Preface

	I would like to preface this text, titled A Hypothetical Journal, by utilizing one metaphor as the means for assisting the reader in coming to an initial understanding of this exposition. This text has focused its attention on the important role played by the use of metaphor in the construction and re-construction of a text and, in turn, I shall adopt the use of metaphor, namely one complex metaphor, to help me in this task of introducing my overall topic of textual interpretation. Of necessity all interpretation is of that which is textual, i.e., any deposition of an intentionally directed disposition. The phenomenon of interpretation must be, therefore, the interpretation of such intentional deposition. Hence the nature of our topic lies between these two correlative polarities of the textual and the interpretive, between that `subjected to interpretation,' and, that `process of interpretation itself.' Polarities by virtue of the fact that these items need each other to define themselves, and, that as such a contrast must be in place for this task to be established it follows that such thematization would collapse without this necessary state of correlativity. Hence these two parallel states must be polarizations of this contrasting field of textual-interpretive correlativity.
	The metaphor I have chosen to illustrate this overall topic is that of the `polished jewel that sparkles in the light that happens to fall upon it.' Therefore, in `flogging' this metaphor, let me commence this task of an introduction.
	To a certain extent the use of any metaphor is indeed stolen or `flogged'. The use of such a device is textually directed. The inscription of any form of a text demands the use of a conventional, literary device of some particular form, or format, that will allow us to commence and continue with our exposition. Before putting pen to paper some form of a structural-function must be invoked in order to order, or i.e., logically limit, the very nature and process of this textualization of a text. In our appropriation of that form it becomes, to some degree or other, adapted to the task to hand. Therefore, invisibly tied to the visible presentation of a text is this meta-textual format that generally decides how this text is to be presented. Initially, such presentation must be the adoption of some format, or series of closely allied formats, already to hand in the meta-textual environment of that author. Then, in appropriating that format to the task to hand, such adoption must be equally an adaptation. In reading that text, whether by the author at some later point in time or by someone else, this adoption and its adaptation must be clearly recognizable. 
	From what intertextual environment have I adopted, and will adapt, this illuminating analogy of the jewel? This determination of origin, or origins, may not always be possible but in this case the original idea came from a miscellany of Indian religious texts that utilize metaphors of jewels with a miscellaneous variety of intentions. So let me continue...
	The importance of the meta-text should not be overlooked. In the interpretation of a text, certainly one written not in the recent past, the distance between its time of manufacture and our time of reading of it must be somehow crossed. Hence the necessity for the process of the proposition of a deliberately reconstructed, most probable, meta-textual reading noting the manner, or style, of its individual adaptation. The meta-text is also a third person dimension, a social dimension in which the individual then attempts to communicate with both themselves and those who are privy to the meta-textual conventions adopted by that author.
	Reconstruction of that meta-text then allows the reader to `overhear' the virtual dialogue that is conducted between it and the generally more visible text that the reader has before them.
	Let us imagine that a shiny semi-transparent jewel is currently ours to look upon. From the faceted surfaces of this polished gemstone a whole spectrum of colours is observed but that the basic colour observed is more often a smoky blue. Let us for the sake of the analogy treat a text as like this gemstone and that all texts are like the variety of gems that can collected and appreciated. That in our appreciation of such a beautiful stone there is borne, hopefully, some resemblance to the process of interpretation. Let me provocatively manipulate this metaphorical image of textual gemstones in such a way so as to communicate the following series of points I have intended all along to demonstrate.
	A particular fragment of the text, or the totality of that text, to a certain extent will reflect the light under which that part, or totality, of that text is viewed under. Although our blue gemstone reflects a spectrum of scattered light more often than not its emits a bluish tinge when seen under a white light, which contains light of a blue wavelength, or that light of a bluish complexion. In some measure, we might say, that the re-emission of blue light suggests that our reading this text in such a frame of reference is more profitable than say our reading it under a reddish light, etc. That the gemstone more easily reveals itself in a bluish light than in a reddish light or some other. Not that such a reading in a blue light is mutually exclusive of other readings only that in this case we can present on reasonable grounds a dominant reading of that text.
	In the investment of our energy into a process of interpretation the apparent successfulness of that interpretation can be evaluated by the degree of energy released above and beyond that degree of energy originally invested. This concept does not rule out possible valid complementary or supplementary readings that could be conducted under different `lights.' Moreover, it should also be recognized that such readings might, at some later point of time, be overthrown, or displaced, re-interpreted, surpassed, etc. That such possibilities should never be ruled out. Such a rule, as this description-prescription of investment, as a guide line, applying only in a general fashion.
	Implicit in this aspect of my metaphor is the fact that the totality of the text can also be invested in a holistic fashion throughout the text. This, to some extent, necessitates a text that is relatively well-balanced in its overall formation. A well-balanced text being one that is well-detailed evocatively and well-formed in the manner these evocative facets are juxtaposed provocatively. Provocation being seen as that which acts as relatively dissonant whilst simultaneously in a state of self-directed resolution. In metaphorical terms of reference we might say that the gemstone, let us say a diamond, has its facets cut at the right angles, and, that these surfaces are adequately polished in their own right. The implication also following that the text that is appreciated as well-formed and well-detailed is open to being read by virtue of the clarity of its structural-functioning. That to a certain extent that a text that is well-balanced is not in need of further polishing and shaping in order to successfully function! That a text has certain limits beyond which it need not go in order to function adequately. That we might say, in a simplistic fashion, that the well-balanced text is effectively `transparent' once its meta-text is adequately determined (by virtue of the fact that the meta-text is in turn also well balanced in the nature of its implicit manufacture).
