Beyond Therapy: A Set of Essays
On Miscellaneous Topics in Psychology and Psychiatry (2001-2003)

V. Deception and Self-Deception:
Part I - The Problematic Phenomenon of Deception and Self-Deception?

0.   Introduction

	How is it possible for the self to deceive others, and, on some occasions to even fool itself? Are deception and self-deception part of the same phenomenon or are they different phenomena (both individually and/or collectively)? Then, although a person may be effectively self-deceived can we argued for the possibility of absolute self-deception - an overall sense of self that is absolutely deceived by its own acts of dissimulation? Moreover, when a process of effective self-deception takes place should we also argue for the presence of a psychotic state of affairs in order to account for this discontinuity between the dissimulation and a general understanding of reality in that regard?! In this paper let me look into these various psychological problems from a philosophical point of view myself. (1)

	I shall start this paper by defining this problem of deception and self-deception by arguing that self-deception might best be understood as a distinctive deepening and extension of the former, i.e., as an act of deception misconstrued literally to that extent that the self itself is effectively fooled by its own practice of dissimulation (through a literalization of the metaphor, e.g.). (2)

	Following this exposition of deception and self-deception as one phenomenon I will then  critically look into a 'sympathetic' meta-critique consisting of various counter-criticisms levelled at various 'unsympathetic' re-examinations of alien abductions; in the process offering my own comments in the form of a meta-meta-critique (of this 'sympathetic' meta-critique). (3)

	Lastly, I will look at possible psychological model that might help us to understand both the causation and consequences in an attempt to phenomenologically explain why this type of meta-meta-critique might be successful (wherein this pattern of counter-criticism or meta-critique is, in turn, countered through this type of meta-meta-critique). (4)

1.   Deception and Self-Deception - One Problem, Two or More Problems?

	What is this philosophic problem of 'deception and self-deception', or, what are these philosophic problems of 'deception' and 'self-deception'??? (5)

	In a nutshell we could say: in the formulation of deception initiated and recognized as such by the self we have a problem if we assume that the overall sense of self is purely integrated, self-unified and monolithic, whereas, on the other hand, the process of self-deception is problematic if we assume that the overall sense of self is neither purely integrated nor self-unified nor monolithic (i.e., consists of effectively non-cooperative, multiple senses of self). These two problems being aspects of one problem if the occurrence of deception and self-deception is understood to be, fundamentally, the same type of process (albeit conducted in the latter situation in such a manner so as to also deceive its own overall sense of self?). (6)

	In an act of deception the person creating the deception normally is not the person who is to be deceived. However, in my tentative understanding of self-deception I am going to propose that the two processes are essentially the same, albeit that self-deception involves a metaphorical 'endeepening' of the process and, perhaps, some form of a phase change wherein the literal semblance of the deception is then mistakenly read as the 'reality-to-hand' in that particular situation. Self-deception is obviously problematic in the philosophical sense - how is it possible for the very same self to deceive itself? To my mind deception is problematic in this special sense for just the same type of reasons, namely, how is it possible for the same self to simulate a deceptive version of reality when that same self knows, or should know, that that version is not in conformity with reality as generally understood - the self having to wear two or more hats, at the same time, so to speak. Essentially the first aspect of this problem is predicated on the monolithic unity of the self. Obviously deception and self-deception exist and therefore it would appear that we must give up this notion of the self as some form of a uniform monolith possessed of absolute self-control and self understanding (and this has been, to date, an effective postmodern critique of a 'modernist vision of self'). Although we must postulate the implicitly projected semblance of an overall sense of self in order to explain the apparent intentional unity of that agent, at the same time, this sense of self must come about through a multitude of different senses somehow cooperating to some degree or other and integrated to some extent within this overall sense of self. In effect it is through this cooperation that an act of deception can be entered into. So, e.g., the 'deceiving self' can say (to another person or persons that) "x is a" when in fact a 'non-self-deceived sense of self knows that '~x is a' or x is ~a'. Once a non-monolithic sense of self is accepted this problem of deception ceases to be problematic! On the other hand, how can the self enter into a process of its own self-deception and act, to some considerable extent, as if it were unaware of its own deception (in the process reviewing what light or darkness might be thrown on the intentional life of the subject?). A resolution in progress of this more difficult aspect of our problem will be taken up in last section of this paper. First, let me look at this meta-critique of the general spectrum of critical evaluations of the theory and evidence (or lack of evidence) for the abduction experience and from a meta-meta-critique conducted by myself note a number of conclusions I would like to make in this regard. As abduction reports are often vague, lack supporting evidence and seem to be logistically untenable from an overall perspective we should provisionally conclude that most if not all individuals making such a claim are, to put it politely, mistaken. On these grounds, with this prejudicial pre-judgment to hand, let me now adopt a transcendental phenomenological position, etc., in order to critically investigate the essential nature of this type of 'phenomenon' (of the 'abduction' experience) and set out to evaluate therein whether my previous research in this regard, specifically with respect to co-authored phenomena, is of value, can throw some informative light on this type of problem, namely, 'how is it possible for the same self to effectively deceive its own overall sense of self?' (as most claims, if not all, of abduction appear, on probability, to be deceptively manufactured by the claimant). (7)

2.   The Critical Evaluation of the Abduction Experience?

	In the section I will basically be commenting on a paper I found on the Internet titled "The Abduction Experience: A Critical Evaluation of Theory and Evidence" as found at the following address: http://www.virtuallystrange.net/aic/appelle1.htm This paper is written by Stuart Appelle in the Department of Psychology of the State University of New York College at Brockport, NY 144420-2977 and can be found on the AIC homepage titled Points of View - put out by the Abduction Information Center. (8)

