The Philosophical Mode of Life: A Philosophical Adventure

Introduction

At very short notice I have put together this philosophical adventure. I would like to start with a distinction developed by the French philosopher Gilles Deleuze (1925-95). I will then explore this distinction, collapse it and let it reflect on work I have been doing in a Second Volume in my theological research titled: Finding a Place for the Idea of God - An Extended Essay, There I shall explore various modes of life - the rational world of chess, the often irrational world of religion, and the somewhat, more often than not, contradictory world of philosophy. Finally, I will extract from our excursion into the hermeneutic circle a threefold distinction that might throw some light on the work of Deleuze, namely his distinctions of the 'world and literature of science', the 'world and literature of philosophy', and, the 'world and literature of literature itself’. (1)

1.   Deleuzean Distinction of Minor Literature

Throughout their major work, A Thousand Plateaus Delueuze and Guattari draw a distinction between minoritarian and majoritarian. Like all their ‘distinctions' what looks like a simple opposition is far more complex. Minoritarian and majoritarian are ways of drawing distinctions. A majoritarian mode, for example, presents the opposition as already given and based on a privileged and original term. So, 'man' is a majoritarian term; we imagine that there is some general being - the human - that then has local variations: such as racial, sexual or cultural variations. The opposition between man and woman is majoritarian: we think of woman as other than, or different from, man. A minoritarian mode of difference does not ground the distinction on a privileged term, and does not see the distinction as an already-given order. Deleuze and Guattari describe 'woman' or ‘becoming-woman' as minortarian (Deleuze and Guattari 1987).

Rather than falling back on a distinction and associated literature already defined on some privileged term, or set of terms, a minor literature, according to Deleuze, is a literature that breaks the mould so to speak, rather than perpetuating identity already constituted it creates a new sense of identity, rather than a process of repetitive reproduction it ventures forth and creates something new (and truly novel). Today, the idea of a woman, I believe, is somewhere between feminine-and-feminist - no longer a so-called bra-burning feminist nor a blond bimbo traipsing around on very elevated stilettos speaking with a highly pitched, helpless voice... From reading newspapers, etc., it would seem woman should expect equal wages for equal work comparable to that performed by men, should not be overlooked for promotion, and can still ask for a reasonable period of maternity leave with full pay… at least that idea is taken for granted if not yet realized. An optimist thinking that it is only a matter of time before this is a fait accompli… (2)
	In the same vein I think the gay person has an even more complex task ahead of them as they creatively attempt to carve out for themselves some sense of identity as they move forth through the deconstructed void of the Postmodern as they head into a Contemporary Era (as previously argued for by myself)? No longer defined or self-defined as ‘inverts’ they must choose between ‘homosexual’, ‘gay’, ‘queer’… along with a plethora of choices in niche ‘markets’ like ‘party or club scene’, ‘bears’, ‘sportsmen’, ‘artists’, ‘married couples with or without kids’, etc., etc… in the main uncharted territory… a similar, but milder, sort of fluid landscape that seems to bedevil most young people today…? (3) *

2.   Collapsing the Distinction

	I have taken this distinction on board but also see the privileged ground against which it reacts as essentially once the same sort of uncharted territory. A truly novel novel writer in turn sets the standard and in that new genre many other writers then try to carve out for themselves a niche within the same. Here, what once was a minor literature, according to Deleuze, now becomes a major literary style. Furthermore, in the minor literature’s creatively carving out a new space for itself that major literary style is automatically redefined, undermined and deconstructed by default, etc., etc. The collapse of this distinction that forever follows creates what I would like to call a mode of life, an existential surplus that spills over into the world and produces an institution with all the traces of life imprinted upon the fabric of the Life-World by the apparent ‘presence’ of the same. I would like to quote a section of this Second Volume as noted above that deals with this type of observation and the sort of critical reflections we might also, perhaps, like to draw? (4)

