Beyond Therapy: A Set of Essays
On Miscellaneous Topics in Psychology and Psychiatry (2001-2003)

IV. An Exploration of Co-Authored Phenomena:
Part III- A Phenomenological Examination of Virtual Co-Authored Phenomena?

0.   Introduction

	In Part II I proposed the need to make a distinction between non-virtual (in effect 'actual') co-authored phenomena and virtual co-authored phenomena. My  reasoning for making this distinction is briefly summed up in the following argument-process. From the position of a transcendental suspension my interest in examining reports of alien abduction is not to ascertain the reality or non-reality of any of those reports in particular but to examine them in general as a distinctive phenomenon, or as a set of distinctive phenomena. It was argued that if three to six million Americans, or any other large number, truly believe they have been victims of alien abductions then logistics alone would seem to discount the large majority from being in conformity with 'reality' (as intersubjectively conceived and inventoried) especially given the dearth of 'evidence' in most of those 'situations'. Moreover, from an understanding of this phenomenon as we cannot argue that a hypnotist-investigator was involved in the majority of these reports so we cannot claim that this type of person implanted these 'false memories' to that effect, yet, on face value, they seem to be a similar sort of phenomenon, i.e., a co-authored phenomenon. In this light, as the former seem to be generated as a co-authored (pseudo-psychotic) process I have argued that the same applies to the latter but without the active actual involvement of an agent or agents, at least initially, who would implant this idea and then foster it. Rather this idea is fostered between miscellaneous senses of self in the virtual space of the psyche itself (as pertains to that individual). Then, thereafter,  it may be fostered by hypnotist-investigators (in a non-virtual pseudo-psychotic fashion), by a group of similar minded individual(-believer)s in an non-virtual non-psychotic fashion, or further self-amplified in a non-psychotic fashion, through some form of self-hypnosis in a virtual pseudo-psychotic fashion, or, psychotically fashioned in some psychotic form or other (e.g., schizophrenia, affective -psychosis, personality disorder, etc.). As this model of a virtual co-authoring (in a psychotic form) has been suggested by myself for understanding a classical multi-personality disorder I would like in this paper to investigate the apparent phenomenology of a multiple-centred dissociative disorder to see if this hypothesis of a virtual component is not only theoretically probable but is also a useful tool for making sense of this dissociative 'hysterical'-like activity. Then, assuming some progress in this investigative task I would like to see if this same model can be applied to help us understand the general, most likely, phenomenology of alien abductions (albeit generated in a less dramatic, less severe form of a co-authored process?)? In other words, I would like to examine the phenomenology of dissociative disorders in the light of this hypothesis of a virtual co-authoring in order to see if this model could be used as an explanation of (the majority of cases of) the phenomenon of alien abductions (on the grounds that both 'conditions' appear to be 'hysterical' in nature (and hence their epidemic like nature in the demographics of their occurrence?)? (1)

1.   The Phenomenological ‘Reality’ of Dissociation

	In the previous paper I discussed twelve classifications divided between non-virtual and virtual, each of which were divided between authored and co-authored, and this total of four classifications was then divided by the following three sub-sub-classifications of non-psychotic, pseudo-psychotic and psychotic. If my hypothesis that alien abductions and multiple personality disorders are both virtual co-authored phenomena then we will be concentrating our attention on its three manifestations as virtual-co-authored-non-psychotic, virtual-co-authored-pseudo-psychotic and virtual-co-authored-psychotic. My intuition tells me that all three categories could be involved in both conditions with a more intense form of the condition taking a psychotic form and, conversely, a vague belief and/or weak practice taking a non-psychotic form (and any degree upon this continuous or dis-continuous spectrum being augmented by the intervention of a hypnotist-investigator/therapist in a non-virtual-co-authored-pseudo-psychotic format and/or the input of a virtual-co-authored-pseudo-psychotic format if we can ascertain the meaning and relevance of the latter in the current context of our investigations?). (2)

	In the book Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory, the author, Ian Hacking, tell us that before 1972 the number of cases in the medical literature of multiple personality disorders could be counted - by various counts the tally stood at eighty-four, over a hundred… and by others as having a similar quanta… that in effect the condition was considered rare. However, after that date the number reported increased exponentially to such an extent that it was described as epidemic in proportion and that maybe one person in twenty suffered from a dissociative disorder. (3)

