Appendix I - A More Rigorous Establishment 
Of The Relativity Of The Metatextual-Textual Relationship 
In The Form Of A Phenomenological Grounding 
Of Our Hermeneutics And A Hermeneutical Treatment Of Our Phenomenology

	In this tract let me establish an argument for the necessity for the simultaneous presence of a meta-text in our appreciation of a text regardless of whether that text be textual or non-textual, i.e.,  respectively, as an apparently intentional reconfiguration of the natural world, or, the natural, non-intentional configuration of the natural world. In our looking at the phenomenon of the text, and in our `return' to the phenomenon of the text in its intertextual environment, it is very easy to overlook the actual necessity for the presence of a meta-text to simultaneously accompany our appreciation of that text. Obviously a literary text, e.g., can be held in our hands and we can look at it. What need therefore, we might well ask, for the shadowy existence of a meta-text (and a meta-meta-text for the appreciation of that meta-text and its textualization, etc.)? But our appreciation of that text as a literary text itself is already an indication that a process of hermeneutic appreciation, and appropriation, has already taken place. The manner adopted, and adapted, in this act of appropriation implicating the involvement of a meta-text. On the other hand to claim the self-sufficient self-existence of the textually deposited presence of a meta-text must also be recognized as a mis-interpretation of the rules of relativity involved in this game of reading a `textual' text or a `non-textual' text. To place this concept of a meta-text on a firmer footing I have constructed the following complex argument.

1.	The Phenomenalization Of The Text

	The `phenomenon,' as a phenomenon, is always a conscious phenomenon, i.e., a phenomenon-for-the-person (and through the third person involvement of the meta-text a social dimension is also indicated with the implication that a phenomenon-for-the-person is also by rights a potential phenomenon-for-us and, therein, a phenomenon-for-people). On the other hand the intentionally directed experience of that content of the phenomenon may or may not be an intentionally directed phenomenon deposited in the form of a `textual' text. In this classification we may be right or we may be wrong in accordance with our definition of the nature of a `textual' text, and, our ability to successfully make this distinction in a practical, non-theoretical framework of our choice. A `non-textual' text is effectively a `natural' text whose appreciation as a phenomenon can have ostensibly no intentional input in the formation of the content of that phenomenon. On the other hand the appreciation of a phenomenon is always developed and exercised in a meta-presentational format, i.e., at the level of a meta-text. Hence the meta-text, in contrast to the apparent textuality of an apparent text (where the content of a phenomenon is treated as only an apparent text) is always in the form of a `textual' text in its depositional appreciation and treatment. 
	The form of the text is appreciated meta-textually. An appreciation of that meta-text is exercised meta-meta-textually. Hence the inter-relativity of these two correlative terms that co-define each other (in our experience of the text and our textualization of experience).
	A `textual' text is an intentionally directed or influenced deposition in the world of intertextuality.
	Hence a `text' is always re-deposited in both a textual format and a simultaneous meta-textual format. Because an apparent text is always re-deposited in both a textual format and a meta-textual format, i.e., in  the simultaneous phenomenalization of that content and the phenomenalization of our appreciation of that phenomenon becoming a phenomenon with content/form-for-the-person (in a life-world that also involves both a second person and a third person dimension).

2.	Interpretation Via Metaphor

	The apparent text may or may not have the presence of overt metaphor. On the other hand that metaphorically generated level of appreciation must be populated with covert metaphor meta-textually. Treating the meta-text textually ensures meta-meta-textual appreciation, i.e., meta-textual appreciation of the meta-text with the consequence that covert meta-textual metaphor now become relatively overt (in the textualization of that meta-text). Hence we can provisionally differentiate a polythematic/multiaspectival text from one that lacks such overt metaphoricalization through a reasonably accurate re-interpretation of that text's meta-text. On the other hand, under a different set of meta-transformations we can differentiate a non-textual text from a textual text by virtue of the self-presence or self-absence of both overt and covert metaphorical input in the auto-critical reading of that apparent text. An auto-critical reading, or a series of such readings, of that text using a critical metaphorical appreciation of the apparent text to determine the nature of apparent metaphorical-intentional input apparently put into the phenomenal formation  and/or re-formation, i.e., interpretation/re-interpretation of that text. Non-textual texts have no apparent covert or overt introduction of metaphor in the simulation of their original reading as a pseudo-text (when both covert metaphor, or, covert and overt metaphor are introduced into that textualized pseudo-text in order to formulate that text, i.e., establish its textual phenomenalization as a phenomenon-to-be-interpreted). 
	But let us note well that such a reading cannot be conducted at the level of the apparent text itself! We can stare at a text until we are blue in the face for no text, whatever its intentional or non-intentional origins, has the power to determine the intentional or non-intentional nature of its own phenomenalization and re-phenomenalization. In a similar fashion a text treated as intentional cannot deliver a verdict on what fraction and in which sections of the apparent text that that text is unintentionally formed. E.g., a row footprints is apparently intentionally formed by virtue of the fact that we can read such tracks as being intentionally formed. No footprint in itself can do this for us! In a similar fashion if the person who made those prints stumbled un-intentionally those tracks in themselves cannot tell us if this apparent disruption in the smooth sequential formation of these prints was un-intentional or deliberately contrived intentionally for some reason or other. 
	Again similar criticisms can be raised in our trying to differentiate our reading of a natural text and a textual text that is a list with the presence of no overt metaphor. At the level of the apparent text itself this type of appreciation cannot be conducted. Appreciation by its very nature involves the relationship of an apparent text in its contextual field or a field constructed/re-constructed contextually for it.

