Beyond Therapy: A Set of Essays
On Miscellaneous Topics in Psychology and Psychiatry (2001-2003)

V. Deception and Self-Deception:
Part II - An Egological Philosophy: Doing the Impossible -
Whether Deceptively or Non-Deceptively
How Do We Encounter that which Cannot Be Encountered?

0.   Introduction

	In the midst of writing a series of papers on miscellaneous topics in psychology I have had to deal with various problems concerning the self and its multi-faceted nature. What is the self? - can we (metaphorically) meet it face to face, or, is the self only an appearance, a simulation of an ego with our encountering of 'itself' itself also only a simulation? In a bewildering array of senses of self from the physiological, emotional, perceptual, conceptual, judgmental, etc., to the personal, social, political, cultural, etc., along with the impact of mental illnesses such as psychosis, multiple personalities, hysteria, etc., the overall vision of the self seems to be taking on the complexion of a jigsaw puzzle, a series of overlying masks, a presence marked by an absolute absence - a mere polarity that can be approached but never absolutely encountered?! Hence my sub-title of "Doing the Impossible - …Can we (absolutely, i.e., actually) encounter that which cannot be (absolutely) encountered?" (1)
	This problem, "what is the nature of the self?", is brought home to us in an interesting fashion in the allied problem (or problems) of deception and self-deception. How can the self in its 'monolithic' unity of function deceive others since to do so implies various senses of self that must be cooperating with each other in order to manufacture that dissimulation, namely, a sense of self that simulates a certain appearance in conjunction with another sense of self that knows that this former sense of self is being dishonest, discordant with a general understanding of reality, etc., along with the invocation of a  series of senses or aspects of self (as part of an overall sense of self?) that individually admire the possible efficacy of this intended deception, fear the possible consequences of its discovery, ponder the ethicality of being dishonest in that situation… in general, review the overall practicalities of such a course of behaviour, etc? Or, assuming the self is a hierarchically organized plurality of personal perspectives, i.e., is not monolithic, how, we might ask, is the self able to deceive its own overall sense of self or some other sense of self that functions like an ego? How can the same 'self' be fooled by its own intentional processes having created to some extent the preconditions and conditions for this act of deception to manifest itself/have itself manifested? In the problem of self-deception the overall sense of self somehow, in reviewing this self-manufactured state of dissimulation, is itself fooled into believing this state of affairs to be in a state of coincidence with their general understanding of reality, whilst, at the same time, it is reasonable to believe that another sense of self should be postulated as being aware of this fact but unable to transmit this 'insight' to that other overall sense of self currently being 'literally' deceived by this state of deception being manufactured by a different aspect of itself, etc… and all this is further complicated by the fact that in the course of our daily lives we are not consistent, have an imperfect memory, hold a miscellany of contradictory ideas and beliefs, and, can never claim to be in complete intentional control of our own  lives. Indeed, the greater philosophical problem must be in how we are to come to understand this very fact of 'our being in the world' that, somehow or other, we do appear to function, on the whole, without utter psychic confusion, its consequent paralysis, our ultimate disintegration and self-dissolution? (2)

	In this paper let me examine a number of points in the light of this problem of an overall sense of self - "how is it that the self can function with an overall sense of self when this sense of self (is without an absolute basis and) is fabricated from a bewildering array of self-perspectives?" (3)

1.   That this Self is a Hierarchy of Various Senses of Self

	Somehow or other the person is 'a' person, someone who functions with an overall sense of self! Then, in order for some sense of self to appreciate some other sense of self that sense of self under review must be appreciated by a higher sense of self, i.e., given a certain sense of self, a self-conscious reflection upon the same demands a greater degree of psychic unity, or gestalt unity, in order to be able to review that sense of self (now made the intentional object-state of that reflexive act). This doctrine of appreciation implies that an object level is always appreciated from a meta-level whose status is effectively raised by one degree (in epistemological organization). Hence, e.g., a pain is not appreciated as a pain qua pain from the perspective of a pain. Pain is experienced as pain from the point of view of that pain but is appreciated as pain qua pain from a higher perspective which cannot be impressional in nature (at the psychological-epistemological location and level of its originating consciousness). Hence pain might be appreciated from the affective perspective of mood or the cognitive level of the perceptual or the conceptual as a linguistic category of thought or as a judgment as to its identity, location, character, intensity, cause, possible amelioration, the potential successfulness of such a program, etc. Indeed, the pain is experienced as pain qua pain on the impressional level and then its affective impact is experienced on the affective level of mood, the pain is then perceived in the perceptual field and named in the conceptual and judged in the judgmental level of reflection (and that judgment recorded in linguistic terms of reference in the cognitive-conceptual aspect of this epistemological hierarchy of intentional consciousness). Hence pain is felt, impinges on mood, is perceived, conceptually treated and judged as such. (4)

	Although appreciation operates on a meta-level whose status is raised by one degree, etc., we do not need to invoked an infinite spectrum of meta-levels in order to appreciate our appreciation, etc. (although the epistemological hierarchy of intentional being might well appear to be so subdivided and extended?). Through processes of transformational treatment/retreatment (and our critical distinction of distinctive products and pathways of transformation) our mental processes can essential straddle two (or a few more) meta-levels of analysis and/or synthesis, finally bringing the (retreated) productivity of our investigations back on par with the initial object-level of examination. So, in the final analysis, the pain through re-treatment can be experienced and 'appreciated' as pain qua pain. (5) 

These two meta-levels of the object level and the meta-level (with a status raised by one meta-degree) in the gestalt field of intentional inspection essentially represent respectively the object-polarity of focus and the polar-background-field of appropriate and significance-producing contrast. A third polarity of the ego-pole is invoked when we negatively define it as not the relationship between the two poles of the object-state and the background field of contrast when the same, i.e., that ‘relationship’, in turn is intentionally reviewed (with the simultaneous productivity of that relationship between the current intentional object-state under focus and its corresponding field of informative contrast). As argued elsewhere these three poles mirror the three moments of the hermeneutic circle, namely, the phenomenological text, hermeneutic meta-text and the existential non-text (along with the three archetypal intentional moments of Object, World and Ego respectively, etc.).(6)

	Now, returning to this problem (one among many of which a small number will be listed and discussed in the course of this paper) - if there is a sense of self that is the overall sense of self how could this sense of self be appreciated without the necessary implication of a meta-overall sense of self? Just as every other sense of self can be appreciated from a more epistemologically organized perspective is there an end of the line where the last station cannot be travelled past so to speak? Let me look into this dilemma, namely, that for a sense of self to operate it needs to appreciate its distinctive intentional field of object-states and be itself appreciated from a more organized epistemological perspective. In this light is the 'overall sense of self' truly 'the overall sense of self' or is it a sense of a sense of self beholden, knowingly or unknowingly, to an even 'higher' sense of self that might be/might not be appreciated by a more epistemologically organized sense of self? Or is this type of self quite different in 'type' from that sense of self that essentially appreciates the relationship between a distinctive type of gestalt field and its distinctive object-states, an appreciation of the relative transcendental unity of a certain field that establishes that corresponding sense of self through appreciation from that higher epistemological perspective. Is this sense of self, then, quite different - being a semblance of self produced/re-produced from a relatively integrated interactive resolution of the collected miscellany of senses of self that appear to inhabit this egological zoo placed under such an overall intentional umbrella - in effect a meta-sense of self that neither can be reduced to a particular sense of self nor their mere collection or summation?! But, then, perhaps we should argue that as 'resolution' is normally realized through the existential moment of the non-textual it follows that this overall sense of self must itself be born in a field subject to the same gestalt rules as any other sense of self, albeit dealing with an intentional field of discrimination whose intentional object-states are senses or other fields of self-awareness (which in turn are probably subject to the same type of harmonized accommodation just as the visual field can be hypothetically entertained as a collection of sub-fields dealing with colour and focus, motion and background observation, line recognition, shape recognition, gestalt essentialization of form, facial recognition, etc.). Hence, in this intentional schematization of consciousness 'self' can only be treated as a pole - a polar objective that, by definition, can never be realized, cannot be completely obtained and, therein, can never be absolutely encountered! (7)

	Looking into this dilemma let us first look more closely as to how a visual-perceptual sense of self might arise from a hypothetical, archetypal point of view. (8)

	In a visual-perceptual field visual objects are discriminatively 'viewed' intentionally as visual objects. On one hand, they are seen as different from the background of that visual field otherwise they could not be seen. On the other hand, they cannot be absolutely different from that background field otherwise how could they be seen as 'visual objects in that visual field'. So there is this intentional relationship between those objects and that field, indeed, it is though this interactive relationship that visual objects are discerned within that visual field. However, visual objects qua visual objects cannot be discerned without reference to their appropriate field of introduction, namely, the visual field. Moreover, this visual field qua visual field could not be discerned without that visual field itself being appreciated from or within an appropriate meta-field that allows us to view that visual field as if it were an intentional object in its own right to that extent that it is necessary for one to be able to review it in that light. A visual field gains its phenomenological sense as one distinctive aspect of a perceptual field (in the discrimination of an empirical object-state). Moreover, it gains its distinct distinctiveness for that (overall sense of) self from this distinctive interaction between those intentional objects in that intentional field of the visual (in the 'light' of its temporal-spatial perspective(s)). The hermeneutic meaning of this hierarchy of intentional interaction between 'objects(-states)' and 'fields' or 'worlds' is determined culturally; through meta-textual genre expectations conducted through processes of protention and processes of memory recognition conducted through productive/re-productive processes of 'textual' retention. The existential meaningfulness of these interactions arising form the third moment of the non-textual, namely, that existentially enriched and non-reducible interaction between the meta-textual and the textual (that has been previously depicted metaphorically on a number of occasions as like the right 'key' being fitted in its lock on a locked door allowing the relatively novel 'phenomenon of opening' to emerge and therein giving us passage through the resolution of their harmonized interaction). The dynamic transcendental balance of all three moments establishing, in this instance, a not-textual sense of an overall visual self (as part of an empirical sense of self). (9)

	All of this theoretical description-prescription of intentionality is obviously hypothetical. Certain phenomenological 'observations', however, might be considered less theoretical or less hypothetical, namely, for instance, that intentionality is complex; is hierarchically organized; each aspect of the self is determined by and determines both a corresponding field of (intentionally structured) consciousness and its corresponding object-states able to be discriminatively focused upon in that field of consciousness; that these polar constructions are ideal, polarized and can never be absolutely obtained or entertained apart from those co-polar aspects that, from their own points of view, mutually co-determine other products and processes that are thematized in that same field and, in turn, are appreciated from their appropriate meta-perspective or meta-sense of self, etc. (10)

2.   Acter, Actor or a Mere (Series of) Mask(s)?

	It is argued that there is a test to help us to 'decisively' reach the conclusion as to whether we are dealing with another human being or a cleverly programmed computer instructed to answer us as if it were intelligent, human and possessed of self-consciousness, etc. This is the Turing Test - essentially our asking complex questions via a keyboard and a computer screen in order to find ourselves in a position of being able to differentiate whether our conversational partner is another human being or a well programmed computer that lacks a true self-consciousness and which lacks as a consequence a sense of self-conscious reflection. However, what if humans (as a sort of quazi standard) were machines, albeit very complex ones, ones that possessed self-consciousness, surely, it would follow logically, if machines became more sophisticated and apparently self-consciousness that, as a consequence, no process of discrimination (other than a close scrutiny of  'personal' history) would be able to differentiate them if we were to merely apply this Turing Test. The implication being that, if the human person is only a very sophisticated machine, then, the Turing Test is only going to be able to help us to differentiate the complexity of one machine vis-à-vis some other, etc., and whether there is the appearance of self-consciousness or its relative absence. (11)

	Furthermore, having argued for 'self' as a polar construction (constructed from a hierarchy of gestalt fields each with their own associated polarities of self) it would follow that we are no longer dealing with an actual acter in the sense of an intentional agent whose intentional being is to be as an actual agent in the world nor with an actor acting behind a mask or series of masks (or personae) as a hidden intentional agent. A polar vision of self argues for the absolute fact that there is no absolute sense self acting in and of itself. However, from an empirical point of view, as engaged in our dealings with others in the course of our passages through this world(-of-life), there is this appearance that this life-world is populated by actors, indeed, in effect acters operating as actors through the appearance of 'masks'. By masks is metaphorically meant the adoption of a particular persona or set of personae appropriate or not appropriate to the course of action that 'person' appears to adopt/have adopted in their passage through this world(-of-life). Such personae as male, female, child, old person, good samaritan, friend, scientist, mother, cook, lover, colleague, rogue, philosopher, deceiver, etc., etc. Indeed, in the emptiness of this nihilistic type of philosophy, although from an absolute point of view we can argue for the absolute non-existence of the person, from an empirical point of view, or any other relative, non-absolute perspective, we can argue from experience for the presentation of the phenomenal appearance of a real ‘person’, real 'people' in this life-world as a ‘fact’ would help to truly establish the world as a world-of-life. Moreover, through the phenomenological fact that this life-world is 'one' world-of-life-there-for-all-of-us it follows that we must be in direct contact with the same and all other phenomena that metaphorically cross our path or whose path we cross (and not 'indirect contact' as proposed in representationalist, dualist and Cartesian styles of philosophy or similar 'foundered' on discrete multiple worlds, etc.). However, this granted, we are now presented by one more problem, namely, if we are in direct contact with all others when we encounter them and are engaged  with them we must now ask ourselves how it is possible for us to both deceive others and be deceived by others? If our phenomenal contact with others is direct how would deception be possible in such a world? Or, even, in the midst of this relational emptiness how could ‘contact’ be conceived when there is nothing there that could be contacted or, for that matter, make contact? (12)

3.   But if There is Direct Contact How Could We Deceive Each Other?

If we meet others 'directly' how could we dissimulate before others and they before us?! Surely, in our direct contact with them and they with us, all intent to deceive would be immediately experienced as such (and not realized 'mediately' through processes of mediation, indirectly recognizing that a process of deception was at some stage intended and put into effect)!? (13)

	But, as good post-modernists we should argue for the fact that no person is in absolute intentional control of the formation of their own sense of self-being as 'a person-in-this-world-of-life! That being the case, it follows that no person can claim to be in full control of their own intentional life nor be fully aware of the intentionality of some other person even if they were in direct contact with them. So, if the other person cannot be in full control of their own life then how much more so should we not be able to divine the intentional life of that person or any other person or all others for that matter!? Yet, at the same time, still be in direct contact with them as demanded by the one-worldness of the life-world. (14)

	Let me resolve this puzzle by noting that it is because we can be in direct contact with others that we can, at least theoretically, re-cognize an act of deception as an act of deception at some hypothetical point in time. Being in direct contact does not mean we could have an absolute understanding of the intentional life of some other person nor an adequate understanding of that other person through 'our' current directness of contact. Although we might be in a position to have an adequate essential knowledge of that person to that extent we can appreciate the ‘holistic unity of their being’ stamped upon the intentional deposition of their life as it traces out its course upon the fabric of this shared world as they make their textualized passage through this lived-world of intentionality(?). E.g., when we meet a ‘good’ person we know them as ‘good’, when we meet a ‘not so good’ person we have come to know them as ‘not so good’, etc. Of course the problem hypothetically remains, if a person went out of their way to pass themselves off as ‘good’ would they truly be a ‘good’ person when their stance in this light is only a position adopted with some other end in sight? But what if a person spent their whole life adopting this ‘good persona’ would we need to change our mind in this regard? If a fake picture in the style of x is treated as a picture by x, and that picture would have been an excellent example of x’s oeuvre if it had been painted by the same, does it make any difference (until that time it is exposed as a forgery, albeit a brilliant forgery?)? Still, our vision of authenticity in this regard demands the ‘hand of the artist’ to have been involved in its creation although I, for one, would be happy to own a ‘van Gogh’ that was treated as a ‘genuine van Gogh’ even if it wasn’t as long as I and all others were not privy to this ‘information’. (15)

	Direct contact does not imply intentional transparency! The person themselves cannot stand transparently before themselves, how much less so can we stand in front of others in this same regard. On the other hand there can be no absolute intentional opaqueness! Metaphorically, there can only be degrees of intentional translucence! In direct contact with the other or something other there can be only degrees of intentional comprehension. Being in a relationship demands that we be in a relationship with that sense of the other directly, otherwise there could be no relationship (except indirectly through the ‘directness’ of an indirect relationship). The intentional nature of our being-in-the-world demands this directness, albeit by degree. As our being consciously aware of ourselves being in a relationship is determined intentionally we must already be in possession of some form of an intentional determination of that sense of the other or other thing in which we are currently focused upon. That being the case this implies that we have already begun a process that is sets out to phenomenologically determine its sense, to examine its hermeneutical meaning and to (re)-discover its existential meaningfulness. Our interaction with this other person or other thing through directness of the relationship implies we already have an essential understanding of that intentional object-state to some degree or other, hence the relative intentional translucency of that intentional object-state! Let me explain this in greater detail and examine there the intentional consequences of this doctrine of relative intentional translucence. (16)

