Insight: Appreciation As A Process Of Recognition

A Hermeneutic Format For The Interpretation Of Statements Made By Psychotic Individuals

This paper addresses the following themes:

1.	The outline of a method for interpreting apparently bizarre statements (made by psychotic individuals).
2.	The practical application of previous hermeneutic research on the role played by metaphor in the construction and re-construction of sense.
3.	What possible light this type of research casts upon the phenomenology of psychotic illness as individually witnessed by the psychotic person (and the role this insight has for the individualized formulation of a treatment plan).
4.	The outline of a method for the examination of the degree, and nature, of self-insight apparently indicated by the textual behaviour of the psychotic person.
5.	Resolution of a particular philosophical problem: How is it possible that psychotic individuals, while using a creative range of metaphor, seem incapable of directly recognizing the analogued self-insight contained in such devices? The exercise, on one hand, of rich metaphorical systems  accompanied, on the other hand, by an apparent deficit in non-concrete, metaphorical, abstract thought processes.
6.	In what way might this research illuminate the phenomenological field of insight itself (assuming that insight is a distinctive phenomenon which, for the sake of these initial investigations, can be provisionally defined as the recognition of a process of appreciation already pre-established)?
7.	An examination of how the individual as a person-in-their-social-context(s) has created for them their own sense of self-worth, their insight into this sense of value, and, the outline of a method for our interpretation of this sense of personal value through self re-evaluation and evaluation of the other.

	Essentially, this paper is interested in the insight the psychotic person has into their own condition, our insight into this type of process, the insight the medical practitioner might find useful in this regard, what value insight might possess for the individual, how insight is actually exercised, and, what is the general phenomenological nature of the type of insight implicated in this paper (assuming the same type of phenomenon is actually in play within the restrictions, or limits, set by collective boundaries of the topics discussed in this paper?).
	To achieve the large number of goals set by this paper I have decided to write it in four sections forming the following index: 

Index

Part I: - On The Interpretation Of Bizarre Statements

1.	Interpreting Statements Made By Psychotic Individuals 
2. 	The Hermeneutical Examination Of Metaphorical 
Structures
3.	A Hermeneutic Format For Interpreting `Bizarre' Texts

Part II: - On The Phenomenological Nature Of Insight 

1. 	Hermeneutical Examination Of The Evidence For Insight
2. 	The Phenomenological Nature Of Insight
3. 	A Hermeneutic Format For Evaluating Insight

Part III: - Concluding Supplement - On The Nature Of 
Personal Value

1. 	The Loss Of Personal Value 
2. 	The Recovery Of Personal Value 
3.	Hermeneutic Format For Re-Evaluating Self-
Authenticity

Appendix - A Systematic Typology Of Mental Disorders

Postscript

I: On The Interpretation Of Bizarre Statements

	Statements can appear `bizarre' for a number of reasons. Their anomalous presentation probably reflecting one or more of the following defective processes that constitute their formation, transmission, reception and/or interpretation. Namely, psychic disturbances in cognitive function, inadequately prepared pre-conditions for social emission, defects in the actual process of publication and limitations imposed upon its reception. Moreover, misinterpretation on our part, for a variety of reasons, can also give an inadequately treated received text the appearance of being bizarre, strange, inappropriate, etc.
	In our interpretation of a text I will invoke a methodology that looks at the type of questions the `reader' will introduce. This method being centered on a phenomenological-hermeneutical reading of the metaphor present in that text and in its socially oriented meta-text.
	As will be argued later in this paper metaphor, like the phenomenological nature of the question, is centered on a transcendental suspension which in turn is centered in a hermeneutic circle balanced between reductive-analysis and reconstitutional-synthesis. Essentially, the creation and recreation of a metaphorical process, in our reading of a simple or complex textual metaphor involves our taking a middle stance between `something being like something else,' and, by virtue of only being alike, also `being unlike that to which it is compared.' In a similar fashion a question invokes similar epistemological mechanisms, namely, the fact that a question entertains both the positive and the negative aspects of this enterprise, i.e., `is x actually y?' implies that x might be y possessing or non-y possessing. That the very entertainment of the question must be invoked in and through the auspices of the (transcendental) suspension `is x actually y or non-y?' Treated on a moment by moment basis this can also be translated to read `x, for moment m (or m1...m2) is both y and non-y.' Effectively, the suspension is written in the form of an entertained state of balance, a radical suspension placing our entire world-experience, as a world thesis, under such a state of counter-balanced play. Under this change in signature nothing is destroyed, rather this state of balance allows us to return to the transcendental roots of our discriminatory experience to re-experience first-hand the existential/non-existential value generated/de-generated therein.
	All information is received in a textual field. To interpret a text we must re-constitute that field otherwise known as its meta-text. If this meta-text is inadequately indicated we are left with a text that cannot be fully appreciated. Psychotic individuals often appear to have some basic problems in the socialization of their meta-texts in a reasonably direct measure to the degree of psychotic dysfunction. 
	Assuming that all communication is motivated to some degree or other it follows that to understand the other person, regardless of their mental health and mental status, implies that we must set out to comprehend their statements, textual behaviour, publications, etc., and that this could put us in charge of important information about that person, their perceived place in the world, their perception of this world, etc. That on the basis of such information we must find ourselves in a better position to communicate with, and possibly help, that person. 
	The very utterance, or emission, of a text involves, as the productive deposition of textual behaviour, some degree of success in the ongoing resolution of the relevant conditions that constituted its formation. Intentionality, to some degree or other, implies some distinctive directedness in conscious resolution, in both senses of that expression which in turn is reflected in its received deposition. Some degree of resolve is needed as well as the necessary degree of resolution that allows that resolve to be formulated and directed into the realization of the future in keeping with the nature and possibilities implicit in such a process of resolution. Resolution of that objective necessitates that we can appreciate the difference, or contrast, between our intentional act of resolution and what would not constitute the nature of that emotionally committed sense of protensional directedness. In other words the very act of being able to make and put into effect a decision to behave in a certain manner involves at least a minimum degree of psychic integration which in turn implies that the intended content in an act of textual deposition must reflect this relatively integrated state of affairs, which should in turn directly and indirectly repay our attention, to some degree or other, in any attempt made by us to interpret what was apparently intended through that which was just emitted. Although the goal of interpretation is guaranteed this does not imply that any attempt on our part to interpret this depositional process has its successfulness automatically guaranteed. On the other hand the appropriation of intentionally directed depositions will be conducted in such a manner that our absolute non-appropriation is as equally impossible as our absolute re-appropriation of that process. Interpretation must always involve some degree of success. Of course whether that success is relatively successful, or effective, in the light of our interpretive needs is another matter. Moreover, we might be able to interpret a text with degrees of embedded sense it does not automatically follow that that content makes much sense or is meant to make much sense. 	

