The Intentional Object In Yogacara Philosophy: 
A Husserlian Perspective

	In this paper I would like to try to make some sense of the perplexing complexity that I find not only in a comparative examination of the translations of specific Yogacara texts but also in this entire field in general when subjected to some form of critical, philosophical overview. In this task I find I not only have to interpret the Sanskrt text itself but also ask myself why a certain translator has adopted a certain strand of meaning at the expense of other possibilities. Often I find a translation to be technically correct on a philological level of analysis but woefully inadequate on a more philosophical level where a certain dense, rich, tight, terseness would appear to be indicated from the very nature of this type of text. Moreover, when a translator and/or author is discussing this type of philosophy I find their heavily qualified discourse often all too easily self-deconstructing on every other page. 
	From my own recent experiences of difficulty in translating this type of text it is my opinion that these more challenging segments revealed in the process of translation are in those key sections that involve a provocative intersection of metaphor and rhetoric - on one hand introducing a strange or striking phenomenal allusion, and, on the other hand creating a conventional context wherein certain rhetorical implications need to become self-evidently derived from the `about to be interpreted' use apparently intended in the utilization of that literary device. The prominent repetition of such key points of intersection without the appropriate level of hermeneutic appreciation merely reinforcing our current inability to properly grasp the textual subtlety that we should intuitively expect to find technically present in this type of text.
	With these hermeneutic difficulties in mind it is my intention in this paper to provide a provisional sketch of a critical apparatus with which we might more effectively interpret this type of text. With this scheme it is my hope to discover a greater degree of clarity and distinctness where applicable, and, when appropriate, recover a greater degree of functional-stability and richness of structural-texture. I.e., disentangle these rhetorical layers and strands in argument, and, re-integrate the miscellany of sequential metaphorical images apparently evoked within that text and invoked inter-textually.
	In my own attempts to understand this type of philosophy, and the historical differences in style and substance to be found within among its various `authors' and anonymous editors (and externally among its translators and interpreters), I have found that a transcendental-phenomenological perspective to be most helpful in clarifying the transcendental-phenomenological concerns of this type of text, in the process helping to reveal the degree of subtlety and sophistication that one would have expected to find in such an intensely debated and scholastically grounded tradition. Indeed, I would argue that such a perspective is necessary, either explicitly or implicitly, in order to begin to properly appreciate this type of text. However, I would not argue that this type of perspective is the only perspective that can illuminate this genre as various texts will often inevitably appear to address simultaneously a miscellany of additional interests, also more or less central to the nature of this genre, from the psychological to the logical, from the experiential to the soteriological.

1. Introduction To A Transcendental Phenomenology

	To introduce this aspect of my topic, on a transcendental-phenomenological reading of this type of text, let me quote the following passage from Ideas Pertaining To A Pure Phenomenology And To A Phenomenological Philosophy by Edmund Husserl as translated by F.Kersten.

On the other hand the whole spatiotemporal world, which includes human being and the human Ego as subordinate single realities is, according to its sense, a merely intentional being, thus one has the merely secondary sense of a being for a consciousness. It is a being posited by consciousness in its experiences which, of essential necessity, can be determined and intuited only as something identical belonging to motivated multiplicities of appearances: beyond that it is nothing. 

	Husserl adding in two other versions of this segment of text these additional qualifications:

that anything beyond that is a countersense/ a countersensical thought.

	The first thing I would like to note is the phenomenological reduction by Husserl of our experience of the spatiotemporal world to a state of mere intentional being. Already, a few pages earlier in this text, he has proposed the thought experiment in which the entire world is to be imagined as if it were destroyed or abolished in an effort to show the difference between transcendencies in the intentional content of thought and the immanent nature of intentionality treated as a thought-process. That on one hand we can deny the need for a corresponding object to match the intentional content of our thought processes but that we cannot deny the immanent necessity in the existence of that thought process itself. Characteristic of Yogacara texts we find a similar type of thought experiment and observation. For example in the Vimsatika by Vasubandhu we find the same philosophical conclusion that spatiotemporally constituted experience is not necessarily matched with a corresponding object (artha).