	This paper notes that various authorities estimate the number of abduction cases as a percentage of the (American) population to be per Jacobs (1992) at 5-6%, Hopkins, Jacobs, and Westrum (1992) at 2%. Accepting the latter as 'accurate' would mean that approximately 4,000,000 Americans have been 'abducted'! If this type of percentage was globally 'accurate' would imply a huge logistic problem for 'the abductors' and the increased likelihood of tangible evidence to that effect. Currently, evidence of UFO's is problematic, disputed, open to re-interpretation or all of the above. The primary intention of  this paper is not directly interested in whether there are or there are not genuine cases of abduction since my primary concern is a phenomenological attempt to understand why some people believe they have been abducted and appear to believe this 'fact' when in truth (through a lack of evidence, on logistical grounds, cogency of alternative non-literal interpretations or demonstrated by other means, e.g., deconstructive accessibility) that they were most likely never abducted. Moreover, the 'uniformity' of the reports made by these 'abductees' should not automatically be construed as 'their meeting with the same type of alien entity or entities' but, in the lack of evidence, etc., as more the exercising of a generally intersubjective genre in this regard. Furthermore, parsimony should prevail in our dealing with the vague, existentially non-rich nature of those 'reports' to the extent that their fabricated construction is reflected in their monotonous conformity, albeit and despite their vivid re-living, and that this should be provisionally accepted as an indication of this type of source rather than as 'memories suppressed through thought implantation to this effect, etc., by these alien abductors' (or by invoking some other non-parsimonious mechanism). The force of this argument, from parsimony and probability, etc., does not rule out alien abduction but implies that in many cases, if not most, we would be dealing with a dissociative type of disorder as examined in the previous essays as co-authored in complexion, psychotic in orientation and as a mixture of virtual and non-virtual influences; the non-virtual element accounting for the hysterical-like dissemination of this type of phenomenon. Furthermore, this type of psychotic phenomenon of dissociation has been classified by myself as a judgmental psychosis, i.e., as a type of personality disorder. 'Normally' being non-overt in nature it is my conjecture that this type of disorder is not overtly obvious to someone who is not aware of this type of differentiation and that most professional psychiatric evaluations of personality could easily miss this type of subtlety in much the same way that the lay public is not expert at recognizing sociopathy, or, the fact that medical staff continually debate whether this type of disorder is 'psychotic', i.e., 'mad' or a '(borderline) personality disorder', i.e., 'bad', when correctly, if my belief is in accordance with reality, what we should 'see' is the fact that this condition is both 'psychotic' in complexion (albeit covertly) and as a 'personality disorder' (this condition sometimes also manifesting with relatively overt forms of psychosis such as paranoia, mood disturbance, auditory hallucinations, etc.). (9)

Various mental disorders have been identified and postulated as explaining why some people feel they have been abducted. In this paper cited, and by people whose ontological commitments are such that they prefer to adopt a literal reading of this phenomenon of 'alien abduction' at face value, such criticisms have been discounted by various counter-arguments and observations. Let me now generally and non-exhaustively list some of these counter-arguments of this meta-critique adopted to counter various types of criticisms, and, then in the following section, outline in more detail how these various criticisms might be countered (through this style of meta-critique) by those whose ontological commitments are to a literal reading of this phenomenon. (10)

Here is an abbreviated list of various counter-criticisms of this meta-critique offered by the type of person who supports the contention that alien abduction is a 'real' phenomenon (that should or could be read at face value):

1.   That 'abductees' are usually not psychotic, have no indication of (overt) psychosis.
2.   Heterogenous population - entail a normal cross-section of society.
3.   Post-traumatic-like consequences of the 'abduction' indicate the 'fact' of 'trauma'.
4.	Reluctance to divulge same (and hence not 'seeking attention').
5.	Psychological profiles don't show much that is different from general population.
6.	Out of character for these people to fake this type of incident.
7.	Uniformity of 'evidence'. (11)

These counter-criticisms can be addressed by the following arguments and observations:

1.	A large proportion of 'alien abductees' could be covertly psychotic. Personality disorders are classified by myself as a judgmental psychosis in distinction to organic, affective and cognitive [read schizophrenic] psychoses, and, manifest with a covert oriented psychosis which allows these people to pass as 'normal' if psychological testing cannot pick up the subtle forms of psychosis that characterize the various types of personality disorder associated with this condition. Indicators for fantasy and slight paranoia have been found and might well be present but not in an overt form as found in schizophrenia, e.g. Still, there is a radical disconformity with reality if the abduction scenario is indeed 'fabricated' hence the strong possibility of a psychosis (or some other explanation?) that can account for that variance and non-conformity with a general vision of reality.

2.	True, you might well find that 'abductees' closely match a general cross-section of the overall  community, but you find personality disorders in all walks of life too. Indeed, many institutions such as universities, schools, etc., have their 'resident psychopaths' just like other professions and associations in the community. So this cross section of the population would be expected if this type of 'psychosis' is that as found in a personality disorder (as described by myself as a judgmentally oriented psychosis). A 'normal' spread of occupational backgrounds, e.g., would, therefore, be expected.

3.	Post-traumatic-like states might arise from 're-living' this scenario even if 'fabricated', or, as a result of therapeutic intervention that 'treats' the 'abduction' at face value. Or, are the signs and symptoms of a post-traumatic condition already present prior to these claims of 'abduction'? In this regard, I would suspect all of the above.

4.	Not true as there would be no case studies. These people often inform a circle of sympathizers, etc. Some audience reinforcement in self-value/self-valuation possibly takes place - hence selective audience seeking re same? A factor that might well assist its relatively rapid hysterical-like non-virtual co-authored dissemination (which again seems to suggest that 'abductees' are very good at disseminating despite this apparent 'reluctance')? So this factor of selective audience seeking should be considered in conjunction with processes of personal re-valuation that must follow from these 'abductees' telling their strange tales to their fellow believers.

5.	Then, I believe, there is a need to treat the 'profiles' of personality disorders to a fine tuning as far as diagnostic evaluation goes. The psychotic nature of those conditions is not generally recognized yet this condition/these conditions often come/s with other effects that would be in conformity with a general psychosis such as sleep disturbance; paranoia; depression; fantasy or a being-out-of-touch with reality in general; problems with motivation, mood, relationships and sexual identity, etc. (that have been noted with this type of condition and as being presented by 'alien abductees'?)?

6.	Delve into the life of these individuals and we might find child abuse or claims to that effect, disturbed parental upbringing, problems in schooling, etc., etc. Moreover, it is my opinion, that although these abductions, at least in the majority, are 'fabricated' it does not follow that these people are actually lying, as I have argued previously. In hypnotism the subjects are not lying when they tell you "they are a chicken" when given that hypnotic suggestion prior to the asking of this question - "what are you?" Various PET-scan studies showing that those regions of the brain normally utilized in acts of deception are not being actively engaged in such responses given the prior implantation of post-hypnotic suggestions. I still hold, however, that a part of the psyche will know in some manner or other, these 'fabrications' as fabrication even though the overall sense of self may not be able to make use of that inner insight (through some form of a hypnotic-like paralysis or suspension, stasic-like paralysis or effective disconnection of an overall sense of self from this aspect of active/passive dissembling, etc.). 

7.	This type of condition(s) attracts those of a similar mind or bent. Being virtually authored and virtually co-authored through the suspension an overall sense of self it follows that it is only a small step for it to be hysterically induced and transmitted, disseminated, etc. Moreover, uniformity of evidence is already pre-established as a genre in the culture/sub-culture. Any one who reads about abductions/watches television/reads the newspapers/talks with friends and 'fellow abductees' would naturally develop a uniformity of culturally predominant genre expectations and less culturally dominant genres. Indeed, this genre has developed its own expressions, e.g., 'greys' and general explanations (as to why their reports seem vague, patchy, dream-like and non-existentially rich overall [through hypnotic suggestions to this effect implanted by these alien abductors] and as to what it might mean [we are being taken over/they are here to help us like gardeners or doctors/ that we are to become a hybrid race and/or a re-engineered species, etc.]. That this uniformity of genre expectation pre-establishes to some considerable degree how this/these type/s of phenomenon would be ‘approached’ and/or creatively ‘re-created’! (12)