1. Interpreting Statements Made By Psychotic Individuals

	One day a patient said to me he was a robot from the planet Mars. This person adding that even though he looked like a person he was in fact a robot. I asked why he said such a strange thing and he told me that he felt mechanical; and that therefore he had to be a robot as human beings are not mechanical machines. Therefore he must be a robot. 
	Well I couldn't argue with that piece of logic but I asked him why he thought he was from the planet Mars? He told me that he knew this was the case for he had had communications to this effect from the planet Mars itself. 
	On reflection I noticed the patient was having some side-effects from the medication he was on which could explain why the patient might have said he felt `mechanical,' i.e., was experiencing some degree of muscular rigidity and stiffness in his execution of movement. His creative metaphor of the robot having the same import. On the other hand this same person also told me, indirectly, that he was currently hearing voices. His communications from the planet Mars itself could be interpreted along those lines.
	In interpreting this overall `text' we need to note the conjunction of the two metaphors (namely, robots and communications from Mars) put into play, and, the way those metaphors appear to function and interact. 
	The use of the same metaphor by two different people (or the use of the same metaphor at different times by the same person) does not imply of itself that they are using the same metaphor in the same fashion. This difference in the apparent use of the same metaphor can be ascribed to differences in the covert manipulation of that metaphorical image. The overt aspect of the metaphor is the presentation of a relatively simple and integrated image. E.g., we have just noted the example of the metaphor of the robot. The generally understood phenomenological nature of robots accounting for its overt thematization. On the other hand how this image is to be used is set up by the metaphorical field in which this metaphor, in its overtness, is to be introduced. Conventionally robots are perceived as stiff and jerky in their movements, come in varying degrees of lifelikeness and non-lifelikeness, good at repetitive tasks, not truly conscious, restricted in what they can apparently do, feel, think, say, etc. In the use of this metaphor this person has concentrated on the stiff, jerky nature of conventionally perceived robotic action. In this instance this aspect of the metaphor, it would appear, has been stressed. Likewise the implication of being, or feeling, non-human has also been taken up. On the other hand the comparative use of a number of other characteristics are not being utilized, e.g., the excellence and accuracy of their repetitive functions is not noted. Moreover, the metallic, or contrived, nature of their visual presentation is not implicated. In essence, therefore, it would appear that this person is communicating metaphorically that they feel stiff and jerky in their body movements (which may or may not be related to the medication they are currently taking) and, also, that they are experiencing feelings of unreality, some form of de-personalization or alienation; a contrast discovered in their reflection upon a time that they were not so effected by their current illness or not so effected to the same extent. This differential contrast in body-tone, self-image, experiential perception of their embodiment in the world, their sense of personhood, etc., being experienced, but not necessarily comprehended, in a direct and fully insightful manner, recognizing that these differences constitute an indication that they might have some form of psychiatric dysfunction. But let me discuss this aspect of insight later on in this paper.
	The use of a metaphorical image has to be understood both overtly and covertly, i.e., as to what is the perceived nature of the image invoked, and, in our understanding of its phenomenological and conventional natures just what aspects are being manipulated, through adoption and adaptation, by being stressed, suggested, discounted, ignored, rejected, displaced, etc. Moreover, the interaction of the various metaphors used in the text under examination must also be attended to. In this instance, in our reading of this text, the robots are seen as `extra-terrestrially influenced giving us an overall science fiction-like flavour reinforcing the sense of personal anomaly experienced, in the form of a differential contrast, by this person.
	Let us attempt this process of interpretation by examining the `text' of a second series of statements made by another psychotic individual. Please note that the apparent accuracy of any interpretation attempted in this paper is not of direct importance, rather, a way of reading is being demonstrated that attempts to re-create a degree of meaningfulness greater than the degree of meaning originally invested in the initial, surface reading of that text. Defining the term text as any form of intentionally directed deposition whose collective traces of deposition appear to possess some degree of contextually pre-determined integrity, e.g., a person writing a letter, a person reading a letter, a person walking along a beach, a smiling person greeting us, a piece of music currently being played, a certain situation being filmed, a painting, etc. Moreover, I am suggesting that the apparently provocative nature of these statements taken collectively, i.e., the sense of strangeness elicited by our initial `reading' of these statements, in entering into a process of resolution that sees `provoked' a pre-determined process of harmonization that successfully resolves this state of apparent textual anomaly with a minimum of fuss, that we have, via these means, the apparent ability to intersubjectively reconstruct the intentional import that originally presented that text along with the insight generated by the apparently pre-determined nature of such a re-induced process. That, essentially, this mechanism of provocation is fundamental to all forms of intentionality and all forms of intentionally deliberate acts of communication, but, that in the psychotic person's use of this process the involvement of a third person dimension of social interaction is inadequately prepared and formulated. That such defects in communication are going to result, quite naturally, in processes of mis-interpretation or outright relative non-comprehension. Relative by virtue of the fact that the intentional import of human interaction can never be completely mis-interpreted, or i.e., mis-appropriated, in the first place.
	The expression provocation has been given a technical meaning by myself to signify the reception of a process of information that is perceived to be different from the general background associated in the reception of that information, and, that such informational disconformity has within its construction the means for its re-accommodation back into that background field (assuming that that process is well-formed in this regard). That in essence the experience of such information is perceived as provocative, by virtue of its difference, and, that such provocation also provokes its own most probable pathway, or pathways, for the resolution of that experience of relative difference. 
	To illustrate this type of mechanism of provocation I have in the past used the comparison of the matador and their red cape. The cape is used to further inflame the bull into rushing forward. At the same time the matador's skilful use of that cape decides where the bull is going to be re-directed at the last minute. The provocative colour and use of that cape provokes the bull to charge forward. The cape is then use to re-direct this charge provoked by itself, resolving the provocation induced by the use of that cape. That, essentially, in the state of cognitive dissonance distinctive, re-producible means can be found, to a certain degree, for accommodating what at first appearances appears not able to be accommodated. A re-living of the provocational pathway elicited by the process of provocation itself contributing to the discharge of the information intended to be released by such a pre-constructed mechanism. Authorial intentions often being reinforced by the different use of similar means to reproduce the same apparent information re-iterating what was pre-intended to be communicated. 
	A similar process can be found in classical expressions of music in the use of prepared dissonance. The resolution of that dissonance utilizing relational aspects present in the relatively dissonant part of that musical score to realize a state of resolution. The important points being made by this concept of provocation is that certain processes of dissonance can not only induce a sense of difference but also provide relatively definitive means for the resolution of the same, and, that all instances of informational transfer are essentially communicated by this type of provocative process. That to understand defective processes of communication we must fill in those parts that are missing and correct those aspects that are malformed (in the hope that the energy released is greater than that energy invested in its thematization and re-invested in its corrected re-thematization).
	Let us try to attempt an interpretation of the following statements made by a very disturbed female patient. This person came to the desk and without any form of self-introduction stated in a series of short sentences the following: I am the saviour. I am going to die soon. Is everything alright? Can you give me a hug.
	The primary metaphor here is that of the Christ figure. This person states that she is the saviour. What aspects of this metaphorical image are being covertly brought to surface in her manipulation of this image? The next statement gives us some insight into what aspects of this image are being used, namely, that she thinks, and feels, that she is going to die soon with the implication that her death is not going to be natural and will most likely occur in a violent, unpleasant manner within a religious framework suggesting a re-valuation, or trans-valuation, of herself in the process. That, basically, she thinks, or feels, that she is going to die soon or metaphorically die soon. That this will be an unpleasant affair, more unpleasant than how she currently feels at the moment, but, that this whole process will not be in vain for some reason or reasons as yet unknown to herself. This experience is to happen soon so she asks the nurse is everything alright? We may well have here an element of self-insight? With some degree of insight into her condition she, in her then current train of thought, requested a hug; somewhat inappropriate in the institutional setting but more than likely appropriate to how she then saw herself given her natural state of distress reflecting, and giving rise to, such intentionality as apparent in her statements.
	The use of religious imagery occurs quite often in the statements made by psychotic individuals and indicates, in my understanding, an exaggeration of the cultural values in which that person was and or is surrounded by, and, the expression of a desperate feeling of a lack of self-value and a corresponding induction of a need, with a similar degree in intensity, for some form of existential self-revaluation. But let me develop this point of self-valuation in a later section of this paper.
	In summary we might say then that this lady was in a state of considerable stress and suffering a similar degree of consequent distress. In her use of a religious metaphor it would appeared that she felt that she was more than likely about to die, that her immanent death had religious connotations, and, that she felt, and recognized, a considerable degree of self-disturbance.

