Chapter I - Introduction

	This first chapter is an introduction to the subject of my thesis: -  a general comparative analysis of the Neoplatonic Tradition in the Graeco-Roman world and the contemporaneous Buddhist-Mahayanic-Wisdom Tradition on the Indian Sub-Continent. I believe that such a comparison is not only possible but also most fruitful and revealing, offering us in the process a way of coming more quickly to better appreciate both traditions.
	When I first came to read the Enneads I noted the emphatic way Plotinus reiterates the non-common sense point of view that the world is more like an illusion, e.g. more like a shadow, etc. This emphasis upon the illusoriness of the natural attitude evoked my recollection of a similar tendency in Buddhist scriptures, written around the same time, wherein the world is treated in a similar fashion. In particular a famous verse from the Diamond Sutra came to mind, namely....

As stars, a fault of vision, as a lamp, A mock show, dewdrops, or a bubble, 
A dream, a lightning flash, or a cloud, So should one view what is conditioned.

	In comparison we can note the following quotation from Plotinus....

.... and the Existence with which it (matter) masks itself is no Existence, but a passing trick making trickery of all that seems to be present in it, phantasms within a phantasm; it is like a mirror showing things as in itself when really they are elsewhere, filled in appearance but actually empty, containing nothing, pretending everything .... feeble, in itself, a false thing projected upon a falsity, like an image in dream or against water or on a mirror,....

	Plotinus regards matter as practically non-existent and anything moving towards a realm of the material as partaking, by similar degree, in a state of unreality. All form, he argues, proceeds from the One via the Forms so that through a process of emanation we arrive at a world of the senses, a world of multiplicity, the embodied. Continuing, he concludes that the end of this process of emanation must effectively be the non-existent, i.e. the material, therefore, our natural attitude to treat the physical- material world as real is thus, in accordance with this point of view, mistaken.
	Noting the general similarity of metaphors found in these two quotations we can now ask ourselves the more penetrating question as to whether their utilization has the same structure and function? A similarity in structure would imply that necessary key essential components in the construction of this concept of the illusoriness of the world are present and effectively parallel each other. A similarity in function would imply that this concept of the illusoriness of the world, in its religious-philosophic context, demands or assists, as a consequence, in the performance of similar patterns of behaviour or activity. The mere use of a similar set of metaphorical images does not imply of itself that the metaphorical structure or structures associated with it have the same intentional content or function. Indeed religious symbols are notoriously polyvalent in this regard and heavily bound by context. The dialectical-structural richness of a symbol itself must also complicate our search to determine the nature of their meaning preparatory to our comparative research. 
	However, we are assisted in this comparative research by noting that both traditions subject their metaphors of illusion to the same type of qualifications, namely e.g., that illusoriness is not absolute but that the relative world is only an illusion from the point of view of the Absolute; that the relative world from the relative point of view does possess a relative validity for us but not an absolute validity. This qualified treatment of illusion, as a concept, I shall call illusionism. This concept is best illustrated from an inspection of the following quotation from the slightly earlier, but practically contemporaneous Buddhist scripture of The Perfection Of Wisdom In 8,000 Lines....

Just as if a clever magician, or a magician's apprentice, were to conjure up at the crossroads a great crowd of people, and then make them vanish again. What do you think, Subhuti, was anyone killed by anyone, or murdered, or destroyed, or made to vanish?
No indeed Lord.
Even so a Bodhisattva, a great being, leads countless beings to Nirvana, and yet there is not any being that has been led to Nirvana, nor that has led others to it.