On account of the appearances of non-existent objects it is all mere consciousness only (vijnaptimatra), just like hairs, moons, etc., (which do not exist in reality) to a man with a cataract (in his eye). (1)
(Hence) no external object (artha) exists.

	In both of these translated quotations we find the use of the word mere in a context that impresses upon the reader a reduction of spatiotemporal experience to a state of intentionality only. Can we find other parallels between these two phenomenologically oriented philosophies?
	For Husserl the transcendental realm of experience is reached and entered through the use of the epoche or transcendental suspension. This use of suspension or bracketing does not destroy or deny the world, rather, it puts out of action the thesis of a transcendent world. Husserl himself tells us:

...we put all those positings "out of action," we do not "participate in them;" we direct our seizing and theoretically inquiring regard to pure absolute consciousness in its own being. That, then, is what is left as the sought-for "phenomenological residuum," though we have "excluded" the whole world with all physical things, living beings, and humans, ourselves included, strictly speaking, we have not lost anything but rather have gained the whole of absolute being which, rightly understood, contains within itself, "constitutes" within itself, all worldly transcendencies.

	In Yogacara texts the use of the concept of consciousness only (vijnaptimatra) in my opinion, among other things, puts into effect a transcendental suspension. Through a reduction to `mere intentionality' the thesis of the world is automatically suspended as a necessary precondition for such a reduction. Therein, the constitutional significance, or `sense,' of that reduced experience is mapped according to our discovery and description of those `functioning-structures' regardless of the actuality or non-actuality of that simulated, intentionally-constructed, cognitive consciousness.
	The thesis of a spatiotemporal world is put into abeyance, however, the epistemological or immanent existence of an intentional state of affairs is not put in question. Neither is the ineffable (anabhilapya) or inexpressible nature of reality (tathata) concurrently put in dispute.
	A similar suspension is also put into effect, in accordance with my understanding, when a thesis is balanced with an anti-thesis and held in a state of non-destructive accommodation. Vast tracts of certain texts influenced by, or have influenced the formation of, this tradition of the Yogacara can be read in this light of such a middle path between the extremes, e.g., The Heart Sutra, the Lankavatara Sutra, etc., a distinctive trend already pioneered in the Perfection of Wisdom literature. 

2. The Non-Idealistic Stance Of Transcendental Phenomenology

	Both philosophies have been accused of being forms of idealism. Husserl states:

If anyone reads our statements objects that they mean changing all the world into a subjective illusion and committing oneself to a "Berkeleyan idealism," we can only answer that he has not seized upon the sense of those statements.

	I am sure a Yogacara philosopher confronted by the same sort of mis-understanding would be in full sympathy with this type of comment. Indeed, this type of text continually qualifies its apparent use of a transcendental suspension (and other forms of transcendental treatment) with a variety of riders to the effect that that type of text is neither nihilistic or eternalistic in its intentions, doesn't preach some form of mere subjective illusion, etc. In the Vimsatika we find the following qualification in the form of a rectification of possible mis-understandings that might arise on this subject of mere intentional consciousness (vijnaptimatra):

If therefore, there is no object (dharmas) at all, there is not even the representation of consciousness also. (Then) how (the theory of mere consciousness) is established? The entry into the (domain) of the non-substantiality of the objects does not at all mean that there is no object altogether. But on the contrary (one enters into the domain of the non-substantiality of the objects) on account of the (absence of the) imagined nature (or character) of the object.

