A Transcendental Phenomenological Re-Reading 
Of Buddhist Yogacarin Texts

Introduction

	The title of this paper opens itself up to being mis-read in the following fashion. By a 'transcendental re-reading' we must ask ourselves whether:

i	The re-reading is conducted in a transcendental phenomenological manner, or,
ii	The re-reading is of a text that can be treated as transcendental-phenomenological in style, or,
iii	Both of the above.

	To answer this question I would like to say that the third option is the one I have in mind. However, as this paper is an introduction to this topic its pre-preparatory nature is primarily that of the second option, namely, the treatment here of Yogacarin texts as essentially transcendental-phenomenological in style. Not that these texts are meant to be purely exercises in some form of a transcendental-phenomenology, but that this re-reading is going to concentrate on an examination on what, I believe, is an essential aspect of these texts. Therefore, in this endeavour to show the transcendental-phenomenological style of this type of text, let me now introduce and briefly discuss what I attempt to achieve in this short paper.
	First, let me briefly introduce and historically situate the Yogacara School of Buddhist Philosophy.
	Second, let me quickly outline how these texts, in my opinion, have been mis-read both contemporaneously and non-contemporaneously.
	Third, let me sketch out, under a number of headings, the general nature of a transcendental-phenomenology.
	Fourth, using these headings, let me introduce the reader to a  concentrated, provisional and highly selective interpretation of the Husserlian concept of a transcendental-philosophy, and in the process, develop various aspects of this sense of vision useful for this task of re-reading about to be conducted in the next section.
	Fifth, let me sketch out how certain key terms in Yogacarin texts can be read through the lens of a transcendental-phenomenology.
	Sixth, let me conclude this 'introduction to this topic' by highlighting key points made in this exposition and noting the practical implications this type of re-reading has for our understanding of this type of text.

I.	The Historical Setting

	The founder of the Yogacara is traditionally accepted to be the rather shadowy figure of the teacher Maitreya. The new ideas on the interpretation of Buddhist thought of the former being promoted first through the brothers Asanga and then Vasubandhu some time around the fifth century A.D. There then followed a long tradition of scholarship, etc., centered in various interpretations of the Yogacara perspective in India with its transference to various countries like China and Tibet before the demise of Buddhism in the lands of its origination. 
	The primary focus of this type of religious philosophy, outside its stated goal of a soteriological intent, was on an ongoing interpretation, effectively a re-interpretation, of the meaning of what was meant in the continually enlarging corpus of Buddhist texts. This re-interpretation taking a pronounced psychological turn especially with regard to texts that, in my opinion, had already taken a transcendental turn (or re-turn) in the Prajnaparamita literature, the writings of the Madhyamika School and texts of a proto-Yogacarin complexion.

