Beyond Therapy: A Set of Essays
On Miscellaneous Topics in Psychology and Psychiatry (2001-2003)

VI. Beyond Therapy: Part I – Generalities:
How Therapeutic is Therapy? – Should Therapy be Therapeutic?

0.   Introduction

	The politics of the world of psychology, like the world of philosophy, is subject to the swings and round-abouts of fashionable trends along with the shifts in political institutions resulting from these changes in patronage, education and practice. The optimist tries to see beyond these mental tides of fickle fashion to perceive those currents of progress as they appear to course beyond the sway of the merely political. Just as modernistic philosophy has been eclipsed by post-modernistic philosophy in a similar fashion, unfortunately, the Freudian style of analytical psychology then migrated into a post-Freudian style of analytical psychology. Fortunately, in this Contemporary, Post-Postmodern era, even that transformation is, at last, being side-lined.  In the first essay of this series of papers I examined Freud’s contribution to psychological therapy and found what was on offer to be thoroughly wanting! Unfortunately, the Freudian fashion of doing (in) psychological philosophy has had such a hegemony over predominant psychological practice that after the Second World War it merely changed its spots, but not its temper, to become a post-Freudian church of a thousand warring sects! Thankfully, this tide has changed and has left much of that stranded or obviously floundering or thoroughly set adrift. In this current sea change, in a dawning Contemporary era, it must be our hope that we can leave such nonsense far behind us and enter a new, brave world of caring psychological endeavour with a fresh slate that, in passing this fashion for psycho-babble, we might quietly like to call the past-Freudian. Of course, Freudians and their ilk, would be best forgotten except for the fact that we need to keep one critical eye on history in the hope that we don’t travel slowly down this lengthy, untherapeutic cul de sac one more time and in which three to four generations were condemned to be talked to death and only the therapist survived to tell the same tale one more time over and over again… to those willing to pay for such an unproductive and torturous waste of time! (1)

	In the First Essay I criticized Freud through a somatic lens spearheaded by two major critics of the psycho-analytic tradition(s), namely, Hans Eysenck and Richard Webster. However, in the Fifth Essay I went further and criticized this excessive somatic orientation through the lens of an almost totally overlooked co-authorial dimension, i.e., an interpersonal dimension where a great percentage of 'our texts' are naturally, and normally, generated by more than one person; a dimension that also manifests with a number of psychological disturbances such as, e.g., the presence of various types of hysterical-psychotic illnesses such as repressed memories (not evoked by orthodox methods), alien ‘abductions’, multiple personalities, ritual satanic abuse, fictitious disorders, etc., etc. (2)

	Much as I would like to completely dismiss the elegantly verbose oeuvre of Freud I have noted in the course of these six essays a very small number of Freudian terms which, in my opinion, need to be very carefully re-evaluated without taking on board those therapeutically pernicious presuppositions of a psycho-analytic framework. This small collection of terms includes neurosis (which I would like to re-define as 'a non-psychotic educative mal-adaptation to the psychic-perception of stress; with the possible implication of a defective physiological response to the same’), hysteria (which I would like to re-define as ‘a psychotic–personality disorder where co-authorial-like behaviour is induced virtually and/or non-virtually’), and the psycho-pathology of personality-disorders (which I would like to re-define as ‘forms of behaviour covertly psychotic in orientation primarily dealing with acts of judgment with or without other forms of psychosis of a relatively overt nature such as mood disorders, a schizophrenic-like symptomatology, obsessive-compulsive features, etc.'). (3)

	In this essay I am going to explore the realm of therapy in general by trying to think beyond the wide array of therapy as institutionalized in various schools of practice. Hence this title Beyond Therapy. (4)

	The two questions in the subtitle are tongue in cheek - but like all forms of humour there is both a sharp 'point' and a 'subject' pricked by the 'truth' that sets them up as the 'butt' of that humour. (5)

	Let one hundred flowers bloom - and one hundred thousand competing blossoms have sprung forth to answer such a call. Not only are Freudian fields thick with rancorous weeds and allied pastures of Spring madness but the entire field of psychiatry is overgrown and overpopulated with whole swathe of mutant floral forests of uncritically conducted and over-optimistically self-advertised therapeutic ‘professionalisms’. Now, some studies have shown that it doesn't matter what psychiatric technique you adopt, or how often, as most show some small degree of promise regardless of which one you might turn to. Indeed, you might like to invoke, instead, some form of random magic… the waving of a wand or a lengthy incantation in Latin or gibberish, because it would serve you just as well, although, no doubt, of course, in the long term not giving you much to write home about. And many illness have patterns of remissions completely unconnected with programs of so-called treatment - their patients just naturally get better in the course of time. Am I being unfair here? Let me, therefore, examine this type of claim that ‘many forms of therapeutic intervention have no real foundations’ – their claim of success being more a non-substantiated claim, an unjustified claim without any real guarantee of effectiveness when put into practice! Sadly, on odds alone, a certain number of the latter will even hinder any therapeutic progress that might have been in train naturally or otherwise. As that old saying goes: "the cure sometimes can be worse that the illness!” (6)

	Then, I am going to investigate whether the primary role of a therapeutic institution, be it medical or psychiatric, be it orthodox or heterodox, is actually meant to be therapeutic, and, just what that (more complex) role might be? In this light we need to critically evaluate “how do we evaluate the therapeutic merit of a form of therapy?”. In my first essay I joined a chorus of voices calling into question the Freudian criticism that the neutral and objective evaluation of psycho-analytic practice was just not possible by members outside that particular profession and institution. Might it not be the case that that same type of counter-criticism is still being expressed today by psychiatric professionals? Then, again, is it not possible that some of these same people might also be arguing for forms of evaluation proposed by such guardians of their traditions that only measure what they wish to have measured with positive outcomes already in-built into such standards along with a complete overlooking of the obvious deficits of such practices? Furthermore, in the light of this type of accusation, we are going to have to consider whether such deceptive practices and procedures are the result of deception or self-deception or just simple institutional inertia or a mix of all three possibilities? (7)

	But, I am an incurable optimist and sincerely believe that much good therapy is actually being done! So, let us see if we can weed out some of the nonsense that passes more as the medicine of a witch doctor in order to discover how we should focus on those who methods are truly successful and how that form of professionalism might be better served by the phenomenological investigations of the critical philosopher. In this shared hope let us proceed…. (8)

1.   Does the Form of Therapy Matter?

	Yes, of course it should matter - by definition! But, alas, what has past for therapy, is often no more than the successful implementation of a placebo effect. The Doctor is happy, and the patient is happy… for a while. Then, the same treatment regime is repeated, or, another type of treatment program is adopted with the re-appearance of the placebo effect, or, at worst, the dissemination of a treatment regime with negative consequences for the patient. Or, as a bonus, the novel treatment program adopted might actually work! But how would we know - it might well be that the patient is purely in remission? Let me examine these types of scenarios. (9)

	If an illness has a distinctive phenomenology then the mere examination of that illness in an untreated environment should establish the natural rate of remission, or, the remission spectrum - the range and degree of remissions one should expect in an environment relatively devoid of 'so-called' therapeutic interventions. Then in the introduction of therapeutic programs if the rate of successfulness can be relatively quantified and qualified and the result is greater than this natural rate of remission then we are on the road to establishing the therapeutic potential of the therapeutic process once, and this is important, the placebo effect can be taken into account. How is this latter factor determined? By offering a number of discrete placebo trials in order to determine this 'contribution' should it exist. Then blind trials between the treatment program under investigation and the use of a placebo should be able to help us to quantify and qualify this additional contribution if that should be found to make an appearance for us. I use the word 'qualify' in both sense, namely, the degree to which an investigated 'therapeutic effect' adds to or subtracts from the deviation from this remission rate plus the expected impact of a placebo, and, all the qualifications one might need to add to our findings in this regard. It may well be that because of our genetic make-up, or for some other reason, only a small number of patients are going show any positive (or negative) deviations from this natural remission rate augmented with the expected rate from the contributions of a placebo effect. (10)

	Now we must ask, in general terms of reference, how might we quantify and qualify these potential therapeutic deviations in the rates of natural remissions adjusted for potential placebo influences (and any other influences that should be taken into account such as socioeconomic influences, masking mechanisms, compensatory reactions, immunological histories, etc.)? To begin with we have the task of defining what are the limits for such an investigation. This part of our calculations should be relatively simple - just what would count for absolute success, and, what would count for absolute failure?! Potential effectiveness of therapy can thus be measured, to some extent, as a symbolic representation between these two poles of absolute success and absolute failure. A profound philosophic problem still remains however! How do we quantify quality (and qualify quantity?)? As stated elsewhere it is only on a profound level of transcendental acuity that such a task should be conducted. On a relatively superficial level of investigation and reflection we should actively discriminate between such relatively non-isomorphic discontinuities. Yet, on a deeper transcendental level of being it is our (transcendental) intuition that we should be able to relate such ostensively non-commensurable styles of evaluation. Let me proffer the following illustration to establish this general intuition. (11)

	An opera star is performing the same role over a period of seven nights with the same orchestra, conductor, etc., in the same venue. She notes that, relatively speaking, every night she 'feels' she is singing brilliantly whilst still making a small increment of improvement in the manner of her performance night by night. That, in accordance with her evaluations, she has made a marginal improvement with each night. In the determination of this degree of quality how could she have quantified the same when the degree of quality, and any incremental advance on the same, is, correctly speaking, only a metaphor, a manner of speaking. There just is no 'thermometer', or any other instrument, for determining this 'degree of quality' and any perceived change in the same?! So how could quality be quantified given this apparently fatal objection that our phenomenological experience of 'quantity' and 'quality' are essentially non-isomorphic in their apparent constitution? Yet, on the other hand, we have the phenomenological observation that we can make this type of evaluation when we say we can do such an evaluation and then go ahead and appear to make just such a forbidden calculation. How might this balancing act be done - maintaining on one side their distinctive separation and on their other side their re-presentation in a form that allows us to do just that, i.e., compare them! This 'balancing act' offering us a clue, namely, the utilization of a transcendental suspension. (12)