3. A Phenomenological Appreciation Of Metaphor

	Not all texts are overtly metaphorical, enlist the obvious use of metaphor in some form or other. For example, in the use of a telephone directory we find the use of no overt metaphor. On the other hand `meta-textually,' in its conventionally intended function, we find that type of text operates with a one to one correspondence analogically set up between a name and a number in that directory, and, that person's telephone in the real world of the telephone company. In a similar fashion the textual use of an overt metaphor is established by its conventionally established manipulation meta-textually. For example, `Richard the Lionheart' is compared to a lion(or the heart of a lion) not because he is hairy, wanders around on all four paws and eats raw meat (or pumps blood) but by virtue of his similarly perceived comparative fighting strength, bravery and courage. In other words the metaphor of the lion is conventionally manipulated in such a way that this traditional image is correctly understood when the rhetoric of the corresponding textual convention is understood. A certain genre is adopted and then adapted to the task to hand. This literary device operating in a certain rhetorical context. Indeed, in some respects we might like to perceive the overt metaphor in the text as an answer to a covert rhetorical question conducted on a meta-textual level. Moreover, striking, or relatively anomalous, metaphors are  provocative figures of speech that find a resolution in the manner in which they are apparently meant to be interpreted, the repetition and harmonization of their initial awkwardness reinforcing both this sense of resolution and their eventual conventional forming characteristics. Without some conventional appreciation a metaphor could never be interpreted either culturally or trans-culturally. In this sense a metaphor can never be read literally, or, if understood metaphorically to some degree or other and it then were to become treated literally in a uni-logical fashion it would cease to function as a metaphor. It would then present an unstable text on the verge of self-deconstruction by virtue of the fact that a metaphor as a manipulated suspension now subjected to a process of logical de-suspension would instantly start to dissolve and fall into an abyss of meaninglessness unless frozen in some form of literal straight-jacket and superficially stamped with such overt ascription. Let me elaborate further on this aspect of my phenomenological analysis of the metaphor.
	In the use of the function `like' we have `it is both like and not like.' If we say that `the world is like an illusion' we mean metaphorically that `the world is both like an illusion and is not like an illusion.' If we were to say that the world is an illusion we would mean literally that `the world is an illusion.' On the other hand the literal treatment of this metaphor `the world is like an illusion' can only save itself from this collapse in its inner state of suspension if we give to it a literal interpretation in some form or other, e.g., that the world is indeed an illusion (in much the same fashion as interpreted, e.g., by certain prominent versions of gnosticism). But we cannot have our cake and eat it at the same time. To mistreat the metaphor literally must create an unstable text unless that mis-interpretation is fixed by some act or edict of textual fiat. On the other hand the metaphor, treated as a metaphor, cannot be subjected to a simple uni-logical form of analysis. In this light if we were to state, or rather suggest, that the world is `like an illusion,' or, `like a dream,' the evaluation of the reputed truth conditions of this statement cannot be asserted in the form of `is true' or `is not true.' Correctly speaking, once we have properly understood and appreciated the rhetorical implications and consequences of this metaphor qua `metaphor' we can only give our consent to its appropriateness or non-appropriateness, i.e., express our opinion as to the pragmatic utility, or otherwise, of this figure of speech in the context of its apparently intended application and function. All this is very important in our critical evaluation of the use, or misuse, of idealistic-like metaphor in certain non-idealistically constructed philosophical settings.

