In Authentic Space - Part II

A Set of Monographs/Sketches for a Series of Thought-Experiments for an Eventual Second Paper

1.   Time – Why The Arrow of Time is One-way.

There is this problem – why is the arrow of time one-way when in thought it is possible to conceive of time going backwards?

	The resolution of this problem, I believe, is found in a recognition of the fact that different metaphors are utilized for dealing with time and these become confused and uncritically interlaced! Let us look at three ways of metaphorically analoguing the ‘flow’ and ‘nature’ of (various types of) time. I will do this through the following three orders, each later one being dependent on the previous one, etc. (along with a super fourth order that links all three at the same time).

First Order Time

	Let us conceive the flow of time, in the most primitive terms possible, as the transmission through three dimensional space of information emitted from a certain point, or region of that space. That information is radiated, when unhindered, in all directions from that point-region at the speed of light; at the varying speed light travels through that medium into which that information is allowed to radiate. We then have the time that information is created at and the point in space/time that receives that same information, an interval dependent on the distance traveled by that part of the light-wave (or energy wave dependent on the speed of its propagation). If we ‘see’ that information traveling in time outwards from its point of origination then time obviously cannot go backwards, certainly not in such a manner as to proceed that initial point of origination. Hence the arrow of time has one direction and only one direction in this sense. Moreover, it makes no sense to speak about that information being propagated before its time of origination.

Second Order Time

	With a flow of information in first order time we see (the illusion of) a succession of time moments (regardless of whether we see those ‘moments’ as artificial or natural in nature). ‘Later’ happens ‘after’ something that happened ‘earlier.’ This second order of time is seen through the lens of a linear metaphor. On this ‘line’ we can demarcate a moment of received origination and later points of information flowing past that original point in time (as perceived in fact or theoretically) whilst that information is then seen as ‘enduring’ through some form of recognition of a transformational invariance which then gives the (illusion of a) sense of ‘duration.’ In this second order of time we can have subdivisions of this line image, regulated in terms of some natural phenomenon (the length of the day, etc.), that differentiate a certain moment of origination, or received origination of information, and its perceived semblance of duration

Third Order Time

	In third order time we allow ourselves to imaginatively migrate along that line upon which time is to be differentiated for us. This migration, in either direction, is accomplished transcendentally and non-empirically, i.e., in consciousness that is trans-empirical in orientation; i.e., in imaginative and speculative consciousness; entertaining possibilities of a relative ‘historical’ sense of past, present and/or future that are not directly influenced by our current empirical perceptions of the world. In this sense of time we seem to overcome the one-way direction imposed by this first order ‘arrow of time.’ As a consequence time travel in this order of time is hence virtual and not real or actual (in emprical terms of reference). If time-travel is in fact something that can be ‘realized’ then it must also take place in virtual terms of reference (otherwise we will be contradicting this ‘arrow of time’ that grounds its transcendental possibility through a relatively fundamental format of its first order of expression). 
We still have one problem though with respect to the possibility of time-travel back into the past. In accordance with my principle that there can be no pure identity and that all identity is correlative in nature (both ontologically and epistemologically) it follows that as no pure, non-correlative identity can be thought in complete isolation it follows that the concept of potentiality, and its correlative of actuality, neither modalities can then be thought, or found, in a pure form. Hence the possibility of being able to go back in time in a third order sense must also admit to the actual possibility of the same! Hence the obligatory virtualness of time travel, if it was found possible, must also admit to its interactive nature as well? By what means are we to dialectically resolve this conundrum with out implying an interactive form of time travel into the past (or future)? One way would be to say that the past, present and future are already present in each and every moment of time and in their own collective way control, influence or alter the onging first order of time as expressed in and through the course of that process of causation. So in this sense past, present and future are in each and every time moment to begin with. That, indeed, by these means we have the effectiveness of causation being able to take place! Hence a fourth order of time can also be proposed - a sense that transcends, and is immanent to, these linear senses of the temporal. I would argue that all three orders of time are interrelated by virtue of the fact that each later one can be derived from a preceding one. That the third order can also be seen to be the transcendental grounds for the possibility of the first and therefore all three orders are intimately connected with the meaning of each other. I would like to think that our fourth order would both ground and be the grounds for this fact but further research must be done before I am able to properly discuss this type of issue. Let me say in passing it would be my intuition here that the three orders of time in some general sense reflect one of these temporal modes of third order time of the past, present and future, and that respectively these modes find their more full expression in the second, first and third orders. Moreover, this sense of a fourth order of time is an ‘existential’ sense of time that in turn grounds a transcendental or judgmental sense of time (as discussed elsewhere) (and in turn correlatively ground, inversely, a sense of ‘transcendental space’ that co-accompanies the former).