	Elsewhere I have argued for the presence of six types of judgmental decision making, namely, determinations of essence, determinations of aestheticality, determinations of ethicality, determinations of pragmaticality, determinations of interpretability.  and, determinations of existence or factuality. All six of these determinations are ostensively non-commensurable. Yet, through the medium of the psyche, this epistemological hierarchy in which all senses of self and, the overall sense of self, are constituted along with all forms of intentionality and therein all forms of simulated phenomenal experience, etc, a sense of the commensurable is to be found on this stage of psychic unity that has us collectively constituted as 'a-person-in-this-world-of-life'! Through this lens of psychic unity all aspects of the psyche are just that - aspects, never types of experience absolutely non-commensurable with each other, nor, for that matter, completely commensurable with each other. How is such a feat accomplished? Because there is this relative degree of unity experienced in our own sense of being a psycho-physical 'organism', an emergent, organic unity realized in and through the phenomenal diversity we experience in our being a person in this world of life, this life-world. Moreover, in-built into this epistemological hierarchy, and dependent upon its relative foundations, a sense of judgment is exercised in such a fashion that in its depths we are allowed to find a deep commensurability between these six distinctive aspects of the judgmental act as noted, namely, the essential, the aesthetical, the ethical, the pragmatical, the hermeneutical and the factual. (13)

	I have argued elsewhere that judgment is realized through the coming together of these three archetypal-gestalt poles of ego, object-state and world or field (that constitute a field of intentional awareness). The relative non-absolute presence and/or absence of these three polarities deciding the nature of that judgmental process with respect to these six fields of distinctive judgmental activity. E.g., aesthetical evaluation is realized through a relative preference for the poles of object-state and ego and the relative suppression of the world pole. So in this field our opera star is able to evaluate the aesthetical quality of her performance. Moreover, through entering an essential field of activity, through altering these preferences, they would then find themselves able to avail themselves of an ability to quantity 'the what there is to be quantified' placed in that essential field. So, in this fashion, our opera star is able to 'measure' the degree of aesthetic quality on one night relative to some other night. Hence this deeper level of transcendental appreciation as we expected as per our intuition in this matter. (14)

	How is this commensurability realized given this psychic unity of the transcendental ego? Through the auspices of the transcendental suspension! (15)

	To come to a deeper understanding of what is meant by my use of this expression suspension let me close this section “Does the Form of Therapy Matter?” and look at this topic more closely. Then, with this research to hand, let me revisit this former topic and apply these insights into the evalution of complex forms of value, i.e., forms of value that necessitate a complex of evaluational approaches (by virtue of the fact that complexity of value necessitates a complex ordered analysis wherein two or more types of ordered value are distinguished, accommodated and allowed to transformationally interact on a relatively deeper level of transcendental epistemological expression in such a manner as to simulate current complexity of meaning to hand and the potential meaningful significance of the same). In this light, e.g., (the degree of) quality and quantity present, along with other relevant types of ordered value, in the complex value of a complex state of affairs can, critically, be meaningfully examined with respect to each other both individually and collectively. Hence our ability to co-examine descriptions and prescriptions, deontological and pragmatical concerns, (pre-essential) essential ‘quantity’ and (essential) aesthetical ‘quality’, the interaction when and where present between the aesthetical and the ethical, potential considerations versus actual considerations, complex forms of value consisting of three or more types of ordered value, etc., with obvious consequences for this type of research (whether conducted from theoretical, practical and/or critical perspectives). (16)

2.   Suspension

Without going into too much phenomenological detail to begin with let me just say that the hermeneutic circle alluded to in these essays on miscellaneous topics in  psychology is constituted from three moments that reflect these three archetypal poles of Ego, Object and World. Moreover, each of these moments concerns a type of suspension whose interaction allows the circle to function in an ongoing fashion with the accumulative excess of emergent value being created through its dialectical-like functioning. E.g., at the object-pole we have a conjunctive suspension which mirrors the sense of the metaphorical. At the world-pole we have a dis-conjunctive suspension which establishes a sense of the rhetorical, and, at the ego-pole we have a complex set of suspensions, namely, a balance between these two former types of suspensions which simulates in turn a sense of the existential. In order to critically appreciate the suspensional nature of the hermeneutic circle, etc., we must now delve into this situation in greater phenomenological detail. (17)

	This expression suspension is my re-interpretation of the same expression utilized by the German philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859-1934). A sense of the suspension is realized when there is a bracketing of the form of the phenomenal appearance. In this bracketing, or epoche, the phenomenal appearance is treated as a mere phenomenal appearance, i.e., as it appears without direct reference to our interpretation of it in the light of our ontological commitments, epistemological prejudgments, prejudices, etc. To begin with, in his earliest transcendental phenomenological writings, Husserl appears to have confused suspensions with reductions, i.e., the process of the epoche itself with a phenomenological 'analysis' of the ‘phenomenal’ content of that suspension. In the course of my own investigations I have noted the need for a third dialectical moment of re-constitution, and, that these three moments can be seen as the three facets of the hermeneutic circle (wherein sense, meaning and meaningfulness can be co-determined) as re-formulated by myself. In my later phenomenological-hermeneutical research I have treated these three moments of the hermeneutic circle as distinctive types of suspension and that collectively their appropriately instituted balance with respect to each other puts in place a complex overall suspension. Although the phenomena to hand can be suspended on a case by case basis ideally the suspension should be exercised on a global stage, i.e., our entire views of the world should be suspended at the same time. In effect our beliefs can still be held, but, in the ‘space’ of the suspension, they are effectively put out of action. By these means assisting us in our desire to focus purely upon the essential configuration of the intentional object-state under examination – therein revealing that object-state in its transcendental ‘ideality’. Because, it is through the auspices of the transcendental suspension that the transcendental dimension is revealed. In a thorough extension of this globalization of the suspension I will extend this suspension to all forms of value, which, in my theoretical investigations, take six forms as outlined in my ordered analysis, namely, pre-essential-essential, essential-aesthetical, de-ontological-ethical, utilitarian-pragmatical, hermeneutic-potential and actual-factual. It is in this complex ‘double’ sense that I will use the word ‘suspension’ unless otherwise described, etc., i.e., as subject to a complex overall suspension, and, subject to a thorough global suspension (through a suspension of all forms of ordered value). Let me now look into this topic in some depth and come to the very coal-face of my own research in this regard. It is my contention that the dynamics of the hermeneutic circle can be generated through the interaction of these distinctive types of suspension as they are allowed to interact within this overall sense of suspension. With this hopeful ambition in mind let me now examine this topic of ‘suspension’ in some considerable depth. (18)

	Why (this current emphasis of my research on) suspensions! Because all apparently commensurable and incommensurable phenomena are created through intentional deliberations by-us for-ourselves, i.e., through processes of intentional judgments. Because, basically, all types of judgment have the same transcendental form (as intentional deliberations generated between these same three poles of the object-states under focus, the fields of relevant contrast and all senses of self (and all sense of other) relevant to the nature of that judgmental process (so, e.g., a perceptual judgment must involve a sense of a perceptual-intentional object-state, a perceptual field, a perceptual perceiver as a perceptual judge, etc.). Moreover, different types of judgment, essentially, are only those phenomenologically distinctive preferentially adopted perspectives that allow us to create/re-create that particular type of judgment – so, e.g., when our primary interest is in the intentional object-state under focus there is a preference for that perspective and a corresponding relative suppression of the other two poles of ego (read the gestalt field of appreciation) and world (read gestalt field). In my circular ordered analysis we arrive at six distinctive kinds of judgment through a systematic recognition of this mechanism, namely, the simple focus on these three poles individually [equally achieved through the suppression of the two ‘opposite’ poles] (giving us [pre-essential-] essential, ethical (deontological) and hermeneutical forms of value) and the double emphasis on two poles at the same time [equally achieved through the suppression of one ‘opposite’ pole] (giving us aesthetical, pragmatical and factual forms of value). The underlying principles here are quite simple. Relatively incommensurable forms of value, say deontological ethical forms of value versus pragmatical forms of value, are each essentially arrived through a ‘slight’ preferential ‘distortion’ of this transcendental machinery but whose underlying nature cannot be written out of the equation since all forms of judgment necessitate this tripartite relationship between ego, object and world. Hence by writing all phenomenal presentations/re-presentations in a suspended format we are returning those phenomenal representations back to this tri-partite ground in preparation for deeper processes of transcendental accommodation given that the underlying transcendental nature of all forms of judgment is the same! So we make a mistake to compare deontological forms of ethical value with pragmatical forms of value in superficial non-transcendental terms of reference. On the other hand, in relatively deeper transcendental terms of reference we must be able to enter into a process of productive interaction and problematic resolution between the same given that the underlying nature of all forms of judgment is the same on this deeper level of epistemological expression! Hence, e.g., the engineer, of say a bridge, can do their duty to the public in the design of their manufactured architecture by making those comprises in the effective strength and stability of their designs whilst at the same time making what pragmatic comprises necessary in terms of cost, materials, techniques of construction, design, etc., (in the building of that bridge in such a manner so as to ensure it survives those reasonably expected stresses that might be brought to bear upon it over the lifetime of that structure). The trick is in arriving at those terms of reference that allow us to productively realize this (existentially experienced) transcendental intuition of a deep transcendental commensurability between these superficially non-commensurable forms of value! At least in this respect common sense should be able present itself as a reasonable arbiter in this contest between doing ones duty to the public and ensuring the minimum ‘economical’ cost in the building of that project. Now let me sum up these provisional points I am making here in a slightly less technical manner!! (19)

1.	By re-writing the phenomenological presentation/re-presentation in a (complex) suspended form we represent the phenomenon to hand as a phenomenon qua phenomenon. (20) 

2.	In such a form we return it structurally to the hermeneutic circle as the relational value created/re-created between the poles of the ego, object and world. (21)