	This same author, as just mentioned, also notes the debate that questioned whether this dissociative disorder was a real illness. As a transcendental phenomenologist this type of question does not concern us except to the extent that this type of phenomena could be regarded by us as a phenomenon with its own essential mode or modes of presentation. In this light we can note that a general consensus does not regard this type of disorder to be a form of schizophrenia (even if a psychotic element might be discerned). It was also noted that some of the relatively superficial characteristics of this illness have changed in time. Besides the different perceptions of doctors in different generations there was also the effect of patients conforming to the classification of their illnesses. This type of observation would seem to suggest a co-authored component. It is with this intuition in mind that this paper sets out to explore this possibility that even though no one else might be involved in the genesis of a dissociative disorder it can still be referred to as 'co-authored', albeit in a virtual form or format. (4)

	To begin let me look at a number of features that are appear to be associated with this condition but do not essentially differentiate it. On presentation to a doctor multiples often have a number of features that are common to a large number of other disorders such as bad headaches, sleep walking, nightmares, flashbacks to the past, lability of mood to severe mood swings in the space of a day, longer term mode disturbances, hallucinations in hypnogogic and/or hypnopompic states on going to sleep/awakening from sleep respectively, histories of poly-substance abuse and alcoholism, a history of and/or claims of child abuse, problems with relationships, problems with employment or periods of unemployment, problems with sexual identity, suicidal gestures, etc. (5)

	Aspects more central, and diagnostic, to this type of dissociative condition are histories that seem to inadequately account for time, so-called accounts of "missing time"; discontinuities and other anomalies in autobiographical histories through an apparent inability to remember temporal sequences because of their disruption through "switching" (between various 'multiples'), trance-like states; the actual observation of switching between various multiples (whose acquaintance and re-acquaintance is necessary for considerations of diagnosis); changes in manner, sound of voice, vocabulary, visual appearance, handwriting, etc, etc. Hacking speculates on whether there are physiological changes arising from or the cause of switching. This can be tentatively answered in the affirmative according to one article in the scientific journal New Scientist. Although features can be listed and assigned various degrees of centrality or essentiality to this condition detailed case studies would probably make better sense of the same for people not directly acquainted with this phenomenon. However, given the limitations on time in this paper I will ask the reader to follow this up for themselves. (6)

	What sort  of characters do multiples appear to switch between, and, is there a true non-dialogue, or a non-recognition of their existence, between them or between some of them? (7)

	One treatment strategy is for the different multiple to be introduced to each other and to be made more aware of their relatively independent existences in an effort to accommodate, integrate and reverse this tendency. Not that all multiples possess the same degree of identity detailization. Some personae are more caricatures than others, on the other hand, some are given quite detailed histories. In switching there is often a great contrast between these 'virtual identities'. One account notes a multiple saying: "To me, having multiple personalities does not feel  like I have lots of people living inside my body. Rather, I find myself thinking and talking to myself in different tones and accents. Some of the voices that talk in my mind sound like children. When I allow them to talk to other people they don't talk like children to impress anyone or be dramatic…. Then there are the deep-raspy intent voices that say the meanest things you could imagine. When they talk, I feel hard inside. I feel cold and calculating." This writer described herself as a victim of extremely severe ritual abuse and it is interesting to note that she gives her 'permission' for these voices to speak. Again, the nature of their interaction seems to be 'co-authored' albeit virtually. The 'voices' seem to enter into a dialogue even if not directly referring to some of the other 'voices'. Being careful not to confuse a prototypic instantiation of this condition as being completely representative of that condition, being situated instead on a spectrum of possibilities. No doubt there are other types of multiples that would not admit that they were multiples in the first place, or, who would state that they have no idea of all or some of their other personae. However, to qualify this extreme position, it is my opinion that by various hermeneutic tricks of the trade we should be able to demonstrate that an overall sense of self is intact enough to realize what is really going on even if deceptively/self-deceptively they were to assert that were not 'suffering' from a dissociative disorder, or, did not know of certain personae, etc., or certain negative or positive act committed in the 'name' of the same. (8)

	Ian Hacking tells us that "there is now no difficulty in summarizing the 1980s prototype for the multiple personality" (in America): a middle-class white woman with the values and expectations of her social group. She is in her thirties, and she has quite a large number of distinct alters-sixteen, say. She spent a large part of her life denying the very existence of these alters. The alters include children, persecutors, and helpers, and at least one male alter. She was sexually abused on many occasions by a trusted man in her family when she was very young. She has suffered many other indignities from people from whom she needs love. The needs are, among other things, part of her class values, which may be abetted or taken advantage of by her abuser. She has previously been through parts of the mental health system and has been diagnosed with many complaints, but her treatments have not helped her in the long run until she came to a clinician sensitive to multiple personality. She has amnesia for parts of her past. She has the experience of "coming to" in a strange situation with no ideas of how she got there. She is severely depressed and has quite often thought about suicide. (9)