II.	The Idealistic Mis-Reading of The Yogacara

	From the beginnings of its exposition Yogacarin texts have been subjected to an idealistic mis-reading, to varying degrees, for a variety of motives not necessarily completely understood by the perpetrators of such misrepresentation. Contemporaneously with this tradition, e.g., we have the Buddhist Madhyamikan philosopher Candrakirti mis-read this type of text, conveniently I might add, as a form of idealism (vijnanavada). Then, in its transmission to China the reception of this type of text was subjected to an idealistic translation and re-interpretation. I am also sure that in the development of the Yogacara there was also perhaps the accelerated import of idealistic-like metaphor, although, as I have argued elsewhere, metaphor not treated literally need not present by themselves an idealistic re-interpretation of this type of philosophy, a style of philosophy that I perceive is essentially of a transcendental-phenomenological complexion.
	This century Hindu oriented commentators have praised this 'culmination' of Buddhist Philosophy in the form of an idealism on some form of par with the Vedantic vision of the religious world. Or, under the influence of forms of German Idealism the same positive type of recommendation has followed its mis-interpretation. Then again Western commentators, in the wake of current Tibetan scholarship, have ascribed uncritically to certain traditional forms of critique as has been preserved textually, etc. All in all a profoundly sorry state of affairs that only recently is being re-addressed through close re-readings of these texts. But, in my opinion, this process of re-evaluation needs to continue and move onto, among others, a transcendental-phenomenological phase of re-interpretation with a parallel accent upon the transcendental-hermeneutical re-interpretation of this type of text. Let me briefly examine this last comment.
	Phenomenology, the Husserlian variety, e.g., has traditionally been described as a 'descriptive phenomenology,' or 'science,' based upon the isolation and clarification of the form of phenomena as meant structures through the clarification of eidetic processes of transcendental reflection and other forms of transcendental-reduction and analysis. However, and what is relatively more controversial here, is the degree to which transcendental reflection also reveals the sense of the 'prescriptive.' Now, I don't intend here to examine this type of question but would like to state my position in this regard in the following manner. The transcendental-phenomenologist deals with phenomena that have been re-iterated, that must be re-iteratable, and to that extent, must already be for all intent, or purposes, textualized. In this regard transcendental reflection is of a 'text' whether that be a 'text' in the classical sense or of a text in the wider sense of the experience of some type of phenomenon subjected to a process of cognitive, or intellectual, preservation, i.e., textualization. Hence the transcendental-phenomenologist must also be a transcendental-hermeneut (or in theoretically oriented terms of reference a 'transcendental-hermeneuticist'). What ever the phenomenon under investigation that phenomenon must be a 'text,' in this wider sense of this term, and must be read as a text. And, in this regard, I also perceive a text in its classical sense as a phenomenon in its own right. Being intentionally structured through the dictates of an author, or a group or series of authors, that intentionally structured artifact is just as much a phenomenon (through that degree of integrity) as a natural item of focus is given a degree of integrity in our 'writing' and 'reading' of that type of text.' Now, this reading of the authored phenomenon, whether it be a 'classical text' or a 'phenomenal text,' must involve a certain combination of the descriptive and the conventionally prescriptive, and, the necessary interaction between these two aspects, in order to have a phenomenon under examination in the first place. This conventional manipulation of phenomenal content implies that a text must be perceived as a multi-layered phenomenon between a more ostensive 'text' and a less obvious 'meta-text.' The 'meta-text' being those conventions implicated, and stamped upon the text, that allow us to read that text or at least come to some degree of understanding dependent upon our awareness of these meta-textual conventions. The presentation of a simple anecdote might better illustrate this contrast between the textual and the meta-textual. 
	Imagine a piece of music written in the Baroque or Classical period  being given to a student today to 'interpret.' Conversant with Modern and Romantic conventions that person must at first read that text in the light of those later conventions, especially as that musical score seems to be in the same conventions as laid down in the Romantic period. However, a closer examination is going to suggest some degree of variance from those conventions as developed in the Romantic aesthetic and only in a becoming conversant with the differences will that student start to give that music something of the aural clothing it was, more or less, originally intended to possess, and no doubt make better sense of that text! At first the text meta-textually looks like an artifact of the Romantic ethos. But only in becoming conversant with Baroque or Classical conventions can that text be sensibly read. No doubt for historical reasons it can be read through the lens of the Romantic tradition, but such a reading cannot do justice to that type of text and can only give a deformed reading that can only find some relatively stunted degree of enjoyment before the effectively mis-informed. When we read a text much more than the text itself is perceived, namely the textual and the meta-textual. In effect this aspect of the 'meta-textual' lending itself to a framing of that text,  a titling of it, an entitling of it, an entering into it in the form of an inserted commentary (that I might add can only 'mis-read' that text being 'about' that text and not 'of' that text, but, that once that mis-reading of the text is understood as a 'mis-reading' it then allows us to effectively 'read' that text through such a 'mis-reading of the mis-reading').
	At this point let me introduce what might be meant by a 'transcendental-phenomenology' and its sense of a 'transcendental dimension,' its sense of space, region, field, place, or the character and style of its distinctive experiential significance as situated within the overall psyche of the individual person (as a facet meta-textually shared by all persons in a society, and all societies as shared by the 'human family' that therein constitutes the 'person' as 'human being' in this 'family of being').