3.	Through a dis-institution and re-institution of the balance between the conjunctive and dis-conjunctive aspects of the complex suspension, etc., we can re-simulate the dialectical dynamics of that hermeneutic circle wherein that form of value was presented/re-presented. (22)

4.	Though a re-creation of the (ordered) preferencing/suppression we produce/re-produce the distinctive value of that (ordered) format (in its approximate complexity, i.e., simulation/re-simulation). (23)

5.	By these means it allows us to experience/re-experience, through the entailed intentional resolutions realized therein in the creation/re-creation of that phenomenal representation, an effective simulation of that phenomenal presentation/re-presentation. (24)

6. 	Hence re-suspended we essentially re-create this relatively deeper basic transcendental nature in conjunction with its less deeper distinctive phenomenologically ordered expression/s (along with those means necessary to establish accommodational forms of commensurability between distinctively different forms of ordered preferentialization on a relatively deeper level should that be necessary). (25)

	From an examination of this project as outlined, it is obvious, given the possible range of therapies, from the positively productive to the negatively counter-productive, that we do have at our disposal an ability to quantify the qualitative (and to qualify the quantitative). Hence in this light we can explain how it is possible for our opera star to be able to say that she is able to evaluate the quality of her performances and relatively quantify their incremental degree of improvement despite the ostensive metaphorical nature of that expression 'degree'. Obviously she has no ‘thermometer’ for this type of evaluation. Although she might find some comfort for her self-appreciation of her performance through the ‘quality’ of the clapping, etc., as a response initiated by the audience who appear to be able to appreciate and 'witness' the quality of her performance. By the invocation of such a mechanism (of the discriminative accommodation of forms of complex value), later in this paper I will be able also to investigate the vexed issue of how medical services can be individually qualified and quantified, and, both collectively qualified and quantified. Hence, in the process, allowing us to determine, in general terms of reference, how the business of the medical can existentially be made to (theoretically, practically and critically) run both as a cost effective business and as a profession that should also have the interests of the patients to heart to that extent current resources are capable of being utilized to realize that ‘complex aim'. Hence my provocative riposte Should Therapy be Therapeutic? since the concern and practice of therapy can never be just ‘positive therapeutic outcomes in the cold reality of our living in this world’, along with the rhetorical question How Therapeutic is Therapy? given that we now have a philosophical mechanism for understanding how quality can be quantified, etc., and how other apparently incommensurable phenomena can be meaningfully co-evaluated. (26)

	So much for theory and so much for its practice! In reality different people will realize different pathways of accommodation between relatively incommensurable forms of value (say, e.g., the deontological and the pragmatical as just illustrated in the example of the engineer and their design of a bridge). There is no a priori reason that all situations of accommodational resolution should demand unique forms of a to-be-discovered realization. In some situations that may well be the case, but, in general terms of reference, we cannot assume, nor should we assume, that there exists a definitive solution in all situations! What is at stake here, and what is more important, is that relatively more successful forms of resolution should be looked for and adopted when and where possible and that we keep our minds open as to what might constitute a more successful resolution in the uniqueness of each relational situation! So the goal in this regard is a discovery of  viable modes of resolution between both ‘commensurable forms of value’ and/or ‘relatively non-commensurable forms of value’ found competing in the ‘space’ of a particular situation under critical examination. ‘Critical’ by virtue of the fact that the re-imposition of suspensions open us up to this dimension of the critical realized through existential processes of resolution re-engaged through the very being, and becoming, of the hermeneutic circle itself as the (transcendental) locus of all sense, meaning and meaningfulness!! (27)

	Now, how does the hermeneutic circle function as a ‘circle’ in the light of this suspensional analysis? In an overall suspension of the hermeneutic circle we have a delicate state of ongoing balance between the ‘reductive conjunctive-suspension’ versus the ‘re-constitutive dis-conjunctive-suspension’ versus the ‘combined conjunction of these two former suspensions’. Given this state of balance, how is the dialectical movement of this circle effected in one ‘direction’ or other; say from the reductive-analytical (of the textual) to the re-constitutive synthetical (of the meta-textual) to their combined suspension (in the moment of the non-textual)? In a simple answer to that complex question let me say that through a relative instability of this ongoing overall state of suspension we get the effective, virtual sense of dialectical movement on a superficial level of analysis (as all three moments in effect simultaneously co-define each other through their informative negation and the absolute absence of anyone of them is an impossibility given the necessary presence of all three polar orientations for the functioning of the hermeneutic circle). Moreover, it should be noted, that the instability of the hermeneutic circle from this perspective of the ongoing overall suspension is only virtual and never absolute, i.e., through the simulation of sense, meaning and meaningfulness, there are moments of ongoing overall suspension that contribute to a sense of duration. A sense of duration that occurs when a sense of a positive hermeneutic excess is being generated within the hermeneutic circle (i.e., the invested psychic energy is exceeded by the creation/re-creation of psychic value released through the auspices of that hermeneutic circle). This release of excess value ‘effortlessly’ re-continuing the apparent duration of that current overall ongoing suspension through its regulatory influence on this sense of a re-continued duration created/re-created therein through its ongoing re-investment. On the other hand the hermeneutic circle is ultimately unstable. The merest introduction or re-introduction of some form of a new bias from the natural attitude will unsettle that dialectical movement which can only be re-stabilized from that excess of value, if present, if it is being adequately re-invested and can maintain that current level of psychic interest. (28)

	What prevents the re-introduction of prejudice, etc., from completely disrupting the hermeneutic circle along with this sense of 'duration' created/re-created therein? (29)

	The coursing of the hermeneutic circle is being continually disrupted. The topics of our mental musings and more serious investigations are continually changing. What is more intriguing is to ask ourselves how is it possible that we can focus on one topic in a period of time and find therein the ‘duration’ of our interest in that topic. The world may appear to change it is not subject to absolute change! In my understanding, our interest in a particular topic is realized when that topic is found to be existentially rich enough to warrant our interest in it in the first place. That interest being elicited through the relationship that intentional object-state under focus bears to itself in the context of our total life-history; noting, in this regard, that what might interest one person need not interest some other. So how is this interest sustained? Through a release of value in excess of that actually invested in our initial and ongoing focus upon it. Then, this surplus is reinvested in the course of our re-continued concentration upon that topic, which, through the release of further value reinforces the re-continuity of this process until such a time that excess is no longer elicited, or, our interest switches to some other topic, or, the quality of our consciousness is altered and impaired to such extent that it can no longer focus on its own intentional production in the light of its currently self-perceived set of motivations, etc., as when we are rendered unconscious through injury or fall asleep, etc. (30)

	This explanation for the duration of interest in a particular topic can now be treated as a clue in how the hermeneutic circle can function in its multi-modal totality. Through this re-investment of psychic energy, this existential excess of value created/re-created, our topic is maintained before our overt intentional focus. Now this excess psychic energy maintains our topic. On the other hand, shifts or different nuances in perspective, motivation, etc., relatively ‘upset’ that ongoing transcendental balance without actually disrupting the course of our current topic. Indeed, maintenance of the intentional topic is kept in place through a cause and effect-like response as if this unsettling of the transcendental suspension induces a counter-unsettling effect to counter-balance the prior sense of relative disruption, and, therein, to re-instigate this sense of an overall transcendental suspension if this excess of transcendental value is to hand. As along as a certain topic elicits an existential excess then this excess psychic energy is re-invested in such a manner as to re-continue our interest in that intentional topic through a balanced overcoming of all potential disrupting influences. (31)

	We have another clue in noting the ramifications of the observation that the existential is realized through an existentialization of the relatively non-existential (and not the relatively existential)! To this extent, therefore, the intentional content of such an observation is dependent upon the introduction/continual re-introduction of the relatively non-existential which could be potentially disruptive if not for the virtue of this re-investment of the psychic energy realized through this process of existentialization and released as an existential excess and its utilization as a mechanism to continually re-instate this sense of an overall transcendental suspension. That additional non-existential content being prejudices (as forms of pre-judgment), other types of biases, the introduction of conditioned feelings, etc. The successful resolution of such additional intake establishing the maintenance of the duration of that topic, set of topics, still under current review. (32)
	
	Let me now briefly summarize the main points of this (concept of ) topic. (33)

1.   An intentional topic endures through a re-investment of an existential excess realized in the course of the same. (34)

2.   The re-introduction of prejudices defines where we are in this life-world and who we are as persons in the world-of-life. (35)

3.   Re-writing phenomena through transcendental suspensions helps us to concentrate on their phenomenal form. (36)

4.   This assists us in our metaphorical, rhetorical and existential pursuits in our passage through this world-of-life. (37)

5.   Minute biases in the dialectical functioning of the hermeneutic circle shifting the intentional direction of our investigations. (38)

6.   Our transcendental re-writing of the phenomenal assisting us in our critical investigations of the life-world through a simulated presentation/re-presentation of that aspect of the life-world. (39)

7.   That through a deeper inspection of the life-world we can evaluate the manner of the interaction of different forms of (ordered) value as they intersect in that current topic under review! (40)

	Hence, through an overall transcendental suspension conducted globally and neutrally with respect to all forms of value we are given transcendental access to a realm of critically self-apperceived value whether that be co-authored or non-co-authored in orientation. (41)

	With these insights to hand let us now revisit this prior topic from a practical point of view…. (42)

3.   Does the Form of Therapy Matter Revisited? 

	Theoretically, the answer should be "that the form of therapy should matter… does matter". However, practically, it has been noted that to some extent all forms of therapy ‘appear’ to be therapeutic. What with placebo effects and natural remissions, etc., it doesn't matter what you do in the way of therapy it will appear to some extent to be therapeutic (even, sometimes, when the net overall ‘gain’ is actually negative?). Of course, in some illnesses and disorders we do have very effective treatment programs. Or, so it seems. An allied problem still remains however, namely, to what degree is this success due to the treatment program itself, and, between competing 'successful programs' how do we determine their relative degree of 'successfulness' and appropriateness of application? This is where I would like to note the relevance of the previous section - the co-evaluation of complex forms of value through the imposition of suspensions in order to critically determine the phenomenal constitution of that under investigation (and, when and where relevant, the comparative assessment of competing processes of treatment conducted in the same critical phenomenological ‘light’). (43)

