Chapter IV - An Examination Of How The Absolute Is Indicated

     But if we seek the vision of that great Being within the Inner Sanctuary - self-gathered, tranquilly remote above all else - we begin by considering the images stationed at the outer precincts, or, more exactly to the moment, the first image that appears. 

     Let us take up this methodological point made by Plotinus in order to see what light might be cast on those expressions that indicate and affirm the presence of an absolute in these two traditions. In the previous chapter I established a prima facie case for accepting that this fundamental element of the absolute was introduced in essentially a similar fashion, that in this regard both traditions could be perceived as isomorphic. Let me in this chapter attempt to integrate and deepen our understanding of what is meant or implied by this sense of the absolute asking ourselves how this aspect is religiously and philosophically indicated, how the structure of this idea or sense of the absolute is constructed and what religious functions it appears to possess or imply in its religious context? At the same time let me show that a general isomorphism is preserved between these two traditions, that textual evidence can be found to support this contention.
     I have argued that a focusing and bringing into a more central prominence of this religious and philosophical sense of the absolute was an innovation developed at the start of the present era and developed more or less simultaneously in both the European and the Indian spheres' of influence (and I suspect in the Chinese World as well). Not that the concept of the absolute was unknown to earlier philosophers but that with increased negative theological treatment and its critical pressure this vision was brought under an increasing degree of philosophic awareness, and vice versa, with as a consequence a profound restructuralization of religious philosophy in this period of time. Along with such a radical revolution in thinking developed new forms of religious expression, e.g. an increasing emphasis on devotion and its focalization upon and through the religious image. Indeed, cultural interchange between these two worlds is vividly manifested in the Graeco-Roman influenced creation of the buddha-figure in Gandhara. That the buddha-image had a devotional aspect is attested to iconographically through the frequent presence of smaller human-like figures beside or beneath the main figure, in various attitudes of reverence and adoration, and that this intention appears to be reconfirmed through noting the later addition of buddha images to stupas, religious items traditionally reserved for such a type of practice. This element of devotionalism would seem on the surface to be an irrelevant feature in an absolute type of religious philosophy for in such a context the human person would seem to count for little before the infinite panorama of the Absolute. Indeed, any attempt in the nature of reverence or prayerful petition would seem to be a pathetic and pointless exercise. Yet, with the advent of this new type of  philosophical restructuralization there is a simultaneously increased emphasis on the aspect of the devotional and in understanding the nature of this type of absolute philosophy the coinciding presence of this feature, I believe, must also be accounted for.
	In this methodological metaphor or point made by Plotinus that I used to open this chapter it would seem to follow from an understanding of such an analogy that by inspecting those ontological realities that are claimed to more closely approximate the Absolute, in the essential nature of their constitution, we should find ourselves in a position not only to appreciate something of what the absolute would be like, through some form of extrapolation or abstraction, but also be in some sort of position to appreciate in what way the Absolute differed from those more spiritual-like realities. These two stratagems effectively map out the via positiva and the via negativa. Although Plotinus appears to stress the aspect of reflection in the way these higher realities mirror the One the overall tenor of his philosophy more heavily concerns itself with the opposite, namely, the way in which the Absolute differs from these images. However some ambivalency must be present with this negative theological attitude because the presuppositional ground of such an attitude demands in the first place some form of positive theological description in order to enter into a process of negation. Moreover, as this negation can not maintain its presence through the complete demolition of this positive ground some form of truce must be found that allows its simultaneous preservation and domination by the negative. Indeed, it would appear that negative theological treatment in the end reestablishes the positive theological element albeit in a heavily qualified transformed state. This emphasis upon the negative theological is a characteristic feature of this type of absolute philosophy and creates its own distinctive styles of discourse in which processes of negation are heavily emphasized both repetitively and systematically and surrounded by subtle, lengthy and highly detailed dialectical-like qualification.
	In the Neoplatonic Tradition the ontological specie closest to the Absolute is the realm of Nous and its collection of forms. For the Buddhist Wisdom Tradition the candidate for this role is the realistic world of dharmas as articulated in earlier forms of Buddhist scholasticism. Both forms and dharmas appear to perform similar functions in a philosophical sense helping to explain the presence in the relative world of an apparent instance of an object of type x and at the same time establishing the this-ness of that instantiation. Both types of items establishing the grounds for the apparent validity of judgments made in these two regards without trying to compromise or undermine their stance that absolute reality is one, insubstantial or non-materialistic, non-pluralistic, without change or motion, etc. The heroic attempt to maintain the distinctive sense of the absolute and the sense of the relative, as well as their accommodation, making for some very exciting and difficult philosophy.
     In this chapter I shall examine and compare how the sense of the absolute is introduced, stated or implied textually in both of these traditions, the nature of its structure as a concept and inspect the religious functions its conceptually appreciated meaningfulness appears to imply or entail in its religious context. Firstly, however, I must outline what is meant by this term absolute, or more correctly, outline what is meant by the sense of the absolute. Secondly, I must investigate the controversial question as to whether there is an absolute in this type of Buddhist philosophy and then provisionally outline the main characteristics, that I believe are held in common between these two traditions, that this sense of the absolute appears to possess.
	The absolute almost by definition can have no meaningfulness in the context of a descriptive religious language. However the idea or sense of the absolute, it would appear, can be meaningfully alluded to through less direct forms of language. In our investigations, therefore, the facticity of the absolute is of no importance, on the other hand the meaningfulness or sense of this concept is for us our prime concern.
	By absolute or, more correctly, the sense of the absolute is meant that transcendent and immanent ground postulated to be presuppositional to the everyday reality of the relative empirical world. This world of the absolute transcends both material reality and intellectual reality and, therefore, can be neither described nor directly referred to in a material mode or in an intellectual mode. The sense of the absolute by itself does not imply a sense of the divine although it will be shown that marked theological overtones are present in both traditions in either an explicit or implicit form. The absolute is also seen as that a priori ground that surpasses the totality of the empirical world being in effect the being of that being but not the mere being of that being. The difficulty of this concept is aided by the fact that its introduction is indicated through negation, analogy and other forms of intricate linguistic manoeuvres. In one respect it represents a fundamental shift in philosophical thinking from the search for the fundamental nature or archae of the world to a very questioning affirmation of its very being. It is because the absolute can be seen as the unifying force behind the appearance of one world that it is also referred to as the Absolute, this unity of ground reinforcing an associated sense of the divine.

	For a number of reasons the majority of Western commentators have either mis-stated the nature of the Buddhist absolute or rejected the presence of the same. Difficulties in translation and comprehension have often obscured the intended import of the essential texts in this regard and scholarship has taken some time in coming to grips with the subtleties of this type of absolute philosophy. Translating Sanskrit conceptual terminology through the lens of western philosophical thought has, more often than not, distorted rather than clarified this field of research. Inadequate understanding of the various schools, their debates and commentaries along with an inadequate understanding of the various levels of critique exercised in this type of philosophy have further complicated the situation. Another complication has arisen in the tendency to translate texts of a more philosophical nature, and hence of a more polemical concern, leaving untranslated those of a more experiential interest where attention is directed towards meditational processes, psychological analyses, metaphorical images, ethical matters, devotional practices, ritual procedures, etc. A more balanced translational programme and the progress of scholarship itself appears to be overcoming many of these problems.
	The Buddhist Wisdom Tradition finds its philosophical thematization (and possible authorship) in the Madhyamaka Tradition. This school contends that it has no views on the nature of reality and shows through various forms of dialectical criticism that theoretical viewpoints entertained by other denominations and faiths are internally contradictory and completely inadequate in their representation of reality. However such a lack of theoretical description about the nature of the
Absolute does not by itself support the contention that there is no Absolute only that language is inadequate for this task of description. It would appear that because one of the functions of the Absolute is to religiously explain why there is a world of relativity, with all its inherent limitations, it follows that, correctly, nothing in this world could directly image the Absolute except analogically or metaphorically. Any attempt would by definition fail since the worldly can only directly represent that which is of the world, however, appropriately conducted such introduction can serve as an indication of the Absolute. Also, balancing this emphasis on the negative in philosophically-orientated discourse is a positivity in claims made for the experiential reception of the Absolute as an intimation of the numinous. Although various spiritual techniques are described the processes of religious experience acquired in the end appear to be, to some degree or other, more a matter of revelation sponsored directly or indirectly by the presence of the Absolute itself. Let me first illustrate that a sense of the absolute does indeed appear to be indicated in this Buddhist Tradition....

....all this Suchness.... is just one single Suchness, is without any trace of positivity and negativity, as being one, non-different, inextinguishable, unaffected, non-dual, without cause for duality. 

	Suchness is not to be misconstrued as something permanent and substantial but equivalent to emptiness, reality as it truly is, etc. Moreover this sense of the absolute is given theological-like overtones through its personalization and cosmological-like treatment as the Tathagata which is equally an epithet for a Buddha or the spiritual ground that supports the apparent manifestation of the same....

For the Suchness of the Tathagata and the Suchness of all dharmas, they are both one single Suchness, not two, not divided. 

     The word Tathagata can also be formed in the plural meaning all buddha-like figures. Yet even this vast plurality is unified by the image of the perfection of wisdom being like a mother to them and leading them on to the revelation of all-knowledge..... 

For she (the perfection of wisdom) is their (Tathagatas') mother and begetter, she showed this all-knowledge, she instructed them in the ways of the world. From her have the Tathagatas come forth.... It is in this sense that the perfection of wisdom generates the Tathagatas, instructs them in this world.

	This sense of the absolute however must not be misconstrued to imply some form of fixed spiritual reality supporting and hiding behind appearances.

....a Bodhisattva, who courses and dwells in perfect wisdom, comprehends that all dharmas are like an echo. He does not think about them, does not review, identify, or perceive them, and he knows that those dharmas do not exist, that their reality does not appear, cannot be found, cannot be got at. If he dwells thus, he courses in perfect wisdom. 