	A relationship is a two-way process. Of course if I see an object x this does not mean that that object x sees me, it does mean though that that object was seen, what ever that object is. Intentionality is an intentional attitude towards an intentional object-state. Because there is only one life-world there-for-us-all then all intentional interaction is direct. If I see a perceptual object then that 'perceptual object', whether it exists or not, is seen. If I remember a certain state of affairs that happened in my past then in entertaining that memory I currently stand in a direct relationship with those intentional memories. Are all relationships direct in this sense? Consider the following indirect relationship. I know Paul who knows John who knows me only indirectly. He directly knows me indirectly. In other words he stands in a direct relationship with his indirect knowledge of me. Are all relationships two-way in the derivation of their relational processes? John knows of me indirectly since Paul has told him about myself. Now, I don't know John so how can we stand in a two-way relationship with each other? Well, we miss the point if we were to cash out the nature of this indirect relationship in that manner! John directly stands in a relationship with me indirectly. I directly stand in a relationship with what I know and/or don't know about John. Directness is between the intender and the intentional object-state, and, between the intentional object-state and the object, if any, that that intentional object-state is related to, and, because there can only be one life-world it follows all intentional relationships with their intentional-object states must be directly entertained and those intentional object-states to some degree must directly participate in the essential nature and being of their re-presentations. So a relationship with 'the' Santa Claus is just that, a relationship with a mythical individual (who might have had a residual basis in historical reality). On the other hand a relationship with my friend Paul is a relationship that engages many more phenomenal/phenomenological modalities of being than a relationship with Santa Claus. When Paul tells me about his friend John I then stand in a direct relationship to John to that extent that I have engaged him, namely, as a person whom I have not met and know of only second hand with only the possibility that I might meet him if that historical possibility is currently open to both of us. So, at this point, I must conclude that all relationships are direct in their relational contact and simultaneously reciprocal in process, gives one direct access to the essential nature of that intentional object-state, and, that intentional object-states co-respond directly with their object-states so intended (i.e., currently my understanding of and relationship with Paul is as a friend met in the flesh, whereas, my understanding of and relationship with John is as a person I have merely been told about). All that granted what implications and consequences does this approach have for our interaction with deceivers and our potential ability to act as a deceiver of others? Being in a state of direct contact could the process of deception be enacted successfully? Should it not be immediately perceived as such, as an act of deception? (17)

	First, we have another problem to work our way through, namely, if a polar approach to intentional objects and subjects is granted how can contact be direct when there is neither a real object nor real subject in place to be contacted, and, neither a real object or real subject making contact with ourselves? If there are no absolutely real objects and subjects then contact could only be an illusion, a mere simulation? But even simulated relationships are experienced! Therefore as a simulation, as a simulation of a simulation, as re-simulations our interaction with other subjects and objects, and with ourselves, is allowed to come into phenomenal-phenomenological existence. By 'phenomenal' is meant that particular phenomena-experienced through its simulation, and, by 'phenomenological' is meant that type of phenomenally distinctive simulation of the simulated-reality-there-for-us that we find is waiting for us to engage it or re-engage it, be engaged by it or re-engaged by it, etc. (18)

4.   How Could Contact Be Maintained if the Ego is Merely a Polar Fiction?

	Does this polar position, therefore, destroy this concept of direct contact through the simultaneous absence of a contacter and contactee? No! There may be no absolute contact, there still remains a relative, provisional form of contact between simulations by virtue of their common intentional formation and the phenomenological 'fact' that there is a direct relationship between the simulations themselves through re-simulation and between the simulations in that relational process, or those relational processes, under review through the re-simulation(s) of the same. Because contact is between simulations as re-simulations and never between or with non-simulated states of affairs that are impossibly and unobtainably ‘understood’ as prior to those intentional acts of simulation/re-simulation. Indeed, all phenomenal presentations are experienced as phenomenological re-presentations and not pre-simulated representations! Contact is between simulations, as re-presentations, by virtue of their intentional constitution as phenomena-there-for-us through re-constitution, and, this 'fact' that they stand in a direct relationship to-us through what they re-present (rather than what they might be incorrectly seen to ‘represent’)! Our complex modal engagement directly reflecting, wittingly or unwittingly, the true modal complexion of the constitution of those intentional-states-of-affairs-there-for-us as phenomena! Now, let us return to the problem of how deception is possible despite the simulation of a directness of contact between an absolute non-existent deceiver and that absolute non-existent person apparently being deceived by the former (and v.v). (19)

5.   That ‘Direct Contact’ is Necessary for the Practice of Deception?

	As I noted earlier it is because of the fact that there is a direct relationship between the phenomenal parties in an act of deception that deception can be realized to be deception qua deception! Moreover, to ensure the success of the deception as an enacted process it is because the deceiver is standing in a direct relationship with their intended victim that they can fine-tune this process, adjust the course of their narrative to this effect. Furthermore, it is only through their relationship to each other that the act of deception can be enacted. Then, as one is neither in a position of absolute intentional self-control nor in possession of a full intentional self-understanding as to the nature of their own motivation we cannot ask others to immediately have as full an understanding as the other party might have of their own motivation. Communication as a process takes place in time, takes time! But it is because, normally, we can have an adequate knowledge of the intentional motivation of ourselves and others that we can in time construct a deceptive process and/or unmask that intent that proves to have been deceptive! Only through direct contact, as outlined, could a deceptive narrative be engineered and put into practice. This fact alone implicating the necessity of directness as a necessary feature for the both the practice of deception and the practice of its unmasking. Lastly, this expression 'unmasking' indicates, I believe, the need for the adoption, by the deceiver, of an externally projected persona of an appropriate nature in order to perpetrate their deceptive process. The assumed persona facilitating this process of deception until such a time phenomenal 'facts' declare the deception to have been a deception and/or critical hermeneutical investigations deconstructively expose contradictory narrative variants implicating a process of deception and/or our existential intuition alerts us to seek signs of good faith when the lack of a good faith is felt to be present in the course of our interaction with the suspected deceiver's presence and/or texts (through the same being subjected to a thorough intuitive transcendental suspension). So, in essence, deception is both possible and recognizable because of the 'fact' of this directness of intentional interaction in a process of deception; this directness, in turn, being a 'fact' of our existence in this world because transcendentally there can only be one life-world-there-for-us in our interaction within this one-world-of-life! (20)

	Now, deception in and of itself is not necessarily inauthentic in its essential nature or practice. Indeed, many social situations authentically call for practices of deception in a variety of forms as discussed in the first part of this essay. On the other hand, deception committed in bad faith, inauthentically, through the greater complexity of personae involved in its commission, whether revealed through their projection or not revealed through their non-projection, collectively establishes through the interaction of these personae an overall holistically reflected imprint whose integrity, or lack of the same, is revealed through the textual deposition of this imprint when subjected to an adequate, in depth phenomenological, hermeneutical and/or existential investigation. As these various personae are differently motivated intentionally it follows that our overall motivation must reflect that fact of their collective constitutional synthesis, the manner of the relative resolution or non-resolution of these competing forces revealing themselves in all textual deposition even if there is an overall intent to perpetrate an act of deception. That this lack of intrinsic harmony can be made evident through an appropriate, in-depth phenomenological, hermeneutical and/or existential investigation. Hence, in the light of this argument, dissimulation can never be regarded as an absolutely intrinsic affair private to the person committed to its perpetration (as implied by the concept of relative intentional translucence). (21)

6.   Is the Distinction Between ‘Persons’ and ‘Machines’ Fatally Flawed?

	Previously, I noted a flaw in the application of a program that attempts the use of any type of a Turing Test, through question and reply, in order to hermeneutically evaluate the presence or absence of self-consciousness and therein the presence or absence of a person with self consciousness and/or a machine without self-consciousness on the understanding that machines must lack self-consciousness, be unable to reflect on the fact of their own existence. Now the flaw is this - if a person is only a very sophisticated machine it follows, if only hypothetically, that a machine could be constructed to equal or surpass the simulation of self-consciousness already possessed by that other machine already in existence, namely, the human person. That that being the case the Turing Text must ultimately fail to that extent that it cannot differentiate between machines and non-machines, only machines more or less sophisticated than the 'human machine'. But this conclusion is itself flawed, or at least needs to be re-configured along the following lines, namely, that neither the human person can be reduced to a body qua body nor can a machine be reduced to a machine qua machine. A machine functions because there is an existential excess over and above the machine qua machine. In a similar fashion the human person cannot be reduced to a mere body since a mere body is only a dead one and is certainly in no psycho-physical condition to then function as a human-body-there-for-us as it could when it was alive, when ‘we’ were alive. This difference then needs to be noted! This flaw, therefore, being fatal if it is read and exercised in an absolute mode! (22)

7.   An Embodied Person Cannot be Reduced to Mere Body!

Humans cannot be reduced to the status of a mere machine, a mere body, a mere mind, etc., for they are defined by that existential excess (experienced through the 3rd moment of the hermeneutic circle, and the global suspension of the same, and reinforced through the ‘fourth moment’, i.e., the hermeneutic circle subjected to a global suspension. But, likewise, a machine cannot be reduced to a mere machine for the 'machinery of the machine' emerges from the structural-functions of that device, or set of devices, in its engagement in this world-of-life and in our engagement and encounter with it? (23)

Both the person and the machine can be provisionally defined through reference to a hypothetical history of that 'person' and that 'machine'. Both cannot be absolutely reduced! On the other hand, a relative loss of meaning is at the ‘expense’ of any (lesser) gains realized through that reduction. Moreover, an absolute reduction realizes only an absolute loss of meaning! Whereas a partial reduction of a machine or a person might release information of a supplementary form or format. to the extent that that type of process is able to deliver this supplementary information. (24)

Hence, self, e.g., is provisionally defined through sense, meaning and/or meaningfulness, i.e., phenomenologically, hermeneutically and/or existentially (which correspond respectively to the object-state, the background field and/or the (relevant) sense(s) of self) involved in that particular intentional act (albeit with a relatively unique 'personal' spatio-temporal history). (25)

8.   That the Polarity of Ego is Only an Intentional Fiction!?

Self is only an intentional polarity, a fiction, that even through reification and projection can never be obtained, reached, realized, etc., and that all other intentional polarites, indeed all distinctions, are equally fictitious or rather ‘fictional’ (from a non-relative/absolute point of view)! Therefore, there can be no pure sense of an overall self nor purity in a distinctive sense of self in the expression of some aspect of self. Only in and through our relationships is the self defined through those relationships, i.e., with others, different aspects of ourselves, through institutions, the everyday-world, cultures, object-states, activities, etc. Consequently, the ‘self’ can never be absolutely distinctive nor absolutely isolated nor absolutely independent. Hence the establishment of a ‘direct contact’ in all our relationships entered into in this one-world-of-life! (26)

As previously argued, deception is able to be enacted because there is a direct contact with the other - that is how it is fine-tuned in the process of its delivery, and, in time, is recognized as deceptive. Moreover, how could we know we were being deceived if not through a deeper awareness of this direct contact with our deceiver in and through a state of deeper insight into this state of affairs; in a comprehension of  their deeper intent to deceive us. Even a psychotic person is in contact with the world to some degree or other - their hallucinations are never absolutely of a science fiction-like character! As communication is always a process, deception therefore takes place within that period of time that full comprehension is not realized, is not able or allowed to be realized! Indeed, deception moreover necessitates enough intentional understanding of the other person and of our own motivation in order to establish the relative successfulness of this mission to deceive that other person. Then, for the deceived person to realize that they have been duped a similar comprehension of intentional motivation needs to be realized and that again as a possibility is pre-established through the directness of interactive interaction already in play (through a deeper awareness of that immediate re-simulation and/or mediated retrospective re-simulation, prospective predictive protention, etc). (27)

Are we in a direct contact with our own overall sense of self/senses of self? Or is this semblance of 'directness' only an illusion, a simulation 'fixed' through retentional re-simulation? A mechanism of intentional simulation that can favour neither the intentional object-state nor its intentional context nor any intentional sense of self whether overall or aspectivally oriented, whether as an individual agent or as a collective assembly of agents (whether institutionally re-organized or not). In this regard should this lack of preference be reflected in our philosophical investigations? What ramifications should follow from the adoption of this type of position? (28)

9.   The Dialectical Art of Preferences and Their Suspension
	
	To have preferences or not to have preferences - that is the question?! (29)

	The sincere transcendental phenomenologist should, initially, face a dilemma here if they were to adopt this type of non-transcendental position of seeking and maintaining preferences?! On one hand, in accordance with my understanding, prejudices, as pre-judgments, should head us in the appropriate direction we wish to advance our investigations, and, help us to set up our pre-recognition/re-cognition of the same, namely, the seeking the practical realization of the transcendental goal(s) of our investigations! To this extent preferences are transcendentally necessary (indeed, they phenomenologically establish phenomenal sense through the essential discrimination of psychic ‘location(s)’ in the culturally pre-determined linguistic mapping of our life-world)! On the other hand, through a thorough suspension, through a thorough de-preferentialization of all our prejudices, the transcendental flavour of our investigation is powerfully re-inaugurated through the ideal retrospective (re-)enactment of the genesis of its intentional constitution (relationally generated between the archetypal polarities of Object, World and Ego). This re-realization can be written neither in terms of real nor ideal absolute preferences, adopted preferentially, because intentional consciousness and the constitution of all forms of intentional identity, in their formation as intentional processes, are ‘entered’ and ‘left’ through the auspices of transcendental suspensions. This ‘fact’ is witnessed when forms of ongoing existential ‘presence’ reveal that all forms of intentional simulation possess at least a central, residual existential authenticity [thence their non-textual/not-textual (re-)simulation of this phenomenon of ‘presence’ and the (re-)simulation of our ‘encountering’ the same])! Then, to restate this again, it should be noted that as a dialectical counter-balance, we must have preferences as prejudices enacted, and in place, in order to be in a position to start to recognize that object-state of our intent, yet, transcendentally suspend the same in order to critically realize their essential-intentional nature ‘face to face’, so to speak, in and through their simulation of a ‘direct contact’ entered into by-us to some degree or other through the (re-)simulation of that relationship. In this regard certain comments on the need for a co-authorial preference, made in the previous essay, need to be critically re-appraised in a wider context. (30)

	In the previous essay in noting the general non-observation, or widespread ‘over-looking’, of a co-authored dimension in the course of our daily lives it was suggested that we should make this dimension of the co-authored a priority in order to re-review the world (of psychology and psychiatry, indeed, of medicine in general) through that same lens. This rectification, in turn, however, should itself be rectified through a non-preferentialization of all phenomenological aspects and distinctions. Our transcendental research demands no less even though the initial rectification of this system is demanded in order to give us the material needed to fully rectify this omission of the co-authorial dimension, and, then, to transcendentilize its contribution once it has been recognized as a necessary ingredient in our therapeutic and philosophical research. But let me examine this process of rectification, and its meta-rectification, more closely in the next essay titled Beyond Therapy. (31)

	This dialectical art of exercising and suspending our preferences, essentially our ‘prejudices’, for good or bad, rightly or wrongly, is what allows us to successfully proceed through this world-of-life. As an observation we might say that we manage to muddle on through life with a successfulness in overall method that can only defy a coherent explanation. Once one knows how to ride a bike or drive a car, e.g., one thinks little on the technique of this achievement and concentrates instead on the current intentional course of our riding or driving or other affairs that fill our day. In a similar manner all manner of judgments that embrace the course of that day are entered into with an ability that near defies all forms of linguistic explication. So, let me do the impossible, an apparent motif of this essay, and sketch out how this balancing act between exercising prejudice and suspending the same might operate from a theoretical point of view. (32)

	Prejudice as prejudgment is a necessary precondition for the act of judgment to take place. This is the ‘material’ to be judgmentally evaluated, that which the judgmental act must embrace as its topic for evaluation and critical appreciation. Its sense located us in this world-of-life, its meaning is to be re-interpreted and the meaningfulness of this act is discovered non-reductively in the relationship between sense and meaning, between the analytic [dealing with relative ‘parts’] and the synthetic [dealing with the relative unity of a ‘totality’], the reductive and the reconstituted, the retrospectivity of textual retention and prospectivity of protentional anticipation. These are the first two moments of the hermeneutic circle as analysed elsewhere. The third moment arises through the non-reductive interaction of the first and second moments of the hermeneutic circle (which can also be described as a relationship between textualization through intentional deposition and meta-textualization arrived at through genre expectations, etc. The harmonic resolution of this relationship between the dissonance of text and the consonance of meta-text is existentially arrived at in and through the spontaneity ‘unlocked’ by the first two moments. In this moment it is as if the ‘presence’ of the text in all its dialectical richness is allowed to speak to us through its relative transparency and immediacy - when translucence becomes relatively transparent. It is (re-)discovered in that ‘moment’ when we meet with a sudden loss of textual resistance, when the text ‘appears’ to be understood in our understanding of it through its understanding of us in its ability to virtually ‘speak to us’. (33)

	Now these three moments (which constitute the hermeneutic circle) are essentially different types of transcendental suspensions that collectively constitute the global suspension of consciousness as demanded by the transcendental phenomenologist! It is my intuitive understanding that these suspensions can dialectically move us around this hermeneutic circle (in both ‘directions’). (34)

	Re-stated simply – the productive phenomenologist needs to balance the use of both prejudice and suspension in the exercise of their critical transcendental investigations! By such means, e.g., they can approach the ethical and extract the ethical from their investigations, or, they can approach the egological and extract the egological from their investigations, etc., etc! (35)

These three moments of the hermeneutic circle (of textual comprehension), in accordance with my phenomenological understanding, give rise, respectively, to sense (as a psychic location in the life-world), meaning (as hermeneutically interpreted and meta-textually demanded by the genre-rules of that text), and, meaningfulness (realized through its ability to harmonically realize a distinctive existential surplus of meaning that cannot be reductively reduced to the mere ‘moments’ of textual sense and meta-textual meaning, etc.). (36)

10.  That Deception is Grounded in ‘Truth’ Along with Self-Deception!

	As a rule of thumb we might say:

99% of the intentional process of deception cannot be deceptive!
1% of self-deception, at the very least, can not be self-deceptive!