	In psychiatry we appear to have the scandal of an over-abundance of treatment programs with dubious degrees of effectiveness. But, at the same time, the adoption of any one would appear to have some therapeutic potential, even, if, in the final analysis, they had adverse consequences. A state of affairs even more scandalous than the over-exuberance of philosophical adventurism demonstrated by philosophies' warring sects forever in a continual state of warfare with each other conducted, I would add, too often without arming themselves with the appropriate tools of combat, or, rather, dialogue; an inability to relate through inadequate rules of debate, etc. That the same would be properly furnished through an understanding of transcendental suspensions and their implication in co-evaluational forms of interaction [and our critical appreciation of the same though the use of the same (transformationally treated) medium]! (44)

	How should we, as patient-advocates, on the behalf of our patients, navigate these disturbed waters awash in our society with this veritable flood of so-called ‘therapeutic professionalisms’, each individual therapy promising ‘the earth’ without necessarily delivering forms of therapy with appropriate, substantial, demonstrated therapeutic value? In crossing this sea of competing claims and excessively induced over-expectations how do we steer a successful course without becoming, like most patients, equally perplexed, confused and unable to critically discriminate the relative merits of these wares and, therein, unable to critical appreciate and digest the worth of all claims made on their behalf; unfortunately all too often served up in generous helpings with an abundance of incentives whilst hiding their true costs through the distortions of medical insurance, subsidies, selective marketing, different brand-names, complex company structures, unethical forms of promotion, etc? To this end let me propose a few guidelines. (45)

	Treatment programs can be looked at under the three headings of Theoretical Considerations, Practical Observations and Critical Reflections. (46)

	Under the heading of Theoretical Considerations, in principle, we can examine the theoretical research done to substantiate therapeutic claims made on behalf of that program of treatment (be it chemical or otherwise). Of course this is not an easy task. On the other hand, we don't need to prove or disproof the efficacy of that treatment process, only establish its apparent relative degree of competence in the performance of those tests and procedures adopted (hopefully on our behalf) to validate that particular program. If this type of evaluation is absent, or appears to be inadequately conducted, then we have stronger grounds for being more skeptical about positive claims made for that particular type of treatment. (47)

	Under the heading Practical Observations we closely examine methodological procedures promoted by that particular treatment in the application of its program. In this examination we need to supervise the essential nature of that enterprise through “the various types of value apparently being argued for” through the lens of our ordered analysis. In other words we need to look at an ‘essential’ clarification of terms and definitions, the overall ‘aesthetic’ coherence of this methodology, the ‘ethicality’ of its practices, its ‘pragmatic’ practicality, its potential ‘hermeneutic’ richness (and cross-references with other types of treatment of an orthodox complexion) and ‘factual’ consequences observed and expected from the adoption of that program. Through this pluralistic lens, with its six divisions, we effectively put in place a relatively systematic appreciation of its mode(s) of application and possible complications (such as the relative incommensurability of co-evaluated forms of ordered value) arising from the application of the same (finessed through deconstruction; the observation of inconsistencies, inappropriate applicational processes, non-substantiated claims, the presence of adverse trends in the occurrence of side-effects, undesirable consequences, etc.). (48)

	Under the heading of the Critical Reflections the total enterprise is looked at from a critical point of view arrived at through the imposition of an adequately thorough and appropriately constructed transcendental re-writing of our research as recovered /uncovered in our theoretical considerations and practical observations with the implication that our theoretical and practical considerations should be conducted in a similar vein, i.e., transcendentally. How is this transcendental approach realized in theory, practice and critical reflection? This I will examine in the next section of this essay. (49)

	The adoption of a treatment program should be realized, managed and maintained in the light of these three headings. Otherwise we are merely hoping for a positive therapeutic outcome. How then do we critically re-write our treatment program through the lens of transcendental suspensions in order to clarify our 'reading' of the essential configuration of its constitution, and, therein, co-evaluate all forms of complex value through this critical lens of an ordered perspective? In the pursuit of this objective let me now outline in general terms of reference how this process of transcendental re-writing is put into practical effect, noting, in the process, key themes and relevant concepts that also need to be addressed. (50)

4.   How Do You Treat a Research Program To Transcendental Suspension?

	On one hand this topic is very technical. On the other hand all acts of judgment necessitate suspensions in order to come into existence and find resolution. This is a natural process that is enacted every moment of our intentional life (and some might argue even in our less conscious periods of existence by virtue of the fact that all epistemological processes are founded on this type of structural-function being in play on all levels of epistemological organization throughout the epistemological hierarchy). So, without intentional deliberation, we are, in effect, entertaining a continual succession of transcendental suspensions. Yet, the mere presence of this aspect of the epistemological is not enough to guarantee the critical exercise of this process-aspect. Only with sufficient transcendentalization of the epistemological functioning of our overall intentional processes can we claim the presence of a 'critical mass' in this regard that then allows us to critically conduct those processes of reflection in such a manner as to determine exactly what we are dealing with through an appreciation of the transcendental constitution of that under reflection, and, can come to a point of appreciation of the complex values interacting in depth in that type of constitution. So, with this theoretical understanding to hand let us ask how such 'insight' can be practically converted into particular processes of insight through a transcendental re-writing of the phenomenon-to-hand through this imposition of transcendental suspensions, etc? Let us first look at this process through the lens of the hermeneutic circle, and, later, through the systematic lens of an ordered analysis. (51)

	But, first, we need to note the role of prejudices! Prejudice is a form of prejudgment. Why should prejudgments, read prejudices, prejudge a judgment when an act of judgment should be left to do just that, namely, be a critically enacted act of judgment! To some extent a judgment is the asking of a question, among other things, and a well-formed question in some measure reflects the essential form that an answer of that question will most likely take in order to be recognized as the genuine response to, or 'answer' of, that problematic situation whose essential appreciation is translated into the form of a question. Hence the need for a recognition of our prejudices - a recognition of our ontological commitments and epistemological expectations, and, an awareness of our blind-spots or acts of existential non-recognition! Indeed, without this sense of location we can be nowhere and go nowhere; prejudice rooting us in this world-of-life and defining the nature of the intentional constitution of that under examination whether it be currently problematic or not problematic. (52)

How do we recognize the transcendental configuration of our prejudices, i.e., the manner of their intentional constitution? Our prejudices locate us in this complex intersubjective life-world and propel us in and through our adoption of their projects whether those objectives are explicitly and/or implicitly stated. In this regard, the 'what' we are examining 'defines' where we are in this open-ended world-of-life and, therein, gives us the sense of that under examination, in effect, the 'where we are in this psychic universe'. Without this sense of location we can be nowhere! Without prejudice we have nothing, no phenomenal content with which to operate upon. Only with 'sense' are we rooted in reality and given some sense of an intentional directedness (towards a reference that may or may not exist as an actual fact in this world-of-life). Moreover, the existential can only operate through an existentialization of the relatively non-existential (just as the transcendental can only operate through a transcendentalization of the relatively non-transcendental). The necessary presence of the existential moment forming the third moment of our hermeneutic circle. But first let me look more closely at our first two moments of this hermeneutic circle. (53)

	The second moment of our hermeneutic circle is that of the hermeneutic, i.e., the rhetoric of questioning. In asking a question we automatically suspend the phenomenal matter to hand in the form of a rhetorical dis-conjunctive suspension, namely, is x a or not-a? On the other hand, an answer concerns the first moment of our hermeneutic circle, namely, of the metaphorical; a state of affairs founded on the conjunctive suspension, namely, x is like a… which translates as… x is both like a and not like a. The state of appropriately asking a question necessitates a well-formed question! To question something is to skeptically place it under a dis-conjunctive suspension. Properly conducted a metaphorical component is implicitly explicated in the resolution of that rhetorical process through an affirmation or negation of the dis-conjunctive suspension converted, i.e., transformed, into a conjunctive suspension; modifications of these two types of suspension resulting in the realized modifications of the rhetorical-questioning-and-metaphorical-answering process. (54)

	What is realized in the questioning and answering process through the imposition and modification of dis-conjunctive and conjunctive suspensions? None other than a sense of the existential, a sense of the non-textual, the presentation of 'what-there-is-as-it-is-there-for-us!' This simulated sense of presence being experienced 'directly' when all three moments of the hermeneutic circle are equally balanced, i.e., suspended - this what-there-is-as-it-is-there-for-us being 'directly' experienced as the simulation of that simulation and not the simulation of something that is not simulated or as that prior to its being simulated. In this sense of presence what you get is what you get - nothing more and nothing less! This transformation being arrived at through the simultaneous suspension of the conjunctive suspension and the dis-conjunctive suspension, and, their co-joint suspension. (55)

	In effect, the simulation of a simulation is a non-simulation! Hence the directness and non-mediated nature of our critical reflection upon the existential moment whose reality is reinforced and reflectively realized through a sense of the not-textual, i.e., an ongoing, balanced transcendental suspension of all three moments. This degree of immediate awareness of 'how things are as they are' being realized through the de-distorted awareness arrived at through this process of transcendental purification in which all types of transcendental suspension are instituted, maintained and modified in sympathy with the ongoing nature of our current investigations. Hence the importance of prejudices, being aware of the constitution (or sense) of those pre-judgments, the importance of being aware of the locative sense of  metaphor ultilized, and being aware of the rhetorical meaning of intentional objects-states, and, the existential meaningfulness of resolutions simulated and their further confirmation through reflective appreciation (as the not-textual) progressively arrived at through the direct simulation of that currently under investigation through an ongoing transcendental balance of all three moments. The directness of our experience being realized through the fact, as an invariant formulaic construction, that the “(re-)simulation of a (re-)simulation is effectively a non-(re-)simulation or a not-(re-)simulation” as argued elsewhere). (56)