2. The Hermeneutical Examination Of Metaphorical Structures

	All communication is intentionally formed. The implication of an intentional dimension, however, does not mean that intentionally formed deposition is intentionally directed one hundred per cent in its mental thematization, etc. The directedness of intentionality is the result of a process of resolution, the realization of a state of accommodation between the intentional object-state under focal thematization and the field in which that act of thematization is being exercised. Moreover, this act of resolution cannot be considered to have been achieved in a logically definitive form, i.e., realized absolutely. 
	Resolution is a process that I have defined in previous research as a distinctive type of mechanism that is dialectically structured with three moments, namely, consonant-field-preparation, dissonant-focalization and resolutional-accommodation. Resolution cannot be the mere instantiation, in some point in time, of the pure presence of any one of these three moments, e.g., resolution. The process of resolution is a process and as a process necessitates the continuing simultaneously processed participation of these three moments. This point should be made clear in the following observation.
	When a tradesperson does some work for us our relationship, as the hirer of that tradesperson, ceases the moment we fully pay our bill. In a like manner when we equalize the overall debt and recognized obligations with gifts to the extent that we have effectively equalized and neutralized that debt in full the relationship can then be considered as being effectively fully paid up in the process discharging all previous obligations more or less recognized by both parties. This fact might, in contrast, account for the habit of tipping a tradesperson, giving them a small gift in some form or other in the hope that their relationship with us is not completely paid up so that when we might need them in the future they might consider our need for their services more favorably. Then again we might like to interpret this practice of tipping as a recognition of service, and care, performed  above and beyond that quality and quantity expected so that in our estimation we might also feel obligated to recognize and reward their additional care and  attention to detail as discharged by that skilled tradesperson.
	The main point of this observation I would  like to put in the form of the following general rule to the effect that the absolute resolution of a relationship results in its non-continuation. But, if we are to have the continuation of a relationship then the process of resolution must respect this maxim and enter into a process of ongoing partial resolution, in effect realize an orientation towards this process of resolution. Conversely, a relationship cannot  commence, and thence continue, if the process of resolution has no point of commencement. It follows, therefore, that a relationship is synonymous with a process of resolution and vice versa. Moreover, I would define the relational successfulness of that process of resolution, its facticity, as the degree to which relative dissonance is adequately resolved. This aspect of a relationship being essentially its strength of relational being, its sense of `presence' in the world, the degree to which the distinctive field of that relationship makes for itself a sense of presence above and beyond the mere summation of the relational impact of its apparent constituents. This sense of `presence' being generated from the interaction of its participant parts cannot ultimately be attributed to its essential intrinsic-ness (even though in our provisional calculations the summation of those participating factors are treated in an intrinsic-like fashion).
	Intentionality, and its communication, is essentially the utilization of a process of resolution, establishing in the process the directedness of that thought process. Hence in our examination of a transmitted text its intentional integrity establishes the relative significance of that emission. All intentionality is motivated, likewise all communication is motivated in its intentionally directed deposition. Our dialectical triadic model of relational resolution implying that an act of communication can have neither an absolutely definitively formed intentional process, and content in a similar dogmatic format, nor an absolutely and completely unformed intentionality. In a similar fashion, assuming the centrality of metaphor in the formation and communication of intentionality, it follows that the complete literalization of the metaphor cannot, conversely, be argued for. For similar reasons the converse is also the case, namely, metaphor cannot be treated as completely metaphorical in its analogicality. The direct implications of this state of central metaphorical resolution being that all communication necessitates the reconstruction of the metaphor embedded in a text and the realization that this reconstruction, reflecting the nature of its parallel construction being imitated metaphorically, must entertain some degree of resolutional successfulness. In our mirrored appropriation of this metaphorical state of affairs it must be realized that this initial process in its constitution must possess a certain degree, more or less, of resolutional successfulness or failure, and, that the constitutional nature of its reconstructive simulation must also be constituted in a similar non-absolute fashion. Hence even in the most bizarre statements, made by psychotic or non-psychotic individuals, the process of intentionality, as witnessed in its deposition must possess some degree of intentional integrity. That being the case it follows that all forms of communication, assuming the involvement of some form of direct intentional participation, are in theory translatable, i.e., can at least in theory be made the subject of an interpretation and possess therein some degree of significance. The completely psychotic individual is a fiction just as much as the completely sane person is capable of exercising, and appreciating, the perfect process of the definitive interpretation. No individual, in the light of these comments, could ever be the complete and absolute master of their own processes of intentionality, their own processes of its communicational deposition and of their own processes of appreciative interpretation of the same. This does not imply, however, that they lack an adequate degree of control over these processes. Moreover, it equally follows that the individual is also incapable of `intentionally' emitting communicational-like processes whose content is essentially nonsense or i.e., possess absolutely no sense. Reflecting the degree of psychic gestalt-integration currently enjoyed by that individual their communicated depositions will generally reflect the same degree of integration (certainly not being able to exceed the same). Of course it is quite conceivable that they might attempt to simulate depositions with the appearance of non-sense it still follows that their reasons for the emission of the same are quite reasonable and that, in theory at least, this must also in some form or other show itself.