4. A Phenomenological Appreciation Of The Rhetorical

	Not only is a metaphor in a state of internal suspension but the rhetorical mode is also constructed in a similar, but not identical, fashion. To begin with let me treat the meta-textual rhetoric of the metaphor, its meta-textual manipulation of the phenomenology of a metaphorical image, as a form of question in which our provoked understanding and resolution of that initial, apparent metaphorical discontinuity is so constructed so as to realize an explicit or implicit (metaphorical) answer to a certain (rhetorical) question. A philosophical text might state that `the world is like a dream.' Our appreciation of that metaphor forces us to ask `why is the world, in this text, treated as a dream?' Answer that question and you answer the parallel question `what does that metaphor mean?' whether you interpret this particular metaphor in its rhetorical context correctly or incorrectly. In order for this rhetorical context to function, i.e., to produce a meaningful metaphor, and re-produce that same meaningfulness more or less as intended, a certain conventional genre in metaphorical figures of speech must be adopted and adapted, then by the interpreter, re-adopted and re-adapted in a similar parallel fashion. The apparent harmonization experienced by the interpreter, in their appreciation of that metaphor, and the reinforcing repetition of similar patterns in provocative processes of resolution, give to that interpreter a sense of relative transparency in their textual appreciation of that text. Not that a text can be absolutely transparent! With a text, whether literary or not, we can never be sure we have even adequately de-encoded its adoption and adaptation of its relevant codes.  Neither, for that matter, can a text be absolutely opaque! Our engagement with a text, the textual `trace' of a `text' in any form whatsoever, by virtue of our `direct' engagement with that text guarantees that we must have some level and form of valid conventional understanding however adequate or inadequate our discrimination in that process of appreciation. 
	Now I would like to stress the following two points, namely, that the rhetorical can be regarded, more or less, as a manipulated conventionally-understood process of questioning of a metaphorically introduced and treated image, and, like the metaphorical the rhetorical is also in a state of suspension. Let me elaborate. In the meaningful formulation of a question, in general terms of reference and in specific terms of reference, an implicit suspension is actively engaged. `Is x like a,' means that in order to understand this question we must simultaneously entertain the disjunctive possibilities of the proposition that `x is either a or not-a.' Hence, although a question is in an implicit state of suspension like the metaphor, this state of suspension is effectively dis-conjunctive, i.e., `x is being simultaneously entertained as both a or not-a.' On the other hand a metaphor is effectively a conjunctive form of suspension, i.e., `x ix both like a and not like a.' However, this simplistic outline is complicated by the correlativity of the rhetorical and the metaphorical.
	This depth of analysis is very important for our appreciation of this type or style of philosophy, a genre that I would classify as `transcendentally phenomenological,' albeit in the more general form that I would like to re-interpret this Husserlian perspective. I have already shown that both philosophical traditions, the Yogacara and the Husserlian, don't wish to be treated as simple forms of subjective idealism. On the other hand there is no reason why idealistic metaphor cannot be (imported into or re-imported back into this type of system and) utilized in a suspended metaphorical mode of discourse. As I have already stated a transcendental mode of discourse is established through the centralized imposition of a state of transcendental suspension. Metaphor, left in a metaphorical modality, when and where appropriate, can enrich the texture of that discourse without dis-establishing the transcendental nature of that discourse. Hence, it must be obvious, that the use of idealistic-like metaphor and rhetorical procedures does not necessarily mean that the nature of that discourse is literally idealistic. Indeed, a transcendental discourse cannot be idealistic if, e.g., the notion of a world thesis, etc., is continually subjected to some form of suspension, etc. Moreover, the simple literal treatment of such devices equally cannot dis-enfranchise this state of ongoing suspension by virtue of the unstable and potentially self-deconstructive nature of our mis-reading of that `mis-treated' discourse. Without forcing it into the mould of a pre-determined interpretation such a text can only deconstruct and re-establish that suspension, albeit temporally and unstably. Moreover, an appreciation of the multi-dimensional nature of the text will, I believe, also reveal deconstructively any intentional mis-matching in non-sympathetic processes of additional textualization either commentorially surrounding that text or editorially inserted within it, and, that this level of effectively increased de-harmonization can be experienced both locally and globally within the confines of that text (and inter-textually). 
	Obviously, neither of these two traditions should be subjected to a critique as forms of idealism despite the importation of idealistic metaphor. Moreover, it is my assessment that later forms of the Yogacara tradition do appear increasingly to adopt and adapt metaphorical images and rhetorical gestures of an idealistic complexion, however, with such reservations as noted that this does not necessarily imply, at face value, an idealistic turn has been imposed, or re-imposed, on certain sections of that tradition.