3.	The Transcendental Perspective On Textual Formation

	In the experiential phenomenalization of an apparent text there is the intentional deposition of the meta-text and the apparent intentional re-deposition of the text which may or may not have been intentionally deposited in the first place. An appreciation of the historical genesis of a text must involve an adequately constructed and applied relationship between a text under appreciation and a field of appreciation capable of appreciating the introduction of that text into its field of appreciation. Just as a conceptual analysis cannot do this for us in a like fashion a conceptual appreciation of a set of conceptual parties likewise must fail us in this endeavour. Only a process of trans-conceptual appreciation, i.e., a transcendental appreciation, can correctly do this for us. In this state of trans-cognitivity the constitutional formation fossilized in the form of conceptual traces represent a productive act of transcendental formation, i.e., an act of judgment or a series of judgmental acts (and from the overall act of judgment its delivery of a conceptually translated judgment, or a series of judgments, in the form of an intentional deposition or series of depositions).
	On the other hand the transcendental dimension involved in the formation of judgments, authentically-existential or non-authentically-non-existential by nature; and all else in between, can be treated distinctively but cannot be absolutely differentiated form its relatively pre-cognitive grounds from whence the trans-cognitive sense of the transcendental must emerge. More correctly, this state of accommodation is the ground for such differentiation hence, by analogy, the necessary parallelization of the text by its appropriate meta-text (or series of meta-texts) by virtue of this differential parallelization of the transcendental modality by the cognitive modality and v.v. In the light of this comment we might say that the meta-text has a greater degree of transcendental bias than its textual counter-part.

4.	A Transcendental-Phenomenological-Hermeneutics?

	So far I have argued directly and indirectly for, first, the necessary relationship between a text and a meta-text before we can attempt a reading of that text. Second, I have argued that texts cannot be read, i.e., interpreted and appreciated, on the same meta-level as that which pertains to the text itself under examination. Third, that all acts of appreciation involve a phenomenalization of the text and the textualization of that phenomenon. That, fourthly, an appreciation of a text cannot purely be a conceptual affair and must involve a transcendental dimension that although experientially distinctive could not be separated from its roots in our cognitive and pre-cognitive world(s). That, lastly, it is because we have a raft of pre-prepared meta-textual conventions that we find ourselves allowed to read documents, etc. 
	From these arguments it follows that the simultaneous textualization of the phenomenon and the phenomenalization of the text implies that phenomenology by its examination of intentional processes of deposition, and, as a phenomenon of interpretation that involves thorough processes of phenomenological appreciation, is by its very nature a parallel process of the interpretation of phenomena, and, the phenomenalization of interpretation. That in effect this philosophy as presented in this text, and other allied texts, from the transcendental point of view sees no difference between these textual approaches and their various interwoven strands, i.e., no difference is seen between the phenomenon of interpretation and the interpretation of phenomena. Through the auto-critical nature of a transcendental reading we must assume therefore that phenomenology is by its appreciative treatment of textual depositions also a hermeneutical process, and vice versa. Hence the declaration that this type of philosophy that insists on a collective refinement and application of meta-textual conventions is a critical-transcendental-hermeneutical phenomenology. That this philosophy is, in effect, a hermeneutical-phenomenology, and, a phenomenological-hermeneutics.

