Beyond Therapy: A Set of Essays
On Miscellaneous Topics in Psychology and Psychiatry (2001-2003)

IV. An Exploration of Co-Authored Phenomena:
Part I - Reflections on Freud, Freud's Critics, Recovered Memories and Hysteria

0. Introduction

	In the first essay of this series I criticised much of the Freudian project, using, in particular, the work of  H.J.Eysenck and Richard Webster. In doing research for this essay I came to the conclusion that one of the best ways of presenting this topic of co-authored phenomena would be to offer the following reflections on some of the conclusions arrived at in this first essay (not counting the brief introductory essay to this series titled Psychiatric Dis-Ease). Let me now introduce this concept of co-authored phenomena by critically reflecting on certain aspects of the work of Freud, and, the work of some of Freud's critics that touch upon the phenomena of recovered memories and hysteria. Both phenomena are considered by myself to be co-authored in nature to some degree in most instances. (1)

	A co-authored phenomenon is the manufacture of a text, or set of texts, with the assistance of more than one person. E.g, two or more people writing a book together, or, the hypnotist and their hypnotised subject where the former heavily influences, if not controls, texts emitted by the latter. These two examples, just noted, exemplify this type of phenomenon (and will serve as archetypal examples against which my research examined in the two parts of this essay must be able to equally account for). This type of phenomenon ranges from the co-authorship of a certain activity (like the writing of a book), the work of a committee, etc., through to including the recounting of past live experiences, alien abductions, recovered memories, satanic-ritual abuse, certain forms of hysteria, multi-personalities, etc., etc. (2)

In this task I am not out to disprove the apparent reality of their phenomenal content, e.g., the apparent reality of past live experiences and the possibility of their being able to be recounted. Neither, on the other hand, am I out to prove their existence, i.e., the purported validity of their content. Rather, the phenomenon is to be accepted as a phenomenon qua phenomenon, i.e., in a (transcendental) phenomenological mode of exploration in which our only interest is in the distinctive configuration of that phenomenon in its apparent generality. (3)

	I will treat all these multi-authored forms of textuality in a transcendental phenomenological framework, i.e., as intentionally formed phenomena, and, in a critical philosophical manner that accepts the need for the adoption of a transcendental suspension, etc. A transcendental suspension is a technical term borrowed from the work of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) where we suspend, or bracket, the phenomenal appearance of the phenomenon under examination. By this I mean, we put our of action the bias of our prejudices that we bring to bear upon a certain topic, the use of our prejudices as pre-judgments helping to bring us to the very phenomenological edges that locate this topic under current review (which, indeed, psychically locate its sense in our mapping of the life-world - our subjective-intersubjective world of lived-experience) but which need to be put to the side once we enter into our critical reflections upon the phenomenological form or constitution of that topic, i.e., its appearance as it presents itself to us. In this suspension we suspend all forms of value judgment, e.g, as to whether the phenomenon actually exists or does not exist; whether we have correctly categorised or described the intentional objects (or states) thought to be present in this type of experience; whether it should be regarded as beautiful or not beautiful; whether it should be regarded as ethically good or not good; whether it should be regarded as pragmatically valuable or useful, or not so valuable or useful; whether our overall interpretation should be regarded as valid or not valid, etc. In this regard I am not saying that these types of phenomena are false or invalid, etc., or true or valid, etc., only that they will be treated in such a manner that value questions will not be directly brought into play in our phenomenological explorations of this topic (a task achieved through analytical examinations and/or synthetical investigations of these phenomenal presentations, or, rather, re-presentations in order to be differentiated from representations fabricated in a representational mode of so-called 'empirical' treatment). (4)