5. The Phenomenological Nature Of Intentionality

	Intentionality has been defined, more or less, by Husserl as a certain disposition towards an object, namely an intentional object, a state of affairs that appears to characterize all states of conscious activity(?). The imposition of the phenomenological epoche creating a new sort of attitude that lets us engross ourselves in the essence of the consciousness of something. This new attitude allows the phenomenologist to conduct their transcendental-phenomenological investigations of intentional constitution (both structural through reduction and functional through forms of re-constitutional synthesis) under transcendental terms of reference as long as that transcendental suspension is established and maintained. Now I would like to bring to your attention that this type of philosophical tradition, whether Husserlian or Yogacara in format, is in danger of either superficially formulating itself or being simplistically read in terms of a fundamental contradiction concerning the nature and status of the intentional object. Is the intentional object an object or is not an object? If the nature of the intentional object is constituted from the perspective of a polarity, or pole, of objectivity and cannot be separated from its correlative determinants can we correctly talk about an `intentional object' as an object? Translated into an Husserlian perspective we might formulate this enquiry along the following lines: if the noetic objectivity (noema) is correlatively determined through processes of noesis can we talk about an intentional object as something distinctly separable from its noetic formation, and vice versa. Or, translated into tri-polar terms of reference of a transcendental ego, an appropriate transcendental field or world (as a background or horizon) and an intentional object, and, all three polarities constitute each other, can we talk about intentional objectivity other than as a provisional fiction? Similarly, in a Yogacara framework, if the intentional object is empty (sunya) can we truly talk about a distinct intentional object? To what extent may we correctly talk about an intentional object? Just recently I, myself, have experienced the apparent terror of this dilemma. It is all very well talking about intentional objects in one breath and to treat them in another as mere polarities in the process of intentional constitution. Just such a controversy, it appears, gripped the later Yogacara philosopher according to an article by Kennard Lipman in the journal Philosophy: East and West, Vol 32, no. 3. In this article he states:

...there is a crucial ambiguity between sakara-jnanavada and nirakara-jnanavada (or alikajnanavada), i.e., the theories that held consciousness was intentional, always containing a noema (rnam-pa, akara), and those which held that consciousness ultimately transcended intentionality, and was without a noema, i.e., does not belong to parikalpita or paratantra.
	
	Husserl, in examining his vision of the intentional process, states that:

every cogito calls for a cogitatum and insofar as this latter is related to the pure Ego in the accomplishment of an act, we find a remarkable polarity in every act: on the one side, the Ego-pole; and on the other, the Object as counter-pole.

