Beyond Therapy: A Set of Essays
On Miscellaneous Topics in Psychology and Psychiatry (2001-2003)

VI. Beyond Therapy: 
A Shorter Version of this Essay
Constructed from a Selection of Paragraphs 

How Therapeutic is Therapy? – Should Therapy be Therapeutic?

	This paper is a shorter version of the sixth essay of this series of psychology papers. I am, currently, in the midst of writing this paper which I envisage will be in three sections - Generalities, Specifics and Overview. Here I will present paragraphs concerned with the nature of therapy in general; the fact that therapy is a composite of different, superficially incommensurable values; an outline of how we overcome apparently incommensurable value facets in this type of project; the role of the transcendental suspension in that type of task; and, I will also outline where other sections of this essay are headed such as the need for a more sophisticated metaphorical comprehension of causality (in order to more insightfully understand the phenomenological nature of transformation in the therapeutic process) despite the ultimate failure of all metaphor 'to metaphor' the reality of things-as-they-are, i.e., the life-world as-it-is, and, the key fact that to go beyond therapy necessitates a thorough transcendental suspension of the same! To more fully deal with this topic and these sub-textual themes the reader/listener might like to read the lastest version of this essay on my homepage site www.homestead.com/noelshomepage/noelsintro.html (i)

	In the First Essay I criticized Freud through a somatic lens spearheaded by two major critics of the psycho-analytic tradition(s), namely, Hans Eysenck and Richard Webster. However, in the Fifth Essay I went further and criticized this excessive somatic orientation through the lens of an almost totally overlooked co-authorial dimension, i.e., an interpersonal dimension where a great percentage of 'our texts' are naturally, and normally, generated by more than one person; a dimension that also manifests with a number of psychological disturbances such as, e.g., the presence of various types of hysterical-psychotic illnesses such as repressed memories (not evoked by orthodox methods), alien ‘abductions’, multiple personalities, ritual satanic abuse, fictitious disorders, etc., etc. (2)

	In this essay I am going to explore the realm of therapy in general by trying to think beyond the wide array of therapy as institutionalized in various schools of practice. Hence this title Beyond Therapy. (4)

	The two questions in the subtitle are tongue in cheek - but like all forms of humour there is both a sharp 'point' and a 'subject' pricked by the 'truth' that sets them up as the 'butt' of that humour. (5)

	Let one hundred flowers bloom - and one hundred thousand competing blossoms have sprung forth to answer such a call. Not only are Freudian fields thick with rancorous weeds and allied pastures of Spring madness but the entire field of psychiatry is overgrown and overpopulated with whole swathes of mutant floral forests of uncritically conducted and over-optimistically self-advertised therapeutic ‘professionalisms’. Now, some studies have shown that it doesn't matter what psychiatric technique you adopt, or how often, as most show some small degree of promise regardless of which one you might turn to. Indeed, you might like to invoke, instead, some form of random magic… the waving of a wand or a lengthy incantation in Latin or gibberish, because it would serve you just as well, although, no doubt, of course, in the long term not giving you much to write home about. And many illness have patterns of remissions completely unconnected with programs of so-called treatment - their patients just naturally get better in the course of time. Am I being unfair here? Let me, therefore, examine this type of claim that ‘many forms of therapeutic intervention have no real foundations’ – their claim of success being more a non-substantiated claim, an unjustified claim without any real guarantee of effectiveness when put into practice! Sadly, on odds alone, a certain number of the latter will even hinder any therapeutic progress that might have been in train naturally or otherwise. As that old saying goes: "the cure sometimes can be worse that the disease!” (6)

	If an illness has a distinctive phenomenology then the mere examination of that illness in an untreated environment should establish the natural rate of remission, or, the remission spectrum - the range and degree of remissions one should expect in an environment relatively devoid of 'so-called' therapeutic interventions. Then in the introduction of therapeutic programs if the rate of successfulness can be relatively quantified and qualified and the result is greater than this natural rate of remission then we are on the road to establishing the therapeutic potential of the therapeutic process once, and this is important, the placebo effect can be taken into account. How is this latter factor determined? By offering a number of discrete placebo trials in order to determine this 'contribution' should it exist. Then blind trials between the treatment program under investigation and the use of a placebo should be able to help us to quantify and qualify this additional contribution if that should be found to make an appearance for us. I use the word 'qualify' in both sense, namely, the degree to which an investigated 'therapeutic effect' adds to or subtracts from the deviation from this remission rate plus the expected impact of a placebo, and, all the qualifications one might need to add to our findings in this regard. It may well be that because of our genetic make-up, or for some other reason, only a small number of patients are going show any positive (or negative) deviations from this natural remission rate augmented with the expected rate from the contributions of a placebo effect. (10)