We can also note that other types of (co-authored) phenomena seem to have a similarity in general presentation, i.e., a marked co-authored complexion, such as e.g., the epidemic-like occurrences of repressed memories, other forms of abductions, multiple personalities, satanic ritual abuse, alternative forms of mass hysteria such as communal trances, e.g., etc. (13)

	There are also instances in the literature of alien abductions taking place whilst the person reporting the same was in the same room with the person reporting this 'current event'. This 'psychic abduction' indicating an 'alteration of consciousness' with a hypnotic-like susceptibility to imagine this type of incident and then take it at 'face value' despite other evidence contrary to the same that should be experienced by the person concerned (on perceptual grounds, e.g.). This same type of phenomenon being noted by some hypnotist-investigators/therapists. (14)

3.   How Should We Understand Deception and Self-Deception?

	First, I would like to offer a number of situations where processes of deception and/or self-deception take place. Then I would like to make a few general suggestions and then follow them up in more detail. Finally, I would like to come to some form of a tentative conclusion which will be used as a starting point in coming to an understanding of the nature of the self - an egological philosophy - the topic for Part II of this Fifth Essay. This discussion will then be used, in turn, as a starting point for a general discussion on the subject of therapy - the topic to be discussed in the last paper in this series and which is titled Beyond Therapy. (15)

1.	Models of Deception

i.    The Successful Self-Deception of the Fully Informed Cigarette Smoker?

How do cigarette smokers fool themselves when the cigarette packet warns them about the dangers of smoking to themselves and others. Why do pictures on cigarette packet prove more effective than written/verbal messages? I have discussed this issue with a number of smokers. Being already informed of the dangers of smoking, the addictiveness of the habit and its cost and confronting themselves on this same discordant piece of behavioural practice I am often met by the reply that it is so stressful to think about that “they feel the need for another cigarette then and there” despite what intellectual voice or voices in their head may be telling them to the contrary. We might find a clue here? The practice of smoking is a process that relieves stress. Some muscles are stimulated, e.g., the cardio-vascular system, and other muscles, e.g., those for purposes of movement attached to the bone through ligaments, etc., are relaxed. Through a relaxation of the skeletal musculature there is a parallel diminution of stress and through a diminution in the reception of stress there is a parallel relaxation of the skeletal musculature (as a result it is impossible to say which comes first here, which is cause and which is effect?). Through a loop-like process the relief of stress is a conditioning process that reinforces the practice of smoking in this regard. Moreover, it is my belief, that in the process of self-deception we have, in effect, a number of parallel looping systems that, in the main, do not overlap. Because we have a set of autonomously conditioned/conditioning loop-feedback systems our motivation to quit smoking has to reflect and come to terms with this greater degree of (intentional) complexity (in general constituting this type of problem). But then a large number of Australians have been able to rise to this challenge, indeed, about one in four people, to be more precise, have successfully given up smoking. (16)

	One method to assist the smoker to give up this habit, or help them to become better motivated, is to print photos of smoking-related diseased body organs across a large percentage of the cigarette packet. No longer can cigarette packets look glamorous. Moreover, the pictorial message seems to have a more direct impact upon the smoker than any literary message written on the cigarette packet. In this regard the visual message seems to leave a deeper, more direct impact upon the problematic self-identity of the smoker that cannot so easily be swept under the carpet or ‘dismissed’ with the lighting up of another cigarette. On the other hand, in a cultural prejudice, legal evidence written down is more likely to be believed than verbal testimony or mere hearsay. Or, in a similar vein, the pictorial representation of information is more likely to be believed than a verbal report and/or the same information written down. In this regard it would seem that pictures, in their interpreted context, have a deeper psyche resonance for us? A good reason for politicians to insist on this form of 'advertising' to be placed on a large percentage of the surface of cigarette packets and legally enforced! (17)

ii.   The Need For the Inter-Personal Social White Lie

Our interaction with others is a bit like 'dancing with them on broken glass'. All parties have to tread carefully lest they injure themselves and each other… and this is where our metaphorical device breaks down here… because our priority, correctly, is not to have the other party 'injure themselves', but, rather, to ensure that we do not 'injure' the other party. This is not just for ultraistic purposes as injuring the other party could well lead in time to your own injury directly or indirectly from actions instigated by that other party in response to your 'injuring them'! And in our armoury to prevent this happening the 'social white lie' is an important piece of the social repertoire. We do not speak the truth lest we hurt the other person (where what counts for 'hurt' is a genre already culturally and personally deliberated upon). This 'lie' taking the form of a mis-truth - from a social formula that merely fudges the truth and truly fools no one to an absolute fiction that is uttered with the intent of not upsetting the other party with or without their knowledge. This spectrum is also a clue to how we might be able to deceive ourselves. Since the self is not absolutely monolithic (because how would we be able to deceive others as previously argued if we could not entertain 'parallel versions' of 'reality' and at the same time appreciate how other minds might or might not be able review 'parallel versions' of 'reality') it could well be treated as a federation of parties in a hierarchy of interrelationships. By extension we could also argue for processes of manufacturing convenient fictions in order not to upset various aspects of our own self. Let me look at this possibility a bit closer. (18)

iii.  The Need For the Intra-Personal White Lie

	Just as the polar fiction of self is a hierarchical federation of different senses of self [from the hierarchical epistemological organization of the psyche, its inclusion in a cultural/intercultural set of worlds in the one-world-of-life] it follows that the relatively harmonious cooperation of the same will involve strategies which allow for an intra-personal harmonization. I will argue that just as inter-personal harmonization utilizes the so-called ‘white lie’, and that as there is no absolute differentiation between the inter-personal and the intra-personal (hence the overcoming and interaction between [the polarities of] the virtual and non-virtual) it follows to some extent in some manner or other that the ‘white lie’ may well figure, indeed, ‘must’ figure as a mechanism in intra-personal harmonization of the overall sense of self [albeit from a intra-personal perspective]. In other words, taking a more observational perspective, the understanding of the overall sense of self of its own sense of self deals in idealities, idealizations whose pragnatz essentially encapsulate an unstable combination of reality-facts-in-the-context-of-desired-idealities whose internal boundaries cannot be absolutely delineated. What ‘is’ and what ‘should be’ should be disciminatively differentiated but that from a deeper transcendental point of view they must be accepted as co-existing since from the transcendental point of view all value-judgments have the same ‘fundamental’ transcendental mechanics as being derived through and from acts of judgment (on the assumption that judgments have one transcendental form by virtue of the phenomenological fact that only conceptual psychic-material could interact through the resolution of their vectorial-like interactions). Hence every act of judgment in its transcendental ideality possesses the same basic transcendental form i.e., as described by the hermeneutic circle, in turn described by the fundamental phenomenological polarities of object, world and ego (and further explicated in our circular ordered analysis, etc.). An implication to be drawn here is that the inter-personal and the intra-personal are going to basically reflect each other by virtue of this shared transcendental machinery fundamental to the realization of all sense, meaning and meaningfulness, and, that these three moments themselves are a reflection, respectively, of those three ideal moments of the object, world and ego. This approach reinforcing this crossing over of the polarity between the interpersonal non-virtual co-authored and the intra-personal virtual co-authored. And the upshot of this technical manoeuvre of mine? The understanding that this observation that the self deals in idealities is the also one that is rooted in the very nature of its phenomenological functioning. So its stands to reason that in our dealing with idealities cognitive dissonance is going to be experienced when the individual cognitively realizes or intuitively senses that there is some form of a variance between the ‘ideal reality of the situation’ and the ‘current situation of its reality’, the ‘self’ naturally wanting to err on the side of its expected ideality, indeed setting out to mis-read that ‘current situation of its reality’ through its expected idealized perfection. We see what we seek, we recognize what we re-cognize… in essence, we only see what we have already seen (even though each act of seeing can never be the same, each act of reading can never be the same act of reading, etc.). That, in effect, in our simulation of the world we must inescapably deal with idealities which must open us up to a continual process of mis-reading whose mis-reading in turn allows us to re-coincide directly, to some extent, with that-reality-to-hand when we realize those mis-reading to be (as) misreadings. That through this process of double irony we find ourselves meeting with each other in the same world, thank goodness, albeit from our own perspectives and idiosyncrasies although the same must to some extent also be 'shared' in part or in essence. (19)