	This last quotation indicates the manner in which philosophically we should go about entertaining the sense of the absolute. The sense of the absolute should be recognized but basically not thought about in some form of cognitive
entertainment. Such an attitude does not deny the presence of the same, indeed, the constant reiteration of this theme reinforces this semblance of facticity, but in the process of acceptance warns us that it should be approached in a special non-intellectual manner. 
	As the Mahayana went on to develop this sense of the absolute it became less implicit and more directly explicit. In this regard the Perfection of Wisdom Tradition and its closely allied philosophical school of the Madhyamaka remain more conservative in the philosophical explication of this presuppositional feature.

     Absolute philosophy or absolutism as a philosophical phenomenon I believe effectively developed with the commencement of the present era, not that such ideas were completely absent before this point in time but that this type of concern was neither centrally prominent nor sufficiently thought out to be made a subject matter for debate, conscious formulation and reflection. With increasing explication and formulation through an increased emphasis on negative theological treatment, and vice versa, the sense of the absolute developed philosophically. The ramifications of this shift are subtle but quite profound and in the process the structure of philosophical expression changed quite radically resulting in a relatively more progressive, complex and influential form of religious philosophical discourse whose novelty and greatly increased powers of criticism and reflection rapidly assisted in its dissemination. Stylistically we have textual evidence for the increased utilization of negational language devices, dialectical-like equivocation and qualification and as a general rule textual size lengthened considerably. As I have stated before exceptions to this tendency in extended textual length are often summaries and as such reconfirm this observation. Overall philosophical thinking became more complex and sophisticated with a marked emphasis on a systematic approach. Comparing Plotinus with Plato from a textual point of view should reveal the considerable distance traversed by philosophical thinking in this regard. Although Plato is rigorous, ambitious, versatile, multi-faceted and very comprehensive in no way can his speculative philosophical endeavours be considered truly systematic. The same judgment also applies to Aristotle. Wide ranging interests and a thoroughness in their systematic-like presentation and dogmatic formulation is no substitute for the systematic approach that translates all philosophical inquiry through the lens of a prominent central highly articulate formulation (based on a position of absolutism).
	With Plotinus we see, page by page, an attempt to comprehend the world and philosophical problems through the prism of a systematic structure in which the subject for investigation is subjected to a reinterpretation in the light of this superstructure or substructure. When this type of philosophy is perceived superstructurally to the field of its intended application a sense of the transcendent is imposed either implicitly or explicitly. On the other hand when the emphasis is on the immanence of the substructure a sense of the immanence of the absolute is introduced either implicitly or explicitly. Although there can be variations in the orientation of the emphasis placed upon the sense of the immanent or transcendent through the degree of their explicit thematization correctly these two aspects form complementary and necessary components in the structure of the absolute treated from a structural point of view. A major difference in this regard between these two traditions can be found in the way the Buddhist Wisdom Tradition emphasizes an immanent approach to the sense of the absolute whereas the Neoplatonic Tradition has an overall emphasis on the transcendent. Nevertheless it is my contention that both of these aspects are necessary features in the idea or sense of the absolute treated as a concept and that this can be made apparent through an analysis of such philosophical structures that demonstrate this type of approach.
	We could argue that in a truly absolute-orientated philosophy because we always find the coupling of these two aspects of the immanent and the transcendent that they must necessarily occur together. Such an observation however does not explain why this descriptive state of affairs must necessarily follow in all cases. Their descriptive coexistence, either explicitly or implicitly stated, may merely be coincidental? That being the case it might be thought possible to describe an absolute-orientated philosophy that articulates a sense of the transcendent without an accompanying sense of the immanent, or vice versa? Some people would regard, for example, Plato's sense of the numinous or God as being purely transcendent. For all that an element of the immanent however does appear to surface in the attempt to conceptually understand the forms as participating in some way in those items in the world that are instantiated under them?
	I would argue that pure transcendence as a concept cannot be entertained without also entertaining its correlative of immanence. This does not mean we cannot orientate our attention onto one of these correlative aspects and there upon focus our explication but that in so doing we do not in the process actively deny the other aspect which in that discourse must then be left implicit whether that fact be recognized or not. An unawareness of this necessary correlativity would seem to imply a lack of presuppositional appreciation of the territory of an absolute-orientated discourse, and the absence of this characteristic feature would seem to mark out earlier attempts in absolute philosophy as proto-absolutist or pseudo-absolutist by nature. In this regard we could consider both Platonic Philosophy and Buddhist Schol-asticism, (with its dharmic analyses) as examples of this proto-absolutism which historically came to develop, under the impetus of systematic presuppositional criticism, into fully recognizable forms of absolute philosophy.
	My main argument for the coexistence of the immanent with the transcendent is therefore developed on epistemological, or psychological, grounds. Meaningfulness of either term arises through its accommodation with and its distinctive separation from its correlative correspondent. To entertain one you must entertain the necessary presence of the other. Again, however, this does not imply that our attention must be equally balanced upon both correlatives at the same time or that we must take both accounts into a full explication, although, if it serves our purposes, full justice can be only rendered when both aspects are distinctively explicated and harmoniously accommodated philosophically.
	Motivation and reasons for this transition from non-absolute orientated philosophical thinking to instances of absolute orientated thought are not simple to pin-point and integrate. It would appear that with increasing educational standards and religious institutions with a considerable history of controversial religious and philosophical debate a point might be reached where cognitive intellectual thinking becomes increasingly suspect and critical of itself from a non-systematic critical point of view. The desire to understand the transient phenomenal world as a whole and transcend its bewildering plurality of experiences as well as bypassing the controversial and unproductive ways of seeing the nature of the world in terms of the way we come to see and know this world in non-philosophical experience might set the more sophisticated philosophical thinker to enquire as to the presuppositional ground that underlies phenomenal experience in the first place. A general
extrapolation or abstraction towards such essential and necessary conditions opening the way for an absolute vision of the world. I would contend that application of this approach would in time systematize one's view of the world and that with increased critical cognitiveness would bring to critical consciousness the stratified and highly inconsistent nature of the world as perceived religiously unleashing the severity of a reformational-like type of mentality with its desire for ideological purity and ethical conformity. However in the period of time that this thesis covers the exercise of the via negativa and other forms of criticism in general would appear to be, with regard to themselves, maintained in a non-systematic form although
their exercise in time would be productive of an increasing degree of systematization of that religious philosophy and that at a later point in time this systematization would be reflected in upon those techniques to produce what I have referred to as the reformational-type of mentality. I make this point in passing to note that in this later stage the increased focalization on imagery, both iconographical and metaphorical, developed in this prior stage becomes subjected to severe criticism which is lacking in the non-systematic exercise of negative theological treatment. A reluctance to criticize the use of religious imagery may well be one of the reasons why the Islamic religion, which developed this tendency, could successfully replace the Buddhist religion in India and Central Asia. This is certainly not the only reason for it would not account for the continuation of the general Hindu Tradition in India itself, e.g.

	In regard to matters of ethical practice in this type of absolute philosophy language again ostensively fails by default in prescribing a cognitively consistent attitude. An investigation into the negative theological-like treatment of accepted ethical priorities will be found to mirror the negative theological treatment of doctrinal matters of a more cognitive concern. Both are introduced in a socratic dialectical-like manner, subjected to some form of negation or paradoxical comparison or reduced through analysis to a position of absurdity. In the Buddhist context this dialogue is explicit and the disturbing pronouncements made therein have this element of ethical instability reinforced and intensified through being made by the spiritual authority of the historical Buddha or other enlightened beings. However this apparent ethical nihilism is conducted in a heavily committed ethical framework whose tenor permeates these traditions in their entirety and would seem to prepare, for the sake of a better term, a transcendental form of ethical practice. By this I mean an ethical activity existentially perceived and exercised in the spontaneity of an intuitive insight that would be claimed to be grounded in and proceeding from reflection upon the sense of the absolute,  (e.g. through contemplation of the One or the perfection of wisdom). This transcendental form is flexible and appropriately adapts itself to the situation at hand. This skill in means (upaya) is the method whereby the perfection of wisdom can apply itself to and through the relativity of the ethical situation confronting it equally from the point of the Absolute (nirvana) and the Relative (samsara). This transcendental interpretation can account for both the ostensive negativity and the scepticism of ethical pronouncements as well as the intense overall commitment to ethical consideration. Moreover, it accounts for the continued existence and need for an ethical attitude, albeit from a transcendental point of view, in the very midst of an absolute philosophy whose very dimension could be misconstrued so as to treat all activity as pointless or as an illusory process or as an act of a deluded mentality that believes it can exercise a real free-will. Investigation into the negative theological-like treatment of ethical considerations also further helps us to understand the nature of the Absolute and the transcendental treatment of cognitive doctrinal themes.
	A brief examination of the Buddhist concept of purification (visuddhi) will illustrate for us the paradoxical and ostensively problematic nature of ethical practice in this type of philosophy and in absolute philosophy in general.

Subhuti: If all dharmas are isolated and empty how is the defilement and purification of beings conceivable? For what is isolated cannot be defiled or purified, what is empty cannot be defiled or purified, and what is isolated and empty cannot know full enlightenment. Nor can anyone get at any dharma outside emptiness which has known full enlightenment .... How then shall we understand the meaning of his teaching?  

     From the absolute point of view there can be no defilement. As all being is empty of self (and permanent substantiality) there can be no own-being, no permanent being belonging to that appearance of self-existence. That being the case there being no being that could be subjected to defilement there can be no real defilement nor for that matter no being that is pure or is able to self-subject itself to an act of purification. From the absolute point of view the whole raison d'être of ethical practice must seemingly collapse. This type of exposition, however, could present for the religious person a dangerous precedent for if from the absolute point of view there is no need for ethical reflection and practice then it would seem to logically follow that in the world of relativity such consideration needn't be put into effect giving a carte blanche to any type of activity in any type of ethical situation. This type of objection is duly noted and resolved in a number of ways, e.g. as outlined in the following quotation (continuing on where our last quotation left off).