	What is an informational system? Basically it is a set of rules for apportioning value to miscellaneous elements embedded in a representational system or field along with rules for the distinction of those elements, their accommodation between various distinctive aspects, and the manner operations are to be conducted within those distinctions and the  manner transformations are to be conducted between those distinctions (by virtue of those accommodations). Hence elemental rules and rules for their individual valuation along with rules for their distinctive classifications, operations, accommodations and/or transformations. E.g., the game of chess involves the field of a chess board with two different sets of sixteen elements defined by the parallel distinctions of king, queen, rooks, etc; a list of possible operations; no accommodations and no transformations (other than the operation of the potential promotion of pawns within that distinctive field). In play we have special operations like castling, en passant along with the ‘destruction’ of ‘captured’ elements called ‘pieces’. The objective of the game being the skilful projection and relative amplification of power in an endeavour to produce an inescapable checkmate of the opposite king or, in the failure of this objective, the creation of a draw. Can the game of chess be meaningfully contrasted with some other game or with games in general? The game of draughts could be fruitfully contrasted with the game of chess. They both use the same board, and, an object of both games is the ‘capture’ of your opponent’s pieces. As ‘games’ the primary intention behind their being played, usually, is as an enjoyable diversion (although other forms of motivation may figure in this type of activity). It would seem to follow that the further away two or more informational systems are located with respect to each other, in their being mapped within this world of life, the more difficult it is to engage a meaningful and informative contrast? On the other hand, the very world of life allows other worlds to form some form of an intersection on many levels of intentional accommodation. E.g., chess is played by a person (or a machine programmed for such) and so are other games. Games reflect their social worlds to some extent – just as chess reflects a classical type of warfare as preserved in the characteristic depiction of the pieces, etc., hence kings and queens, bishops and knights, and, the military figures of knights and castles or rooks and the perception of pawns as ‘foot-soldiers’. So, in this respect, no world can be absolutely incommensurable with some other since they all reflect the overall nature of the life-world to some extent or other (and this is reflected in the use of the metaphors, terminology, etc.,. involved in performance of those games. E.g., in the game of draughts pieces ‘jump’ over each other and therein ‘capture’ the piece so ‘jumped over’. [(14) 5]

	Now, the game of chess reflects the worlds in which it evolved. But this process also runs in reverse! Into the wider world it has spilt over in the form of the dissemination of chess boards and pieces, collector editions and antique chess sets and pieces, an extensive chess literature, computer software and electronic chess games, the premises of chess clubs and the venues of chess competitions, a number of people who define themselves as chess players of whom a small number are graded as ‘masters’, etc., etc. As the locus of an existential excess the world of chess is practically a world-of-life in its own right without absolute boundaries between its representation and its re-presentation. Although we might now define the rules of the game in a legalistic fashion and invoke a representational model of the functioning of its pieces, etc., correctly the game is more the performance of a re-presentation since the beauty of the game lies in its becoming for those players a unique game each time it is played. Thence one should, perhaps, recognize the fact that although chess, or any other ‘game’, or mode of life for that matter, can be represented to some extent or other the existential fact is that its ‘presence’ in this wider world, this world-of life, is itself a world-of-life within the same and ‘surviving’ above and beyond, below and within, as its own living world-of-life to some extent or other in its own absolutely indefinable manner despite its general evaluation (in terms of a logical sense, conventional hermeneutical meaning and particularized forms of an unique existential imprinting of meaningfulness in this life-world)!! [(15) 6]*

	How, we must now ask, is the relevance of an informational system to be determined? Or, re-paraphrased, how is an informational system, as a mode of life, to be properly determined and appropriately appreciated? Obviously, merely giving the rules is not going to capture the actual and possible existential excesses that have been engendered and might be engendered through that mode of life being lived out in this world-of-life. In this process of understanding such an open form of life the informational system itself needs to be located in its meta-informational system and this is determined conventionally through an appreciation of textual context and textual meta-context, etc. Our hierarchical psychic mapping of the life-world, as culturally and inter-culturally available to us, assisting us in this type of task. So, e.g., the game of chess is located sense-wise as a game, etc. Understanding those families of conventions that pass for games assisting us in understanding its hermeneutic meaningfulness. Playing those games opening us up to something of their existential meaningfulness as it intersects the life of the individual or party of players and the community, etc. So, our appreciation of the value of a particular informational system necessitates its context in a more embracing informational context, etc., i.e., a relatively meta-informational context, etc. However, this process is not to be regarded as one that involves an infinite number of containments by the informational context, meta-context, meta-meta-context, etc., as wholes-and-parts are phenomenally/phenomenologically presented to us at the same time as processed-package-processes without a precedence of the whole over the parts or vice versa! Thus, the-world-is-there-before-us ready to be re-discovered rather than merely discovered! Doomed as we are to forever re-interpret the world and never merely to just interpret it! A state of affairs re-simulated for us through the valid, proper and appropriate deployment of an overall transcendental suspension. [(16) 7]*

