The Intentional Object - Truth Or Fiction?

	This paper will begin with an examination of Husserl's comments on `mere intentionality' in Ideas I. 
	I will then re-examine what phenomenological presuppositions might be implicated in the expression `intentional object' and also question the need for an intentional philosophy. 
	Next, I will examine some of the wider implications involved in the exercise of the transcendental suspension. In the process discussing the exhibition of the intentional ground through suspension, intentional motivation, the directness of relational experience and the evaluation and instantiation of authenticity in our relationships.
	My argument will then conclude that from a transcendental perspective the intentional object is correctly a fiction and that as a consequence, when properly considered, our relationships are directly involved with the phenomenal realities apparently associated them. 

1. Introduction To A Transcendental Phenomenology

	To introduce this aspect of my topic, on a transcendental-phenomenological philosophy, (and our hermeneutic reading of this type of text), let me quote the following passage from Ideas Pertaining To A Pure Phenomenology And To A Phenomenological Philosophy, Volume I, by Edmund Husserl as translated by F.Kersten.

On the other hand the whole spatiotemporal world, which includes human being and the human Ego as subordinate single realities is, according to its sense, a merely intentional being, thus one has the merely secondary sense of a being for a consciousness. It is a being posited by consciousness in its experiences which, of essential necessity, can be determined and intuited only as something identical belonging to motivated multiplicities of appearances: beyond that it is nothing. 

	Husserl adding in two other versions of this segment of text these additional qualifications:

that anything beyond that is a countersense/ a countersensical thought.