5.	No Meta-Text - No Text, and, No Text - No Meta-Text

	Entertain the following, different textual situations and then let us subject each one of them to a simplified phenomenological-hermeneutical examination, as presented in this paper. By these means let me demonstration that a text cannot be appreciated at face value, i.e., in its textualization as a `phenomenon about to be interpreted' we are unable to determine the intentional status of that textualization if the terms of reference effectively coincide only with the presentation of that apparent text as a text.

a.	On a cave wall various markings look man-made, how do we determine such a differentiation.
b.	A nervous gunman heard a car backfiring, thinking he was being attacked accidentally shot, in his panic, the person his gun was aiming at, later denying that it was his intention to ever kill anyone.
c.	Some refugees are escaping from a certain country. The border is marked by a narrow, reasonably fast flowing river. An observer who can see the border region will signal to the people beside the stream about to escape by dropping leaves into the water. It is Autumn and red leaves seen down stream will be read to mean that these people should keep their cover. Green leaves, on the other hand, implying that the coast is clear for their short swim to safety.
d.	What difference can we see between a sequence of natural events and a list (perhaps of those very same events)?
e.	What difference is there between a poem and a poem with a secret message embedded within it?
f.	What difference is there between a short poem written by an amateur and a computer created piece of poetry?
g.	What difference is there between a series of interpretations of the historical relevance of a cache of ancient texts just recently discovered and currently being interpreted, evaluated, etc.

	Here we have a number of different types of apparent textuality. Let me briefly describe them, assuming that I have the privilege of an appropriate and adequate meta-textual perspective in order to make these common place acts of differentiation:

a.	An interpretation that attempts to determine the presence or absence of intentionality in the formation of the apparent text under examination.
b.	An investigation, of an ethico-legal nature, that attempts to determine whether the person was killed accidentally or intentionally.
c.	A natural sequences of events has been coded. How do we know a code is involved and not merely a sequence of natural events, i.e., in this instance the observation of autumnal leaves that happen to be floating `innocently' on the surface of a river?
d.	What difference is there between two sequences that possess no overt metaphor and are effectively monothematic, i.e., possess no interpretive depth, levels or layers of meaning?
e.	A question of polythematicity - how do we determine the presence and nature of the same if present in a text?
f.	How de we determine a directly intended deposition from the appearance of an indirectly intended non-intentional performance?
g.	The harmonization and selective integration of a number of interpretational fragments in order to create a more powerful interpretation of the historical ramifications and significance of this cache of texts (e.g., the Dead Seas Scrolls)?

	Let me briefly elicit the salient points of these examples of apparent textuality.

a.	In looking at the markings on a cave wall the interpreter of those designs and patterns must eventually decide whether some or all of these configurations have an intentional dimension or not. In other words from a study of other cave walls, rock surfaces, other textual surfaces, etc., the reader of those markings must eventually decide whether, in their distinctive historical formation, their essential nature is the result of an act, or series of acts, of textual re-configuration, or, an event, or series of events, of non-textual configuration, and, then, in their interpretive treatment, treat them accordingly. Intentional markings can be read as designs that either possess or indicate some form of meaning, or, as marks that possess no meaning and meaningfulness beyond their intentionally performed deposition. 
	In this act of reading, therefore, meta-textual criteria are going to decide one way or the other as to the nature of their imputed origination of these text-like configurations. As things stand some of those patterns under a close reading are going to eventually `talk' by virtue of the imposition of a meta-textual framework that allows our apparent text to enter into some form of a virtual dialogue. However, our appreciation of this type of apparent text, therefore, could not be dismissed as merely textual! A close reading always being conducted from a meta-textual perspective. The `fruitfulness' of our reading, whether realized or not, demanding a certain degree of meta-textual distance. This `distance' also allowing us to interpret `texts' that are non-textual in nature, e.g., geological, geomorphological, paleontological, etc.

b.	How does one determine the nature of intentionality, either its presence or absence, and, if present the nature of its content? If the person was conscious and was consciously involved in the incident then this question becomes a consideration of the degree of intentional-unintentional behavioral involvement that might be present if relevant to the nature of our inquiries. Under such a situation motives, extenuating circumstances, etc., are  investigated. In such a climate probabilities are seriously entertained in our re-entertainment of the situation to the extent that such an external assessment can be disentangled from our interpretation of relevant documentation which itself can not escape the web of interpretation, etc. Hence it is only with various pragmatic, meta-textual attitudes that we can seriously start to investigate the apparent evidence in this situation so as to provisionally hierarchicalize and interrelate the apparent evidence to hand. Even a confession from the apparently guilty party must be subjected to a careful scrutiny, i.e., subjected to some form of an epoche. Overall a harmonization of the `evidence' is sought that allows the interpreter to come to a thoughtful conclusion, or, the realization that under the present circumstances such a possibility is as yet not obtainable.
	The apparently unintended synchronicity of the car backfiring and the shot being fired from the gun plus the interpretation of nervousness observed by the witnesses of this event in conjunction with the known history of this person might allow us to come to some general conclusion in this regard. The judge might accept that some degree of unintended circumstantiality entered into this situation despite the demonstration of intentions ostensibly to that effect. Essentially, various closely interrelated readings are chosen to harmonize the degree of anomalous behaviour through to be present. Then that set of readings that deliver the greatest degree of harmony are more seriously entertained unless new information or a more powerful, or more compelling, interpretation is able to displace the former. Obviously an interpretation that takes the text solely at face value, if that was at all possible, can only find the person completely guilty in this respect by virtue of their expressing such intentions, having the gun and actually firing it and in the process killing the person the gun was aimed at. But life is not that simple, nor that simply deceptive! Our so called surface reading at face value is itself meta-textually structured in such a manner as to infer intentional, causal, temporal and/or spatial connectedness in and between that data which are themselves interpreted in the light of some predetermined scheme, or series of schema, in order to present our `presentation,' or `re-presentation,' as to what is relevant to this case to hand. E.g., a close description of the clothing of the people directly and indirectly involved in this situation is most likely being not relevant to our reconsideration of the degree of intentional involvement in this series of unfortunate events. A definition of relevancy assuming a non-chaotic system and a certain thematization of scale in which inputs that make changes to outcomes greater than that scaling factor in that system's appreciation are considered to be relevant.