	Now, these broad directions of the phenomenological, hermeneutical and the existential are systematically explicated through the application of our ordered analysis. All forms of value generated in a certain situation can be explicated through this grid of the six orders that create/re-create all forms of value (in accordance with this theoretical understanding, and, help us to deal with co-occurring forms of complex value; the self-interaction of the same with respect to themselves and the ramification of this has for-us in this world-of-life. Our six fields of ordered value taking the form of a bias of preference for the object-pole in pre-essential essential considerations; a preference for the object-pole and the ego-pole in aesthetic preoccupations, a preference for the ego-pole in ethical considerations; a preference for the ego-pole and the world-pole in pragmatical considerations; a reference for the world pole in hermeneutical considerations, and, a preference for the object-pole and the world-pole in factual considerations. Hence a deep co-occurring of complex value must exist in the creation/re-creation of all forms of value regardless of their apparent univocal-like nature 'found' in their relatively superficial distinctive recognition as ‘sited’ in one or other of the ordered divisions (as pre-essential thoughts, integrated essential thoughts, ethical ideas, pragmatical percepts, hermeneutical possibilities, and ‘actual’ facts as propounded by the consequences of my ordered analysis). (57)

	A state of affairs that is quite simple to realize when one has refined the clarification of what naturally happens in our investigations! The first step being a recognition of our prejudicial motivations - i.e., what are they in that situation, where are we, what are we facing, what happens when we arrive at the simulation of what might be expected there..?  A recognition of the psychic nature of our prejudices revealing this path to suspension more clearly for us! A preference for 'a' being transcendentally suspended through the parallel entertainment of 'its alternative as '~a'. This then gives an entrance to this process of metaphorical, rhetorical and existential suspensions within the ambit of the hermeneutic circle with or without a deeper, systematic enrichment of an ordered analysis in part or in whole. Such a suspended state of affairs being further assisted, if not actually authorized, through the rectification (through suspension) of our ontological commitments, epistemological expectations and an awareness of the non-awareness of our existential blind-spots. Let me look more closely into these concepts of authorization and rectification because without our proper engagement with these forces true transcendental objectivity, however provisional, cannot be arrived at! (58)

	Ontological commitments are retrospective beliefs entertained in the fabrication of our world view. Epistemological expectations are prospective beliefs entertained in the fabrication of our world view. Blind-spots are defined as aspects of our world-view that are not properly recognized and consciously accepted as existing in the manner of their presentation whose current tenor is in a state of relative non-coherence with our overall understanding of the life-world. Through the enacted possibility of a suspension of the same our world-view is able to enter into a process of re-assessment and, therein, consequent rectification. The existential surplus that is realized and re-invested in this process of critical reflection (entered into in a spirit of authenticity elicited through our openness to the open-ended nature of the life-world) has the effective power to authorize a change in our appreciation of this life-world. Hence these concepts of rectification and authorization., respectively, a ‘critically conducted change in our world-view’ ‘empowered by an existential surplus of value realized through the proper imposition of an overall transcendental suspension or the imposition of an ongoing set of overall transcendental suspensions’. On the other hand, through an inability to re-engage the psychic totality of our world-view through an overall transcendental suspension sets us up to find ourselves progressively out of touch and out of step with the life-world (experienced subjectively, intersubjectively and objectively [from the directness realized through the (re-)simulation of (re-)simulation, etc., as previously noted]). (59)

These definitions, to my mind, are an improvement on previous research for the following theoretical, practical and critical implications and consequences. For a start, to define psychosis as ‘a non-conformity with reality’ may be a start it cannot do adequate justice to the fact that no-one can view reality in such a state of absolute conformity; that no-one can find themselves in a state of absolute conformity with the “reality of their ‘vision of reality’” nor could that ‘pure’ possibility of conformity even be envisaged! Such a definition would imply that to some degree everyone would be psychotic by definition. This statement I do not agree with except to the extent that a reification of phenomenal reality is in some measure an empirical psychosis. But not everyone is 'psychotic', as the expression is understood in common parlance, as a consequence of this universal fact that no-one in their understanding of the world can be in absolute conformity with the 'reality' of that vision of the world. We could qualify this type of position and re-define psychosis as ‘a radical non-conformity with their our vision of reality’. Still, this definition cannot account for the fact that, in some aspects of our existence, we might hold both inconsistent beliefs and an understanding of reality that is currently in a state of radical non-conformity, still, that is our natural state of being in the world to the extent that from time to time we will hold views that are essentially in a state of contradiction with others, beliefs held by ourselves and/or in a state of overall non-conformity as culturally understood currently and collectively! The virtue of this new definition is that psychosis is realized through an inability to suspend beliefs that could prove to be in a state of non-conformity with the 'reality' of the reality of their world-view, and, which would be rectified if subjected to adequate processes of appropriate suspensions. The relative inability to do this both defining the psychosis and maintaining its existence (and that, by extension, we should reconsider neurotic and stasic forms of illnesses along the same lines as the inability to suspend other aspects of the psyche?). (60)

	With the previous definition of “non-conformity/conformity” we must also be prepared to be criticized as mere ‘representationalists’, either de facto or by default, even though that criticism correctly does not apply. As envisaged, the definition ‘conformity’, or the lack of the same, is realized not between our vision of reality and reality in a repsentationalist mode as after Locke, e.g., but as “a phenomenal/phenomenological mismatch between ‘the vision of reality’ and ‘the reality of that vision’.” The expression ‘reality’ in the phrase ‘the ‘reality of that vision’ is meant the ‘phenomenological richness’ of that vision (of reality), i.e., what phenomenal/phenomenological modes are actively engaged in the experience of that ‘current experience of reality’, and, to what extent that activity is engaged. So, e.g., a ‘dream apple’ cannot engage the modality of medium term hunger assuagement because the dream apple has no nutritional qualities, etc. So the vision of an ‘apple’ must be richer in phenomenal experience and phenomenological reflection than our phenomenal experience of and phenomenological reflection upon a ‘dream apple’, or, the ‘oil painting of an apple’, or, the ‘photo of an apple’, or, the ‘distant memory of an apple’, etc. On the other hand it appears obvious to people other than the psychotic person (and even they are not in absolute non-agreement with this comparative observation to the extent they must possess some form of covert insight into the ‘fact’ of this non-conformity) that in a psychosis there is an apparent general non-conformity with an overall, general cultural understanding of reality. However, the relatively more important essential aspect of an understanding of what a psychosis is, in accordance with my interpretation of what this phenomenon is/what this type of phenomena are, is the fact that this non-conformity arises by virtue of this inability to ‘give up’, read ‘suspend’, those ontological commitments that prevent this relatively more impartial assessment and critical self-assessment of the situation to hand… Hence, in my opinion, the superiority of this later definition that a psychosis is the relative inability to give up, i.e., suspend, one’s ontological commitments in part and in whole (as in the necessary exercise of a global suspension in the realization of personal authenticity, etc.)! (61)

Now, one might also reason that there is too much conformity in the psychotic person’s apparent understanding of the world, on a superficial level of experience, through a defective literalization of the metaphorical to the extent that their metaphorical appreciation of the world is subverted along literalistic lines in this regard! So, e.g., ‘I feel like Louis the XIVth.’ becomes ‘I am Louis the XIVth.’, and, ‘It feels like people are “after me”’ therefore ‘people ‘are’ after me!’, etc. But this increased degree of apparent conformity, for them, between their ‘vision of reality’ and their misinterpretation of the ‘reality of their vision of reality’ is, effectively, only operative on a superficial level of  experience, i.e., from a concrete, literal, non-metaphorical point of view albeit with all the attendant indications of non-conformity on a relatively covert level of critical, self-reflective appreciation (in conjunctions with the increased levels of discomfit attendant either upon reflecting upon those psychotically mis-interpreted situations or by being forced to reflect in such a manner through social pressures that call for this type of task in some manner or other). (62)

	Hence I would like to hazard an intuitive guess that we could well re-define psychosis, neurosis and stasis through the following equations. That we can re-define psychosis as the inability to suspend our ontological commitments! That, in turn, we can re-define neurosis as an inability to suspend our epistemological expectations! That we can re-define stasis (and its non-adaptable routinization of the personality) as an inability to suspend our non-awareness of our existential blind-spots! Not that this degree of suspension called for in all three situations, in order to naturally and ‘normally’ overcome these otherwise defective conditions, can be absolutely put into effect, only, that an adequate degree of an appropriately constructed suspension be in place for the adequate and appropriate function of the hermeneutic circle! (63)

In order to share this ‘intuition’, as outlined above, let me now look at a recent experience I had that provoked my philosophical reconsideration, or rather ‘modification and amplification’, of my treatment of this topic of the nature of psychosis, etc. (64)