Footnote 1: Should we see time (and space) as momentary? I would like to approach this question from an epistemological point of view. Our consciousness is limited in its ability to differentiate the length of duration of smaller and smaller ‘moments’ of time. Hence in epistemological terms of reference our senses of time must also be so limited. Moreover, because there can be no pure epistemological sense of reference it follows that the sense of the ontological must be equally limited! Additionally, the invocation of the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle also creates quantum limits on the dimensions of space and time (beyond which it makes no sense for us to travel in physical terms of reference even if only speculatively). Thence the momentary nature of time-and-space.

Footnote 2: Lastly, we should note the relatively hyperbolic contrast that the first three dimensions have with the so called fourth. Because time and space are also correlatively co-joined it follows that a greater epistemological focus upon one aspect will be at the expense of the other (in the same way the Heisenberg Uncertainty principle also seems to operate). So a greater focus on time will be at the expense of our spatial sense of perception, and vice versa. Implying, epistemologically and ontologically, an inverse relationship between these two correlatives.

2.   An Analogy for Modeling the Exchange Mechanism Type of Interaction

	One of the problems at the back of my first paper is the question what exactly is the nature of the exchange mechanism in processes of nuclear interaction that involve ‘current,’ e.g., as in electrical fields, gravitational fields, colour fields between quarks, etc., etc. (and by extension forms of exchange on personal and social levels of human interaction)? In my next section I will propose an ontological schema for differentiating fundamental types of relationships. But before I discover this type of approach I would like to run with the following image (as a possible image for modeling the dialectics of a relationship).

	Imagine a group of people with a rather large and relatively heavy ball, each one passing it on to some other in turn. Now if people get too far away they cannot throw the ball in such a manner that it will be successfully caught.  On the other hand if they get too close they equally cannot transfer the ball to each other on an equal basis. Does this sort of image help us to model the dialectics of exchange mechanisms between particles in a field (with a ‘current’ demonstrating a potential difference)?

3.	An Schematic Ontology of Relational-Types and their Interaction

Another way to treat this sort of problem (in section 2.) is to ontologically schematize the types of relationships possible and then go from there.  Once such schema could be the following.

1.	Relationships of emission (when the relationship breaks up in parts).
2.	Relationships that involve 3 or more parties in a sense of a system of interaction..
3.	Relationships between 2 parties involving their potential difference manifested as a current.

It is my belief that these three ‘attitudes’ categorize all forms of relationship. Moreover, all three can be found to aspects of the other. E.g., an emission takes place from a system. Currents are between systems (in their own right) that interact through some form of a virtual emission (I give to you if you give to me and the net result is from one point of view nothing and from some other the physical establishment of a current which characterizes the nature of that relationship). Then, maybe, emissions take place in the disruptions of a current, etc. 

	I also perceive these three types of ‘relationships’ as modeling, respectively, the nature of the phenomenological polarity (centered on the sense of the intentional object), the nature of the hermeneutic polarity (centered on the nature of the intentional field or world), and, the nature of the existential polarity (centered on a sense of an intentional ego). 

Please note: These points needing to be written up in a series of thought-experiments along the same lines of the first paper. A third paper might be attempted to re-look at the possibility, and actuality, of our doing a theological ontology in the light of the research developed in these two papers, N, 9.7.00.