Inter-Cultural Interpretation Of Cultural Phenomena

	In the first version of this paper I explore, and develop, a phenomenological-hermeneutical approach towards the subject of inter-cultural interpretation and the question of the commensurability of this type of endeavour. I will argue that although barriers between fields of interpretation are experienced with a certain degree of resistance their existence is one of the necessary features for a process of interpretation to take place. 
	In this first exploration various themes will be addressed, e.g., the function of metaphor, the interrelated roles of question and answer, the importance of repetition in the performance and re-performance of a text, the nature of interpretation and translation, types of textuality, the hermeneutic treatment of phenomena, the necessary dimension of the intersubjectivity of the life-world for all forms of engagement, etc.
	The import of my exposition being that although intercultural interpretation is a potentially difficult process to engage in those barriers once traversed actually help to establish the hermeneutic value released in all forms of inter-cultural engagement.

						 Noël Tointon, Sydney, 1.7.93.

Inter-Cultural Interpretation Of Cultural Phenomena

(Version I)

	In this paper I would like to explore, and develop, a phenomenological-hermeneutical approach towards the subject of inter-cultural interpretation and the question of the commensurability of this type of endeavour. I will argue that although barriers between fields of interpretation are experienced with a certain degree of resistance their existence is one of the necessary features for a process of interpretation to take place. Therefore, in this light, I will argue that although intercultural interpretation is a potentially difficult process to engage in those barriers once traversed actually help to establish the hermeneutic value released in such inter-cultural interpretive encounters.
	As already hinted the nature of my exposition of this process of inter-cultural interpretation will take a middle path between the fields of phenomenology and hermeneutics. Moreover, a middle path will also be taken in this process of interpretation between a dogmatic cultural absolutism and a nihilistic cultural relativism. The examination of this non-extreme region of cultural relativity also arguing for a process of appropriation that is neither absolutely open nor absolutely closed. That, in essence, regardless of the type of interpretation involved, the appreciation of that subjected to such interpretation is neither completely transparent nor completely opaque in our practical engagement with the subject matter of that particular phenomenon of interpretation.
	To begin with I will recount an anecdote on the subject of interpreting cultural conventions. Then I will examine the implications of my analysis of this particular  type of process. Such analysis will then be applied to the subject of texts and especially the problematic field of interpretative texts.
	Some universal structures and functions of the hermeneutic dimension will then be introduced and examined under a series of miscellaneous headings.
	To conclude, the overall import of this paper will be outlined and briefly re-defended. The main point of this exercise being the argument that it is the traversing of margins, boundaries, fields, etc., that actually establishes the phenomenon of hermeneutic value. In this light it will be my contention that inter-cultural barriers rather than preventing hermeneutic comprehension in the final analysis actually assist us in the commensurability of such a topic. That it is only in the active overcoming of such cognitive resistance that inter-cultural commensurability is actually realized. That this possibility, as a possibility, is guaranteed by virtue of the fact that the interpretation of phenomena is a process that is grounded in the phenomenalization of interpretation implying that the relational link of the life-world metaphorically characterizes all processes of interpretation in the same relatively fundamental manner! That in essence, despite closure; or rather because of the relational nature of such a limitation, meaning is always in a position to be adequately thematized in the light of the constitution of the relevant questions asked of the identity of that phenomenon, or phenomena, under examination regardless of whether those investigations are conducted within a certain culture or between cultures.

	A friend of mine is married with a Japanese wife. Recently, he visited his Japanese in-laws in Japan. He related to me the following story when I asked him if he had experienced any form of inter-cultural difficulties during this visit. Of particular concern for my friend was the daily custom of bathing. The bath was a tub that could fit one person, the water being continually boiled by a heater to the side underneath. The same water was used each day by the same people that used this bath. Now a series of problems presented themselves to someone not conversant with the conventions used in the use of this device. For a start you entered the bath to get wet all over and then quickly left to soap up outside it nearby. You then rinsed yourself and returned to the tub for an extended stay. But for how long? Apparently the bath was not just an excuse to get clean. It was also used for relaxation which entailed an extended period of private soaking of about an hour's duration by each person in the household. No doubt after a few questions, a few hints and instructions and some carefully interpreted observations one would soon work out how to perform the expectations of this daily ritual. Besides the issues of what to do, personal reactions to bathing in the same unchanged water, etc., the most perplexing question for my friend was the matter of how long should one stay in this bath that caused him initially the most anxiety.