	In theory, if not in practice, it follows that if we were able to reconstruct the constitutional configuration of such intentionality, as is the case in its short term preservation in the specious present, in its protentional fixation for appreciation, for its re-construction in memory and its meta-textually driven communicational reconstruction, it should follow that the motivational impetus behind its original gestation should manifest itself in its very intentional formation and re-formation. I.e., an equivalence can be drawn between intentional motivation and its intentional directedness. Now motivation accepted it follows that all utterances must have some form of meaning or significance even if the degree of significance is diminished in states of psychotic dysfunction, or in states of psychic dysfunction in general. However, this does not allow us to dismiss such apparent utterances as totally bizarre and therein as worthless (without some form of trans-thematical value)! Such depositions may possess little sense, in theory at least, they can still be interpreted. In such a light, therefore, we should not dismiss the bizarre statements emitted by the psychotic individual, or the non-psychotic individual for that matter, as entirely worthless. It may well be that the successful interpretation of an apparently bizarre utterance might directly contribute little to our knowledge about the world at large, indirectly it could have a lot to say about the state of the person who made that utterance. Often, however, the psychotic individual is trying to say something that is, to a certain extent, quite reasonable. Although their texts may be quite bizarre in appearance this appearance of disorder is further not diminished by their inability to exercise a socially intact meta-textual set of conventions that would allow their prospective public to make better sense of what they might be trying to say. Therefore as an interpreter, perhaps assisting this psychotic person to communicate less ineffectively, we must adopt those hermeneutic methods that will allow us to make better sense of such apparently bizarre depositions. As already indicated this type of investigation involves an in depth appreciation of the metaphor at work, if present, in that text and in its associated meta-text. In this type of investigation, with this type of deposition, we must not expect to find perfectly reasonable texts completely in harmony both internally within those texts or with their meta-textual fields and frames of context. On the other hand we can at least expect that our understanding of these depositions is going to throw an indirect light on the psychological disposition of those individuals. That all depositions, to some extent or other, also indirectly reflect the then current psychic state of the performers of those texts.
	All intentionality, and therefore all acts of meaning, (including all forms of sense, reference and other kinds of significance), are exercised through the use of analogical structures. `Is like' is entertained through a parallel form of accommodation (`the being like') and those regions not bounded by such non-indistinctness (`the not being like'). Between this region of consonance and this focus on the not consonant, or relatively dissonant, meaning and meaningfulness is generated. In between the two poles of this tension a state of suspension is effectively engineered and it is from this mid-point that the resolutional nature of that intention, and the intentional nature of that resolution, are discharged into the world of universal discourse.
	Some texts lack overt metaphor and present themselves as effectively literal. On the other hand the meta-text that unlocks the text must possess metaphor either covertly in the meta-metatext or overtly in that meta-text. In order to understand the wide range of metaphorical functions we must focus upon the phenomenological nature of the adopted metaphor and then select, in accordance with the meta-nature of our text. The relatively covert aspect of a metaphor being used selectively, indicating aspects and associated readings implied by that meta-text. The meta-text adopting conventional practices and then adapting them to the nature of the situation to hand. The meta-text, as a metaphorical key, unlocking the text and allowing us to selectively manipulate that metaphorical image currently under some form of public access. The meta-text imprinting upon the textuality of the text an indirect indication of the rules and processes situated in the meta-text.
	Therefore, in the process of interpretation the direction of this procedure is effectively reversed. The immediately presented/re-presented meaning structural-functions are seized upon as already pre-constituted. Our re-appropriation of this significance through the suspension of the `is like' and the `is not like' through discharge re-directing our intentional focus. In the wake of this process of intentional discharge meaning and meaningfulness is synthesized that effectively parallels, to some lesser degree, the original recovered in our hermeneutical treatment of the text. The internal selectivity divined within initial or key metaphor is approached (and re-applied). This same process repeats itself with each new metaphor. Then, when this linear region of covert meta-textual use of metaphor is more or less completed an inter-metaphorical region of treatment is now approached, i.e., the manner in which the interrelationships between the metaphor are accommodated and therein harmonized (an exercise intuitively conducted on a meta-meta-level of analysis-synthesis, etc.). The whole process integrating our already acquired understanding of the situation. The successfulness of our endeavours releasing value in proportion to that degree of recognized usefulness. In other words in trans-thematical appreciation the value of our translation should release more value than that originally invested in that performance of interpretation (and appreciation). The overall harmonization of the text as an assumed collective entity revealing a virtual sense of `presence' in keeping with the intentional status of the author of that tract. Similar processes harmonizing the metaphorical structures highlighted as essential to that document, systems of more closely interrelated metaphor further reinforcing or deconstructing newer overlays of meaning and meaningfulness. More successful interpretive approaches `releasing' more hermeneutical value than that invested in these acts of interpretation (as long as our interpretation of this excess is in keeping with the general intent of that text or set of texts under examination as indicated by the meta-text through titles, etc., and our re-evaluation of such indications when and where necessary. This last qualification being made to prevent interpreters from being able to tell the authors of texts much more than those authors themselves set out to transmit to their audiences).
	In essence this process is the identification of metaphorical structural-functions and their interaction in the form of systems and meta-systems, etc. Then a phenomenology of these metaphorical complexes is undertaken upon which the relative meta-text is allowed to select those features it brings to prominence in that aspect of this general metaphorical field at the same time discounting those aspects of our phenomenology that appear to be not involved in those apparent meta-textual conventions adopted and adapted. The resolution of these features can be discerned as the style of that genre and the individual style, or lack of style, exercised by that author. Resolution indicating intentional directedness, and pointing towards communicational motivation, the reiteration of the same intentional resolutions reinforcing the probability of our interpretation(s) heading in the right direction or directions. The reconstruction of meta-textual dispositions, through our analysis of titles and other relatively direct meta-textual devices reinforcing the general tenor of our conclusions. The overall excess of differentiated trans-thematic value released usually indicating the relative success of one interpretation over another, the ability to accommodate the diverse spectrum of complementary and supplementary interpretations reinforcing this process of evaluation-excess and meta-textual contextualization. This process of interpretation also revealing the intentional state or status of the author, or authors, involved in that process of deposition currently under re-constitutional analysis and synthesis. Reductive analysis focusing upon the nature of our phenomenological selectivity whilst pre-constitutional synthesis taking a more functional and pragmatic orientation. Processes of contextualization locating the meta-text in an historical dimension when and where applicable, with varying degrees of appropriateness. Our appropriation never starting from scratch nor realizing an absolute state of completion, finding only degrees of adequacy and appropriateness relative to the gestalt integration originally imparted to that text.
	In the next section of this paper let me outline a general hermeneutic format for the interpretation of statements of a bizarre or anomalous appearance.