c.	In this type of instance the situation is quite simple. The presence of a code is meant to be concealed to a certain extent and if this state of concealment is not announced or indicated in some form then to the reader of that coded text, who is not aware of this deeper level of intentionality, this aspect of the text must currently enter into their overall experience of that text neither directly nor indirectly. Put bluntly it has no existence for them. On the other hand the suspicion that a certain text might be coded is itself enough for that text to be experienced in a different fashion to a text that is treated as non-coded. In the light of this suspicion we might say the text is subjected to some form of suspension; the imposition of this suspension continuing until such a time we believe that that text has been adequately de-encoded, or, we no longer believe that this text was encoded in the first place.
	To a certain extent we might say that the mis-interpretation of a text is the over-interpretation of that text when considered from a general meta-textual perspective. Bringing to a text meta-textual frames of reference that are inappropriate and/or inadequate to that task of textual interpretation is to witness, in this sense, an over-supply of relatively non-relevant meta-textual conditions. The imposition and exercise of this unnecessary excess of conditions producing, and re-producing, as a consequence the creation of a defective reading or a series of defective readings. From a textual (non-metatextual) perspective, on the other hand, a defective reading releases a relatively deficient degree of interpretive value. Relative to this more successful reading of that text the de-encoded text should release a greater degree of interpretive value than that invested in this act of de-encoding the text, such value also being dependent upon the quality of encoded intentionality imprinted on that text and the successfulness we achieve in releasing such polytextual facets. In our de-encoded reading of a text this release of excess interpretive-value, i.e., released interpretive-value minus invested interpreted-value, allows us to feel that this task has been satisfactorily realized in approximately direct proportion to the degree excess interpretive-value stands in relation to invested interpretive-value (even if such acts of de-encoding only realize an imperfect appreciation of that (level of) text(validity).
	Just how is a text de-encoded? The imposition of a code is effectively the re-arrangement of textual elements in such a manner that in being read in that meta-textual framework certain meaning structures are analogically re-released. This same process occurs on a number of coded and non-coded levels of textual hierarchicalization. That a text is always appropriated to a certain extent by virtue of the fact that many non-textual and textual levels are to be accounted for and some of these will always be correctly approached. A successful interpretation of non-coded and coded levels of textuality always depending on an adequate reading of lower levels of textuality. A successful reading of the coded aspect of a text or a series of texts depending entirely on the final imposition of the correct meta-text and the relatively accurate or correct application of the same. In this light we can note the fact that many texts announce the fact that they are in code either directly or indirectly. Directly in the form of meta-textual insertions or pre-announcements that can be read in the pre-encoded reading of that text. Indirectly in the form of an inadequate reading of the elements of that text suggesting that the interpretive value of that text has not been fully released, e.g., a series of random-like letters suggesting the presence of a code and the necessity for the re-imposition of the same in order to successfully interpret that text. On other occasions the awkwardness of the pre-encoded reading suggesting it is being distorted by some form of a higher or deeper level reading in the form of a code.
	In the example chosen we have re-arranged a natural text, namely, the scattering of red or green leaves on the surface of a river. The phenomenon of leaves in Autumn floating on a river is not in itself unusual. However, if someone was to find this pattern of red leaves was followed by a cluster of green leaves and perceived an anomaly to the effect that that should not have happened, given the fact that green leaves rarely fall unassisted into the river in any great quantity at that stage in their life cycle, they might then suspect the presence of intentionality in some form or other and read this text as now textual and not non-textual. However, despite the inferred presence of direct or indirect intentionality it probably remain unlikely that they would suspect that this textual text was in fact a coded text, i.e., as a deposition with more meaning than that attending upon the mere act of deposition itself. Given the circumstances that this region is a militarily controlled border area a guard might suspect the presence of humans without drawing the conclusion that this text was in fact coded. On the other hand if those guards that patrol this region are informed about the meta-textual nature of this code then this phenomenon might well be read in the manner it was set up conventionally to be so interpreted. The conclusion that can be drawn being the observational fact that codes must be directly or indirectly announced for us to be aware of their presence, and, then the relatively correct meta-textual reference frame must be imposed in order to read the same. The release of greater degrees and/or other fields of value, relatively consistent with its con-textual and contextual surroundings, reinforcing this apparent awareness that this text has been read on a deeper, or a higher, level of textual field manipulation, i.e., textual re-configuration of textual elements (already given some degree of identificational recognition, interpretation and/or possible re-configuration).
	This distinction between coded and uncoded levels of text being rather arbitrary to the extent that all levels of textual entextualization, other than the traces themselves left behind in the mere act of deposition itself, are effectively encoded. The model I have in mind here is that of the computer with its machine codes, proprietary codes, soft-ware impositions, etc., whose collective interaction and manipulation establishes various levels of dialogue that in the end effectively simulate the text in its intended intentionality to the extent that our vision of the text/metatext will allow us to do this.
	How is de-encoded meaning and meaningfulness realized? Is it not possible to see un-intended meaning anywhere and everywhere? For the sake of argument imagine the following. We have a schizophrenic listening to `the voices.' The voices tell him that the first lady to go past with a red handbag is the messenger appointed by God to contact him here on earth. After some time this person then espies a lady with a red handbag. He goes up to her and asks her if she has any instructions for him. Annoyed by this sudden intrusion she says, "go to hell." This psychotic person then interpreting this response to the effect that they have failed in their mission for some reason or other despite not knowing what their `mission' was meant to be and that in due course they must go to hell (which in turn might be interpreted literally as applying immediately necessitating that this person commit suicide or substitute some other action or series of actions in lieu of the same, for the expiation of sins committed and uncommitted, etc.). 
	In examining this anecdote we might like to ask ourselves how we learn to differentiate, under normal circumstances, between reasonably interpreted facts and values, and, acts of loose association, fantasies, situations of over-interpretation, acts of inadequate interpretation and mis-interpretation in general, etc?
	For a start the imposition and exercise of a meta-text should release, or be found to re-release, an excess in interpretive value above and beyond that invested in the imposition and exercise of that meta-text. Moreover, such an apparent release in excess value should also appear to present a picture that is consistent with its encoded emplacement, i.e., simulate a picture that is both reasonable within itself and reasonable in the context in which it is found. I.e., that this de-encoded meaning and meaningfulness mutually reinforces these two aspects supplying in the process, directly or indirectly, the raison d'etre for such encoding; reasons as to why such information was encoded in the first place (e.g., considerations of privacy, advantage, concealed future reference, dis-association of self-involvement, etc.).
	When a meta-textual frame of reference is adopted and/or re-created and then applied in a potentially encoded textual situation the release of interpretive value should be in excess of that originally invested. Merely to think, or be told in some form or other, that `the next lady seen with a red handbag is a messenger from god with a message for you' and to espy the same is not sufficient to establish that this situation has the meaning analytically supplied. For this meaning to take a synthetic complexion interpretive value must be released in an excess to that initially invested in this analytical-like equation. In the example of our `leaf-encoded river' patterns of meaning can be released greater than that invested in the mere depositional exercise of this code. That, essentially, our text must be put into a meta-textual context that recognizes people trying to escape from one country to another via this river, the conventions for reading this code, altogether an affair reinforced by observing, when and where possible, the consequences associated with the use of this code, etc. That, effectively, the de-encoding of a code should release, or re-release, new information for the person or persons conducting that de-encoding! E.g., if we come across a note that reads `the black cat sat on the mat' and we know that this means `the mother-in-law has arrived and intends to stay' then we know from the manner of its enplacement that `the mother-in-law has arrived and intends to stay' and that `this is indeed the case' and not merely a possibility (and that this information is, moreover, a fact that is about to be verified by the person who received that note going home). This excess of coded or non-coded information, or i.e., interpretive value, being realized through the successful textual-metatextual dialogue engendered between those relevant levels of textualization currently under interpretive examination. That such an excess-release indicates and simulates a greater intentional depth to that successfully de-encoded text along with the enrichment and/or engagement of new perspectives for viewing and reading that deposition. 
	In effect the relative non-mis-interpretation of a text implies a relative simplicity of meta-textual imposition and a relative excess in interpretive value above and beyond that invested in that interpretive act of metatextual-textual interaction. In a similar manner an act of interpretation has a theoretical-like nature to the effect that consistency, elegance, economy and predictive power are all the hallmarks of both a relatively successful act of interpretation and a powerful theoretical construction.