The Lord: What do you think, Subhuti. Do beings course for a long time in I-making and mine-making?
Subhuti: So it is, Lord.
The Lord: Are also I-making and mine-making empty?
Subhuti: They are, O Lord.
The Lord: Is it just because of their I-making and mine-making that beings wander about in birth-and-death?
Subhuti: So it is, Lord.
The Lord: It is in that sense that the defilement of beings becomes conceivable. To that extent that beings take hold of things and settle down in them, to that extent there is defilement. But no one is thereby defiled.  

	In so far as beings entertain their relativity and their place in a realm of relativity that limitation can enter and define the person in accordance with the limitations they, and others, place upon themselves and come to entertain. Hence the restoration of the term purification in this new perspective involves the individual realizing that they need to free themselves from this type of cognitive thinking. That in effect the individual purifies themselves when they no longer primarily entertain this relative mode with its fictitious mentally constructed thought-forms.
	In the Neoplatonic Tradition a similar problem presents itself. Although purification is stressed and not presented in a problematic form its negative theological background and treatment is implicit. As the One from the absolute point of view is beyond consciousness, being good, etc. the same type of implication could be drawn that as all stems from this One, via emanation, everything in its inner essence must already be pure, be a participant in real being with the further implication that there be no need for ethical reflection and practice. Of course such a position for the religious person cannot be accepted at face value for it offers a license to disregard an ethical supervision of our interaction in the world with a consequential ethical anarchy. However this blind freedom is quite contrary to the spirit of absolute philosophy. To counter and obstruct this intellectual tendency for amoral behaviour ethical practice is reinstated but in a transcendental form, i.e. grounded in intuitive insight and the need to develop the same.

....the Supreme is neither what is good nor what is not good,
then, containing nothing it is the Good by that very absence of content.
      Thus we rob it of its very being as the Absolute Good if we ascribe anything to it, existence or intellect or goodness. The only way is to make every denial and no assertion, feign no quality or content there but to permit only the `It is'.

	This absence of content perfectly mirrors the Buddhist concept of emptiness. Both expressions, I believe, indicate the desire to seek out and know the presuppositional ground prior to the relativization and finitization of this ground in the presentation of the Relative. This element of immanence forms a key aspect in the structure of the concept of the absolute and this element is found equally in both traditions. The presence of this feature in the Buddhist context indicates the sense of the absolute is present or implied, the fact that this aspect slips by, more often than not, without being named should not fool us as to its true intentions. Such expressions as emptiness, Suchness, Tathagata, Tathata, the inconceivable, etc. all indicate through the province of their apparent descriptive function this sense of the absolute. However, these expressions cannot be exactly pinned down and oscillate or resonate between descriptive and denotational functions acting tentatively as names or psuedo-names in one context and descriptions that metaphorically point towards this sense of the absolute in other situations.

Unthinkable, O Lord is the perfection of wisdom.
Because the perfection of wisdom is not something that thought ought to know, or that thought has access to....

I pay homage, O Lord, to the perfection of wisdom.
One pays homage to the cognition of the all-knowing when one pays homage to the perfection of wisdom.
So it is. For from it has come forth the all-knowledge of the Buddhas, the Lords.

	The problematic question of a Buddhist absolute, I believe, can be best approached when this question is properly placed in the entire continuity of the Buddhist Tradition both before and after this period in time. Reluctance to ontologically create a category called the Absolute and consider it as the totality and reality of all dharmas and compounded things is quite in keeping with the spirit of Buddhist thought. However such a predilection does not rule out a presuppositional ground immanent to relative reality that transcends ontological categorization, and for that matter, epistemological categorization also. This sense of immanence is treated in a religious and devotional sense as also being transcendently unified and in other Buddhist denominations with time this aspect is treated to an increasing explication. Absolute philosophy has a prejudice against multiplicity and this tendency manifests itself in this tradition in reaction to the radical pluralism and realism of early Buddhist Scholasticism. A world constituted out of the mere collection of ontological or epistemological realities is almost a contradiction in terms, moreover, such a disorganized disunified assemblage cannot be addressed in spiritual-like terms of reference. With the increasing influence and development of devotional trends in philosophical thinking such a position presents itself as inadequate and outmoded in its intuitive appreciation of religious reality. Further, under such limited conditions, this type of collective nihilism cannot allow our transcendental appreciation of the world to take on an unified aesthetical, ethical and spiritual form of experience and expression. The collective unity of this ground of presuppositional immanence also implies the sense of transcendence and the increasingly devotional flavour of this period reinforces this religious perception.

....there is no multiplicity, and there 	is no difference attained.
Past Suchness, future Suchness,
	present Suchness, the Suchness of 			the Arhats,
the Suchness of all dharmas, the 				Suchness of the Jinas -
all that is the Dharma-Suchness, and no 	difference is attained.

	Moreover this ground is personified in the transcendent unity of the same as the perfection of wisdom which is like a mother to the Buddhas, instructing them, revealing reality as it truly is, etc. 
	It is the distinctive nature of absolute philosophy to attempt to transcend the limitations of language and seek out and approach that which is presuppositional to the world as it presents itself in and through experience. The potent-ial obscurity of this philosophical stance is both its strength and its weakness. A refusal to the let the world be encaptured by the limitations of some cognitive-categorical structure allows the religious person who adopts this type of absolute perspective to perceive the open mystery of the phenomenal world. On the other hand the subtlety of this type of approach can be easily misconstrued as either presenting some form of intricate, yet sterile, philosophicalization or advocating the promotion of some form of nihilism (or for that matter just mere paradoxical nonsense). This type of absolute approach must escape such labels as monism, e.g. through the dialectical trans-linguistic nature of its indication and only a superficial inspection could label it as nihilism or any other ism. The very nature of this type of philosophy is to be as a process of philosophicalization and to mistake the methodology of this process of potential intuitional vision for the way the world should be philosophically viewed is to confuse `process' with `products derived from the exercise of that process'. 

	In our examination of these two religious philosophies we shall note how the sense of the absolute is textually indicated, what common structural elements are present in this indication and what function this type of exercise has for a religious-experiential dimension.

The Manner In Which The Sense Of the Absolute Is Indicated

	It would appear that the sense of the absolute is indicated through ....
i) positive statements that there is something that escapes our normal perception and thought but of which we should be philosophically aware of, 
ii) perceive that via the use of analogy a transcendent/
immanent realm is metaphorically implied, 
iii) realize that via the use of specially conducted processes of negation we can attempt to describe this realm. 	
	It would also appear that a fourth avenue of ritual attempts to point out, and introduce, to our cognitive awareness this element of the numinous belonging to the sense of the absolute. But this last aspect will be examined briefly elsewhere through the examination of related topics, e.g. devotionalism, salvationalism, etc.
	We could ask ourselves the question whether it would be possible for the via positiva to indicate a sense of the absolute?  By itself I believe this task would be impossible being very much a contradiction in terms. However in conjunction with the via negativa or processes of metaphor, or via some other form of introduction, terms found in a positive theology could quite naturally be used to indicate and name this more profound sense of the numinous. In this mode there can be no direct descriptive use of language and meaningfulness is generated through a metaphorical pointing or showing. This attitude or process-direction once articulated can then be named using terminology from a traditional positive theology or terms defined in a negative theological critique of the same. Such a denotational process must not, however, be confused with the normal usage of names through the fact that negative theology is exercised in a meta-descriptive frame of reference or context. It is the ability to pass as normal names that the sense of the absolute generated in a negative theological process of critique can easily be made to reinvest a positive theology's terminology with a sense of immanence and transcendence, two aspects that otherwise would be absent from the same. Neither omnipresence nor the magnitude or extent of the divine could account for either of these terms immanence or transcendence.
	As examples of this process of indication and its meta-descriptive sense of denotation we can note the following...

The Supreme, as the Absolute Good and not merely a good being or thing, can contain nothing that could be its own good.
Anything it could contain must be either good to it or not good; but in the supremely and primally Good there can be nothing not good; nor can the Absolute Good be a container to the Good: containing, then, neither the good nor the not good it contains nothing and, containing nothing, it is alone: it is void of all but itself.

....Suchness is also no Suchness, ....Subhuti's Suchness is immutable and unchangeable, undiscriminated and undifferentiated, just as the Suchness of the Tathagata. ....For the Suchness of the Tathagata, and the Suchness of all dharmas, they are both one single Suchness, not two, not divided.

	In the first of these two quotations Plotinus names his vision of the absolute Supreme and Absolute Good. He then uses the metaphor of a container but turns the whole idea of this metaphor inside out by arguing that the absolute can contain nothing but itself. The negative theological-like qualification of this metaphorical image is typical of the way the absolute philosopher uses language to de-describe itself and in the process reveal its presuppositional basis or ground ostensively coincident, either by implication or explication, with the reality of the Absolute itself. Thus we find here the introduction of denotational-like terms, analogical devices and processes of negative theological qualification.
	In our second example we have in the introduction of denotational-like terms, namely, Suchness, Tathagata, also the process of their equation, a textual feature very common in both of these traditions (and this feature can also be found in our previous quotation). Close to such apparent denotational introduction we also find the almost ubiquous processes of negational treatment that qualify these positive-like terms.
	Generally we can say, from an overall textual observation, that this type of absolute philosophy found in these two traditions has a distinctive style characteristic of such an endeavour. A plurality of terms are carefully allowed to masquerade before us which through various forms of treatment present us with a deeper vision of the unity of the absolute.
	Both traditions go to considerable length to qualify their use of analogies, metaphors and apparent descriptions. Plotinus often tells us that he is speaking incorrectly (ovk opÕws). It would appear that one of the reasons for this qualification is the need felt by the negative theologian to de-dualize their terminology. The very basis of language and cognitive thought is dualistic, a contrasting and partial separation of that which is under the focus of investigation from that, by nature, which it is not. However, that being the case, the absolute philosopher still has the option of subjecting their dualistically based terminology to non-dualistically orientated qualification letting apparent descriptions act more as indicators of what is being referred to rather than as descriptions of that being indicated. In the same critical manner our Buddhist text continually qualifies its discourse when referring to the sense of the absolute. 