III.	Headings for the Explication of the 'Transcendental'

	This introduction of the meaning or 'sense' of the transcendental-dimension for convenience will be conducted under a certain restricted set of headings, namely, that a sense of the transcendental is implicated through:

1.	A Certain Style of Critique of the Natural Attitude
2.	The Imposition of the Transcendental-Suspension
3.	The Articulation of a Sense of the Phenomenal
4.	Reading the Phenomenal as Intentionally Structured
5.	Read Through a Process of Noetic-Noematic Correlativity
6.	With the Implication of a Transcendental Life-World
7.	As an Implicit Critique of the Correspondence Theory
8.	With Distinctive Implications For Experiential Practice

IV.	A Brief Sketch Of Husserlian Phenomenology

	With these headings in mind let me briefly outline my my selective interpretation of the Transcendental-Phenomenology of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and my re-interpretation of this vision where relevant. Then, after my exposition of these headings, let me apply them to a brief exposition of certain key-terms in Yogacarin philosophy as found in the works ascribed to Vasubandhu, one of the most influential voices in the dissemination of this school of religious-philosophy.

1. A Certain Style of Critique of the Natural Attitude

	Admittedly, most forms of philosophy are a critique to some degree or other of the 'natural attitude.' What distinguishes the transcendental-phenomenological critique is the style of that critique some of the essentials of which are listed in the other headings, in this section, currently being discussed. 
	To describe this distinctive style of critique in general terms I would like to define it as:

A temporary, non-destructive disvaluation of the natural world, bracketed and subjected to a highly controlled degree of psychic balance in its manipulation of meaning structures and functions, and not subjected to traditional forms of devaluation as exercised perjoratively. 

	'Temporary' by virtue of the fact that the imposition of the transcendental suspension or transcendental epoché is limited in time, i.e., the brackets must eventually be lifted. This lifting of brackets, in my opinion, occurring through the transcendental suspension of the transcendental suspension itself. The sense of the expression 'transcendental suspension' will shortly be discussed in some detail. 
	'Non-destructive' in that the world is not destroyed, only the 'sense' of the world is, correctly, subjected to suspension.
	By 'disvaluation' is meant a 'process of devaluation,' rather than a 'terminated act of devaluation,' of our attitudes to the natural world in such a manner that, through processes of transcendental suspension, reduction and reconstitution, their apparent transcendental form is made self-evident (through a suppression of those features that are relatively accidental).
	By 'psychic manipulation' is implied that the suspension is enacted throughout the psyche in so far as all facets and levels of structural-function are subjected to the suspension simultaneously.
	By 'devaluation' is meant a complete de-valuation of that under examination as might be found in Gnostic forms of dualism, solipsism, skepticism, extreme forms of realism and materialism, or forms of reduction that attempt to reduce all forms of reality to some form of limited denomination be it atoms, mind, spirit, and other types of metaphysical entities, etc.
	By 'natural attitude' is meant the natural world as perceived on a day to day basis, and, forms of re-evaluation of the same through the lens of a transcendentally uncritical science, ideology, philosophy, etc.

2.	The Imposition of the Transcendental Suspension

	It must be realized from the outset that this imposition of the transcendental epoché, transcendental suspension, this use of the metaphor of bracketing is non-destructive. Our ontological commitments are frozen, put out of play, suspended and not destroyed. Moreover, I might add in the properly functioning suspension, in accordance with my re-interpretation of what is meant by the exercise of a transcendental suspension, all value commitments are put out of play be they ethical, aesthetic, pragmatic, factual, emotional or connotative, hermeneutic, etc. In this suspension, in effect, our prejudices are recognized and entertained in a form of balance with their anti-prejudices; our prejudices being recognized and welcomed as forms of introductory 'pre-judgments' relevant to that type of examination under investigation and giving us already preconstituted material to being our investigations. Our prejudices bringing us to the topic to hand, but, it is their suspension as pre-judgments that allow transcendental processes of investigation to examine the meaning-structures brought forward into such a transcendental arena. An investigative space given a transcendental complexion by virtue of the transcendental suspension with the implication that no philosophical investigations can be transcendental in nature without the central, properly conducted imposition of this transcendental suspension. Husserl describes this sense of suspension as:

In short, not just corporeal Nature but the whole concrete surrounding life-world is for me, from now on, only a phenomenon of being, instead of something that is.