	Just as for every noetic process there is the presence of noematic content, namely noema, in a similar fashion the polarity of the Ego-pole is matched by the polarity of the Object-pole. These two distinctly different states of bi-modal reciprocity, in my opinion, can be better harmonized by invoking a tri-polar scheme of ego, object and world (as a sense of background or horizon, a field in which different `intentional objects' can be focused upon). 
	Regardless of whether we use a bi-modal, tri-modal or even a tetra-modal scheme for the analysis of the intentional process in my opinion an unequal emphasis on one or more of these polarities in these various analogically constructed `models,' (or modes of simulation), realizes the natural attitude. On the other hand, the apparent sense of the transcendental, as a polarity in its own right, is realized when our intentional interest on all natural polarities invoked is equally weighted and suspended (through the imposition and maintenance of such an ongoing state of psychic equilibrium). In this light the senses of the `transcendental' and the `natural' likewise mutually co-define each other. Moreover, the full sense of the transcendental would then demand the complete balancing of all natural attitudes. In these realms of polar orientation, whether `within' the natural attitude or `outside' it in a transcendental frame of reference all senses of identity in their phenomenological constitution can only be provisional, polarized and ultimately unobtainable.   
	I have introduced this re-interpretation of the Husserlian perspective in order to highlight how it is possible to view, effectively in the form of a commentary, how certain bi-polar contrasts in Buddhist philosophy came to be viewed in the Yogacara tradition through the lense of a tri-modal frame of reference. E.g., what for the Yogacara is the nature of the relationship between an intentional object and any `object' it might appear to represent? What is the nature of the relationship between nirvana and samsara? What is the relationship that lets conventional truth (samvrtti) relate with ultimate truth (paramartha)? What is the nature of the hermeneutic relationship between direct meaning (nitartha) and indirect meaning (neyartha)? What is the relationship between that grasped (grahya) and the grasper (grahaka), etc., etc?
	With respect to the intentional object the concept of consciousness only, or mere consciousness (vijnaptimatra), through its suspension and reduction to mere intentionality, in the Yogacara tradition appears to recognize that this dichotomy is more apparent than real. In our intentional relationship with a certain type of intentional object we stand, correctly, in a direct relationship with that type of intentional object. How otherwise could we stand in relation to a certain object if we were not somehow directly in a relationship with it? Therefore, in a perceptual relationship we stand in a direct relationship with the perceptual object. In a dream state we stand in a direct relationship with the dream objects experienced in that state of dream. When we think about a certain state of affairs or remember a certain state of affairs we stand in a direct relationship with that object being thought about or remembered. How do we know we are experiencing a perceptual object or a dream object, an object of mere thought or of memory? Certainly not through some form of correspondence that allows us to mysteriously perceive some erie replica of what that object in the first place was but now merely represented through some form of simulation. When all phenomena are in a state of phenomenological simulation we can only compare one process of simulation and its noematic content with some other process of simulation and its noematic content. By examining the functional and structural constitution of certain phenomenal presentations or processes through an in depth inspection of the differential texture discovered in this state of reflection only then can we can find ourselves in a situation to better appreciate the nature of that type of intentionality under current examination. In the final analysis this type of approach effectively taking a pragmatic turn; an intentional orientation that finds itself interested in the fruitful functioning of that phenomenological event or situation.
	Very early on in the practical beginnings of the Yogacara tradition Vasubandhu in the Trimsatika, following on from the phenomenological treatment espoused in the Vimsatika, in his doctrine of the three natures (trisvabhava) appears to recognize a need for some form of mediation in dichotomous states that, in some form or other, appear to parallel and relate to each other. If I am correct in my speculative reading of Vasubandhu's motivation on this type of topic it would appear that early on in this tradition, and not later (as previous claimed by Kennard Lipman), some form of middle ground had to be indicated in order to phenomenologically relate these forms of non-symmetrical parallelism. If I am correct this doctrine is but one attempt to indicate the nature of this relationship between these parallel polar artifacts of our intentional processes. Let me spell out more specifically what is meant here.
	From the natural, non-transcendental point of view we can provisionally assume the intentional object exists through the directness of our relationship with it. However, from the transcendental point of view, through its polarized constitution in a phenomenological field, we can make no such claim. From the transcendental perspective the intentional object is quite correctly unobtainable. How then do we relate these two seemingly irreconcilable spheres of the transcendental and the natural? Quite simply we declare these two dimensions as correlative; mutually polarized and co-determining, and, consequently, equally unobtainable in their own right! In the shadow of their shadow we then invoke one sole dimension and declare that this realm of phenomenological experience, this world-of-life, or life-world, can be viewed from either a transcendental perspective or a non-transcendental `natural' perspective. Hence these tri-modal terms of reference, in my opinion, is in effect an attempt to resolve this very dilemma as to whether the noetic act has true noematic content, and, whether intentionality is appreciated intentionally or trans-intentionally.