	Now we must ask, in general terms of reference, how might we quantify and qualify these potential therapeutic deviations in the rates of natural remissions adjusted for potential placebo influences (and any other influences that should be taken into account such as socioeconomic influences, masking mechanisms, compensatory reactions, immunological histories, etc.)? To begin with we have the task of defining what are the limits for such an investigation. This part of our calculations should be relatively simple - just what would count for absolute success, and, what would count for absolute failure?! Potential effectiveness of therapy can thus be measured, to some extent, as a symbolic representation between these two poles of absolute success and absolute failure. A profound philosophic problem still remains however! How do we quantify quality (and qualify quantity?)? As stated elsewhere it is only on a profound level of transcendental acuity that such a task should be conducted. On a relatively superficial level of investigation and reflection we should actively discriminate between such relatively non-isomorphic discontinuities. Yet, on a deeper transcendental level of being it is our (transcendental) intuition that we should be able to relate such ostensively non-commensurable styles of evaluation. Let me proffer the following illustration to establish this general intuition. (11)

	An opera star is performing the same role over a period of seven nights with the same orchestra, conductor, etc., in the same venue. She notes that, relatively speaking, every night she 'feels' she is singing brilliantly whilst still making a small increment of improvement in the manner of her performance night by night. That, in accordance with her evaluations, she has made a marginal improvement with each night. In the determination of this degree of quality how could she have quantified the same when the degree of quality, and any incremental advance on the same, is, correctly speaking, only a metaphor, a manner of speaking. There just is no 'thermometer', or any other instrument, for determining this 'degree of quality' and any perceived change in the same?! So how could quality be quantified given this apparently fatal objection that our phenomenological experience of 'quantity' and 'quality' are essentially non-isomorphic in their apparent constitution? Yet, on the other hand, we have the phenomenological observation that we can make this type of evaluation when we say we can do such an evaluation and then go ahead and appear to make just such a forbidden calculation. How might this balancing act be done - maintaining on one side their distinctive separation and on their other side their re-presentation in a form that allows us to do just that, i.e., compare them! This 'balancing act' offering us a clue, namely, the utilization of a transcendental suspension. (12)

	Elsewhere I have argued for the presence of six types of judgmental decision making, namely, determinations of essence, determinations of aestheticality, determinations of ethicality, determinations of pragmaticality, determinations of interpretability.  and, determinations of existence or factuality. All six of these determinations are ostensively non-commensurable. Yet, through the medium of the psyche, this epistemological hierarchy in which all senses of self and, the overall sense of self, are constituted along with all forms of intentionality and therein all forms of simulated phenomenal experience, etc, a sense of the commensurable is to be found on this stage of psychic unity that has us collectively constituted as 'a-person-in-this-world-of-life'! Through this lens of psychic unity all aspects of the psyche are just that - aspects, never types of experience absolutely non-commensurable with each other, nor, for that matter, completely commensurable with each other. How is such a feat accomplished? Because there is this relative degree of unity experienced in our own sense of being a psycho-physical 'organism', an emergent, organic unity realized in and through the phenomenal diversity we experience in our being a person in this world of life, this life-world. Moreover, in-built into this epistemological hierarchy, and dependent upon its relative foundations, a sense of judgment is exercised in such a fashion that in its depths we are allowed to find a deep commensurability between these six distinctive aspects of the judgmental act as noted, namely, the essential, the aesthetical, the ethical, the pragmatical, the hermeneutical and the factual. (13)