	In neutrally addressing this 'phenomenon' (as a phenomenon or set of phenomena) a number of puzzles present themselves. Given many literary prototypes of this condition, such as "Dr. Jeckyll and Mr. Hyde", and, the prevalence of the Freudian psychoanalytic model and its long-winded discussions of hysteria, repression, suppression, etc., why did this phenomenon assume epidemic proportions only when the concept of child abuse came to the fore in the 1970s, etc? Then, why is the ratio of female multiples to male multiples imbalanced in favour of the former in a ratio of almost 9:1? Why, given that sexual abuse is considered as seriously wrong as it is, that not all children subjected to sexual child abuse do show similar symptoms let alone symptoms, whereas, a positive correlation with violence and subsequent trauma can be claimed (but again not in all cases). Lastly, given that many theoreticians of this disorder consider it to occur as a mental defence mechanism in response to violence and psychological trauma finding its beginnings in the imagination of the child to create new identities for itself and thereafter recreate the same that we find no (or very little) dissociation in the form of multiples in children? It would appear that viable (and scientifically acceptable) resolutions of some of these puzzles may well help us to more deeply understand the current 'mythology' behind this 'disorder' and evaluate to what extent such public intuitions were correct or incorrect in this regard? In this desired light I believe an understanding of the concepts of co-authorship and virtuality along with a deeper appreciation of what is meant when we use such terms as non-psychotic, pseudo-psychotic and psychotic should help us, hopefully, to come to a deeper appreciation of this phenomenon. (10)

Keeping these puzzles for the moment at the back of our mind let me focus our attention on another phenomenon closely associated with the same that arose to prominence around 1988, namely, satanic ritual abuse (often known by the acronym of SRA which, because of its religious implications [not accepted in a legal frame work], also come to be known as sadistic ritual abuse). (11)

	As noted in paragraph 10 this concept of multiple personalities, as a process of dissociation, was argued by Ian Hacking to depend for the articulation of its relatively recent historical construction through the relatively new concept of child abuse. This does not mean to imply that children have only recently been exposed to abuse, i.e., forms of violence and violation of a physical and/or psychological and/or sexual nature. Rather, in the development of this concept the idea of dissociation is given, among other things, a causative mechanism, namely, the 'fact' that childhood abuse promoted the mental defence mechanism of dissociation. A problem then arises as to how dissociation provoked through child abuse in childhood in adulthood takes the form of a poly-centred dissociation of identity. What further mechanism of transmission allows the former to be connected with the latter? Is it a sort of underground process surfacing in adulthood? It is my speculation that unhealthy dissociation in adulthood is an indicator of a mental illness along the lines of a personality disorder, a type of condition, or set of conditions, characterized by a psychotic disturbance centred in that level of the psyche that deals with acts of judgment. One observation we might be able to make is that forms of childhood dissociation are not fixed in an investigative and/or therapeutic situation and the 'patient' can be easily distracted from a dissociative pattern of intentionality, whereas, in adult forms of dissociation the pattern is relatively entrenched and the 'patient' cannot be distracted from replicating such a pattern of mental activity? The therapist then has to adopt other therapeutic strategies? Hopefully avoiding an interaction that fuels this type of process of dissociation through pseudo-psychotic-like practices (as noted in the previous essay). Now, Ian Hacking further re-interprets this hypothetical 'causative fact' of child abuse as instrumental in most cases of adult poly-centred dissociation of identity by philosophically perceiving it as "not strictly caused by child abuse. It is rather that the multiple finds or sees the cause of her condition in what she comes to remember about her childhood, and is thereby helped. This is passed off as a specific aetiology, but what is happening is more extraordinary than that. It is a way of explaining oneself, not by recovering the past, but by redescribing it, rethinking it, refeeling it." In other words the past can be, is re-manufactured and may not be inconformity with historical facts, and, that this act of reconstituted 'memory' explains, appears to validates current processes of being in our being in this world-of-life. Of course, whether that creation/recreation of value is existentially authentic or inauthentic is another matter, a topic which I shall touch upon at the end of this essay. (12)

	Philosophically we can conjecture that this concept of child abuse in conjunction with this concept of multiple personality or dissociation is linked via this type of process that seeks a validation of current intentional processes through a re-creation of the past, a so-called recovery of that past when in fact 'our' past is being re-written with varying degrees of conformity or non-conformity with its historical factuality; radical non-conformity making an effective discontinuity with the past hence the experience and expression of lost time, a feeling of "coming to", a so-called recognition of child abuse, etc., etc., when there had been no previous 'evidence' that this had occurred. When encouraged, aided and abetted either by one's own sense of self and/or through its being effectively sidelined, and/or, through forms of intervention directly or indirectly involving others the metaphor of a 'plural sense of self' is realized literally albeit in a virtual form (and format). Hence the primary concern of this paper - an exploration of this concept of virtual co-authorship. (13)