	The point of this concept of illusionism is that between acts of magic or illusion and the relative world there is an analogical structure that can be extracted from the former and applied to the latter, namely, that appearances are deceptive and in their presentation their content does not truly describe the situation as it is in reality, as it is in Absolute Reality. However the illusion is not treated as a mere illusion in a nihilistic sense but as an illusion when it becomes appreciated from the absolute point of view. In our quotation a crowd can be seen but as it is only that which has been conjured up it truly does not exist as a crowd would if it were to be present at that crossroads. This analogical strand in the imagery of illusion is then applied to the world as we perceive it, to crowds, people, Bodhisattvas, Nirvana, etc. From the absolute point of view all this semblance of independent identity is in turn declared to be illusory, empty, (sunya). This gambit does not nihilistically dissolve the relative world but does attack the reputed absoluteness of our interpretation of it. Criticism is thus applied at an epistemological level and not directly to an ontological-physical realm per se.
	Intrigued by this facet of illusionism occurring in these two contemporaneous traditions and knowing something about the lengthy controversy on the topic as to whether Plotinus was subject to oriental influences (from Indian
sources, e.g.) I decided to explore ways one might be able to resolve this question.
	One avenue of influence that has been poorly researched in this dispute, and to my mind the most probable influence if there was one, is that stemming from Mahayanic Buddhism. At the start of, or just before, the Christian era under the influence of its own criticism Buddhism appears to have changed its general philosophical state. In this transformation was developed the Mahayana - a radically critical systematic-absolutist orientated philosophy with a marked emphasis on the via negativa. Under its polemical onslaught three traditional forms of Hindu philosophy disappeared and all surviving traditions were profoundly influenced and altered by its critical-dialectical stance. Buddhism was certainly the most cosmopolitan of Indian religions as witnessed by the success of its missionary activity. Further, a considerable degree of Graeco-Roman influence has been recognized as having entered into the genesis of Buddhist figure sculpture and along with a marked increase in East-West trade, parallels with Gnostic philosophy, etc. this question of influence either way is one that well deserves our attention. 
	Apart from similar metaphors and some superficial motifs like reincarnation and karma our two traditions on first appearances would seem to have little in common either stylistically or substantially. However in probing the structure of our two religious philosophies I have found many elements that parallel each other. This appearance of a general-structural isomorphism has allowed me to develop a provisional format for comparing these two traditions, a methodology whereby these two disparate language games can be made effectively commensurate.
	This provisional format entails carrying out a number of sequential stages, each stage representing both a facet reflecting the general nature of this proposed isomorphism from a particular point of view and an endeepening of our essential appreciation of this phenomenon. This overall format is provisional in the sense that deeper levels of criticism will not only self-correct this appreciation but also in a sense verify it, or at least reinforce our conclusions in this regard. Moreover, through deeper processes of analysis qualification of previous positions will introduce us to the subtlety of this type of philosophy and reveal for us the dialectical richness of this type of intellectual system through the paradoxes and contradictions brought forward for resolution and the creative manner in which these dilemmas are approached and transcended.
	In this thesis the unfolding of each stage will be given its corresponding chapter. Each chapter has also been conceived of as a semi-independent paper or essay that could be read in its own right.
	In this the first chapter I shall, besides creating a context for this thesis, introduce a number of key concepts that will initiate this process of appreciation, such concepts as, e.g. structural and functional isomorphism, the negative theological process, the sense of the absolute, etc. Essentially this first chapter acts as an introduction.
	In our second chapter an attempt is entered into to ascertain if a prominent feature in one philosophy is held by the other and thereby in the process allow us to establish a bona fide case for proposing that a possible isomorphism exists between these two traditions. This structural feature under consideration here, which I shall call the concept of illusionism, is the distinctively qualified utilization of similes of illusion or similar and will essentially be an examination of what appears to be meant in the invocation of this type of metaphorical comparison.
	In our third chapter this congruent ground is enlarged through a brief comparative textual examination of a number of such proposed isomorphic or coincident aspects.
	In our fourth chapter we extend our analysis and in the process attempt to come to an understanding of what is meant, or indicated, by the general term of the Absolute and the nature of its relationship with the Relative in these two traditions. To facilitate this approach we shall examine the deeper structure and motivation behind the use and reinterpretation of traditional approaches in dealing with universals, namely, forms and dharmas.
	In our fifth chapter we shall examine the functional consequences of our previous research allowing us to investigate and relate the negative-analytical dimension and the positive-experiential dimension of the via negativa.
	In our sixth chapter we shall examine the transcendental dimension in the constitution of the sense of the absolute and note the phenomenological implications that this type of approach appears to have for our understanding of this difficult concept.
	In our seventh chapter we shall examine the difficulties that might be thought to have been overlooked in our previous research. In harmonizing the dissonant ostensively non-isomorphic essential features found in a comparative examination of these two traditions a richer appreciation is sought along with a better understanding of the deeper structural and functional nature of this type of philosophy.
	In our eight and last chapter we shall overview the practical or experiential dimension of this type of religious-philosophy through an examination of four problematic and potentially paradoxical regions in absolute philosophy, namely, questions concerning purification, devotion, insight and salvation. Once these functional difficulties are dealt with the thesis then goes on to consider the implications that might be reasonably drawn from such research.
	As an introduction (to my thesis) time nor purpose does not permit me to here substantiate this claim that there exists a general isomorphism between these two traditions. However I shall list some of those features and point out what significance I believe can be attached to this semblance of identity. By my use of the term isomorphism is meant the idea that in the alteration of one particular structure in order to recreate some other structure those elements under that transformation that are found to be preserved intact can be effectively treated as invariant under such a transformation and that structural components can be regarded as isomorphic in terms of those features that remain transformationally invariant. By structure in this thesis is meant the general and and essential conceptual constructions that constitute a definitive description of a particular religious philosophy exhibiting it as a realm of a certain set of ideas that bear a generally specified and mutual relationship to each other. By function is meant the consequences, experiences and behavioural patterns of physi-cal, mental and spiritual activity that are deemed to follow from the utilization of the corresponding structures. More correctly this distinction between structure and function is only a critical tool in our philosophical investigations for the meaning of these structures is a function of the same.
	Both traditions place a heavy emphasis upon the use of the via negativa. Both traditions define, equate and transcend fundamental dichotomic divisions of their philosophic world. This type of resolution of logical tension appears to realize, and be realized in, the creation of a systematic and absolutist point of view. The numinous, as the Absolute, is no longer seen in space and time and experience of the numinous is described as beyond perception and conceptual intellection. Experiential access is stated to be realizable through some form of intuition that goes beyond sense multiplicity, predication, subject-object dichotomies, etc. Expl-icitly or implicitly a sense of absolute unity is realized through an equation of fundamental dichotomously treated divisions in the traditional positive theologically des-cribed world. Other features that will be noted in our tacit format include an emphasis on the devotional, an emphasis on purification and associated ethical practices, an emphasis on transcendence, immanence, emanation, meditational withdrawal, revelation, etc.
	Before I continue let me textually demonstrate one instance of this isomorphism. With respect to the unity of the divine Plotinus states....