	Shiny gemstones also have the ability to reflect each other when in close proximity. Under this aspect we can place the invocational influence of allusion to other texts in a shared intertextual environment, and, what I have defined as the convocational pressure of other texts that are meant, if present, to closely accompany the presentation of that particular text under investigation. My hermeneutical format in this regard also taking note of two other factors I believe are important in interpreting a text, namely, the vocation of that text through its titles, the type of work done, the manner of how that text addresses us, and, to what degree certain hermeneutic pressures actually re-write the text in our ongoing re-interpretation of that text, i.e., subject that text to some form of a revocation of initially understood meaning.
	In a state of open wonder we marvel at the ability of this gem to reflect various facets of its overall form. This process of appreciation, open suspension of all possibilities, allowing this text to reveal its vocation, self-declare the nature of that text and the nature of our relationship with it. Moreover, in our addressing of that text it also addresses us. Vocation often being found in the title of a text and in the nature of the work done by that text in its addressing of us.
	Some gemstones appear transparent, others are translucent, whilst others are opaque. Can texts be transparent, translucent or opaque? Without doubt certain texts appear transparent. Telephone books appear to be just telephone books, menus appear to be just menus, etc. We need not be too suspicious about most texts. Usually only art-texts, coded information, texts of a literary complexion or of a secret nature need to be less than adequately transparent. But the moral to be drawn from such considerations is twofold. A text should never be assumed to be transparent, or, for that matter, could ever be absolutely  transparent. Secondly, we must discount the interpretational objective that a text that is not apparently transparent, or adequately translucent, could be rendered in such a manner. Not all texts are well-balanced in the manner of their formation. Some texts are just not adequately integrated in a holistic fashion to allow the reader to adequately read them. That in essence a text cannot be absolutely transparent although the clearly formulated text for all practical purposes might be provisionally treated in such a light, and, that not all texts could or should be treated as if they were intentional depositions that could be perfectly seen through. Let us be aware that the text that could be seen through, in such a manner that offered little obstruction to our vision, would offer little resistance to our appreciation, and, would soon, in fact, not be seen at all. That when a text no longer gives up a return on our capital invested in our interest in it then returns for us no interest on that capital invested which in turn then sees our rapid disengagement of our attention from that text. This explains, to some extent our lengthy enjoyment taken from our ongoing appreciation of a translucent artwork that demands concentration and depth in our appreciation but which over time actually returns more interest than that invested in it.
	Elsewhere philosophy has been declared to be the critical manipulation of metaphor. In what manner can the use of metaphor actually contribute to serious philosophical discourse? Again, let us imagine our looking at this gemstone. We rotate it and in one placement we find all the colours of rainbow are spread before us. But can we assume that this text is coloured with all the colours of the rainbow, and, that this presentation is no more than some artifact of our current perspective?
	All information is transmitted via provocation, via the medium of metaphor at the very point or edge of that metaphorical structure. The metaphor working by virtue of how the metaphorical field is meta-textually manipulated, or i.e., pre-constructed. Covert metaphorical forces at work in this field determining how the overt metaphor is going to function, how this metaphorical structure is going to be seen functioning in this textual environment of the intertextual. If we said Richard the Lionheart was referred to, in his day, as like `a lion' how do we go about interpreting such a device. Obviously, on meta-textual grounds, this metaphor appears at first sight to be talking about how brave this particular king was on the field of battle. On the other hand what is most likely not intended is the fact that Richard was hairy, had bad breath, long finger nails, etc., and other characteristics associated with that of a lion. That in essence a dialogue is set up between the covert and the overt aspects of the metaphor, between the metatext and the text and that the resolution of this relationship is the means by which information about this relationship is transmitted and received (through a reconstruction of the metaphor in its appropriate field of context). Hence the aphorism that a text is not heard but is overheard.
	Gemstones are seen as valuable. Texts are seen as valuable. How is it that a few pages of paper, an inscription on stone, a scroll of parchment, or a collection of palm leaves might be considered as valuable? How is it that humble carbon atoms configured in the form of a diamond can command much more than that accumulation of fine soot found in a prestigious ink or superbly crafted Chinese inkstick? Without doubt our own individual appreciation of a gemstone is conducted in the light of a social appreciation of the same. The beauty of a stone can be enjoyed without much reference to a social dimension. On the other hand judgments of a non-aesthetic value in a social world of desire and demand command a different form of awareness. In a similar manner the value of a text is conducted with such an audience in mind, i.e., with some degree of pre-judgment in our anticipation of this dimension of social awareness. In this hierarchically schematized frame of reference our own judgments are conducted with one eye on our own priorities that are to be exercised within our adaptation of this cultural meta-text.
	The non-aesthetic value of our diamond cannot reside within itself. In a similar fashion the value of a text is best appreciated in a social dimension, albeit from the personal point of view of the person concerned in such evaluation or, rather, re-evaluation.
	The structure and function of a text is engineered by its metaphorical disposition. How do we read a metaphor? If a metaphor is read literally it is then not read metaphorically. The playfulness of a metaphor, in its oscillation between the `is like' and the `is not like,' is enjoyed by maintaining this state of suspension between all the relevant parties. A metaphor, through some form of analogy, also mirrors the facet of the phenomenon it wishes to analogue. Moreover, it also synthesizes an overall simulation of that phenomenon it wishes to illustrate. A series of metaphorical provocations in resolution synthesizing a complex simulation of that state of affairs indicated, or pointed to, by the text under examination. A text that can be read points to that beyond itself, namely, the non-textual. A text would have no meaning, nor meaningfulness, without some form of a contrast to the non-textual. Our access to this state of non-textual simulation is given to us through this state of suspension, this state of transcendental suspension. Transcendental by virtue of its trans-phenomenal meta-status. But how could this state of apparent