iv.  The Distinction Between Deception and Lying

	We all know what lying is, there is no one among us that has not lied in some form or other (to others or to themselves). People do have differing standards in this regard and what may be at stake here might be more a matter of integrity, self-perceived self-integrity, consistency, being self-consistent, etc. Rather than define what a lie is let me instead differentiate deception and lying in order to more broadly 'define' the wider range of the expression deception. (20)

	Paraphrased one author defines the logic of a lie as:

1.	A statement, something that is spoken or written;
2.	A belief in the mind of the statement-maker;
3.	An intention in the mind of the statement-maker;
4.	The character and rights of the person addressed. (21)

These four conditions take into account that this author appears to believe that in order to tell a lie someone else must be present hence condition 4. Although I believe we can tell ourselves a lie in a sense we must be telling some other part of our psyche in order to 'deceive' ourselves in this regard. Hence I would emend the above to reflect this. Moreover, someone could ask us a question and we could reply by nodding our head in a culturally pre-determined manner so that the other person takes such a sign to be a 'yes' or a 'no' without an actual statement, as defined above, taking place. If our reply is deceptive then, in my opinion, we would also have been 'telling' a lie. We would certainly have committed a deception indicating that the boundaries of a deception are much wider than a process of mere lying? E.g., let us say we were a prisoner and the jailer inadvertently leaves the door(s) open. It’s in the middle of the night and you know you need a good six hours walking to escape from this state that has jailed you for what ever reasons. You decide to escape and leave behind in your bed bundles of clothes under the blankets to make it look like you are still asleep under the sheets. You make your exit shutting all doors quietly so as not to alert any one. You may not be lying (by definition) but you are certainly committing a deception which I suspect has a similar deep logical structure to that of lying but with wider boundaries in this regard. (22)

	Now, rather than defining lying and deception, defining types of lying and types of deception, let me concentrate my attention instead on how various parallel streams of being need to be entertained concurrently and thereby implicating various senses of self and various senses of an other. (23)

	For a start, in telling some party a certain 'version of reality' it just so happens that the reality of that situation, its truth or falsity, is in many ways irrelevant to whether we enact a deception. It only becomes a lie, a deception, if we believe the version we are passing of as 'reality' to be false. The appreciation of a practice of a deception, therefore, should correctly be determined at the level of the 'apparent' intention of the person who may or may not be practicing a deception. In legal circles this determination of possible 'guilt' is dependent upon the pre-conditional transcription of 'evidence' and the conditional utilization of the same for the presentations of cogent interpretations to be argued for or against by the prosecution and the defence, and to be re-examined by the judge(s) and/or the jury. In many ways this is exactly what the phenomenologist attempts to put into effect. But intentions cannot directly be empirically evaluated hence this need for a cogent hermeneutically assisted practice of interpretation of textual deposition. Suffice to say that this type of pursuit can be conducted with some degree of success as attested to by the relative successfulness of properly conducted law-courts. On the other hand, this calls forth the need for a considerable degree of discrimination and there is great wisdom in recognizing those limits beyond which we cannot currently travel and declaring an impasse to be an impasse should that occasion occur! On the other hand, intentionallity always traces itself out upon the fabric of the world and in correctly reading this 'tracing out' we successfully trace out its evolutional path as a text upon the texture of the world (by which, correctly, I mean that one-world-of-life that is there-for-us). This is often not an easy task but it is one that needs to be conducted even if only to rule out the relative non-merits of such a practice, i.e, determine if an interpretation is possible or not possible in a certain apparent textual situation that appears to call for a ‘close’ interpretative investigation (into its possible intentional formation, its readability, and, the genre-form and content of a text that is shown to be readable when and where present). (24)

	Just how many 'streams of being' or 'voices' and associated sense of self are necessary for the pursuit of deception to be either committed and/or appreciated? It would appear that at least four voices are necessary for the commission of a deceit and, perhaps, another two more voices need to be addressed, invoked, in order to appreciate the same? Let me elaborate. (25)

	First, in an historical sense, we need to entertain a certain belief about the world. Then, taking our audience into account, we need to speculate what they might think when we test-drive some of those possibilities (we regard as false) in front of them, then continuing in another mode in order to arrive at a certain set of deceptively envisaged possibilities. Lastly (and fourthly), we must come to some understanding on how we think we should transcribe one (or more) of those deceptive possibilities with the intention of deceiving the other person or persons (or some institution). (26)

	In appreciating an act of deception we need to appreciate the four or more streams of being conducted above in some form or other and then to evaluate the integrity of the same we need to re-evaluatively appreciate the same - subject our acts of judgment to a re-evaluative act of judgment. (27)

	Now, it would follow that each of these 'voices', 'streams of being', ‘intentional attitudes towards the world, etc.,’ etc., being envisaged must involve a different sense of perspective, a different attitude of self, and, therein, a different sense of self. This is not to imply that with x perspectives we need x selves but we do need x different senses of self. Moreover, as the overall sense of self is not monolithic we can then propose a set of self-aspects that must be cooperating to some degree in order to intentionally enact this complex intentional process that determines this intention to deceive. But is self-deception a complex intentional process that determines this intent(ion) to deceive its own overall sense of self or some other closely allied sense of self? We may set out to distract our selves from re-simulating the truth-as-perceived but it would appear to make better sense to see self-deception as a process that takes place by default so to speak, i.e., in a breakdown of the overall appreciation and relative self-control exercised in that complex process of intentionality. As a result the overall sense of self ceases either to have the adequate possession of certain information or is not able to be in a position of having the adequate possession of that same information that would stop its overall sense of self from being taken in by its own simulations of possibility to the extent that they should be appreciated as only possibilities and not as simulations of actual states-of-affairs (a process of mis-interpretation that occurs when there is a literalization of the metaphor as previously noted in certain psychotic conditions as discussed elsewhere). That being the case how many strands, as a preconditional minimum, would need to be operative in order for their overall breakdown to establish this process of self-deception? To answer that last question let us speculate in the following fashion. (28)