	The first thing I would like to note is the phenomenological reduction by Husserl of our experience of the spatiotemporal world to a state of mere intentional being. Already, a few pages earlier in this text, he has proposed the thought experiment in which the entire world is to be imagined as if it were destroyed or abolished in an effort to show the difference between transcendencies in the intentional content of thought and the immanent nature of intentionality treated as a thought-process. That on one hand we can deny the need for a corresponding object to match the intentional content of our thought processes but that we cannot deny the immanent necessity in the existence of that thought process itself.
	This treatment of our intentionally structured appreciation of the spatiotemporal world as mere intentional being puts into effect both a transcendental suspension and a transcendental reduction. Through a reduction to `mere intentionality' the thesis of the world is automatically suspended as a necessary precondition for the `transcendental' complexion of the reduction. What we are left with as a phenomenological residuum is, to quote Husserl, the whole of absolute being. Therein, the intentional constitution of the contents of particular types of intentional experiences can be revealed in order that, through such processes of transcendental reduction, their most distinctive characteristic features can be described. In this manner the `structure' of those types of phenomenological experience can be critically delineated and comparatively contrasted. In accordance with my own phenomenological understanding, a transcendental reversal of this analytical, retrospectively oriented process reveals through processes of transcendental reconstitutional synthesis the `function' of such structures in their appropriate contexts.
	If the contents of intentional consciousness can be dismissed as mere intentional being does not such a reduced economy run the risk of loosing all sense, becoming a region devoid of all structure, function and purpose? In what manner then can an experiential contrast be put in place in order to discover, through that relationship, the meaning and meaningfulness of our engagement located therein?
	In the past I have been quite philosophically suspicious of systematic forms of reduction to one common denominator. Without some form of a contrast, in my opinion, there would be no intelligible `sense,' (there could be no structured `meaning' and no functioning `meaningfulness'). Without a sense of `sense' the meaning of such a process would be, theoretically, meaningless. What conditions, therefore, we may well ask, must be necessary and in place, for a realm of absolute being to make sense if only metaphorically? We might like to `visualize' this problem of absolute sense by working through the following analogy and therein simulating the type of resolution already indicated. 
	Imagine, if we would, that we were, instead, lively fish swimming in the beautiful blue sea-water of an immense ocean nearly perfect in its transparency. Now, let us ask ourselves, how do we know that we were swimming in a medium of water if all phenomenological `aspects' of that medium were experienced as perfectly `transparent?' In this light, our experience of a sense of medium would suggest that we were able to differentiate some degree of difference therein. Perhaps a  sense of medium could be discovered by each fish from the fact that as it swims `upward' it finds the temperature of the water is warmer and when it swims `downward' it finds the temperature is cooler. This upward-downward continuum in direction being reinforced by an increased sense of pressure being experienced by that fish in its descent. Even though that fish lives in one medium, and one medium only, indirectly that medium takes on a sense of being, or presence, through the differential texture, in various experiential facets or fields, discovered therein. 
	Continuing this analogy, let us suppose that each fish takes a philosophical turn. Imagine as we are happily swimming along our horizon is darkened by a series of philosophical thoughts, a series of thoughts entertained with all the perplexity in their wake equal to their degree of profundity. `In what am I swimming,' we ask ourselves, `who am I, where am I, where am I going,' etc. In an attempt to answer such enquiries each fish individually enters a transcendental suspension and taking the differential texture of their world subjects it to an epoche, bracketing the polarities discovered therein. Psychically balancing each differentiated polarity by its counterpolarity, polarized field by polarized field. In this process they learn to discern the various facets of their world of life, the various aspects that experientially constitute their overall manner of being. In this they eventually find themselves formulating a series of conceptual fields like the concepts of temperature, pressure, light, salinity, distance, direction, speed, etc.
	One of the morals that can be extracted from this analogy is the fact that the transcendental phenomenologist, among others, is now entitled to reduce their experience of the world to the form of one medium as long as they delineate this reduction through a balance of polarities and assume that these fields all inhere in the world of one medium and one medium only, a fact guaranteed through their self-perceived integrity of being, their transcendental sense of `self.'
	Therefore, in the transcendental-phenomenologists' suspension and reduction of the world, that realm of pure being, that transcendental dimension of absolute being, a sense of meaningfulness can be discovered through the moments of suspension, reduction and reconstitution of their perception and appreciation of these interrelated fields of differential texture. A relatively more fundamental sense of being being derived from a relatively more fundamental level of textural differentiation (which, broadly speaking, through its treatment of experiential `traces' is also effectively `textual' and thereby also implicating the need for the recognition of an hermeneutical dimension in our phenomenological investigations). In this regard Husserl supplies us with a number of examples both theoretical and practical in scope, e.g., the intentional domain of a noetic-noematic correlativity, the polarities of the Ego-pole and the Object-pole, etc.
	Now, if this absolute territory is defined through a series of polarities what consequences has this for our theoretical understanding of the nature of intentionality and of the nature of the intentional object? First, let me introduce these two distinctive polarities of noetic-noematic correlativity and the interaction between the Ego-pole and the Object-pole. Second, let me examine what the nature of the relationship between these two distinctive polarities might involve. Third, using this relatively more integrated model let me discuss what implications this might have for our phenomenological understanding of the intentional object.
	Husserl, in examining his vision of the intentional process, states that:

every cogito calls for a cogitatum and insofar as this latter is related to the pure Ego in the accomplishment of an act, we find a remarkable polarity in every act: on the one side, the Ego-pole; and on the other, the Object as counter-pole.