	What can we learn from this anecdote that might help us broach this topic of intercultural interpretation?
	For a start the genre of `bathing in heated water' was something held in common by both traditions. The problematic region in this pursuit of inter-cultural comprehension was the manner in which this apparently similar custom actually differed  between these two cultures. As recounted questions, instructions, and above all, observations helped us interpret how to perform the actual process of bathing as it was normally conducted in this Japanese household.
	In a similar manner inter-cultural comprehension is always going to be conducted from the perspective of perceived parallels in one's own cultural background first. Then the differences will be looked for and hopefully, and eventually, mis-interpretations will rectify themselves and produce an effectively valid understanding of that specific cultural situation.
	Translated into a textual sphere we might say an author chooses a particular genre, or an amalgamation of genre, and then adapts that adoption to the task to hand in such a way that the whole process of textual production is in some form of an adequate conformity to its adoption of certain cultural conventions, and, the perceived adaptation of those conventions. It stands to reason, therefore, that all clearly formulated intentional thought and behaviour is formulated and expressed through the adoption of already pre-determined genre and the adaptation of such adopted conventions.
	How does one question the text in order to understand the nature of those conventions being exercised through that text? To a certain extent a text is always introduced in a certain context that may or may not allow us to interpret this conventional, meta-textual dimension of that text. Moreover, this dimension of the meta-textual may also introduce itself to us through that text, or, through other texts that appear to comment for us on that particular text under examination. 
	In an examination of the discovered context of that text and its apparently intended context, if that is possible, we set out to entertain how that text is recovered both as a materialized textual fact in the world, and, how it functions when its intended context of function is also thought to be present. We first observe the nature of its textual presence in the world. We note what spatial, temporal, causal, social and personal characteristics appear to accompany the presentation (and possible performance) of that text. Next, we note, if we can, the nature of its apparently intended function, i.e., the manner in which certain aspects of genre are selected and distinctively stressed in the apparent function of that text (in accordance with our appreciation of the structural-functional description/prescription most likely associated with its apparently intended genre). In determining the nature of this apparently intended functional dimension we are also helped by meta-textual elements surfacing through the material textuality of that text, e.g., if the (ex-textual) title of a text announces that it is a selection of poems, or what so ever, or, when comments made inside a text (in-textually) help to re-define the meaning of terms found therein, etc. In this regard there is an emphasis on re-defining (our understanding of) those conventions, etc.
	E.g., a scrap of paper is handed to us. It is a text that is hand-written. On the top there is a title. The rest of the test is apparently in the form of a poem, namely, a sonnet. At the bottom of the text we find a name and discover that this is the name of the author of this poem, which, already known to us, is also the name of the person who handed us this text in the first place. Thus we would most likely be correct in concluding that this poem was written by this person and that, from past experience, this person was seeking our critical estimation of the value of that text as a poetic text.
	The mere examination of the situational context discovered with the discovery of that text might not declare the nature of its apparently intended situation. In this regard we might or might not be able to determine this intentional fact from an examination of the discovered context of that text. However, let us say at that moment the author of that text stands up and reads that text out loud to those gathered there and that the nature of that gathering is of a religious purpose. That that sonnet was in effect intended to be read as a religious text. That the performance of that text in its intended setting was of a religious nature, etc.
	However, from the conformity of our deductions determined through an examination of the context of that text, observations on the possible use of that text made in periods concerned with the performance of that text, the textual content of that text and the apparent meta-textual dimension implicated in the textual function of that text we should find ourselves in a position to realize an adequate understanding of that text both with regard to its structural-meaning and functional-meaningfulness. I.e., when our determination of these four factors of discovered context, intended context, textual content and meta-textual content are collectively exposed and apparently in conformity with each other, more or less, then we can safely assume that the essential nature of that text is in some degree of conformity with our current understanding of that text and vice versa (assuming that that text is adequately well-constructed and effectively presented, and represented, in those investigations).