	Let me explain. (37)

	99% of the deceptive process is dependent upon non-deceptive material. Only the overlay of that last '1%' is in the form of deceptive material and through which that deception can then be planned, engineered and finely tuned! This ratio 1:100 is only meant to be taken metaphorically, as an approximation. Can we theoretically demonstrate this type of constitutional ratio and through whose interactive relationship we get the instantiated practice of the deception (just as a small quantity of yeast is instrumental in the making of leavened bread). E.g., let us say for the sake of a proto-typical argument that  “I (i) wanted you to believe that person (x) stole (S) from you (u) your book (b) when it was, in truth, one of my friends (f), namely (y) who currently has this tome (b).” I am, for the moment, protecting my friend Fy in this instance and will very soon ask him (y) if he indeed stole (S) this book (b) or had merely intended to temporarily borrow it (L) [and, unbeknownst to myself, seek permission for its being lent to him when he next saw (u) as he urgently needed this text for an unexpected university exam…] till he read the same (R), since for (x) to steal (S) did seem to me to be out of character (c) for (x), but, I do know that currently he is in possession (p) of this volume (b)? What facts do we have? For a start I have a plethora of facts that are relatively atomic in nature such as x, u, b, y, r, c, p… Not one of those facts just listed is incorrect and/or deceptively portrayed! Moreover, these facts form various relatively non-atomic facts such as xFy (x is a friend of y), yPb (y currently possesses b), uOb (u is the legal owner of b), etc., and none of those additional complex facts just mentioned are in themselves incorrect. Deception only comes into existence when it is the intention (I) of some person to mis-represent (M) their vision of reality (R) by not telling their vision of reality as they think they truly see it; this distortion of reality being accomplished through sins of commission and/or sins of omission, or, any other strategies that incline (u) to view what is viewed as true (T) by (x) as not true (~T), or that incline (u) to view what is viewed as not true (~T) by (x) as (T). Hence an enormous amount of the deceptive process is truthful and has to be truthfully in play for the deception to 'properly' work (and be fine tuned by the deceiver in the midst of its execution, and, be received by the victim of that deception as ‘apparently’ true and to be acted upon in accordance with that incorrectly interpreted ‘perception’). (38) 

So, in the light of the above scenario, if I was to say to (u) that I don’t think yPb (that y possesses b) I would be acting deceptively even if this deception is committed from a good motive or a set of good motives. On the other hand if I was to say I believe (x) did not steal (~S) that book (b), i.e, that y~Sx, I would not be acting deceptively since I truly believe this, i.e., x~Sb is T. Hence to be deceptive we only need to alter a few propositions, the much greater bulk of the deceptive process is, indeed,  truthfully reflected (and herein lies the path for the rectification of a deceptive process - that only a few propositions need to be (re-)suspended and treated with due suspicion and therein rectified in accordance with what is necessary to de-distort that deceptive mis-interpretation of what is more or less a collectively entertained empirically oriented reality). (39)

	On the other hand, metaphorically, at least 1% of the self-deceptive process cannot be absolutely involved in a process of self-deception since, to some extent, the self-deception is manufactured by that individual themself with or without co-authorially influence. Therefore, we must conclude that such a process of self-deception could never be practiced in an absolutely self-deceptive manner even though, for all practical purposes, it might well have been. Let me elabourate on the theoretical logic behind this phenomenological ‘fact’. (40)

	Let us say for the sake of argument that there exists a certain person (j) who believes they are incredibly good-looking and aesthetically pleasing upon the eye (a). However, by no shared canon of good taste would most people (w) regard (j) as (a), moreover, (j) is aware of this fact that the world generally regards him as quite ugly (~a). But (j) suffers from a delusion that he and the world (w) in their heart of hearts both should regard him as (a). Let us assume that (j) is mildly psychotic (p) which allows him to gloss over this discrepancy between the reality that he is (~a) and his mistaken belief that both the world (w) and him (j) really believe he is incredibly good looking and aesthetically pleasing upon the eye (a). As stated, part of him knows that he is (~a) but this is overlooked in his delusion to the extent that he can override this disconcerting fact through this misplaced belief that he is truly (a). (41)

	All senses of the self must be interconnected, but, interconnected neither absolutely nor non-absolutely! No person can have complete mastery over the intentional processes that constitute there existence in this world-with-others. Hence this collective continuity can never be absolutely realized, either passively or actively, although, it is usually realized most of the time in an adequate and indubitable-like manner. At the same time, no person, whilst alive, can have a complete disconnection of the various senses of self that collectively constitute a holographic re-presentation of their overall sense of self. We may acquire some new skills and we may loose some old skills, yet, this process of acquisition and de-acquisition is never an absolute one. Through the intentional continuity of our existences, despite and in spite of sleep, memory loss, cerebral-vascular accidents, etc., there is never the complete loss of this overall sense of self and this egological ‘fact’ of our existence can be appreciated when one finds oneself able to reflect upon this state of affairs re-presented through this overall state of intentional continuity that accompanies all intentional formation and expression. This is not to say that through hypothetical defence-mechanisms, cerebral-vascular accidents, all types of memory loss, etc, that we must always find an adequate access to the simulated re-constitution of previous characteristic representations of self-identity, memories and repertoires of behaviour from the past. Still, holographically speaking, they are still there – even if laid down in a textualized form that cannot currently be adequately retrieved, etc! In this regard we might say that no intentional trace is ever lost – merely ceases to be available for us to read. Moreover, as the epistemological hierarchy is grounded on the epistemological ‘fact’ that all ‘levels’, ‘aspect’, ‘layers’, ‘senses’, ‘perspectives’, etc., of consciousness are collectively dependent upon all of their completely stratified interconnections (which follows as a consequence from the transcendental ‘fact’ that there is a life-world, and, the epistemological-ontological ‘fact’ that there is this thorough transcendental unity of an unobtainable subjectivity, intersubjectivity and objectivity which collectively constitute that life-world as one-world-of-life-there-for-us). Moreover, even our residual powers of transcendental reflection (read judgment) guarantee the integrity of our psycho-physical organism and vice versa. Furthermore, the world as a shared phenomenon implies a mutual interdependence that extends both into the community and the world (because the life-world is a shared phenomenon constituted in that polar space intentionally constituted between those unobtainable archetypal poles of Object, World and Ego [both subjectively and intersubjectively]). Hence the reification and projection of intentionally constituted object-states, worlds and egos (etc.,) are, correctly, transcendental illusions, and, our treating them as otherwise causes us to commit, therein, a transcendental mistake! Hence the ‘self’, correctly, should be treated both as a transcendental illusion and as an empirical reality - as a mere series of masks reflecting these levels, aspects, layers, senses, perspectives, etc., yet, from the empirical point of view it is also both an acter (through the ‘self-presence’ of an historical, spatial-temporal continuity, etc.) and an actor with a series of masks (in order to be able to commit acts of deception, etc.). Furthermore, as even the most psychotically self-deceived person is rooted, to some variable extent (like all other people), in the ongoing reality of the life-world, therefore, it follows that they cannot be absolutely self-deceived without invoking their consequent absolute loss of self-integrity and the complete individual and collective dis-integration of all senses of self-consciousness in the wake of such a loss. Because, essentially, deception and self-deception are aspects of the same type of phenomenon (as previously argued in Part I of this essay), namely, as a mistreatment, either wittingly or unwittingly, of the hermeneutic circle and its intentional constitution of sense, meaning and meaningfulness through a literalization of the metaphorical, etc., a dis-placed substitution of the hermeneutical, etc., and/or inauthentic treatment of the existential, etc. (42)

11.  The Existential Transformation of Deception, Deceiving and Being Deceived

	As previously shown, only a few propositional re-arrangements characterize the intentional re-constitution of a deceptive intentional act as exercised in its planning, its expression, its fine tuning, and, in our recovery from being deceived by a deceptive state-of-affairs. In this section let me explore the implications and ramifications of an existential transformation of deception. (43)

	First, I would like to make some distinctions, namely, those as noted below:

	1. Deception from the relative point of view
	2. Deception from the absolute point of view.
	3. The relationship between 1. and 2.
	4. The Existential transformation of deception. (44)

	(1.) The intention to deceive always takes place within a certain intentional perspective or set of intentional perspectives. If I tell a child about Santa Claus it is usually in the context of Xmas (and related mythology). Because deception is perspective-oriented there can be no form of deception from an absolute point of view. As noted previously in the formula “the x of the x is no(t)-x” “the deception of deception is no(t)-deception” implying that deceptive-ness is not itself deception per se (by virtue of the different meta-status exhibited by these two linguistic items). The expression-fragment “…is no(t)-deception” means that from an appreciation of the situation of the deception, from an appreciation of the intentional act of deceiving, and, from an appreciation of the intentional act of being deceived, an appreciation of the same is not a situation of deception, is not an intentional act of deceiving and is not, in turn, being deceived. Although neutral, in effect, it is the opposite, namely, by default, a non-act of deception, a non-act of deceiving, a non-act of being deceived, etc. If this appreciation of a relative frame of reference is truly being conducted from a critical point of view it follows that the relativity of the relative, in establishing the absolute (‘non-perspective’) realizes, in effect, a state of affairs that is not delusive in nature even though dealing ‘directly’ with what is delusive in nature. Coupled with our insight that deception only involves a minimal re-arrangement of propositional attitudes it follows that to non-deceptively re-re-arrange that distorting propositional material is to de-distorted the deceptiveness of the deception. Let me invoke the following analogy. (45)

	Deception involves the act of deceiving and being deceiving and/or the belief that there is/was an act of deception and one is/was being deceived. In a rectification of deception there is a need to take into account the fact that an act of deception may not have taken place but that the belief that one is/was being deceived might be present in its place – it being my opinion that the rectification of deception, whether actual or virtual in nature, is essentially the same in theory and in practice. Let me also demonstrate this fact in this analogy. (46)

	Shoplifting is a form of deception – the intention to directly acquire merchandise without payment in such a manner as to try to not come to the attention of the owner of the merchandise or those acting of their behalf. Now, the owner of a bookshop (o) needs to go to the bank for a few minutes and leaves their shop unattended. As they leave they see a potential customer (c) enter with no bag and nothing in their hands. When the owner returns to their shop just before going in they observe in the distance this customer (c) having left with one book (b) in their hand. The owner believes (B) that this customer (c) has shoplifted (S) a book (b) and knowing that this person is a friend (F) of (x) when (x) enters the shop shortly after mentions this occurrence to them. This person (x) believes (B) that (c) has a good character and would not have stolen a book. That person later sees (c) that day and speaks to (c) about this set of events and in reply (c) tells them (T) that they paid (P) the stated price on the book of $5 and left 5 one dollar coins on the ledge under the counter. Soon after (x) mentions this to (o) who remembers finding (F) $5 dollars in the stated place later that same day…. (47)

	In this example we have a whole series of true, relatively atomic facts and true, relatively non-atomic facts. The shop owner entertained what transpired to have been only a belief that there was an act of shoplifting and that certain evidence seems to have adequately disproved this person’s belief. On the other hand if this person’s belief was true (T) then an act of shop-lifting would have occurred, i.e., the deceptive intention to directly acquire merchandise without payment in such a manner as to try to not come to the attention of the owner of the merchandise. We have this complex propositional attitude which is the owner’s interpretation of the facts to hand, namely, oB{cSb} but this belief that {cSb} is ~T as cP$5 and oF5$ after being told that cTx(cP$5), etc. Of all the propositions present in this situation only oB{cSb} is ~T. In this situation to rectify this belief that an act of deception had taken place the evidence of $5 found in a certain place as relayed to the owner was all that was needed in this instance to rectify their false belief. Would that the falsity of our false beliefs in this so-called ‘real world’ could be so easily recognized and de-distorted accordingly! (48)

	Various points are being made by this analogy. First, deception from the relative point of view needs to take into account actual deception, i.e., the true belief that an act of deception had taken place, and, virtual deception, i.e., the false belief that an act of deception had taken place. Second, a relative point of view entails the adoption of a certain phenomenal point of view or a set of phenomenal points of view. Third, most of the ‘facts’ to hand are treated as true and unproblematic in the determination of their value. Fourth, in theory and in practice, only one or a few of all those facts need be treated as problematic or possibly problematic; need be regarded as the locus of a possible deceptive practice. Fifth, when treated as problematic, called into question, that ‘apparent fact’ is subjected to a suspension (in this case dis-conjunctive in nature if the proposition and its truth value is subjected to a process of questioning). Sixth, all facts are essentially interpretations whose truth determinations are either true, false, non-applicable and/or not currently able to be determined. Seventh, adequate evidence is able to turn around a false belief, although, eighth, what counts for adequate evidence might itself be a false (meta-)belief. Ninth, a phenomenal perspective demands a phenomenal point of view or phenomenal points of view. Tenth, the ‘perception’ of an act of deception demands an ‘interpretation’ to this effect, an appreciation of the truth value of a ‘fact’ being primarily meta-factual, meta-interpretational in nature even though in accordance with transformation treatment/re-treatment philosophy the situation portrayed by a fact, a fact considered as a fact, and its appreciation as a meta-fact, etc., can all be viewed on the same par, i.e., treated with the same meta-status through treatment/re-treatment. (49)

	(2.) A relative point of view is a phenomenal point of view. The transcendental constitution of a phenomenal point of view in its transcendental ideality is an absolute point of view. We are no longer concerned with phenomena qua phenomena, but with the phenomenon of that phenomena, i.e., its phenomenality (which is not a phenomenon/has no phenomenal nature being meta-phenomenal). Deception from an absolute point of view does not exist, as deception per se is a type of phenomenon (or a proto-typical set of phenomena). But deceptiveness does have an ideal transcendental ideality, or set of ideals, to that extent it has a distinct(ive) essential-phenomenology. I am going to argue from an absolute point of view that deceptiveness as a phenomenon has three overlapping degrees of distortion in their instantiation of this type of general type of phenomenal condition, namely:

1.	Focalized, non-psychotic deception
2.	Individualized, psychotic deception
3.	Globalized, psychotic deception (50)

The first category is deception on a focalized level, e.g., for the first time seeing a stick look bent in the water without realizing that it is the water that is making it look bent and being told that it was bent. Similarly, lying and being lied to, shoplifting, etc., etc. The second category is the entertaining of deceptive-like beliefs, true or false, because the person's overall thinking is distorted by that person's psychosis, such as delusions and their delusional systems whether systematized or not systematized in nature. The last category applies to everyone of us by virtue of the fact that through the natural reification and projection of intentional object-states and/or intentional fields and/or intentional subjects, i.e., as intentional polar-facets as presented/re-presented in and through the natural attitude, because this transcendental illusion is not seen as a transcendental illusion a transcendental mistake is therein committed! Hence the implication of a global psychosis because the way things-are-in-the-(life)-world is misapprehended on a global scale. I am going to argue that the reification and projection of polar intentional-facets therein treated as independent and self-existent states of affairs is indeed a form of psychosis and that an amelioration of this psychosis would be beneficial in our lives and of assistance for the de-distortion of all other forms of non-psychotic and psychotic deception. Of course, in our empirical employment of phenomenal presentations/re-presentations we ostensively do not commit a transcendental mistake if we operate within the limits of those boundaries that encompass and constitute the empirical deployment of our conscious faculties. But, as there is no absolute limit between the relative-phenomenal dimension and the absolute-transcendental-dimension it follows that even within the limits set by empirical employment we are still committing a transcendental mistake by virtue of our absolute inability to isolate ourselves from the transcendental-dimension (and by extension of the same argument, an inability to isolate ourselves from the Absolute dimension, and, each other). This should be brought home to us when we realize that all acts of judgment demand an overall transcendental suspension in order for judgment to proceed and realize if, within the potential powers of that act of judgment, it can successfully arrive at a definitive resolution and conclusion of that judgmental process. All questions are conducted under the auspices of a dis-conjunctive suspension, etc. For the hermeneutic circle to function, as it must in intentional consciousness, all three moments and their respective transcendental suspensions must be collectively operative hence the implication of an overall transcendental suspension. As an overall transcendental suspension is transcendental and by implication the metaphorical doorway to the transcendental dimension it follow that no phenomenal state of affairs can avoid being implicated in the parallel, concurrent transcendental dimension. Hence the relationship between the relative dimension of the phenomenal and the absolute dimension of the transcendental is one that is mutually dependent because it is through mutual dependency that the intentional significance of that relationship is bourn/born. Hence the presence of an overall transcendental suspension implicates the direct, simultaneous  presence of the transcendental dimension. Hence the permanent presence of a global psychosis to that extent we treat our phenomenal presentations as phenomenal representations (i.e., as not ‘mere’ phenomenal presentations but through reification and projection, etc., when we in the natural attitude just accept them at face-value 'in the apparent manner of their presentation/re-presentation'). This occurs through the ‘literal reading’ of those presentations/re-presentations and accepting them merely at ‘face-value’ (but not ‘merely’ treating them at face-value; as mere appearances as discussed by transcendental phenomenologists and as happens in fact through the natural, everyday imposition of an overall transcendental suspension preparatory to an act of judgment be it existentially oriented or not existentially oriented). Yet, in order to enact the ongoing course of judgment we equally must suspend all phenomenal appearances in order to await a relatively non-distorted appreciation of our phenomenal presentations/re-presentations. To that extent we don't appropriate these presentations and appropriately and adequately enter into the 'spirit' of the transcendental suspension to that extent we are left with a global psychosis and all other forms of distortions built upon that basis. Indeed, a psychosis is nothing other than a loss of our powers of transcendental discrimination, and, the intensity of that psychosis is reflected in this degree of loss! Hence even our conventionally appropriate empirical employment of sense perception, etc., is the subject of this global psychosis even if we don’t go beyond that level of deployment. (51)

	(3.) The relationship of the relative-phenomenal dimension to the absolute-transcendental dimension (and thence to the Absolute dimension) is therefore a mutual one to that extent both dimensions co-define each other! Without the transcendental there could be no relative, and v.v. Being like 'the two sides of the same coin' how could this mutuality of interdependence be enlarged upon or diminished, i.e., how could there be an augmentation in or a loss of our transcendental powers? (52)

	In answering this question we effectively come to an understanding how there can be an existential transformation and rectification of deception through a recovery of our transcendental powers of discrimination. In this hope let us proceed! (53)

	(4.) The relative and absolute dimensions are there to the same extent because the transcendental preconditions for the former are expressed in the latter which, being mutually co-dependent, are, in turn, the transcendental preconditions for the latter. On the other hand our powers of transcendental discrimination represent, and mirror, the degree to which we have been able to integrate our psyche through the an increase in the gestalt integration of the epistemological hierarchy. With increasing integration comes an increasing sense of self-integrity which is reflected in a sense of positive body-tone (the extent to which we feel a 'whole person' in relative terms of reference and which can be evaluated by the person by their giving an approximate percentage as to how they are feeling at that moment, in reflection, and before and after in retrospection in consultation or in consultation with others, etc.). (54)

	How is this the case - that increasing gestalt integration is reflected in an increase in our transcendental powers of discrimination and through the increased powers of their appreciation a consequent and subsequent rectification of deceptive distortion naturally follows? Because a deeper appreciation of the intentional life allows us to see 'deception as deception' and 'the rectification of distortion as the rectification of distortion.' Furthermore, in theory and in practice, our ability to determine the truth of our propositional attitudes, to that extent this avenue is available to us, is a direct reflection of our deeper appreciation of ‘our’ intentional life as ‘lived together’; not only of ourselves but also of others by virtue of the fact that we share the same lived life-world! Our own intentional life is not a closed book to us nor to others, and, the intentional life of others is not a closed book to them nor to us! The intentional life of the person leaves a continual poly-textualized trail of intentional deposition in the form, e.g., of memory traces, traces upon the fabric of the visible world, verbal communications, written communications, emotional indicators, signs of intentional discrimination, etc., etc. Our access and ability to read that 'woven trail of trails', our ability to determine a re-simulated re-constitution of sense (of psychic location in the life-world), our ability to the hermeneutic ascertain the coherence of textual trails internally and intertextually, and, our ability to intuitively determine non-textual textual authenticity helping us to realize this appreciation of our intentional life as it is shared in this one world-of-life. Through a simultaneous transcendental balancing of transcendent height and immanent depth, through an integrated joint balancing of analytical mental acuity and (synthetical-)physiological-relaxation, through an artful dialectical balancing of prejudices and suspensions we arrive at this promised land which is none other than our ability to appreciate the phenomenal world as it is, as it presents itself which, in all truth, is little more than our natural ability to determine truth as it evidently appears to ‘reveal’ itself in the natural course of our daily lives. (55)

	As noted before, in ideal theoretical terms of reference the rectification of deceptive distortion needs to turn around only a few propositions at the most in each deceptive context. Adequate and appropriate evidence is one way to do this. Another methodological aspect would be to endeepen our suspensions and our reflective receptivity to their productive and discriminative transcendental productivity. Then a further technique would lie in a deeper and more systematic hermeneutic treatment of what is already to hand. Or, a cultivation of our intuitive ability to appreciate the existential authenticity of being in conjunction with other additional methods that would complement that type of practice…. (56)

	Hence a discussion of deception from 'perspective' of the relative and absolute dimensions, the mutual cooperative interrelationship between the same and those practices that assist in the existential recognition, rectification and transformation of deceptive distortion. (57)

	Now let me consider how an amelioration of our global psychosis might be of assistance to us in this endeavour for an existential recognition, rectification and transformation of deceptive distortion. (58)

12.   How Should a Global Psychosis Be Treated If At All?!

	A psychosis by definition is a relatively fundamental distortion of (what should be) a common vision of 'reality'. In a global psychosis there is a relatively deeper fundamental distortion of reality as it is there for us to find and define, have ourselves found by and, therein, re-defined, or, in effect, ‘spiritually’ refined (through an ‘atunement/atone-ment/at-onement’ with the way things are! In an endeepening of those methods that lessen this sense of a global psychosis there should be a lessening of all other forms of psychotic and non-psychotic distortion(?). Let me look more closely into this equation. (59)

	All acts of judgment necessitate transcendental suspensions. A non-distorted ‘act of judgment’ necessitates the appropriate utilization of the transcendental mechanics operative in the dynamics of judgmental activity. As intimated earlier this is a dialectical balancing act between the exercise of our prejudices, as pre-judgments, and the full suspension of all suspensions that establish the hermeneutic circle and its ability to function in both an active discriminative mode and a passive interpretative mode, i.e., to intentionally deal with both judgments once delivered in acts of judgment being made and those specific acts of judgment themselves (as ongoing transcendental processes of discrimination). In other words, properly exercised transcendental suspensions establish a non-distorted transcendental productivity; in effect, a non global psychotic sphere of influence and extension. Unfortunately, prejudices not properly suspended distort this productivity commencing with the re-imposition of a global psychosis, etc. It stands to reason, therefore, that with the re-imposition of a properly executed transcendental program all forms of psychosis are rendered non-psychotic over the duration of time that that program is able to be successfully implemented appropriately! What ramifications, implications and complications must qualify this transcendental program from theoretical and practical points of view? (60)

	If it is correct that from an appropriately conducted transcendental program all psychosis is neutralized in the execution of that state of affair through properly conducted transcendental suspensions, etc., why is it that no profound insight is necessarily demonstrated and maintained in that critically conducted process of judgment, how is it that inauthentic prejudices are not eliminated, and, all forms of psychosis and deception can be found to continue as if nothing has happened? (61)

	For a start the natural attitude asserts itself on 'leaving' the overall transcendental suspension (implying that a globalized psychosis can only be dealt with through an ongoing overall transcendental suspension. Second, the current causes of any non-globalized psychosis will continue to contaminate the implementation of all forms of suspension (unless, somehow, a transcendental program can rectify this additional form of process-distortion). Third, despite the presence of any form of psychosis, judgment is still realized with some degree of authenticity implying that to some extent transcendental suspensions must be in play; giving us hope that such a program is realistic and demands only therapeutic forms of supplementation and complementation? The fact that even the majority of the propositional attitudes that constitute a delusional system are an accurate reflection of that cultural reality as socially perceived reinforces this hopeful speculation that de-distortion of deceptive interpretations is a relatively superficial procedure if we exempt the overwhelming inputs from the natural attitude. So in this regard we must remain hopeful even though the ramifications of mis-interpretations greatly exceed the mere weight or quanta of mis-interpreted throughput. Moreover, even though we cannot argue with a psychosis (a psychotic person who will irrationally dispute your arguments through a literalization of the metaphor, etc.) the fact that suspensions are being conducted and the greater mass of their world view is in cultural accord with 'their socially perceived reality' must give us some hope in this regard? But can the natural attitude ever be transcendentalized in an existentially authentic manner? (62)

	In my reply to this last question I need to introduce the correlative concepts of an existential authenticity versus a non-existential inauthenticity. Let me elabourate. First we must question what authenticity is? As an initial definition we could say that it is 'the spirit of appropriateness' being demonstrated 'in tune' with 'the spirit of the relationship' involved in that currently 'approached and entered' relational situation or set of closely related relational situations. E.g. if a father is relating to his son he does so as a father even though in this instance he could also be the son of his father who may or may not be still alive, a husband, a citizen, a friend of (x), a person being befriended by (y), the teacher of (z), a pupil of (w), etc., etc. The point being made here is that the dominant relationship or relationships that currently appear to offer the greatest value for that individual, all other potentially pressing relationships being taken into account, should take an appropriate precedence on how we are to currently react and behave in this world-of-life (from the point of view of that relationship currently embracing us). So, we must appropriately select, or, find selected for us, what relationships we potentially have with the life-world that we should now be about to actively 'enter'. 'Enter' is meant in a metaphorical sense and in its use here does seem to be an apt metaphor(?). So how, phenomenologically, is a relationship faced, approached and entered? A relationship is greater than the sum of its parts and this existential excess is encountered on the re-simulation of that relationship. On determining the particular textual sense of a relationship (and essential texts of its dominant parties and which help constitute the essential nature of that relationsnhip), its particular meaning derived from its meta-textual genre invocations, and, its particular meaningfulness existentially realized through its textual-metatextual interactions we have, in effect, a simulation of the hermeneutic circle as it applies in this particular relational situation and as it is interpreted by that person entering into this simulated interaction. Because this relational excess is greater than the mere summation of its inputs, in simulating the relationship we are, in effect, entering into its relational excess to that extent that we are entertaining an appropriate simulation/re-simulation of that relationship. Now, we need to address the next issue before us, namely, "how can we be 'in tune' with 'the spirit' of that relationship we have metaphorically entered through experiencing the simulation/re-simulation of its relational being through the being of that relational excess?  In simulating the experience of that relationship through re-simulation we are essentially re-experiencing that same relationship through a re-simulation of that experience. In the course of that re-simulated experience we experience the continuity of that relationship by re-experiencing a relative transformational invariance running through that process of re-simulation. Hence when our re-simulated understanding of a relationship is in tune with its essential constitution we can then say we are essentially experiencing its relatively invariant nature as 'spirit' by virtue of that excess and stability of significance re-created through its re-simulation. Lastly, how is the appropriateness of our relationship realized when entering into the spirit of that relationship under current examination? In approaching and meeting the relationship on its own terms we are essentially rewarded by increasingly encountering that existential surplus experienced in the being of that relationship which therein fine tunes for-us this rewarded sense of a closer re-alignment (guaranteed by virtue of the transcendental unity of the life-world as a lived-dimension-of-being ‘there-before-for-us’). Lastly, we must ask how a relationship could be encountered if all object-states, all fields of experience and all egological entities as polar fictions cannot be approached and encountered being only unobtainable reifications and projections of transcendental illusions deceptively created under the all pervasive influence of the natural attitude mistakenly perpetrated in a global psychosis and overlaid by prejudices and misinterpretations of a psychotic and/or non-psychotic nature? Quite simply these 'simulations of reality' are met through the 'reality of simulations' - through simulations as simulations, through re-simulations as re-simulations. Processes of re-iteration taking a variety of forms as noted and discussed in previous papers. (63)

	So having unpacked this complex metaphor of  'spirit of appropriateness', 'in tune' with 'the spirit of the relationship', currently 'approached and entered', etc., let me now sketch out how we are to define authenticity in this complex metaphorical frame of reference. For a start authenticity is an experience experienced through 'the simulation of the relationship' through 'the relationship of that simulation'. In this, in effect, the relationship qua relationship is simulated/re-simulated and experienced as that relationship qua that relationship (in all its simulated uniqueness). To do this the relationship is experienced in its transcendental ideality (in its intentional configuration qua intentional constitution) as simulated in intentional consciousness subjected to an overall transcendental suspension as 'located' in this 'one' life-world through the pre-conditional necessity of the appropriate prejudices/pre-judgments as argued previously. Transcendental ideality is experienced through the auspices of the overall transcendental suspension. Transcendental ideality is the essential configuration of that relationship which, through being in a relationship with-us, allows us to experience some degree of essential coincidence between itself and ourself/ourselves albeit in the simulated space of that simulated relationship-with-us. Once an essential understanding is essentially realized in our phenomenal/phenomenological appreciation of that relationship in the transcendental reflection of judgment we have a direct and true understanding of that relationship (unless mis-interpretations in the assessment of that understand distort that overall appreciation necessitating, when discovered, the transcendental review, in turn, of those suspect defective propositional attitudes). Now existentialization is the existential transformation of the relatively non-existential and never the existential transformation of the existential! Moreover, once an adequate level of essential understanding is reached all additional input into such appreciation of that relationship is merely a confirmation of our direct awareness of its already realized essential nature. Through (re-)alignment we essentially move, through simulational/re-simulational refinement, the psychic centre of our own existential richness of being within that shared relational space, i.e., with the psychically experienced nature of the other party or parties experiencing therein the uniqueness of that relational 'space' as it automatically embraces this particular relationship. Hence, it must be fair to say that authenticity is realized when an adequate and appropriate essential understanding is put in place through the degree of psychic alignment that has been put into play. It is for this reason that the existential cannot itself be existentialized because being at the psychic centre of that shared relationship it cannot become more central in this regard! On the other hand, the relatively non-existential can be centred, i.e., existentialized, in and through that relationship treated in that manner. Hence authenticity is a measure of how well we know the other, whether it be object-states, fields, egos, institutions, etc. A complex relationship demanding the respect of a complex pattern of simulated/re-simulated authentic interactions. Moreover, there is hope for us, again by virtue of the fact that once an adequate and appropriate essential understanding has been reached we need not endeavour further other than to merely confirm the directly ascertained truth delivered in this psychic re-alignment. Hence the ability  of transcendentally conducted research to deliver an apropriate, essential, adequate, direct and true appreciation of that under investigative transcendental reflection! Now let me examine how an existentialization of the relatively non-existential is be realized? (64)