d.	In our appreciation of our observance of a sequence of events the sequence effectively has the status of a text, i.e., is given the textual status of a list or set. It is by such means that we can compare items on that list or compare different lists (as deposited sets of listed items).
	Again, acts of comparison demand meta-textual conventions which in turn imply that what is being compared must have the status of a text in some form or other (in so far as listing conventions, or conventions for the creation of sets, in turn deposit such items in the form of the resultant text (prior to transformations of its treatment/retreatment realized in the secondary comparative analysis/synthesis of that itemized deposition).
	The experience of a sequence in the unfolding of real time itself must be an act of interpretation in order to thematizationally demarcate that type of item under such focus, and, thence allow ourselves to psychically stand back and attempt to relate items in that `act of thematizational appreciation of the sequential nature of that apparent sequence.' Hence we cannot absolutely differentiate the act or process of interpretation from that object or content of that event of interpretation. In essence the phenomenon of interpretation cannot be absolutely separated from the hermeneutical act of the interpretation of phenomena. That the degree of separation that is distinctly realized is achieved by the imposition of a set of conventions that suppress those features not under direct thematization. Hence in this act of appreciation, (whether critical or non-critical, transcendental or non-transcendental, phenomenological or non-phenomenological, hermeneutical or non-hermeneutical) there can be no place for pure universals, pure particulars and their interaction in the presentation of pure individuals. On the other hand our critical appreciation cannot ignore the relative orientation of such apparent presentations in this respect of their provisional treatment allowing us to adopt such conventions in accordance with the limitations inherent in such onto-phenomenological classification.
	A sequence is, therefore, always experienced as an interpretation of a series of items realized in an interpreted sense of real time regardless of whether the items in that sequence are directly experienced in such a state. What could separate a sequence experienced as a sequence and the mere list of textually deposited items, e.g., a set of a series of events put into the form of a list). From a non-conventional point of view there can be no difference between either state. However, from the conventional perspective such a difference can be discerned from a historical, textual-metatextual point of view. E.g., the relative chronology of a series of photos over the lifetime of a certain individual could be roughly sorted out on the assumption that babies become children who then become adults, etc. Therefore, given appropriate conventions and their appropriate application such re-sequencing can be conducted. A different set of conventional priorities and the act of re-sequencing could be quite different.
	Monothematic texts, therefore, in their sequential unfolding can, at least in theory, be conventionally differentiated in terms of their natural entextualization and their possible non-natural entextualization. Essentially, theoretical and/or coded criteria can be re-imposed in order to expose natural and non-natural forms of sequentialization. The release of interpretive value beyond that imposed helping to decide the issue on affective and cognitive grounds even though, correctly, all judgments are conducted in transcendental `trans-cognitive' terms of reference.
	As interpretation is developed through an appreciation of metaphor hence our appreciation of a monothematic text must come from our appreciation of the covert metaphor at work in the sequentialized deposition of that text. In other words a metaphorical appreciation of the meta-textual conventions allows us to conduct this investigation. Then the same type of treatment can be applied to our  con-textual and contextual appreciation of that text or series of texts. Relative degrees of interpreted value excess allowing us to inter-subjectively demonstrate the relative success, or relative failure, of such a task or series of tasks. Covert metaphor being investigated on these two levels of the differential-grid that allows us to thematizationally focus on that type of thematized entity or entities, and, the comparative treatment programme that allows us to relate those thematized entities in accordance with some form of format in keeping with the nature of that treatment programme.