	To summarise let me say that I will be exploring the topic of co-authored phenomena, i.e., those phenomena whose textual deposition involves the intentional cooperation of more than one author. This will be done in a transcendental phenomenological mode through the suspension, etc., of all forms of value judgments. Hence the existence or non-existence, validity, non-validity, etc., of the apparent phenomenal content of these phenomena will not be directly explored in this paper. Instead, what will be explored is the appearance of that phenomenon as it presents itself to us, i.e., an exploration of what is essentially distinctive to that type of experience. Let me start with a resolution of the problem that asks "is there a text that is not co-authored?" (5)

1. When is a Text Authored/Not Co-Authored?

	All thinking is 'contaminated' by language which is an intersubjective affair. What we can do in this world has already been predetermined to a considerable extent through the cultural lens of society, a fact reflected in language. All genres of activity have been meta-textually articulated through the communal nature of our existence in the world. So if I want to write a letter I must first re-adopt the meta-textual conventions of a letter and then re-adapt them to the nature of my task to hand. So, e.g., I want to write a business letter and not a love letter, in the process adapting my re-adoption of this genre of activity to the nature of this particular task to hand. On the other hand, although I have borrowed from the meta-texutal conventions of writing a (business) letter, the intentionally deposited textual content of that letter was determined by myself in this instance. Not asking someone to help me write this letter I can say safely, at least to myself, it was then written by me and in this regard was not co-authored. So the question now becomes "how can we determine if a text is authored or co-authored?" (1)

	In this light let us reflect upon the fact that many a scholarly text in its foreword, preface or introduction has the author thanking a miscellany of people who have had a direct or an indirect influence upon the writing of that text. So perhaps this question should be "when is a text not co-authored"? (2)

	My solution to this problem is that from a phenomenological examination of the genre invoked we should be able to tell whether its was either authored or co-authored, or, from a general appreciation of the genre that it might be either authored or co-authored. The textual deposit of a letter, e.g., presents us with a text that from a superficial appreciation could be either authored or co-authored. On the other hand if we look more closely at the meta-textual conventions re-adopted and re-adapted we might find ourselves in a position to adequately judge the probability that it was either written by one author or by more than one. We look at the signature at the bottom of the letter and if we find one person has signed then we might conclude, knowing that that letter writer had the ability to write that letter by themself, that it could have been written by just that one person. Then again if we find more than one signature appended to that text then we might like to assume that the writing of that letter must have most likely enlisted the assistance of more than one author, namely, those who added their signature to it. On the other hand the minutes of a meeting although written by one person being the report of a committee would be correctly co-authored in orientation. (3)

	So my reasoning is this. To establish authorship or co-authorship we look more closely at the specific nature of that genre re-adopted and re-adapted in order to determine whether that genre is usually authored, co-authored or could be either authored or co-authored. With this insight to hand, it is my argument that a number of textual phenomena are normally and characteristically conducted with co-authored intent even though this co-authored input may be overlooked in an initial appreciation of the content of that type of textual phenomenon. In this light I would argue, e.g., that most past live accounts elicited through the use of a hypnotist are essentially co-authored phenomena and need to be treated as such unless strong hermeneutical reasons can be found to persuade us to treat that type of text otherwise. In a similar fashion I would regard recovered memories and many instances of hysterical phenomena to be also essentially co-authored phenomena. That one can make this phenomenological observation not through the exercise of a value judgment but from a careful phenomenological assessment of its meta-textual nature as reflected in and through its textual form, formation and content. (4)

	Once we have accept this co-authorship of certain phenomena and, indeed, certain 'types' of phenomena then I am now in a position to critically re-evaluate certain aspects of the work of Freud and certain aspects of his critics who essentially make the same type of mistake by overlooking the co-authored nature of phenomena in question. Let me elaborate. First let me look at the phenomenon of hysteria or hysterical phenomena, and second, let me look at recovered memories. (5)

2. Re-Interpreting Hysteria and Recovered Memories as 
Co-Authored Phenomena

	Richard Webster in his book Why Freud was Wrong: Sin, Science and Psychoanalysis notes, as have many others, that hysteria as a phenomenon seems to have disappeared. Let me summarize what this author, and others, seem to think on this intriguing topic. (1)