	I recently entered into a conversation with a middle-aged woman and a linguist who were debating whether all languages might have descended from one initial language. This certainly was the thesis strongly being put forward by this neatly, well-dressed intelligent and quite articulate woman. In response the linguist stated that in his opinion her views presented a rather “fluffy” theory on the origins of language. He cited the fact that many words in one language matched another in sound and that occasionally similar sounding words even had similar meanings which without the establishment of cultural links should be treated as merely coincidental! Moreover, that between any language about four percent of words in those languages are going to sound alike by sheer chance. This woman was quite insistent that her view on language must be the correct one and cited numerous examples of her native tongue and words in a miscellany of languages from aboriginal dialects to various European languages. Now, I, personally, e.g., believe that the family of Indo-European languages do seem to have some deeper super-family resemblances with language families such as, e.g., Semitic languages. On the other hand, I do not believe that a particular language of recent and/or historical existence is that ur-language from which all others descended from. Without exactly stating her inner most convictions in this regard it was obvious from the vehemence that this woman held her beliefs, etc., that she thought her mother tongue was just that original language! In this regard her preferencing of her native tongue could be considered to be one of her ontological commitments, a commitment moreover that she, it seemed, was unable to distance herself from through a process of suspension. The closer one got to this unstated belief the more vehemently she would oppose, in equal measure, the apparent strengths of our critique of ‘this incontrovertible fact of her understanding of the life-world that seemed to define her very existence in this world-of-life and especially privileged her understanding of it’. This resistance experienced by myself in her refusal to even entertain this counter-possibility is an experience I have often met in dealing with the delusions promulgated by psychotic people. Moreover, as a sort of blind-spot qua hot-spot, to probe anywhere near the same was to meet with this differential degree of resistance equal to the intensity of the critique and the degree of ‘closeness’ in its targeting of that blind-spot/hot-spot. Hence this type of experience could be called a delusional resistance, a resistance that is the hallmark of a psychosis contra Freud and his apparent use of this term in relation to his concept of neurosis and the desired instigation of changes in world-view initiated by the psychoanalyst [although, in regard to the equal impossibility of shifting a neurotic person’s fears and other negative expectations (in accordance with my definition of this term ‘neurosis’) then this different type of reluctance to change might well also be regarded as a form of resistance, say an expectational resistance?]. Re-meeting this experience of delusional resistance thence alerted me to this observation that there is a profound reluctance, if not an impossibility, on the part of the psychotic person, in their being able, adequately, to suspend certain ‘committed views’ (regardless of the fact whether those beliefs were true or false; regardless of whether their arguments in sustaining those beliefs on carefully scrutiny and critical reflection should or could be judged as either valid and/or invalid). That, in effect, I was witnessing an essential feature in the phenomenon or condition of a psychosis. That, in this light, these views held by this woman in this regard, therefore, were essentially entertained in a psychotic fashion (even though this individual was not overtly psychotic)! Hence, in effect, in psychosis, the inability to properly and appropriately conduct a suspension of the object-moment will manifest itself in a non-conformity with reality (where ‘reality’ is treated in a multi-modal perspective both phenomenally and phenomenologically, i.e., as a ‘phenomenon’ that deserves to be ‘treated as a phenomenon’ through the use of transcendental suspensions, etc.). That a psychosis is essentially located in the defective treatment of the object-moment of our hermeneutic circle through this inability to conduct a transcendental suspension there to the proper degree and in an appropriate manner. This aspect of our hermeneutic circle and its overall transcendental suspension dealing with conjunctive suspensions, metaphors, reductions, retrospectivity, gestalt focus, the intentional object-state, etc. Defects in the functioning of the transcendental suspension in this aspect of the hermeneutic circle manifesting in a defective treatment of conjunctive suspensions, metaphors, etc., and, will effect the ability to conduct an overall transcendental suspension hence a psychosis has, for the psyche, detrimental ramifications for the process of judgment both locally (centered on the particular intentional object-state under gestalt focus) and globally (in terms of putting in place a proper and appropriate overall transcendental suspension along with its implications in the realization of authenticity of being through the ensuing distortion of those defective inputs into the overall process of judgment). (65)

	Can I extend this interpreted observation to the disorders of neurosis and stasis? As the hermeneutic circle is dependent upon all three moments (of object-state/reduction, world/re-constitution and ego/existential suspension) I would like to analogically reason that the other two 'sides', or ‘polar aspects’, of our hermeneutic circle have their own distinctive phenomenology of disorders, etc., this presupposition granted, can I, in articulating this research project, parallel world with neurosis, and, ego with stasis? I believe I can do so! (66)

	Previously, I defined a neurosis as more or less a mal-adaptation to stress or the anticipated immanent prosecution of the same (with a possible physiological component [as found in panic attacks and similar conditions]). In the light of this new approach we can now define neurosis as an inability to suspend prospective epistemological expectations; 'prospective epistemological expectations' meaning 'the unreasonably perceived imminent realization of fears, negative expectations, etc., that cannot be shifted, ameliorated, modified to some significant degree or other, etc., through the imposition of an overall suspension in that regard'. This inability to shift, etc., these fears held for the future manifesting as an expectational resistance (which is not to be equated with the Freudian concept of resistance or the concept of a delusional resistance). Hence, in effect, in neurosis, the inability to properly and appropriately conduct a suspension of the world-moment will manifest itself in a mal-adaptation to stress, etc. (67)

	In the case of the predicted stasic disorder we should find a similar inability of the individual to suspend a more egologically-oriented aspect of their psyche. In this condition, I would speculate that, through an inability to enact an overall transcendental suspension, the individual is equally unable to view certain problematic aspects of themselves that act, as a result, as potential blind-spots; points in the psyche that in probing would have a tendency to produce a negative type of denial, which, when probed indirectly would manifest as a hot-spot - a point of psychic discomfit only experienced by that individual when rhetorically focused upon. The net result being that that individual must progressively loose touch, and be out of step with others in their general, cultural perception of the life-world (and find themselves unable to actively review the spectrum of different attendant possibilities in this world-of-life from their unique point-of-view). Hence the routinization and loss of existential creativity experienced in this condition by those people unable to suspend their own egological sense of self, i.e., as consequence finding themselves unable to entertain truly novel situations of behaviour/behaving in the course of their ‘own’ life and loosing as a result both an adaptability to changing life-situations and a deeper enjoyment in life's pleasures both expected and unexpected. We should note here that all people (and cultures) have blind-spots! The point I am trying to make pivots on ‘a matter of degree’ and ‘a matter of possibility’, i.e., the extent that there is this degree of egological non-suspension and rigidity, and, the effective possibility that this suspension can actually be entertained if the (existential) situation should call for this modification of our being-in-this-world-of-life that under relatively ‘normal’ circumstances one would expect to have been put, more or less, in place! Hence, in effect, in stasis, the inability to properly and appropriately conduct a suspension of the ego-moment will manifest itself in a non-adaptability in routine behavioural patterns in situations that should call for new patterns of re-evaluation and re-adaptation in response. (68)

	Let me now concentrate on how a suspension of ordered value returns the same to its deeper phenomenal/phenomenological roots allowing us in the process to appreciate co-evaluational forms of value through the establishment of this deeper form of accommodation through this relatively more stable and effective bridging mechanisms. In other words, how do we in reality intuitively overcome the naturalistic fallacy without committing that fallacy, can overcome the deontological-pragmatical divide, arbitrate the ethical and the aesthetical in questions of censorship, etc., etc? (69)

	As previously argued by myself there are six fundamental forms of value belonging to either essential, aesthetical, ethical, pragmatical, hermeneutical or factual orders. That a co-evaluational form of complex value arises through the intersection of these six orders in part or in whole. That, on the deepest level of transcendental being, these six orders are absolutely self-intersected (in turn defining that deepest level of transcendental being through their absolute epistemological intersection). What are the ramifications of this position? For a start, through the thorough, adequate and appropriate imposition of an overall transcendental suspension we should find ourselves in a position to accommodate various streams of ordered value that on a superficial level, in those limited, ordered terms of reference, should be treated as incommensurable! Hence, in this light, through such a suspended regime, we can compare metaphorical chalk with cheese such as, e.g., 'ethical duty' with 'pragmatical concerns' (and in this vein, e.g., co-evaluate medical objectives versus their cost-benefit analysis, etc., an accommodation achievable through the imposition of an overall transcendental suspension of their phenomenal interaction in the context of a responsive regime of potential, self-authorized auto-rectification of practices, etc.). As promised let me now look into this culturally problematic type of situation in the next section of this essay. (70)

5.   What is the Primary Purpose of Therapy?

	As already noted the primary role of therapy is the therapeutic advancement of the patient. However, in the real world the 'business' of therapy must also be taken into account. Hence the purpose of therapy can never be just the therapeutic advancement of the patient's welfare. As a result, a tension between the practicalities and economics of therapy and the primary goals of the same must be 'forever present'; that tension only subsiding and ceasing on the cessation of that therapeutic regime (through the successful realization of therapy, or, the absence or death of the patient, or, the dissolution of that therapeutic industry in part or in whole). Need this tension 'forever present' be both an indication and cause of institutional disharmony? Let me address these issues first. (71)

	All relationships are generated through the resolution of dissonance. A therapeutic relationship is realized through a resolution of the dissonance presented in the course of that therapeutic process. In essence dissonance is one of the raw ingredients in the relational process. Without it there could be no relationship! Equally, dissonance cannot be absolute in intensity because it arises in relationship with that which is relatively consonant and against which it acquires its dissonant character as experienced in that relational context. Moreover, it is the nature of relative dissonance to be provocative; a concept I have discussed on a number of occasions elsewhere. That the relativity of dissonance is better described as provocative in that not only does it provoke but also shows how it is to be resolved through revealing that part of itself that is in common with the field of consonance in which it is operating and from which it was ‘drawn out of’ and thereby gains its relative sense of definition. Now, in that field of consonance that which is relatively new, different, extreme, disconcerting, and/or painful, etc., is experienced as relatively dissonant. The same, in principle, can be used to define, with respect to an agent or a group of agents, the therapeutic field or the initial nature and need for a process of therapy. Then, in a converse reading of the situation any lose, diminution, etc., in these relatively negative characteristics could be construed as the ongoing presence or character of a therapeutic relational situation arising through the resolution of those relatively negative characteristics. Or, some other relational process is at work and therein contributing to this experience of resolution and its parallel sense of relief. (72)

	From a philosophical understanding of the relational resolution of dissonance I would like to make the following conjoined general observations, namely, that the type of dissonance present in a relationship defines its basic nature, and, the manner of its resolution defines the style of that resolution along with the consequent character of that relationship should that process be successfully engaged, to some extent, in that relational process of resolution. In exactly the same way the basic nature, style  and character of a therapeutic relationship can be observed and noted! So, e.g., a patient with a life-threatening carcinoma has that as their basic condition, the style of treatment adopted might be chemotherapy, and, the resulting character of that therapeutic process being dependent on the manner and degree of success realized through that particular process of therapy. (73)