When one has no notion of either body, 			or thought, or a being,
Standing rid of perception, coursing in 	the non-dual Dharma, -
That has been called by Him who bestows 	benefits the perfection of vigour
Of those who desire the blissful, 				imperishable, foremost enlightenment.

The Structure Entailed In The Sense Of The Absolute

	In an examination of the structural composition of the conceptual sense of the absolute we have before us the appearance of two choices, namely, to go directly to the significance of the absolute as a concept or to examining the structures present in its indication. The philosophical and religious nature of the sense of the absolute, as a presuppositional ground to the relative, would seem to deny us direct access to its essential meaningfulness and even if experiential access is obtained in some form or other its direct descriptive expression in language is to all intent practically impossible being also presuppositional to the nature of language itself. Textually we are frequently informed about this experiential fact by both of these two traditions that the absolute can not be descriptively expressed in language based upon conventional world-based experience, however, the use of terms that appear to indicate the sense of the absolute can be studied in their religious-philosophical context and in this manner allowed to throw some light on the significance of this type of concept. It would appear that an important method for doing this type of research might lie in that very procedure outlined by Plotinus himself whereby we investigate those ontological features that more closely resemble the sense of the absolute. In our situation, however, we will examine those ontological realities presented by these two traditions as being closer to their vision of the numinous, the reality of such ontological proposals being of no concern to us here. First I shall examine the Neoplatonic concept of nous and its congregation of forms (eidos) and then I shall conduct a similar type of examination in regard to dharmas as critically treated in the Buddhist Wisdom Tradition. That completed I shall then attempt to show the general degree, in this regard, of structural isomorphism that appears to be shared by these two contemporaneous traditions.

	By the time of Plotinus, through the prism of Middle Platonism, the term nous had undergone a considerable synthesis of mainly Platonic and Aristotelian themes. In this regard we can note distinctive ideas taken from a number of key Platonic texts, e.g. the Good beyond being of the Republic, the One of the Parmenides, the nous of the Philebus, and the demiourgos of the Timaeus.  Aristotelian influenced input includes the idea that the nous in a special manner thinks itself and although unmoved is able to move others (as an object of desire) being in effect the Divine or God. 
	For Plotinus the nous is the second hypostasis after the One. On the One it is dependent and reflects the unity of the same as a unity-in-plurality. The image is advanced of the mind being able to entertain a multitude of individual thoughts yet preserving its unity as one mind. The multitude of entities entertained by this Mind are the forms - universals whose spiritual-like existences are claimed to transcend the spacio-temporality of this empirical everyday world. For a start these beings are treated as changeless entities that subsist throughout eternity without spatial properties whose intellectual-like character therefore allows us, in accordance with certain tendencies in Platonic philosophy, to consider them to be both real beings and true objects of knowledge at the same time, a gathering together of both being and the intellectual. Although these separate existences match the distinctive objects in this world object for object yet their congregation also reflects the unity of the One. This unity is metaphorically compared to the way the human body has many different parts and functions yet taken collectively this diversity harmoniously operates under normal circumstances in one common accord. 
	For Plato the forms are separate existences hypothetically proposed in order to solve a number of philosophical problems. Although the term eidos had a long history as a technical term before Plato's redefinition of it this term appears to have historically evolved in his writings to take on the meaning now traditionally ascribed to it. However for Plato himself this term remained problematical and did not escape his own excellent and thorough criticism of it. Overall, it would seem, perceiving Plato's reluctance to jettison this concept, that for him this concept, subject to his redefinition of it, would, in the final account, appear to present us with less problems than if we tried to do without it? Plotinus' treatment of universals in the Platonic mode is at least, to my point of view, more satisfactory in that he harmoniously accommodates both the transcendent-Platonic approach and the immanent-Aristotelian approach. Be that as it may much of the work of the forms appears to be subverted by the role and function of the nous and that except for a few specific tasks the forms are more platonic relics from the past. Certainly a pluralistic realm of separate beings, perhaps hierarchically structured and ruled by one arch-form of the Good or One, is more a fiction or illusion in the ontological cosmology of Plotinus. The only true reality can be the One and although the forms are eternal beings they are still dependent on the Nous which in turn is dependent upon the One itself. Their purpose is useful in that they theoretically supply the element of diversity or multiplicity in the unity of Nous and thereby allow it to mediate between the unity of the One and the plurality of the world. Further, they are made to supply a foundation for the possibility of knowledge. Lastly, they are also made to mediate between one of the most fundamental dichotomies of language and thought, in their proposed dealings with the phenomenal world of experience, namely, that posed in the juxtaposition of thinking and being. In one of the two main triadic formulations of Plotinus these two dichotomies of Being (on) and Intellect (nous) are mediated by Life (zoe). But all these functions can be performed by the nous itself and overall more philosophical emphasis is given to that aspect of this second hypostasis. In that other triadic formulation of Plotinus Nous itself is the intermediary between the One (hen) and the World-Soul (psyche). The Nous being both immanent and transcendent is left quite capable of performing this task of mediation and in the process would keep Plotinus' ontology simpler and more efficient. However, as I shall point out in this chapter, there is one important reason why these forms should be philosophically preserved, namely, as stepping stones in a negative theological process of indicating the Absolute. Through a negative criticism of the forms the sense of the absolute is introduced but as this introduction is philosophically dependent on the preconditional presence of the same this dependence effectively preserves their continuing philosophical existence. In the same manner Buddhist dharmas are effectively preserved in some later forms of Buddhist criticism when to all ostensive purposes their hypothesis is superseded.
	One of the motivating forces behind the adoption of the hypothesis of the forms would seem to be the influential model of mathematics as it presented itself through the Pythagorean Tradition. There the field of mathematics was subjected to successful forms of simplification and unification and this ideal of the mathematical has come to haunt the history of western philosophical thinking ever since.
	In Indian philosophy this emphasis on the mathematical appears to be somewhat absent and in its place appears to be an implicit modeling on the systematic and succinct formulations of grammar as presented by a series of influential grammarians, e.g. Panini. An intense preoccupation with language philosophy follows this implicit emulation along with the use of the aphoristic/commentorial style of exegesis. In this light Nagarjuna's polemical text the Mula-Madhyamika-Karikas would be a prime example. In one aspect where revolutionary mathematical thinking did make some impact would perhaps arise with the invention and adoption of the zero and its transference to the world of philosophy in the concept of emptiness (sunya, sunyata which has the meaning of zero in mathematical language) and needless to say this concept is very central to the Buddhist Wisdom Tradition. 
	In the chronological treatment of the development of Plato's thought we can see an evolutional development in his hypothesis of the forms, however, at no stage is a proof of the same undertaken. Rather the forms are assumed to be known through a number of avenues ,e.g. recollection and through processes of dialectical reasoning. This hypothesis has a number of tasks to perform and various difficulties can be seen to stem from an inability to completely harmonize this diversity. The forms are invoked to unify various fields of thought, e.g. the mathematical, sense perception, ethical, religious, political, etc. In another quotation similar to the one I used to open this chapter we can glimpse something of the variety of tasks imposed upon the theory of forms.

....filled with God, he has in perfect stillness attained isolation; ....utterly resting he has become very rest. He belongs no longer to the order of the beautiful; he has risen beyond beauty; he has overpassed even the choir of the virtues; he is like one who, having penetrated the inner sanctuary, leaves the temple images behind him - though these become once more first object of regard when he leaves the hollies; for There his converse is not with image, not with trace, but with the very Truth in the view of which all else is but of secondary concern.
                                                       
	In this quotation we can find an implied element of irony for indirectly the province of the forms is compared to a hierarchy of temple images. First we leave behind matters dealing with beauty, then the philosopher bypasses concerns of an ethical nature to confront the very being of Truth itself. As Plotinus states all else is secondary. Although central to the metaphysics of Plato the forms are not so prominently placed in the philosophy of Plotinus. On his own implicit admission we find them hierarchically structured with respect to themselves and dependent on the intellectual being of Nous which in turn is dependent upon the One from which all emanates. In a quotation just prior to this last one we can see this same type of stratification at work in the following manner....

Life in the Supreme is the native activity of Intellect; in virtue of that converse it brings forth gods, brings forth beauty, brings forth righteousness, brings forth all moral good, for of all these the soul is pregnant when filled with God.
	
	Between these two last quotations there is an apparent inconsistency for in becoming pregnant with god are we to assume we really leave behind the orders of the beautiful and ethical? Must we not, in order to harmonize these two quotations, perceive that at the level of the numinous that forms of beauty and morality, in effect all forms in distinction to the fields in which they have themselves applied, find themselves coming together and becoming as one? No longer, under this type of situation, can forms maintain a truly self-sufficient existence and this trend began by Plato now finds more consistent and explicit treatment. Thus with historical hindsight we can perceive the use of the concept of forms as being made to operate on at least two levels - in a number of fields, e.g. aesthetics and ethics, and also in such a manner as to integrate these miscellaneous provinces of application.
	As I earlier intimated the usefulness of the concept of the forms in Neoplatonic philosophy came to serve an absolutist platform and in the process emphasis passes from these beings to the very preconditional ground of being itself, i.e. the Absolute.
	In one sentence Plotinus tells us ....