	A certain possibility needs to be entertained. That possibility needs only to be simulated as a possibility. That stream of 'possible being' then needs to be mis-treated as a stream of actual being, and then accepted at 'face-value' as actual. May be at least three senses of self need to be invoked, find themselves invoked in default, namely, those senses of self concerned with the following three orientations, possibility, possibility as possibly actual, and actuality; the realization of self-deception, in turn, both needing to be appreciated as deceptive and having that judgmental-ruling on self-deceptiveness confirmed. (29)

	The net result of this complexity is, I believe, that there is a greater degree of interactive productivity, but that on balance, less attentive attention has to be exercised in order for there to a 'successful' 'act' of self-deception. A process it is suggested takes place more by default than active intent (although some degree of active self-deception is not to be ruled out in so far as idealities desired, relatively knowingly or unknowingly, in being mis-treated metaphorically and/or rhetorically, are therein ‘realized’, albeit in an illusory presentation; i.e, realized in and through an insufficient set of phenomenal/phenomenological modes when compared to an adequate set of modes necessary for the realization of a justified belief or a belief whose provisional truth could be treated as being at least provisionally established through an absence of current disproof). (30)

v.   Diminished Discrimination through Loss of Transcendental Distance

	As just argued, active or passive self-deception is less an intentional 'act' than a corresponding intentional 'act' possessing an adequate degree of transcendentally informed discrimination. Moreover, it also stands to reason that to transcendentally reflect upon an 'intentional act' with an adequate degree of discriminative awareness implies a greater quanta of psychic energy being invested in that additional meta-activity by virtue of the epistemological fact that to reflect on some intentional object (in this instance an intentional act) is going to require a greater degree of activated and utilized epistemological organization. With this theoretical background in mind I would like to speculate that in a qualitatively diminished judgmental environment when we find a systematically entrenched diminished degree of judgmental investment that we would find ourselves moving into the area of the psychotic misinterpretation of phenomena (both relatively internal and external to the psyche in the schematized location of the origination of those phenomenal presentations). I would hazard a guess that this incremental loss of transcendental distance through a progressive loss of transcendental perspective mirrors what normally happens when the person loses their gestalt integrity through oncoming sleepiness (and in organic illnesses), and, that in a more systematic entrenchment of this type of defective discernment process, as in a psychotic illness, it would first manifest itself covertly, at the level of judgment and with an emphasis upon the quality or tone of lived experience (unless the psychotic epicentre is specifically located in our epistemological hierarchy in, e.g., an affective psychosis). Let me elabourate. (31)

	Gestalt integrity is realized in our epistemological hierarchicalization of consciousness. The psychic centring of consciousness reflecting the degree of overall awareness present within the epistemological organization of that psyche. With the progress diminution of this degree of integrity there would be a progressive withdrawal of psychic energy at hand for the functioning of judgmental processes. This would initially occur on a relatively covert-background level of manifestation, hence the covert nature of a judgmental psychosis unless it progresses through a relatively more overt phase. Moreover, in the approximate identification of the moments of world (as an intentional field) with the Affective Aspect, object with the Cognitive Aspect (as an intentional object-state) and the ego with the Judgmental Aspect (as the 'reviewing polarity of an intentional act') we would expect a negative transformation of self-image to result. A judgmental psychosis would most likely impact on the psyche in the form of a covert loss of self-enpowerment, an increasing inability to relate to other egos and with a sense of loss of ability in our dealings with others with an attendant increase in frustration (just as people can get cranky, or relatively more cranky, before retiring, or, at least be more inclined to demonstrate a greater loss of patience, etc., at the end of their day). A loss of historical perspective should also ensure with an increasing inability to learn from the past and an increasing inability to plan for the future directly reflecting this qualitative loss of transcendental distance, with, as a result, an excess degree of focus upon the historical sense of the present, the now and the type of desires attendant upon this being rooted in the sense of a non-spontaneous immediacy. (32)

	Why does a loss of transcendental distance more easily facilitate an 'act' of self-deception? (33)

	In a progressive loss of gestalt integrity there is the increasing autonomy of aspects and perspectives, etc., albeit with a progressively diminished degree of qualitative richness. In such an environment idealities desired might be mistakenly identified and recognized through a literalization of the(ir) metaphor(ical simulation), etc. Moreover, psychic loops and their consequent compartmentalizations (from an increasing non-overlapping with each other) would become relatively more prominent. Furthermore, insightful affirmation of transcendentally based evidence (i.e., located in the appropriate transcendental functioning of judgment) would become increasing detached from an overall sense of self that arises from and through this increased autonomy of polar components that constitute this consequently diminished overall sense of the epistemological hierarchy (as reflected internally in our overall sense of self and externally through a textualization of behaviour). One might say that insight is 'no longer to hand' even though to some degree or other it must remain ever present (as the potentially of the epistemological hierarchy must remain ever present, but, that neither potentiality nor actuality is ever realized in an absolute form it implies that insight, whether connected or disconnected, must at least potentially be at hand if only in 'spirit' if not in practical 'fact')! That only in an increasing critical awareness can evidence be properly submitted and examined in order to overcome disjuncture between potentially interconnected loops and compartments (relating to similar object-states in our mapping of the life-world)… for the quality of gestalt integrity to be adequately restored, for an overcoming of misplaced idealized identification, for our powers of transcendental detachment and discernment to be re-activated, etc. Through a transcendental balance of the senses of the immanent and the transcendent, through this increased senses of psychic depth and height, is the mind then able to find itself in a better position to discriminatively discern the presence and quality of all the relevant modalities that should either establish or disestablish the presented form of that currently reviewed evidence being presented. Our powers of appreciation being able, in effect, to better understand what modalities are present and how they are exercised in the light of what should be expected in a given situation-type in so far as what needs to be present in that presentation(-type) and what activated modalities need to be present in order to establish that intentional 'simulation' as evidence qua evidence. So, e.g., a dream apple may taste like an apple, indeed, ideally like a very good or perfect apple, yet, without a full complement of modalities that should accompany a 'real' apple tasting process our judgment could never arrive at the affirmation of such a judgment without the same! Without this degree of psychic depth and richness of modalities, etc., no judgment would affirm the existence of an apple beyond the classification of this type of (imagined) experience as a mere apple-like experience. However, in the loss of our gestalt integrity we open ourselves up to a mis-placed affirmation of idealities envisaged without realizing, through a process of re-cognition, to what degree those 'phenomenal presentations' are not modally rich enough to sustain that 'apparent' attribution (as might be presented in a dream, a delusion, an hallucination, an illusion, etc.). On a re-establishing adequate powers of transcendental discernment, we of course, re-open ourselves to a better appreciation of just what (intuitively) establishes or disestablishes, confirms or dis-confirms, that phenomenal presentation to be or not to be as its appears. E.g., on waking an apple dreamt might have tasted very nice we know damn well that it will not satisfy our current hunger, etc. (34)