3: A Hermeneutic Format For Interpreting `Bizarre' Texts

	This format will be conducted under the headings of the Non-Formal and the Formal, etc.
	Let the interviewer or reviewer introduce or self-define the nature of their investigations. Next, with the person or persons about to be directly interviewed or indirectly reviewed find some rapport with the person(s) or author(s) being interviewed or reviewed and get that person or persons being interviewed or reviewed to communicate or indicate, through a highlighting of text, their current thoughts and preoccupations relevant to the nature of those investigations already introduced or defined.
	Into this introductory phase let the interviewer or reviewer ask the interviewee or themselves, as the `reader' of those texts, either open questions or directed questions in order to clarify textual/metatextual aspects of that being communicated. Let our research be centered on an identification and clarification of the metaphor in the text-metatext currently being examined. Under either of our subheadings questions can be phrased in either a direct manner or in a less direct fashion. Such questions being formulated either for oneself or prepared for the actual questioning of that person being interviewed. Non-formal questioning taking place in the form of an interview or a series of interviews, or, a review or series of reviews. On the other hand a formal investigation is conducted using documentation relating to some form of a prior interview or series of interviews, or, a prior review or series of reviews. 
	`Formal' by virtue of its methodical analysis and argued for reconstitutional synthesis, i.e., the formulation of documentation that critically argues for a `reading' of the meaning and/or reference most probably intended by that text under investigation. 
	Open questions are being asked in order to search for and find a lead that will allow us to follow a more direct approach in our enquiries. Open questions being formulated directly, etc.  Hence:

The Broad Methodological Direction Adopted In Our Research

0.	Introductory Phase (then either 1, 2; 2, 1; 1. or 2.)

1.	Non-Formal Questioning (in real or virtual dialogical 													time)

	i.	Open Questions

		a. 	direct
		b.	indirect

	ii.	Directed Questions

		a. 	direct
		b.	indirect

2.	Formal Questioning (in documentational time and space)

	i.	Open Questions

		a. 	direct
		b.	indirect

	ii.	Directed Questions

		a. 	direct
		b.	indirect

Our Methodology For Questioning Taking the Following Form:

0. i.	An initial determination of the boundaries of our 			text or set of texts.
   ii.	An initial, general determination of the adopted 			genre form and adapted details of our meta-													text.
1. i.	Noting the presence of metaphor in the text.
   ii.	Noting the presence of metaphor in the meta-text.
2. i.	General list of essential and associated features
		phenomenologically involved in the denotation 			and connotation of those metaphor noted in 1.
3. i.	Describing the covert, selective, meta-textual 			manipulation of overt metaphor in the text.
   ii.	Describing the covert, selective meta-metatextual 			manipulation of overt metaphor in the meta-text.
4. i.	Examining, if present, the complex interrelation-	
		ship between metaphor in the text/meta-text, 			harmonizing and noting features in that reiterate
and reinforce adopted readings.
5.		A final, provisional re-determination of meta-			textual genre in the light of 0.-4.

II.	On The Phenomenological Nature Of Insight

	In order to throw some light on the experiential phenomenon of insight I would like to present a philosophical problem and in the course of this section attempt a resolution of the same. This philosophical problem has already been alluded to in the opening section of this paper under `themes addressed,' namely the observation that `although the psychotic person often uses a rich vocabulary of metaphor their diminished powers of abstract thinking would seem to preclude their meaningful use of the same.'
	In this first section I will present an interpretation of miscellaneous documentary material pertaining to this topic in order to demonstrate that some form of indirect insight is in evidence. In the process we will also be able to observe the relatively excessive and creative use of metaphor exercised by psychotic individuals. At the same time we will also make the observation that such people, in the midst of their psychoses, also seem to loose the ability to entertain abstractly the metaphorical nature of such textual devices. We can then ask quite correctly, given such documentary material as supplied by myself, if such observations have been correctly interpreted, then how is it possible for this type of person to appear to use a creative, original range of metaphor and, yet at the same time, also appear to have considerably lost the very ability to entertain the abstract, metaphorical tenor of such devices? How is this dilemma to be resolved? 
	First, let me demonstrate that we can present much textual evidence for the supposition that these people also possess some form of indirect insight into the nature of their current psychotic condition. Then, let me phenomenologically interpret the apparent nature of  this situation and in the process discuss some possible mechanisms for this distortion in interpretation (of the world) and the relative concealment of insight displayed by this type of person. Finally let me sketch out a format for determining the degree of insight exercised by the individual.

1. Hermeneutical Examination Of The Evidence For Insight

	The statements made by psychotic individuals are often very bizarre. One often wonders to what degree the person who makes a bizarre statement might actually believe the same to be true. In this section let us look at a number of textual reports made by a number of psychotic individuals and demonstrate from internal evidence the extent to which some degree of self-insight is actually in evidence. Hence the hermeneutical, or interpretive, nature of our task, i.e., a textual investigation of the verbal utterances and/or deposited behavioural descriptions if made concurrently with the former, and vice versa.
	To complete this task I will illustrate a number of different textual forms that I believe demonstrate some degree of self-insight. The presence of such textual-forms indicating that this phenomenon of self-insight was present regardless of whether such recognition was successfully achieved or not.
	It is my belief that no psychotic person is without some degree of self-insight. Often some degree of self-insight is present it just seems that that person just does not make the necessary connections in order to make this presence of self-realization an existential fact in the centrality of their being. Later in this paper this aspect of a non-connection with the evidence will be discussed.
	Psychiatric hospital have lots of stories about the bizarre statements made by patients and their equally bizarre patterns of behaviour. E.g., there was a patient who stated he was "the Emperor of China" and whose cleaning task in this ward was to clean the toilets once a day in the evenings. In this instance when this inconsistency between the statement of this person that he was `the Emperor of China' and the behaviour fact that this was `the same person who, each evening, cleaned the toilets' was brought to the attention of this patient he promptly stated that `he was currently a prisoner of war and that he had to obey these humiliating instructions.'
	From experience I have learnt that its always wiser never to argue with a psychosis, and, that one should not affirm, or too strongly disconfirm, the contents of an expressed delusion (assuming that the delusional matter expressed is actually delusional). For a start you will more often than not never win and, if for some strange reason you find yourself apparently winning the debate, there is always the chance that the psychotic person will mis-interpret what you are trying to say  and do, and the reasons why you are trying to attempt such a feat. Then, from this state of mis-interpretation, in the form of a response there is the possibility of potentially dangerous consequences developing either in the immediate present or at some time in the future. A strong, relatively forceful intrusion into that persons’ delusional thinking, and delusional system if possessed by that psychotic person, usually only increases the psychic distance between yourself and this psychotic person. Under the circumstances increasing this sense of psychic distance only makes it harder for this person and oneself to communicate. Moreover, one's chances of loosing this type of debate are in a direct measure to the relative severity of the psychosis. All in all, it is usually a pointless encounter although it can reveal the creativity needed by that psychotic person in order to avoid what would effectively amount to a process of insight if this avoided region of their psyche was more objectively reflected upon. It would appear that this avenue, in a non-indirect form, is progressively closed to such a person by the very nature of their psychotic illness? In this paper let me explore, with some relative safety I might add, this controversial region for the psychotic person when constrained to face these dissonant facets in their psyche (between `the reality of their delusions' and `their delusions of what they mis-interpret as reality').
	Evidence for some form of insight will be discussed under the following subtitles, namely, Direct Statements Of Insight, Analogous Forms Of Insight, Inconsistent Behaviour Indicating Partial Insight, Hot-Spots Indicating Non-Acknowledged Insight, Symbolized Insight, Compartmentalization Of Insight, Insight Demonstrated Through Reversal In Conversational Perspective, Behavioural Inconsistency, Self-Recognition Of Exaggerated Value Claims, and, Indirectly Recognized States of Self-Insight.