	Now playing a game is a general mode of life and the game the game of chess is a particular mode of life. I would like to ask now can we draw a comparison between the rational world of chess and the often irrational world of religion? Surely the religious way of seeing the Life-World is a general mode of life, whereas, some particular religious point of view is a particular mode of life. However, the world of chess is based on a rational, integrated set of rules, whereas, most religion, it would seem, more often than not, is based on believing the impossible? If that were the case then how can we account for a world of life spilling into the world when by rights it should de-construct, or, be paralyzed, or, completely disintegrate, dissolve and disappear? (8)*

	This example of chess as an existential mode of life is an interesting one. This mode of life may be centred in its rules but in and through an existential excess spills out over into the world as a mode of life. There we also discover each game of chess, when properly played, as unique, at least experienced as if unique for those players, i.e., as a game whose horizons are an exciting amalgam of the expected and the unexpected. Even a second rate game played by second rate amateurs can interest those bystanders conversant with the rules of this game (even if one were to be frustrated in watching the blunders of mere amateurs and found that the examination of those mistakes were to incite more interest than that game per se). This example of chess could act as a prototype in our understanding of all other games as modes of life in their own manner. Can we extend this analogy and ask ourselves whether the theological point of view could also be viewed as a mode of life? In general the industry of religion, what ever its interest or lack of interest in a theological dimension, spills over into the world with an almighty footprint (if I am allowed to make this pun). So, it would appear that the theological world view could well be considered as another example of a mode of life? What are the ramification of this type of consideration? [(17) 9]

	In one aspect theological difference does make a difference. If you perceive the world through a theological lens then your interpretation of object-states in this vision of the life-world will be coloured directly or indirectly by that type of intentional attitude. Overall it may or may not make much difference but it will make some difference. Against this observation there are many thinkers today who believe that the world is empty of value. Then, there are many who profess a plurality of values arising in a plurality of incommensurable value-systems. In my opinion we should try to adopt a middle path in this instance. The life-world is a world of value. As argued elsewhere the economy of the life-world is as a world of value, and, because there is no division into one public external world and a multitude of private internal worlds there can only be one world-of-value, albeit one with an open infinity of evaluational perspectives. Moreover, there can be no absolute dichotomy between intentional object-states, intentional subjects and intentional fields hence the open unity of this horizon of our being-with-others. On the other hand, each mode of life has its own point of view almost as a world-of-life in its own sense. With this distinction in mind let me now, henceforth, treat the expression of the life-world, or world-of-life, as the Life-World, or World-of-Life, in contrast to these modes of life as relatively limited worlds-of-life in their own right. That, in essence, we might be able to say that the Life-World is 'fleshed out' by the concatenation of these worlds-of-life; themselves the result of an existential excess spilling out into this one-World-of-Life and intermingling therein to form the all embracing uniqueness of this open World-of-Life! Now, my previous concern about the nature of information and informational systems was the putative problem of how different types of informational systems could interact (within the embrace of the Divine on the understanding that as the Divine was defined as a "relatively greater degree of epistemological organization" it followed that this form of accommodation must be possible)? It would seem that we also have an answer to this type of problem as to the commensurability of informational systems and systems of distinctive value-formation, namely, in this observed 'fact' that (all) modes of life are seen to interact and naturally overlap one another in this one-World-of-Life through their existential overflowing into and over each other by virtue of the fact that these modes of life inhabit the same world, i.e., that these worlds-of-life are transcendentally resident in this one-World-of-Life, indeed, form this one Life-World. E.g., a game of chess could be played in a church hall (which is being rented from the city council which in turn is a recipient of tax from the state government, etc., etc.). The question still remains how do value-systems that are relatively incommensurable meaningfully interact with each other? In the light of research done on ordered forms of value [i.e., first-order pre-essential essential value (like mathematical equations, lexical entries, conceptual elements, types of quantification, etc.), second order essential aesthetical value (as in aesthetical states of affairs, qualitative forms of evaluation, conceptual coherence, etc.), third order deontological ethical value, fourth order pragmatical value, fifth order hermeneutical value (as in meta-textual considerations, systematic evaluation, environmental forms of value, etc.) and sixth order factual value] I have found their inter-accommodation occurs on a relatively deeper level of epistemological functioning (since all forms of value are derived through their associated forms of judgment and inter-relational assessment, and, the above all possess the same transcendental mechanics, namely, as processes of judgmental discernment operating within the very dynamics of the same hermeneutic circle, albeit subjected to various forms of privilege, prejudice, pre-judgment, etc.). Put simply, all forms of value have the same transcendental form (namely, as forms of judgment) hence their theoretical potential for processes of accommodation regardless of whether the conduct of that type of process is or is not instrumental in the realization of a relatively existential meaningful degree of value. E.g., we could evaluate the aesthetical poetic merit of a shopping list as an example of an essential inventory. Now, it might just happen that the shopping list was written as a poem in which case it may possess or may not possess a noticeable degree of poetic value. On the other hand, and more likely, this kind of comparative evaluation will produce little value (even though, as shown, this type of evaluation is not an impossible one to conduct). Hence all forms of value have some degree of commensurability even if the merit of that type of process of accommodation is discovered eventually to have little merit. [(18) 10]