The One does not bear to be numbered in with anything else, with a one or a two or any such quantity....

	In comparison we can note the following quotation from The Perfection of Wisdom in 8,000 Lines.

Just simply one single is this Suchness, not two, not three.

	At this point let me investigate what factors might be at work in fashioning this type of philosophy. Assuming that this state of isomorphic parity exists let us reflect upon what possible mechanism might underlie and distinctively direct this type of religious framework?
	Already we have noted that this type of philosophy is critical, absolute-orientated, potentially systematic in aspiration. Moreover, it is heavily indebted to an emphasis that strongly focuses upon the use of the via negativa to indicate the nature of the numinous. The emphasis and centrality of this negative theological approach has important consequences for the structural and functional dimensions of this type of philosophic framework. I shall argue that the adoption of a marked central emphasis on the via negativa unleashes a critical absolute-orientated attitude that would in turn finds itself articulating itself through further negative theologically-orientated discourse, and vice versa, etc. Under such a process, a process I shall refer to as the negative theological process, positive theological terminology is subjected to some form of critique that critically and dialectically retreats the religious significance of such language in line with a systematic absolute-orientated attitude. By dialectical is meant either one or both of the following two senses, namely, that subjected to some form of critical dialogue that attempts to discover the essence of (some positive theological) object or state under examination and/or, that which subjects logical form or questions of logical practice to some type of trans-logical analysis. Both of these senses can often be found entangled together and effectively combine to form an attitude that attempts to epistemologically understand and appreciate the ontological nature of reality as it is thought to be discovered in and through experience, an approach that phenomenologically tries to link the subjective, intersubjective and objective facets that would attend upon the ideal of true knowledge.  
	It would appear, therefore, that the adoption and emphasis upon the via negativa is conducted with the intention of subjecting traditional religious discourse, thought and practices to some process of critique in order to establish some form of religious verification or confirmation. As a philosophical examination of the concept, or sense of, the reality of `Reality', can be neither conducted nor expressed in and through the terms of ordinary non-critical language the question arises as to what avenue or avenues might be found open for the negative theologian in their research? Indeed, this question can be more strongly formulated - can the negative theological programme be conducted and discussed in any form of language at all, religious or otherwise?
	As a simple answer to this question we can note that language in natural discourse has many other functions besides that of the considerably dominant descriptive aspect or factor. That being the case the door is left open for us, as a possibility, to gain some form of non-descriptive access or insight into the nature of reality. Non-descriptive functions of language could include, for example, a discussion of what religious reality is not, i.e. follow the via negativa. Then it could affirm the possible existence in experience of the directly intuitive which transcends intellection, and then could show the necessary direction or path along which the religious person should follow as a precondition for the entertainment of that type of religious experience. Language could also be used to allude to aesthetical, poetical or ethical forms of appreciation along with the transmission of a cultural dimension. Further, religious pronouncements could be viewed pragmatically as devices that create and help assist the development of insight versus their more traditional appearance as literally intended descriptions of the numinous embedded in, and legitimating, a matrix of ethical, political and religious behavioural prescriptions.
      It is my belief that through increased critical-logical examination of traditional positive theological discourse by the traditional religious specialists and their congregations, especially through debate, the domains of the sacred and secular became increasingly separated so that in their divergence they presented to the religious person a dichotomic state of affairs wherein both of these spheres become increasingly irrelevant to the other. In other words through a history of religious controversy, and its examination, coupled with an increased logical thoroughness the sense of the numinous is so separated from the everyday world that the religious person finds themself increasingly cut off from the believed existence and influence of the sacred with a consequent experience of religious alienation along with its concomitant loss of religious value for, and valuation of, the individual, the world and the place for the individual therein. With increasing self-criticism a critical point can also be reached that induces a sense of religious inadequacy that further exaggerates this personal separation from the sacred.
	Negative theology as a style of religious philosophy appears to accompany a reversal of this trend towards non-productive criticism, religious skepticism and alienation and as a method appears to operate on a number of levels beside the purely philosophical.