	How do we determine the function of a text when that text is not currently being performed in accordance with this aspect of its intended function? In this examination we are helped by a meta-textual examination of the meaning, and meaningfulness, of the metaphorical dimensions of that text. Elsewhere I have argued that a text is interpreted when we have an in depth appreciation of its metaphorical configuration. The intended use of a metaphorical image being controlled by a covert field of metaphorical selectivity that meaningfully manipulates our general understanding of that phenomenon utilized by that particular metaphor to produce an analogical comparison between that re-interpreted phenomenal simulation and the situation to be re-interpreted by the application of this device. 
	E.g., if we say Richard is like a lion, or is lion-hearted, what is conventionally meant is that that person is `brave' and `noble,' and not some one who is completely covered with hair, has bad breath, walks on all fours and prefers their meat uncooked, i.e., freshly killed, raw and left on the bone. This metaphor by convention selectively promoting certain features of this phenomenon of the lion and passively suppressing, by implication, the rest of those features (which, through the existential openness of the phenomenon, are effectively infinite in number).
	Many texts have no overt metaphor embedded in their surface textuality, e.g., lists, telephone books, etc. This model of metaphorical function then applying only to the levels of metaphorical functioning that constitute its relevant meta-textual dimension in this regard. To understand the functioning of a text, how that text is to be performed in its appropriate contextual setting, this structural model that looks at the nature of this overt-covert relationship is re-written in a functional mode. In effect this structural appreciation of the conventional manipulation of the metaphor is merely extended to include its relatively decisive treatment of behaviour. E.g., in saying that `Richard is lion-hearted' automatically invoked is our positive admiration of such an individual by virtue of the fact that the connotational import of `bravery' and `nobility of character' are features that are normally given such positive connotational treatment. Then, our behaviour towards this individual is to be coloured by the nature of such treatment. I.e., our behavioral dispositions are to follow, and be in conformity with, our connotational understanding of such supplied metaphorical information provocatively suggested by such textual devices. Put more simply, behaviour is moulded and manipulated in accordance with our conventional understanding of this (type of) situation. Then, when we meet in actual practice with this type of situation, we give either our cognitive agreement or non-agreement to those conventionally pre-determined dictates and, therein, either our assent or non-assent to behaviorally conform or not conform to our understanding of those implied conventions.
	In many ways a text is also like the script of a play that gives us instructions on how it is to be performed and how we are to perform thereafter in the light of that text. On this subject I would like to make a few comments on the role played by repetition in this performance of a text.
	In my opinion there are two forms of repetition, mere repetition and sheer repetition. The former is established through processes that are relatively accurate in their reproduction of repeated material. The net result of such relatively uninteresting repetition is a sense of a covert, background field of relatively consonant material, an apparently redundant reduplication of material that in effect sets the tone of the cognitive field about to be subjected to a process of focus. On the other hand sheer repetition is conducted in a process of reproduction where there is a continual, ongoing, minute alteration in that material reproduced. This difference adds an element of interest and dissonance within that field that then allows us to focus and thematize this relatively provocative aspect in the simulation of this experiential situation. Information being imparted through the resolution of this relationship between mere repetition and sheer repetition by virtue of the provocative nature of that dissonance to not only provoke but also to provocatively suggest the most probable manner of that resolution. It only follows then, in accordance with this understanding, that to reproduce this text in a similar manner should allow us to perform that text correctly if that text is coordinated enough to discharge this sense of textual integrity, which, discharged through resolution, effectively integrates this process of appreciation (assuming that we are also both an adequate party to its conventions and that we respect that text in an appropriate fashion). Obviously, the relatively correct performance of that text is one that strikes the right balance between these processes of mere repetition and sheer repetition. 