paralysis between the `is like' and `the is not like' actually function with all the power commonly associated with metaphor? In this we need to recognize the double suspension of this phenomenal simulation, i.e., the suspension of the suspension. In this release from the suspension the suspended matter of the suspension can interact and through provocation find itself taking a course of resolution that is existentially in keeping with the nature of the relationship under consideration. Therein the relationship, in simulation, can effect the course of its own interaction. Thence the simulation ceases to be merely a simulation and becomes equally that of which the simulation is a simulation of (through its power to re-simulate that state of simulation). The text is mirrored by its anti-text, the text that opposes the perspective(s) adopted for viewing that textual constitution is its counter-text(s). When the text is structurally in balanced with its anti-text and is functionally in balance with its counter-text(s) then we have a state of suspension. When that state of suspension is itself in a state of suspension then this metaphorical enstructuralization is functionally free to metaphorically follow its own vocation, a vocation in keeping with the textual constitution, and the textual re-constitution, of that relationship. This state of suspension being its trans-textual reading, i.e., a metaphorical reading of that text (that is neither paralyzed nor treated literally), a reading delivered through the relationship of the conversation that metaphorically takes place between the text and its meta-text. 
	Ultimately, the flogging of a metaphor must eventually see out a disintegration of that metaphorical device. Taken to its very limits the metaphor must cease to function effectively and therein reveal the particular limits of that piece of metaphorical machinery. In what way, therefore, must we not see texts as like a brilliant `polished jewel that sparkles in the light that happens to fall upon it.' For a start texts essentially concern the intentionally inferred deposition of intentional acts that in themselves are perceived to have either an inherently contrived state of coded meaning or no such encoding of intentionality. Meaning and meaningfulness where inferred can be re-constituted without the actual material presence of a text or series of texts. Such information can be stored in the form of some other text and then overtly reconstituted. Certainly a jewel can be given a general formula with an account of the essential and trace elements  necessary for its material re-configuration along with a description of its formal appearance, but, no amount of reconstitutional simulation can bring to life the same jewel whereas the same text can be restored and this occurrence happens everyday in the form of computerized replication of documents, photocopying, electronic facsimiles, photos, the printing of texts, etc. In this regard we might like to see a text as the relational configuration of its elements with respect to its historical imprint in the formation of that text. The import of this position is that the text is seen as that overall relationship engendered between its elements. That, correctly, not only is the meta-text invisible but that the text, in its textuality, is likewise invisible. What is seen is the imprinted form of that text from which is derived its meta-textual adoption, and thence its adaptation, and, the elements themselves involved in the form of an encoding if both aspects are intentionally present. In a trail of footprints meaning is usually not conferred. In our reading of that trail of footprints we create a text within a text that then allows us to interpret the same. Our experience of footprints allowing us to read the nature of their deposition and the probable manner of their formation, i.e., determine the probable disposition of the agent involved in their imprinting on the fabric of the world.
	Hence, although we may be able to see through our jewel, this seeing though is not literally the same as that involved in our seeing through a text. In the former the seeing through is conducted literally, in the latter the seeing through is conducted metaphorically and in this difference we have the discontinuity that divides the world of the non-textual text from the world of the textual text!
	One last difference between our metaphor of the jewel and the nature of textuality is the fact that when we smash our jewel into many pieces we still have stones of the same overall composition as that which we originally started with. On the other hand there comes a point when our text is so pulled to pieces that it provocationally ceases to function, ceases to convey information in a meta-textually directed fashion. Mere words, mere letters convey little information and practically no information that reflects upon the textual nature of that text. Although a non-textual text can be a better candidate for this shredding of its material instantiation even here its imprinted deposition is equally dissipated. The pages of a book can be shredded and although we are always left with fragment of paper in so far as we can physically destroy that text there must come a point in time when its imprinted text ceases to be able to be read as imprinted elements, or characters, on those micro-fragments of text. 
	All in all a text is a deposition whose imprinted characteristics necessitates a meta-text for its interpretation. The reading of this deposition, whether it be a textual text or a non-textual text, involves a recognition of this imprinted component on the fabric co-opted for this process of deposition. Regardless of whether this text has a message or not its being read demands certain conditions and it is my hope that this text, this Hypothetical Journal, will throw some light on the nature of this process. Therefore, it is my hope, that this lengthy, open, working paper on this subject of textual-interpretation will commend itself to your careful inspection and thoughtful criticism, and, therein find your positive recommendation. Hopefully you will find it polished and well-formed to that extent and to that degree that meets with your satisfaction recognizing the difficult task I have set myself in this desire to walk a Middle Path between the dogmatism of miscellaneous forms of absolutistic foundationalism and the mindless sterility of displays of purely subjectively arranged exercises of relativism. Like a jewel a text should be both polished and appropriately shaped. In our appreciation of such a gem our interpretation should be likewise, recognizing the limits of both the process of textualization and its re-interpretation. That regardless of the light a text is seen under it will reveal something of its intrinsic nature and, with some variety in that lighting, better reveal a depth to its textualization. That in our hermeneutic investigations we should always desire a well-balanced examination in the hope that the text might better speak on its own behalf and let us hear, or rather overhear, what that text might intentionally have possibly been set up to convey in the first place. That when we find the text speaking to itself we can then listen in to its re-expression, and, in finding this revelation to be adequate rest happily in our re-interpretation of that text through that text's re-interpretation of itself; content in such an interpretive relationship that no revelation can be absolutely transparent, nor for that matter, completely opaque!