e.	What difference is there between a poem and a poem with a secret message embedded within it?
	In the previous section we examined monothematic texts, texts whose textuality is ostensively monothematic (and hence without the polytextual nature of texts with the overt presence of metaphor). Of course all forms of textuality, monothematic or polythematic, are accompanied by a meta-textual dimension. Examination of this meta-textual dimension realizes a meta-textual textual deposition, i.e., treatment of the meta-textual dimension as a textual dimension in the light of a meta-meta-textual frame of reference in the textualized appreciation of that meta-text under investigation. In a polythematic text we must repeat our monothematic-like investigations to that level that appears to adequately account for the full polytextual intentionality apparent in that text. How do we them go about the interpretation of a polythematic text? How is polythematicity recognized? How do we recognize the extent of polythematicity present in that text, e.g., a poem with a secret message, a poem with a hierarchy of subtexts, etc?
	As stated before the presence of a coded code must somehow be recognized before the polythematicity of that type of text can be appreciated. E.g., the possibility of a coded text might be internally announced in that text meta-textually, or, the same effect might be realized by the external announcements of this type of possibility, e.g., by the use of a preface to this extent, suggestive titles, a commentary that recognizes and demonstrates the probable presence of the same, etc. Indirectly, the strange, stilted nature of the text might itself suggest this possibility, or, this possibility might accidentally be suggested by analogy with some other text treated in a similar fashion and whose coded potentiality is already revealed or under the epoche of that type of suspension. 
	In the final analysis the qualitative release of interpretive value should decide the possibilities and economics of this type of research. Again, the release of value hinges on an appreciation of the covert or overt-covert metaphor at work in the text under examination. Hence, the same criteria can be seen at work in our evaluation of a text regardless as to whether its textuality is monothematic or polythematic! In finding a possible deeper coded level of meaning on that level of interpretation (e.g., in a poem), i.e., when the release of interpretive value is found to be in excess of that invested, then, along with other factors, we find ourselves under such circumstances having sufficient grounds to make that assumption that there is indeed a covert, coded level attached to that text. The depths or heights of polythematicity going to that level of metatextual-textual organization that still works for us in and through the release of `excess' interpretive value above and beyond that originally invested in the pre-supposed hierarchical, meta-textually directed treatment of that text or series of texts. 
	That, essentially, pragmatic criteria must reinforce non-pragmatic criteria in the determination of polythematicity. E.g., a section of text might present itself as ostensibly overt in its use of metaphor (therefore by definition exhibiting one form of polythematicity). However, that initial observation can only gain its validity from the functional observation that a metaphorical reading releases more interpretive value than the degree of interpretive value invested in that type of reading. A facet that finds a harmonious integrative reinforcement when that particular reading of that section of text is also reinforced by the overall reading of that text; that facet of the text in this interpretive treatment being seen as either complimentary or supplimentary in this respect.