6. Some Practical Consequences of a Transcendental Position?

	Before I conclude I would like to discuss some of the consequences I believe follow on from this type of tri-modal/tri-polar transcendental-phenomenological reading.
	One consequence of this type of position is that this genre of philosophy argues for a non-correspondence theory of perception and truth evaluation; that essentially such a position is a type of pragmatism with certain qualified apodictic-like features. Let me explain.
	Through the invocation of a `direct' experience of perceptual phenomena, etc., it could be argued that a valid perception of phenomena is not only possible but actually realizable in all forms of perception given an appropriate and adequate degree of transcendental-phenomenological reflection, examination and retrospective verification. That given the correct phenomenological procedures we should at least arrive at a position when we can tell whether we have valid or invalid grounds for our specific evaluations, or, whether we have, currently, insufficient grounds for that degree of appreciation. 
	Then, given that processes of transcendental  reflection, etc., demand the imposition of a thorough transcendental suspension it would follow, from the phenomenological nature of this demand, that the middle ground between, e.g., theory and practice, and, subject and object, etc., must likewise be under a state of suspension and therein allowed to reveal itself through processes of resolution between those non-symmetrical forms of parallelism. At least directness of perception must establish, and self-establish, some grounds for the verification of those perceptual-like states, etc. Moreover, our hermeneutic interpretation of these `texts' will never find a text that is absolutely opaque nor absolutely transparent! In effect always presenting some grounds for experiencing the potential authenticity of a textual reading of that particular phenomenon.
	It would also follow that overcoming and transcending the apparent dichotomy between theory and practice, subject and object, subject and other subjects, etc., must also put into effect the possibility of eliciting a response that is perfectly appropriate, or at least effectively appropriate, in that particular situation. I have in mind here an epistemological basis for the concept of skillful means (upaya). That a refinement of methods would allow the intuitively directed transformation of inauthentic modes of being into authentic modes of being (on the grounds that inauthentic modes of being could never be completely inauthentic, and, that a transformation of the inauthentic into the authentic merely implies putting in place a refinement of the latter).
	That, overall, we could characterize this type of religious-philosophy as fundamentally pragmatic, and not dependent on a correspondence theory; accepts some form of direct perception; accepts some form of transcendence of the intentional object per se; and, is able to draw a distinction between forms of authenticity and inauthenticity and offer methods for the transformation of the latter into the former?

7. Conclusion

	To conclude I would like to summarize the main points presented in this paper, collectively incorporating these provisional insights as a critical apparatus for dealing with texts characterized by a transcendental phenomenological complexion.
	First, in my opinion this type of philosophy effectively takes a transcendental-phenomenological approach, and, therefore, any valid, meaningful translation and interpretation of its key terms, etc., must recognize those transcendental terms of reference.
	Second, in this light the expression vijnaptimatra in its phenomenological treatment as `mere(ly intentional) consciousness' should be viewed as a form of transcendental suspension and reduction.
	Third, as a consequence of its transcendental-phenomenological treatment it must be considered neither proper nor appropriate to view this type of philosophical enterprise in a realistic or idealistic perspective or any other non-suspended, non-transcendental `natural' perspective.
	Fourth, on the other hand recognizing the internal suspension resident in metaphorical and rhetorical modes of treatment it does not follow that the importation of such devices functioning in such modalities as the natural, idealistic, realistic, etc., necessarily means that the fundamental transcendental complexion of this type of philosophy is compromised.
	Fifth, the nature of a transcendental philosophy implies that the effective and fully functioning suspension of the natural attitude demands that all dichotomous forms of non-symmetrical parallelism be reduced to some form of mediating middle ground that through suspension merely creates a change of sign, a process of transcendental valuation provoked through processes of resolution, a release of authenticity through some form of a transformation of the relatively inauthentic.
	Sixth, that the transcendental suspension of all polarities, e.g., self and non-self, theory and practice, means and ends, etc., merely allows the response of the person, in such a state of relative and effective authenticity, through forms of resolution to appropriately respond to the phenomenological nature of that experiential situation? Hence, by these means, both theoretical and practical, we might be able to make some `sense' of the sort of claims made on the behalf of Bodhisattvas, Buddhas (and transcendental-phenomenologists).

8. Some Final Comments

	Essentially, the easy part has now been finished and the hard part is yet to begin! How are we to phenomenologically and transcendentally relate the miscellany of Sanskrt terms and expressions that can be seen to be relatively near this broad phenomenological concept of the intentional object, e.g., artha, visaya, vastu, dharma, abhasa, prati-bhasa, etc. But this more difficult task will have to be conducted at some future point in time. 

						Noël Tointon, Sydney, 9.7.94.

Endnotes