	A few paragraphs later he adds:

Likewise everything 'meant' in such accepting or positing processes of consciousness (the meant judgment, theory, value, end, or whatever it is) is still retained completely - but with the acceptance-modification, "mere phenomenon".
	This universal depriving of acceptance, this "inhibiting" or "putting out of play" of all positions taken towards the already given Objective world... this "phenomenological epoche" and "parenthesizing" of the Objective world - therefore does not leave us with nothing...

	A little further on Husserl tells us that:

The fundamental phenomenological method of the transcendental epoché, because it leads back to this realm, is called transcendental-phenomenological reduction.

	In my own re-evaluative re-interpretation of the Husserlian project I like to draw a distinction between the 
transcendental suspension and the transcendental reduction, a distinction that Husserl appears somewhat to draw later on in his writings. Moreover, to this pair of 'moments' in transcendental research I like to add a third, namely, that of a sense of 'transcendental synthesis' or 'reconstitution' of the overall sense of the phenomenon under examination as an integrated and contextually dependent meaning-structure, etc. All three moments negatively, or relatively, defining each other through their collective, mutual contrast to each other.
	That without this sense of a transcendental suspension in play those philosophical, experiential investigations, etc., under investigation cannot be considered as transcendental in character or intent! Therefore it behooves me to demonstrate at some point in this paper that the Yogacarin operate in this type of transcendental-phenomenological investigation through the use of transcendental suspensions central to the fabric of their philosophical expositions.

3.	The Articulation of a Sense of the Phenomenal

	Many forms of philosophical investigation can be seen as phenomenological. Phenomena are seen as that which appear in our world of experience, as intentionally-structured phenomena-there-for-us. A variety of approaches can be adopted to help us in our treatment of experience through a phenomenological lens, e.g., analogical comparison of the world to a dream, the invocation of a healthy, non-pathological degree of suspicion, a scientific-like scrutiny of appearances, etc. All three of these approaches occur in the Yogacarin world, especially the first. In this light I would like to mention in passing the following thought-experiment proposed by Husserl.
	In Ideas I Husserl proposes the much mis-understood proposition that we could understand what it might be like if the entire world was annihilated whilst still maintaining our sense of consciousness and self-consciousness. His point is that consciousness is a 'consciousness of a something,' that that something is transcendent to the immanency of our thought processes, and, that the existence or non-existence of the reputed objective-correlative of the content of that thought process is effectively irrelevant to the indubitable nature of that process as an immanent process of thought. Indeed, this type of metaphorical illustration is also in effect an argument against the classical Correspondence Theory of Knowledge, a position also adopted by the equally mis-understood Yogacara; often for much the same sort of reasons, namely, through an idealistic mis-reading of what is correctly intended through the use of such a metaphor or analogy. Both the Yogacara and Husserl have been mis-read as idealists. In this vein I am reminded of the following comments made by Husserl (which could apply equally to those who wish to mis-read the Yogacara as some form of idealism).

If anyone reads our statements objects that they mean changing all the world into a subjective illusion and committing oneself to a "Berkeleyan idealism," we can only answer that he has not seized upon the sense of those statements.

4.	Reading the Phenomenal As Intentionally Structured

	On many occasions Husserl points to the dictum that "consciousness is a consciousness of a something," i.e., that cognitive consciousness is intentionally constructed. I believe we should be careful here, however, to leave open the possibility of other forms of consciousness, e.g., the pre-intentional, non-intentional, trans-intentional, etc. But cognitive consciousness, consciousness intellectually self-aware, does appear to be intentionally structured, possess some sense of an intentional object (or at least the illusion of an intentional object). That this intentional constitution is the primary subject matter of a transcendental style of phenomenological investigation.