	This expression suspension is my re-interpretation of the same expression utilized by the German philosopher Edmund Husserl (1859-1934). A sense of the suspension is realized when there is a bracketing of the form of the phenomenal appearance. In this bracketing, or epoche, the phenomenal appearance is treated as a mere phenomenal appearance, i.e., as it appears without direct reference to our interpretation of it in the light of our ontological commitments, epistemological prejudgments, prejudices, etc. To begin with, in his earliest transcendental phenomenological writings, Husserl appears to have confused suspensions with reductions, i.e., the process of the epoche itself with a phenomenological 'analysis' of the ‘phenomenal’ content of that suspension. In the course of my own investigations I have noted the need for a third dialectical moment of re-constitution, and, that these three moments can be seen as the three facets of the hermeneutic circle (wherein sense, meaning and meaningfulness can be co-determined) as re-formulated by myself. In my later phenomenological-hermeneutical research I have treated these three moments of the hermeneutic circle as distinctive types of suspension and that collectively their appropriately instituted balance with respect to each other puts in place a complex overall suspension. Although the phenomena to hand can be suspended on a case by case basis ideally the suspension should be exercised on a global stage, i.e., our entire views of the world should be suspended at the same time. In effect our beliefs can still be held, but, in the ‘space’ of the suspension, they are effectively put out of action. By these means assisting us in our desire to focus purely upon the essential configuration of the intentional object-state under examination – therein revealing that object-state in its transcendental ‘ideality’. Because, it is through the auspices of the transcendental suspension that the transcendental dimension is revealed. In a thorough extension of this globalization of the suspension I will extend this suspension to all forms of value, which, in my theoretical investigations, take six forms as outlined in my ordered analysis, namely, pre-essential-essential, essential-aesthetical, de-ontological-ethical, utilitarian-pragmatical, hermeneutic-potential and actual-factual. It is in this complex ‘double’ sense that I will use the word ‘suspension’ unless otherwise described, etc., i.e., as subject to a complex overall suspension, and, subject to a thorough global suspension (through a suspension of all forms of ordered value). Let me now look into this topic in some depth and come to the very coal-face of my own research in this regard. It is my contention that the dynamics of the hermeneutic circle can be generated through the interaction of these distinctive types of suspension as they are allowed to interact within this overall sense of suspension. With this hopeful ambition in mind let me now examine this topic of ‘suspension’ in some considerable depth. (18)

	Why (this current emphasis of my research on) suspensions! Because all apparently commensurable and incommensurable phenomena are created through intentional deliberations by-us for-ourselves, i.e., through processes of intentional judgments. Because, basically, all types of judgment have the same transcendental form (as intentional deliberations generated between these same three poles of the object-states under focus, the fields of relevant contrast and all senses of self (and all sense of other) relevant to the nature of that judgmental process (so, e.g., a perceptual judgment must involve a sense of a perceptual-intentional object-state, a perceptual field, a perceptual perceiver as a perceptual judge, etc.). Moreover, different types of judgment, essentially, are only those phenomenologically distinctive preferentially adopted perspectives that allow us to create/re-create that particular type of judgment – so, e.g., when our primary interest is in the intentional object-state under focus there is a preference for that perspective and a corresponding relative suppression of the other two poles of ego (read the gestalt field of appreciation) and world (read gestalt field). In my circular ordered analysis we arrive at six distinctive kinds of judgment through a systematic recognition of this mechanism, namely, the simple focus on these three poles individually [equally achieved through the suppression of the two ‘opposite’ poles] (giving us [pre-essential-] essential, ethical (deontological) and hermeneutical forms of value) and the double emphasis on two poles at the same time [equally achieved through the suppression of one ‘opposite’ pole] (giving us aesthetical, pragmatical and factual forms of value). The underlying principles here are quite simple. Relatively incommensurable forms of value, say deontological ethical forms of value versus pragmatical forms of value, are each essentially arrived through a ‘slight’ preferential ‘distortion’ of this transcendental machinery but whose underlying nature cannot be written out of the equation since all forms of judgment necessitate this tripartite relationship between ego, object and world. Hence by writing all phenomenal presentations/re-presentations in a suspended format we are returning those phenomenal representations back to this tripartite ground in preparation for deeper processes of transcendental accommodation given that the underlying transcendental nature of all forms of judgment is the same! So we make a mistake to compare deontological forms of ethical value with pragmatical forms of value in superficial non-transcendental terms of reference. On the other hand, in relatively deeper transcendental terms of reference we must be able to enter into a process of productive interaction and problematic resolution between the same given that the underlying nature of all forms of judgment is the same on this deeper level of epistemological expression! Hence, e.g., the engineer, of say a bridge, can do their duty to the public in the design of their manufactured architecture by making those comprises in the effective strength and stability of their designs whilst at the same time making what pragmatic comprises necessary in terms of cost, materials, techniques of construction, design, etc., (in the building of that bridge in such a manner so as to ensure it survives those reasonably expected stresses that might be brought to bear upon it over the lifetime of that structure). The trick is in arriving at those terms of reference that allow us to productively realize this (existentially experienced) transcendental intuition of a deep transcendental commensurability between these superficially non-commensurable forms of value! At least in this respect common sense should be able present itself as a reasonable arbiter in this contest between doing ones duty to the public and ensuring the minimum ‘economical’ cost in the building of that project. Now let me sum up these provisional points I am making here in a slightly less technical manner!! (19)