	In the light of this exposition it would appear that the significance of a text is conventionally generated through an appreciation of its meta-textual dimension. This world of conventions is obviously situated outside the text in the socially constructed contextual realm of its intended situatedness. In effect, we would reasonably infer that the meaning and meaningfulness of a text is outside the text, and, that there is nothing inside the text! Every element in the text, whether it be letters of an alphabet or pictograms of some description or other, whether it be words, names grammatical sequences, sentences, paragraphs, etc., is conventionally manipulated from outside the text in a world of pre-determined genre that are adopted, perhaps mixed, and re-adapted to the situation then to hand!
	On the other hand there are some schools of thought that would argue the exact opposite. One argument that might be put forward to defend this contrary position would be that texts in order to be appreciated must be appreciated in a field of textuality. But as that is already supplied by the text in and through its (textualization of its) own individual place in this world of textuality there can be, therefore, nothing outside the text, nothing outside textuality! That in effect all signs stand only in a textual relationship to each other and from their mutual interaction alone generate the significance of that text. 
	Do we need to reject or accept either or both of these extreme positions? In my opinion this impasse can be by-passed if we recognize that it is the traversing across, crossing over, re-crossing and crossing out, of barriers, margins, frames of reference, distinctions, sets of differences, etc., that that text is able to appropriately enter into a process of interpretation. Being trapped inside or outside the text is obviously not going to do this process of interpretation for us in our travels through this text.
	In a certain sense we have to be simultaneously both inside the text and outside it to be in a metaphorical position to engage the substance and style of its provocative textual fabric (as a potentially distinctive textual phenomenon). In this regard a text is as much a phenomenon to be interpreted as a non-text must be textualized in order to be interpreted. This necessary cooperation between the phenomenological and the hermeneutical allows us to textualize the phenomenon of that interpretation, whether it be of a text or a non-text, and to re-interpret it through a process of repetitive re-presentation. This simulation of the simulation allowing us to thematize, when and where possible, that under the directed focus of such intentionality. 
	The nature of those barriers, margins, edges, frames of reference, etc., are effectively metaphors, or, metaphorical constructions using forms of analogy, e.g., processes of naming, differentiation, comparison, commendation, transformation, mapping, etc. To question the text we effectively parallel its metaphorical constitution and therein place that text in a state of suspension or epoche. To ask a question our metaphorical pathway must bifurcate, fork in at least two different directions. When we question a text that text answers us in an exhibition of its metaphorical constitution. This is facilitated by virtue of the fact that the metaphor is already in a state of de facto suspension through the ambivalence of the metaphorical function is like implying a simultaneous is like and is not like. Therefore, questioning the text merely allows, and assists, in the revelation of the dialectical nature of its metaphorical constitution in the manner alluded to by that process of questioning. In response, our understanding of that text answers us through a re-exhibition of its metaphorical constitution in such a manner that resolves those dialectical tensions in a set of specific re-directions. This process of question and answer repeating itself as long as that process is productive within this hermeneutic circle. The state of suspension implicit within the question in turn being suspended through the resolution of the answer. The suspension of the answer, itself in the form of a weighted overtly-covertly manipulated metaphorical construction, being re-turned to the state of the question in this circular process of hermeneutic thematization through the re-imposition of a suspension, etc. The suspension of this relationship between question-and-answer, in the form of a third moment of (pure) suspension, giving us a psychic entry and exit from this circular process of ongoing hermeneutic appreciation.
	Interestingly, short of absolute disengagement (through a suspension of this relationship between the-question-and-the-answer), a process of de-presentation of that re-simulated and re-interpreted phenomenon is put into effect when our processes of repetition lean towards either extreme of mere repetition or sheer repetition. Mere repetition eventually de-presents that intentional state of affairs through a state of psychic disinterest, or virtual boredom, with that intentional object causing it to submerge itself and slip back unnoticed into the field of its introduction (and continual re-presentation). With a more or less similar result the excessive involvement of sheer repetition effectively re-constructs that intentional state of affairs along relatively novel lines producing eventually a phenomenal presentation that bears little resemblance to that from which it arose. Either way, under either extreme, that initially presented is effectively de-presented.