	To provisionally conclude at this point I have speculatively implicated the following, namely, that diminished insight allows the partial enactment of a process of self-deception; loss of transcendental detachment allows us to focus on the presentation of idealizations and to mis-represent them to ourselves; that increasing autonomy of distinctive levels and aspects, etc., assist us in this misplaced project of idealizational-re-emphasis, the literalization of the metaphor, etc., loss of overall transcendental distance and discernment, etc. Moreover, it appears to follow that from a loss of transcendental distance through the loss of an overall transcendental suspension necessary for the rhetorical dimension of an act of judgment to take place (through the asking of a properly formed question) by virtue of a suspension of belief that an inverse suspension of dis-belief is substituted for the former. Instead of asking “does x possess ‘a’?’, in its stead, we say to ourselves that “x must possess ‘a’!”, or, “why isn’t x in possession of ‘a’?” without seriously asking this rhetorical question, perceiving (wrongly) the situation as apparently self-evident. Now, let us look into a hypnotic model of self-deception and inquire what role the co-authored might be construed as being present either actively or by default (paralleling this non-transcendental suspension of dis-belief at the expense of a transcendental suspension of belief)? (35)

vi.   A Hypnotic Model of Self-Deception?

	As noted elsewhere a process of self-deception conducted in a hypnotic mode is not apparently entered into as a process of deception or self-deception. In other words, in a hypnotic state the hypnotized person is not acting out a dissimulational role. In effect, they appear (through the auspices of the interpretation of PET-Scan, etc.,) to genuinely believe the hypnotic instructions given to them, albeit without a complete disconnection from the ‘real reality to hand’. Tell a person in a hypnotic trance that a certain chair is empty and they will not be eager to sit on that same chair. When questioned they will tell you it is empty (as instructed) but still will not sit on the same (certainly not doing so as if in a manner of ‘just sitting on a chair’). Evidence that some part of the mind is insightful enough to know that things are not as stated. Furthermore, as noted, their affirmation that the chair is indeed vacant (although with a person sitting on it) is not conducted in a dissimmulational mode, i.e., the type of mode(s) that would need to be activated in an active process of deception. In effect, they are not lying! Yet, even though not creating or accepting that a process of deception is in play, at the same time there is an awareness that all is not as stated. What possible implications could be drawn here? (36)

	It would seem that our overall sense of self is the effective, ongoing resultant of a series of senses of self some of which are relatively activated and/or integrated with that ‘over all sense of self’ whilst others are relatively inactivated and/or non-integrated with the same. What possible implications could be drawn from our research into co-authored phenomena in regards to a theoretical appreciation of hypnotic phenomena, especially with respect to the classification of the virtual? (37)

	What insights could we argue for from an examination of hypnotism? For a start we have the observation, e.g., when in a relaxational trance, that we would like to move our fingers and finding ourselves powerless to do so. One way of reading this type of phenomenon is to suppose that this task of moving our fingers apart from the clasped together position necessitates a number of loops of intentional-behavioural sub-routines, e.g., feeling our hands clasped together, thinking of them as clasped together, willing them to be moved apart, thinking of them as moving apart, perceiving them as moving apart, etc. Now, if we envisage all of these 'loops' (as mini-hermeneutical circles) schematized according to their position in the epistemological hierarchy (and that in turn in an intercultural-cultural cosmic mapping of the life-world) and therein placed metaphorically in a 'vertical position' one above the other in accordance with their degree of epistemological organization in this epistemological hierarchy then we may suppose that through 'induction' all these 'loops' could interact in such a manner that there is an attuned flow between the same. I.e., in a perception of the situation to hand (so to speak) and an intention to separate our clasped fingers this intention is put into practice and we find our hands moving apart in practice and in our perception of the same. All loop-levels feeding into an overall loop wherein we find no effective resistance to the successful accomplishment of this intention to separate our clasped fingers from the clasping fingers of the other hand, and v.v. However, in a trance-like state, these levels are psychically separated and made relatively non-aligned with as a result a desire to separate these fingers being thwarted in practice. We know what we intend but through a non-alignment we cannot follow through on this desired intent. (38)

Is there another way of reading this type of phenomenon (involving the trance-like separation of intentional-subroutines)? No doubt we could supply an infinite number of different readings in our interpretation of this phenomenon or any other for that matter. Let us, however, look for those readings, those metaphorical models that appear to adequately simulate this type of situation, that appear to have a greater interpretative value in their distinctive reading of this situation to hand. E.g., we could use this same model of loops being aligned with each in a 'vertical dimension' but supply an 'overall centre of psychic gravity' to the same with as a result that as our mind in this relaxational trance is centred on the fingers felt clasping together and not further up in this hierarchy towards those regions that respond to acts of will, with as a result, we are left with those fingers immovably clasped together despite an ineffective ‘apparent desire’ to move them apart. Another way we could read this situation is to see a different sense of self being involved at each relevant level, and from each relevant perspective involved in this complex operation of unclasping the fingers (as outlined a few lines previously). Then with increasing autonomy of those levels and perspectives things are more inclined to stay the way they are within those relatively autonomous parameters. Then to overcome the inertia of the clasped fingers enough psychic will power has to be successfully channelled in order to move them apart. Otherwise inertia remains the 'order' of the day. (39)

	The phenomenon of hypnosis also suggests a number of other models as to what might be taking place, e.g., a paralysis of the will; a distraction of an overall sense of self and thereby allowing other lower levels of the psyche a much greater weight or degree of autonomy; suspension of disbelief along with a literalization of imaginatively envisaged phenomena (so, e.g., if you think snakes could be under the bed and you 'literalize the metaphor', etc., then snakes are under your bed and so it would be perfectly normal to be greatly upset by this prospect [as once recounted to me by a psychotic patient mentioned in my second footnote] [and which is a type of phenomenon that can occur in children of a certain age when they are going to sleep/waking up?]).  The implication for a co-authored reading of this phenomena of hypnosis being that through increased autonomy of aspects and perspectives variously involved sense of self are less inclined to act together in an overall process of resolutional harmonization! These relatively non-cooperating senses of self taking on an apparently virtual co-authorial-like co-authorship. Hence the implication of this virtual co-authorial dimension indicative of this loss of a gestalt psychic self-integration). (40)

	The metaphor of 'paralysis' could be explained, or rather modelled on the alignment of loops as just outlined - with sub-induction below and super-induction up from a certain lower level in the epistemological hierarchy to a higher level not being able to take place effectively through a mis-alignment of transformational interaction. A model that could also be envisaged from a weighted perspective - if our attention is pre-occupied with a certain level then that level of activity/inactivity takes precedence over all other possibilities until such a time that weighting is released and re-assigned, etc? A mental blocking model could also be envisaged in this regard - through some type of metal rigidity in thought processes all other possibilities are effectively 'blocked'. (41)