					    Noël Tointon, Sydney, 27.12.92.

Foreword

	In the following paper the reader will find a number of faults that, misguided as I might be, I would rather like to refer to as virtues in the light of the nature of the following project about to be unravelled (in both senses of the that word).
	To begin with the type of project entertained is phenomenological in complexion and more precisely transcendental in character. A transcendental-phenomenology is a trans-phenomenal reading of the phenomenal grounded on the thorough imposition and maintenance of a transcendental suspension - the suspension of all forms of value through its non-destructive cognitive recognition and neutralization of the structural-functions that constitute the presentation of that value. Hence, already, in the eyes of some, the commission of four sins, namely, invoking a phenomenological approach, adopting a transcendental perspective (complicated by its inclusion of a number of interrelated senses involved within my own formulation of the expression `transcend-ental'), apparently contradicting my footsteps with so called `suspensions' and  excessively hyphenating expressions like structural-functions! Let me quickly defend myself.
	Adopting a phenomenological approach towards the appearance of phenomena must be trans-phenomenal in the nature of its appreciation. But is not the expression phenomenological merely as good or as bad, as interesting or as uninteresting, as any other philosophical approach? What privilege can we claim for the relativity of any perspective? In reply I will argue for, more often than not implicitly, that experience is intersubjectively and objectively enstructured and enfunctioned. That, that granted, the same should also apply to the phenomenon of interpretation and that therefore texts should also be treated in a similar light? I admit that the sense of the expression `transcendental' is difficult for some people to entertain? However, it is at first simply defined through the imposition and maintenance of a transcendental suspension. Moreover, it recognizes that all forms of appreciation are essentially meta-propositional in logical flavour and transcendent in meta-status in that section of text treated in that fashion. But, more correctly, the merits of a transcendental philosophy must be experienced rather than merely interminably, and unproductively, speculated upon. Then, the subject of suspensions, needn't be treated as too complicated. A phenomenological examination of the nature of questions, or metaphors, should show that we deal with such procedures many times a day if not continually. Lastly, hyphenation is merely alerting us to the fact that trans-logically we must take a close, dialectical approach to the philosophical appreciation of the fruits of human intellectual discernment. The suspense of the suspension also aiding a rather long winded, excessively qualified, diplomatic attitude that might more annoy some people rather than impart to them a need for the acceptance of limitations in the discernment of phenomenon and their carefully constructed interpretation, thematizing the patterns that naturally enstructure the distinctive functions of chaos. Concepts are defined and thematized in a dance of simultaneous opposition and accommodation so the correlativity of expressions, in their differential demarcation, through their being on the very edges of experience, must be critically taken into account. A recognition that must also realize the close reciprocity between such mutually defining terms. Put simply there is no structure that does not at the same time function, nor, no function that is not in some way structured. In essence, the non-analytical purity of thematization is an impossible state of affairs to entertain let alone to recognize (although, phenomenal essences once recognized in experience merely reinforce this notion of a necessary degree of co-mutuality).
	The reader must also be on guard for veritable swarms of terms and expressions often hovering around the same type of linguistic root, e.g., the use of the suffix trans or words utilizing the expression of text, e.g., transcendental  reflections, transcendental reconstitution, trans-textuality, etc; e.g., meta-text, con-text, context, trans-text, multi-textuality, etc. Should not different concepts perhaps use different expressions? However, for the reader's convenience a glossary and index are supplied at the end of this essay.
	The format of this paper, as a hypothetical journal, also recognizes the plurality of subjects that are entered within it. It is my hope, however, that my reader will accept the confusing, sometimes repetitive nature of this complex exposition and not waste their time expecting a definitive understanding of it to arise sentence by sentence, paragrah by paragraph. In its stead it is my hope that they will focus on those aspects of the text that they find speaking to them and letting, in the goodness of time, the rest of the text clarify this otherwise apparently impenetratable fog.
	The nature of this project is also, to my mind, best conducted ahistorically, in a tenseless realm of phenomenological necessity synthesized from the analytical nature of transcendental reductions and the synthetical nature of non-verbally conducted states of transcendental reconstitutions. To this end I have misused the use of the present participle in order to promote this sense of timelessness and transcendental necessity.
	Hopefully my reader will bear with these apparent defficiencies and relish the unfolding, or rather, unraveling, of this intellectual landscape in which I have found much pleasure travelling within and over which, I might add, much sleep was lost in order to weave together many of these themes which had previously surfaced in a number of recent papers. I have had to herd my many thoughts in both a linear direction and in a collective fashion in preparation for a close shearing of this complex subject, preparing this fleece for the scrutiny of a close reading. The theme of this lengthy working paper, from which the `reader' is only required to choose a small number of sections, is a  transcendental-phenomenological-hermeneutical appreciation of the phenomenon of textuality and its allied topic of the phenomenon of interpretation. To this extent as `a reading of reading' the `listeners' of this text must realize that `the fleece itself must be fleeced,' that that which is shorn must be trimmed without discarding too much fibre, or, for that matter, leaving the wool untouched. In this dialectical task, I believe, a middle path must be taken between the seduction  of modern, fashionable forms of relativism and conservative, dogmatic forms of formalism. That, in truth, no other path can be taken, but, in demonstrating the one highway we must all travel upon we must realize that that road comes from no where special nor takes us anywhere else out of the ordinary but that in our traveling, through our collective efforts, a richness of vista is there for all to marvel at and find infinite delight within. That in our passage this process must answer, in the very language of our formulation, if we are prepared to listen, a response in keeping with the nature of that question that we had formulated for ourselves. Discovering for ourselves that the question once formulated is, indeed, an answer half-formed, already in formation.