	Often medical phenomena ‘disappear’ when they are re-differentiated in the light of better diagnostic practice. This would seem to have happened in this instance. The hysterical condition as diagnosed by Charcot, et al, would seem to have been a misunderstanding of a certain form of epileptic illness, namely, temporal lobe epilepsy. Sometimes this type of fit results in a sensation of the lower gut moving (in women interpreted as the ‘womb’) rising to a tight ball in the throat with other aspects associated with an epileptic aura. It was only in the 1940’s that this type of fit could be identified with the use of the electroencephalogram. In an era that knew little about germs before the work of Pasteur, could not differentiate (numbness and paralysis), e.g., (in) multiple sclerosis from extremely rare forms of hysterical conversion, and, was inclined to psychoanalyze every other condition, (including certain neurological conditions even though apparently saturated with organic features, e.g., brain trauma, tertiary syphilis ) perhaps Freud could be partially forgiven for being in tune with the spirit of his time. But we should not be so charitable with proponents of psychoanalytical practice who still argue for the relevancy of much of what Freud did when the philosophical and medical grounds upon which it was based are now no longer in existence! (2)

	Now, it may well be that some instances of hysteria can be analysed out of existence, as hysterical, by discovering a medical cause such as temporal lobe epilepsy of the form just described, or, being recognized as a feature of multiple sclerosis involving the loss of power in a limb, or some other medical condition, but I think Richard Webster et al, and Freud, are collectively wrong if they regard hysterical phenomena (etc.) as an authored phenomenon when the same phenomenon, in my opinion, should be considered as most likely co-authored in nature! Indeed, it is my belief that hysterical phenomena are not so much internal to the psycho-physical organism as being certain types of textual artefacts of certain fault-lines in our inter-personal relationships. For what ever reason, hysterical phenomena are generally invoked from a pre-established repertoire of co-authored activity. In effect an hysterical genre is adopted and adapted be it the paralysis of a limb to fainting to a whole village (or a considerable segment of it) falling into a state of trance as has been witnessed and sociologically described in Bali, e.g. This might also explain the epidemic-like nature of this type of phenomenon and the equally rapid disappearance of the same as seemed to have occurred in the 'genre' of hysteria. So, in the place of the former, hysteria, e.g., we now appear to have had the rapid appearance of new genres such as people who believe they have been abducted by alien spaceships; have recovered memories of abuse in childhood; or worse, have been abused in satanic ritual cults; have multiple personalities, etc. Now, it may well be the case that certain medical conditions might be responsible for, or at least implicated in, this type of activity, such as various types of personality disorders, or, those phenomena actually occurred as represented, but regardless of these possibility these types of activity should, in my opinion, be still regarded as essentially co-authored in their formation if they cannot be shown to be otherwise! (3)

	Hysteria was long thought to be the disease of women, attributed by Hippocrates to the movement of the womb (hystera). Recently, as a medical term, it has lost ground for much the same reasons as the topic of neurosis seems to have left the stage in our post-post-Freudian world. However, there is a residue, I believe, can and should be salvaged in the light of this work on co-authored phenomena. In the recent past hysteria has been classified under the headings of a personality disorder, a conversion process and as a dissociative phenomenon. Although I am of the opinion that personality disorders do have a part to play in hysterical phenomena this paper is suggesting that the essential nature of this broad type of phenomenon is neither necessarily nor directly dependent upon either a psychic aspect or a physiological aspect of the psycho-physical organism that constitutes our sense of being-an-embodied-person-in-the-world. As a conversion process, through processes of repression, suppression or for what ever other reason, psychic conflicts are translated to a physical sphere in the form of paralysis, fainting, and other psychosomatic like phenomena. Perhaps in a more extreme form of psychic conflict, of a form that finds less resolution, we get dissociative phenomena like fugue states, loss of memory, trances, multiple personalities, etc. This expression also has a non-medical sense as expressed in the connotations of ‘being hysterical’. It should also be noted that a marked change of character is often indicative of an organic psychosis of some form effecting the brain. In my use of the term I wish to restrict it to those phenomena that appear to be covered by conversional and dissociative states keeping in mind that the hysterical nature, once given expression, is often in keeping with contemporary and not so contemporary genres of ‘fashionable adoption’ as developed or developing in a cultural sense of our lived-space (now given a vastly extended range through the saturation of a culture by the media in all of its electronic and non-electronic forms). (4)