	In a distraction model behaviour is maintained through an inability to focus adequately on a differently desired behavioural pattern. Hence conformity with the status quo, in other words, in effect, a trance of some form or other. (42)

	Another model is that of  'being trapped in the transcendental suspension(s)'. In effect a suspension of dis-belief. Normally, the act of judgment mirrors the conditions called for in an act of transcendental reflection, i.e., a suspension of belief, etc. However, on the other hand, through a loss of our transcendental powers of discernment there is put into effect an opposite suspension of dis-belief. Taking all phenomena at mere face value implies that we are being evaluatively sceptical re the value to be ascribed to a certain situation. We are in effect asking a question. In being able to ask a question we enter a disconjunctive suspension, namely, does x (as a logical subject) possess feature a? I.e., in situation S it is the case that x either possesses feature a, etc., or does not possess feature a, etc. (where a is a predicate, relation and/or logical subject). By such means a transcendental suspension is put into practice (in part; in conjunction with the suspension of other moments). Hence in an act of judgment, in effect, the status of the predicate or relation or logical subject is called into question and thereby formulating how that reply is to be constituted by the manner of its archetypal mapping in this world-of-life as predicate 'p', relation 'r' and/or logical subject 's', etc. A properly formed question calls into question the basis of that quest(ion) and thereby pre-formulating the archetypal response that would be recognized as an appropriate response to that particular question. On the other hand, in a loss of transcendental distance there is created in an equal measure a suspension in our ability to dis-believe a certain interpretation of that situation, with as a result, an effective belief in the literalization of that state of affairs. In such an atmosphere, all manner of beliefs, disbeliefs, etc., are allowed to occur in this non-discriminate climate of belief, hence the effective literalization of the metaphor. This literalization proceeding a pace to the same degree there is put into effect a suspension of dis-belief, i.e., through a loss of transcendental distance (wherein normally we would suspend all belief as a transcendental condition prior to any act of judgment, the opposite is allowed to occur, namely the suspension of our dis-belief and our readiness to accept what is apparent at face value) (or its equivalent 'read' in a literal sense). (43)

	What role, therefore, should we envisage for the overall sense of self given a loss in our powers of transcendental discrimination? Nothing other than a directly related degree of paralysis, blocking, distraction, loss of self-autonomy, loss of integrity, loss of transcendental distance, loss of authenticity, etc., with, as a result, the imposition of a psychotic or psychotic-like distortion of reality, etc. Hence the nature, the manner and degree of a psychosis can be modelled by the implication and quantification of these same parameters, etc. (44)

	To conclude let me sketch out some of the implications our philosophical research appears to play in the formulation of an egological determination of the nature of the self, i.e., just what is involved in the being and the becoming of our self (along with its multiple sense of selves) in this world-of-life!? To conclude, we must ask ourselves, in our current project to hand, whether our concepts of the co-authored, the non-virtual and virtual, the non-psychotic, pseudo-psychotic and the psychotic, etc., have a part to play in the re-formulation of this problem of deception/self-deception - a topic which will be confronted in the second half of this essay? (45)

Conclusion - A Preamble to the Formulation of an Egological Philosophy

	What phenomenological nature has the self? If we refer to the overall sense of the self through an overall sense of self just what can this sense of self do and not do, etc? If a particular sense of self is that gestalt polarity that can review the relationship between the intentional object-state and the intentional background field (that collectively form the hermeneutic circle as a basic structure that organizes the epistemological hierarchy which, in turn, is set in its cultural-intercultural frames of reference which collectively constitute the life-world as experienced by the person and which delineates that pluralistic sense of self) can this overall sense of self be referred to in the same manner as a 'self'? In this light, is this overall sense of self then more a fiction, albeit a fruitful fiction? Being the resultant consequence of this relatively cooperative federation of selves it cannot therefore be itself an active sense of self able to review itself if this overall sense of self has no higher sense of self against which it could be appreciatively 're-viewed'. On the other hand, this sense of self cannot be dismissed as completely ineffective as our intentional activity and our desired intent through processes of intentional resolution can be put into practice to that degree that is practicable for it to appear to be able to do so and in this regard is, in effect, a reflection of this qualified self-referential ability to be itself, or, at least appear to be like any other sense of self with an overall sense of acting as a self. But is the self then, in this sense, an acter or an actor behind a mask, or, indeed, just a mere (set of) mask(s) without any substantial sense of self other than as a logical subject connecting an intentional flow of connected personal history in our collective mapping of this one-world-of-life? (46)

	In this space between an 'absolute sense of self' and a sense of self that is a 'mere illusion' we will find the 'real self' albeit with all the qualifications attendant upon this 'in between state of affairs'. This in between ‘space’ permits the ‘self’ to practice deception towards others and, in turn, to suffer varying degrees and types of self-deception as noted in this paper. To that extent that it is a logical subject with a sense of historical continuity it finds itself allowed to exist with a qualified being-through-becoming-in-this world-of-life with the ability to purport itself in a relatively authentically-oriented manner or a relatively inauthentically-oriented manner. But let us investigate this qualified province of the egological anon. (47)

							   Noël Tointon, Sydney, 6.12.02.

Postscript: Some Thoughts on a Fundamental and Universal Model of Deception

1.	Some initial ideas retained in note form

How would such a (universal) model of deception be formulated?

A thinks x is p but tells b that x is not x-like, or, x is not p, or, x is q…
A thinks 'x is p…'
A tells B "x is -x-like, -p, or q"
A is telling a lie because (in truth/reality) {x is x-like, p or -q}
B knows that A is wrong when he knows 'x is x-like, p or -q' i.e., {x is x-like, p or -q)
B assumes that A is telling a lie if he believes that A 'x is x-like, p or-q' despite what he says, namely, that "x is -x-like, -p, or q"

In truth there is a conformity or a complete transformational isomorphism when you can travel from "x is  x-like, p or -q" to 'x is x-like, p, -q" to {x is x-like, p or -q}

Do we need to say 'know' is different from {know}, or "know" is different from "know"?
How do we know a 'lie' is a lie?

A lie is suspected when there is a loss of transformational isomorphism and/or internal contradiction is manifest, and, dissimulation is suspected (in part or in whole). More simply: isomorphic transformation can not be conducted between the various phenomenological descriptions of their respective simulated time-space situations. E.g: A/'x is p', A/"x is p", AB/{x is p}, B/'x is p', B/"x is p"… and x is p if p' (after Tarski). Moreover, a lie can always be suspected even if there is no proof, i.e.,  transformation breakdown is suspected. What role does a guarantee play in this sense of trust/distrust?

Note all three states could be rewritten as phenomenological states of affairs in a simulated time-space to which degrees of access, in part or in whole can be granted to some extent or other. In other words neither absolute access is granted nor absolute non-access is denied.