	In comparing a chess-oriented mode of life and a theologically-oriented mode of life we must wonder if the former is perfect reasonable in its core-requirements and whether the latter in this same respect is perfectly unreasonable at least in its classical theistic formulations, or rather, mis-formulations?? In the rules of the game of chess are there any situations in play that cannot be arbitrated within those same system of rules and are those rules perfectly consistent with each other and the totality of that system? The game of chess is arbitrary in the formulation of its rules, and, moreover, has evolved over the centuries and, therein, testing the competence and viability of those formulations. Hence its degree of systematization could be said to be completely analytical as well as provisional, yet both markedly competent (in each of its individual functions, rulings, etc.) and viable (as a functioning totality). As to the perfection of that system, how could that process of appreciation be conducted within that set of rules when this game qua game needs to be evaluated outside the system of its own rules? In contrast, the effective, provisional systematization of chess accepted how could a system be evaluated if its core-proposals were fundamentally riven with a profound contradiction or set of contradictions, resident paradoxes, aporias, impossible equations, etc? Is it not the case that the excess of metaphysical speculations that all too often drive the formulation of a theology would be destructive of the formation of an existential excess as it spills over into its 'embodied-imprint' as a mode of life in this World-of-Life and in the process losing its viability to function as an authentic mode of life? Then, again, can such cracks be glossed over through dialectical processes and processes of harmonization that attempt to maintain the facade of an existentially meaningful exercise (without a critical appreciation of the true merits of that type of proposal). It would seem that central to most religions, and philosophies, are a set of contradictions that in turn drive the existential excess of value 'seen' emanating from the same by virtue of their common transcendental mechanics. Let me now investigate this problematic topic. [(19) 11]

	Religions are notorious for their use of paradoxical devices and similar. E.g., individuals who live after death, the resurrection of the decayed body, virgin births, burning trees that remain unburnt, the problematics of communion, celibate monks in various states of sexual congress, etc., etc. Rather than the destruction of that associated religious mode of life there appears, more often than not, the flourishing of that system when common sense would seem to declared at least the paralysis of that system if not its absolute self-destruction? How is this accomplished and how authentic is the value that issues from such a 'defective' process of systematization that one would reasonably believe must ultimately fail despite all attempts to harmonize such absolute anomalies central to those philosophies? [(20) 12]