	Just as for every noetic process there is the presence of noematic content, namely noema, in a similar fashion the polarity of the Ego-pole is matched by the polarity of the Object-pole. These two distinctly different states of bi-modal reciprocity, in my opinion, can be better harmonized by invoking a tri-modal scheme of ego, object and world (the latter invoking a sense of background or horizon, a field in which different `intentional objects' can be focused upon). 
	In the Cartesian Mediations Husserl harmonizes these two models by invoking a tri-partite model of ego-cogito-cogitatum. In this he appears to envisage a linear flow of noetic activity linking the transcendental ego with the noematic content, and vice versa. 
	I believe this `linear' vision of harmonization, albeit in a provisional form, to be essentially defective. As a first order approximation for modeling the nature of the relationship between the transcendental ego and the intentional object it has some initial merit but its essential construction is basically flawed and leaves itself open to conceptual paralysis from the critical pressure that must result from its own self-deconstructive analysis. For a start the correlative nature of the relationship between the noetic cogito and the noematic cogitatum is one of a bi-polar nature and hence the intentional object could never be reached or obtained. If an intentional object can be arrived at then this relationship cannot be one of polar correlativity. If, on the other hand, the intentional object cannot be arrived at, and that relationship between the cogitatum and the cogito is truly in a bi-polar process of correlativity, then how can the Ego-pole itself stand in the same type of polar-correlative relationship with that stream of experience as entailed in the cogito as that between the cogito and the cogitatum. If in simple mathematical terms the poles are set at infinity how can you infinitely go beyond infinity. On the other hand if the use of the polar metaphor invokes a sense of an approximating limit that can never be quite reached then how can that fictitious point be itself involved in the same relationship on its other side if both sides can never be in true contact. Then again if the point of contact is a region of overlapping then we would have two non-coinciding poles, what need would we have then for four poles when two alone would obviously suffice. This criticism aside I don't believe this model does this phenomenological framework justice and is hard pressed to include, let alone model, a sense of background, the sense of other intentional objects (and subjects) in the background field, the ability to compare intentional objects in the same field and the multi-variable potential of that sense of horizon associated with every intentional object in that background field.
	Instead, I believe our tri-partite terms of reference should be, correctly, tri-polar in character (and not of an extended bi-polar nature). Let me briefly elaborate.
	These two distinctly different bi-polar models can be better harmonized by invoking a tri-polar model of transcendental ego, intentional object and a sense of transcendental field, horizon or world. Each pole can be defined, in so far as a pole could be defined, through a negation of the conjunction of the other two poles. E.g., the sense of ego "is not that which is `object-oriented and world-oriented.'" In a similar fashion our other two poles can be defined in exactly the same fashion. In Husserlian terms we might say the cogito or noematic content and the object pole coincide with the sense of the intentional object. That noetic activity can be regarded as centering on the pole of the world with a psychic emphasis on synthesis, reconstitution, process, horizon, field, prospectivity, etc. On the other hand the object-polarity is characterized by a psychic emphasis on analysis, reduction, content, focus, retrospectivity, etc. The polarity of self being characterized by a psychic sense of suspension, ego, ongoing spontaneity, etc.
	In phenomenological terms these three poles or `moments' (in a dialectic that creates and re-creates a sense of phenomenological significance) in effect simulate the hermeneutic circle. The analysis of parts (or objects) only being able to take place through the contrast of the synthesis of wholes (or contexts), and vice versa. This hermeneutic process (when oriented towards the meta-textual sense of field or context) or phenomenological process (when oriented towards the textual sense of an object) being entered and left through the moment of suspension (itself being defined through the balance and negation of these two other poles of object and world).
	Now I apologize for the complexity of this re-interpretation of the Husserlian model but I wanted to give a quick sketch of how, in my opinion, the intentional object is simulated through its relationships to these two other moments or polarities of ego and world? Obviously, if the intentional object is, in effect, only a `moment' or a `mere polarity' in the thematization of our intentional consciousness then how is it possible for us to talk about an intentional object as an object qua `object?' Let me briefly define the nature of this philosophical problem.