	From an examination of this project as outlined, it is obvious, given the possible range of therapies, from the positively productive to the negatively counter-productive, that we do have at our disposal an ability to quantify the qualitative (and to qualify the quantitative). Hence in this light we can explain how it is possible for our opera star to be able to say that she is able to evaluate the quality of her performances and relatively quantify their incremental degree of improvement despite the ostensive metaphorical nature of that expression 'degree'. Obviously she has no ‘thermometer’ for this type of evaluation. Although she might find some comfort for her self-appreciation of her performance through the ‘quality’ of the clapping, etc., as a response initiated by the audience who appear to be able to appreciate and 'witness' the quality of her performance. By the invocation of such a mechanism (of the discriminative accommodation of forms of complex value), later in this paper I will be able also to investigate the vexed issue of how medical services can be individually qualified and quantified, and, both collectively qualified and quantified. Hence, in the process, allowing us to determine, in general terms of reference, how the business of the medical can existentially be made to (theoretically, practically and critically) run both as a cost effective business and as a profession that should also have the interests of the patients to heart to that extent current resources are capable of being utilized to realize that ‘complex aim'. Hence my provocative riposte Should Therapy be Therapeutic? since the concern and practice of therapy can never be just ‘positive therapeutic outcomes in the cold reality of our living in this world’, along with the rhetorical question How Therapeutic is Therapy? given that we now have a philosophical mechanism for understanding how quality can be quantified, etc., and how other apparently incommensurable phenomena can be meaningfully co-evaluated. (26)

	So much for theory and so much for its practice! In reality different people will realize different pathways of accommodation between relatively incommensurable forms of value (say, e.g., the deontological and the pragmatical as just illustrated in the example of the engineer and their design of a bridge). There is no a priori reason that all situations of accommodational resolution should demand unique forms of a to-be-discovered realization. In some situations that may well be the case, but, in general terms of reference, we cannot assume, nor should we assume, that there exists a definitive solution in all situations! What is at stake here, and what is more important, is that relatively more successful forms of resolution should be looked for and adopted when and where possible and that we keep our minds open as to what might constitute a more successful resolution in the uniqueness of each relational situation! So the goal in this regard is a discovery of  viable modes of resolution between both ‘commensurable forms of value’ and/or ‘relatively non-commensurable forms of value’ found competing in the ‘space’ of a particular situation under critical examination. ‘Critical’ by virtue of the fact that the re-imposition of suspensions open us up to this dimension of the critical realized through existential processes of resolution re-engaged through the very being, and becoming, of the hermeneutic circle itself as the (transcendental) locus of all sense, meaning and meaningfulness!! (27)

	In psychiatry we appear to have the scandal of an over-abundance of treatment programs with dubious degrees of effectiveness. But, at the same time, the adoption of any one would appear to have some therapeutic potential, even, if, in the final analysis, they had adverse consequences. A state of affairs even more scandalous than the over-exuberance of philosophical adventurism demonstrated by philosophies' warring sects forever in a continual state of warfare with each other conducted, I would add, too often without arming themselves with the appropriate tools of combat, or, rather, dialogue; an inability to relate through inadequate rules of debate, etc. That the same would be properly furnished through an understanding of transcendental suspensions and their implication in co-evaluational forms of interaction [and our critical appreciation of the same though the use of the same (transformationally treated) medium]! (44)

	Sections of this essay then re-visited the question what is the phenomeno-logical nature of  psychosis (and neurosis, etc.). It was argued that the inability to suspend one's 'ontological commitments' in effect created/recreated a psychotic environment for that individual. (ii)