						Noël Tointon, Sydney, 6/6/92.

Introduction

	In this working paper a series of thoughts on the subjects of `textuality' and `interpretation' will be examined. Some of these ideas will be followed up in detail whilst others will only be thinly sketched out. It is my intention, however, that this document as a `working paper' will in general only offer a framework, or introduction, to this double topic, and in the process bring together, and attempt to tie up, a multitude of concepts scattered about in a number of other papers dealing with this overall subject of `hermeneutic appreciation.'
	It is my belief that we can entertain a phenomenologically clarified vision of what exactly, and essentially, constitutes a text in its generality as a relatively distinct phenomenon in all its forms; a fact attested to in natural language through the use of expressions allied to the infinitive `to read.' That granted we then might find ourselves in a better position of being able to say how we actually go about this `process of reading' and `interpreting' a text under the scrutiny of a more hermeneutically oriented investigation. At least we might find ourselves in a better position of being able to turn our phenomenological focus on this process of reading that text and therein realizing, and recognizing, its intended interpretation (in accordance, to some degree or other, to the frame of reference and manner, as a meta-text, that text was intentionally set up to be read within).
	Normally, a text in a natural language that is successfully understood by the reader produces no textual problems for that reader. Such a person by necessity must be privy to these meta-textual conventions necessary for its comprehension or in a position to adequately determine the same through some form of reflection upon the format of that text coupled with an actively-manipulative intuitive-comparison of that format to other apparently similar textual conventions already in the repertoire of that reader. When the reader is at home with a text the text is just approached, interacted with and allowed to communicate its intentionally intended content. The whole process is just experienced with the focus of our attention on the end product of that fruitful process. On the other hand when we find a text no longer apparently transparent to our inspection this degree of opaqueness alerts us to our no longer being at home with that specimen of a text now before us with a feeling that, to a certain degree, we are metaphorically locked out. The appearance of this barrier erected between us and the text, however, also intimates the impression, by virtue of its textual appearance, that we need only go around it with the appropriate conventional language-keys in hand, and in finding the right door for its access, allow ourselves, in the goodness of time, with some effort, to enter therein. In this paper let me explore what might constitute a text and the general manner in which we might hermeneutically appropriate that text and make it our own.
	Recently my thoughts on this type of subject have accumulated on a daily basis and instead of resurrecting relevant notes from my latest philosophical notebook let me ensure their re-entry at the appropriate place in this paper if, some short time later, I find such ideas still merit such an entrance. Hence the format of this paper takes the (meta-textual) form of a `hypothetical journal.'
	As an introduction to this paper let me list some of the most important and salient points it has to offer in order to alert the reader to those sections of the text that I regard as more crucial to its comprehension and appreciation.

1.	A text is not just a language game in the manner as suggested by Wittgenstein! It has come to my attention recently that there is a central, crucial, non-verbal element to the reading of a text whose presence establishes a reading of that text. That in our final estimation this necessary presence should be recognized as just as important as the sequential de-encoding, textual fragment by textual fragment, that acts as the pre-conditional input into this overall, completed sense involved in the act of a reading a text. That in essence, expressed in the form of a soluble paradox, the text is read the moment we stop reading it! With an emphasis, as a counter-balance, on the spontaneity of our `overall reading' and our stopping or `overcoming' this prior level of relatively superficial reading. In the same manner judgment is able to declare itself that moment when we stop calculating, when we leave or transcend a calculative level of cognitive entertainment. 
	Why is the production and reproductive reading of a text not a language game? It is certainly a game on a sequential, logical and verbal level of appreciation. However, the central act of reading necessitates its holistic appreciation and that cannot be directly entertained merely through our determination of the conventional rules of application necessary for the appreciation of that text. Hence the game ceases to be merely a game in the philosophic sense of this concept. In the realization of meaning the game is left behind. The game is still present on this pre-conditional level and as a critical philosophical concept does have a role to play on this level of manifested structure and function. However, a true reading is realized in center stage when and where we must leave behind our mere sequential encirclement of that text. As a phenomenon the text then speaks to us through our identification with that text as a text to be read, as a text that has been read. In our metaphorical entry into its world of being, the meaning and meaningfulness of the text is simulated and projected before us from the center of our interaction with that text. Our interaction, on the experiential level of that relationship, with that text set up to be read being direct, immediate, spontaneous, appropriate, critical, possessing depth, perhaps apparently successful, able to resolve our doubts as to the apparent nature and content of that text, etc. Although the simulation of the meaning and meaningfulness of the text under examination is a projected simulation it is `our' simulation that projects both `it and us' before each other. Through the cracks in the text, between the words, between the various senses of a word being apparently co-opted or not invoked, between the very bits and pieces; all retrospective fictions, that constitute our sensory panorama, a text is synthesized before us to the same extent that we stand before it. This direct experience of the text being non-verbal is defined as non-textual. In this paper I will argue that this simulation is the result of a dialogue between two important aspects of the text, namely, the text proper and the meta-text. This dialogue being defined as trans-textual and transcendental in complexion.