A. Direct Statements Of Insight

	Little need be said here than to recognize those texts that demonstrate an adequate degree of self-insight. E.g., on interview when a patient tells you the nature of their illness, describe their symptoms, discuss the effectiveness of their medication if taken, etc., such a conversation finding a verified demonstration in the apparent, current behavioral disposition of that person, documented evidence to this effect, etc.

B. Analogous Forms Of Insight

	A tearful, very over-weight, elderly, female patient once seriously recounted a series of statements to the effect that she saw herself as a horse and that she was terribly upset that they were going to put her in the Melbourne Cup tomorrow because "my little legs won't be able to take me."
	The terrified, tearful disposition of this lady, who seriously supplied the conversation as reported above, to all purposes appeared to believe her impossible identification with a horse. But, for all such an identification, this patient still maintained her self-image as overweight. In this state of analogy between `an overweight horse' and `an overweight person' we see indirect evidence that this person maintained some access to the nature of her personhood as a person embodied in this world despite all apparent claims to the contrary. That in effect some part of her psyche was not going to be fooled by claims maintained by some other part of her personality. Indeed, in the form of a general conclusion that I believe should be drawn from this type of particular incident is the existential observation that no one can withdraw completely from reality! Some part of the person is always going to remain in touch with the way things are in our overall, socially oriented appreciation of reality. This point of contact must always be present to some degree or other, and, to some extent, directly or indirectly, consciously or unconsciously, censor behaviour that deviates too far from this `being a person in this world of social-reality.' This act of censorship being imprinted, to some degree or other, on their intentionally directed acts of behavioral deposition whether verbal or non-verbal in character. That, theoretically at least, such `self-insight' can always be demonstrated, but, that it is not always the case that this insight is metaphorically centered, encountered, allowed to make contact, etc., in that person's consciousness, i.e., insightfully `recognized' as being present.

C. Inconsistent Behaviour Indicating Partial Self-Insight

	An elderly lady in bed once asked me the following question: "What is the security like on the main door of this hospital?" This statement of concern about this hospital's security was accompanied by the incongruity of a big, silly smile. Wondering why this strange type of question was being asked, or, why this respectable question was being asked in such a strange manner, I enquired, "why do you ask suck a question?" She answered in a dead pan voice, albeit with the same silly grin, "I hope gangsters don't get in and beat me up." It almost appeared that this lady was hoping for such an occurrence as evidence that she was an important person, as some prominent person in the world of fame and infamy that deserved to be taken notice of, or more probably deserved to be punished, in this manner. 
	The point of this anecdote is that between the verbal text and the non-verbal text of her facial expressions an incongruity unwittingly indicated that this person was experiencing some degree of an anomaly in her own thinking, in her own thoughts on the presuppositional grounds and imputed content of her verbal request. That although an imaginative fantasy was in charge in the formation of her thinking and behaviour it was not completely in charge. This difference making itself consciously apparent at least to the listener of this statement. A demonstration of this patient's non-absolute sincerity most likely being denied by this person if brought to their attention or at least prompting some form of rationalization part way between these two (interpretive) levels of reality-appreciation (i.e., between the `reality of the fantasy' and the `reality' of that fantasy).
	Another incident might reinforce this type of demonstration. A newly admitted patient recounted the following `information,' "the staff have been giving me `goblin poison.' I didn't want to upset the nurse giving me my modecate injection by telling her this."  This statement was made by a male patient one day after receiving their weekly modecate injection; anti-psychotic medication in the form of an oil-based depot that lasts for a certain period of time longer than the oral delivery of that same medication.
	Again the point of this anecdote is to note the fact that although one aspect of this patient believed they were be being given goblin poison another part of the same person consented to turning up and receiving their medication. If you really thought you were about to be poisoned would you turn up to receive and accept the same.
	The prime `metaphor' in this text is that of `poison.' I believe we have evidence here for seeing the break down in metaphorical appreciation as not occurring in a literal form, i.e., that the degeneration in metaphorical appreciation does not occur in a literalization of that metaphorical structure. If that person literally believed they were being poisoned, or about to be poisoned, then their behaviour would more than likely have appropriately reflected such fears that devolved from such a literal interpretation. A certain fearfulness was verbally recounted but not followed through in the behaviour of that person in their actively engineered acceptance of this `poison.' This person not telling the nurse this information in deference to not upsetting this nurse even though on one level of the psyche receiving this medication was upsetting for this patient, something he still thought about and felt he had to tell another nurse the next day.
	When questioned a week later about why this patient thought his medication was `goblin poison' he said that `he had been told that, that where he stayed he knew everyone thought that to be the case.' Then he quickly denied that he had ever said such a thing. 
	An examination of this latter text indicates that this person might have been `hearing voices' that told him these things, that he might be receiving ideas of reference, experiencing paranoid ideation, expressing parts of a complex delusional system, etc. Along with this glimpse into this person's mental state we also find a general reluctance to discuss these relatively verbally-suppressed aspects of his conscious life and that, again, some part of his psyche was able to censor this aspect of his existence through his sudden denial, reluctance to discuss further such apparently crazy ideation, etc. Hence, in effect, we find an incongruity between both what is said, and, between what is said and what is done.
	I would like to add that although a literalization of the metaphor can adequately explain neither concrete thinking nor delusional thinking in a severe psychosis some degree of literalization is observed. However, let me at a later point in this paper examine this aspect in more detail in order to discuss the manner this process of literalization will most likely present itself in as distinct from a mere process of literalization.
	A third anecdote might reinforce our understanding of this aspect of indirect self-insight.
	A quietly spoken female came to the front desk of a psychiatric hospital and made the following statement to the effect that a rapist or a number of rapists had been climbing up her drain pipe outside her bedroom window and raping this lady while she slept and that this person or persons had always manages to leave before she properly woke up. She stated that she knew this was the case because when she woke up she would find that the sheets all rumpled up with occasional stains. These statement were asserted very seriously by a relatively unattractive female person told to come to a psychiatric ward for assessment after informing the police about the `same series of events.' She lives, for the sake of argument, on the 12th floor of a block of flats.
	When asked why she had come to the psychiatric ward to make this type of complaint she said that she had been redirected here by the police. We might question her absolute sincerity on this matter by asking her why she accepted such re-direction to a `psychiatric' admission ward and had not persisted with her complaint? It is not impossible that the interpretation she presented was correct. However, with the relative poverty in presented evidence, or rather the relative lack of evidence and the overall improbability of this type of phenomenon, given the nature of her accommodation, it would appear to be essentially unsubstantiated and that this state of affairs is in an indirect form actually acknowledged by this person by her passive acceptance of the `mis-direction' or `re-direction'  of her complaint to a hospital. By re-laying her complaint to the nursing staff in attendance she had practically admitted her story was delusional and that she needed some form of psychiatric assessment and possible assistance from this type of service. She certainly evinced no signs of affective distress from these encounters despite the apparent cognitive sincerity transmitted in her account. Although it became apparent that the events recounted by this person were most unlikely this person stated she `knew' these events had taken place despite the lack of real evidence to this effect. In this light the apparent cognitive intensity of her convictions was not in harmony with the evidence, and, that this difference between the so called evidence, as interpreted by this person, and the relative worth of this evidence to a certain extent must be supplied by this person herself (for whatever reasons whether rational or irrational). On the other hand some degree of indirect self-insight is also in evidence for the listener listening to this person's account even if that person concerned would not agree with these overall observations of inadequate evidence and inconsistent behaviour if such was pointed out to them. As she said herself the police told her to come to this psychiatric hospital and she was only doing as directed.
	From reflections on this type of encounter I would be tempted to make the following provisional observations and interpretations, namely, that in the production of this type of text there is some form of imbalance between the affective content and the cognitive content communicated verbally and non-verbally. Moreover, there is an imbalance between direct cognitive content and indirect cognitive content and that this type of anomalous communication is reflected in the variance that can be demonstrated between parallel verbal aspects and non-verbal aspects isolated as relevant to our examination of that overall process of deposition. That, in essence, direct insight might be lacking some form and degree of indirect insight will present itself and, given enough detail in our examination of that type of depositional process, can be demonstrated!