	To interpret a text we need, in effect, to reproduce its apparently intended re-performance in such a manner that it takes a middle path between these two extremes of mere repetition and sheer repetition. Obviously, our inability to do this will result in our inability to effectively appropriate that text. Moreover, any defects in our efforts in this regard will also effectively de-present those investigations, bring such an examination to a premature state of termination. On the other hand, if our careful re-production of that text reaches a point where no additional hermeneutical and/or phenomenological value is released then again those investigations will, for the present, naturally de-present themselves, disengage our attention from continuing with such a pursuit. Obviously, only after the further enrichment of those terms of reference relevant to a deeper appreciation of that text, or of a series of closely related texts, would it be worth our while to re-start those investigations. It also stands to reason that the quality of this textual appreciation cannot exceed the quality and depth of the development of our textual background relevant to our appreciation of that text under examination.
	An interpretation of a text could be defined as a text that attempts to textually reveal and expose the meta-textual dimensions of that text subjected to such hermeneutic treatment. On the other hand a translation of a text could be defined as the parallel substitution of another text, in the same language or some other, that effectively mirrors the import of that text apparently translated. To translate a text one must first interpret it but this does not imply a translation is the same as an interpretation. An interpretation effectively mapping out the provocative mechanisms in that text under interpretation and the most probable pathways involved in the resolution of such forces treated individually and collectively.
	It could be argued that some texts do not need to be interpreted by virtue of their relative transparency, their lack of textual depth or their non-complicated textual content, etc. On the other hand it could be argued that no amount of interpretation is going to hermeneutically resolve difficult texts, texts of a dialectical complexity or texts that are essentially defective in their enstructuralization and/or performative enfunctionalization. In the light of these difficulties we need, I believe, a series of distinctions and related discriminatory procedures to sort out texts that are well constructed from texts that are defectively constructed, and, simple interpretive texts that can be easily interpreted from interpretative texts that stand in need of hermeneutically-oriented practices borrowing this latter distinction from the work of Vincent Descombes. An interpretative text being a text that, through its dialectical complexity in the textual functioning of its provocative structures, stands in need of critically disciplined hermeneutically-oriented procedures in order to release a deeper degree of textual appreciation through deeper processes of hermeneutic resolution whilst recognizing that in regard to this type of text (although this notice of limitation applies to all texts for that matter) that we cannot subject it to a state of absolutely definitive resolution and therein treat it to forms of absolute closure in meaning, etc. This necessary reluctance to subject a text to the illusion of closure recognizing that the phenomenon of interpretation, and by extension the textual interpretation of phenomena, has its existential roots in the life-world, in this one world of collectively shared experience, and thus could not function if it were subject to the imposition of arbitrary, artificial and extreme processes of dichotomization although recognizing the relative distinctiveness of phenomena as simulated intentionally. The gestalt nature of intentionality recognizing that all significance is generated in and through the differential nature of relationships, through the simultaneous entertainment of the differential-distinction and integral-accommodation of phenomenal boundaries. The distinctive demarcation of natural and conventional phenomenal boundaries being determined relatively and never absolutely through forms of metaphorical encirclement. On the other hand the experiential center of our naturally and conventionally determined phenomena can be given various relatively determined degrees of interpretive precision or interpretative imprecision. Let me elaborate on the details and ramifications of this position.
	In the determination of intentional significance, i.e., structural-meaning and functional-meaningfulness, it is my belief we have three fundamental mutually co-defining axes upon which to go about this thematization of the reference and sense of our distinctions be they temporal, spatial, causal, psychological, personal and/or social in complexion. 
	The first axis concerns psychic location, i.e., the nature of the field or fields under thematizational focus and the relative location of the same in a general, overall, intuitively appreciated schematization of the life-world. E.g., are we dealing with intentional phenomena primarily located and centered in emotional states of consciousness, or in states of perceptual awareness, intellectual states of conceptual discrimination, acts of judgment, a vague sense of embodiment, hypothetical periods in time, an astrophysical sense of space, a certain realm of mythological interaction, etc., etc. 