	Because of the transcendental unity of the life-world all relationships are in relationship with each other by virtue of this transcendental unity (and what does not exist for-us might as well not exist!). Since this 'space' is realized between the intentional polarities of Object, World and Ego it follows that there can be no absolutely independent, self-existent object-states; no fields nor worlds nor any other frames of reference; no egos nor institutions, etc. That no form of phenomenal identity could be constituted in intentional consciousness other than those simulations/re-simulations of identity thematized in this polarized ‘space’ of the life-world!  By a transcendental process of rectification, through de-reification, de-distortion, de-projection and dissipation of all forms of attachment and rejection, all transcendental illusions ‘found’ to populate this world-of-life, in theory at least, are then seen for what they are, namely, mere phenomena! Through the re-imposition of an adequate and appropriate overall transcendental suspension all forms of psychosis and deception are ultimately cut through, defused and re-stored as phenomena qua phenomena; as phenomena-there-for-us in this shared world-of-life. Hence, in effect, through the re-imposition of an overall transcendental suspension authenticity already present, whether recognized or unrecognized, is returned to us and enlarged and therein self-confirmed through this transcendental existentialization of the relatively non-existential. That relational being, being experienced in the ongoing 'spiritual fullness' of the relationship, comes into ‘our’ experience through the existential excess of value that holistically permeates that relationships, reflecting its degree of distinctive integrity. This degree of relational integrity being experienced as 'the authenticity of its own passage through this world-of-life', re-investing itself in the re-enriched integrity of its own being whose integrity is ‘shared’ with the transcendental illusion of our own being! Our being in this world being uplifted through the natural beauty of the world, the beauty of a great work of art, the harmony brought to bear through our being there for others and finding others there for us…! (65)

	Hence, I must conclude that, through the existential enrichment of our relationships, through an existentiallization of our interactions enacted through auto-critical processes of transcendental suspensions, etc., all forms of deception whether globalized or non-globalized should meet with some appropriate degree of rectification through the ongoing dissipation of all forms of distortion and mis-representation! That this optimism explains why most of the life-world is met in a truthfulness of re-presentation, how we find that most of the world is not problematic for us even for those poor people who suffer individualized forms of psychosis. Hence my belief that, to some extent, even a global psychosis is, in effect, ameliorated in practice through the fact of this all pervasive ‘aura of truth’, this overwhelming ‘spirit of truthfulness’ that inhabits all of what we think, do, encounter and reflect upon even in the midst of error, illusion, deception and delusion that superficially colour our passage through this world. That, indeed, this ‘ground’ can be built upon through an increasing existentialization of that residual inauthenticity in our relationships through this dance with all senses of the other met ‘face to face’!! (66)

	But one more problem still needs to be effectively addressed - how is it possible to encounter that which, correctly, is absolutely unobtainable and therefore could not be encountered (regardless of whether our approach was deceptively or non-deceptively motivated)?! (67)

13.   How Do We Encounter that which Cannot Be Encountered?

	To begin to resolve this problem let me look into how we meet our own sense of an overall sense of self because as all senses of self are polar fictions we must wonder how any sense of self could be met let alone the semblance of an overall sense of self? And in dealing successfully with this aspect of our problem we should be in a better position to confront the semblance of an other, namely, how is it possible to encounter other intentional object-states, other frames of reference, other egological entities, etc., let alone the epistemological-ontological fact that both the other and the non-other (in all their diverse possibilities)  (e.g., our own senses of self and an overall sense of self) have no absolute epistemological-ontological existence? (68)

	Imagine we have a tooth ache. We experience pain. How do we know we are experiencing pain? We are experiencing pain full stop! We tell the dentist we have a toothache and point to a possible tooth that we think might be the miscreant. Something as fundamental an experience as pain involves the whole psyche of the person, the entire epistemological hierarchy. Pain qua pain is experienced. It upsets, has us feeling out of sorts, we recognize its origins as dental, we are motivated to see a dentist,. we tell the dentist we have a toothache and point out which tooth we think it is… and this fact more than likely will be confirmed for us. Physiologically, emotionally, affectively, perceptually, conceptually, judgmentally, motivationally, factually… many aspects of the psyche passively and actively have had to deal with this experience of pain, an 'experience' that has involved many different senses of self. Obviously these senses of self can cooperate when they need to! (69)

	We have this philosophical problem - how can the pain that is being experienced be thought about since 'the pain being experienced' is, by category, not identical with 'the pain being thought about'? To 'think something' and 'to think about that thing' are obviously not the same thing! Just as a title may be part of the text (being put there by the author) it is also the case that as the title is 'about' that book and is not the 'book itself', etc., it hence misrepresent that text. In previous research on this type of problem I have proposed a transformational treatment/re-treatment type of solution, namely, that through a process of transformation (a part of) that process's essential symmetry remains invariant under those transformations (between, e.g., 'experience qua experience' and that 'experience under some form of reflection', etc.). How is this achieved? In an account that is much simplified I would argue that the relationship on one meta-level is reflected on some other in such a way that those relational components and factors that are invariant, i.e, isomorphic, maintain this virtual stability of relational identity despite differences in frames of reference; meta-status; introduction, alteration, and/or subtraction of non-essential components; re-treatment of that transformation's production back on to the same meta-level where that process of transformational treatment was initiated, etc. (70)

	Stability of transformational identity is maintained, therefore, through the preservation of symmetries across those transformational states where this invariance of relational identity is maintained. But, surely, the consequences of this preservation of symmetry is an illusion? As all sense, meaning and meaningfulness are intentionally constituted in a polarized ‘space’ between the archetypal poles of Object, World and Ego it surely implies that in intentional consciousness we can meet with no absolute object-states, no frames of reference, and no egotistical entities, etc! What is met with is only an illusion, a simulation which through retention is a re-presentation and not a representation of the apparent ‘reality-realized-to-hand’! Hence the semblance of reality is re-presented and not represented! Hence, through a global psychosis, phenomenal simulations/re-simulations are misrepresentations when reified, distorted, projected and prejudicially desired and/or rejected! (71)

	Thence, as a set of isomorphic simulations re-simulated we meet with our own various senses of self and an overall sense of self, and, as sets of isomorphic simulations re-simulated we meet with all senses of an other open to such an encounter…. (72)
	
	As all intentional object-states, frames of reference, egotistical entities, etc., have no absolute existence in intentional consciousness obviously we should ask "how is it possible to actually encounter that which does not exist… cannot be absolutely encountered! However, what can be encountered can be encountered, and, what that is are those fictitional polarizations produced and re-produced in the intentional 'space' simulated, and re-simulated, between our three archetypal poles of Object, World and Ego. Moreover, we, ourselves, encounter these simulations/re-simulations as simulations/re-simulations being ourselves only simulations/re-simulations - through simulations/re-simulations of various senses of self and an overall sense of self! So, in the light of this explanation we need to ask ourselves these two questions. First, in this simulated vision of reality just what might be real and what might not be real if everything in truth is only simulated? Second, what meaning can this type of proposition possess if we were to state "everything is a simulation of a simulation, i.e., merely a re-simulation" when significance of a proposition demands an informative contrast implying that everything cannot be just a simulation of a simulation, merely a process of re-simulation? (73)
	
	This first awesome problem is quickly tamed by the transcendental phenomenologist through a recognition that all experience is intentionally constituted and that the nature of that constitution is multi-modal in complexion (which, as a ‘fact’, is guaranteed by its formative passage through the multi-modal complexities of the epistemological hierarchy in its structuralization of the psyche). The phenomenal experience of ‘reality’ is an experience whose existential ‘weight’ is a reflection of the number of appropriate modes normally engaged in the invocation of that type of phenomenon. In an apparent instance of that type of phenomenon the corresponding modalities associated with that type of phenomenon need to be actively entered and engaged. This critical density and intensity of modes actively engaged helping to establish the ‘apparent reality’ of that to hand (through this active invocation of the ‘quantity and quality’ of modalities necessary for the true establishment of that type of phenomenon). So, e.g., a dream apple might appear real in a dream it does not truly satisfy bodily hunger, etc., and this experiential mode is, therefore, (eventually) experienced as absent or deficient in our overall experience of that particular ‘apple phenomenon’. In such a climate we can no longer say that that ‘apple’ is truly an apple as meant in the full multi-modal expression of that phenomenon. The experience of ‘reality’ in general, therefore, is this recognition/re-cognition that the phenomenal reality of our experience of all intentional object-states, frames of reference, egotistical entities, etc., is determined through the appropriate ‘mix and might’ of modalities being adequately exercised and satisfied in a similar manner to that normally found to constitute that type of experience. In essence – nothing more and nothing less! No unobserved occult entities need apply! Of course a variety of other factors and influences might help (correctly or incorrectly, validly or invalidly) to disestablish the apparent ‘reality’ of that experience, e.g., disease, mental illness, absent sense modalities, invalid logical methods dealing with supposition and presupposition, contradictory beliefs, misinterpretations, inadequate consequential analysis, faulty memories, etc., etc. But those factors when relatively negative in character do not contribute to the presentation/re-presentation of a phenomenal simulation, only its dis-establishment. In a relatively positive frame of reference they merely clarify the fact and its confirmation of what actively is modally present and what is modally absent, what has been retained and what is anticipated or should be expected. (74)
	
	The second problem is also very successfully dealt with by the transcendental phenomenologist when they examine the nature of the ‘intentional’ qua the ‘nature’ of the intentional by asking what significance this expression has internally and externally. Internally, I have noted in this paper that intentionality is generated between those poles of the Object, World and Ego which correlatively define themselves in terms that are not 'intentional'. Moreover, this tripolar disposition is further examined or described through various tri-modal sets of expressions such as sense, meaning and meaningfulness; reduction, reconstitution and suspension; textual, meta-textual and non-textual, respectively, etc. Externally, the intentional is noted as 'simulated/re-simulated' but not as a 'simulation of that which is not simulated prior to this act of simulation', etc. Moreover, the expression 'non-intentional' has a number of contrasting meanings, such, e.g., as 'intent' when viewed as motivation without recourse to an intentional object-state; those philosophies that invoke naive metaphor to describe the world and end up literalizing their metaphorical vision of that world as occurs in empiricism, realism, rationalism, idealism, objectivism, etc. This expression is also co-defined in a matrix of terms like pre-intentional, post-intentional, trans-intentional, (extra-intentional when referring to the so-called 'external world' as an impossible philosophical entity, e.g.), etc., that supply a complex informative contrast to this expression of the 'intentional'. So, externally, this expression does not reduced the entire world of significance to a 'mere intentional' playing field although treating 'phenomena' as 'mere phenomena' does give us transcendental access to the constitutional domain of the intentional through the implicit transcendental suspension, etc., embedded within this type of expression (that correctly utilizes this expression 'mere' when this practical technique is carefully inserted into this critical phenomenological frame of reference). The non-intentional point of view is also referred to through the use of the expressions not-textual/not-textual when we have a direct recourse to the reality of life-world through the de-construction of the intentional 'space' between intender and intentional object and object as intended, etc., through the unity and one-worldness of the life-world.  (75)

	As transcendental fictions entities like 'self', etc., can only be treated as fictions that may be fruitful in one context and fruitless or poisonous in some other. From the general everyday point of view intentional objects and states can be lent a provisional existence even though, correctly, in their empirical employment they still constitute and perpetrate a global psychosis as previously argued. As the distortion of 'reality' has its roots in the global psychosis it follows, I believe, that deception of deceiving and being deceived would be considerably ameliorated in the neutralization and diminution of the same. Why do I have this hope? For a start despite the all-pervading influence of the natural attitude the world is correctly viewed, in the main, from an empirical point of view. Hence the ‘empirical’ nature of this point of view, this point of view that does seem to successfully simulate the everyday world. Only on the metaphorical edges of our universe, it would seem, does ‘our world’ become problematic for us factually, ethically, religiously, scientifically, etc. Through the imposition of transcendental suspensions, etc., in the exercise of our judgments, the discrimination of the life-world is validly ascertained within the general limits of our cultural understanding. Although channelled by our empirical attitudes, and despite the limitations of our cultural and scientific models of reality, these transcendental suspensions, etc., appear to keep us in contact with the reality of what there is to hand in this world-of-life! Hence, in this light, we should review our critical passage through this world more as the de-distortion of the distortions of mis-re-presentations rather than as the de-distortion of the distortions of misrepresentations, in effect coming to an understanding of how we deal, must deal with deception in the life-world experienced through those processes of deceiving and being deceived, and, insightfully realized through processes of rectification and validation. Thus, in this critical endeavour, dealing with deception in its three forms or levels of being we have, in effect, through default, formulated an egological philosophy! Let me make some general observations on this topic “how the self is phenomenally constituted” in outlining some of the themes that establish a relatively more speculative side to this type of enterprise before going on to finally conclude this essay. (76)

14.	Facing/De-facing Speculation in a Critical Egological Philosophy?

How does the critical transcendental phenomenologist, from a critical transcendental-phenomenological perspective, deal with egological speculation? Can they confront egological speculation and find themselves actually facing such concepts as ‘self’, ‘mind’, ‘soul’, ‘spirit’, ‘divinity’, etc? Or, does the critical transcendental philosopher merely end up scratching out/defacing such expressions by discovering and declaring them to be expressions lacking, or completely devoid of, phenomenological sense, hermeneutical meaning and/or (experientially-oriented) existential meaningfulness? (77)

	That in the course of their work the metaphysician knows they can invoke Ockham’s razor and go for a relatively more simple economy should they be presented with sensible alternatives whose only difference is a matter of theoretical complexity. On the other hand, the phenomenologist has to take a more balanced approach. Phenomenologically the experience of existence, when thoroughly investigated, is found to be is incredibly complex, modally many-layered and multi-aspected, and, existentially rich (to a degree beyond our imagination). Moreover, they must carefully walk a balance between ‘prejudice’, on one hand, and, on the other, a suspension of the same with out positing or denying the fruits of their labours until that final moment their work is presented in a form that is adequate to the intent of their investigations; albeit forever provisional even if such research is (mis-)treated as definitive in form and format! The critical philosopher, therefore, needs to adopt this more balanced methodological approach or rule, namely, taking the prejudice of the pre-judgments to hand and through a thorough process of suspension, (reduction and reconstitution,) etc., find the right balance necessary to conduct their research into that particular topic. In this respect the critical phenomenologist at no point in the midst of their transcendental research can either affirm or deny either the existence or the possible speculative ramifications of their topic. Whatever meaning there is should be examined critically despite the nature of one’s own epistemological-ontological commitments! They are there only to examine the possible meaning that is to hand in such speculative items, and, subject the same to a critical process of phenomenological analysis which demands this openness to an appreciation of the phenomenon itself (to the extent that it maintains it own distinctive sense of identity, albeit as a simulated re-simulation). If the linguistic expression of such a term appears to have sense, etc., then it falls within the province of a transcendental phenomenological investigation in order to recover that appearance of sense, etc. So in what way, they must ask, do linguistic expressions like ‘self’, ‘mind’, ‘soul’, etc., appear to function in a manner that actually seems to generate some degree of significance? They must first re-produce what significance is discovered to hand. Then they must ascertain just what that significance is and how it is generated. Penultimately, they must closely attend to those factors that seem to help establish the linguistic sense, etc., of that item in the here and now which is already the phenomenal province of the multi-skilled transcendental philosopher. Lastly, questions of value are dealt with, i.e., logical questions, factual questions, ethical questions, hermeneutical questions, etc. This web of interconnections helping to establish the ‘final’ overall sense, meaning and meaningfulness of that expression under examination. Being an investigation into locative sense, essential meaning and experiential meaningfulness subject to a thematically systematic, overall, process of transcendental suspension in the hope that the canvas of our exploration has a value greater than that psychic energy invested in the theoretical-practical thematization and realization of that topic! However, all processes of language do indeed mirror the nature of ‘the world’, in some manner or other to some extent, from their relative point of view hence the potentially productive fruitfulness of this type of research. Then, we also have the concept that the potential can never be treated in a mode of pure potentiality neither epistemologically (because we cannot think it) nor ontologically (because it could not exist for us as we could not re-cognize it) nor epistemologically-ontologically (for the reasons as already briefly alluded to). How then should we confront egological concepts of a relatively speculative nature? (78)

	To answer that last question I would like to propose some general rules from the following list to that extent that they, tentatively, can be made to apply:

1.	Attempt to determine the concept’s primary motivation for being proposed by seeking to ascertain what philosophical problem is being resolved?
2.	Attempt to determine the concept’s secondary reasons for being proposed, by seeking to ascertain what other philosophical problems are implicated?
3.	Attempt to re-write those mechanisms from the point of view of the here and now (hic et nunc)?
4.	Attempt to determine whether there are possible methods for the experiential determination of those re-written mechanisms in (an existential sense of) the living present?
5.	Evaluate the values and degrees of possible success attained/might be possible to attain (in the current ‘directions’ being travelled)? (79)
If we were to examine the expressions ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’ and comparatively attempt to relate them to each other and an everyday understanding of ‘self’ how might we go about this type of research in the light of these five rules or guidelines just noted? How do we ‘save’ these terms from merely a speculative domain and attempt to re-introduce them back into an arena of experiential appreciation and potential phenomenological reflection (on the grounds that all expressions have an original basis in an experiential arena?)? For an expression to have significance it must possess sense, meaning and meaningfulness, i.e., be located in the psychic world of phenomenal experience, be subject to hermeneutic interpretation in accordance with meta-textual expectations and genre conventions, and, have a distinctive sense of non-textual presence that allows us to meaningfully refer to it directly despite its overlaid ‘misrepresentative’ linguistic sense of ‘definition’ (as an expression with a distinctive sense of phenomenal being in some form or other). (80)

	Whole books are being written about ‘self’, ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’, etc., and it would be churlish to sweep then all under the carpets as merely the transcendental mistakes that they correctly are! We may only be a series of over lapping masks, the mere illusion of a very complex personae, still in the life-world the phenomenon of ‘being a person’ cannot be dismissed from a relative point of view whether empirically oriented or non-empirically oriented in the deployment of their ideological utilization. (81)

	In the highly charged atmospheres of the religious and/or political spheres where many of these ideological expressions have their deployment (which, correctly, extend well outside and beyond the religious and political domains) how is the critical transcendental philosopher to venture neutrally into their midst when most of the proponents of such linguistic expressions so obviously fail to demonstrate even a modicum of the necessary degree of transcendental detachment needed in the course of their own related endeavours? (82)

	The resolution of this dilemma, e.g., should a certain ideological discipline be promulgated or merely transcendentally reflected from by its proponents, has already been dealt with, by default, in my earlier argument that the critical transcendental philosopher pre-conditionally needs to operate from a position of ‘prejudice’ but, that, in the course of their critical research, those investigations need to be exercised through appropriate ongoing transcendental suspensions, reductions and reconstitutions, etc. as critically, and naturally, establish the course of the hermeneutic circle in its productive re-production of sense, meaning and meaningfulness (through re-simulation). All this is quite simple! Until we try to put into words how we actually seem to go about this business of making critically purified forms of judgment! But, then, that is the case with all skilfully conducted operations performed in this world-of-life. Could we discuss how we walk along the street, ride a bicycle, play the piano, the organ or harpsichord… Even then the same piece of music played on those last three instruments would be played differently and need to be dealt with in a different commentary… the sort of text perhaps only a novelist or phenomenologist might be able to start to emulate… and then we must ask, in this self-reflected narrative where does the realm of the factual end and the world of fiction begin? Might not the phenomenologist being doing little more than the novelist. As previously noted, it is only the addition, or subtraction, of a few propositions to shift an honest rendition of this world-of-life to a vision of the world meant to deceive!? And in our obsession to minutely analyse the world with the necessary blinkers on to what degree is this only a project of self-deception? (83)

	As previously argued for I have noted that what ever is said about the world must to some extent mirror the same. We cannot completely mis-represent the world in our mis-re-presentation of the same! Even in our global commission of transcendental mistakes we cannot escape the fact of our being in this world-of-life by being-in-this-world-of-life through the transcendental powers of re-simulation, and therein re-presentation, unleased through suspensions, etc! The hermeneutic circle, through a re-simulation of the-world-there-for-us, acts both as lens and that very same world being simulated therein. It is as if the simulation of the simulation is no simulation, has no simulated simulation there-for-us… allows us to directly access the world of simulation as the simulation of the world, and, that together, they constitute this world that is there-for-us! It is as if the world is a video recording of a video recording that is never anything other than a video recording (say an animated world created in the cyber space of computer animation). Of course, when ‘pushed’, all metaphor ultimately break down as they cannot operate through the literalization of the metaphor, but, in simulating the world they also re-simulate it for us! So, to this extent, to the extent the metaphor is ‘set up’ to simulate a certain aspect or set of aspects about the world, they should be allowed to operated through their powers of simulation! (84)

	So, how do we go about this re-retrieval of significance assuming an expression had meaning, has access for-us to that meaning? (85)

	Our first guideline (in paragraph 79) states “…determine the concept’s primary motivation for being proposed by seeking to ascertain what philosophical problem is being resolved?” This is a question – what is the primary ‘metaphysical’ problem being dealt with by that ideological expression? ‘Metaphysical’ by virtue of the fact that that expression will reflect the relevant primary presuppositional preconditions that constitute that ideological frame of reference in which that term is being meaningfully ‘situated’ or ‘set-up’, and, the relevant primary suppositional conditions that actually constitute the immediate application of that ideological frame of reference. In other words, the concentration of our attention on the metaphor present (in their rhetorical contexts) will help us to focus our attention on the very problematic that those artefacts are set-up to resolve in an ideologically acceptable fashion. The metaphor are situated on the centre of this disconcerting semblance of tension that that metaphor, and ultimately that metaphysical frame of reference, and its hierarchy of existential tensions endeavour to resolve. Because the metaphorical is a conjunctive suspension between ‘the is and is not’ (and the rhetorical is a dis-conjunctive suspension between the either/or) we find that the centre of the same is directly aligned with the psychic centre of our problem (and its being searched for problematic). Therefore, by asking “why this metaphor” (and/or “what is this question” when looking at its rhetorical context) we are given the very tools to help us start this metaphysical ‘unpacking’ of the primary problematic and its associated secondary problematics (by also looking more closely at allied metaphor utilized in that/those rhetorical contexts, etc., in the light of this relatively primary problematic, etc.). (86)

	How do terms like ‘self, ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’ function in our world(s)-of-culture in which we find ourselves born into, embodied therein and/or possibly transplanted to (even if only through the ‘processes of time’ in this multi-cultural world-of-ours with the accelerated osmotic-like interaction that cultural worlds now seem to have with each other)? (87)

	In this endeavour I am going to try the following experiment. In the book The Soul’s Code written by James Hillman let me see how he deals with this expression of ‘soul’ in the first chapter of his book. (88)

	After a number of paragraphs criticising various forces in our culture that seem to have us cast as ‘victims’, and, the author suggests that, despite this, there is at work in the life of every person some form of fate that seems to have us called to be who we are in a certain distinctive way, which, in being allowed to come into existence, seems to better define who we are. “In a nutshell” (in this literal pun) he defines this vocation as entailed in the being of our life in much the same way that an acorn grows into an oak tree, that “the image of the oak” is somehow entailed in the seed of the acorn. (89)

	Then he discusses this in the following paragraph:

The soul of each of us is given a unique daimon before we are born, and it has selected an image or pattern that we are to live on earth. This soul-companion, the daimon, guides us here; in the process of arrival, however, we forget all that took place and believe we come empty into this world. The daimon remembers what is in your image and belongs to your pattern, and therefore your daimon is the carrier of your destiny. (90)

	Such a concept is, of course, a re-telling of a myth used by Plato and taken up subsequently by Plotinus and the Neoplatonists, as dully noted by Hillman. But, is this story, as an explanation of an experiential observation that people do seem to be called to various vocations in life to varying degrees, to be taken literally or metaphorically or a combination of both? Hillman has preceded the above quote by the following qualification:

	…that there is a reason I am alive.
	
	Not the reason to live; not the meaning of life in general or a philosophy of religious faith-this book does not pretend to provide such answers. But it does speak to the feelings that there is a reason my unique person is here and that there are things I must attend to beyond the daily round and that give the daily round its reason, feelings that the world somehow wants me to be here, that I am answerable to an innate image, which I am filling out in my biography.

	That image is the subject of this book… (91)

	But “image” could have two meanings here – figurative and literal? Like a ‘black-box’ – we cannot see into it but it does what that sort of ‘black-box’ is meant to do. As he says the “image of the oak” is entailed in the acorn and that is meant metaphorically, but also, in the goodness of time, literally to the extent that the acorn is allowed to become an oak. In effect the daimon is like a black-box in this regard – he will not define what it is but will allude to it through its effects it has upon us by means of various metaphorical ‘images’, etc. He concludes this first chapter titled In a Nutshell on page 40 by saying:

	We will be elaborating the acorn theory and discovering other effects of the daimon in other chapters of this book. (92)

	So the essential metaphor of his book is the (black-box of the) diamon and its primary metaphor is the ‘image’ in the acorn as expounded in its rhetorical context of the acorn theory, i.e., that an acorn is destined to become an oak tree (from the moment it was produced) and not otherwise! That granted, we are now in a position to understand the intentional motivation behind his use of this expression soul? (93)

	It would seem that the psychological ‘self’ as a ‘person’ in this world has a destiny that is essentially pre-set. It is up to us to put that destiny into effect and through being in harmony with our destiny we will be in harmony with the world (and therein through such harmony of being find our true happiness in the being of who we are). Hence this ‘self’ has soul… is a ‘soul’ taking a middle path here without necessarily disappearing into a religious frame of reference or a scientific direction (these “contesting dogmas” as Hillman refers to as “barking at each other through the ages and which Western thought fondly keeps as pets”). (94)

	In the light of my first guideline it would appear that the primary motivation for the word soul is to ensure that the self be seen as something with value that cannot be reduced to a mere self as a practice that Western psychology seems so often to attempt (according to Hillman). As he notes:

The core subject of psychology, psyche or soul, doesn’t get into the books supposedly dedicated to its study and care. (95)

Other motivation hinted at in the end of this first chapter, it is promised, will be revealed in the course of reading this book. (96)

My third guideline notes the need for an “attempt to re-write those mechanisms from the point of view of the here and now (hic et nunc)?” This Hillman has done for us by noting both a need for re-writing the self, ego, etc., in terms of a soul accompanied by this daimon, and, seeking the value of this exercise in the here and now of our life in the current course of its living existence (rather than for the purposes of advancement in some other, etc.). (97)

The next guideline notes the need for an “attempt to determine whether there are possible methods for the experiential determination of those re-written mechanisms in (an existential sense of) the living present?” This Hillman attempts to do for us by supplying examples of various famous people who, very early on as children, knew what they were going to do in life. Most of the first chapter is devoted to this task with a commentary to guide us in interpreting these ‘observations’ with various possible objections and other theoretical explanations argued against and, thereby, disposed of. (98)

	My last guideline notes the need to “evaluate the values and degrees of possible success attained/might be possible to attain (in the current ‘directions’ being travelled)?” In this first chapter Hillman has set the stage for the rest of his book. The values he seems to focus on are the need to recognise that we should divine our destiny and conform to its course (as, essentially, a deontological expression of the ethical), the need to let beauty enter into the course of our existence through this harmonization offered though setting out to actively realize the course of our fate, a need to seek this inner truth of our soul, etc. That Hillman both evaluates the values needed to be brought to the fore and offers us ways and means for the mechanisms for determining the success we might feel if we were to adopt this attitude, etc., towards the soul and its ‘accompanying’ daimon. (99)

	Hence, in using this example from Hillman, I believe I have been able to successfully sketch out how a critical transcendental-phenomenological-egological philosophy might deal with egological concepts of a relatively speculative nature, in the process ‘returning’ them to an experiential arena. (100)

	I also mentioned that I would like to comparatively explore the use of the world ‘spirit’. In many ways the words ‘soul’ and ‘spirit’ appear to be different terms and that this fact can be demonstrated by substituting them in contexts used by one or the other. E.g., if we say “with soul” we might be saying something to the effect that “it is more profound and in some ways sad too   ‘ (as it might be used in the Blues or Gospel music?)? On the other hand if we were to say “with spirit” we get a different meaning with a different aura of connotations, indeed, “something with life, speed, and is naturally happy”? I don’t wish to proceed further on this point other than to note that different expression can bring their own unique baggage so to speak and that we need to be sensitive to these nuances given to the ‘self’ or ‘ego’ in our transposition of such  ‘neutral’ terms into that particular context. (101)

	Hence an approach to how we face/de-face egological concepts of a relatively speculative nature and retrieve from them a significance that, if properly conducted, can be ‘returned’ to an experiential arena in the ‘here and now’!? This ever present  possibility giving us an explanation how expression of marked speculative nature appear to possess a significance beyond their mere reduction, and, above and beyond any ‘black-box’ use and effect? But not in all situations - that much speculation should be seen for what it – a wishful thinking often dissolving into near nonsense with a pernicious effect upon the life of the person in so far as it stops us from living our own lives and being true to ourselves (or as Hillman might put – being true to our daimon)! (102)

15.   A Succinct Method for Determining Ideological Perspectives

	Before I conclude this essay I would like to tender the following philosophical observation and succinct philosophical technique, namely, that as philosophy often entertains itself in prolix conversations, that, despite this observation, we can always find to hand a short-cut through whose proper use we can quickly get to the essential message, or lack of one, of that philosopher, ideologue, pseudo-philosopher or any one presenting a philosophical-like opinion. Merely ask them “how they would like to define, in as few words as possible, the nature of the ‘self’ or the ‘ego’ or the ‘person’, etc., in their philosophical system or from their current philosophical point of view (if they are not feeling particularly systematic in their endeavours)?” With this simple stratagem they will, if they can be brief, accept this stricture of being succinct, state everything there is needed to be known about what is being philosophically focused upon and what is over-looked in their philosophical thinking or opinion. And this is regardless of whether that person is a philosopher or not! An economist, e.g., when asked how they define their sense of ‘person’ in their thinking will, with one stroke, reveal the essential nature of their thinking, warts and all! Insights and blind-spots should be equally available for reflection. So if they define the person ‘merely as a consumer’, e.g, then we know immediately where they are coming from and what they are missing out on, namely the fact that person cannot be reduced to a ‘mere consumer’, etc! For those reasons, on reflection, that should be obvious! As I have argued that the sense of self is phenomenologically simulated (in the coursing of the hermeneutic circle, etc.) through it relative distinction from a sense of the not-an-object-state and the not-a-frame-of-reference it follows that along with this vision of self their philosophy of the intentional object-state and its intentional field of reference should be equally spelt out! Most philosophers seem to avoid a philosophy of self and in their over attention to the object-states and fields-of-references become prolix (a fault I must too confess from suffering from and, hopefully, seek my reader’s indulgence and/or forgiveness, or, at least, their compassion and understanding in this regard). (103)

So this tip is basically this: that to get quickly to what a philosopher is really up to, or anyone else with an overt or covert philosophical point of view we would like to understand better, all we need to do is to simply ask them “how do they define the self, what have they to say about the nature of self…?” This type of questioning providing us very rapidly with an essential snap-shot of that questioned person’s philosophical points of view, being, in effect, an essential snap-shot of their philosophy in its holistic entirety regardless of the length or lack of length they go to in answering this question, or, even their honesty of reply (since any rely is going to reflect upon their own nature and how they perceive themselves (in this particular situation of having to give an answer in this respect). The person's ‘vision of self’, therefore, being an essential snapshot of the integrity or lack of integrity of their overall philosophical stance(s). (104)
	The informative response elicited through such interrogation allows the questioner, and others privy to this reply, to ascertain the essential philosophical characteristics of that person’s stated philosophical point(s) of view – in effect what is under focus and what is left out in their overall picture of the ‘world’, and, an outline of the possible motivation for this distinctive positioning in the life-world from an understanding of the primary and secondary motivation as to why this person’s appears to have adopted that type of position. Therefore, through these sins of omission and commission we are in a position to determine possible primary and secondary motivation for the utilization of relatively speculative egological concepts. So ‘soul’ might be proposed in order to see out ‘the survival of the ego after the death of the body’. That’s would most likely be its primary motivation? But, then, you could also re-write it as in the here and now? Surely, the mechanism in play for this survival of ‘psychic identity’ must already be in place if it is going to do what motivates its ideation (maintaining and giving continuity of the psyche despite the transformations it must undergo?). Then, we can ask ourselves if it is possible in theory and practice to find a basis for that type of view from a phenomenological point of view? E.g., that person’s reply directly or indirectly can tell us how they view (or don’t view) the transition of ‘death’. From this aspect one can then determine the ideological nature of their religious beliefs, if religious beliefs are indeed present. The use of other ‘selectively supplied contexts’ further refining this technique…. (105)