2. The Problematic Nature Of The Intentional Object

	`Intentionality' could be defined, in relatively simple terms of reference, as the mind intending towards an object; the nature of that `intentional act' reflecting both `the nature of that noematic object and the nature of that noetic process.' But I have previously criticized the apparently linear character of this metaphor as relatively simplistic, a model not able to analogue adequately the complex complexion of the intentional process. Moreover, under such a restricted economy the status of the intentional object must remain considerably more problematic than a provisionally useful philosophical construction. Several avenues of criticism can be successfully mounted against this type of model, e.g., how do we know which intentional processes have the same intended content, and, how can we compare different intentional `objects' when the directed focus of our act of intentional comparison can be directed effectively only at one object at a time, etc? Then again, if intentionality is conceived in polarized terms of reference how is it possible to arrive at even the mere semblance of an intentional object? But, to be truthful, this last criticism strikes at even a tri-polar modeling of the intentional process rendering the use of an `objective' metaphor severely compromised. Indeed, how can we even talk about an intentional object, albeit metaphorically, if as a polar construction it can never be metaphorically reached, arrive at, grasped, etc? If the semblance of an intentional object is only an illusion (which in turn can never be reached, arrived at, grasped, etc., etc.) we might well ask ourselves do we need the conceptual machinery of an intentional objectivity? Then, in the same vein, we might like to become completely radical and commit that ultimate phenomenological heresy of asking ourselves as to whether we even need an intentional philosophy? 
	Leaving all such matters of faith for the moment in a state of suspension, instead, let me examine the phenomenological nature of the epoche, the act of suspension. In the process let me delineate what I believe is the intimate relationship that exists between it, our various `senses of self' and the concept of a transcendental ego. Then, in the light of this research, let me offer my tentative clarification and resolution of this controversial territory of the intentional object and therein establish its truth or fictitiousness.

3. Understanding The Nature Of The Transcendental Suspension

	First, let me draw your attention to an important distinction that needs to be made between a transcendental suspension and a transcendental reduction. Husserl, in my opinion, and  I am not alone in this believe, to begin with did not adequately draw this distinction. Suspension and reduction are often referred to in the same breath, whereas, correctly considered, the suspension is procedurally prior to the establishment of the transcendental reduction, indeed, without the former the latter could not be `transcendental' in complexion. The imposition of a global suspension and a more specific suspension of the material to hand, through a non-destructive accommodation of polarized-differential texture, is necessary in order to examine the constitutional structure of those intentional processes. The reduction, through forms of analysis, revealing the transcendental structure of those distinctly constituted processes in sense formation. Moreover, as previously noted, processes of transcendental re-constitution re-contextualizing those noematic formations in structural sense revealing through these processes in transcendental synthesis the genetic constitution of those noetic functions.
	In my extended metaphor of the fish I had those fish discover their sense of environment through a transcendental suspension, reduction and re-constitution of their collective world of differential texturalization (as experienced in its differential textualization). In re-examining the nature of the transcendental suspension let me now argue for a much broader and richer concept and in the process, in the form of a conclusion, let this research cast some considerable light on our phenomenological examination of the nature of the intentional object. 
	This examination of transcendental suspension will be conducted under the following four headings: `exhibition of the intentional ground through suspension,' `intentional resolution through an informed suspension,' `the trans-intentional nature of relational experience,' and `authenticity in the transformation of our relationships.'

i. Exhibition Of The Intentional Ground Through Suspension

	The suspension, in my opinion, is achieved through a balanced accommodation of polar opposites. The suspension, in effect, revealing the underlying `ground' of the differential texture subjected to such a state of mutually non-destructive accommodation. Hence the suspension, e.g., of hot and cold gives us the field of temperature. Our eidetic variations within this field establishing the extent and essential nature of such a distinctive aspect of the psyche. On one hand the choice exercised in textual differentiation establishing where we are in the overall scheme of the transcendental life-world, and, on the other hand, establishes for us the current complexion of the ego as it has become involved as an engaged participant in this world-of-life. An interest in the phenomenon of temperature is reflected in an ego that can experience temperature. An ego involved in thought is a thinker, an ego involved in the act of perception is a perceiver, etc. On the other hand the ego thinking is not the object of that thought unless reflexively the ego is thinking about itself as a thinker. Similarly the ego is not perceiving itself unless reflexively it is perceiving itself as a perceiver.
	The transcendental suspension, in these broad terms of reference, is therefore not merely the global imposition of the suspension of a world thesis. Implicitly that must be the case, but, explicitly, the suspension must involve the mutually non-destructive balancing of this aspect of differential texture chosen for this act of suspension. Hence all judgments, once delivered, are the potential raw material for an act of suspension in order for this presuppositional ground of that textural/textual differentiation to be exposed and revealed. In this light all textural polarities and all textural fields are potential candidates for an act of suspension, e.g., judgments of identity and character, judgments of aesthetical value, of ethical situations, pragmatical concerns, hermeneutical interpretations, questions of factuality, etc. Moreover all polarities can be subjected to the same transcendental form of treatment, e.g., the oppositions between theory and practice, ends and means, the person and society, etc. In essence all forms of judgment, once delivered and chosen, are suspended in an act of transcendental suspension. Moreover, I would argue that, a suspension is necessary for an act of judgment to take place. The properly performed suspension of an informed state of affairs allowing the person to spontaneously and non-calculatively reach an appropriate resolution of that rhetorical process of questioning, the answering of that suspension being declared metaphorically, through processes of analogical simulation, either overtly or covertly.
	In effect, accumulatively, the suspension reveals the textural nature of the life-world for that person as they have become engaged within it in accordance with the nature of their inherited and acquired dispositions. Intuitively, the nooks and crannies of our communally led lives become indexed in a hierarchy of distinctions that finds itself reflected in our languages and other modes of communication.