	The word 'mystery' springs to mind. Because, indeed, it is often a mystery as to how people can believe what is fundamentally a state of nonsense. We have a parallel here in the impossible claims of the representationalistic empiricist. If as a number of eminent empirical thinkers have claimed "our ideas in our minds are copies of those objects so represented in the 'external world'" we must ask them how, as empiricists, they can 'see' that those ideas actually match those objects in the so-called 'external world' when both they and we empirically have no way of ever being able to do this trans-empirical process of comparison. Yet, we have armies of so-called empiricists claiming just this sort of nonsense. So what hope have we when dealing with religious people who fervently claim they believe a set of doctrines that could have no rational, logically self-consistent formulation?  So how do we account for this state of affairs? [(21) 13]*

	To answer this type of question let me look at the dialectics of harmonization and the phenomenological role played by metaphor. In previous research I have developed a comprehensive understanding of the function of metaphor. Let me bring together these various strands in order to account for the process of harmonization, the error of the metaphysical extrapolation of the metaphorical, the inherently contradictory nature of metaphor, the deceptive sense and attractiveness of metaphysical speculation, the role of metaphor to directly 'metaphor' the world from within the hermeneutic circle, and, the possible implications this has for a direct metaphoring of the theological? [(22) 14]

Without going into this in too much detail I have argued elsewhere that harmonization is a process that engages the entire hermeneutic circle and essentially involves an accommodation between the relatively dissonant and the relatively consonant, a state of affairs achieved through a core isomorphic region that remains invariant under transformation (through the moments of that hermeneutic circle and through its ordered refinement); a fact guaranteed through the transcendental constitution of those processes of intentionality, etc. The transcendental constitution of that phenomenon or set of phenomena under examination is realized through a transcendental suspension, etc., of the same (within the ambit of an overall transcendental suspension). This transcendental orientation is recognized through the existentialization of the relatively non-transcendental found being re-interpreted in this process of critical examination. Now, such resolution can be either adequate or inadequate, self-terminated or ongoing, and, these attributes of this critical process of examination will find themselves reflected in the nature of the ramifications that proceed from those investigations. Hence in this light we might like to charaterize the seemingly non-rational nature of religious belief as, generally, inadequate and on-going. On the other hand, an existentialization of our research project should lead to an adequate ongoing process of critical reflection centred in the midst of the overall transcendental suspension until such a time those reflections are found to be self-terminated for what ever reason, and in that regard then to be determined as either adequate or inadequate in both their sense of a realized conclusion and the nature of the value derived from such a 'conclusive' resolution. Put simply "all information and value is derived through a process of harmonization operating [appropriately or inappropriately] within the associated hermeneutic circle". Such value being simulated through re-simulation (and without reference to a 'that prior to such simulation' because simulation can only be a process of re-simulation!). [(23) 15]

	What is the role of metaphor in this process of harmonization, existentialization, information formation, value formation, etc? The nature of metaphor is a vexed issue and one that has preoccupied my attention for some considerable amount of time. Let me borrow from that research and produce this latest version of how metaphor functions, etc., in the process examining the nature of the metaphysical as an illogical, yet attractive, extrapolation beyond the deployment of its resident metaphor(s), etc. [(24) 16]