5.	Read Through A Process of Noetic-Noematic Correlativity

	This intentional constitution being the subject matter of our transcendental investigation and is read, among many other methods, through a process of mutually co-defining reflection upon this noetic-noematic correlativity. Put simply, all processes of examination that involve a concentration upon structural content of the intentional object are mirrored dynamically in noetic processes or 'acts,' of intentional constitution. This parallel inspection of intentional constitution allowing us to, in effect, check our investigations and give some degree of relative confirmation to the results of those investigation since this process of correlativity co-determines those processes and hence those current processes of investigation.

6.	The Implication of a Transcendental Life-World

	In this type of research a life-world is implied. An experiential, intersubjective world of meaning structures whose adopted conventions are co-defined meta-textually and intersubjectively or 'socially,' and, adapted textually and subjectively. A necessary realm of transcendental being that equally transcends and immanently supports a world of life shared intentionally by all other intentionally co-responding individual beings. A world that, in effect, can have no sense of the inner and outer, the internal and the external, the purely 'mine' or purely 'yours,' etc. And in this light living proof that a Correspondence Theory of Knowledge is not only redundant but also wrong and illogical (except in a vague metaphorical sense) and, thereby, totally unnecessary.

7.	The Implicit Critique of the Correspondence Theory

	As just stated the sense of the life-world is seen as antithetical to a Correspondence Theory that classical states that 'our mental representations are copies of the objects in an external world of sense.' How do we know this?  As the theory stands there is no way we can stand outside our experience to experience that this state of correspondence is actually the ways things have been merely imputed to be! The Yogacara have taken just such a position and have been severely misunderstood in the process.

8.	Distinctive Implication For Experiential Practice

	Lastly, for completeness, I would like to add that, contrary to much criticism of the transcendental project, this type of research has many distinctive ramification for existential practice, e.g., in the fields of ethics, personal responsibility, pragmatics, etc. However, I will merely mention, in passing, some comments under this heading in the Conclusion of this paper.

V.	A Transcendental-Phenomenological Re-Reading of 
					Key Yogacarin Terms and Concepts

	Using the first seven of these headings let me briefly introduce and examine various key expressions used by Vasubandhu in this type of religious-philosophical text.

1.	The Transcendental Critique of the Natural Attitude

	The sense of the 'attitude of the natural world' is effectively paralleled in these texts by the traditional Buddhist term of samsara. This realm is often described as a world of relativity, subject to change, the subject of desire, the imagined, etc. In contrast we have the expression of nirvana which, with much caution, could be read as of the 'realm' of the transcendental, with the proviso, 'that from the point of view of nirvana there be no ontological difference between the realm of samsara and the realm of nirvana,' only a difference in epistemological perspective. The transcendental realm of nirvana (lokottara) being described as inexpressible (anabhilapya) and only experienced by the Buddhas. However, at this stage it would not be advisable to make any direct linkage, either unqualified or qualified, between the Husserlian concept of the 'transcendental' and the Buddhist expression of 'nirvana.'

2.	The Imposition of the Transcendental Suspension

	The prime candidate for the investigation of the presence or absence of a transcendental suspension in this category of text would be the expression vijnaptimatra and its equivalents cittamatra, prajnaptimatra and vijnanamatra.
	The compound is ended with the word 'matra' which normally has the meaning of 'measure, size, number, quantity, etc., but with the conventional meaning at the end of compounds of 'nothing but,' 'merely' or 'only.' I might add that this word appears to share a common linguistic root with our words of 'measure' and 'mere.'
	The words vijnapti, citta, prajnapti and vijnana all have a connection to consciousness, mental phenomena, psychological states of cognitive function, etc.
	Now a correct reading of this term, in an epistemological context, should see a meaning suggestive of 'mere consciousness,' 'mere phenomena,' 'mind only,' etc. The idealists, or those who wish to give this term an idealistic interpretation, mis-reading this expression, and allied expressions, as 'a reality that is nothing but consciousness,' 'nothing but mind only,' etc. A reading that is contradicted by these texts in their recognition of the sense of the inexpressible (anabhilapya) experientially entertainable by the Buddhas and other enlightened beings, etc. Moreover, and more important, the epistemological orientation of the context of these texts automatically rules out an ontological reading along these lines. 
	This reading of this expression vijnaptimatra as mere consciousness, etc., reminds me of a short section of text I would like to quote from Husserl, "Ideas I."