2.	A text is always presented through the format of a meta-text.  The meta-text is the form and format of that text and is the generalized adoption and individualized adaptation of a genre or a series of genres. The style of a text reflects this adoption and adaptation of genre and is further individually realized through the manner provocative dissonance in the text is resolved either through some form of accommodation and/or rewriting of the overall textual field. 
	No text without a meta-text! How could a writer put `pen to paper' without some idea as to how they are going to arrange the manner of their presentation and therein offer us a share in its re-presentational communication and comprehension. In the field of interpretation this meta-textual aspect of the text is often completely ignored, or distorted through the lens of some other set of rules not sufficiently close to that text or just simply inadequate to undertake this task currently to hand. Moreover, the further this text is removed from us by virtue of time, space or cultural distance the more this meta-text stands in need of some form of translation that will allow us to appreciate the nature of the relationship between the meta-text and the text that would then allow us to `silently hear this inner dialogue' and re-create this non-textual simulation. 
	In the field of music I often come across this barrier to a better appreciation of the score. Without an understanding of the conventions that were expected to be known by every cultivated person of those times the reconstruction of that type of music in another era, in the terms of reference of that latter era, will almost inevitably result in a boring, lifeless piece of music. Sometimes, in the midst of bashing the piece of early music into a modern form, the interpreter, despite themselves, actually silently hears the piece and lets something of its inherent power motivate its re-simulation which, alas, often then merely conditions the performer to continue on in their `old ways.' Often these conventions only get spelt out in periods of transition or in the manuals for beginners wherein these things need only to be pointed out although some treatises in their conservatism are more preserving old ways lost or embedded in new performance approaches. Sometimes, when confronted by an ancient text, musical or non-musical, I feel that 90% of the visible page is visibly `missing' and that a critical re-reading of the meta-text is needed in order to realize a close, balanced reading of that visible 10%. The fact that a text appears to confront us in the form of a complete document must not fool us into believing that a reading of the visible text is going to achieve this necessary commentary for us! Indeed it is only when we have the meta-text to hand in the form of an implicit code, that the text gives up its opaqueness and gives depth to its interpretation. Then again it is the patent text that gives the latent meta-text its individualized genre-adaptation. These two two-way aspects of the text when in dialogue realizing a greater degree of value than that invested in the application of that code-like protocol. In our hermeneutic treatment of a text this excess value is appreciated and focused upon. Processes of commensuration and super-commensuration linking aspects of the text, other texts, other minds and other cultures in their interaction with this text, other texts that (convocationally) surround this text, etc.
	The presence of the meta-text allows the use of metaphors in that overt text to function. This does not mean that the text correctly takes the form of two textual embodiments only that there are various strands within the phenomenological concept of text and that these elements generate the relational dialogue embedded in that text. No text, therefore, can be correctly mono-modal, or univocal. Thus a text can only operate in ostensive, intentionally exclusive terms of reference by virtue of some form of provisional treatment that focuses our attention on a level of discourse that lacks all trace of overt metaphors or the presence of codes that might liberate that text from its apparent thematic impoverishment. 
	Embedded in this dialogue, subject to some form of an in depth examination, is the recognition of a mutual tension between the phenomenological and the hermeneutical dimensions; the former being centered on analytical forms of reduction and the latter being centered on synthetical forms of reconstitution.

3.	Next, I would like to discuss a phenomenology of the hermeneutic circle. In this paper this subject is touched upon on numerous occasions and generally builds on previous research without arguing for the conclusions developed out of those previous findings. For the sake of the reader let me here introduce a brief sketch of my current understanding of this topic.
	To begin with the argument over the priority of analysis over synthesis, or, synthesis over analysis, is to my mind quite artificial. Rather, what is utilized is that already pre-constituted which is then in turn subjected to some form of analytical or synthetical orientation. That the pre-constituted is met transcendentally in a state of transcendental suspension; a state of affairs that takes place in a balance of the analytical and synthetical tendencies, a balance between process and content, an equilibrium put in place between conceptual processes and perceptual processes, etc. Hence the hermeneutic circle is re-written in triadic terms of reference. Moreover, I see a parallel between these three transcendental moments of suspension, reduction (analysis) and reconstitution (synthesis) and the transcendental-phenomenological moments of transcendental Ego, transcendental Object and transcendental World. Connected to these poles of phenomenological activity, with varying degrees of relative autonomy, are certain orientations towards the present, the past and the future respectively. Six fields of value creation (and recognitional re-creation) are also superimposed on this circle (or rather itself doubled upon itself) in its transcendental manifestation through a relative suppression of one or two of those three transcendental poles, namely, thematical value (connected with naming, identification, mathematics, logical manipulations, etc.), aesthetical value, ethical value, pragmatical value, factual value and trans-thematical value concerned with a hermeneutic appreciation of semantic successfulness, etc.). Another aspect of the metaphor of the circle is the concept that processes of analysis or synthesis are simultaneously met, clockwise and anticlockwise, by opposite processes to the overt nature of those investigations. Then, taking this metaphor one step further, it is suggested that when our passage one way around this circle is met equally by a simultaneous and opposite passage the circle simultaneously implodes to reveal the simulation of the non-text and explodes to reveal that of which the simulation is `a simulation of' trans-textually outside the circle. It is claimed that experience is a `direct' experience `of' that experience whereas verbal language is `about' non-verbal experience. This development of an experiential transcendental dimension simultaneously re-investing the cognitive with an on going thematization of identity (and other forms of value), and vice versa. This triadic pattern and its centering happening throughout the hierarchical stratification of the psyche finding its hermeneutical reflection in the relationship between the text and its meta-text, between the inter-textual space of the meta-text and genre in general, and, the relationship between textual parts and the text's sense of a totality, etc. The all pervading presence of the hermeneutic circle informing us of the dialectical nature of  (our appreciation of) reality and the need for a trans-logical approach to the thematization of identity. That our entry and exit to and from the hermeneutic circle is via the moment of transcendental suspension, that from that point volition can relatively authentically or inauthentically flow. The degree of authenticity/inauthenticity being the degree the transcendental suspension is invoked and maintained, and, our transcendental functions overall have been correctly exercised and allowed to exercise themselves auto-critically. The above list of comments only thinly sketching out the broadest of outlines on this central topic of the hermeneutic circle (the reader being advised to either seek those sections of text that have already dealt with various aspects of this theme or to go straight to the present text and take up these threads as they present themselves in the context of this paper).