ii. Intentional Resolution Through An Informed Suspension

	Paradoxically the balanced accommodation of polarized texture in the transcendental suspension acts as the fulcrum for the delivery of a resolution in our intentional motivation! Motivated choices are individual-like responses that do not occur in an intentional vacuum. Rather, the apparent resolute directedness of such responses is the result of a process of resolution wherein competing intentional streams of already pre-resolved intentional components are allowed to come together, interact and find a path of resolution that allows the mind to act in an integrated fashion, allows the person to behave with a certain degree of integrity. Indeed, the semblance of personhood itself is dependent upon the relatively effective resolution of conflicting intentional choices. Put simplistically reductively-oriented intentional processes establish a sense of dissonance, provocation, focus within and against a psychic background that is relatively non-dissonant or consonant. Mediating, the process of suspension allows for various types of interaction between these two poles of object and world. Through processes of resolution between object and world, object and object, one world reference frame and some other, the moment of suspension attempts to establish the productive resolution of such interaction. In the event of an adequate resolution of this intentional material the psychic stream of our mental lives is allowed to take on a sense of directedness along with a sense of integrity and involvement in a distinctively characterized relationship with the world, within the transcendental possibilities of this overall world-of-life.
	The dialectical moment of the transcendental suspension allows competing intentional processes to both interact and find pathways in processes of resolution. It is in this manner that motivation can be initiated and given an integrated sense of direction and purpose. Indeed, from this point of balance we can enter into both processes of reflection upon the world and active engagement therein. How is it possible then, in the state of the transcendental suspension itself, from a state of balance, that decisive decisions and judgments can be entered into from what in all appearances must look like some recipe for permanent paralysis, contradiction, indecisiveness and perpetual confusion? The solution, put quite simply, is that the suspension itself is subjected to a state of suspension, enfreeing our sense of self from the clutches of what must otherwise would be for the person the psychotic realm of madness. Because the suspension over-rides each intentional thesis with a counter-thesis it can only be through the suspension of the suspension that this point of equilibrium can be upset to re-ensure that our intentionality is allowed to flow in a certain direction. Through this double suspension a sense of personhood and personal power can be be seen to flow into the world from that point of view. Moreover, through the nature of the suspension over-riding, or over-writing, all forms of thesis and anti-thesis it follows that the consequent transcendental sense of self experienced must equally over-ride all forms of intentional polarization. Hence the transcendental ego cannot be limited to a single agent but must equally encompass, in its essential character, in our embodiment as a person-in-the-world, all forms of life, albeit from the point of view and nature of those agents. Hence the intersubjective complexion of the transcendental ego and its relationship to all `points' of agency and their complex integrated `senses of self.'