...the whole spatio-temporal world, which includes human being and the human Ego as subordinate single realities is, according to its sense, a merely intentional being, thus one has the merely secondary sense of a being for a consciousness. ...can be determined and intuited only as something identical belonging to motivated multiplicities of appearance: beyond that it is nothing.

	What 'is beyond' for Husserl is a 'countersensical thought' as he adds in two corrections of this text namely in Copy A and Copy D.
	What corresponds with that 'beyond' is effectively that which cannot be experienced, hence the fundamental critique of the Correspondence Theory and his emphasis on 'one' life-world of experience, collectively shared and experienced by all agents, albeit from the point of view, points of view, of those participating subjects, etc.

3.	The Sense of the Phenomenal

	Reasonably obvious from the use of such expressions as vijnaptimatra, etc., in this sense of 'mere presentation,' is the fact that in these texts the world of the natural attitude, i.e., samsara, is, in effect, re-perceived and treated as phenomenal, as a series of phenomenal presentations intentionally structured in their constitution by the mind of the intentional subject.

4.	Reading the Phenomenal as Intentionally Structured

	In these texts the constitution of the intentional construction of phenomena is expressed through the complex term of grahya-grahaka-vikalpa, i.e., the 'discrimination between the graspable and the grasper.' This process of intentionality being seen as that occurring and between and through the two poles of 'that which appears to be grasped' and 'that which appears to act as grasper.' Moreover, this act of discrimination is conducted in such a manner that 'there can be nothing  grasped' without 'there being the act of an apparent grasper,' and vice versa. The correlativity of this noematic-noetic reading of intentionality mirroring the Husserlian invocation of a 'noetic-noematic correlativity.'

5.	Intentional Read Through Noetic-Noematic Correlativity

	As indicated this noetic-noematic reading of the intentional has the important implication for the Yogacara that without 'a grasper there can be nothing grasped,' and vice versa, etc. Hence there can not be in intentionally constructed experience an experience of the thing-in-itself, nor of a thing-for-itself, in the presented form of that phenomenal constitution as treated in any classical sense of these terms, or their Sanskrit equivalents, as proposed by various non-critical, non-transcendental styles in philosophical exposition. Hence the sense of 'self' and the sense of the  intentional 'object' extrapolated beyond this conventional usage, qua conventional usage, in the natural attitude can create nothing other than a sense of a transcendental illusion, the creation of a realm of the purely imaginary (parikalpita), along with all the karmic consequences of such a misplaced identification, emotional clinging and rejection, desire for or against, the non-transcendental exercise of our `motivation.'