4.	The phenomenal nature of a relationship is investigated in a relational philosophy, and, that such an understanding should give us relative foundations for the exposition and practice of a transcendental-phenomenological-hermeneutics, or equally a transcendental-hermeneutical-phenomenology. 
	Too often in philosophy, especially Western Philosophy, a gulf has been created between various apparent dichotomies, e.g., self and other, mind and body, concepts and percepts, text and non-text, etc,. etc,. An absolute dichotomy would imply some non-form of relationship even though a relationship might be simulated simultaneously. But how could such an information paralleling occur except in the context of some form of relationship? Obviously an indirect relationship must still be some form of a direct relationship? That granted we then cannot claim some form of an absolute dichotomy in the first place. Thus with these considerations we must reconsider the nature of the relationship between the parties of an apparent dichotomy. Further it is obvious that the parties of a relationship reflect the nature of that relationship and in turn the nature of that relationship must reflect the nature of its participants. However, many relationships are between parties of a disparate nature, certainly between entities or states that can never be self-identical. I have argued elsewhere that a self-identical relationship possesses no phenomenological sense, that identities can only appear self-identical in terms of various `different' aspects held in a state of self relationship. That, essentially, in a relational philosophy, the common ground between the various parties of a relationship is established on transformational grounds, i.e., in terms of a transformational invariance wherein internally certain relational features are analogically entertained in an invariant fashion and that this ground, let me add, is the very territory central to the mental phenomenon of metaphorical understanding. Let me notate this invariance of internal self-relatedness. For the sake of argument let me say that the warrior Richard (R) is like a lion (l):

Let Richard = R, 
a lion in general terms of reference = L,
a certain feature of R discussed by direct or indirect 			reference = r, 
a certain feature of L discussed by direct or indirect 			reference = l,
let the text = T,
and let the meta-text that covertly controls this process of 	overt metaphorical ascription = T',
and the function `is like', which is = `is like and not 			like' = *,
and let `:' = transformational invariance = #,
# = the degree of transformational invariance as an 				approximate numerical coefficient where 1 = invariance.
where r' = the concept of r, l' = the concept of l.

	R * L because in the text T, the T' has R/r * L/l in 			such a manner that r : l = # = 1

	In other words R is like a lion by virtue of a certain feature (or set of features) defined implicitly by the meta-text. I.e., R is like a lion because he is strong, or brave, a good fighter and not because lions have bad breath and this Richard also has bad breath, or both are hairy, etc. I.e., conventionally to say X * L is to normally say something about the fighting skills of that person, or something similar. That to say R * L is to say that between these two entities there is one feature held by both that is common, i.e., the internal logical nature of this focused field is held in this (metaphorical) state of relationship in an invariant fashion, i.e:

	R/r * L/l because R : r = L : l = r' : l', # = 1

	Note metaphorical analogy is not to be treated literally, e.g., that the lion is as good with a sword as is this Richard, etc. That essentially the internal relationship of r in R, and, l in L is the same in the terms of reference implied by T'. 
	The transformational aspect of this relationship is such that in our movement of focus from R to L, and vice versa, we find we have some common territory to do this by virtue of the fact that these general metaphorical features r and l in relationship to their bearers on transformation the translation of our interested focus in this relationship between R and L is held in a separately invariant fashion, 

	i.e., r' : l' = # = 1.