	A number of requirements appear necessary as preconditions for the development of negative theology and its increased textual presence. The appearance of the via negativa itself must not be seen as novel but that innovation resides in the fact that it became subjected to an increasing emphasis placing it more centrally and consistently in its associated religious philosophy. The centrality of this type of utterance is both indicative of, and a cause for, the increasing absolutization of its associated philosophy.
	Negative theology has been described as parasitic upon a positive theology, its negational treatment applying only to traditional theological items. It stands to reason that because of this priority with a positive theology and the complexity of its negational treatment it would seem natural to demand for its development something of a reasonably active academic-like environment. It would be expected that in this environment there would be a well regulated sense of logic with well defined rules of debate, etc. Moreover, through reflection upon the historical it becomes realized, through a critique of the disputational process, that both thesis and antithesis in a purely philosophical context, in what ever controversy entered into, are equally tenable or untenable and that from this vision of philosophic scandal arises the need for a higher order of treatment that through dialectical-like synthesis qualifies the deficiencies of positive theological utterances in an attempt to rationally transcend the apparent limitations of the purely logical.
	The results of such semantic manipulation are complex and rich in meaning, almost symbolic. Such negational treatment forms a higher order language which criticizes and requalifies its encapsulated positive theological language producing in this process of translation an element of insight. Through the shock of changing our mental set a change of perspective is entered into, the world is consequently seen differently, more insightfully. This dialectical-like transformation, through the ambiguity of its construction, also lends itself to lengthy qualification and commentary. Negative theological writings are more often than not not noted for their brevity, indeed exceptions to this fact are often summaries,  and thus tend to reconfirm this general tendency towards literary abundance.
	I proposed earlier that negative theology arose as a response to dichotomic tensions created by critical discursive thinking. To be noted that this type of philosophy tries to heal this gap by de-defining the logical boundaries of positive religious items. This abstractional process is considered to return the intellectually understood multiplicity of the sense world, etc. back to its roots in the one world of Reality. This turning back occurring on a number of levels, e.g. religious, philosophical, experiential, ethical, meditational, mystical, etc. Further, this synthesis is often effected on a grand scale wherein fundamental positive features are defined logically, equated with each other or their contraries and therein seemingly transcended in the sense of the absolute.
	However, it appears that the via negativa is not just a philosophical sleight of hand but also an experiential process wherein the religious person can reestablish their religious relationship and harmony with the world in its totality. Negative theology therefore cannot be criticized as an exercise in nihilism. It would appear that an increased emphasis upon its methodology realizes a point beyond which it radically and constructively restructures its associated religious philosophy. The adoption of persistent negative theologicalization, I believe, marks one particular point in history when philosophy dramatically changes state, changed its structure, function and direction. Through the grand equation of fundamental dichotomies at the heart of this type of religious philosophy, and their transcendence, a resolution of logical and religious tensions results realizing a systematic and absolutist point of view. The numinous is then no longer seen in space and time, its intuitive experience is described as being beyond perception and conceptual intellection, etc.
	By the term absolute I would like to define it, to begin with, as that which is presuppositionally, preconditionally and logically prior to the world as we come to know it, that which is both transcendent and immanent to the same and that which exists as a ground to the dichotomic division and separation of Reality, as it is in itself, into an epistemological mode versus an ontological mode. These two modalities of the epistemological and the ontological represent too opposed fundamental polar tendencies in discursive consciousness to see or locate, respectively, a mental, psychological, egotistical state of affairs in contrast to a material, unconscious, physically-real state of affairs. As my thesis deals with the meaning of absolutism in these two traditions it does not purport to deal with the Absolute itself but with the meaning or sense supplied by these two traditions. In a religious context this philosophical concept is also subject to various forms of treatment, e.g. theological, logical, soteriological, cosmological, etc. that colour it but generally do not fundamentally alter its essential absolutist character. Effectively the Absolute is trans-empirical thus the sense of this concept cannot be articulated in descriptive terms of reference hence the dependence on the via negativa, analogy and other non-descriptive forms of language to compensate for this non-natural use of language. The sense of the Absolute is also treated trans-conceptually with as a consequence a transcendence of logical dichotomies in the process inducing a systematization and unification of this ground presuppositional to the being of the world as we come to know it.