iii. The Trans-Intentional Nature Of Relational Experience

	The net result of this discussion on the topic of intentional resolution, transcendental agency, etc., is our experience and recognition of the relational dimension of our involvement in the integrity of a world of agency, a world-of-life. Moreover, as the world of our transcendental agency in its realized potential transcends our own integrated limited senses of self it follows that our involvement within the world must be in a direct relationship with those entities in which we currently stand in an intentional relationship. In other words as intentionally directed thinkers we are in direct contact with the intentional objects simulated in those state of intentionality. In a perceptual state we must be in a direct relationship with those perceived objects themselves whatever be the true intentional nature of their simulated constitution. Hence, in this light, we might like to agree with Husserl that all types of transcendent intentional states of noematic formation are merely intentional, and that all else has no sense, is without sense. That as a consequence, by virtue of the very nature of our intentional experience of relationships, we stand in a direct relationship with those intentional states. When we experience an illusion we directly experience the simulated objectivity of that illusion. When we experience a dream or hallucination we directly experience the simulated objectivity of that dream or hallucination. When we experience a perceptual state of affairs we directly experience the simulated objectivity of that perceptual state of affairs. How can we discriminate between these various types of intentional objectivity? Being in a direct relationship does not mean that we stand in a full understanding of that simulated objectivity. All objectivity is aspectival, a complete sense of full comprehension is not automatically guaranteed nor is it possible to obtain in the light of the polar inaccessibility of intentional objectivity. On the other hand by virtue of being in a relationship with a certain intentional object that by itself guarantees that we must stand in some form of a meaningful relationship with it. What should be sought, when and where possible, is an adequate understanding of the intentional constitution under focus. 
	Hence the intentional object from a transcendental point of view must be a fiction, but that from a non-transcendental point of view it has a reality in keeping with the apparent or non-apparent nature of its constitution. On one hand, from the side of the apparent intentional object itself it has a distinct objectivity of its own which it can reveal to some degree or other. On the other hand its intentional objectivity is a fiction in so far as that `image' or `trace' is an image or trace of something else. Hence the reality of the intentional object is correctly fictitious but that such an ascription does not characterize the intentional nature of the life-world in which we find ourself directly engaged!

iv. Authenticity In The Transformation Of Our Relationships

	If we are directly engaged in this world-of-life then how is it possible to contemplate the theoretical concept of `authenticity' and a practical evaluation of the same? If we are directly engaged in this life-world how is it possible to be not authentically engaged?
	The solution to this puzzle is quite simple. In so far as our engagement is conducted from a transcendental point of view in an equal measure is that relationship then being conducted authentically. The difficult part in all this is how to practically evaluate our current levels of authenticity and therein be able to develop stratagems that will allow us to see further developed a more positive transformation in the value of the same?
	The natural attitude, in accordance with this scheme as outlined, depends upon an overall unequal intentional focus upon the polarities of world, object and ego. On the other hand a balanced emphasis upon the poles of the world, object and ego establishes an authenticity in value-formation in an equal measure. Therefore, it follows that a positive transformation in the current levels of authenticity must involve the re-imposition of a `purified' transcendental suspension capable of achieving this ambition. 
	What pre-conditions are necessary for this positive transformation in authenticity? 
	First, for a transcendental suspension to be effective it must be an informed one. All relevant aspects of the situation must be taken into account. An aspect being relevant, or essential, in that situation if its absence, or presence, makes a difference in our appreciation of the intentional constitution of the transcendentally conducted resolution of that situation. 
	Second, the imposition of the informed suspension must be central to the intentional nature of our objective. E.g., if we desire an ethical appreciation of a situation then the nature of our investigations must be oriented with that type of motivation in mind. 
	Third, our imposition of a centralized and informed suspension must be thorough. I.e., all relevant polarities must be articulated and properly balanced in the exercise of that suspension.
	Fourth, the suspension itself must be suspended in order for it to productively enter into its own manner of resolution.
	Fifth, among other factors that might be considered, we should forever remain open to unexpected outcomes that appropriately realize and reveal themselves to us in our investigations. The richness of reality, of a text, of a person, is that apparent intentional object or subject will defy a mere predictableness. 
	Last, in our critical appreciation of the foregoing, to be conducted in the same manner, our understanding must be in conformity with its `object.' Authenticity is truly realized and recognized when our intentional understanding is in an adequate degree of conformity with the intentional constitution of that in which we have entered into a state of relationship. Because all our relationships are entered into in a direct manner, as I have previously outlined, it follows that our appreciation of our current levels of conformity with the object merely necessitates, with all the difficulties entailed, critical forms of phenomenological-intentional analysis of the intentional constitution of that state of intentional objectivity. An `indirect relationship' being a direct relationship where the full intentional nature of that object of that interaction remains partially `outside' the intentional nature of that relationship. 
	Implicit in such a position is the importance attached to the need for an intentional philosophy. Although from the transcendental point of view we can suspect the actual presence of an intentional object qua intentional object this does not impugn the validity of an intentional investigation of our phenomenologically examined relationships.