	The second aspect of a relational philosophy that I now wish to focus upon is the `direct' nature of the relational experience. When we experience a relationship we experience it metaphorically from within that relationship. A characteristic identity is discovered in and through that relationship that lets us make this observation, an observation of transformational invariance between the relationship S and the characteristic p. This experience of relational directness is experienced `non-verbally' hence the simulation of that relationship is primarily non-verbal and hence non-textual in nature. Only when we talk, write, think conceptually about that experience do we start to textualize it. The implication being that we are in a direct relationship with the actual world even if that actuality cannot be absolutely defined, thematized, identified, correctly interpreted, etc. Further, our discourse, whatever its meta-textual form(at) or textual content must bear some degree of real relationship and relevance to/with this sense of the actual world. E.g., a fictitious novel, even a fairy story, etc., must bear some degree of direct relationship to this common world of experience. A purely possible world cannot be described because no such world can be thought in purely self-sufficient terms of reference. Moreover, that which can stand in no form of possible relationship to us can have no possible existence for us. Hence this aspect of a direct non-textual experience of the world implies some degree of association with a world of ontical facticity, factuality. Hermeneutics is the discipline that investigates in what degree and in what manner a certain frame or frames of reference bear to some other frame or frames of reference. A hermeneutic transformation taking place when we can `sensibly' shift from one frame of interpretive reference to some other via this region of transformational invariance.
	A phenomenology is the essential-phenomenal appreciation of the phenomenal. A transcendental-phenomenology is a phenomenological appreciation conducted via the imposition and maintenance of a transcendental suspension. Hence the critical trans-intentional, trans-constitutional and trans-phenomenal nature of a transcendental-phenomenology. Moreover, an interpretation of phenomena must also centrally entail the phenomenon of interpretation. Hence a correctly (self-)critical phenomenology must be a transcendental-phenomenological-hermeneutics!
	A search for relative foundations is possible by virtue of the fact that all `forms' of phenomenal reality are structured in their function to some degree or other, and, that all `forms' of function are structured to some other degree or other. That a precise inverse reciprocal in thematizational determinability is maintained between these mutually dialectical correlatives. That just as experience is structured and its functioning unfolding is enfunctioned it follows that a phenomenal description is possible as long as it is maintained within certain limits set in thematizational determinability. By virtue of an assured degree of relation with a common world of experience given to us directly and non-textually are we then allowed to recognize a certain degree of foundations for the critical, circumscribed exercise of a transcendental-hemeneutical-phenomenology. Hence the articulation of relative foundations allows us to steer a middle path between forms of absolutism and relativism, between sterile formalisms and puerile displays in relatively ungrounded performances of philosophical prejudice and fabrication. To be noted, however, that although the text might be considered to be centered, and grounded, in its non-text such a center, and grounds, are themselves correctly without a center, or grounds; or at least without an absolutely centered center, grounded grounds, etc. That in effect the essence of essence is no essence, is without essence. Yet, without absolute grounds, essence, e.g., is without an essentially-absolute `essence', essence is still essentially distinctive enough to distinctively locate in a psychic map of the universe of potential discourse and describe phenomenally. Similar arguments can be used in the discernment of a relative textually simulated hermeneutic objectivity, a distinctive state of affairs reinforced by the textual preparation of distinctively taken up provocational pathways in the creation and resolution of dissonance, a distinctive relatively pre-determined process of resolution that constitutes the ongoing facticity of that relationship being simulated in experience, being experienced as a simulation.
	That all forms of communication proceed via this process of provocational harmonization. A dissonant state of affairs is set up in experience between the introduction of some form of relative difference to the overall consonant field of that relationship. A pre-determination of accommodational pathways establishing this relative degree of communicational intersubjective-objectivity. Again, I will argue that the metaphor is central to such a process and that such a process is essentially metaphorical (and that restoring the metaphorical to a state of transcendental suspension transforms the phenomenal description into one of a transcendental complexion).

6.	Relative hermeneutic objectivity was treated in this paper as the transformational shift, provocationally assured, between hermeneutically constructed interpretive frames of reference by virtue of the relative grounds of a transformational invariance central to that state of transition. A middle position between absolutisitic formalisms and relativistic fabrications (treated merely as a process of pure dissemination, or edification, etc.). Relative hermeneutic objectivity being centered in the ability of a text to provoke, to a certain degree of certainty, a provocationally directed and assured simulation of the non-textual wherein the distance between that `simulation' and `that of which the simulation is of' breaks down through the trans-textual transcendence/immanence of the hermeneutic circle generated in and through a metaphorical implosion/explosion of the hermeneutic circle and its simultaneous reconstitution and re-exercise. That, in essence, relative hermeneutic objectivity can be argued for without reference to a transcendental signifier anchoring this process of signification, but, that the illusion or `presence' of a transcendental signifier can be re-created through the trans-textual re-simulation of the non-textual, and, that the non-textual is essentially re-experienced directly as a relatively provocationally assured re-simulation of that intended simulation. That, ultimately, there can be no real difference between `textual simulation of the non-textual' and non-textual simulation of the non-textual', all experience being relatively grounded to some degree or other in our hermeneutic appreciation of this world of experiential reality, in the phenomenal reality of our experience of a common world (as a transcendental[ly necessary] world of life or life-world)

	In some measure the writing of this paper has, for me, been like an experience that could metaphorically be compared to the rounding up of a flock of five hundred or so sheep if I could impose upon my reader such a state of vicarious experience. You can keep some of those sheep stationary, or headed in the right direction, but you cannot control the whole flock at any one moment. This mass of new ideas, and new ways of treating the relationship between old ideas, has always threatened to deconstruct, displace itself, re-construct, dissipate itself, break forth into numerous relatively incommensurate monologues, etc. In reading this text I suggest the reader put what ever interpretation upon what ever section they might wish to interpret/re-interpret (or interrogate) and then follow through those other sections of this paper relevant to the themes adopted in their current thinking and set about therein to test their interpretation of those ideas. In the process hopefully refining their thoughts on these matter and realizing, via provocative readings of this text, the recognition of a position that finds their intentional construction co-inciding with, and then surpassing, the formulations entailed in this working paper; a provisional text that has set out to establish, and relate, these two fields of textuality and interpretation. In this task a close reading of covert, and overt, metaphor is necessary in order to mark out those segments of text that provocationally appear to release more hermeneutic value than that value originally invested in such a reading. It being my suggestion, therefore, that the reader seek out for further reflection only those segments of text that might actually interest them and proffer them a potential degree of fruitfulness in this regard. Or in the language of the metaphor just adopted, manage to round up and capture one or two of these sheep and in closely shearing them find out what quality of fleece they might possess estimating what price such a fleecing might earn for their labours on the world market in practical terms of reference?

Edited: 12.10.99