	The second axis concerns population, i.e., what intentional entities, logical subjects/states populate that located region under current thematizational focus. E.g., if we are entertaining various perceptual entities what are those objects that are subject to the thematizational focus of our present scrutiny?
	Lastly, the third axis concerns various states of transformation, i.e., those shifts in significance being entertained in psychic location, (quantitative, qualitative, relational) alterations in population, and/or transformations between these two (logically distinct but relationally accommodated) polarities of location and population.
	As previously noted in introducing this topic these three axes are mutually co-defining. I.e., these three axes mutually define each other in such a manner that information on any one axis can be determined through a suppression, or reversal, of information on the other two axes. As these three axes mutually co-define each other in relative, non-absolute terms of reference it follows, in accordance with this logic, that if reference was only in terms of location and population a sense of transformational sense must also be implicated through a relative reversal of the same (as it is processes of transformation that psychically take us in the first place to a certain location to encounter certain states of identity that can be encountered therein). Moreover, the further implication can be drawn that sense and reference cannot be absolutely distinguished nor for that matter any distinction in any shape or form (other than in provisional terms of reference). It follows, therefore, that a simple distinction, or a set of related distinctions, cannot be subjected to a state of closure by virtue of the fact that it is impossible to absolutely define any one coordinant without reference to the other two axes of coordinates, which in turn would have to be recursively referred to their other two co-defining axes of coordinants, etc., implying the impossibility of such a task in absolute terms of reference. On the other hand the relative centers of intentional objects can be mapped in this tri-polar frame of sense and reference. Moreover, the complexity of interpretative texts can be given relatively centered centers on an inter-regional basis. E.g., if a poem is apparently intentionally ambiguous about whether it is to follow a certain hermeneutically determined first reading or a complementary, or supplementary, hermeneutically determined second reading, etc., then we can accommodate this indeterminacy by arguing for an inter-regional centering of the text in this regard. Additional readings of that text properly conducted further re-defining the psychic center of that textually treated phenomenon currently subjected to the scrutiny of our ongoing processes of interpretation (in accordance with the relativity of such re-treatment, discounted in accordance with the relative forcefulness of those competing interpretations).
	By virtue of our inability, and the impossibility, of closing a text the difference between an interpretive text and an interpretative text is correctly only a matter of degree. Subjected to closer and closer readings all texts, as phenomena subjected to interpretation, must ultimately break down and reveal their dialectical and existentially non-absolutely determined roots in this inter-subjectively open world of life. 
	This implicit concept of the existence of a total psychic universe of possible discourse, or life-world, might be granted on a subjective basis by what right have we to philosophically declare that such an indeterminate basis is also shared on an inter-subjective level of experience? In the following arguments let me show that presence of inter-subjectivity infiltrates and relatively grounds the determinations of our subjectively oriented experiences.
	As I have stated earlier in this paper all intentional behaviour is exercised through the adoption (and possible mixing) and adaptation of socially pre-determined genre. In this light no intentional state could be experienced without the necessary presence of this implicit social dimension.
	Although our experiential definition of psychic location, population and transformation cannot be absolutely determined the same can be relatively determined. The definitional center of our textually interpreted phenomena can be determined by reference to various phenomenological processes, e.g., suspension, reduction and reconstitution (which directly determine our axes of transformation, population and location respectively). E.g., the thematization of a state of suspension defines the psychic mid-point between the located reference of that identity and its counter-identity and therein locating the reference of that identity (allowing us to differentiate between that identity and its counter-identity and therein mapping for us that cognitive pathway that will let us re-simulate that identity's sense of reference or psychic location). These refinements in re-direction allowing people to modify their intersubjective vocabulary of genre along effectively intersubjective avenues of intentional simulation.