	This tension between the deontological goal of therapy and the pragmatics of the therapeutic process is an obvious example of a complex co-ordered collision of incommensurable value systems that on a deeper level of examination must find some form of an interaction and resolution. A philosopher may note that these two conflicting value systems may be incommensurable in theory, but, in practice, in reality, they must recognize that they cannot be non-incommensurable! That there is this existential fact of our being in this world-of-life that in this ‘world’ all conflicting value systems must be able to interact and realize some form of a complex co-ordered resolution as witnessed, e.g., by the evidence of the ongoing resolution in progress of that therapeutic process itself as it navigates means and ends! Therefore, the deontological and the pragmatical must interact and enter into a fruitful dialogue in some form or other (as a transcendental precondition for the very ‘fact’ of the therapeutic process itself to be in play). That established, we must now ask ourselves how these superficially incommensurable value systems can interact as they do in fact, and, in the same vein, how can we better conduct this type of an ongoing, interactive process of co-ordered value judgment, i.e., how can we better discriminate the ‘nature’ of that type of condition and better evaluate the therapeutic ‘character’ of that therapeutic process and, with that general and particular end in mind, how do we refine the ‘style’ of that adopted and individually adapted process of therapy? (74)

	Common sense is one ingredient! Intuition is another along with experiential successfulness of our current ‘science’ (hopefully finding through a critical reflection upon experience a confirmation or dis-confirmation of current habits in this regard). So, how might common sense and intuition, etc., be successful in this type of task given this lack of an obvious dialogue? For a start, through the relative unity of the human constitution, as reflected in an overall egological sense of self; despite a bewildering array of different senses of self on display in our culture and in any other culture, it must be possible for that overall sense of self to enter into an indirect overall dialogue through its individual dialogues with those incommensurable value systems implicated in that virtual process of interaction? Of course, although seemingly a step in the right direction it does not explain how the self in all its variety of senses can entertain this overall 'virtual ' sense of a dialogue. However, a resolution of this philosophic problem is already to hand in the recognition of the role that transcendental suspensions play in assisting this deeper sense of an inter-psychic dialogue, i.e., establishing, thereby, an interaction between ordered forms of value and their resultant (re-)simulation of a complex co-ordered process of resolution. I would argue, that in the same manner that resolution is entered into through common sense and/or intuition this same type of process can be simulated through the imposition of transcendental suspensions. So let me look more closely at this possibility by proceeding along this avenue. (75)

	As already argued, the first place to commence a process of transcendental suspension should be through a recognition of the relevant prejudices present in that situation under examination. This both psychically locates us in this world-of-life and gives us content for a process of suspension. Then, once our relevant prejudices are recognized we should then systematically, in due proportion and priority, individually entertain these suspensions and apply our simultaneous entertainment of their co-relative opposites. All prejudices are correlatively created/re-created in so far as no individual prejudice can be meaningfully entertained absolutely in its own right. From its very matrix of being its psychically attached opposite correlative prejudice can be re-brought into focal consciousness and therein allowed to relatively neutralize that prior preferentialization of the world within the 'space' of that suspension. In effect we have here a process of deconstruction. However, despite this de-preferentialization we still must conduct this type of process in an ad hoc hierarchy of priorities reflecting the hierarchical set of objectives currently in play although they, in turn, at the appropriate juncture, will need to be suspended (through the re-imposition of a global suspension of that project-in-context). (76)
	
	Next, we need to essentialize the essential features that constitute that particular situation about to be placed in that state of suspension. By 'essentialize' is meant 'looking for the relatively core, essential features that characteristically define that type of phenomenon in that type of phenomenal situation'. By 'essential features' we make a mental note or catalogue of all relevant features that constitute that particular situation; this sense of 'essential' being defined by the existential fact that in their absence the existential tenor of that particular situation is radically altered, i.e., essentially. In other words, the absence of an essential feature definitively alters the essential nature of that situation as a result of that absence. E.g., we could loose an arm or a leg, perhaps all our limbs and yet still be the type of person who we were prior to that loss of limbs. On the other hand, and hopefully you will forgive this gruesome analogy, we cannot loose our heads. The again we could lose our eyes or our ears, we might even be able to loose a considerable proportion of our brain and yet remain relatively intact from a psychic point of view. In this light, the removal of a portion of one's body that does not invoke a radical change in the psyche of that individual could be considered as the removal of a relatively non-essential component of that psycho-physical organism in this regard. The point of this analogy being that the absence of a feature of the nature, style and character of a relationship that radically alters the nature of that relationship should be defined as an 'essential feature of that relational situation'. Hence, once we have defined and prioritized our relevant prejudices we should become adequately and appropriately essentially informed about the nature, style and character of that particular situation under examination. Then, with this essential mapping of that relational situation to hand and its subjection to a process of transcendental suspension we should be able to proceed with a deeper investigation of that relational situation by virtue of the fact that we have more deeply located ourselves in the transcendental (read 'ideal') constitution of the same. As, a result, before, in and through processes of resolution, relatively dissonant features discover what is commonly present in consonant aspects of that same intentional field, and vice versa. Thence the style of that resolution, as it would occur in fact, can be re-simulated and dissected under the attention, or, rather 'scalpel' of the mind's eye! These 'common features', as relatively invariant isomorphic structural-dynamical aspects of that relational situation, therein helping us to bridge these relatively non-commensurable fields of value formation and thereby deepen our transcendental point of view on that particular relational situation. In effect, re-simulating how it would operate intuitively or in common sense and its intuitive feel for the relevantly practical… a process that is best developed and refined through skilful practice and careful reflection… almost as a critical 'reflex' in this regard! A sense of the critical naturally surfacing through the appropriate imposition of the suspension etc, assisted through the force of the resolution permitted and entailed therein, and, reinforced or conditioned by the existential excess of value created/re-created in its simulation/re-simulation. The repetition of the same process, albeit refined through reflective fine-tuning, re-establishing an aura of critical reflection in equal measure to the authenticity invoked and realized in that process of phenomenological reflection. Although here defined in and through a technical and transcendental language what has been put into effect is none other that what, more or less, occurs in deliberate acts of judgment, albeit on a more automatic, less intentionally aware basis. With this insight to hand let me explore certain general guidelines in the instigation of the resolutional transformation of our relationships as might occur in practice through the intuitive exercise of our common sense, etc. (77)

	In summarizing the previous paragraphs let us re-iterate the roles of prejudice and the suspension of the same, the informative essentialization of that relational situation under examination and the suspension of this collection of essential aspects paying due regard to their relative priority and appropriateness in the relational play of their being simulated/re-simulated and suspended in the context of that relational situation given the nature and perspective of our current ambitions in that regard. Let me now proffer some general guidelines relevant to this complex business of therapeutic practice. (78)

	The search for essential features of a relational situation in effect manufactures a simulation/re-simulation of that relational situation and in time a refinement of our understanding of that situation from the perspective of that situation itself. Our very interaction in that simulation/re-simulation of that relational situation subtly or not so subtly effects and alters the process of that interactive relationship. Our entry into that situation thereby beginning a process of relational transformation whose authenticity of change can only be guaranteed through the quality of the overall transcendental suspension instigated in the simulation/re-simulation of that relational situation, etc. That, in essence, through the ongoing resolution of the relationship itself the relational situation effectively creates/re-creates its ‘own’ authenticity of response (just as the authenticity of the 'transformational intervention' is a reflection of the authenticity of the overall transcendental suspension critically 'put into effect' by the person or persons conducting that actual and/or virtual intervention be that active and/or passive in intent!)! Now, in deciding to actively intervene in a certain relational situation the decision making process that effects others should be shared with those people effected by that decision, unless, the existential merit of its imposition outweighs the merit of collective deliberation, i.e., through transcendental reservation, in acting on behalf of that relationship, our transcendental 'duty' informing us of this need to directly intervene on the behalf of that relationship itself in this regard despite what merit or demerit might be retrospectively attached to those actions by participants in that relationship or non-essential observers outside the same. Then, we need to ask ourselves, in transcendental sympathy with that relationship under examination, what valid activity could be put into effect in that situation and what possible or hypothetical merit might be realized through the adoption and adaptation of such a practical mode of address. Lastly, we need to note at what speed and in what manner we should proceed in the instigation of those changes, and, set out to envisage and speculate on the consequences of our actions in this state of affairs, this relational situation, and travelling from there intuit what other relational consequences might flow from this act of intervention in the light of this reflection’s enriched ‘self-appreciation’. (79)

Now, rather than getting bogged down in taking up some of these points in the context of a concrete situation in order to illustrate these general existential guidelines let me instead indicate a few guidelines for how our relationships should be entered into in the light of this type of relational philosophy.  I define a ‘relational philosophy’ as a ‘phenomenal/phenomenological understanding of the nature of relationships with an appreciation of what advances the psychic welfare of a particular relationship in general or particular terms of reference, and, what also simultaneously advances the hierarchical nature of the relationship that relationship has to the relationship of the relationship of all relationships, namely, the life-world’ in general or particular terms of reference. In other words, an ‘ethical’ relationship advances the overall psychic welfare of a particular relationship in and through the relationship it has to the life-world, especially those relationships in the immediate ‘space’ of that primary relationship under consideration hence the hierarchical appreciation of this ‘interrelational proximity’ of this state-of-affairs under phenomenological appreciation as an effective phenomenon from its own-point-of-view but, ultimately, as an interrelated phenomenon. The (therapeutic) progressing of this extraordinary affair already taking place, in some form or other, to some extent or other, by virtue of the deeper transcendental nature of the life-world as it is to be found as a phenomenon in the world-of-life and as a subject for phenomenological reflection(s)! Let me quickly focus on some of some these general principles of this relational ethics, or, rather, relational meta-ethics, and, then relate these to general principles involved in the advancement of patient welfare’, in the light of these existential guidelines (that set up the conditions for the advancement of those relationships in the context of their relational worlds albeit in ‘the’ transcendental ‘space’ of the Life-world). Such processes of active-reflection indirectly giving us, i.e., tracing out, certain significant measures for evaluating the degree to which a relationship-in-this-world-of-life has found empowerment/re-empowerment. The resolution of active reflection, that modality of response adopted and adapted being realized in the existential moment of the non-textual and acted upon in the overall transcendental suspension of the not-textual moment as ‘an appropriate response called forth from the being of that relationship itself’ as it ‘find-itself’ becoming in this world of life. (80)