6.	Implication of a Transcendental Life-World

	Such a style in philosophical exposition demands the recognition of some sense of 'a transcendental world-of-life,' or 'life-world.' Acceptance that there can be no absolutely distinct sense of empirical ego or subject and equally no distinct sense of intentional object, or object correlate, means nothing more than the phenomenological fact that in empirical experience there can be no absolute dichotomy between subject and object, and, moreover, that there equally can be no absolute dichotomy between one subject and some other subject (or one set of subjects and any other set of subjects). The ramifications of this 'position,' or rather a transcendentally suspended sense of position, are quite rightly profound and most certainly need to be taken into account in our re-reading of this type of text. Although a re-reading of this type of transcendental exposition must take into account that the style of this type of text is overtly or covertly critical of various instances and aspects of the Correspondence Theory of Knowledge it is not enough to finish one's appreciation at this point and not realize that this type of text is also an exercise in a transcendental phenomenology with, or without, soteriological consequences re-written in keeping with the transcendental complexion of such a text! I would like to note here that I would like to criticize Kochumutton's explication of the texts of Vasubandhu in this regard. His criticisms of idealistic misinterpretations of these texts, and, his exposition that these texts fundamentally criticize the Correspondence-type of Theory are excellent, clear and most admirable. However, it would be wrong of him to both stop there in his explication and at the same time turn round and try to demonstrate that some form of a pluralistic realism was also present. Without doubt Buddhist prejudices seem to favour that type of naive religious gloss on the empirical world, and that this prejudice may well be resurrected after the imposition of a transcendental suspension (although I doubt it, except in those parts of the text the provisional, non-critical treatment of the natural world as normally understood by the audience of that text is allowed to enter). 
	During the imposition of a transcendental suspension no position can be taken literally. The initially suspended, or bracketed position, can only be exercised metaphorically and/or rhetorically, and then as one subjected to a thorough suspension.
	In general terms what important ramifications can we expect to see flowing from a transcendental critique of the Correspondence Theory, the natural attitude, the intentional constitution of phenomena, etc. Much as I would like to answer that here let me postpone the delineation of such a summary, leaving the existential ramification we might expect from such an explication for the Conclusion of this essay, and therein merely pointing out why a re-reading of this type of text, whether Yogacarin or Husserlian, or some other, can or might expect to see in this regard. And why a transcendental re-reading should move into a more practical arena and not stop at the discovery of a critique of a correspondence-type of theory, etc!

7.	Critique of the Correspondence Theory

	Vasubandhu criticizes the natural attitude and especially those views that fall within the confines of a correspondence type of theory. In numerous places within his short list of treatises, generally accepted as by him, we find statements that appeal to arguments from 'the analogy to various forms of illusion.' E.g., at the very beginning of the Vimsatika in the first verse we find the statement:

It is all mere representation of consciousness (vijnaptimatra), 
Because there is the appearance of non-existent objects;
Just as a man with a cataract sees hairs, moons, etc., which do not exist in reality.

	In the next few verses we are presented with various counter arguments as to why it is believed, in effect, we have and can see extra-mental objects. These objections hinge on the need for time and place to be present, the need for subjectivity and objective-intersubjectivity of experience, physical effectiveness of actions and causes, etc. Vasubandhu replying through the use of analogies from dreams, and from the conceivability of certain mythological situations, that it was perfectly possible to have such experiences without the reputed presence of such imputed extra-mental objects. That, therefore, there was no need for such redundant, and impossibly perceivable, entities, and, that all we needed was these 'mere representations of consciousness' already present. The obviously infelicitous use of this English expression 'representations,' often used to translate this key-term of vijnaptimatra, leaving open the question as to whose side the translator might be on - the side of the non-Correspondence Theory in approach or the side of the Correspondence Theory itself? Moreover, the fact that this type of critique is discussed almost entirely in an epistemological-psychological framework must rule out any direct ontological re-interpretation that might be invoked to mis-represent this type of text as some form of idealism.
	We could ask of these texts, "What can be entertained in experience?" In reply we find the response, "Nothing but consciousness," i.e., phenomena intentionally constituted by-us for-us without the guarantee of any actual ontological correlates. Indeed, there being nothing other than the reality, or suchness (tathata) of this transcendental life-world there can not be experienced any such so called 'cor-responding ontological correlatives.' Such entities could not be known and, moreover, such entities could not be found to exist, certainly not exist as that intentionally con-situated as that-there-for-us.