	All potentiality in the intentional determination of identity, whether it be locational, populational and/or transformational in orientation, is exercised in and through the inescapable inter-subjectively shared unity of this life-world. E.g., the possible world, or worlds, outlined in a novel must bear some reference to a commonly understood world of culture. If the configuration of the world in that novel strays too far from our normal everyday expectations then it takes on a surreal complexion and/or a science fiction like flavour, or, through a loss of referential proximity looses sense altogether). Potentiality is always written directly or indirectly in terms of a re-constitution of actuality; an actuality written in terms of a pre-determined cultural awareness of this one-world-of-life. 
	But does such a cultural awareness establish an inter-cultural inter-subjectivity and therein an adequate basis for an inter-cultural commensurability? My answer to this question would be a qualified yes and no! 	
	In defending this qualified equivocation it would be my argument that various natural phenomena are already constituted for us and that all forms of conventional non-naturally determined identity can be configured in some form of reference and transformation of these relatively pre-determined natural phenomena. Such phenomena as eating, sleeping, taking a bath, grooming, seeing colours and shapes, experiencing certain emotions, etc., are essentially pre-configured for us; our exposure to the same merely taking on the form of a closer appreciation of their psychic detail. Conventionally determined phenomena, e.g., dwellings, books, table and chairs, roads, cars, trees, etc., being built up from our relatively more primitive sets of natural phenomena, etc. Hence the theoretical possibility for an inter-commensurable dialogue, whether actual or virtual in form, to be set up between two or more cultures, cultural texts, etc. Thus an inter-cultural dialogue might be a difficult project in practice to set up between different cultures this task in theory is not an impossible one to perform. This task being premature or coming to a temporary end when we don't have an adequate richness of interrelational connections to fully establish an appropriate interrelational field in which to conduct this type of endeavour. The relative non-release of hermeneutic value naturally seeing us dis-engage from that type of project. However, on the other hand, our ability to overcome the resistance between different metaphorical constructions actually facilitating our comprehension by virtue of the accommodation put in place that allows us to experience, and explore, the differential nature of those different constitutions within that overarching, inter-relational framework or meta-framework.

	To conclude I would like to make the following philosophical observations in the light of this exposition:
1.	Boundaries in the form of edges, margins, frames, different languages and different families of languages, temporal limitations, etc., in interpretation give interpretive or interpretative centers to those textualized phenomena under appropriately pre-constructed hermeneutic investigations.
2.	Boundaries in the form of edges, margins, etc., are necessary for processes of interpretation to take place because the significance generated in such a process can only occur through our ongoing traversing across, crossing over, re-crossing and crossing out of such significant signposts on the relational landscape in which we find ourselves able to differentiate such significance therein.
3.	 All differentiation takes place in the simultaneous embrace of an accommodational field and this establishes the integrity and overall identity of our `progress' in the collective realm of our intentionally directed and exercised endeavours.
4.	Therefore, commensurability demands regional differences and an appropriate pre-determined meta-textual vocabulary that will allow us, on the relative grounds of a pre-determined basis of natural phenomena, to theoretically and practically establish some degree of inter-commensurability whether it be cultural or inter-cultural in extent and complexion.
5.	That some degree of commensurability is always established by virtue of the fact that we are already in a process of relationship and that in the hierarchicalization of natural phenomena some inter-commensurable grounds can always be found to commence this form of dialogue or natural conversation (through the involvement of an implicit or explicit textual process of question-and-answer).
6.	Moreover, although commensurability is theoretically established this does not imply that the practical worth of such an exercise is going to release a degree of hermeneutic value equal to, or beyond, that degree of value invested in such a process; such considerations establishing the relative worth of such a project in the interrelational treatment of the senses and references of those textual fields, etc., under comparative examination.
7.	That this project of the thematization of inter-relational commensurability is merely an extension of what occurs within the psychic unity of a certain region or field wherein significance is generated and interpreted through traversing across, crossing over, re-crossing and crossing out of textual-phenomenal boundaries; the overcoming of such extremes re-leasing such significance in the parallel forms of sense and reference (as mapped out on our three axes of location, population, and, transformation).