	In my comparison of these two traditions I came to realize that each philosophy having the same effective structure, the same type of motivation and functional consequences, could through this apparently congruent symmetry, act as a commentary upon the other. Often implicit features in one tradition are explicitly articulated in the other, and vice versa.
	Let me briefly compare two terms, one from each tradition, in order to demonstrate this parallel correspondence of essential terminology. First there is the greek term apohasis (negation). I believe that, structurally and functionally, this term can profitably be compared to the Buddhist term sunya or sunyata (emptiness). Both terms are difficult to understand, e.g. in the history of Buddhist scholarship in the West this term of emptiness has caused many problems and much misunderstanding and mistranslation has issued from this. When reading Plotinus I came to note this congruence in structural and functional meaning, further, I noted that this comparison was very illuminating and suggested that a quicker way of appreciating both of these terms consisted in a comparative contrast. In this process similarities and differences could be noted along with explicit/implicit features, often features left implicit in one tradition being made explicit in the other, and v.v.
	One insight I noted from this comparative contrast is that both terms, as methods of meditational-like analysis, also had a pronounced experiential dimension although buried amid philosophical, polemical, commentorial strands of text this element becomes relatively less explicit. Problems of translational perspective, translations themselves, mere philosophical, logical, and/or linguistic analyses, etc. further obscure this negative theological component in the text for us. Overall it would appear, therefore, that the via negativa placed in its context is thus not just an exercise in critical negative philosophy but also, conceivably, an experiential process with a dimension of positivity that counterbalances its negative introduction.
	For example, from an analysis of Buddhist texts one might conclude quite easily that the term emptiness was a philosophical term for a type of analysis that among other things is process-orientated (rather than being/thing orientated). Similarly, in an analysis of Plotinus writing we could easily come to recognize that his general use of the relatively implicit concept of negation creates a particular style of absolute-orientated type of philosophy. Plotinus rarely uses the term apohasis (negation) but many of his chapters are constructed as exercises in this process of negational-abstraction. 
	In both traditions this experiential aspect is meditationally orientated and, it is claimed, insight productive. In a withdrawal from the multiplicity of the sense world, in a transcendence of discursive thought processes the One, the perfection of wisdom, etc. is allowed to reveal itself through some form of direct intuition. Preparatory to such insight is an emphasis on a prior process of purification. Along similar lines through a withdrawal from the sense world and an annulling/dissolving of discursive thought processes/products it is claimed the psyche is also purified in order for it to be in a position to realize its natural state of luminous at-onement with the Absolute.
	For Plotinus negational-abstraction appears to reverse the natural tendency for mind to define, name, utilize the objects that appear to come before it whether from the multiplicity of the sense world or the multiplicity engendered by processes of predication or imagination, etc.
	One of the basic presuppositions of the Neoplatonic Tradition is the priority of the One, the Absolute or manifold, etc. to any subdivisional definition of that whole. In a sense the process of subdivisional definition, like emanation, realizes a diminished reality to that degree conceptually/perceptually entered into. From an absolute point of view, in this philosophic frame of reference, only the whole is completely real, on the other hand from the world of relativity our-vision-of-reality is a diminished reality, not that reality-as-the-Absolute-itself can be diminished (only our vision of it). In the Mahayanic Tradition as a recognition of this consequence of its absolute position or absolutism a Two Truths Doctrine of Reality is explicitly defined and stated, i.e. Truth from an absolute point of view and truth from a relative point of view.
	Emptiness (sunya) as a meditational process applied systematically to all categories of thought processes realizes in effect an abstractional-negation along Neoplatonic lines. This method of abstraction applied to a particular definition, or object of consciousness, realizes for its practitioner its inherent emptiness, the negation of that definition revealing its presuppositional ground in the Absolute, or at least a position philosophically closer to the same.
	I have come to the conclusion therefore that, stylistic differences apart, the essential structure and function of both philosophies is generally isomorphic. This congruity naturally leads one to speculate as to what meaning this parallel state of affairs might possess, whether indeed it is merely coincidental or indicates some form of interaction between these two traditions. To affirm or deny one of these two options is controversial. Then to affirm some form of interaction and maintain one of those influences was more dominant is equally controversial. What I would like to propose at the end of this thesis is a possible way out of this controversy in such a manner that this route can, through further research, be subjected to some form of confirmation or disconformation. 
      