It is in virtue of unity that beings are beings.
	
	In the same tractate he elaborates this theme...

Above all, unity is the First: but Intellectual-Principle, Ideas and Being, cannot be so; for any member of the realm of Forms is an aggregation, a compound, and therefore - since components must precede their compound - is a later.... In sum: The Unity cannot be the total of beings, for so its oneness is annulled, it cannot be the Intellectual-Principle, for so it would be that total which the Intellectual-Principle is,.... 

	Plotinus then asks the question....

What then must that Unity be, what nature is left for it?
No wonder that to state it is not easy; even Being and Form are not easy, though we have a way, an approach through the Ideas. 
	
	In answering this question Plotinus tells us that we have a way of coming to understanding the reality of this Unity. The one resource to hand is that the (my italics)....

Soul must see in its own way; this is by coalescence, unification;....
We are in search of unity; we are to come to know the principle of all, the Good and First; therefore we may not stand away from the realm of Firsts and lie prostrate among the lasts: we must strike for those Firsts, rising from things of the sense which are the lasts. Cleared of all evil intention toward the Good, we must ascend to the Principle within ourselves; from the many, we must come one;.... We shape ourselves into Intellectual-Principle, we make over our soul in trust to intellectual-Principle and set it firmly in That, thus what That sees the soul will waken to see;....
If the quester has the impression of extension or shape or mass attaching to That Nature he has not been led by Intellectual-Principle which is not of the order to see such things;.... only Intellectual-Principle can inform us of the things of its scope, its competence is upon its priors, its content and its issue: but even its content is outside sense; and still purer, still less touched by multiplicity, are its priors, or rather its Prior. 

	Plotinus gives the game away by saying in effect the Firsts (forms) are not the First or i.e. the One. Although we come to an understanding of the Nous through a contemplation of the forms and extracting our attention from the world of sense (and being like them with a purity in our moral intentions) ultimately we must bypass even the forms. It would appear from a reading of Plotinus that this last jump, in an act of faith on our part, proceeds more from the decision of the One itself. Then the One is experienced as a  presence overpassing all knowledge. As the forms are realized through the negation of the things that participate in those correspondent forms in a like fashion it is suggested we negate and abandon even the forms. From the point of view of the One even the Nous and its world of the forms is more an illusion and real only in so far as this realm is more real than the material world of sense. In this task Nous as a mediator between the world of sense and the One has the ability of directing its intellection in these two directions. To the former it looks outward, with respect to the latter it concentrates its attention and looks inward. In looking inward and accomplishing this highest state of vision Plotinus urges us to cut away everything! 
	In an absolute-orientated philosophy the absolute is perceived as being that which is preconditional to the world and all its spectrum of ontological categories as we come to know them. As Plotinus states that First is no being but precedent to all being. Basically, Plotinus' account of the One is to treat it as being that unity of ground presuppositional, preconditional and logically prior to the world of the material, sense perception, thought, the realm of the intellectual and the very forms themselves as they congregate in the living choir of the Nous. The structure of this account is therefore essentially three tier with two distinctive transitions. First the world is disvalued by redirecting our esteem and interest towards the realm of the intellectual, then a similar process is undertaken in our intuitive re-understanding of this realm of the intellectual in order to realize the presence of the absolute. This first transition is inherited from Plato. Plato, I believe, anticipates this second transition but its discussion and religious-philosophical investigation would correctly seem to occur only in an absolute-orientated philosophy that is sufficiently well developed in its powers of criticism, systematization, appreciation of the phenomenal, and when it recognizes a need to transcend the limitations of cognitive thought and language in order to appreciate the very roots of being that must by necessity be presuppositional and preconditional to such thought constructions in their intellectual distortion of this reality (on either or both personal or cosmic levels of intellection).
	The first tier, or meta-level of language discussion, concerns its self with the world as it is communicated on a normal public everyday basis. Essentially it an object-language which grounds itself in the utility of a natural-language.
	In distinction to the natural-language basis of the first level of language discussion the second level of exposition is an artificial-language designed to reinterpret the first through the prism of some type of philosophical attitude. When put into effect this allows us to reperceive and reinterpret the contents of the relative object-language in the light of this new attitude. In the transition from the former language context to the latter it would be claimed a process of insight is effectively engineered. In both the Neoplatonic and Buddhist frames of reference this transition involves a movement to a pluralistic world of epistemic entities that deal in their respective fashions directly or indirectly with universals. In the Neoplatonic context they are affirmed as more real than their expressed particulars whilst in the Buddhist context as universals they are denied and initially treated as thought constructions secondary to specific combinations of unique momentary particulars (dha-rmas). In either case the deeper motivation is basically the same even though the end result is expressed differently in these two traditions. Together both can be seen to initially invite us to retranslate the world through a schema that results in our reperceiving it as an expression of one all encompassing ontological category that involves a large number of elemental components.
	In a second transition the meta-translation of the object-language is itself subjected to further criticism in order to realize the underlying unity of those pluralistic elements or principles invoked in our first transition. Seemingly divorced from the realm of the multiple both traditions, however, come to equate this absolute vista with the phenomenal experience of the relative world in so far as the latter is allowed to be derived from the former though the discursive and constructive ability of consciousness. 
	This meta-meta-language discussion of absolute-orientated discourse through its double removal from the normal realm of description derived from a public world of sense-reports has within its powers a number of techniques in order to meaningfully manipulate language which essentially must remains embedded in its natural object-grounded foundations. Metaphors can be chosen and qualified, criticisms can be expressed pointing out the perceived limitations of relative discourse, items defined in the meta-language can be negated in a process of negative theological treatment. In this regard we can examine the following quotation and perceive the use of metaphor (in this case of generation), qualification and processes of negation seeing the interplay of these various meta-levels of language.

Generative of all, The Unity is none of all; neither thing nor quantity nor quality nor intellect nor soul; not in motion, not at rest, not in time: it is self-defined, unique in form or, better, formless, existing before Form was, or Movement or Rest, all of which are attachments of Being and make Being the manifold it is.

	Let us now turn our attention to an examination of our Buddhist Tradition and investigate the manner in which the traditional theory of dharmas came to be treated therein.

	Dharmas are momentary entity-like features argued for by various traditional Buddhist schools in the scholastic development of their respective philosophical positions. Various lists detailing the number of types of different dharmic features proposed by these various schools became formulated and commentated upon. Essentially these lists agree in their more basic categories and only differ in the number of dharmic features proposed for these more traditional subdivisions. Besides disputes over the question of the appropriate number of dharmic features per basic category philosophical debate centered on more divisive issues of their ontological nature, their role in matters of identity, their implication in questions of time and causality, their relationship to consciousness and experience, etc. These dharmas also played a role in meditational analysis of experiential-reality as perceived in the Buddhist perspective. It would appear that the primary overall motivational reason for their proposal was the reductive desire of this type of philosophical attitude to make, in its quest to see the experiential-world as it is in itself, no appeals to substances, souls and other persistent unchanging entities. It was claimed that through the development of meditational insight into the phenomenal world of sense perception one could come to realize therein a lack of substantial reality beneath the presentations of things and personalities. That ultimately all reality could be reduced to assemblages of essential momentary irreducibles that were substance-less and ego-less.
	The word dharma has many technical senses in the Buddhist and Hindu Traditions and the appropriate meaning is usually determined contextually. In the plural it has, however, a unique Buddhist usage as briefly introduced above. This particular usage has presented Western scholarship with a long history of problematic interpretation and much controversy has arisen from the very difficulty of trying to comprehend this terminological concept, moreover, the particular Buddhist Traditions themselves have disagreed about the nature of their constitution and the manner of their interaction. In philosophical discourse this term is best left untranslated as there is no safe western equivalent to substitute in its place. In coming to understand the constituent concepts behind its proposal we have, however, thankfully at hand, a number of other possible stratagems, e.g. an analysis of its historical development, examination of its textual instantiation in the light of associated commentaries, an understanding of the motivation behind its proposal and a general philosophical appreciation of its usage.
	It would appear that the term developed as the Philosophical Division (abhidharma) of the Buddhist scriptural tradition developed in its oral pre-written format finding its classical scholastic definitions in the commitment of this tradition to a literary form along with its philosophical amplification through the use of commentaries which in turn heavily reflect the debates between the various schools in this regard. Lists are an important component in an oral tradition and this aspect is also prevalent in the literary construction of the Rules of Discipline (vinaya) and the Religious Discourses (sutras). It would appear that this type of reductive philosophy developed and grew out of the materialistically influenced Sankhya-Yogic Traditions but with the important philosophical difference that the persistence of identity was not seen to be supported by the presence of changeless substantial entities. This shift from a substance-attribute attitude to that of a process-orientated analysis of phenomena marks an essential differential characteristic of the Buddhist Tradition from its general Hindu context (which in many ways runs counter to the subject-predicate structure of the Indo-Aryan family of languages).
	The term dharma normally supports a cluster of meanings that center themselves around the senses of law, duty, doctrine, truth, way or path of righteousness, natural order, etc. In the distinctive plural form there is some indirect association with this general ground through seeing the sense of these dharmic-factors as essential principles or forces, or laws of nature, that through some form of necessity help maintain the appearance of identificational stability in the phenomenal world. Although these dharmic forces are momentary their distinctive congregation and causal propagation in a stream or flow of existence (san-tana) continuously recreate and thence maintain the phenomenal appearance or illusion of persistent identity.
	Initially it would appear that the word dharmas was a term loosely applied to a list of types of mental states with doctrinal and/or moral overtones whose features could be better discerned in a meditative state of reflection and whose development should either be promoted or discouraged, e.g. the formulation of the seven dharmas on the side of enlightenment. Along with this loose generally unsystematic usage there is a more strict and specific use of this idea in its application to the classifications of the skandhas, the ayatanas and the dhatus.
	In the desire to reductively demonstrate the non-existence of the soul or ego a very early Buddhist formula dissolves the self into five heaps (skandhas), namely, form, feeling, perceptions, impulses and general consciousness. The first heap treats the body of the person as just the presentation of a material form whilst the latter four categories have a distinctive psychological bias. As well, between these five categories, the whole world and all its experiences can be reductively treated to such analysis and in the process the need for the persistence of unchanging language and mentally based entities can be done away with. Under these five fundamental headings all conditioned dharmic-forces can then be subsumed. 
	An elaboration of this schema invokes the categories of the ayatanas and the dhatus. Ayatanas are bases of cognition and are equally divided between the six senses (mind being the sixth) in regards to a faculty of sense cognition in conjunction with its corresponding object giving us twelve items all told. Extending this idea to the process interaction of the sense faculty in conjunction with its object realizes six more sub-categories of the dhatus, namely, visual consciousness, auditory consciousness,.... non-sensuous men-tal consciousness. 
	Under these basic categories various lists of conditioned dharmic-elements were subsumed in accordance with the particular philosophical tenets and dictates of the  school proposing such tables. Finally, to complete the list, a miscellaneous number of unconditioned factors were added. In the light of this schematization the world of experiential reality could then be reexamined and redescribed as a specific and coordinated pattern of interdependent dharmic factors. Allied with practices of meditation the whole process could be seen as akin to some form of scientific-like investigation of the phenomenal with the successful reception of insight, as defined by this system, giving validation to, and reinforcing, the fabric of this applied schema.
	Although sometimes translated and described as elements dharmas are more correctly seen as non-substantial predicational-like qualities that act like forces with the proviso that their existence or manifestation be recognized as momentary. In the Buddhist perspective universals are nominalistically treated as fabrications created and reified beyond their language dependent basis. In a dharmic analysis they are seen as secondary to the primary facticity of dharmas. Accepting the fundamental Buddhist dictum that everything is subject to change (sarvam anityam) the dharmic theory takes this principle to heart by proposing the momentary existence of these unique particulars whose staccato-like existences amount to no more than their simultaneous flashing into and out of existence in a stream of phenomenal flux whose essential perception is conveniently arranged under the auspices of some nominated concept. Finding an English philosophical equivalent that matches its usual meaning with this sense of momentary procession is therefore not without some difficulty although there are some terms that do seem to approximate this particular type of situation. One term that has been suggested is that of principles a word that does convey their non-substantial nature, their process-activity, their apparent individuation but for all that does not indicate or allude to their momentary existential status. 