	As previously discussed metaphor operate through the mechanism of a conjunctive suspension (within the overall transcendental suspension of the hermeneutic circle), e.g., 'the world is like an illusion' should be translated as 'the world is both like an illusion and not like an illusion'. 'Like' is not 'is'. Hence to literalize the metaphor in this case is to say 'the world is an illusion' (which is to say something quite different and to give a completely different complexion to one's philosophical exposition if this metaphor is both resident in its construction and to be treated/mis-treated in this fashion). But, one may counter that as a metaphor it is already in a state of dialectical-like ambiguity if not self-contradiction. To say the world is 'both like and not like an illusion' is to certainly give one this impression. However, a metaphor is a 'set-up', a type of literary genre with certain conventions for interpretation already operating or, at least, operating in such a manner that they are to be seen in time operating in the manner intended, i.e., in the manner as set-up to be interpreted. So, this type of pronouncement that 'the world is like an illusion' comes with certain commentaries, expectations, qualifications, etc., etc., and in our recognition of this metaphorical context we, hopefully, go on to appropriately read the same (assuming that this relationship between metaphorical text and its meta-textual conventions is already appropriately set-up to be read in the intended metaphorical manner). When appropriately understood the metaphor is no longer perceived as paradoxical or contradictory in nature, indeed, the process is meant to illuminate the very phenomenon in question, namely, in this instance, 'the world', and be productive of an existential excess in the process. In the context of this expression 'the world is like an illusion' and our understanding of the ramifications apparently intended in its enunciation there would result a shift in our attitudes towards that phenomenon with what ever ramifications that would be expected to follow from this attitudinal shift. Metaphors are constructed in conventionally pre-determined meta-textual contexts. Essentially, this is a rhetorical exercise, i.e., a question is asked and the metaphor is its answer. Metaphors are exercised in this economy and only understood within that economy! That economy being exercised within the hermeneutic circle as examined previously in Volume I under the theoretical grid of three dialectical moments that co-define each other (and which through different directions of relative privileging/de-privileging produce distinctive forms of ordered value (such as the essential, aesthetical, ethical, pragmatical, hermeneutical and factual). The rhetorical being constructed upon a dis-conjunctive suspension, e.g., 'is the world and illusion?' means (assuming the question is properly and appropriately formulated pre-suppositionally) that the world 'either is like an illusion' 'or is not like an illusion', i.e. being answered either by the metaphorical assertion or by the negation of that metaphorical assertion. Hence there is in the answering of a question its pre-conditional preparation and  conditional transformation into a positive or negative metaphorical assertion. The formation of the question being the reverse of this process, namely, the transformation of the metaphorical conjunction into a rhetorical dis-conjunction. The third moment of our hermeneutic economy (in the formation of all forms of value, information, etc.) is a suspension of a synthesis of this two-way metaphorical-rhetorical transformational process, i.e., third moment of the existential (excess of value) is the simultaneous assertion and negation of the pre-embedded metaphorical-rhetorical correlativity, i.e., [(m-r)-(m-r)]. This moment is read non-textually as a simulation through re-simulation; the balance of all three moment giving us a not-textual reading of the metaphorical phenomenon/phenomena in question and a surplus stream of value as a result that flows back into the world through the appropriate modes of life therein invoked through that process of value formation. The satisfaction or non-satisfaction we may feel or not feel in our engagement with that text-to-hand in such a process being dependent upon the relationship between the surplus value derived from that process in the light of expectations regarding the same. [(25) 17]

	Although both the metaphorical and the rhetorical appear to be constructed in a contradictory fashion through, respectively, a conjunctive suspension and a dis-conjunctive suspension, we must assume that the adequately formulated and exercised metaphorical process and/or rhetorical process through their transformation from one to the other, and v.v, to essentially overcome the otherwise contradictory flavour presented by the initial expression of that metaphor and/or rhetoric. Indeed, a fresh metaphor can seem shocking, whereas, in contrast, an overused metaphor becomes no more than one more tired cliché. Similarly, the same question, or type of question, being asked too often would elicit the same type of response, or rather, relative non-response. Then again, one might say, that the apt use of a novel metaphor or piece of rhetoric could well be experienced as a surge of value, as a breath of fresh air whose delight interests us and motivates us to read on. That, essentially, this dialectical dance at the centre of hermeneutic economy is one that can overcome the contradictory tensions embedded in either the overt presentation of the metaphor (and the initial anxieties engendered through being both 'like and not like' a certain phenomenon) or the overt performance of a piece of rhetoric (and its anxieties engendered through the continuance of this indecisive state of the 'either/or'). When the appreciation of the metaphorical and/or the rhetorical is allowed to flow back and forth between these two moments of the metaphorical and the rhetorical and both are mutually suspended in the third, etc., an excess of value is realized whose degree either fails, meets or exceeds expectations then the degree of that 'excess' is appreciated accordingly. This expression of a surge of value further facilitating this dialectical harmonization of the metaphor and/or the rhetoric being expressed through that associated text. [(26) 18]