8. Conclusion

	Returning to the nature of the intentional `object' it is obvious that in this type of scheme the realization of the objectivity of that intentional object does not mean that that state of focused intentional objectivity is actually an object per se or merely an intentional representation of some state of affairs beyond its mere intentional constitution! Using my lengthy analysis of the wider implications and consequences of the act of transcendental suspension let me elaborate on these important insights.
	First, Husserl himself tells us that the intentional content of our transcendent noematic formations can be reduced to a state of mere intentional being. In being an apparent object-there-for-us it becomes intentionally constituted by us for the use by ourselves.
	Second, the recognition of this intentional constitution as constituted-by-us does not commit one to the claim that this must involve a simple, naive form of idealism. All relationships are processes in reciprocity. Although every intentional state-of-affairs-for-us must be constituted by us it is also constituted from the side of that simulated objectivity itself. A recognition of the modes of intentional constitution involved telling us whether we are involved with an object, a world, another person or a group of persons. 
	Third, the transcendental suspension in revealing the relative, related grounds of that intentional state of affairs under investigation also reveals the nature of our interaction and the apparent nature of that simulated in that simulated relationship. But that being simulated is not the simulation of something not being simulated, it is the very being of that being simulated in accordance with the the aspect, manner and quality of our interaction with it.
	Fourth, it follows then that all forms of appreciation are forms of intentional appreciation regardless of how aware or unaware we might be of this state of affairs.
	Fifth, all forms of intentional appreciation must be the result of the resolution of intentional processes, the quality of such performances reflecting the extent to which those performances are conducted within an intuitive or deliberate transcendental complexion. The quality of this transcendental orientation reflecting the degree to which a thorough, centralized and properly pre-informed transcendental suspension is able to impose itself through the integrity of that relationship.
	Sixth, by virtue of the direct nature of relationships the intentional object is correctly that which it appears to simulate. Therefore, from the transcendental point of view the intentional object qua intentional `object' can only be a fiction, albeit a fruitful fiction. All objects and all subjects have their place in a transcendental world of meaningful-being, this sense of place giving to those apparent `entities' their sense of meaning and meaningfulness.
	Lastly, a transcendental-intentional philosophy should recognize that authenticity in the manner in which we purport ourselves in the world is a direct reflection of the degree to which we enter into a positive transformation of sense, i.e., a recovery of an intentional understanding of the constitution of that under examination in conformity with the nature of its apparent intentional objectivity. From the natural standpoint we have the apparent manifestation of intentional objects, however, from the transcendental point of view we can only recognize the transcendental illusion of such entities.
	Without an intentional object the appreciation of an intentionally constituted state of affairs, whether constituted by-us or for-us, must correctly be trans-intentional. Hence, on one hand, from the natural standpoint, the intentional object has an apparent truthfulness, whereas, on the other hand, from the transcendental point of view, the intentional object is truly fictitious! 

						Noël Tointon, Sydney, 30.7.94.

Endnotes