Keynote Address: Personal 'Identity':
From Theories of Self to the Problem of Philosophical Identity

	The idea of the self is problematic for philosophy. In the world of everyday life the idea of the self itself is not perceived as problematic. We are who we are and get on with the chores and rituals of our existence and enjoy the pleasures we are permitted to find and suffer the sufferings that life seems to throw at us. We exist with a set of identifying characteristics given to us at birth, in growing up we acquire a number of skills and in adult life we take up or give up occupations and preoccupations that further define us. To this extent the idea of the self is not problematic. But let a philosopher loose among a group of capable individuals and we end up with intellectual mayhem. Perhaps Plato should have banned the philosophers from his Republic rather than the poor poets whose prosody only sought harmony.

	Why is the idea of the self problematic for philosophy?! What appears to be understood in the market place becomes problematic on its edge. For a start we have some perfectly respectable gentlepersons telling us the self is all, is everything - through transcendental subjectivity the meaning of the world is constituted for-us by-us. On the other hand, we have some other perfectly respectable gentlepersons telling us that there is no self, no world, no ‘causal’ processes, no ground of being… that can be viewed, if they could be viewed, from a so-called 'absolute point of view', that, in essence, as no things exist as designated one should be a nihilist. Then, others preach that we are merely ‘bodies’, whilst even in the same room, others preach we are only ‘minds’. Then, other voices tell us we are both ‘bodies and minds’, or, ‘bodies and minds and spirits’ whilst others ponder whether they should also add ‘soul’ to one of these lists. In the madness of this interminable babble the psychiatrist only throws proverbial fat on this verbal conflagration by declaring the self as composite - id, ego and superego, or, potentially multiple as in multiple personalities, or, as only a cultural artefact manufactured by communities within communities within communities… Help!

	It is fair to say today, therefore, that when a group of philosophers are in the same room together that ensuing proceedings may not be good for your mental health and so the following warning has been posted: Beware - Philosophers At Work! However, as most of us are aware of what is meant by the phenomenological expression transcendental suspension then, from to time to time, we have no excuse not to adopt and practise the same, for the benefit of our mental health, and, subsequently we should suspend our ontological commitments (and our preferred epistemological perspectives) if only to temporarily admire the folly of others... or that committed by ourselves in a less transcendentally balanced moment.

	Why have I chosen this title, this topic of Personal 'Identity'? Well, it does cover a multitude of sins, and, I am sure much of the research we are engaged in could be re-presented in the light of this type of problematic. For a few paragraphs let me sketch out what I have been up to for the last couple of years and show why I am finding the concept of self, as an elusive object of philosophical scrutiny, to be problematic.

	I am currently engaged in writing two series of essays, one in the field of psychology and the other in the field of theology. To date I have written about eight essays in each of these fields. 

In the first set, on psychology, I am intrigued by the problem of deception and self-deception. How can we deceive others and how can we deceive ourselves? In order to answer this simple question, "how is deception possible?" I have endeavoured to prepare myself for its resolution by a critique of Freud and a critique of Freud's critics, I have looked into psychosis, neurosis, I have noted a new 'illness' called ‘stasis’ (where there is a lack of adaptability and an extreme routinization of personal existence), and have examined from a co-authored perspective the hysterical like conditions of multiple personalities, alien abductions, repressed memories, hypnotic states, etc. Soon, I hope to be able to be in a position where I will be able to answer this question "how is one able to practice deception, especially self-deception?" The answers that I am piecing together will involve a re-looking at this problematic concept of self, not just from a psychological point of view but also from a philosophical point of view. It would seem, from my research to date, that the self is not a just unitary artefact of embodied consciousness but also appears to have a composite character as well, indeed, appears to organize an internal dialogue between various senses of self that normally cooperate to a degree that is unproblematic for the 'individual'. But I am not able to say much more than that at this point in time.

	In the second series of papers I am subjecting the idea of ‘God’ to as rigorous a philosophical scrutiny as possible. In a crisis of faith, or possibly to forestall one, I have decided to investigate what merit a theological point of view has in this very secular, hyper-commercial world of ours. I have been pleasantly surprised that the concept of the ‘Divine’ could be both a viable proposition and a relevant proposal. Whether it is a true picture of the cosmos is another question. 

	I am Westerner by birth who has been deeply influenced by Buddhist thought from about the age of thirteen. At the age of five or six I decided I was a Christian but by the age of fifteen I found I could not be both a Buddhist and 'go to church'. Only recently have I been able to make sense of both my Buddhist and my Western ways of seeing the world. I have integrated both though a philosophical lens I would call a positive nihilism. However, yet to be integrated are any residual theological aspirations. Hence this philosophical research program Finding a Place for the Idea of God. To date only a 'process vision' of the Divine would seem to make sense, a vision quite different in many ways from an orthodox 'understanding' of the Divine. Currently I am examining what relevance such a religious concept could have, or rather, what relevance in the 'here and now' this type of idea might possess. Indeed, if religious thinking cannot satisfactorily engage with the 'here and now' and  will not cease to be over-preoccupied with the 'before' and the 'hereafter' it is quite conceivable that organized religious thinking is just not going to be found relevant by most people of all persuasions. Again, contrary to my sceptical expectations, I seem to be making some progress here too. But the 'religious' merit or otherwise of this philosophical research is not for me to judge. I am merely interested in seeing if I can better integrate my thinking and not find my psyche divided into watertight compartments dealing with a miscellany of topics that don't, indeed, cannot speak to each other or would allow me to speak as 'one person', not that that objective is, I believe, absolutely obtainable. The sense of person must always remain an arena of conflicting interests, beliefs and practices to some extent or other. Elements of discontinuity that make for a more interesting experience of one's own self and that of some other person or persons…?