	Let me now take a brief look at the recovered memory syndrome. Taking a neutral transcendental phenomenological position I am not saying that recovered memories might be or might not be actual memories that have been recovered, what I am saying, though, is that we should at least take a cautious approach through this controversial minefield by being on the lookout for possible co-authored causation, in part or in whole, in the formation of what appears to be the assisted recovery of memory, or, perhaps, in some instances, the over-assisted recovery of so called 'memories'. (5)

	Certain presuppositions must be found already in place, or be put in place, in –order to operate and run an argument for the therapeutic recovery of repressed memories, namely, the acceptance of the existence and validity of repressed memories, the possibility of their relatively accurate recovery, and, that a therapeutic environment results as a consequence of that practice of recovery; the same set of preconditions more or less argued for in Freudian psychology or some other psychoanalytic tradition. Personally, I believe, that traumatic and unpleasant non-traumatic memories are not repressed but more generally avoided in the long term and, in the short term, if cannot be currently avoided, are almost obsessively confronted until such a time their reason for being is satisfactorily resolved, or, in the goodness of time, we are able to more on either through a successful form of distraction or through the normal dictates and pressures of our human existence. However, as argued in my paper ‘on the existence or non-existence of the neurotic condition’, the third essay in this series, the presence of extreme stress over a relatively long period of time experienced in an unresolved manner for the individual can shift their response to the same from a neurotic type of reaction to one of a more psychotic nature. In such a transformation one might well be able then to argue for forms of dissociation in our various senses of self and overall sense of self that could produce and reproduce repressed like phenomena and the development of multiple personalities, other forms of dissociative phenomena whose expression will remain, however, primarily co-authored despite tracing or scarring the psycho-physical dimension(s) of our psycho-physical being and therein simulating such secondary phenomena. But this extremely rare set of adverse preconditions and conditions normally does not occur, certainly not to the extent that would allow epidemics of these types of ‘co-authored phenomena’ to be seen to the extent that they do. Keeping this type of minor qualification in mind, which will be looked at in some depth in Part II of this essay, let me continue. (6)

	At this juncture we might like to give to Freud the following award, namely, the title 'the father of all recovered memories'. It has been noted by a number of authors that Freud consistently browbeat his patients, especially women, into finally changing their opinions as to 'what must have happened in the past' along those lines he felt his theories would predict on such artificial a priori grounds. So, if a woman was considered neurotic and/or hysterical it was because she was abused, sexually or non-sexually, as a child, and/or, was a practising masturbator who should therapeutically admit to such a practice and should show no more resistance to the therapeutic guidance of her psychoanalytical therapist in this regard by admitting to such and/or confessing to such practices, etc.  (7)

	In a number of experiments it has been shown that memories are more malleable than is generally given credit for. A number of people who are eye-witnesses to the same incident often give different accounts and interpretations of the same event. Moreover, in interviewing people, people can change 'their minds' under intentional pressure or unintentional pressure from their interviewer(s). Certain recollections, and their self-interpretations, can be thrown into doubt by the suggestion of doubt expressed by the interviewer. Then, they may wish to please their interviewer by modifying the account of their recollections, or, recast their recollections in a form that they think is more consistent with the recollections on the same subject as expressed by a group privy to the same set of experiences, etc. Then again, as memory is not a window, or a photograph, but the active reconstruction of events with a filling in of detail it follows that in the assisted recovery of memory the nature of that interviewing process should be recorded in adequate detail and depth in order to extricate itself from charges that a manipulation of this reconstruction and its fine detailing took place rather than its neutral assistance being merely facilitated. Importantly, the interviewing technique should be as free of co-authorial pressure as possible. How is this neutral interviewing technique to be achieved? Is it possible to achieve some form of an interventional neutrality in conducting an interview? (8)