	Given that our current historical sense of self can be 're-written' it was not long after the development of this concept of the multiple personality condition and disorder that satanic ritual abuse should surface, or rather, resurface. On one side of this controversy, those that accepted at face value such preposterous activity saw only 'recovered memories' of such abuse along with the necessity for forms of therapy that dealt with the adult aftermath of such abusive practices. On the other side of this controversy, sceptics only saw the implantation of false memories of child abuse whose acceptance in time would call forth the necessity for forms of meta-therapy, i.e., processes of therapy where those subjected to recovered memory therapy in turn were de-therapied so to speak. The over-acceptance of child abuse in its most bizarre form (and format) took the form of a 'recognition' of satanic ritual abuse - children 'being present' and 'witnessing' the ritual sacrifice of babies often born merely for that gruesome purpose often in conjunction with the commission of loathsome sexual practices involving these children participants. A cult practice that was claimed to be highly organized and spread around the world even though the evidence in the form of actually sacrificed babies never materialized when authorities were convinced that such practices had occurred in their local parishes. Never, certainly, to the extent claimed! Now, I am not saying that such practices did not occur, rather, the degree to which these practices were supposedly being engaged far superseded all real evidence for the same by many, many orders of magnitude. Coming prominently to the fore around the 1980s the whole phenomenon took on an hysterical complexion reminiscent of the witch trials in Europe in the not so distant past. Moreover, it exacerbated the division between sceptics and believers in the reality of multi-personalities. Personally, I take a middle path in this controversy. It is obvious processes of dissociation can occur, however, on the other hand, recovered memories are not recovered but rather 're-covered', in effect implanted co-authorially, apparently rewriting 'our' perception of that person's past and therein their own sense of that past as made public through this act of re-writing. (14)

	Taken at face value when confronted by tales of satanic ritual abuse in all their gory gothic details how would you react?! Demand the Police do something? Or, would you dismiss such 'nonsenses' but at the same time be uneasy that perhaps processes of child abuse might have occurred in some form or other but not to that extent or manner as portrayed in and through those fantastic fantasies? How is the transcendental phenomenologist to react in such a situation? Is it right for them to merely sit on the wall and be a mere witness, albeit second hand, to the apparent 'reconstruction' of those abusive practises? Can the transcendental phenomenologist in their exercise of the transcendental suspension escape this charge of ethical passivity? Indeed, how can they escape the very paralysis of this suspension?! Or, put another way, how can this type of investigator engage with the 'reality of the phenomenon' if they only meet the phenomenon qua its phenomenal reality? (15)

	This conundrum reminds me of the Zen koan that asks "How do you get the goose out of a bottle?" One traditional answer is… "There, it is out!" What is put there by the imaginative construction of the mind can be released in the same manner. My solution to this problem re-empowers the transcendental specialist. It is true that the suspension is a parallel rewriting of the phenomenon as it appears to present itself. In essence, the suspension is a parallel re-writing of the apparent essential configuration of the object-state under investigation. In this light the 'transcendental suspension    of a red apple (-like phenomenon)' could be technically rewritten in the following form, namely, there both is and is not a apple-like phenomenon that is both red and not red'. Cashing out this suspension in this manner it is a wonder how the transcendental phenomenologist could get any further, indeed, ever escape the paralysis of that type of parallel formulation?! (16)

My simple answer to this problem is to suspend the suspension itself in the same fashion and then to repeat that process again. In suspending the suspension we exit the first suspension, in a sense metaphorically cast ourselves outside it. In suspending that second suspension we are then miraculously re-immersed in the world of that suspension as we first came to know it, albeit via this circle (this hermeneutic circle of comprehension). In this manner the transcendental phenomenologist is able to investigate and engage with both the 'phenomenon of reality' and the 'reality of that phenomenon'. Engaging in an existentially authentic manner when we emplace ourselves in such a balanced fashion, properly purport ourselves upon this royal road of the middle path… no longer trapped, instead, indeed, critically freed from the mere confines of ego-construction whether authored or co-authored in its simulation of that phenomenon-under-review... (17)