	I recently entered into a conversation with a middle-aged woman and a linguist who were debating whether all languages might have descended from one initial language. This certainly was the thesis being strongly put forward by this neatly, well-dressed intelligent and quite articulate woman. In response the linguist stated that in his opinion her views presented a rather “fluffy” theory on the origins of language. He cited the fact that many words in one language matched another in sound and that occasionally similar sounding words even had similar meanings which without the establishment of cultural links should be treated as merely coincidental! Moreover, that between any language about four percent of words in those languages are going to sound alike by sheer chance. This woman was quite insistent that her view on language must be the correct one and cited numerous examples of her native tongue and words in a miscellany of languages from aboriginal dialects to various European languages. Now, I, personally, e.g., believe that the family of Indo-European languages do seem to have some deeper super-family resemblances with other language-families such as, e.g., Semitic languages. On the other hand, I do not believe that a particular language of recent and/or historical existence is that ur-language from which all others descended from. Without exactly stating her inner most convictions in this regard it was obvious from the vehemence that this woman held her beliefs, etc., that she thought her mother tongue was just that original language! In this regard her preferencing of her native tongue could be considered to be one of her ontological commitments, a commitment moreover that she, it seemed, was unable to distance herself from through a process of suspension. The closer one got to this unstated belief the more vehemently she would oppose, in equal measure, the apparent strengths of our critique of ‘this incontrovertible fact of her understanding of the life-world that seemed to define her very existence in this world-of-life and especially privileged her understanding of it’. This resistance experienced by myself in her refusal to even entertain this counter-possibility is an experience I have often met in dealing with the delusions promulgated by psychotic people. Moreover, as a sort of blind-spot qua hot-spot, to probe anywhere near the same was to meet with this differential degree of resistance equal to the intensity of the critique and the degree of ‘closeness’ in its targeting of that blind-spot/hot-spot. Hence this type of experience could be called a delusional resistance, a resistance that is the hallmark of a psychosis contra Freud and his apparent use of this term in relation to his concept of neurosis and the desired instigation of changes in world-view initiated by the psychoanalyst [although, in regard to the equal impossibility of shifting a neurotic person’s fears and other negative expectations (in accordance with my definition of this term ‘neurosis’) then this different type of reluctance to change might well also be regarded as a form of resistance, say an expectational resistance?]. Re-meeting this experience of delusional resistance thence alerted me to this observation that there is a profound reluctance, if not an impossibility, on the part of the psychotic person, in their being able, adequately, to suspend certain ‘committed views’ (regardless of the fact whether those beliefs were true or false; regardless of whether their arguments in sustaining those beliefs on carefully scrutiny and critical reflection should or could be judged as either valid and/or invalid). That, in effect, I was witnessing an essential feature in the phenomenon or condition of a psychosis. That, in this light, these views held by this woman in this regard, therefore, were essentially entertained in a psychotic fashion (even though this individual was not overtly psychotic)! Hence, in effect, in psychosis, the inability to properly and appropriately conduct a suspension of the object-moment will manifest itself in a non-conformity with reality (where ‘reality’ is treated in a multi-modal perspective both phenomenally and phenomenologically, i.e., as a ‘phenomenon’ that deserves to be ‘treated as a phenomenon’ through the use of transcendental suspensions, etc.). That a psychosis is essentially located in the defective treatment of the object-moment of our hermeneutic circle through this inability to conduct a transcendental suspension there to the proper degree and in an appropriate manner. This aspect of our hermeneutic circle and its overall transcendental suspension dealing with conjunctive suspensions, metaphors, reductions, retrospectivity, gestalt focus, the intentional object-state, etc. Defects in the functioning of the transcendental suspension in this aspect of the hermeneutic circle manifesting in a defective treatment of conjunctive suspensions, metaphors, etc., and, will effect the ability to conduct an overall transcendental suspension hence a psychosis has, for the psyche, detrimental ramifications for the process of judgment both locally (centred on the particular intentional object-state under gestalt focus) and globally (in terms of putting in place a proper and appropriate overall transcendental suspension along with its implications in the realization of authenticity of being through the ensuing distortion of those defective inputs into the overall process of judgment). (65)