	One of my friends is doing a study on adult survivors of abusive family situations where the gamut of abuse covers the range from sexual abuse to physical violence to forms of psychological pressure inappropriately imposed upon the children by members of their family. This person's modus operandi is to let these people tell their own stories with as little prompting as possible over a series of interviews. Moreover, these stories are also checked out in parallel with documentation that might actively support the reported presence of possible abuse, such as documented by social workers' reports, incidents of police interventions, comments to this effect by teachers, close relatives, etc. On the whole I am told that these memories needed no prompting and that the continual, often unexpected richness of vivid detail bespoke of events that actually happened. The resilience of these 'survivors' was also a feature to be noted and my friend reports that only one interviewed person, out of nearly two dozen, in her opinion, seemed to be contriving stories or excessively and inconsistently embellishing them. This researcher informs me that this particular case-study will not be included in her writing up of these interviews in a final report (and only its absence will be noted for the reasons just mentioned). (9)
	Besides letting the person tell their story with as little intervention of the interviewer as possible other techniques could include finding an awareness of the bias that might be present and neutralizing it in and through the use of transcendental suspensions as previously mentioned. E.g., a certain question might have been asked which could then be followed by asking the opposite, or, that question itself could be subjected to a process of enquestioning, or, that line of approach could then be re-adopted at a later point in time from a slightly different angle in order to ascertain if the original story provided is not contradicted by later versions; that these stories essentially contain core-invariances that allow us to migrate from one version to another without a great loss of detail, etc., perhaps revealing real personal ambivalences on the part of that story teller, etc. Each story teller, each story-line demanding the appropriate treatment on the part of the interviewer whose role is not so much to interview but to act as an elicitor of information in distinction to an actively involved producer/reproducer of information. Essential to this task one also needs to note the nature of the formation of this information because an examination of that formation should reveal the degree of authorship and/or co-authorship that was present in its manufacture and dissemination. Lastly, content should be subjected to hermeneutic techniques of interpretation and interpretative evaluation of its apparent existential richness (looking at themes, consonant background re-occurrences, dialectical contrasts, provocative elements and forms of resolution, evaluations of resolutional successfulness adopted by the text and/or hermeneut, etc.) along with the invocation of clear rules of evidence when and where they are called for (e.g., in empirically testing the validity of past life accounts that appear to be testable in those terms of reference). Moreover, one's own readership or reception of those texts can also be examined - looking at how that text came to be understood and critically appreciated in and through re-reading, reflection, cross-reference with other associated texts, etc. (10)

	An examination of the interplay between interviewer and interviewed, i.e., the formation or presentation of that text or set of texts, is important in our research in order to ascertain the apparent degree of authorship and/or co-authorship involved in the formation of that text or set of texts. Then the essential nature of that formation should be documented in order to assist a later researcher, or the same researcher at a later date, to ascertain the nature of this mix apparently involved in the realization of this documented interview process. (11)

