Does Philosophy Have Anything to Say? – With Apologies to Wittgenstein

	Many people might think that philosophers say too much! Moreover, the cacophony of their many voices, along with the various equivocations of individual philosophers, has led a long list of people, even philosophers themselves, to note, often to lament, this continual ‘scandal of philosophy.’ What prestige, privilege can philosophy abrogate to itself when the edifice of philosophy is nothing but a house divided, an institution that cannot raise itself above the ground of common opinions and all the interminable conflicts found therein?

	As such a ‘divided house’ could philosophy, metaphorically personified, speak with one voice, even speak at all?

	Others, no doubt, would argue, for some of the reasons as noted, that philosophy has, indeed, nothing to say! It may make a lot of noise, publish lots of texts, cause floods of criticism to arise in waves of secondary texts, be found in numerous paper jams in photocopiers, be found clogging up much of the precious fabric of cyber-space, ultimately, many people would argue it should be found wanting, as having nothing to say above and beyond the pompous voice of its own vacuous pronouncements! 

	For different reasons, I will argue that philosophy, through the mouths and pens of philosophers as philosophers, in truth has nothing to say! 

	To support this contention I would like to argue that philosophy, correctly, can only ‘show,’ and, that this textual act of showing itself can be seen, under ideal conditions, to be itself a ‘valid or invalid act of showing.’ A showing of the ‘superficial logical form’ of the argument through various tricks of the trade that create, or rather re-create, moments of insightfulness, or at least, apparent insightfulness into the situation-to-hand under philosophical consideration! 

	In essence an act of ‘saying’ is the textual representation of various factual-like-states-of-affairs that may or may not be correct representations of the so-called reality-of-these-matters.

Then, true to form, as a philosopher, I too will deconstruct! Hopefully, not too quickly or visibly, by arguing that there is a special sense in which philosophy too can be seen to say, to speak, namely, to utter so-called ‘philosophical truths.’ For example that the ‘whole is experienced as richer than the mere sum of its parts,’ ‘that a tautology is true under all relevant circumstances’, ‘that it is wrong to murder someone just because you are having an argument with them,’ etc., etc.

	Of course we might not agree with such a list! Then, others might like to argue that even a list of synthetic, non-analytical, propositions that seem to offer us existential insights into the nature of reality is just as vacuous as normal philosophic speech. Many people might also argue that the philosophic use of language is far from normal! That the philosophic use of language invites distortions in that language causing distortions even in out thinking therein creating philosophical problems which further distort the use of language, etc.

	Would I be correct in saying that ‘usual’ speech involves an act of saying? “Hi there, how are you,” e.g., is a polite inquiry as to your health? “The weather is hot, isn’t it?” e.g., is a sharing of the observation that the weather is hot, etc.

	On the other hand a rhetorical question that asks ‘what is health,’ ‘what is hot weather’ might be construed as asking either for a scientific investigation and explanation or a philosophic investigation and explanation? In the former we seek to say what it means for health to be in place, for the weather to be considered as hot. In the latter mode we seek to understand the essential nature of health, weather, etc., and what meaning and meaningfulness is there for us to be found in such an inquiry. To attempt this task we must find the appropriate language to model the phenomenon in question and through the use of metaphorical-like images construct a process that lets us insightfully analogue the very nature of that in question. Or at least to re-constitute a simulation of the essential nature of that under examination in such a manner that other people too can share in this re-creation of insight! In effect an illuminative focusing on the matter to hand, in the midst of our common, general, experience in the hope that others too can re-realize the nature of that being philosophically shown, pointed out, but, not directly said! Then, hopefully, like a puzzle that has just been solved, we find ourselves ‘seeing’ the answer in a spontaneous burst of insight, a moment of deep and seemingly indubitable-like understanding. A discovery of meaning in a text beyond our mere reading or our mere hearing of it!

	In this light we might say metaphors show but do not say. A group of metaphors, properly used, showing the ‘point’ of the philosophical exercise. A bit like being told a joke when suddenly we find ourselves understanding the humorous nature of the punch-line, directly re-experiencing the point seemingly intended by that joke.

	But can we escape the use metaphor in acts of saying? With the implication that all reports must, therefore, take place in a process of showing rather than in an act of mere telling. We might say the weather is hot, namely, 48 degrees. Our thermometer revealing a certain length of mercury that represents in a 1:1 relationship, through appropriate calibration, the current temperature; finding this representation of the temperature by reading the scale. To that extent it ceases to be a metaphorically oriented act and instead a literal act of saying. We see that it is 48 degrees, we read this length of mercury to mean that the current temperature is hotter that 47 degrees, etc.

	Philosophically we might note that in hot weather people say “they are melting and that they are sticking to their clothes and items of seating, etc.” But strictly speaking, not in keeping with a literal reading of the metaphor, we do not expect to see people actually ‘melting’ in front of us nor ‘strongly glued’ to their clothes, etc.

	Metaphor, when used in a basic, metaphorical mode, analogically ‘images’ how ‘that phenomenon appears or how it is to be experienced.’ When we see the point of the image then we come to an understanding of the point of such an act of showing. In this light I would like to argue, with apologies to Wittgenstein, that much of philosophy is involved in such acts of showing. Indeed, as a consequence, is more involved in ‘how we are to interpret’ a certain phenomenon.  By implication ‘showing’ is therefore relatively ‘meta-textual’ in orientation.

	So we might say that to the extent that philosophy is ‘reflecting’ on an act of saying its primary orientation must be involved in an act of showing. Of course, something must be said, but, it is the case, that ‘that which is being said’ is not the raison d’etre of this exercise. In being philosophical the point of the text is to show, illustrate some insight the text would like us to focus on and, eventually, share in. This type of text usually suggesting that we should find ourselves equally convinced as to the validity of the argument illuminated by the sequence of metaphors used in that text to set up, provoke, resolve and therein impart the primary ‘point’ of that text. By these means we come to feel that we are re-realizing the intentions of the author. Authorial intent becoming manifested through properly and appropriately constructed processes of repetition.

	But no philosopher can speak alone to themselves. Being philosophical is a genre of activity already articulated by the culture, and cultures, that person finds themselves immersed within. Because each culture has its own sense of ethos means that each of us must react with respect to that ethos in either a positive or negative manner in a piece meal fashion. Only escaping it, finding a limited sense of freedom, through our powers of being able to re-interpret it. Being impregnated within the fabric of this emplacement-of-ourselves-in-society are the existential truths that seem to shape that culture. Like a fish out of water we cannot escape this milieu without our cultural death! The death of all thought and of all saying! We can only re-interpret this edifice of meaning and meaningfulness in part, and, in this act of re-direction, it would seem that the philosopher might then have something to say but only after such acts of showing! ‘Special acts of saying’ that can only be found illuminated through these prior acts of showing? But have I said too much? Have I said enough? Have I said anything at all? Have I been able to show you what I mean?

	Therefore let us ask ourselves these questions: “Does philosophy, does the philosopher, have anything to say? What does the philosopher really do? What value might be found in the textual activity of a philosopher? Should we not just dismiss the work of a philosopher as an elusive and deceptive chimera?”	
					
							       Noël Tointon, Sydney, 6.10.00.