f.	Can we differentiate the apparently true presence of intentionality from the rule generated manifestation of an intentionality simulated by a machine or computer? 
	Usually such a task is not too difficult to perform. Only on the interacting demarcational edges of our psychic universe differentiated in this manner does such a problem present itself. When the computer simulation is practically winning the Turing Text, i.e., fooling its human interviewer with apparently appropriate intentional-like responses, have we some other mechanism for re-introducing this distinction? On one hand we must recognize that intentional `intentionality' is somewhat random to a certain degree in the way it sets up and resolves its own internal and external inconsistencies. That act of intentionality being the result of a process of ongoing resolution we can claim consistency may be realized it can never be absolutely realized nor absolutely absent! To a certain extent consistency can only be realized to a certain extent on a certain level of textualized exposition. Excessive scrutiny can only reveal this inherent inadequacy in textualized resolution if the text is improperly formulated logically, syntactically and semantically, or, when that test is made to perform past its functional level of conventional application, i.e., beyond the psychic conditions imposed by the nature of its cognitive employment. However, it should be added that resolution in a text can be realized as long as more unified, fundamental meta-textual dispositions are also reflected in that text. The absence of such holistically oriented meta-textual imprints implying that the text was only rule-generated and not intentionally deposited in an ongoing, self-unifying meta-textual environment. On the other hand if this form of differentiation can not be achieved then our distinctions in this regard must be scrapped, modified or replaced in this particular field. In the final analysis perhaps only a genetic, historical re-simulation might allow us to continue to make this type of distinction  in this regard (in this otherwise chaotic territory). Failing that our distinction between the intended intentional act and any successful simulation of the same must be re-enacted (perhaps from the social perspective of the meta-textual when and where relevant in order to allow us to make this type of distinction in this regard). Although a computer may be simulating its own meta-textual consciousness of its textual deposition this need not imply that it is actually conscious of that process of simulation in this respect. Otherwise intentionality must be ascribed to such reflexive flexibility. The simulation that is simulated in every relevant modality ceases to be a pure simulation for if the copy is as good as that which it replicates it then indeed must have the same ontological status (and thus the formal equivalence between the mere `simulation in virtual reality' and the same (non-)simulation in non-virtual reality' is ruled out in this form of thorough ontological re-evaluation).