	In looking at transcripts, e.g., of past-life accounts conducted under hypnosis, I am often made aware of the fact of a marked co-authorial pressure being created by the 'interviewer', in this case the hypnotist-as-interviewer, and, that in turn, this pressure is answered by a co-authorial filling in of the spaces by the interviewee, as if one were metaphorically joining the dots. E.g., the hypnotist might say "are you experiencing a past life situation?". In reply the hypnotized subject might say "yes". Then the next few questions inevitably ask: "where are you, in what period of time do you seem to be, what is your gender, what is happening to you, how do you feel, etc? And from there you can see the entire text is being co-authorially pressured to answer a yes or no to such questions or to a filling in of the details required by the question. Often, if not always, imaginative detail is supplied by the interviewee but 'information' of a quality which often fails to bespeak of the existential richness of reality as it would be if constituted by reality itself rather than constituted in the imagination on the behalf of the same regardless of whether this constitution by proxy is apparently constructed in good faith or otherwise, formed in intentional consciousness with or without an intent to deceive. I have read that insurance assessors are more inclined to believe unbelievable stories and suspect more believable accounts.  In this light I am also reminded of the following anecdote. (12)

	An historically minded friend of mine was apparently recounting his understanding of the nature of Mongol warfare when one of those people present listening to this paper proffered the following interesting piece of information "that he, in a past life, had been one of those Mongol marauders". Well, this discussion was now about to enter a whole new dimension and everyone's attention was fixed on what revelations might be bought to bear by this rather quiet person who had to this point in time not contributed to this discussion. When, however, this person could not even imaginatively recount what it might have been like to have been there… the smell of hundreds of horses, the dust, the flies, what was eaten on a daily basis… the audience questioning him found his 'first-hand account' as ‘suspect’ to be quite charitable in this regard. Although not present at this meeting, I believe this person, who claimed to be a Mongol in a past life, suffered from some type of a psychosis and from a metaphorical-like identification of what it might be like to have been there, as imaginatively reconstructed by the author of this paper, then automatically subsumed that identification literally, but, also in a most unimaginative, uninformative fashion. (13)

	The point, or phenomenological observation, that I am trying to make here is that although some 'recovered memories' may be 'memories that are recovered', and, some forms of 'hysteria' might be symptoms of underlying medical disorders of a physical nature, it is my belief that co-authored causation would be a better account of the general phenomenological nature of these types of phenomena when those exceptions are duly noted! Moreover, this type of research should take this co-authored option into account. What advantages result from this type of interpretation? (14)
	For a start, treated as phenomena in a transcendental-phenomenological account allows us, in some measure, to circumvent the controversial nature of how the content of these experiences is to be treated and interpreted. E.g., in recovered memories of sexual abuse our philosophical concern is not with the reality or non-reality of the content of that phenomenological experience but, rather, with the form and the nature of its formation, i.e., the nature of its phenomenological presentation (and the phenomenological nature of its reception). Then, through an examination and investigation of the phenomenological nature of its form, formation and content allows us to ask whether the phenomenon in question is primarily authored or co-authored in intentional consciousness. Lastly, a co-authored reading of that phenomenon then allows us to note the primary causation of that phenomenon to have been directly inter-personal rather than relatively internal to the psycho-physical organism itself. By such means, hopefully, critically clarifying these miscellaneous fields. (15)

	In this light, once we have established a primary co-authorial causation we can note the following consequences this can have for our research. (16)

3. Some Provisional Conclusions

	For a start, if the causation of a phenomenon is co-authored, there is no point in looking for the direct cause or causes of its manifestation in the psyche of an individual (pace Freud) or in the physical constitution of the same (pace Webster) once all these internal, and external environmental, causes can be effectively ruled out. In other words, co-authored phenomena inhabit an interpersonal/cultural type of experiential space that cannot be directly reduced to psychic aspects or physical aspects of our psycho-physical constitution, nor, to external environmental factors. (1)

	That if a co-authored causation can be demonstrated it should be accepted as the prime focus for our research until such a time it can be demonstrated to have been otherwise. So, e.g., in accepting a co-authored causation for hysterical phenomena we must look for the locus of this type of phenomenon in an interpersonal cultural type of experiential space. (2)

	Once a co-authored causation is accepted this complex form of intentionality then needs to be examined and investigated in the light of a critical transcendental phenomenological perspective noting the parties involved and the phenomenological nature of their interaction. Treated as a phenomenon qua phenomenon implies a phenomenological style of examination and investigation with its emphasis of interest on the configuration of that event-type hence our concern with its form, formation, the essential nature of its contents, but not the reality of that content (and the nature of its reception in intentional consciousness). (3)