	Now what is the primary purpose of therapy considered in general, philosophical terms of reference? Surely ‘therapy’ is the advancement of the welfare of the patient in such a manner that that advancement takes the ‘patient’ from an adverse situation to a situation that is less adverse. The mere ‘advancement’ of the welfare of a patient is not in and of itself necessarily therapeutic. Would one describe winning first prize in a significant lottery therapeutic?  It could well contribute to ones advancement in life but to see that as ‘therapeutic’ is to stretch the meaning of that expression unless that ‘advancement’ could actually contribute to a therapeutic process (e.g., enabling a patient to take up some form of therapy that hitherto had been beyond their means, which in real terms is quite a different matter). In an ideal world this definition may be adequate but not all forms of ‘therapy’ need be therapeutic, indeed, they could well be counter-therapeutic for some or all of the patients who subscribe to the same. Hence a therapeutic program should also be evaluated in terms of its successfulness in particular and in general terms of reference; an evaluation that should also take into account all goals set prior to the implementation of the same. As if a philosophical argument there should be well-formed premises (presuppositions), valid arguments and accurately evaluated conclusions realized as therapeutic results, i.e., results that are therapeutic and conform to our definition as outlined above. But, again, we live in the real world and often all three of these phases are not accurately defined and understood, quantified and qualitatively evaluated. Why, e.g., do we still give patients ECT (electro-shock treatment)? Because it works, and, when no other adequate therapeutic measures are to hand, it can saves lives through the turning around of suicidal ideation, let endogenously patients get on with life’s necessities like eating, taking adequate fluids, attending to the proper elimination of waste-products, washing, etc. In lieu of better measures to hand it is still used, often very effectively when appropriate guidelines are adopted and followed in its utilization. How does it work – on what presuppositional foundations, by what therapeutic mechanisms and to what degree in particular and general terms of reference? All these factors, in this instance, may well still not be clearly thought out, understood, etc., yet its therapeutic successfulness can often be quite startling, in evidence after the first application of this method (usually consolidated through a course of six to twelve treatments over the space of a few weeks). Now, I am using this example of something that appears to work for reasons that may well defy current medical science for a few more years, ultimately, we must hope that these presuppositional, methodological and evaluational facets become adequately delineated in an integrated and framework that can validly answer a set of rhetorical questions such as “is that particular treatment program effective beyond the mere masking of symptoms, the placebo effect, normal remission rates, etc., and, should it be adopted in general terms of reference and in what particular situations with what expectations in terms of a ‘pre-defined successfulness’?” So, it seems, if this philosophical analysis is correct, that the same type of dichotomous rift that superficially divides the ‘business of therapy’ from its ‘therapeutic goals’, as previously alluded to, also crosses the very process of the application of the treatment program itself, namely, “by what means - to what ends” - how are these pragmatical and deontological issues dealt with in the very implementation of the treatment program itself? To this problematic issue I would propose the same type of reply, namely, that this type of issue ceases to be problematic on a deeper transcendental basis, a basis in experiential terms that is realized through the utilization of an adequate overall transcendental suspension in the pursuit of our research, the means of its application and our critical reflections on carefully evaluated outcomes regardless of whether they be positive, neutral or negative in part or in whole! In essence all forms of relevant partiality need to be noted and appropriately suspended, i.e., one needs to be aware of but oblivious to all forms of institutional bias and expectations that might actively or passively set out to seek fulfillment in some form or other be that authentic or non-authentic in orientation. Let me elaborate. (81)

	How is the suspension to be put into effect in a non-philosophical, institutional, clinical and scientific environment? Fortunately, in the ‘relational space’ centered and surrounding a particular relationship the complexity of this affair is already pre-ordered through the adoption and adaptation of a genre, or mix of genres, to hand. We play by those rules and it only behooves us to enter into their spirit in an authentic manner, i.e., be aware of what is relatively relevant through that hierarchy of presuppositions already in play, and, our receptivity to an authentication of those measures through their refinement and/or acceptance. Hence the need for a process of ongoing re-adoption and re-adaptation of those meta-textual guidelines that re-constitute an authenticity of genre arrived at through those processes of refinement and/or acceptance. Therefore, in this light all therapeutic presuppositions, expectations, goals, procedures and evaluations/re-evaluations need to be kept open, reasonably fluid and available for re-definition/de-definition. In the latter instance of de-definition a treatment pathway that is counter productive or without therapeutic successfulness (beyond mere masking of symptoms, the placebo effect, normal remission rates, etc.) should be stopped and no longer practised, or, modified if such a revision is felt justified by some means or other. Moreover, the same should also apply to those institutions that no longer need to be with us having successfully served their purpose or unsuccessfully realized their expected goals, etc. Conducted as an ongoing process with, mainly, small increments of change should ensure the stability of the workplace despite the fact that it remains a work in progress. On the other hand, less responsive institutions that no longer have a relevant raison d’être, without adequate re-direction, stand to be rather unhappy place to work in with all the attendant problems in the wake of those issues as well. A large, viable institution should be able to existentially accommodate for those transitions. On the other hand, a small institution may well need to re-invent itself. Today we no longer have such a great need for thatchers, coopers, ironsmiths, etc., and new professions have come into existence undreamed of only a few years ago. All transitional processes can be uncomfortable but society will become a better place when this type of process is allowed to existentially function and, in essence, this state of affairs reflects the very dynamics at the center of the therapeutic process itself; these same dynamics applying to all processes of change! As an observation we might like to conclude that the sooner a society or institution has to face a process of ‘inevitable’ change the sooner it should be allowed to face the same on the understanding that the prevention of change will often only initiate a catastrophic-like phenomenon further down the track whose intensity will directly measure, to some extent, the length in time such a transition was prevented from occurring. In effect, the resolution of dissonance, difference, defective parts and processes, conflict, pain and adversity merely highlighting, through repetition, how the transformation of a process is existentially entered into, namely, as a process of resolution assisted and put into effect through processes of transcendental suspension! Nothing mysterious – nothing more than how we go about the process of making a judgment be it simple or complex, or, rather, how the relational process of judgment existentially judges itself and in the process judges us! It is the nature of a relationship to come into ongoing existence through the very nature of that relationship itself to realize through itself a process of ongoing resolution of dissonance, and, it is this core of relational being to ongoingly enact the same that established the resultant form of that relationship, hence its presuppositional nature (through its explication of what is relatively dissonant-consonant in that relationship), the style of resolution (through the distinctive signature of how that relationship uniquely resolves this state of relational tension), and, resultant character (through the unique presentation/re-presentation of that relationship in the context of its context-in-the-life-world). These few insights, and their implications, establishing this philosophy of relationships, or, relational philosophy as just previously noted. Relational authenticity being the direct product of the ongoing fact that an overall transcendental suspension is being effectively entered into and appropriately exercised therein. The resultant existential excess that defines the relational facticity of that relationship being to what extent the relationship is ‘psychically’ greater the mere sum of the parts of that relationship! Thence, through emergence, the relationship takes on the relative uniqueness of its own-being-in-this-world-of-life. This excess then being re-invested in the body of that relationship, which, if put into effect from an intentional point of view is essentially the exercise of judgment – a natural process of how we come to be in this world-of-life though the active-reflection of our-being-before-others in this world-of-life as they, in turn, stand-before-us!! The existential refinement of our relationships establishing the increased facticity of our being in this world-of-life. This authenticity of being, through ongoing existential transformation, establishes our advancement of being whether that is therapeutic and/or non-therapeutic in orientation. Hence the necessary implication of our understanding and exercise of a relational philosophy in the implementation of a therapeutic program!!! A program that by its very (‘deep’ transcendental) nature must overcome all forms of preferentialism (whether deontological or pragmatical, etc.) through the proper exercise of an appropriately constructed overall transcendental suspension!!!! (82)

	Let me break this essay at this point to sum up what I feel is necessary for us to adopt and adapt in order to move beyond the current state of therapy; be that in a particular instance or in more general terms of reference (noting the following six points in the form of a summary). (83)

1.	Therapy was defined as the advancement of the welfare of the patient in such a manner that that advancement takes the ‘patient’ from an adverse situation to a situation that is less adverse. (84)

2.	The context of therapy was defined, by implication, as taking place in the context of a relational philosophy, i.e., as a process whose transformation was put into effect through the resolution of relative dissonance which in a therapeutic relationship was seen as ‘a state of adversity’ in some form or other, to some degree or other. (85)

3.	In order to overcome all relevant superficial dichotomous types of value-judgment and all forms of bias and preferentialism the instantiation of an appropriate overall transcendental suspension to the proper degree was called for and insisted upon. (86)

4.	That this process of an overall transcendental suspension was already in play to some extent through the adoption and adaptation of meta-textual/contextual genre rules already in place in the course of that therapeutic process of evaluation and possible implementation. (87)

5.	That it remains to us to ensure that an authenticity of response is realized through the active-self monitoring of our relationships be they therapeutic or non-therapeutic in orientation from the point of view of those relationships in the context of their relationship to the life-world. (88)

6.	Hence, in moving beyond therapy, the therapeutic process itself stands in need of an ongoing therapeutic process of active self-reflection! (89)

	In Part I of this essay titled Beyond Therapy I have looked at the introduction of certain generalities, as listed above, e.g., implicated in this type of subject and its discussion. The remainder of this essay will concern itself with Specifics and an Overview wherein I will set out to evaluate and re-evaluate various issues, etc., appertaining to this important topic in the light of the provisional ‘ground’ as constructed and explicated above…. (90)

							        Noël Tointon, Sydney, 21.2.03.