	Let me look more closely at what has been briefly explicated in the last paragraph. First let me state that an acceptance of the 'one' world of the life-world means that in the simulation of a phenomenon this simulation is being conducted within this one-world-of-life. The simulation does not represent the phenomenon being simulated but, rather, re-presents it! Previously I have described three different types of suspension as entailed in the dialectical functioning of the hermeneutic circle (of comprehension), namely, reduction, reconstitution and suspension (this circle being 'entered' and 'left' via the moment of suspension). Re-described from a different point of view, in the previous paragraph,  those same three moments are reduction based on a conjunctive suspension - the basis of metaphorical thinking, a suspension of the same in the form of a dis-conjunctive suspension - the basis for the rhetorical format of a question, and, a suspension of both in the form of a trans-conjunctive-dis-conjunctive suspension. In the light of previous work I have come to the conclusion that metaphorical dysfunction is basically psychotic in nature, in effect, a confusion between the literal and the metaphorical with a mis-reading of the latter through the lens of the former. So the schizophrenic, e.g., might think they have a hole in their stomach or that they have no stomach because they literally mistreat its metaphorical perception as empty or absent, is felt to be a void. Or, that the 'voices' he hears are real, are real entities or spirits trying to take them over. Or, feeling grand and godlike that he is a god, etc., etc. On the other hand should we interpret the pathological dysfunction of the rhetorical orientation as neurotic in complexion, i.e., as based on defective processes of questioning with aspects of self-doubt, anxiety about the present, fear of the future and guilt about the past? Invoking the dysfunction of the moment of suspension, as a trans-conjunctive-dis-conjunctive suspension, was thought previously to be characterized by the hallmarks of the stasic condition, i.e., an inability to adapt, a marked propensity for a rigid routinization of life's activities, etc. Taking these three moments in a 'vertical' (non-horizontal) frame of reference (mirroring the epistemological hierarchicalization of the psyche) we have, re-paraphrasing the last paragraph, the immanent reduction on a cognitive level below which we have the transcendent reconstitution on an affective level, and above the cognitive level, the trans-conjunctive-dis-conjunctive 'suspension' on a judgmental level of epistemological functioning. However, this vertical modelling should not be exaggerated through (the fallacy of the over-extended analogy and) the fact that psychosis can be found on all three levels of the psyche, e.g. But, with this qualification, we might like to loosely associate the psychotic condition with the psychotic aspect of metaphorical dysfunction, the non-psychotic condition with the neurotic aspect of rhetorical dysfunction, and, the pseudo-psychotic condition as a stasic dysfunction. With the establishment of these parallel, dialectical associations what further implications can be drawn? For a start let me look at the relationship between hypnosis and the symptomatology of the psychotic and the non-psychotic, and, the speculative, theoretical nature of the phenomenological nature of hypnosis itself. (18)

	For a start, if hypnosis and stasis are mirrored by the suspension of both the conjunctive suspension and the dis-conjunctive suspension then, speculatively, what can we say about the phenomenological nature of hypnosis? Then, can we differentiate the psychotic from the neurotic, and, furthermore, differentiate the complex psychotic states of schizophrenia from the complexity that characterizes the dissociative disorder of multiple-personalities, etc? (19)

2.   Implication/s of Hypnosis?

	Previously, I have metaphorically likened hypnosis as a process of distraction. That would only be half true, and the lesser half at that. Essentially, it must, first, be a process of paralysis, a being trapped in the suspension of the suspensional balance of the conjunctive suspension and the dis-conjunctive suspension. With the stasic paralysis of this 'suspension' the overall sense of self, or some proxy or proxies for the same, as an intentional agent can then be instructed or re-instructed by being distracted by the superimposition of routines (or more correctly the sub-imposition of routines or instructions) that bypass this partially paralyzed overall sense of self. What evidence do I have for this type of theoretical model? (20)

	In an interesting article on the subject of hypnotism in the Scientific American some observations were made by the staff of that magazine of what it was like to be in a state of hypnosis. "We all had a sense of "watching" ourselves and were sometimes amused. "I knew what my name was, but I couldn't think how to move my mouth," recalled one staff member. Another said his fingers "felt stuck" during the finger-lock exercise. "At first they pulled apart easily enough, but then they seemed to sort of latch up. It was interesting to see that it was so difficult." On the strength of this type of observation and in the light of type of intentionality envisaged in' my psychology' it is not strange to find numerous senses of self at every level and with every aspect of the epistemological hierarchy. So we have an emotional sense of self, a cognitive sense of self and a transcendental-judgmental sense of self along with an array of 'selves' in keeping with the nature of the intentional objects under examination, e.g., perceptual, mathematical, the 'reviewer' of a work of art, etc., etc. (21)

