

	In the exercise of judgment or evaluation the necessary degree of concentration must be brought to bear upon the essential information conceptually treated in the pre-conditional phase.
	Secondly, a balance must be had between perceptual and conceptual states, dynamic-functional treatment and object-orientated treatment, emotional contributions and non-emotional contributions and finally between that area under focus versus the appropriate gestalt background. Any imbalances between these features will probably distort the final judgmental outcome. Unless an overall psychological balance is put in place the transcending synthesis of judgment cannot successfully leave the psychological confines of this conceptualized ground.

3. Post-conditional Considerations

	After the completion of the act of judgment its successfulness, or otherwise, can be measured on retrospective reflection letting us formulate perhaps a semantic theory of truth determination that also takes into account and integrates our previous formulations? Consequential activity flowing from such reflection being also open to evaluation, reformulating this particular field of activity in finer detail.

	Overall, the quality of the judgment reflects the quality of the input put into it. The nature of the judgmental process found speaking for itself in self-evidence if the phenomenological nature of the delivered judgment or evaluation is delivered in a distinctive fashion that satisfactorily reflects the authentic nature of authentic judgment. The essential characteristics of the judgmental process, I believe, can be catalogued under the following four heading, namely, the trans-temporal, trans-spatial, trans-causal and trans-egotistical. The nature of judgment being spontaneous, not spatially bound by context, has an inner existential sense of freedom that is not directly bound by material causality and that the judgment is essentially initiated through the relationship of the judgment itself without direct egotistical intervention, manipulation and distortion.
	The concentration necessary for the unimpeded delivery of undistorted judgment or evaluation implies the individual must exercise that quality and depth of discrimination necessary to achieve this result. This degree of gestalt integration reflecting itself in the psychic integrity of the processes and consequences involved, etc. Paradoxically this inner endeepening opens us up to the naked presence and power of the other, and the powerfulness of our own being, revealing an authenticity of being that is not isolated in a pure world of self nor one subjected to the construction of a conceptualized sense of self or ego.

4. Overall Considerations

	From an understanding of the process nature of judgment we could be led to conclude that judgment can only be fully instantiated if certain pre-conditions, conditions and post-conditions are adequately met. If we were to regard the authentic judgment as being in a sub-set in the set of judgments in general then we must conclude that for the authentic judgment to come into existence these process-conditions must be properly met. It would stand to reason that the set of inauthentic judgments would include as a sub-set those judgments that were defectively developed in their process origination. If one were to concede that the judgmental process has an existential spontaneous life of its own then the stronger position could be adopted whereby the authentic judgment is considered to be that judgment that has all process-conditions adequately fulfilled prior, during and after the execution of the process of judgment involved. Conversely, that inauthentic judgments arise when defects in their generation or gestation are allowed to contaminate their process-derivation. Personally I would argue for the stronger alternative but that this case could perhaps only be decided through a carefully conducted phenomenological investigation that descriptively compared `authentic judgments' with `properly conducted judgments' to see whether the range of both sets were exactly identical? Failing such a rigorous examination let us provisionally treat properly conducted judgments as authentic in flavour. That granted what conclusions can we draw as to the psychological nature of that type of experience that experiences authenticity, that feeling of satisfaction, fulfillment, or completion in a process of judgment that manifests itself with a sense of validity that to all purposes is effectively self-evident on both reflection and repeated processes of reflection (perhaps subjectively and intersubjectively?). As noted before to transcend a level of conceptualization pre-conditional to judgment necessitates the increased gestalt integration of the individual. Quite simply this means that the potential psychic organization of the individual is realized to a greater extent than if the mind, ostensively, were to entertain only a conceptual, perceptual or emotional level of psychological operation. With this gestalt model of degrees of being in the psychic organizational integration kept in mind let us examine the Heideggerian concepts of authenticity and inauthenticity.