	As already noted the primary role of therapy is the therapeutic advancement of the patient. However, in the real world the 'business' of therapy must also be taken into account. Hence the purpose of therapy can never be just the therapeutic advancement of the patient's welfare. As a result, a tension between the practicalities and economics of therapy and the primary goals of the same must be 'forever present'; that tension only subsiding and ceasing on the cessation of that therapeutic regime (through the successful realization of therapy, or, the absence or death of the patient, or, the dissolution of that therapeutic industry in part or in whole). Need this tension 'forever present' be both an indication and cause of institutional disharmony? Let me address these issues first. (71)

	This tension between the deontological goal of therapy and the pragmatics of the therapeutic process is an obvious example of a complex co-ordered collision of incommensurable value systems that on a deeper level of examination must find some form of an interaction and resolution. A philosopher may note that these two conflicting value systems may be incommensurable in theory, but, in practice, in reality, they must recognize that they cannot be non-incommensurable! That there is this existential fact of our being in this world-of-life that in this ‘world’ all conflicting value systems must be able to interact and realize some form of a complex co-ordered resolution as witnessed, e.g., by the evidence of the ongoing resolution in progress of that therapeutic process itself as it navigates means and ends! Therefore, the deontological and the pragmatical must interact and enter into a fruitful dialogue in some form or other (as a transcendental precondition for the very ‘fact’ of the therapeutic process itself to be in play). That established, we must now ask ourselves how these superficially incommensurable value systems can interact as they do in fact, and, in the same vein, how can we better conduct this type of an ongoing, interactive process of co-ordered value judgment, i.e., how can we better discriminate the ‘nature’ of that type of condition and better evaluate the therapeutic ‘character’ of that therapeutic process and, with that general and particular end in mind, how do we refine the ‘style’ of that adopted and individually adapted process of therapy? (74)

	I now move into the second part of this essay title Specifics. I start with a new definition of the therapeutic process. Focusing on the transformational nature of the therapeutic process I will very rapidly sketch out some of my intentions in this new direction of research. (iii)

	In the continuation of this essay let me now concentrate on the relative specifics of this topic “beyond therapy”. To start let me try to look beyond the specifics of predominant models in therapy and in the process look at our current motivation in these dominant and dominating directions, and, therein, closely focus on the overall and specific phenomenology of the therapeutic process. (1)

	Let me begin with this more specific refinement of my previous definition of therapy, namely, that therapy is the management of a course of transformation of a relatively adverse socio-psycho-physical condition to a state that is relatively less adverse for that person both in some particular facet(s) and in overall character, over a certain stated period of time, both theoretically and practically! (2)

	This re-definition notes that therapy is the management of a course of treatment that should work both in theory, i.e., in intentional expectation, and in practice. It is also conducted over a certain stated period, i.e., involves a period of time that is either limited or ongoing and open-ended in intent, and, applies to the improvement of both a part of the socio-psycho-physical constitution and the totality of the same. Lastly, therapy need not be absolutely effective, merely that it reduce the perceived degree of adversity experienced by an individual (or the potential adversity and its amelioration perceived in an individual by the therapist on the behalf of that patient). (3)

	What is the nature of this definition as outlined above, what motivates its explication? My intent is neither linguistic nor legal in orientation (although not without being able to contribute some input in those areas of concern). This intent is primarily phenomenological – an attempt to understand the essential features that constitute the meaning and practicalities of this particular phenomenon of ‘that which sets out to be therapeutic’. My understanding of this general topic of therapy applying to physical conditions, psychic disturbances and social/intersocial dysfunctions as implicated in the socio-psycho-physical element(s) of this definition, it not being my wish to draw an absolute distinction between these three overlapping fields of how we exist and interact in this world-of-life. Even though the therapist might concentrate on one of these three aspects correctly all three are involved in that experience of relative adversity and should be taken into account to some extent or other (even if their attention is divided unequally between them). Moreover, there is implied this phenomenal/phenomenological ‘fact’ that our therapeutic ministrations should be on the three fronts of the somatic, psychic and the co-authorial although not necessarily on an equal basis in intent, in practice and in the consequences discovered in the exercise of that particular ‘therapeutic’ process or process-type. (4)