	The theoretical structure of dharmic theory finds a thorough reformulation under the great Buddhist logicians and epistemologists Dignaga (ca.480-540 A.D.) and Dharma-kirti (ca.600-660). The latter philosopher treats the nature of dharmas in the following fashion. He perceives them to be basically indescribable in empirical perception and without the appreciation of a yogic-based insight we perceive instead the stream (cetana) of these momentary forces or factors. On the momentary nature of these dharmas a summary of his analysis would show that they are characterized as causally efficient, real, unique, changeless, inexpressible, particular and related directly to sensation as that which is given prior to our cognitive-intellectual awareness of the same. On the other hand the perception of this stream of dharmic activity is seen as secondary being, more correctly, a series of constructions generated by mind that conceal the absolute reality of its dharmic constitution. Consequently, the appearance of this perceptual reality can be characterized by the opposite of those features that essentially distinguish the momentary nature of dharmas, i.e. as that which is causally inefficient, fictional, common or general, changeable, expressible, universal and related to judgment. An implication of such analysis is that we are presented with two truths, namely, an absolute truth that operates at the level of the dharmas themselves and an empirical or conventional truth that is constructed by the powers of the imagination on a level secondary to this dharmic content. This secondary level of mental activity is seen as effectively concealing this dharmic aspect and to operate in the realm of discursive thought and judgment, in that language based form that characterizes public discourse. This latter truth, although pragmatically viable on an empirical level, effectively conceals the true reality of the world in its dharmic constitution.
	In such a schema we can find, in structural terms of reference, much that appears to be held in common with the Platonic operation of forms. Although the forms are unchanging universals and the dharmas are momentary particulars the nett result of their respective operation in the phenomenal world of experience and perception is to all purposes practically the same. Both forms and dharmas are indescribable, both transcend the temporal-spatial constitution of the empirical appearance of the world, both are also simultaneously immanent to the same, both account for the appearance of change and identity in the world and the fact that there can be knowledge in the midst of such flux.
	The raison d'être behind a dharmic analysis would appear to be the establishment of a rationale for the reductive, meditational and process-orientation of Buddhist philosophy both in the interpretation of its own texts and in its interaction with, and in maintaining its distinction from, non-Buddhist traditions. With its doctrinal emphasis on the impermanence of empirical reality, its reductive dismissals of the personality, universals and the nature of things in general and the meditational emphasis upon phenomenalogically orientated analysis of experiential processes the Buddhist Tradition from its very inception presented itself as a distinctively different type of project in the midst of the Hindu world where the traditional emphasis was on a subject-attribute language-based attitude. 
	In an attempt to understand the nature of this difference let me enter into the following short digression. I would contend that for a simple non-complex proposition to be meaningful it must be constructed of at least two cognitive components, namely, a logical-subject orientated aspect coupled to a functional component that qualifies that logical-subject with either a predicational-qualification or a relational-qualification. Normally language is primarily centered in its concern for the qualification of its logical-subjects with a weighted emphasis upon the logical subjectivity of the proposition. Only in reflection does the emphasis of our attention rarely switch to an examination of the functional nature of our predicational or relational qualifications per se turning the latter into logical-subjects for what becomes in effect a meta-analysis of the propositional state of consciousness. It would appear that to switch the emphasis of our attention to the functional at the expense of the static subjectivity of the logical- subject would involve an opening up of ourselves to the dynamic process-orientated nature of the cognitive process as it goes about the construction of propositional proposals. Normally we attend to the end results of our cogitations and overpass the process of their construction and thereby focus our interest on the logical-subject in its relatively-final fixed state of qualification. Now to reorientate our attention upon the process of qualification, I believe, also heads us towards a reductively biased attitude with a phenomenalistic-like interest and emphasis on the essential nature of that qualification. Altogether the overall shift of our interest towards the qualificational aspect of propositional functions induces those tendencies that favour the reductive approach, meta-level shifts in language expression, an emphasis on the dynamic, a disvaluation of the logically-subjective, and a general emphasis on processes. Moreover, I would argue, that this trend away from traditional language based habits of intellection is as equally viable as more traditional types of philosophical practices but that neither style of analysis can completely dismiss the other and go it alone. Correctly, the generation and reception of meaningfulness necessitates the cooperation of both logical-subjects and their applied qualificational functions. Finally, we can note that an emphasis on the logical-subjectivity of propositional structures tends to imply a dependence on the logical with its insistence on the principle of non-contradiction, whilst, on the other hand, an emphasis on the functional nature of qualification induces a more dialectical-like approach. Consequently a process-orientated emphasis on the functional nature of qualification would be more inclined to permit the presence of unqualified contradictions, inconsistencies and paradoxes. In a general comparison of Buddhist Traditions with the overall nature of Greek Philosophy we should find that the former have less trouble with the acceptance of such logical dissonance. Where Greek Philosophy has an acceptance of contradiction, etc. then there is a shift towards a process-orientated type of analysis (like that found in Heraclitus, e.g.?)? An image springs to mind that might help us come to understand this possibility of the dialectical being able to enter into propositional structures. 
	Around a potential victim birds, wasps, bees, spiders and other insects can all equally gather in contest but once the victim is stung and trapped by its predator it is so bound in its fate by that particular force. In a like fashion as forces all manner of predications and relations can gather in a process about a logical-subject but once that logical-subject is attached to a particular qualifying force that facet of it becomes bound by such qualification until such time that that situation is essentially altered.
	The general motivation behind a process-orientated dharmic-style of analysis would appear to be the desire to fully explicate this reductive attitude and thereby maintain the strength and integrity of the Buddhist Tradition in its interaction with, and difference from, the Hindu Traditions both orthodox and heterodox. The specific motivation behind this type of project is the creation of insight (prajna) and, more particularly, the achievement of salvation (nirvana). Effectively this type of tradition tries to persuade us to examine our everyday normal interpretation of the world in our experience of it and subject it to a reinterpretation in the light of a dharmic-analysis. In this process of reflection the empirical object-language of worldly experience becomes subjected to a meta-level transformation through the grid of dharmic theory. Speaking metaphorically the object-language in its transformation, through the process of reinterpretation, could be seen as being made to pass through a sieve with those entities not being able to pass through having to be further ground down in order to facilitate their final passage. The resultant meta-language translation of the object-language ensures the dissolution of certain types of conceptual entities originally entertained in the object-language. In this fashion the Buddhist argues, from their perception of the absolute point of view, i.e. from the theoretical point of view of the truth of things in themselves (yatha bhutam), that personalities or egos, universals and things in general have no real existence. These entities that only exist in the context of the object-language can therefore not be real as only those features expressible in the meta-language are to be accepted as such. Although treated as relevant in the object-language these mentally constructed fruitful-fictions (prajnapti) can only be useful in those restricted non-real public terms of reference. In the midst of a process of meditation, or analysis (vicara), this type of realization is claimed to be enlightening and new attitudes to empirical experience are engendered that would appear to assist a spiritual transformation of the person.
	In hindsight we can appreciate the direction and overall momentum of the exercise of this type of reductive attitude as the process of Buddhist history continued to unfold itself realizing a point in time when even its utilization of apparently irreducible factors (dharmas) themselves became subjected to a reductive criticism. This new critical attitude would appear to have developed with the Sautrantika (ca. 100 B.C.?) finding a more complete explication with the Buddhist-Wisdom Tradition and its philosophical systematization in and through the Madhyamaka. Now the theory of dharmas, itself a theory of criticism, is subjected to an intense presuppositional criticism and the conclusion is arrived at that even dharmas themselves are imaginative constructions of the mind and therefore in their own right fruitful fictions useful in (the realm of meditation e.g.) but for all their utility definitely not real. Just as the apparent self-existence (svabhava) of things and personalities was analyzed, through argument and meditation, and found to be wanting, in a like fashion the apparent self-existence of dharmas was equally attacked and found to be deficient. 
	Just as the platonic theory of forms can be seen as a critique of the naive realistic point of view so too can dharmic analysis be seen in a similar light. Moreover, with the passage of time these critical perspectives themselves came to be subjected to critical investigation and the advent of this transition saw the development of this type of absolute philosophy as we have previously defined its essential characteristics. In this regard we are presented with a profound isomorphic structural correspondence between these two traditions that allows us to enter into a productive comparative analysis. 
	Basically religious language defined in the meta-language treatment of an object-language discourse becomes the subject matter for a critically conducted process of negational critique. Negation, however, does not negate religious terminology or religious concepts in a destructive sense but modifies them, demonstrates their restrictions or limits. To a certain degree religious language is de-constructed and then re-constructed in the light of this type of absolutism. This type of three tier structure, as found in the critical meta-meta-language treatment of a traditional-critical treatment of an object-language, would appear to have been adopted by both traditions as one of the methodological avenues developed by them in their attempt to discuss the nature of the Absolute from the point of view of the absolute. The mechanics of this negative theological approach can not be understood if the process of the via negativa is read on one level of language only. Correctly three levels at least are involved with two transitions taking place between them. This vertical tripartite structure is a fundamental feature of the absolute approach as previously defined and marks out a prominent structural feature isomorphic to both traditions. At this point in time let me map out some of the essential features of this isomorphic aspect and let me do this using the following schema.
	Realizing the religious necessity to develop ways of relating the Absolute to the world of relativity, to rectify the tendency for their increased logical separation engendered by the intellectual historical trends preconditional to the development of this critical absolutist approach, various stratagems were adopted in order to cross over this otherwise increasingly unbridgeable gap. These attempts can be more easily understood and appreciated when approached via the following schema. Taking a two truths approach, i.e. an absolute realm (of things as they are in themselves) and a realm of relativity, we can come to view either from the same point of view or from its alternative. This gives us the following formula....