	A concentration of our attention on the nature of the meta-textual genre or genres adopted and adapted in the causation of that co-authored event in the context of current psycho-social trends helping us to determine whether it is a fashionable contemporary phenomenon or a relatively non-fashionable non-contemporary phenomenon. This insight helps us to account for the epidemic-like nature of certain culturally determined co-authored phenomena, e.g., non-contemporary hysterical phenomena, and, various contemporary forms of co-authored phenomena, e.g., the false memories syndrome, alien abductions, fantastic accounts of satanic ritual abuse with no physical evidence, i.e., the non-discovery of the sacrificed corpses of babies, etc. (4)

	An understanding of co-authored phenomena helping the therapist, etc., to properly understand the nature of the condition when its manifestation is causing problems for that person and/or those individuals closely interacting with them an/or their community. In this day and age contemporary forms of co-authored phenomena are often treated as therapeutic practices in their own right hence e.g., past life therapy. Then, if this form of treatment is not therapeutically successful and instead is actually psychologically harmful we then get post-contemporary-co-authored phenomenal forms of therapy. So, people experiencing the revelation of adverse recovered memories often need to be inserted into a therapeutic program dealing specifically with particular issue using recovered memory practices as a therapeutic tool in  its own right… which then in turn may call for a form of post-contemporary CAP (co-authored phenomena) therapy in order to recover from the previous form of ‘therapy’. In this light I might also add that some people are of the opinion that all forms of therapy are more often than not of an equal merit because of natural remission, placebo effects, positive psychological benefits arising merely through being taken attention of by medical staff and therapists, etc. (5)
	
	Lastly, such knowledge and insights can help us deal more effectively with questions and consequences raised by the same, such phenomena often impinging on matters that deal with the sense, meaning and meaningfulness of our lives in this world-of-life, this life-world! (6)

4. A Preview of Part II

	In the second half of this essay I will look more closely at co-authored phenomena in particular paying attention to 'recovered memories', 'alien abductions', 'ritual satanic abuse', etc., in order to obtain a deeper understanding of the essential nature of these types of cultural phenomena. (1)

	On an even deeper phenomenological level of exposition the relationship between the psycho-physical dimensions of our subjectivity and the objective-environmental dimension and the co-authored intersubjective dimension will also be looked at more closely exploring in what manner intentional traces can be found mirrored between them, etc. (2)

	In preparation for the fifth essay in this series, Deception and Self-Deception, I will then move my attention to 'multiple personalities' and from a neutral middle position in this controversial topic, propose that the same can be explained, in part, by reference to a form of a virtual co-authored causation wherein within the psyche multiple senses of self can interact with various degrees of self-awareness re ‘each other’ although not ruling out non-virtual co-authored influences also being at work in the presentation of this type of virtual co-authored phenomenon (when different parts of the brain can be ostensively shown to function in the manifestation of specific characters maintained by the psyche functioning with a multi-personality complex). This work helping to model and explain the philosophical puzzle “how we are able to lie?” and “how is it that we are also able to deceive ourselves?” as found in delusional states, fictitious medical disorders, etc. (3)

	This series of essays then contributing new insights on the nature and role of therapy in general and in particular as discussed in the final essay titled Beyond Therapy. (4)

	That certain phenomena, of a co-authored causation, should not be seen as directly inhabiting either a psychic or physical aspect of the psycho-physical organism (that constitutes our overall sense of self-as-an-embodied-person-in-the-life-world), nor, should they be primarily located in an external environmental sphere, but, should be regarded as occurrences that occupy an intersubjective experiential realm that ‘locates’ our interpersonal and cultural life! (5)

						   	  Noël Tointon, Sydney, 13.4.02.