	All philosophical concepts are foundered on the metaphorical, and, on this metaphorical ‘ground’ will ‘founder’ if utilized beyond their critical level of normal deployment! In this light, e.g., the (correlative) philosophical concepts of ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ are relatively viable if used within their normal, metaphorical terms of empirical deployment. A match lit, e.g., could be seen to be the prime cause for a particular bush fire, the individual lighter of that fire being treated as the particular causal agent whose intentionality initiated that conflagration through the act of the lighting that particular fire. An agent being treated as present when a particular action is apparently initiated by that agent that appears to result in intentionally determined consequences (to some extent or other). So in this scheme we have non-intentional causes and intentional causes. A match that spontaneously ignites should not be classed as an intentionally determined cause (of that bush fire) even though those matches were ‘designed’ to ignite (but not intended to spontaneously ignite). The difference between these two ‘causes’ is a matter of the degree of the implicated epistemological organization relatively present or relatively absent. So on this spectrum we might see the ‘consciousness’ of a stone or worm as relatively minimal whereas that of a cat or dog is relatively greater, whilst, in relative terms of reference, human consciousness is relatively much more complex. This also implies, through complexity of levels in epistemological organization, that intentionality cannot be merely an intentional field, an intentional object and an intentional ego (as per a simple reading of our hermeneutic circle [archetypally])! Only the totality of the interaction between intentional fields, between intentional object-states, between intentional egos, and, their interactions amongst themselves, establishes the overall thematized sense of that intentional state-of-affairs. Only with the sufficient presence of thematiztion can an intent, like the mere tip of an iceberg, be self-reflected upon, discussed and shared through the intentional designs of language. Please note the limited philosophical deployment of this concept of an ‘iceberg’ by virtue of the fact that an iceberg whatever its size is always visible above the surface of the ocean, whereas, an intentional state-of-affairs only comes to thematization after the necessary degree of thematic complexity/thematic density has first been reached pre-intentionally, etc. Such embryonic ‘thoughts’ being, perhaps, only pre-intentional, merely background oriented sub-intentional or residual post-intentional (as vague awarenesses of past processes of intentional simulation, e.g., connotations pre-intentionally recognized but not intentionally noted in overt consciousness and its retrospective reflection). The point I am trying to establish here is that only through intentional complexity, with the requisite thematization of density, can the intentional process proceed and arise in overt consciousness. That, moreover, only through the implication of a complex intentional field, etc., can we establish the possibility of a casual agent, as a person, who could envisage and enact a therapeutic process either with respect to themselves or some other agent or agents. Hence the concept of therapeutic management, as per our definition of a therapeutic process, necessitates the involvement of an intentional agent or agents. Now, let me examine very briefly why a causal philosophy is controversial and how it could steer itself around such a philosophical obstacle. (6)

	At this point in this paper let me merely sketch out some of my plans on how I am going to construct a more sophisticated metaphorical version of a causal philosophy, and, the implications this will have for a critical appreciation of the therapeutic process. (iv)

	The therapeutic process should be treated as just that - a process (and not as a connected and/or disconnected bundle of causes and effects)! In other words if all contributing factors are present then from this overall state of affairs a new state of affairs should evolve from the same. If x then y… The easy part of this metaphor now declared the hard part starts. I envisage a parallelism between the tripartite hermeneutic circle, as previously examined elsewhere, and the richer reality- orientated envisualization of the life-world. (v)

	Causation will be re-considered as streams or flows of causation. Combining a physical-world-oriented vision of causal process and an intentionally influenced and directed causation both of these two previous causal philosophies will then be scrapped for this combined account (in recognition of the fact, e.g., that all intentionality is an embodied consciousness as psyche in an psycho-physical organism [in a community of monadic like agents], and, all physically-oriented processed show an intentional-like behaviour in non-absolutely determinable chaotic states - the linking theoretical mechanism being a vision of epistemological organization that encompasses the extremes of non-sentience and  sentience). Also looked at will be the role of self-organization, quazi-transcendental-like mechanisms instrumental in the re-direction of causation and the implication this type of insight has for theoretical, practical and critical appreciations of the therapeutic process. (vi)

	Finally, this essay will deal with the question "How do we go beyond the current, culturally 'self-aware' appreciation, or lack of appreciation, already to hand into this overall business of therapy?" I will answer this rhetorical question by suggesting that only through a thorough suspension of all our ontological commitments, epistemological expectations, etc., can we make critical progress in this direction. That, indeed, all forms of insight are advanced through this same type of mechanism, namely, the instantiation of a thoroughly prepared and properly executed overall transcendental suspension! (vii) 

	 Noël Tointon, Sydney, 12.4.03.