i	The Absolute from the point of view of the absolute,
ii	The Absolute from the point of view of the relative,
iii	The Relative from the point of view of the absolute,
iv	The Relative from the point of view of the relative.

	Negative theological treatment concerns itself with the attempt to articulate the nature of the Absolute from the point of view of the absolute. Language ostensively ceases to be used in a descriptive fashion and adopts a pragmatic type of approach severely criticizing in the process ordinary language usage and its everyday naive way of seeing the world.
	Our second category has implicit theological overtones. The numinosity of the Absolute, and its reputed experience, being treated as something religious or spiritual, this aspect being subjected to an explicit or implicit explication to some degree or other.
	The Relative from the point of view of the absolute in this type of philosophy is perceived as something in the manner of an illusion or dream, etc. Such disvaluation being subjected to various qualifications as previously outlined that separate this approach from being mis-labelled as extreme scepticism, nihilism or nonsense. An hierarchical vision of the world is also implicated with the potential for some form of an emanational-like generation from the Absolute.
	The last category perceives some relative value in the world from the empirical point of view. Under this heading traditional treatment of universals, their preservation of identity under change, etc., is allowed to operate, within these restricted terms of reference, without critical interference from the point of view of the absolute.
	Let me now illustrate using this classificational scheme some of the prominent features of this isomorphic structural correspondence that I believe are held in common between these two traditions. Compare the following quotations from Plotinus with their more or less equivalent Buddhist counterparts.
	In discussing the concept of the One in relation to the possibility of its own self-consciousness, i.e. the Absolute from the point of view of the absolute, Plotinus states....
	
....the Supreme does not know itself as Good.
As what then?
No such foreign matter is present to it: it can have only an immediate intuition self-directed.

	In comparison we can note the following similarities...

.... you should contemplate the true reality of dharmas, i.e. that all dharmas are without defilement and purification. For all dharmas are empty in their own-being.

Perfect wisdom neither knows nor perceives.
From purity....
Perfect wisdom neither helps nor hinders all-knowledge.

Deep, O Lord is perfect wisdom. Certainly as a great enterprise has this perfection of wisdom been set up, as an enterprise which equals the unequaled....
And why is it an unthinkable enterprise? Because unthinkable are Tathagatahood, Buddhahood, Self-Existence, and the state of all-knowledge. And on these one cannot reflect with one's thought, since they cannot be an object of thought, or of volition, or of any of the dharmas which constitute thought.

In that Beyond there is no discrimination. Through their non-discrimination do all dharmas become fully known to the Bodhisattvas.

	In these four quotations we are informed, in the first, that the reality of reality (the reality of dharmas) is without both defilement and purification, i.e. that correctly an appellation of goodness is not possible to make as such an evaluation is just not applicable (of the Absolute from the point of view of the absolute). In the second quotation we are informed that the perfection of wisdom neither knows nor perceives (as a subject), and in the third that it is unthinkable (as an object for us to entertain) whilst the fourth quotation tells us that in that Beyond there is no discrimination. Yet, for all that, without the perfection of wisdom there would be no wisdom and its intuition of all-knowledge.
	On this aspect of the trans-conscious self-consciousness of the Absolute the Neoplatonic Tradition would appear to have this notion more fully explicated in comparison to the more implicit treatment by the Buddhist Wisdom Tradition. On the other hand this latter tradition is a lot less reluctant to criticize and transcend their traditional treatment of universals. In the Wisdom Tradition dharmas are continuously disvalued. In the same type of breath there are often long lists of traditional religious items subjected to negation or contradiction and a consequent disvaluation or de-emphasization. In this regard, in comparison, Plotinus is often reluctant to dismiss the dominating role of the Platonic forms but there are times when his intellectual honesty forces him to diminish the primal status of these beings and to make comments like the following....

But, first, if multiplicity holds a true place among the Beings, how can it be an evil?
As existent it possesses unity; it is a unit-multiple, saved from stark multiplicity; but it is a lessened unity and, by that interwoven multiplicity, it is evil in comparison with unity pure.

	In a similar fashion the primary role of the scholastic dharmas became de-emphasized. Subjected to negation, criticism, disvaluation, dismissal, forms of contradiction these philosophical-entities were effectively transcended, but not bypassed, in the development of a philosophical vision of the Absolute. With the advent of the absolute-type of approach taking a more central position in religious discourse these multiple entities or realities became more like stepping stones in the articulation of the sense of the absolute. In this type of treatment they effectively have preserved for themselves a religious role, albeit a diminished one, and in this manner perpetuate the religious usefulness they had previously acquired. Invocation of the Absolute by itself as a sufficient explanation for the existence of universal categories, the preservation of identity through change, etc. would seem bound to fail for the lack of some form of adequate metaphorical mediation between these philosophical realms of the Relative and Absolute. Ultimately, from the absolute point of view, there is only the One, Suchness, etc. and the world of relativity is identified with the same but this process of identification, convenient as it may be, remains philosophically and religiously unsatisfactory. In order to account for the relationship between absolute and relative by other means other intellectual devices are introduced, explicitly or implicitly, e.g. emanation, concepts dealing with transcendence-immanence, processes of abstraction, sacralization of the relative (by the divine and through ritual or theurgy), revelation, meditation, prayer, etc.
	Both forms and dharmas are critical schemes proposed for a number of philosophical reasons with religious overtones. The sense of the Absolute considered from the absolute point of view in the process of its development subjects these critical schemes themselves in turn to criticism and being dependent upon this complex substrata cannot overthrow and remove such a basis without disestablishing its own critical super-structural development. In such a light forms and dharmas become effectively redefined preserving their utilization but with a diminished status. Allowed to continue in their traditional operation, but restricted to the relative world from the relative point of view, these entities also act as stepping stones in processes of negative theological critique. Under such treatment, and being systematically redefined in the light of some form of absolutism, these meta-level devices become increasingly more sophisticated in their overall philosophical formulation. Moreover, an experiential element also appears to be preserved in their continued proposal, assisting an insightful intuition that is allowed to realize this absolute point of view. This state of realization being seen to arise through the intuitive receptivity and activity of a spiritually productive state of wisdom founded in, and grounded upon, some form of analysis of the world-condition. Again, in this regard, both traditions are very close to the essential nature of the other.
	As I have indicated previously dharmas and forms in the development of the absolute perspective are used in the manner suggesting the metaphor of stepping stones. In the negative theological treatment of these conceptual entities the vision of the Absolute is pointed to and characterized as being in some way not related to the nature of that conceptualized item as it is allowed to express itself, but, rather, by implication, to be centered on that ground that is immanent and transcendent to such a feature. In the Buddhist Wisdom Tradition this utilization of the via negativa often occurs in the form of paragraphs containing lengthy lists of negations and in this regard The Perfection of Wisdom in 8,000 Verses is no exception, e.g.... 

As simply empty has the Tathagata described all dharmas.
And, being empty, they are also inexhaustible. And what is emptiness, that is also immeasurableness. Therefore then according to ultimate reality, no distinction or difference can be apprehended between these dharmas. As talk have they been described by the Tathagata. One just talks when one speaks of `immeasurable', or `incalculable,' or `inexpressible,' or of `empty,' or `signless,' or `wishless,' or the `Unaffected,' or `Non-production,' `no-birth', `non-existence,' `dispassion,' `cessation,' `Nirvana.'