	In this regard we should also ask the psychiatrist or the psychologist, the doctor or nurse, or any other medical practitioner we might have to deal with, how they might review their understanding of the nature of the ‘self’? Our examining of their response(s) helping us to quickly come to an understanding of the presuppositions central to their philosophical point(s) of view, and, helping us to come to an understanding as to whether their therapeutic methods might possibly have any merit or not – an aspect of our psychological research that will be taken up in my next paper Beyond Therapy. (106)

16.   Provisional Conclusion

	The title and subtitles of this paper suggest three interlinked themes, namely, an in-depth examination of deception and self-deception (which, in this paper, have been treated as part of the same phenomenon of deception), the phenomenological formulation of an egological philosophy, and, a confrontation with the philosophical problem - how can we actually encounter the self if the self from an absolute point of view has no existence? A fourth topic was also looked at in passing - how do we face (or de-face) egological concepts of a relatively speculative nature that, on the whole, seem to overpopulate various diverse egological philosophies whose consequential ramifications, whether therapeutic, neutral or non-therapeutic in ambition and in truth, on the whole can not be ignored in the (cultural) understanding(s) of our being in this world-of-life? (107)

	Let me look at these four areas in reversed order. (108)

	(4) In dealing with an experiential retrieval of the significance of egological entities of a relatively speculative nature five guidelines were suggested (in paragraph 79) and briefly demonstrated (in paragraphs 95-99)? (108)

	(3) In answering the question: "how can we actually encounter the self if the self (or any other self) from an absolute point of view has no existence?" A(nother) tentative solution/resolution could be proposed along the following lines - that as all intentional significance (defined through sense, meaning and meaningfulness) is simulated and that the same through processes of retention is, in effect, virtually re-simulated, it would appear that identity qua identity is apparently 'fixed'  in the flux of time and therein give the appearance of an 'appearance' through this ability to exhibit duration; to endure as a re-simulation through such retention. Now, as the phenomenal world is experienced as a re-simulation it follows that it is possible for one re-simulation to meet another re-simulation if this interaction is itself being simulated/re-simulated! That from the point of view of this re-simulation of the 'reality of this interaction' and the 'interaction of this reality', because there is no essential difference between the same they are, in effect, in a state of interaction through re-simulation. So, although there may be no absolute sense of self it does not imply that from a relative and empirical point of view that the various senses of self and an overall sense of self need not appear to interact, or, that someone’s overall sense of self cannot appear to interact with some other’s overall sense of self, etc! Moreover, using our formula "the x of x is no(t)-x" we could also argue along these tentative lines: 'the appearance of an interaction' of the 'appearance of an interaction' is 'the no(t)-appearance of an interaction', i,.e,. the reality of an interaction being a re-simulation. Which stands to reason that any two items of the same ontological status in a state of interaction must be able to interact as such, a state of affairs that gives their interaction the status of a 'direct state of interaction'! On the other hand, but in the same manner, the overall sense of self remains just that - an overall sense of self, and, that the various senses of self that interact with each other essentially recreate the non-semblance, i.e., the reality, of that interaction between the same! In a transcendental phenomenological setting, therefore, the interaction between the same type of intentional entities is apparently 'direct'! Thus although an overall sense of self might profitably be viewed as a semblance of reality, a collection of personae, as an empty fiction, etc., the simulation of the interaction between entities of a similar status is effectively direct and real, albeit simulated, and, re-simulated through retention! Moreover, as there is no pre-simulated state, a state of affairs being simulated through simulation, it follows that reality is there to that extent there is a matching of modalities. A reflection seen in a dream is not a reflection being a meta-reflection… a dream of a dream is not a dream being a meta-dream… but, the handshake had between two hands of similar ontological status is real by virtue of the fact that there is a direct alignment between these two hands of the same/similar ontological status which simulates this directness of interaction! Despite the absolute (Absolute) emptiness of the self and its various collection of personae, the relative sense of self is, effectively, as real as any other of its counterparts operating with the same modal status in this world-of-life. (109)

	However I recognize that a number of issues would need to be correctly addressed here to run this type of argument. For a start if a simulation of a simulation is no(t) (a) simulation being a ‘re-simulation’ how would re-simulations and simulations be able to (directly) interact assuming that they have a different ontological status - being of a meta-level and of an object–level respectively? This problem is easily overcome in a transformational philosophy where treated products can be re-treated on to the same meta-level that they initially originated upon (say that initial object-level). And this type of re-treatment can apply to all processes of transformation. Furthermore, between disparate product types whose interaction is realized through transformational invariance on each of the meta-levels involved in that overall process we have in effect a de facto directness of interaction when that can be put into ‘play’ through the demonstration of that transformational invariance. But rather than follow up the complexities of this direction let me try a third path in a resolution of this problem (involved in encountering that which absolutely does not exist). (110)

	Let us say a relationship is exercised in a ‘relative’ frame of reference. This stands to reason. There is a relationship by virtue of the fact that there is the appearance of an interaction between the involved parties. Now let us say that the relativity of this relativity is its absoluteness by virtue of the a fact that this type of transformational interaction is essentially meta-relational or i.e., relatively absolute (in relation to the relativity of the relational level as a relative object-level in meta-status). Then it follows, without processes of re-treatment back on to the original meta-level, that the absolutivity of the absolute is essentially not ‘absolute’ in meta-status, i.e., as essentially ‘Absolute’ in meta-status (being raised by two degrees relative to the object-level of relational relativity). Now the interaction between two relational entities of the same type is on an object level to commence with. The resulting interaction is then raised by one meta-degree and the final product of that interactional transformation is re-treated back on the same par as possessed by its initial parties involved in that interaction. But relational simulations and relational re-simulations, treated/re-treated on the same meta-level in their interaction re-produced, initially, an essentially absolute type of product. It is through the absolutivity of that product that we arrive at a new entity, namely, the relational transformation of their interaction. So if a simulated state of affairs effectively interacts with another simulated state of affairs we find ourselves entertaining an absolute state of affairs in the re-simulated productivity of that interaction. Of course we can then through transformational re-treatment return to the initial meta-level of commencement. But before we do that let us consider the interaction of all possible absolute states of affairs with any other absolute state of affairs. What would we find through the resultant of such a(n open ended) process? Surely, none other than a sense of the Absolute equal to the transcendental ambit of the life-world itself. So the possibility of interaction in the life-world is accomplished for us by virtue of the transformational-philosophical ‘fact’ that the ‘Absolute’ is ‘grounds’ of the ‘absolute’, i.e., the interaction between relational states of affairs, e.g., re-simulational simulations, and, the absolute is the ‘grounds’ for the relative, i.e., the realm of simulations/re-simulations. Thus through the transcendental grounds of possibility, that constitute the ambit of the life-world, all forms of simulation and/or re-simulation can interact despite the absolute absence of intentionally constituted object-states, intentionally constituted frames-of-reference (or fields/worlds), and, intentionally constituted egological entities. So the ‘simulation of interaction’ guarantees the ‘interaction of those simulations’ in terms of that simulated-interactional frame-of-reference (as argued for previously in paragraph 109)! Basically the argument is saying that if an interaction is simulated then, from the point of view of that interactional space, an ‘interaction’ is effectively being simulated in the same despite the fact that no intentional object-state needs to be absolutely constituted as an object-state, etc. So in cyber space, e.g., a process of interaction is an interactive-process in those simulated terms of reference despite the absence of represented objects or states being present (since the ‘intentional state intended’ is the ‘object-state as intended’ through the relative directness of their interactivity)! But, because there are no object-states representing any intentionally constituted object-state it implies that, ultimately, from an Absolute point of view, through the ‘relativity of relativity’ (as no(t) relativity) there can be no real relativity hence its mere simulation/re-simulation. But, what appears to be in a state of interaction does just that, appears to be in a state of interaction despite the ultimate isolation of all things from an Absolute point of view which is none other than the Absolute unity of the life-world, the oneness of the life-world as the Life-World, the virtual grounds of all possibility and its actualized expression through the simulation/re-simulation of appearance/appearances. Hence appearances are relatively ‘substantial’ in their own right, not by virtue of their so-called underlying reality! The philosophical difference between an intellectually bankrupt absolutist philosophy and the existential richness and potential creativity of a transcendental-phenomenological constituted Absolute philosophy. (111)

	(2) I have also arrived at an egological philosophy by looking closely at certain problems that to varying extents seem to have belittled the sense of being a person (through deception and self-deception, psychosis, global psychosis, etc.). Moreover the significance of such an encounter with specific senses of self, our overall sense of self, and, with the sense of other egological entities and institutions, is described through the significance producing interaction between sense, meaning and meaningfulness (without absolute recourse to the intentional polar-fictions of object-states, frames-of-reference, egological entities). (112)

	(1) Lastly, the subject of deception (and self-deception) was closely investigated and three levels of deception were discerned, namely, a global level where through reification and projection of intentional states a global psychosis was set in train by virtue of the epistemological ‘fact’ that the intentional nature of all constituted products (read simulations/re-simulations) to be only ‘polar fictions’, on an individualized psychotic level and on a focalized non-psychotic level through acts of deception and/or being deceived. It was also noted in that research that through the ongoing imposition of a transcendental suspension, etc., that the distorted productivity of what ever is being simulated/re-simulated still essentially remains in touch with the reality that is generally shared through the auspices of the life-world, as realized through a common general (con)census of reality; which is, in effect, that-reality-there-for-‘us’! (113)

	Now, let us turn our attention, very briefly, to the possible therapeutic ramifications and consequences of this understanding of deception, etc. (114)

	As noted, the process of deception basically involves being in general conformity with our understanding of reality and the reality of that understanding! Deception, and its deeper cousin, self-deception, is arrived at only through the minor re-arrangement of a large set of true propositions, through a transformational processes of omission and/or commission (or, those processes that virtually establish the same by default). It follows, therefore, that to rectify the distortion of this situation all one needs to do is to turn around a small fraction of those deceptively re-constituted propositions and a spirit of rectification will automatically ensue(?). Hence the possible therapeutic consequences of this research in this regard - a fact assisted through the installation of an appropriate transcendental suspension, etc. Moreover, this realization of a conformity with reality should automatically lead to an increasing degree of productive harmonization of the individual which, in turn, would be radiantly reflected in their existential choice of (those ‘choice’) activities (creatively found available for them). (115)

	Hence, the possible therapeutic consequences of a de-distortion of deception and self-deception, although, one should also note, the social harmony put in play and preserved through acts of socially acceptable patterns of deception. This dialectical balancing act, between the de-distortion of distortion and the prejudicial installation of distortion helping us to existentially walk that fine path between the extremes that as 'polar fictions' help to constitute the reality of that-one-life-world-there-for-us but which in themselves, from an absolute point of view (or the Absolute point of view), have absolutely no-existence, but, which as fruitful fictions, help to create the relative illusion of the same and, therein, a relatively safe and sane path, to some degree or other, through this world-of-life-for-all-of-us!!! (116)

	What an irony it is that to perpetrate an act of deception a greater degree of truth has to be proffered! (117)

							    Noël Tointon, Sydney, 9.1.03.

Beyond Therapy: A Set of Essays
On Miscellaneous Topics in Psychology and Psychiatry (2001-2003) 

V. Deception and Self-Deception: 
Part III - An Overview: A Focusing on the Philosophical Issues
Concerning The Problematic Phenomenon of Deception and Self-Deception, etc.

0.   Introduction

	A number of primary philosophical problems were looked into in this Fifth Essay. I would like to name these as follows:

1.	The problem of deception. (I1-7,II1-18)
2.	The problem of self-deception. (I1-7,II1-18)
3.	The problem of egological existence. (I19-21, I1. etc.)
4.	The problem of a substantial world. (An implication that parallels Prob.3.) 
            (II111).
5.	The problem of phenomenal directness. (II12-18, 75-76)
6.	How does the critical transcendental phenomenologist deal with egological 
           speculation? (II77-102) (1)

A number of secondary problems were also looked into, e.g:

1.	The critical evaluation of the abduction experience. (I7-14)
2.	The disparity between linguistic texts and visual texts. (I16-17)
3.	The failure of the Turing Test? (II22-25)
4.	What prejudice should the phenomenologist have or not have? (II29-36)
5.	The problem of intersubjectivity. (II42, 65)
6.	How is deception exposed? (II43-57)
7.	How should we treat a global psychosis if at all? (II59-67, 76, 113, 116)
8.	What is the nature of authenticity? (II63-66)
9.	How are relationships entered into? (II63, 68-76)
10.	How do we determine what is real? (II 74-75) (2)

In relatively simple language let me briefly describe what is problematic about those primary problems as noted above. (3)

1.	The problem of deception is only a problem when one views the self as if it were monolithic in its semblance of self-unity. The problem ceasing to be a problem when we postulate one aspect of the self creating the deception and another dissimulating that intention. In essence, one aspect of the self looks at the deceptive practice at face value whilst some other facet of that self sees it as a deception qua deception. As long as these two facets are cooperating together, yet relatively separated, the self is able to deceive (without finding itself being deceived). (4)

2.	On the other hand the problem of self-deception is a deeper puzzle since we must ask how the self, in constituting that deceptive practice, is only able to read it at face value and therein be self-deceived? Although the self appears to be self-deceived, by various stratagems it can be shown hermeneutically that 'part' of the psyche 'knows' and 'acts' as if were not being deceived even though overall it generally, or more ostensively, behaves as if it were being self-deceived. The implication that might be drawn is that 'in appearing as if deceived' this metaphor is then read literally by that sense of self that misconstrues this as 'if one were deceived' and through this loss of transcendental distance comes to believe and act, to some considerable degree, as if it were being self-deceived with this qualification, namely, that a more integrated aspect of the overall sense of self does 'recognize' this self-deception as a deception qua deception even if, overall, by the relatively impossible literalization of metaphor it cannot, as a result, be absolutely self-deceived. That to some extent the 'relatively more insightful sense of self' is over-ruled by that sense of self that confronts that loss of transcendental distance at face value. (5)

3.	The third problem of egological existence comes into play when the philosopher holds the view that the overall sense of self and all subsidiary senses of self are only an illusion, an impossible to obtainable polar fiction, a construction and reified projection of the mind. If the self can have no absolute self-existence then how do we interact 'within' our own sense of self and with so call 'others' 'without' our so-called sense of self? (6)

4.	Paralleling this problem is a loss of world, it too being treated as a polarized projection of the mind along with all object-states being treated in the same fashion, i.e., as absolutely non-existent? Hence the implicit fourth problem should note the problem of an absent substantial world. (7)

5.	Following on from problems 3. And 4. We can then ask how can there be one life-world, and, how could there be any directness of (relational) interaction given that phenomenal selves, others, world(s) and objects are all non-existent from an absolute point of view? Since the self, world, etc., are all absolutely non-existent how can there be any form of an interaction between 'things that don't exist'? (8)

6.	How does the critical transcendental phenomenologist deal with speculation? By noting both the use of metaphors being utilized and the normal limits of the usage associated with the same, That through such a reading we should try to understand the existential import of the same, and, adopt the richest reading that allows us to establish what degrees of relevance are had by that metaphorical construction in the light it throws on the 'here and now' of 'our' everyday existence. (9)

Let me re-address these problems in the reverse order. (10)

6.	The metaphorical is always conducted in a metaphorical context that is rhetorically driven. An inspection of that rhetorical context and its existential relevance helping us to determine the existential worth of that metaphorical construct (be it actual or virtual in ontological range or extent?)? (11)

5.	One might say that it is because there is no absolutely substantial sense of self, world, object-state, etc., that that the semblance of an interaction between the semblance of these 'fiction' is assured! Being simulations/re-simulations (in order to establish a sense of temporal duration, etc.) the apparent relationship between the same can be equally simulated. The 'reality' of that interaction manifesting through the multi-modal richness apparently entailed. Hence 'directness' can be re-established, albeit as simulated/re-simulated (and thence not met in any impossible to comprehend self-existent, substantial type of mode). (12)

4.	 The same type of argument as presented in 5. being adopted, namely, by virtue of their simulated nature everything in the life-world acts and interacts through simulation/re-simulation, including the sense of an overall semblance of one's own sense of self or some one other than one's else? (13)
3.	The same argument as presented in 5. being adopted, namely, by virtue of their simulated nature everything in the life-world acts and interacts through simulation/re-simulation, including the sense of a world and its miscellaneous inventories of object-states and egologically-oriented entities. (14)

2.	The self-deception of the self is understandable if the self looses its sense of a transcendental distance in its reading of metaphor and in the reading of its own metaphorical constructions, etc. (15)

1.	Deception being understood as an artefact, like all the other problems noted here, of our philosophical perspectives. Placing a monolithic sense of an overall self centre stage simulates the problematic nature of this and other problematic areas of concern. (16)