	For those of us who can ride a bike or drive a car once we have acquired that skill it is not something that we attend to in the same manner when we were acquiring that skill. Once the pianist has mastered the fingering they can then get on to more closely observing how they are interpreting that piece of music. In the exercise of its difficulty as soon as the thought enters their head that 'they are playing very well to day' it is often at that moment, or shortly after, that difficulties or gross errors re-visit them! Much of our life we operate on automatic. The intrusion of cognitive thought can interrupt the smoothness acquired in the exercise of that routine. In a similar fashion it would appear in the state of hypnosis routines can be re-engaged or thwarted without their instigation by an overall sense of self. Our complex hierarchical psychology demands relative autonomy on its different levels of epistemological complexity. On the other hand the complete loss of integrity cannot be argued for as this autonomy is partial, fluctuating in degree, but never absolutely lost. Moreover, we cannot argue for absolute integrity through the complete self-control of agent as the sense of the agent is never in complete possession of themselves. It should remain possible, therefore, for an agent in a state of hypnosis or some other type of trance, state of consciousness, to have some degree of re-call as to what is happening and what might have happened. In this light this same article discusses the observation that "only one f us experienced item 12 on the Stanford scale - posthypnotic amnesia. In this exercise, the hypnotist tells the subject not to remember what occurred during the session. "Every time I'd try to remember," said the staff member who had this sensation, " the only thing that came back to me was that I should not remember. But when Dr. Benham said it was okay to remember, it all came flooding back." The thought 'I should not remember' must be applied to something. That something was re-called when permission was granted for that to occur which meant that not only was the memory not lost its presence or absence was to be recalled even if in some other analogued form or format. We might suppose, therefore, that all intentional activity is traced to some extent or other regardless of whether an overall sense of self is playing an active or passive role in the re-constitution of the same. (22)

	This same article also notes a number of myths that have no scientific basis in this phenomenon of hypnosis. E.g., if tricked into believing x the hypnotised person may assert x without actually lying or dissimulating to themselves in this regard. In a brain scan their assertion is not treated by the brain as if it were an act of dissimulation. As the article noted - "physiological responses indicate that hypnotized subjects are not lying." It is as if the visual field is imagined and in imagining the same it is taken as visualized. In this light we might see something akin to the psychotic literalization of the metaphorical. The stomach feels empty therefore it is empty or a hole, I feel like a god therefore I am a god, etc., etc. (23)

	Another reason why I feel hypnosis is directly or indirectly implicated in this quest for an understanding of virtual co-authored phenomena is the observational-fact that the essential phenomenology of 'multi-personalities' can be identically created in a hypnotic state of trance. Then, again, a neurotic non-psychotic state of affairs, such as 'a belief in having been the victim of an alien abduction can also be re-created without any discernible difference (except on a deep hermeneutic level that looks into origins and sense of self-identity concurrent with a particular state of affairs). As noted in this article in the Scientific American "hypnosis may actually muddle the distinction between memory and fantasy and may artificially inflate confidence" (in the accuracy and power of our memory). In the light of these comments let me speculatively propose a working model for hypnosis and the manner of its involvement in co-authored phenomena whether virtual or non-virtual. (24)

	In the 'absence' or 'relative loss' of a non-textual dimension through temporary stasis other presentational aspects get read in a literal metaphorical light or taken for fact in a rhetorical mode that argues for the same. These alternative 'readings' are able to be entertained in a more positive light by virtue of a loss of transcendental distance though the side-lining of our powers of transcendental discrimination. Hence the metaphorical sense of self can entertain the metaphor literally to some extent but never absolutely (because the hermeneutic circle is dependent upon the circular functioning of that transcendental apparatus). And similarly with respect to a rhetorical sense of self. The breakdown in the metaphorical sense of reality giving us a deeper degree of psychotic dysfunction through a more radical non-conformity with reality. On the other hand a rhetorical dysfunction seems to give us a less radical, neurotic, disconformity with the reality of the life-world… a state of affairs that we can argue with to some degree and is therefore less radical in its non-conformity! What else might we say in this regard before moving onto to a closer phenomenological examination of the psycho-dynamics of dissociation, especially with respect to the appearance of multiple-personalities being exhibited in the 'life' and the ‘individual’? (25)

3.   A Sociopathic Basis For Psychotic Dissociation?

	At this moment in time I am of the opinion that the dissociation of the overall personality into a number of apparently discrete 'identities' unassisted by hypnosis is essentially a psychotic disorder centred in the judgmental level of the psyche as opposed to a cognitive schizophrenia and an affective psychosis (as explored in the second essay in this series). As there seems to be breakdown of metaphorical thinking in conjunction with a dramatic re-living of one's existence I would suggest it be might linked with categories 2 (Section 20. in the complete scheme of psychoses) and 5 (Section 23.) in the following scheme as noted in this second essay (of which the last three classifications are described as overt  and the first three are described as covert ego-oriented dysfunctions (i.e., operating on a background gestalt-field level in intentional formation)). 