8.	That the project of thematization, regardless of its disparity in intentional subject matter, is accomplished through the distinctive overcoming of differentiation within the accommodation of an appropriate inter-relational field!

A Short Postscript

	The a priori attitude, or fixed belief, that different fields of value are automatically and permanently incommensurable is in effect an obstacle on our path to the phenomenological recognition that, experientially, we are miraculously witnessing in our engagement with the world a continual overcoming of instances of such apparent incommensurability! Different fields of value, as translated within the ambit of the psyche, are continually involved in apparent forms of inter-relationship; such regions of experience being brought together under the auspices of a variety of metaphor, e.g., intersection, overlapping, coming closer, mutual re-orientation, accommodation, transformational interaction, analogical parallelization, etc. Moreover, this interaction, real or virtual, conducted within the transcendental possibilities of the life-world, is facilitated by virtue of the fact that the formation of intentionality is realized through an ongoing resolution of such differences, tensions, juxtapositions of the apparently incommensurable, etc. This process of intentional interaction being assisted through the interactive relativity of various foci, e.g., that supplied by an historical author, a future reader provoked by the provocative nature of a certain text, the text itself as it finds itself in a literary world of (meta-textual) genre, a text that may or may not have a direct reference to certain objects and events in the social perception of a world, etc. Moreover, through appropriate processes of suspension, reduction and reconstitution the constitution of our various fields of value are exposed in their relatively pure metaphoricality. In such a format various different metaphorical frames of reference can then interact by processes of metaphorical translation to productively re-produce a collectively embraced signature of such an interaction on our three axes of location, population and transformation as previously discussed. Such a signature producing in effect, to some degree or other, an interpretative text as long our re-production of such constitutional exposure is not too simplified to either the levels of the metaphorical constitutents of such fields, or, indications of their pre-linguistic, sub-metaphorical psychic-materiality in the pre-conscious, pre-constitution of our intentional experience. Commensurability being guaranteed, therefore, through the expansion of intentional horizons, the cross relationships achieved by points of focus and the common metaphorical nature of all forms of intentionality.
	This recognition of an interacting world of apparently incommensurable fields of value was brought home to me recently in my analysis of a rather simple poem I wrote about my visit to Canterbury Cathedral. Within three and a half pages of text I was to discover the overlapping of at least thirty different regions of value from the historical and architectural through to the descriptions and impressions that this event had for me through to more rarefied philosophical and hermeneutical dimensions, etc. If a simple text can never be a mono-modal affair, through the necessary implication at least of a meta-textual dimension, how inconceivably more complicated must be our appreciation of the world wherein we have a metaphorical sea, or a thick, rich broth, of value systems in apparently chaotic competition with each other and therein interacting, by some means or other, either directly or indirectly. In some measure `reading through' a text, or a series of texts, is bit like digging into their impenetrable depths - meaning and value being generated at that point in our interface within that text, or between that series of texts, between the relatively commensurable, already to hand, and, the relative incommensurable, at that point it becomes the more relatively commensurable. The resistance of the text is met, however, in a productive engagement - such opacity must also give way in and through a transmutation of the relatively incommensurable in such a fashion that this margin, between the commensurable and the incommensurable, finds itself transformed into the relatively commensurable!
	To conclude, it would be my observation that it is because of the apparent incommensurability of a text, or between a set of texts, that a process of interpretive interaction is engaged, finds us engaged in an overcoming of this overall presence of textual resistance that through a relatively successful process of overcoming also allows us to remain engaged with that same text or series of texts. That it is this interface between the incommensurable and the commensurable that, overall, establishes the effective commensurability of that text, or series of texts, and an overcoming of the apparent incommensurability of the different fields of value that find themselves presented in our interpretation of that text or that series of texts! This does not mean that although a text, or a series of text, may become effectively transparent that philosophically they must be treated as if perfectly commensurable or transparent! On the other hand a text or a series of texts can never be treated as absolutely opaque, or incommensurable, even if for practical purposes these texts effectively remain impenetrable and currently unavailable for productive processes of meaningfully inter-related interpretation!