	Let me now quote some sections of this essay that deal with these problems and then later let me quote some of their solutions. (17)

1.   The Problem of Deception

In an act of deception the person creating the deception normally is not the person who is to be deceived. However, in my tentative understanding of self-deception I am going to propose that the two processes are essentially the same, albeit that self-deception involves a metaphorical 'endeepening' of the process and, perhaps, some form of a phase change wherein the literal semblance of the deception is then mistakenly read as the 'reality-to-hand' in that particular situation. Self-deception is obviously problematic in the philosophical sense - how is it possible for the very same self to deceive itself? To my mind deception is problematic in this special sense for just the same type of reasons, namely, how is it possible for the same self to simulate a deceptive version of reality when that same self knows, or should know, that that version is not in conformity with reality as generally understood - the self having to wear two or more hats, at the same time, so to speak. Essentially the first aspect of this problem is predicated on the monolithic unity of the self. Obviously deception and self-deception exist and therefore it would appear that we must give up this notion of the self as some form of a uniform monolith possessed of absolute self-control and self understanding (and this has been, to date, an effective postmodern critique of a 'modernist vision of self'). Although we must postulate the implicitly projected semblance of an overall sense of self in order to explain the apparent intentional unity of that agent, at the same time, this sense of self must come about through a multitude of different senses somehow cooperating to some degree or other and integrated to some extent within this overall sense of self. In effect it is through this cooperation that an act of deception can be entered into. So, e.g., the 'deceiving self' can say (to another person or persons that) "x is a" when in fact a 'non-self-deceived sense of self knows that '~x is a' or x is ~a'. Once a non-monolithic sense of self is accepted this problem of deception ceases to be problematic! On the other hand, how can the self enter into a process of its own self-deception and act, to some considerable extent, as if it were unaware of its own deception (in the process reviewing what light or darkness might be thrown on the intentional life of the subject?). A resolution in progress of this more difficult aspect of our problem will be taken up in last section of this paper. First, let me look at this meta-critique of the general spectrum of critical evaluations of the theory and evidence (or lack of evidence) for the abduction experience and from a meta-meta-critique conducted by myself note a number of conclusions I would like to make in this regard. As abduction reports are often vague, lack supporting evidence and seem to be logistically untenable from an overall perspective we should provisionally conclude that most if not all individuals making such a claim are, to put it politely, mistaken. On these grounds, with this prejudicial pre-judgment to hand, let me now adopt a transcendental phenomenological position, etc., in order to critically investigate the essential nature of this type of 'phenomenon' (of the 'abduction' experience) and set out to evaluate therein whether my previous research in this regard, specifically with respect to co-authored phenomena, is of value, can throw some informative light on this type of problem, namely, 'how is it possible for the same self to effectively deceive its own overall sense of self?' (as most claims, if not all, of abduction appear, on probability, to be deceptively manufactured by the claimant). (7)

	Essentially, the pseudo-philosophical problem of deception is a problem if one's view of the self is monolithic and unified. An experience of pain should disabuse us of that notion - we feel pain, we feel pain here or there, we think about it, it motivates us to look for some form of pain-relief or strategy to deal with it, we know we are in pain, etc. Hence the overall sense of self is a sense of self that overviews all the other senses of self such as an impressional sense of self, a reflective sense of self, a motivated sense of self, a sense of self that knows that they are truly in pain, a sense of self that knows what it is like not to be in pain, etc., etc. (18)
2.   The Problem of Self-Deception

	I ask in I33: (19)

	Why does a loss of transcendental distance more easily facilitate an 'act' of self-deception? (33)

	In a progressive loss of gestalt integrity there is the increasing autonomy of aspects and perspectives, etc., albeit with a progressively diminished degree of qualitative richness. In such an environment idealities desired might be mistakenly identified and recognized through a literalization of the(ir) metaphor(ical simulation), etc… (34)

	I argue that a self-delusion takes place in a loss or diminution of our powers of transcendental discrimination wherein there is an associated impoverishment of the overall hermeneutic circle: (20)

…So, e.g., a dream apple may taste like an apple, indeed, ideally like a very good or perfect apple, yet, without a full complement of modalities that should accompany a 'real' apple tasting process our judgment could never arrive at the affirmation of such a judgment without the same! Without this degree of psychic depth and richness of modalities, etc., no judgment would affirm the existence of an apple beyond the classification of this type of (imagined) experience as a mere apple-like experience. However, in the loss of our gestalt integrity we open ourselves up to a mis-placed affirmation of idealities envisaged without realizing, through a process of re-cognition, to what degree those 'phenomenal presentations' are not modally rich enough to sustain that 'apparent' attribution (as might be presented in a dream, a delusion, an hallucination, an illusion, etc.). On a re-establishing adequate powers of transcendental discernment, we of course, re-open ourselves to a better appreciation of just what (intuitively) establishes or disestablishes, confirms or dis-confirms, that phenomenal presentation to be or not to be as its appears. E.g., on waking an apple dreamt might have tasted very nice we know damn well that it will not satisfy our current hunger, etc. (34)

	To provisionally conclude at this point I have speculatively implicated the following, namely, that diminished insight allows the partial enactment of a process of self-deception; loss of transcendental detachment allows us to focus on the presentation of idealizations and to mis-represent them to ourselves; that increasing autonomy of distinctive levels and aspects, etc., assist us in this misplaced project of idealizational-re-emphasis, the literalization of the metaphor, etc., loss of overall transcendental distance and discernment, etc. Moreover, it appears to follow that from a loss of transcendental distance through the loss of an overall transcendental suspension necessary for the rhetorical dimension of an act of judgment to take place (through the asking of a properly formed question) by virtue of a suspension of belief that an inverse suspension of dis-belief is substituted for the former. Instead of asking “does x possess ‘a’?’, in its stead, we say to ourselves that “x must possess ‘a’!”, or, “why isn’t x in possession of ‘a’?” without seriously asking this rhetorical question, perceiving (wrongly) the situation as apparently self-evident. Now, let us look into a hypnotic model of self-deception and inquire what role the co-authored might be construed as being present either actively or by default (paralleling this non-transcendental suspension of dis-belief at the expense of a transcendental suspension of belief)? (35)

	The last point made in this quotation is an important one to note, namely, that in a suspension of disbelief the overall sense of self opens itself up to being deceived by its very own overall sense of self!. On the other hand, it is through a suspension of belief that we avail ourselves of the powers of transcendental discrimination that will help to shield us from self-deceiving ourselves! (21)

	Another point that is made is that reality should, phenomenologically, be defined as the multi-modal richness of modes engaged in the construction of that phenomenal re-presentation and the degree of richness of those modes exercised therein with respect to the degree of richness that should be normally expected to be entertained from a multi-modal perspective and from an individual modal perspective. I.e., how many modes are engaged, and, how rich or poverty stricken is that specific modal experience experienced therein (all evaluated from a general, comparative, expectational point of view)?? (22)

	In the light of these comments one could ask oneself just what type of suspension is taking place - a suspension of belief or a suspension of disbelief?! (23)

3.   The Problem of Egological Existence

	A third problem arises from the realization that the self is only the overall sense of a collection of various senses of self that are individually distinctive in themselves to some degree or other but not absolutely separate from an overall sense of self which itself has no absolute basis in fact as a self qua self, i.e., as an entity that has a substantial, self-reflexive substance (despite having the continuity of a distinctively personal life-history intersecting that temporal-spatial point or locus  of an apparent embodiment and personal identification). How have I argued for this type of position? Why do I find the 'self' as problematic philosophically (and phenomenlogically?)? In what sense is the constitution of self problematic? (24)

	What phenomenological nature has the self? If we refer to the overall sense of the self through an overall sense of self just what can this sense of self do and not do, etc? If a particular sense of self is that gestalt polarity that can review the relationship between the intentional object-state and the intentional background field (that collectively form the hermeneutic circle as a basic structure that organizes the epistemological hierarchy which, in turn, is set in its cultural-intercultural frames of reference which collectively constitute the life-world as experienced by the person and which delineates that pluralistic sense of self) can this overall sense of self be referred to in the same manner as a 'self'? In this light, is this overall sense of self then more a fiction, albeit a fruitful fiction? Being the resultant consequence of this relatively cooperative federation of selves it cannot therefore be itself an active sense of self able to review itself if this overall sense of self has no higher sense of self against which it could be appreciatively 're-viewed'. On the other hand, this sense of self cannot be dismissed as completely ineffective as our intentional activity and our desired intent through processes of intentional resolution can be put into practice to that degree that is practicable for it to appear to be able to do so and in this regard is, in effect, a reflection of this qualified self-referential ability to be itself, or, at least appear to be like any other sense of self with an overall sense of acting as a self. But is the self then, in this sense, an acter or an actor behind a mask, or, indeed, just a mere (set of) mask(s) without any substantial sense of self other than as a logical subject connecting an intentional flow of connected personal history in our collective mapping of this one-world-of-life? (46)

	In this space between an 'absolute sense of self' and a sense of self that is a 'mere illusion' we will find the 'real self' albeit with all the qualifications attendant upon this 'in between state of affairs'. This in between ‘space’ permits the ‘self’ to practice deception towards others and, in turn, to suffer varying degrees and types of self-deception as noted in this paper. To that extent that it is a logical subject with a sense of historical continuity it finds itself allowed to exist with a qualified being-through-becoming-in-this world-of-life with the ability to purport itself in a relatively authentically-oriented manner or a relatively inauthentically-oriented manner... 
(47)

	Because the sense of self is a polar fiction it cannot be reached, i.e., obtained. Indeed, it cannot be thought (or even met face to face)! In a like fashion the intentional object-state cannot be met and be obtained, and, the intentional sense of a world or frame of reference equally cannot be met and be obtained. On the other hand, I am not arguing that the empirical sense of a self should be denied, only that there can be no absolute absolutist sense of self. What are the implications of this egological positioning? (25)

	That the self is an empirical reality but a transcendental illusion when the metaphor of a self is projected beyond the level of its empirical/metaphorical deployment! (26)

4.   The Problem of a Substantial World

	I won't look into this problem here other than to note that if the polarities of Ego, Object-State and World are all polar fictions then it implies that the transcendental reality of world, etc., is too a transcendental illusion, i.e., being the reified projection of intentional expectations (beyond the limits of their metaphorical deployment [through a literalization of the inherent metaphor of the world as a space or field, as a background or ground] and the instantiation, therein, of a global psychosis). 
       (27)

5.   The Problem of Phenomenal Directness

	Because, in accordance with this type of philosophy being articulated by myself, there can only be one-world-of-life then all must be in direct contact when in a process of relationship, the sense of 'contact' being defined by the nature of that relationship. Hence  two people shaking hands is a physically direct experience for those two parties, e.g., etc. The implication being drawn that in a re-presentational view of reality (contra an impossible to obtain representationalistic point of view) we are indirect contact with the world and each other, albeit with the particular perspective adopted and all the limitations attendant upon each parties point(s) of view). In this essay I noted this problem… (28)

In the midst of writing a series of papers on miscellaneous topics in psychology I have had to deal with various problems concerning the self and its multi-faceted nature. What is the self? - can we (metaphorically) meet it face to face, or, is the self only an appearance, a simulation of an ego with our encountering of 'itself' itself also only a simulation? In a bewildering array of senses of self from the physiological, emotional, perceptual, conceptual, judgmental, etc., to the personal, social, political, cultural, etc., along with the impact of mental illnesses such as psychosis, multiple personalities, hysteria, etc., the overall vision of the self seems to be taking on the complexion of a jigsaw puzzle, a series of overlying masks, a presence marked by an absolute absence - a mere polarity that can be approached but never absolutely encountered?! Hence my sub-title of "Doing the Impossible - …Can we (absolutely, i.e., actually) encounter that which cannot be (absolutely) encountered?" (1)

	It was noted that if our contact with each other was 'direct' then how could we deceive each other? (29)

If we meet others 'directly' how could we dissimulate before others and they before us?! Surely, in our direct contact with them and they with us, all intent to deceive would be immediately experienced as such (and not realized 'mediately' through processes of mediation, indirectly recognizing that a process of deception was at some stage intended and put into effect)!? (13)

	This is the problem of directness! But I note that intentional directness does not mean intentional transparency! Nor do we have absolute intentional opaqueness. Rather we operate in the in-between with some degree of intentional translucence! This type of hermeneutical point being made by the philosopher Geog Gadamer when he suggests that we can never confront a text with absolute certainty as to its intent nor can we approach it without some form of an understanding as to it genre, that it's a text of some kind, etc. (30)

First, we have another problem to work our way through, namely, if a polar approach to intentional objects and subjects is granted how can contact be direct when there is neither a real object nor real subject in place to be contacted, and, neither a real object or real subject making contact with ourselves? If there are no absolutely real objects and subjects then contact could only be an illusion, a mere simulation? But even simulated relationships are experienced! Therefore as a simulation, as a simulation of a simulation, as re-simulations our interaction with other subjects and objects, and with ourselves, is allowed to come into phenomenal-phenomenological existence. By 'phenomenal' is meant that particular phenomena-experienced through its simulation, and, by 'phenomenological' is meant that type of phenomenally distinctive simulation of the simulated-reality-there-for-us that we find is waiting for us to engage it or re-engage it, be engaged by it or re-engaged by it, etc. (18)

	I attempt to resolve this problem in the following fashion. (31)

Does this polar position, therefore, destroy this concept of direct contact through the simultaneous absence of a contacter and contactee? No! There may be no absolute contact, there still remains a relative, provisional form of contact between simulations by virtue of their common intentional formation and the phenomenological 'fact' that there is a direct relationship between the simulations themselves through re-simulation and between the simulations in that relational process, or those relational processes, under review through the re-simulation(s) of the same. Because contact is between simulations as re-simulations and never between or with non-simulated states of affairs that are impossibly and unobtainably ‘understood’ as prior to those intentional acts of simulation/re-simulation. Indeed, all phenomenal presentations are experienced as phenomenological re-presentations and not pre-simulated representations! Contact is between simulations, as re-presentations, by virtue of their intentional constitution as phenomena-there-for-us through re-constitution, and, this 'fact' that they stand in a direct relationship to-us through what they re-present (rather than what they might be incorrectly seen to ‘represent’)! Our complex modal engagement directly reflecting, wittingly or unwittingly, the true modal complexion of the constitution of those intentional-states-of-affairs-there-for-us as phenomena! Now, let us return to the problem of how deception is possible despite the simulation of a directness of contact between an absolute non-existent deceiver and that absolute non-existent person apparently being deceived by the former (and v.v). (19)

	Am I successful here? What are your thoughts - do we have a real problem and/or a real solution? Or, is the problem an artefact of a philosopical way of "seeing things'…? (32)

6.   How does the Phenomenologist Deal with Egological Speculation?

How does the critical transcendental phenomenologist, from a critical transcendental-phenomenological perspective, deal with egological speculation? Can they confront egological speculation and find themselves actually facing such concepts as ‘self’, ‘mind’, ‘soul’, ‘spirit’, ‘divinity’, etc? Or, does the critical transcendental philosopher merely end up scratching out/defacing such expressions by discovering and declaring them to be expressions lacking, or completely devoid of, phenomenological sense, hermeneutical meaning and/or (experientially-oriented) existential meaningfulness? (77)

As a provisional answer to this question I will proffer the following list of options in response. (33)

	To answer that last question I would like to propose some general rules from the following list to that extent that they, tentatively, can be made to apply:

1.  Attempt to determine the concept’s primary motivation for being proposed by seeking to ascertain what philosophical problem is being resolved?
2.   Attempt to determine the concept’s secondary reasons for being proposed, by seeking to ascertain what other philosophical problems are implicated?
3.   Attempt to re-write those mechanisms from the point of view of the here and now (hic et nunc)?
4.   Attempt to determine whether there are possible methods for the experiential determination of those re-written mechanisms in (an existential sense of) the living present?
5.   Evaluate the values and degrees of possible success attained/might be possible to attain (in the current ‘directions’ being travelled)? (79)

In effect, accepting the transcendental illusion of our reified and projected intentional entities/states, and, the empirical reality when that phenomenal presentation/re-presentation conforms to the modal richness expected to accompany that type of state. (34)

7.   Conclusion

What I have presented here is but an essential snap-shot of these particular primary problems and their resolutions, a number of other resolutions also being attempted in this essay not being noted here. How would you go about this type of process? And what implications does this type of position have for our dealing with the 'reality' of our being in this world-of-life-together-with-others??? (35)

						       	     Noël Tointon, Sydney, 9.5.03.