The hermeneutic circle as analyzed by myself consists of three moments, namely, a phenomenological moment, a hermeneutical moment and an existential moment. Now my research to date has concentrated on the first two. From an examination of the phenomenological (in its examination of the phenomenal) I perceived the need for the hermeneutical, namely, some discipline for understanding and interpreting the deposition of intentional traces upon the fabric of the world. Comments made by Deleuze, I think, can help us to understand the import of this third moment, a balance of the first and the second, the ‘suspension' of text and meta-text. As already argued by myself, the existential moment is essentially non-textual in it flavour of presentation/re-presentation. We could represent it as that type of experiential state when we are reading a text and have forgotten, more or less, that we are actually engaged in the process of reading being absorbed in that very process itself. In some measure the investment of our psychic energy meets with a harvest greater than that invested and this excess, this existential surplus, propels our reading in an absorbed and rapt fashion, This sort of simile is what I have in mind here - a moment oriented on the 'non-reading' of a text, the sort of experience where we are experiencing the simulation of the textual process qua simulation with our cognitive, conceptual concentration neither on the act of reading nor on the text itself (nor feeling a need to question what meta-textual conventions of genre are currently being invoked, etc,)! That what is being experienced here is a mode of life (or at least an embryonic mode of life) - a surplus of value that overflows into the world and deposits as intentional traces upon the fabric of the world. (1 9)*

 3.   A Concluding Observation and a Set of Questions

Deleuze's comments on a scientific literature, a philosophical literature and a literature of literature itself seem to mirror the types of literature that would appear if we were to concentrate on these three relatively fundamental moments of the hermeneutic circle as proposed by myself. They would seem to parallel respectively, the analytical-reductive, phenomenological emphasis on text (as an intentional object-state); the synthetical-reconstitutive, hermeneutical emphasis on meta-text (as an intentional field); and, the existential emphasis on an existential surplus as experienced in and through a non-textual emphasis in the process of ‘reading’ (and its implication of an existential sense of self). This surplus forms, as I have already noted, the articulation and expression of a mode of life. The literature associated with this type of experience being literature itself. Of course these distinctions can be neither absolutely defended nor should one try to do so since effectively they co-defined each other (dialectically). The hermeneutic circle is just that, a hermeneutic circle and all three moments are necessary in order to be able to have an 'emphasis' superimposed on one or two of them at the same time. In the same light the metaphorical should not be extracted and isolated from its rhetorical context, etc. (as I have argued occurs in the illegal formation of metaphysical speculation [itself divided between a privileging of 'identity' over 'difference’, or v.v.])! (20)

In this paper I have sketched out a rough guide or map for the following philosophical adventure: First, the distinction of a minor literature as proposed by Deleuze was noted. This distinction was collapsed and allowed to form my distinction of a mode of life. Then, we looked at the world of chess as an instance of the same noting in the process how various ideas can existentially overflow into the world in an immense surplus of value along with all the deposition of intentional traces such an institution seems to deliver to some degree or other as we move through this World-of-Life. Then, I asked if the religious point of view in general could be seen equally as a mode of life although troubled by the fact that a lot of religious thinking along with most schools of philosophical thought (and ideology, etc,) also seem to be unfortunately based on similar seething seas of resident contradictions, oceans of paradoxes and floods of other types of aporia, etc. Then, I noted that the Deleuzean distinctions of scientific literature, philosophical literature and literature itself might be better understood through the lens of the hermeneutic circle as proposed by myself as but dialectical aspects of the same. (21)

To conclude let me ask the rhetorical question - to what extent is our own serious thinking also based on this type of fluid-ground so overlooked by the ideological proponent of a system of thought? Are we able to discern the resident paradoxes that send us into an overdrive of dissemination, endless commentary and chatter - does such a system have any authenticity of value - or - are we forever doomed to continually re-interpret this impossible world of non-sense dressed up as rational sense?! Can we ever extricate ourselves from such an impasse, through an overall transcendental suspension, and make real sense of this Life-World, this one, wonderful World-of-Life?! (21)*

        Noel Tointon, Sydney, 6,2.04.