	In the writing of these two sets of papers I am continually travelling from one to the other. One of the interconnecting threads has been my continuing research into metaphor. How does metaphorical thinking figure in a religious context? When are we allowed to think metaphorically and not think metaphorically as philosophers. Then, again, it would seem in a psychological sphere that defects in metaphorical thinking come to the fore in psychotic states of being. So, when someone tells us there is ‘a hole in their stomach’ and they insist there is a ‘hole’ there, that their stomach does not exist, etc., it would seem that a metaphor is being mistreated in a literal mode. Or, if someone tells us that they are the Virgin Mary, Jesus Christ, Louis the XIVth or someone else that is impossible for them to be, or, that they possess 10,000,000 bucks in the bank (and they don’t), that they are a friend of the Prime Minister John Howard (and have never met), that they have been abducted by aliens many times (and that was most likely not the case) or something else that we suspect is not in conformity with reality then we must suspect, indeed, expect, alas, the faulty treatment of a metaphor is present in the context of a psychotic or psychotic-like state of affairs.

	In the course of writing these papers I am also finding a number of other intersections. Moreover, both fields are asking me to question and re-question the nature of self-identity, indeed, furthermore, force me to ask myself where do I stand as a philosopher in this much divided world of the philosopher. Even to question whether we have a philosophical sense of identity given the Postmodern critique launched against Modern philosophy and other variants of a Postmodern complexion. In the Contemporary era I am forced to ask myself can this ‘philosophic scandal of western Philosophy’ be commercially allowed to persist in our hallowed halls of academia? When we hire philosophers, I can hear these Postmodern bureaucrats say, we find no unanimity of voice, no hegemony of practice… only a continual shouting match, however polite, without result, without purpose, without sense. We must cut off their funding… at least confine such mispractices to a Cultural Studies Department, or worse, let them look at these things in the Literature Department… or in Sociology (where they enjoy playing around with fashionable philosophies from the Continent).

	Of course, I am not suggesting that our august assembly will solve these problematic issues of the self, certainly not in one conference, but, I do hope, we will have a lot of fun amicably looking into how this chameleon of the ‘self’ is able to cause so much (more) perplexity for the (non-transcendental) philosopher (the type of philosopher who does not operate from the point of view of a transcendental suspension). Therefore, with short papers, lots of discussion and critical reflection, and some good food and drink, let us turn this conference into a symposium where our first toast must be to the 'self', what ever it is or is not! “Hail/Hale to the ‘self’”… Let this intellectual banquet now proceed with this general, hydra-headed philosophical problem of personal identity in the hope that one day it will no longer perplex us…?  Avanti!

					          Noël Tointon, Leura, (19.10.02)/10.11.02.				

Recent Bibliography of Papers in the Fields of Psychology and Theology

Psychology – A Set of Six Essay on Miscellaneous Topics in Psychology
0. (Introductory Essay) Psychiatric Dis(-)ease.*
1. Freudian Myths.*
2. A Provisional Topology of Psychosis Revisited.
3. On the Existence or the Non-Existence of the Neurotic Condition (& the Stasic 
4. An Exploration of Co-Authored Phenomena:			        Condition?)?
Introduction: Co-Authored Phenomena - Brief Account.
Part I: Reflections on Freud, Freud's Critics, Recovered Memories and Hysteria.*
Part II: Examining the Distinctive Phenomenology of Co-Authored Phenomena.
Part III: Examining the Phenomenology of Virtual Co-Authored Phenomena. 
Part IV: Overview - Alien Abductions: Have You Been Taken? (And a General 
5. Deception and Self-Deception. (Not started)	            Examination of Hysteria)
6. Beyond Therapy...? (Not started) 

Theology - Finding a Place for the Idea of God (In Ten Essays?) 
Part I - Is there a Phenomenological Way of Doing Theology??*
Part II - Is there a Hermeneutical Way of Doing Theology??*
Part III - Is there an Existential Way of Doing Theology??* 
Part IV - Process Philosophy - From Physics to Theology??*
Part V - Does Theological Difference Make Any Difference?? 
Part VI - What Relevance Does Positive Theological Difference Possess??
Part VII - On Love of the Divine - Subjective and/or Objective Genitive(s)??
Abridged Version of Papers IV-VII and an Introduction to Paper VIII 
Brief Working Paper: Overview of Papers IV-VII and Introduction to Paper VIII 
Part VIII - On Continuing and Extending the 'Divine Conversation' ?? (Not started) 
Part IX - A Possible Ontology of the Divine - How Does the Divine Manifest 
     Themselves?? (Not started)
Part X - Overview or Oversight - On the 'Death' of God?? (Not started)