Overcoming of (the formulaic conventions of a culturally determined public sense of) conscience. (But like all principles they only deal with simple ideal situations – reality is infinitely richer). (Need there for a dialectical, intuitive sense of the moral/ethical – and this occurs because i). More ethical patterns are predetermined culturally, and ii). only on the edges of our psychic-moral universe do we need to re-determine those rulings/sets of precedents, etc. for that one percent of the time that this re-ordering needs to be reflected, for which we have precedents to fall back upon in some measure or other [or at least to form hybrid precedents as in torts when dealing with novel situations]}. General ethics demand this to some reasonable degree. Then societal demands also necessitate appropriate forms of lying/dissimulation. How is this tension resolved?

Resolution by convention, or, hybrid-precedent-conventions ethically reflected upon existentially. I.e., allowing a judgment to be judgmentally oriented and entered into (and these a priori pre-conditions, conditions and post-conditions find themselves, in the main, already explicitly reflected in a transcendental phenomenological philosophy as after Husserl, e.g.).

Transformational states (‘between versions of reality’) therefore depend on evidence and the rules for the acceptability of that evidence. Evidence is realized through the transformational ease of access and successfulness of that access realized, hermeneutic coherence, pragmatic utility, egological enpowerment, linguistic-semantic competence, [indexed-]syntactical correspondences, transcendental strictures, appropriate pre-essential/essential construction/re-construction, etc., etc. [as should be found in a unified theory of truth already sketched out elsewhere {and implicated in our ordered philosophy which looks at the types of truth-judgment in our circuit around the hermeneutic circle, e.g., aesthetic second order judgments involve coherence of the object state whereas hermeneutic judgments depend on the coherence of the field, pre-essential-essentials being determined through an analytic, syntactic form of correspondence, etc}].

Delusional self-deception could be engineered and strengthened by  a supportive rhetorical flux when (analytically) used to support a (metaphorically envisaged) position, etc. (as entered into in and through a hermeneutic circle). For example: "There could be spaceships, and they could abduct people… to… there are the same… they could abduct… these bruises/missing time seem to imply that I have been abducted… I must have been abducted… what would it have been like… so it must have like that… it was like that… I was abducted!… and it was not a nice experience/it was a nice experience… what does it mean… supply your own cosmic interpretation/quasi-religious meaning… toady I feel as if I have been kidnapped again… I must have been abducted again!… etc… (with consequent 'reinforcement' of that type of ‘delusion’ [implying that all delusions are situated in delusional systems?])".
These two laws are in an inversed relationship with each other:

i).   Loss of transcendental distance 
      Results in a suspension of dis-belief!

ii).  Possession of transcendental distance
      Is realized through a suspension of belief!

Scientifically and philosophically there is a need to weed out these types of misrepresented and deceptively constructed phenomena, e.g., false, delusionally constructed, self-reported ‘instances’ of alien abduction, etc., in order to truly concentrate on what is left to see if 'alien abduction' is, indeed, a true phenomena in residue?? Would we be able to recognize a residue if one was to exist? Guess nothing can be so strange that it could not be metaphorically analogued in some fashion or other? Successfully - that is another matter.

And in this we will need to take a primary co-authored perspective!!! And incorporate past successes, etc., if to establish successfully accomplished, competent interpersonal/inter-cultural transmission/sharing of information, etc.

2.	Some later thoughts on a relatively unified theory of deception

How do we establish a general theory of deception?

The partially criticized, previous four conditions noted in sec. 21 can be collapsed in the following observation rule:

There is deception when there is -
the intent to mis-re-present a textualized version of reality!

Intent can be claimed directly by the author of that intent, and, shown by demonstration that mis-re-presentation did indeed appear to occur.

If mis-re-presentation can be shown to have occurred and this ‘intent’ can be demonstrated then we can argue for deception indirectly.

In mitigation we can argue that it is possible for people to hold contradictory ideas without being aware that they do so – but separate compartmentalizaton in the derivation of those conflicting items needs to be ascertained, the fact that there was a lack of reflection in this comparative instance, etc.

Deceiving others is deception…
Deceiving one’s own self is self-deception…

That there can be no absolute boundaries between, the same only possible, practicable forms of delineation. Hence a field of polarity between deception-and-self-deception needs to be recognized (although in their ideality there is a distinctive phenomenological difference between the same, e.g., as to the 'perpetrator'/'victim' of the deception, etc.). Moreover there is a polarity between inventories that are deceptively engineered and non-deceptively engineered. Reality cannot be completely formulated (through inventory, etc.) in a deceptive fashion, and, reality cannot be completely formulated (through inventory, etc.) in a non-deceptive fashion. Hence the need for accommodational resolution, basic transformational isomorphism, background coherence, pragmatic utility, etc., in the practical formulation of truth whether in object-terms of reference or in meta-terms of reference (when dealing with theories of truth determination themselves, etc.).

Deception can be invoked when there is a non-transformational isomorphism between visions/versions of reality in regard to those features felt to be deceptively engineered, and, intent can be reasonably demonstrated. Evidence establishing this inter-transformational correspondence when there is this transformation pathway between textual versions/visions of reality (without making absolute claims for a ‘reality’ beyond its textual inventorying, etc.). Comparative degrees of reality being established  through a symmetric isomorphic depth of stability! Evidence being directly documented in a context that notes this manner of its documentation or inferred through inter-textual processing of textual information that establishes this relative ‘fact’, albeit treated as provisional (under transcendental reflection, i.e., transcendental suspension, transcendental reduction and transcendental reconstitution [as articulated in our investigations of the hermeneutic circle, circular ordered philosophy, etc.]).

But it is only between the object-level and the meta-levels of our semantic inquiries that relative and provisional truth determination is realized (albeit through treament/retreatment of this ‘space'), albeit in conjunctions with all other transcendental implications of our hermeneutic circle, ordered philosophy, etc. That object-levels, etc., can never be absolutely realized hence only across this space…! This space taking a relatively unified dimension through transcendental intersubjectivity, transcendental subjectivity and transcendental objectivity, and, conformity with the transcendental ideality of archetypal intentional constitution which, in essence, mirrors the life-world in its transcendental ideality {i.e., as a possibility to be entertained in intentional constitution (at the same time ‘idealistic’ prejudices and ‘realistic’ prejudices are transcended through a relative, critical overcoming of the epistemological-ontological divide in a recognition of the experiential fact that neither polarity [indeed all polarities whether bi-polar, tri-polar, etc.] can be known either ideally or actually in fact!)} !

Hence it is in, and only across, this semantic space between object-inventories and their parallel meta-inventoried evaluations, with acknowledgment of all limitations to be found therein, that between these textual accounts that when transformational isomorphic symmetry is established (and only across this ‘space’) that we then have determined, albeit provisionally, a relatively truthful account of reality along with all imputed instances of deception, evidential success and confirmation of deceptive intent, non-deceptive intent, etc!!

And this manifests itself in a relativity of indubitableness but never as an absolutely indubitable experience which, in effect, still puts us in ‘direct contact’ with the one reality of the life-world which is this ‘one’ world-of-life to the extent that there is this direct implication of being in this one-world-of-life!!!