1.	Borderline Sociopathic Behaviour: (Sociopathic behaviour being perceived as less focused than psychopathic behaviour which is relatively more focused), inability to cope with frustration, etc.
2.	Narcissistic Sociopathic Behaviour: An excessive attention to a (fantastic) sense of self that does not correspond with reality.
3.	Inhibited or Avoidant Sociopathic Behaviour: An inability to interact with others even on a superficial level of interaction.

4.	Political (or Active) Psychopathology: Tendency for apparent long term goal setting in a political context, a perverse enjoyment exercised through the power of political manipulation, etc.
5.	Histrionic Psychopathology: Over-dramatic behaviour, self-preoccupied, demanding, attention-seeking behaviour, etc.
6.	Dependant (or Passive) Psychopathology: A desire to be manipulated by other, especially dangerous when this is done by an active psychopath. 
										           (26)

In a psychosis, almost as a matter of definition, there is a breakdown in metaphorical thinking centred on the object-polarity of our hermeneutic circle. Hence there is also an ego-oriented distortion which is what one would also expect. [In a sense we have a triple ego-disturbance in this scheme of mine as articulated to date. In looking at how the psyche is epistemologically organized we might say that there is a vertical axis of the Somatic-Affective Aspect(s), the Cognitive Perceptual-Conceptual Aspect and Judgmental Aspect (and its division between the six judgmental fields of the Essential-Pre-Essential, the Essential-Aesthetic, the Ethical, the Pragamtical, the Hermeneutic-Inter-Relational and the Ontical or Actual-Factual Field of Determination)   and a horizontal axis wherein we have our Hermeneutic Circle (and its three archetypal moments of Suspension, Reduction and Re-Constitution). We could also envisage a z-axis concerned with the third moment of our phenomenological dialectics namely that of Ego (as opposed to a horizontal sense of Object and a vertical sense of World? Each phenomenological distinction having its own distinctive sense of self that can appreciate that type of phenomenon). It just so happens that, in our sociopathic/psychopathic scheme as re-produced above, categories  2 ( 20) and 5 (23) implicate a covert and an overt sense of ego-oriented dysfunction respectively in the Ego-oriented Judgmental Aspect. Hence this triple ego-dysfunctional description of this aspect/these aspects of the sociopathic segment of our epistemological schematization of the overall psyche. In other words on all three axes (horizontal, vertical an ego-oriented) the ego-orientation is implicated]. If this is correct, and 'one is trapped in the moment of the suspension' - equivalent to the ego-pole, one might speculate that the mind has in some measure ‘hypnotised itself’ and it is through this ‘stasic-like paralysis of the transcendental suspension’ that we have various psychotic forms of ego-dysfunction, i.e., a loss of transcendental distance/discrimination; inadequate suspension of the suspension; an inadequate suspension of belief and a converse suspension of disbelief, a literalization of the metaphorical, disturbance of the rhetorical, and stasic-like phenomena of excessive re-iteration, loss of ‘existential freedom,’ personal choice, literal process of dissociation, manufacture of virtual voices, other types of hallucination, delusions, etc., in conjunction with a lost appreciation of the truth (although it is my hermeneutic observation that this cannot be completely entered into absolutely only relatively and effectively. (27)

Let me now put these epistemological speculations to the side and examine the phenomenology of this type of disorder, these types of disorder(?). (28)

	It was noted previously that it is an observation that in hypnosis one’s overall sense of a (transcendental ego or) self is in some sense dis-empowered, unable to actively enter into intentionally formulated acts of will. That in a similar manner, metaphorically, patent untruths can in part be affirmed and/or overlooked, or, accepted truths can in part be denied and/or overlooked. As previously argued various mis-truths are affirmed or truths denied without such dissimulation being experienced as a process of dissimulation, lying, trickery or fakery, etc. On the other hand, to qualify this interpretative observation it should also be noted that hermeneutically this overriding is never absolute and some deeper or higher part of the psyche still knows what is truly going on implying that the application of deconstructive methods would more easily be able to be applied to illustrate this deceptive/self-deceptive activity of the mind with respect to its overall relative totality in its overall sense of self. So in a sense ‘lying’ is still taking place but not with the full phenomenology that would normally occur in ordinary act of dissimulation. (29)

	With this interpretative background to hand can we now tentatively determine what types of selves are created in these processes of self-dissociation? In some measure what is ‘created’ is merely the literalization of what is already taking place, is to hand so to speak? (30)

	A major split seems to take place between a relatively active transcendental sense of an overall sense of self and a more empirically oriented, passive, embodied sense of self. (31)

The embodied sense of self could then be ‘divided’ along the lines of its fundamental epistemological divisions already in place, namely, e.g., a perceptual sense of self (as a perceiver) versus a conceptual sense of a self (as a thinker), an emotional sense of self versus a cognitive sense of self, an impressional sense of self experiencing e.g., pain and an affective sense of self experiencing mood, a physical sense of self versus a less physically oriented sense of self, etc. (32)