g.	The historical ramifications of a series of texts written in a certain era of historical time is essentially a question of phenomenological-hermeneutics or i.e., hermeneutical-phenomenology. The identification of textual elements and a comparative treatment of the same is essentially the assembling of a series of textual interpretations and harmonizing the same in an overarching interpretive framework, i.e., in some form of comparative format. The phenomenon in question is textualized, i.e., hermeneutically treated, in order to examine the structural-functional characteristics of that now textualized phenomenon (or series of textualized phenomena). Hermeneutical treatment demands the textualized treatment of now textualized phenomena. In the same fashion, albeit conversely, phenomenological treatment demands the phenomenologicalization of the hermeneutical entextualization of that phenomenon or series of phenomena. Hence in this regard there can be no absolute difference between phenomenological treatment and hermeneutical treatment other than in the conventional nature, as revealed meta-textually, of the preferential degree in orientation attached to the general attitude of that process of textualization. In a similar fashion with respect to methods, and not basic materials, there can be no absolute difference between historical research and non-historical forms of research. Research, in general, investigating the correctness, or appropriateness, of the manipulated elements of interpreted textuality and the nature of their overall interaction. This hierarchical treatment of interpreted textuality effectively simulating a phenomenological simulation of the phenomenon under investigation, and vice versa. Higher levels of organizational treatment effectively forming the meta-texts for lower levels of treatment.
	In an examination of the texts, and fragments of texts, that are known under the rubric of the Dead Sea Scrolls a similar state of investigation is undertaken. Essentially a process of harmonization is undertaken in order to allow these higher levels of analysis/synthesis to act as meta-textual constructs in the interpretation of the texts under their applied imposition and vice versa, i.e., in a transformational transition from the relative meta-text to the relative text, and vice versa, our passage should release a greater degree of interpretive value than that invested in that act of interpretation and at the same time, in the reversed direction, meta-textual conventions should also `suffer' a greater degree of thematizational clarification. Opacities in this transformational processes implying imperfect textual reconstitution and/or meta-textual reconstitution. The experience of interpretive opacities occurring in the absence of interpretive value excess, textual-metatextual blockages or mis-matchings, currently unresolvable inconsistencies, excess duplications, loss of predictive power, the inability to fill in missing fragments of text, a diminishment in the harmonization of textual fragments in  con-textual and contextual levels of treatment, etc. The reinvigoration of interpretive treatment taking place when there is an improvement in the structural-functional detail on the overt level(s) of textualization and on the covert level(s) of metatextualization that appropriately parallel the former and vice versa.
	
	In essence I have attempted to show that the text can never be appreciated at the level of its own textuality. Moreover, its status as `textual' or `non-textual' in origination cannot likewise be appreciated at the level of an apparent text's textuality. A text can only make sense in its meta-textual environment. 
	Also shown was the observation that phenomenological treatment involves the necessary textualization of data along with the meta-textualization necessary to perform this task. Similarly, hermeneutical treatment is essentially the phenomenon of interpretation and therefore equally falls under the auspices of the phenomenological. Hence phenomenological methods can be applied to hermeneutical ends and vice versa.
	Hence with no appropriate meta-text no text can be read, without a text no associated meta-text can be inferred.

6.	Conclusion

	In our phenomenological appreciation of a text in this paper I have tried to outline various arguments that show the necessity for the simultaneous presence of the appropriate meta-text. Successful interpretation could therefore be defined as the appropriate imposition and exercise of a text's meta-text. Also directly noted in this paper was the observation that mis-interpretation was a process of over interpretation through the over supply of non-relevant meta-textual impositions in the process of attempting an act of interpretation. As a result from the point of view of the text's interpretation there is a relative poverty in the excess of interpretive value released in the process of interpretation. That, essentially, a process of interpretation was effectively the rectification of a process of mis-interpretation with the consequent release of relatively greater degrees of interpretive value than that invested in that act of interpretation. Hence through the appropriate re-creation of the textual-metatextual relationship the structural-meaning and functional-meaningfulness of a text is re-realized, i.e., insightfully recognized. As noted elsewhere the trans-textual-metatextual relationship realizes the transcendental `trans-textual' dimension of our hermeneutical experience of that text and therein, immanently, our face to face appreciation of the non-textual simulation intended by the deposition of that text. That through the correct application of such meta-textual conventions the textual status of a text can be realized and recognized. Lastly, it was also argued that effectively, from the transcendental point of view, that there was no real difference between the hermeneutical dimension and the phenomenological dimension in our research, and, that effectively the success of that research depended on their mutual and fruitful co-operation! 
	To conclude this paper let me quote some propositions from Essential Aphorisms In The Form Of A Commentary on whose more detailed significance, and argument for, this text has been constructed, in effect, as an auto-commentary:

	1.	From the transcendental point of view
		the `interpretation of phenomena'
		is the `phenomenon of interpretation'
		because phenomena are textualized 
		and the phenomenon of phenomena 
		is appreciated trans-phenomenally.
	2.	A text is read in its meta-textual environment.
3.	Textuality is either textual or non-textual 
in orientation and this is determined through
the application of meta-textual conventions.

7.	Some Additional Comments

	A text may lack the presence of overt metaphor. However, a meta-text can never suffer the absence of overt (covert) metaphor by virtue of the fact that the analogical relationship exercised by the meta-text over the text, in its mutual manipulation of sense, is exercised by such means. Other facets of the text can also exercise the same transformational transcendental processes of suspension, phenomenological-reduction and hermeneutical-reconstitution (etc.), namely, the exercise of existential attitudes (centered on the polarity of the Transcendental Ego), the imposition of suspension, etc., through acts of questioning, disvaluation, etc. 

Edited: 12.10.99