D. Hot-Spots Indicating Non-Acknowledged Insight

	"I am Louis the XIVth, the Sun King." This was a statement made by a very psychotic male patient. He was asked if he spoke French? His testy reply was - "its none of your bloody business!"
	The point of this anecdote is to demonstrate that those regions of non-acknowledged indirect insight are often regions of the psyche whose reality is rather uncomfortable, or problematic, for that person to directly confront. Such confrontation, when it does arise, being quickly avoided by that individual with an energy equal to the proximity of those investigations to that particular hot spot and the effective intensity of that problematic or potential anomalous region.
	Some part of the psyche is in effect saying to itself that certain regions of cognitive material are to be affectively insulated from the scrutiny of a more direct cognitive approach. That the intensity of this form of psychic insulation is in direct proportion to the disparity of that anomaly and their current psychic proximity to it.
	Probing this type of region can also be problematic for the interviewer if not quite dangerous. That in some measure the relative extent that such regions are in place in the psyche is also, in some form or other, a direct indication of the severity of that person's attempts to self-interpret, or re-interpret, the actual social constitution of their world. Indicative of psychosis both as to the manner in which it presents itself and the degree to which it presents itself.

E. Symbolized Insight

	"I am being treated in this hospital because I have sinned, and God wants me to stay here." This statement was made by a middle aged woman.
	Broken down this statement communicates directly or indirectly the following items, namely, `that she is being treated in hospital,'  that, therefore, something must be at fault, that this lady believes that this fault is the fact that `she has sinned,' moreover, it  is her convenient belief that `God wants her to stay' that lets her stay in hospital for the time being. In effect the self-awareness of having a psychiatric illness is substituted for the recognition of a  religious frame of reference dominated by a landscape of sin, sinning and sinners. In essence through an act of continuous mis-interpretation `sin' symbolizes her non-acknowledged state of current psychiatric disturbance. The stated belief that `God wants her to stay in hospital' indicating that she is aware of the anomaly of sinners being treated in hospitals, and, that `having sinned' she should be in a hospital at all. In effect `sin' symbolizes more than mere sin and takes on board in symbolic form some form of indirect insight to the effect that she is exhibiting an awareness that she is subject to some type of psychiatric disturbance. Moreover, in this case, the re-writing of the interpretation is to a certain extent undone by her expression of her belief that `God wants her to stay in hospital,' despite the fact that sinners are not normally `treated' in hospital.

F. Compartmentalization Of Insight

	Statement made by a schizophrenic patient on meeting a psychiatric nurse known to them on a public bus: `I know they are not against me it's just that it does not feel like that. For me it feels like they are against me regardless of whether I know that to be the case or not.'
	This patient was indicating that he had a certain degree of insight into his paranoid interpretations and delusions about certain people he knew. One part of his psyche, the affective, was experiencing intensely emotional states of suspicion. On the other hand other parts of his psyche, non-affective aspects, were aware that to a considerable extent his paranoid ideation was being self-generated as the product of his schizophrenic illness. In the process of interpreting the world around him he was more inclined to mis-interpret in a paranoid fashion. Moreover, his suspicious attitudes evinced towards others also found a reflection in the circumspective manner people would deal with him which in turn often reinforced his initial paranoid feelings towards those people. Yet, despite such intense feelings of mistrusts and suspicion a more central part of his psyche was itself suspicious of such suspicion. More `central,' or whatsoever, by virtue of the fact that appreciation demands `wider' terms of reference in order to engage in such reflection. Compartmentalization of insight also being left in place when related but different regions are not directly interrelated (in order to allow direct insight to elevate itself into a more full consciousness). Compartmentalization being erected when different aspects and/or attitudes of the psyche take on a variety of non-interrelated perspectives. Problematic regions being further insulated from an insightful cross-fertilization of perspectives, regions, etc. A simple example of this natural process of compartmentalization being exemplified by literate medical personnel who read the health warnings on cigarette packets but who must still persist in smoking. A process further assisted by degrees of psychic insulation put in place often in direct proportion to the degree of anomaly that would be experienced if such regions were to be closely interrelated and directly brought before the courts of our full consciousness and its sense of an integrated conscience.

G. Insight Demonstrated Through Reversal In Conversational								    		Perspective

	After a psychotic person has just recounted an apparently bizarre story that was most probably not true we can demonstrate some form of insight by getting that person to use their imagination and put themselves in the following imagined scenario and then ask them the following type of question. We might say to them: `if you were standing in my shoes listening to the story you just told me what would you most likely think and say about that type of conversation just heard.' Normally, I find  the response to this type of imagined situation taking the following format. Either I am told that they would think it was bizarre, strange, crazy, and/or react in a manner suggesting that a hot-spot, or a raw nerve, was touched with a tetchy response that was either mildly abusive informing me that I shouldn't be so silly or crazy to ask that type of question, or, the complete cessation of that dialogue; punctuated with a stream of invective.
	Often I am told by the other person that you must think them to be a little crazy. Slightly embarrassed they suggest that their story might indeed sound bizarre, etc. On the other hand there is another type of response that I find elicited by this reversal in conversational perspective, namely, the complete disruption in this conversation with loud, indignant expressions of how dare you suggest I might be crazy, often being informed at the same time that you must be crazy for having the nerve to suggest otherwise, etc. Generally, reactions falling some where between these two types of response.
	It would seem that, despite protestations to the contrary, some part of the psyche is not being fooled by the utterance of apparently sincere, and intense, expressions apparently inconsistent with a collectively perceived and appreciated social awareness of a social reality already shared to some degree or other in order for those two people to at least go through the motions of entering into a dialogue with each other. It is as if insight is not so much the possession of insight as its recognition, i.e., recognizing the experiential fact that we indeed already possess such insight. That, in essence, what must be realized is a recognition of such recognition, and not merely its mere possession. However, let me examine this aspect of insight more deeply towards the end of this paper.