	Then particular emotive states might be given a literal sense of identity. So, e.g., part of the psyche might be experiencing anger or wanting to experience the same and so ‘creates’ an angry persona. (33)

	Furthermore, mythic models in social (and religious) reality might be literally assumed hence the assumption of ‘victim’, ‘hero’, ‘god-like divinity’, ‘leader’, ‘recluse’, e.g., etc. (34)

	And what drives this ‘literal splitting’ or 'splintering' of the psyche? Psychotic causation would seem to be implicated (if a pseudo-psychotic hypnotic state can be ruled out). The person's apparent imagination taking on a literal(ly true) appearance to them (even though a deeper/higher part(s) of the overall sense of self would be aware that this was constructed by-the-self-for-the-self). (35)

Some people would also argue that extreme stress, or stress experienced in an extreme format for that over-sensitive individual, could set in train this defective and potentially disruptive type of dissociation? So childhood trauma could well be implicated. Indeed, in brain scans it has been shown that different personalities actually take on difference somatic locations in the brain when they manifest themselves to that individual, etc. Hence this phenomenon has a reality beyond the merely phenomenological although I is equally true to say that is phenomenological reality can be excessively enlarged through the intervention of a hypnotist investigator/therapist which, in the main, have given this disorder an overly sensational reputation and bad press. Moreover, these distinctive identities or alters would be better regarded as co-authored artefacts rather than separate identities as if the person were possessed by a number of 'personalities' or 'spirits'.  Excessive, ongoing psychological and physical trauma in children being implicated as an avenue for the possible origin of this type of adult disturbance. On the other hand reports of childhood abuse from the person themselves, unsubstantiated and/or uncorroborated, should not be taken at face-value (nor dismissed for that matter) especially if a process of hypnotically oriented memory retrieval is put in place (primarily) for that purpose. (36)

4.   What Can We Conclude?

	Although much of this investigation is theoretical and speculative in nature there is some support in the literature for this type of approach? But let me end here with a reiteration of my argument as to why I believe there is a virtual dimension to co-authored phenomena. (37)

	For a start co-authored phenomena of a non-virtual nature in order to flourish is correctly dependent upon a psychic-somatic interrelationship with the minds of those individual by those individuals. Hence the necessary-like presence of the virtual in order for the non-virtual to manifest its sense of an inter-relationship and interaction therein. In other words, no virtual dimension - no non-virtual dimension, v.v. Or even more succinctly: no (meta-textual) intersubjective dimension without a (textual) subjective dimension, and v.v. (38)

	Moreover the role of hypnosis in either the virtual dimension or the non-virtual dimension suggests an intimate degree of potential relationship between both dimensions. (39)

	The apparent ability to cross this relative divide between the individually authored and the non-individually authored also suggests an ontological/epistemological gap that can be crossed in practice. Hence the concepts of induction and transmission of the hysterically engineered transformation from one to the other and/or vice versa. This proceeding a pace between those like-minded individuals that are potentially and/or actually psychotic in some form or other or subjected to hypnotism or some other process of recollection and engineered social control. (40)

	Hence the relative epidemic-like proportion of socially fashionable virtual and non-virtual co-authored phenomena. The mind in effect being paralysed by a relative lack of judgmental authenticity. And the close movement of one to other on either a virtual level or a non-virtual level. E.g., through the medium of hypnosis (and other forms of psychosis?). e.g? (41)

From the discussion of observations made in self reporting and reporting. E.g., a dis-empowered sense of self in hypnosis. From the phenomenon of auditory hallucination and our own ability to address ourselves in all three cases (first, second and third), the ability to think about ourselves in different tenses, in different geographic positions, and, in different manners and personae. All suggestive of the rich internal virtual co-authored dimension that in and through a psychotic literalization of the metaphor would naturally take a more concrete, poly-centred form and format! (42)

Hence, I am forced to conclude that, the virtual co-authored dimension is a necessary part of our existence and allows us to enter into processes of non-virtual co-authorship with others, indeed, (transcendentally) allows us to think and communicate both with our own overall sense(s) of self and with others (through the implication of this meta-textual inter-subjective dimension which forms the second moment of our hermeneutic circle)! (43)

	Thus, the co-authored dimension should be considered to encompass both a non-virtual sense of interpersonal 'space' but also a virtual sense of the same along with our ability to enlist both through the manner 'we' 'purport ourselves' in this 'one' inter-subjective dimension of the live-world and whose cooperation ensures the functioning of a hermeneutic circle basic to all processes of comprehension and the realization of a sense of community! (44)

							Noël Tointon, Sydney, 26.10.02.