VI.	Conclusion

	Let me now conclude this brief pre-preparatory and introductory transcendental re-reading of Yogacarin texts, at least as represented in the works of Vasubandhu. 
	In this paper I have attempted to show very quickly that a transcendental re-reading of this type of text makes sense, indeed reveals (in a flood of hermeneutic excess) much of the meaning and meaningfulness of this type of text. Indeed, that we have at least the makings of a prima facie case that the Yogacarin texts are productively amenable to a transcendental-phenomenological re-reading.
	As shown I have demonstrated that this type of religious philosophy is, indeed, in keeping with the general nature of a transcendental-phenomenological philosophy, and along with that there is a profound critique of the natural attitude, an articulated sense of the phenomenal, a reading of the phenomenal as intentionally structured, a reading that can also be conducted through processes of a noetic-noematic correlativity, the recognition of the all encompassing embrace of one transcendental Life-World (read with the suspension of all ontological commitments and all other senses of value, etc.) and a thorough critique of Correspondence-types of theoretical explication. In my eighth heading I also alluded to the existential implications of such a philosophy in experiential terms of reference. 
	Obviously, and with no doubt, we could say that this type of Yogacarin text sets out a soteriological format for the religious person to follow. However, along the way so to speak, this type of philosophical exposition also re-interprets various experiential aspects and functions of the psyche that are more immediately recognizable and approachable. Moreover, I would like to regard these existential and experiential consequences as generally present, either implicitly or explicitly, in all types of text that invoke a central and profound use of the transcendental suspension in order to reveal the sense of the transcendental dimension. The transcendental dimension being a realm of experience, in my opinion, that is superimposed, to some extent, on that realm of the psyche that concerns itself primarily with acts of judgment. The purified experiences centered in such an aspect of the psyche may well be open to mystical influences, or religious or religious-like experiences, or perhaps merely the door to the same, other than this qualification, and suspension, I perceive the transcendental perspective to focus merely on that aspect of the psyche that deals with judgment qua 'acts of judgment.' Now in this light of a distinction between 'acts of judgments' and 'judgments as delivered cognitively and retrospectively,' I believe we can see certain, distinct, experiential expressions of the former that might be classified, classically, as characteristically existential in scope. That, in essence, a transcendental-existential philosophy might be formulated that concentrated on the representation and re-presentation of transcendentally oriented and purified acts of judgment. In this type of research I believe certain enfreeing existential hallmarks can be discovered in the midst of the transcendentally purified act of judgment that emphasize a sense of personal and inter-personal response and responsibility, and, therein discover a sense of freedom wherein we can appropriately exercise or not exercise a sense of free choice, etc. Now I make this rather unorthodox comment to note that in the Yogacarin texts there is a profound emphasis on karmic motivation, its purification, etc., and that this type of enterprise quite naturally follows from the transcendental style of enterprise therein that appears to be undertaken. And that to miss this aspect is also to enter equally into a profound mis-reading of these texts. A mis-reading, like all mis-readings, that does not have the advantage of being seen as a mis-reading. But that when seen as a mis-reading then allows us, through 'the mis-reading of that mis-reading,' to then continue in an even closer re-reading of that text. A re-reading that, correctly, should also be conducted in a transcendentally- critical hermeneutical frame of reference; a dimension of research entered and maintained through the thorough ongoing imposition of the transcendental suspension. That an exposition of this new subject of the 'implied existentially experiential' must, however, be conducted elsewhere.
	In grappling with this type of text, or any other profound, existentially rich text for that matter, a sense of meaning and meaningfulness is often entertained above and beyond the close reading of that text as a mere text. For me one of the pleasures I have realized in a reading of these Yogacarin texts is a simultaneous realization of the progress and lack of progress in the advancement of philosophy in our very own century. It is both comforting and discomforting to find that one and a half thousand years ago, e.g., the same philosophical forms of critiques as evidenced in our own era being thoroughly discussed and richly re-interpreted, argue for and against, etc. Discomforting in the fact that it is only through a re-discovery of the sense of the transcendental, a critique of the Correspondence Theory, etc., that we can then turn round and more closely re-read these types of text. Without the re-creation of the appropriate hermeneutic 'glasses,' so to speak, we can not see these texts for what they are and that this insight has a salutary effect on any dogmatism that might be enunciated by myself or anyone else in their apparently critical re-reading of texts. That ultimately it is in the experience, and the re-experience, and the critical reflection upon a hermeneutical excess revealed in our research that allows us to continue with some degree of satisfaction and confidence in our investigations. My confidence in transcendental research being encapsulated in the following dictum:

	That hermeneutic success is realized through
	the realization of an hermeneutic excess!

				Noël Tointon, Sydney University, 21.7.95