H. Behavioral Inconsistency

	`It is not possible for me to eat, I don't have a stomach.' (Statement made by a male patient after just having eaten breakfast). 
	When it was pointed out to this person that he had just eaten not so long ago, he replied, `that the food wasn't real food, it was only magical tucker.' Or, in another instance, this same person stated, `that it only looked like he was eating as he was only simulating this process at the breakfast table so as to not upset the nursing staff about his not really eating; merely going through the motions.'
	Normally, no amount of argument is going to logically persuade this person with this type of nihilistic delusion that they do indeed have a fully functioning stomach. In the face of all logical argument they will continue to insist on their initial proposition being true. The only way such a statement will find its obvious disproof is the observation that that person is indeed eating. It is as if they don't really believe what they say. Their actions alone disproving, and disapproving, of the position adopted on a verbal level of performance. But, at the same time, it is not the case that we can say to these people that they are lying as a verbally accessed part of their psyche does seem to believe in what they say, whereas, on the other hand the rest of the total psyche acts as if the situation is not painted in such cognitive terms of reference. It is a bit like questioning a solipsist who answers that `they simply do not exist.'
	How might we interpret, therefore, this type of nihilistic, or partially nihilistic, delusion? On one hand an awareness of a changed sense of bodily awareness, in regards to their overall experience of embodiment, might account for such nihilistic, or partially nihilistic, expressions of a sense of personal valuelessness. This topic of value will be touched on later in this paper.

I. Self-Recognition of Exaggerated Value Claims

	`Tomorrow I am going to marry the President of Mexico.' (Statement asserted by a female patient).
	`I am going to marry Princess Anne, we are engaged you know.' (An often repeated statement made by a male patient suffering from  Huntington's Chorea).
	With respect to the first statement it was pointed out to this person that they could not possibly get to Mexico in time for this wedding to take place. The response to this observation was a slightly inappropriate laugh and a comment to the effect that the wedding will have to be postponed. This did not expect me to believe her and would probably been disappointed in my lack of integrity if I had played along with this story taking it at face value.
	With respect to the second statement it was pointed out to this person that they could not possibly get married to Princess Anne as she had recently just got married to someone else. All protestations to the effect that this was not the case merely highlighting this patient's own doubts in their own delusional interpretations or mis-interpretations of reality. Their experience of this misfit between fantasy and a continually re-presented reality to the contrary was to experience this anomaly with all the intensity of a disappointment to the effect that they were not going to marry the person of their dreams. However much this person protested their belief that they were going to marry Princess Anne it was done in a spirit of sad dis-belief. despite a flood of tears he still `knew' he was going to marry this person, albeit with all the doubts, or dis-belief, those tears really signalled.

J. Indirectly Recognized States Of Self-Insight

	`The aborigines are out to murder me! They have already killed a half dozen people that look like me!' (Statement made by a very disturbed male, non-aboriginal patient).
	On one hand this person was indicating a fearful belief that they were about to be killed. On the other hand they were also indicating some degree of disbelief in the successfulness of this immanent process by the fact that these reputed killers have not been very successful so far in actually tracking down the real object of their mission, namely, the person making these statements. The gravity of the situation is also unsettled by the insertion of the belief that they have already killed six people that looked like this person. A state of affairs that cognitively sounds possible but affectively strikes a pathetic note with an element of macabre humour, being stretched beyond the bounds of the believable. Does this person feel he has been killed six times already? Should we try to interpret this metaphor of `multiple murder' rather than take it on its face value and then dismiss it as bizarre? Obviously this person was motivated to communicate and communication must have some form of content. At the same time it is also obvious that for the psychotic person meta-textual conventions become disordered with a consequent loss of both communicability and sociability for that person as a-person-in-their-social- context.

	All in all, despite the vehemence of surface affirmations, and protestations against the contrary, this type of bizarre, inauthentically driven dialogue gives one the impression, on a closer reading, that this type of text is some how attempting to conceal a profound hollowness in the overall substantial and stylistic facets of its deposition. In our hermeneutical treatment of these statements we should become more inclined, with practice, to quickly see through the surface cognitive content to reach an appreciation that allows us to not only understand this type of encounter but also to penetrate the more meaningful depths, for the psychotic individual, of its intended social and personal reality despite the immanent threat of chaos and loss of value concomitant with psychotic dysfunction. 
	In this hermeneutical pursuit all texts are read in their immediate textual environment or in a close, facilitated reconstruction of that same type of environment. This social environment, from the point of view of the person emitting that textual deposition, is effectively reflected in the manner that meta-text imprints itself upon the final format of that deposited text. In order to conduct this type of dialogue both parties must possess a certain degree of adequate psychic integration in order to be in a position to conduct this type of communication. At the same time this aspect of integrity is in equal proportion to the present degree of integration currently in play, both individually and collectively, and, as a consequence, the transmitter and receiver of such textual interaction cannot be absolutely fooled about the nature of any particular transmission, nor, for that matter, absolutely certain either that they completely understand those texts already communicated and currently subject to interpretive reconstruction. That, in the end, the pragmatics of the situation effectively establishes the relative facility and adequacy of this process of communication and interpretation. That both our access to, and the excess of, interpretive value discovered within the effective boundaries of a text, or set of texts, as a priority in the relative scheme of things (in our perspective upon a world of textuality) more or less decides for us whether or not we will, and would be able, to reconstruct that subjected to the focus of our textual appreciation. That, if the recovery of significance is achieved with less energy than that invested, through a return on our `investment,' we then find, in effect, that the text effectively reads itself. In effect the harmonization of cognitive (and affective dissonance) built into the text, and its emplacement in the dialectical movements of the hermeneutic circle, ensures that the well constructed, or adequately constructed, text, given all necessary pre-conditions, is `able to speak to us.' Recognition of this dialectical unfolding in the generation of significance allows us to exercise and deepen our insight into the nature of that text (as discovered from our initial meta-textual appreciation of the same). E.g., the text looks like a newspaper and I find myself reading it as a newspaper, and that its gives up of itself as if it were a newspaper, etc. In essence my interaction with this textual entity is thematized in such a manner that all hermeneutic thematization is between these senseless poles of the absolutely literal and the absolutely non-literal. Insight into that text taking the form of a recognition of the nature of the interaction of that already recognized and therein a resolution of this tension between the literal and the metaphorical. To adopt an overt metaphor `insight' is like the falling into place of a jigsaw puzzle; the pieces being both found to fit and seen to fit. 
	Let me now examine the phenomenological nature of insight. Then let me construct a hermeneutic procedure that allows us to determine the effective degree of insight we can assume from an examination of statements relevant to the double nature of this topic.