V. The Heideggarian Concepts of Authenticity and Inauthenticity

	The Heideggarian concept of authenticity is not so much defined as contrasted with the concept of inauthenticity. Heidegger refers to inauthentic being of Dasein as a `fallenness' (Verfallen) and explains such a term by stating that Dasein has, in the first instance, fallen away from itself as an authentic power to be its own self, and has `fallen' to the `world'.  `Fallenness' to the `world' means to be absorbed in being with one another, insofar as this being is guided by idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity. Dasein is seen as lacking its primordial power to be in its inauthenticity and is likewise unable to realize its authentic self. Overall the horizon of our world is overtaken by a world of `they', a world of everydayness where value is pre-set, a fossilized version of what others appear to impose upon the being of ourselves. In this world we become more an appearance without substance or, rather, a material reflection or copy of the world of beings that we find around us. We loose our spontaneity and creativity, we loose a sense of transcendence that comes through an authenticity of being that always remains a possibility for us even if not realized. Moreover, we come through hindsight or insight to see ourselves trapped in a world of material causation as an ego without freedom subjected and subjugated by a fate that remains beyond our control whilst we remain in that state of inauthenticity. 
	To qualify this gloomy picture we should note that this `fallenness' should be considered more an orientation and not an absolute state of affairs, it is certainly not a state of not-being and in ontological terms of reference is just as real as authentic being. Perhaps complete and utter inauthenticity can only be realized in the authenticity of death, that life itself is a form of authenticity that must reassert itself, and has to that degree that life has the power to manifest itself, be to that degree also authentic.
	I would like to interpret this state of `fallenness' in the light of the previous comments I made on the subject of the gestalt integration of the psyche. As I noted we loose our powers of appreciation to that degree we loose our gestalt integration and that authentic judgment was exercised in a transcendence of the pre-condition of adequately informed and exercised conceptualization. Through the mind being able to tighten its epistemological-psychological powers of organization a depth is added to our being that allows the individual to better appreciate the nature of the world. Concomitant with this depth is a greatly increased sense of freedom and power to be as an agent in the world rather than to be as an object subjugated by it.
	Without this depth it would seem natural for the individual to indulge themselves in the pursuit of idle talk, curiosity and discover a world of ambiguity. Floundering in a world at the level of the conceptual alone, or the perceptual likewise, could not resolve any questions for us that were trans-conceptual, trans-perceptual or trans-cognitive. Without doubt a sea of ambiguity would arise for us just as our established examples of the valuable, without taking the structure and function of a personal dimension into account, would present for us a range of conflicting alternatives.
	In dealing with philosophic proposals that discuss degrees of being we must bear in mind that correctly questions of ontological being are not directly under consideration but rather matters dealing with a miscellany of concepts that involve degrees of organization, power, status, hierarchy, freedom, psychological levels, etc. An analogy that illustrates this idea of degrees of being can be found in the image of the king presiding over a court in the administration of a kingdom. Obviously in the hierarchical organization of the kingdom the king should be the most powerful person, the members of the court possessing various degrees of power and status, etc. At no time can the king be considered more real than any one of his subjects, on the other hand he should be seen in this type of political frame of reference to have the greatest importance in the decision making processes, the greatest exercise in administrational power, the highest status, and on a number of counts the greatest degree of freedom, easier access to luxuries and objects of prestige, exercise of a greater range of human rights and a general precedence over the presence of others. The use of the expression degrees of being is therefore often a sign that these other considerations are involved and not ontological matters per se.
	An interesting aspect in this examination of authenticity is the type of comment made by Heidegger to the effect that language is correctly not the province of such a field and that only thinkers and poets can undo this degeneration. Interpreting this observation in the light of this investigation of mine as discussed in this paper I would like to point out that a precondition to the fruitful activity of judgment is the adequate and relevant conceptualization of the information necessary to effect such positivity of judgmental resolution. However the judgment itself, the discovery of value and the revelation of meaningfulness are essentially trans-cognitive and therefore transcend the conceptualization of language insofar as the judgment is not subjected post-conditionally to the treatment of a process of conceptualization. It is true that judgments can be and are articulated in language but this can only be conducted retrospectively to the exercise of the relevant judgment.
	This idea of fallenness is therefore interpreted by myself to mean a loss of psychological-gestalt integration which in turn finds itself reflected in the products of consciousness experienced and/or discussed by the person concerned. Taken further we would perceive a fracturing in the imagery experienced and related by that person under such a state of diminished psychic integrity. A poverty of detail is realized, perhaps mental disturbance if experienced whilst awake, then a surreal-like state of dreaming is encountered followed by a greater poverty of detail and finally as we approach the depths of deep sleep an endarkened abyss of forgetfulness. The more integrated we are the more we find ourselves in a position to better evaluate the current nature of our experience. With such integration follows a more integrated sense of self with all the powers and privileges associated with such advancement. Such a concept therefore appears to have important implications in a theory of psychic welfare or health. Moreover, the role for value and value-creation in conjunction with this idea of authenticity along with the enpowerment of the individual to effect their own processes of judgment with all the spontaneity and creativity involved must give to such theoretical understanding a practical aspect with important consequences for the self-realization of the individual as a valuable member in society! To complete this paper let me discuss and explicate some of the consequences that would appear to be involved in this concept of value-creation in the light of the investigations outlined so far.