	In this chapter, as an introduction, I first noted that both traditions appeared to adopt similar metaphors on the subject of the illusoriness of the empirical world, the realm of the embodied, the world of material existence, etc. The difficulty of a comparative analysis on this subject was obviated by the fact that both traditions subjected their metaphors of illusion, etc. to the same type of qualification, namely, that illusion is perceived only from the point of view of the Absolute and then non-nihilistically.
	Initial inspection of these two traditions presents an apparent incommensurability which, however, disappeared when seen from a structural and functional perspective. this deeper level of analysis was stated to reveal a structural and functional isomorphism which consequently would allow us to conduct a comparative analysis.
	Seeking an explanation for this congruency it was briefly noted that the centrality of the via negativa acted as a catalyst in the formation of this type of absolute philosophy which in turn re-expressed itself along negative theological lines.
	The question could be posed as to what motivated the need for negative theological articulation? It was suggested that the logicalization of the world led to its religious categorization and concomitant alienation and that the negative theological attitude reversed this trend.
	Next, I proposed briefly that through general isomorphism these two traditions could be read together as a commentary upon the other. I suggested, e.g. that the two methodological terms of Neoplatonic negation (apohasis) and Buddhist emptiness (sunya) have much in common and that their comparison throws much light on their explicit and implicit construction.
	Finally, the subject of an oriental influence upon the philosophy of Plotinus, namely a possible Indian Buddhist influence, was broached. Certainly, I would like to add at this point, direct influence need not be invoked. It will be argued at the end of this thesis that the uptake of religious innovation needs no direct transmission through philosophies, philosophers and their philosophical texts and that in the final analysis all processes of relation are correctly reciprocal although not necessarily equal. That, perhaps, the fact of innovation itself can be catalytic of its own transmission?
 
	Let me end this chapter with the following quotation from Plotinus....

He that has strength let him arise and withdraw into himself, foregoing all that is known by the eyes, turning away for ever from material beauty that once made his joy. When he perceives these shapes of grace that show in body let him not pursue: he must know them for copies, vestiges, shadows.