VI. The Creation of Value

	An important point I would like to make here at this juncture is to outline what I believe is the nature of the relationships between conceptualization and judgmental activity and between inauthenticity and authenticity. Judgmental activity for one reason or another that operates from the level of the cognitive, i.e. activities of a perceptual-conceptual nature, cannot be authentic as judgmental activity cannot be reduced to the level of conceptualization without all the distortions and misdirection of pre-conceptions involved in the control of the judgment or pseudo-judgment arrived at. On the other hand that which is defined as authentic is not unrelated to the realm of the inauthentic because judgment is conducted from, treated and pre-judged through the habitual exercise of the cognitive. Not that conceptualization per se is inauthentic only that judgment that is conducted primarily in such terms of reference. In a succinct formula we could say that authenticity is a transmutation of inauthenticity, that the authentic is a transformation or transcendence of the inauthentic: - a resolution of the ongoing ambiguity, curiosity and idle chatter expressed in the conceptualization of language, a revitalization of the static content-structure of the cognitive and a calming concentration of the restlessness of the function of the cognitive mind along with a sense of transcendence given to the judgmental sense of self, a sense of self that directly experiences value and value-creation per se. The critical transcendence exercised by the judgmental therefore demands the necessary presence of the relatively inauthentic as a pre-critical foundation for its generation and develop-mental transmutation. To illustrate this idea of transmutation I would like to allude to the following brief analysis of the aesthetic experience of an artwork.
	In its material instantiation a physical work of art, e.g. a painting, is not unlike anything else in the world about us. When it is viewed in this light it is not perceived as a work of art even though certain clues, like an aesthetic aura, might indicate that it was meant to be so considered, e.g. its frame, placement in an art gallery, etc. To discover the aesthetic value of a painting we must therefore approach and regard it in an aesthetic light. At the same time, however, we must also view it as an object in the world in order to perceive the shapes and textures of the paint on the surface of the painting to discover the merit of that painting and not enjoy the wandering fantasies of our own minds dis-associated from the being of that artwork. Ideally a balance or resonance must be entertained between the input we supply to the work of art in the form of interpretation and evocation and the output invested by the artist in the aesthetic provocation of the picture. Then to appreciate the work of art we home in on the essential features expressed in the overall form of the artwork and enjoy the interplay and resolution of the consonant and dissonant relationships entailed in this gestalt-field. Under this synthesis the aesthetic merit of the artwork is then hopefully experienced. The aesthetic experience therefore necessitates an essential conceptual translation of the material expression of the artwork as a prior condition to its final aesthetic enjoyment or otherwise. Effectively we come to an appreciation of the internal relationships in the concept of the painting engineered by the artist. From such material the spirit of the painting is synthesized or transmuted. In a similar fashion all forms of judgment, including the discovery or creation of value, are experientially discovered through a transmutation and resolution of the conceptual. The inauthenticity of the conceptual vis-à-vis the judgmental is pre-conditional to the condition of the aesthetic experience. Thus authenticity can not therefore exist without the relatively inauthentic as a ground for its existential experience. Authenticity in this light is therefore a transcendence of inauthenticity without our dis-association from this prior ground. The moral to be drawn from this insight is that the positive creation of value cannot divorce itself from a material appreciation of the world but which at the same time cannot be reduced to this material or conceptual level of appreciation.
	As I outlined previously I divided this experiential realm of value between the broadly enclosed regions of the aesthetical, the ethical and the factual (or ontical?). Under the classification of ethical we can include all forms of interpersonal relationships, e.g. cultural, political, moral, religious, social, economic, etc. 
	To create value we must go about allowing a transmutation of the material world as embraced in a world of relationships wherein the relationship under experience or investigation, is allowed to take itself where it will through the creativity and spontaneity of the relationship itself. In the advancement of the associated psychic integration involved we find ourselves opened up to the self-critical, fully appropriate, responsible, on-flowing power of the consequences that must de-evolve from such advancement and active reflection. Without doubt we must insure that the presence of all pre-conditions, conditions and post-conditions are correctly observed. Then, we must stand back, and, let the overall relationship itself deliver and reveal to our being the unique meaningfulness of being that is correctly an expression of our natural birthright as a-free-agent-in-the-world.

	Lastly I would like to ask the question what value has value? Put quite bluntly the answer is none, absolutely no value! Value is nothing in itself, a searching for it in its own right is an exercise in futility, a discovery of non-being, a pursuit that meets the inauthentic. Only that being that seeks the ongoing discovery of the being of value and the value of being discovers the value of being-in-the-world and can realize the valuableness of that being, as like a living treasure, discover how the world of value can evaluate its own measure of authenticity or validity and induce a valour in that being as it existentially faces the anxiety of the unknown and confronts the one known fact of that-death-to-be as its ultimate act in this world. Through such openness, or a clearing in being, there is to be discovered a succinct crystallization of the real possibilities open to that distinct human being or community characterized by a sense of well-being, freedom and the exhilaration of spirit in tune with the unexpected existential richness of the world. When we recognize that this door to meaningfulness is open before us we now find a new world, a world of value that turns upside down and inside out a world that previously we had taken for granted, where the revelation of existential structure and function invites a challenge, a phenomenological challenge as like that taken up in the work of Husserl and Heidegger and a small number of other earlier and later philosophers.

								           Noël Tointon, 24/8/89,
								           Macquarie University.
								           (Re-edited 24.1.04)

An Essential Overview

1. Value

i		The Valuable
ii		Evaluation
iii		Validity
(iv)		Valour

2. Psychological Levels

Transcendental (Judgmental Psychology)

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Cognitive (Perceptual/Conceptual Psychology)

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Affective (Affect[-Impressional], Motor/Sensory Psychology)

3. Structure of Complex Judgmental Processes

(In order of descending [ordered] complexity)

Semantic... Judgment of judgmental successfulness. 
	  Factual (concept of object… concept of world)
Pragmatic... Evaluation of utility. (concept of agent… concept of world)
Value... Evaluation of coherence.
	  Ethical (concept of agent... concept of agent)
	  Aesthetical (concept of agent... concept of object)
	  Ontical (concept of object... concept of world)
Essential...Evaluation of identity correspondence.
	  Logical (concept of object... concept of object)