	In comparison we can note the following quotation....

It (the One as Authentic Beauty) can be no shape, no power, nor the total of powers and shapes.... it must stand above all the powers, all the patterns. The origin of all this must be the formless....
It can be none of existing things; yet it is all:.... no extension; it must be limitless and so without magnitude;...

	With respect to Plotinus any form of negation must in some fashion negate the appropriate form. The attempt to describe the Absolute, or more correctly point out its transcendent existence, must involve some transcendence of the form just as the form itself must in some way transcend its spacio-temporal instantiations. As Plotinus states it must stand above all the powers, all the patterns and by implication the forms as well. The consequence of all this is that forms (and dharmas) are made to do even more work, to work overtime and to suffer at the same time a diminishment of their status with the introduction of the sense of the absolute.
	Accompanying attempts to discover the essential nature of the Absolute from the point of view of the absolute are plentiful disclaimers circulated to the effect that language must ultimately fail us in this regard.
	An interest in the Absolute from the point of view of the relative would appear to impart a theological-like tenor to this type of philosophy. This does not imply the admis-sion of an anthropomorphism although some metaphorical imagery does hint of its presence, a residual element that does find some reinforcement through the strong undercurrent of devotionalism. With Plotinus we have his addressing the Absolute as Father and in the Buddhist Wisdom Tradition we find the personification, metaphorically and iconographically, of Wisdom (Prajnaparamita) in feminine terms. Coincidentally Plotinus also refers to the personification of wisdom (sophia) as feminine in presence. With this philosopher the divine, its being and presence, also has functions more in keeping with a godhead than a creator god. There is an emphasis on power without active production, in emanation there is a sort of material-like bubbling over of creativity without the divine moving or actually being involved in the active creation of material relatively lesser to the nature of itself. Interestingly, in comparison, our Buddhist text tells us (my italics)....

Perfect wisdom does not reproduce herself.  

Also all dharmas are isolated in their essential nature. And the isolatedness of the essential nature of all dharmas is identical with the nature of the perfection of wisdom. For the Tathagata has fully known all dharmas as not made.

	In the appreciation of the relative from the point of view of the Absolute this type of philosophy insists that we would discover that the world is an illusion. This aspect of the illusion discovered in this vision is, however, heavily qualified and the empirical validity of the world of appear-ance is not dismissed only its claim to present an authentic picture of the reality of reality (vis à vis the Absolute) is in dispute. Concomitant with this type of position is a consequent disvaluation of the relative world, an examination of this third perspective having been dealt with in detail in Chapter II. Interestingly in this regard the attitude that concerns itself with, or looks outward into, the relative world of multiplicity is regarded as being spiritually immoral. In both traditions there is an equal distaste for the multiple. In The Perfection of Wisdom in 8,000 Lines and Its Verse Summary we are told....

Intent on the perception of multiplicity 	he is perfectly immoral.
He is faulty in his morality, not       	perfectly pure in it.             
He who has no notion of I and no notion 	of a being,
He has performed the withdrawal from     	perception,....      
He has been proclaimed by the Leader as 	restrained by morality.

	In a similar fashion Plotinus states....

In sum, we must withdraw from all the extern, pointed wholly inwards; no leaning to the outer; the total of things ignored, first in their relation to us and later in the very idea; the self put out of mind in the contemplation of the Supreme;....

Otherwise, as Plotinus states, in our turning away from the real or the Absolute (my italics)....

Our being is the fuller for our turning Thither;.... here it has its Act, its true knowing; here it is immune. Here is living, the true; that of to-day, all living apart from Him, is but a shadow, a mimicry.

	In the realm of the Relative from the point of view of the relative it would appear that the theories of dharmas and forms are allowed to operate, as they did traditionally, without restrictions. Negative theological treatment it would appear only restricts their operation when they step beyond their transcendental employment as empirical structures (pertaining correctly only to our understanding of the empirical). These pre-scientific hypotheses, however, can not be radically dismissed in a negative theological critique for the very fact and persistence of that critique itself necessitates their continued existence, or similar, in order for it to persist in its ongoing negational operation. The result of such a critical symbiotic interrelationship is the re-examination and re-definition of these theoretical structures effectively disvaluing these religious realities when their application is made to extend beyond their empirical employment whilst, at the same time, utilizing their relative incapacitation (to pass beyond this boundary that separates Absolute from Relative) as a methodological device in the articulation of a sense of the absolute. Outside their interpretation of the relative world of the empirical their disvalued utility can only be pragmatic, potentially experiential (through some form of intellectual provocation or revelation) and indirectly non-descriptive in scope. In our investigations this aspect can be subsumed under a functional examination of those textual indications, in the light of the total religious context, that properly suggest such an aspect. In this regard we are left with an examination of relevant textual sources and the textually transmitted reports of religious experiences relevant to this topic.

The Functional Aspect of the Via Negativa.

	It stands to reason that entering into repeated pro-cesses of philosophical negation is going to be found, on retrospective reflection, to be either a productive and fruitfully useful exercise, or, as a useless and pointless expenditure of time. It would seem to suggest, therefore, an inadequate appreciation on our part to regard this textual emphasis on negation in these two traditions as a mere exercise in intellectual wastefulness. Such a pursuit must have delivered some form of payoff or benefit in order to explain the frequency of its much laboured persistence. Unwittingly philosophers may embark on a course that results in a definite dead end, that would appear to be often the case, but for all that much good must also come out of such an exercise through an appreciation of the fact that it informs us, on retrospective reflection, that we need to redirect our efforts towards some other direction or develop wider terms of reference. Rather than seeing the increased emphasis on the via negativa developed in this period of time as a dead end it would appear, on the contrary, to be have been, and to have been seen, as more of an attempt to make an exciting and positive exit from the relatively fruitless world of the interminable debates conducted between, and within, traditionally opposed religious schools. The novel consequences of this approach must have quickly carved out for itself a new place or niche in the religious psyche assisted by the pressures induced by the psychological consequences of the critical disvaluation of traditional positive theology. The advent of this type of philosophical inquiry in the Indian World radically restructured its entire philosophical format, at least on those influential margins of it, leaving behind those traditions that ignored this new ground or that inadequately adapted themselves to its critical onslaught. The same type of revolution must have occurred in the Western World and this fact might explain the loss of many of its relatively less critical traditions, Paganism included. On the other hand the relative dis-inclination of the Christian World to take up a fully developed negative theology (after the demise of the Neoplatonic Tradition in Alexandria and Athens, etc.) may well indicate a general decline in intellectual standards with the political breaking up of the Graeco-Roman world and its consequent de-urbanization, especially in the western half of Europe, postponing its general acceptance and recognition.
	Plotinus makes an experiential claim for the correctly conducted pursuit of the via negativa. This type of exercise, he would claim, is not a mere indulgence in a negativistic or passive form of philosophicalization but an awakening of our understanding into what is really true or truly real. Under the auspices of the Nous both the thinker and the object of thought merge realizing their more fundamental nature, as a unity, from the point of view of the Absolute. In this attempt to describe the Absolute a method is prescribed that claims we can also come to experience the essential and unified nature of this absolute. Such experience however is neither perceptual nor conceptual and appears to be open to discursive thought, albeit indirectly, only retrospectively to its original-immediate intuition. Plotinus makes numerous references to such a process of experiential insight although the details are more alluded to through the use of analogy and metaphor. One avenue of approach that appears to be stressed is that found through some form of meditation on the forms and then from the level of Nous a transcendence of the same and along with it in such flight, by implication, a transcendence of the forms in turn. In a similar fashion dharmas appear to be entertained and then transcended in turn. Compare the following two quotations.

No wonder that to state it is not easy; even Being and Form are not easy, though we have a way, an approach through the Ideas.... thus what That sees the soul will waken to see; it is through the Intellectual-Principle that we have this vision of The Unity: it must be our care to bring over nothing whatever from sense, to allow nothing even of soul to enter into Intellectual-Principle: with Intellect pure, and with the summit of Intellect, we are to see the All-Pure.... The Unity, then, is not Intellectual-Principle but something higher still.

	In comparison we can note that our Buddhist text echoes the same types of ideas ....

Deep is this perfection of wisdom. Hard to win, exceedingly hard to win is full enlightenment,...
How can the Lord say that full enlightenment is hard to win,.... when there is no one who can win enlightenment? For, owing to the emptiness of all dharmas, no dharma exists that would be able to win full enlightenment....

	In both quotations we are told that this ultimate experience is difficult to obtain, moreover, both forms and dharmas indicate an avenue or approach in our coming to some understanding or intuition into the nature of the Absolute. But, however, in the final analysis even these multiple religious entities must be transcended along with the realm of appearances that they are made to structure (in empirical terms of reference). In this regard emptiness would seem to suggest a transcendence of that which is declared to be empty. Of course the logical subjectivity in the expression that states x is empty can only have a provisional and empirical relevance for from the point of view of the Absolute the same is equally denied. 
	It is interesting to note that the Buddhist term samvrti-satya (relative or conventional truth), in the doctrine of Two Truths, has an etymology based on the sense of covering up or veiling, that aspect that distorts the reality of things as they really are, moreover, it is claimed that this distortion is the result of cognitive intellection in its dichotomization of concepts and conceptual components and their reification and ontologicalization as self-existent and unchanging substances. Absolutism as a philosophy is committed to making this distinction of things as they are in distinction to how they appear. The basic intellectual conflict between these two modes, however, resides in the manner in which the two aspects of the dichotomy are to be formulated and treated. In the Buddhist context dharmic reality was treated as the causally efficient whilst the concealed truth of the relative and empirical is seen as being mistreated in a static reificational mode. On the other hand in the Neoplatonic context the static substantial reality of the forms was contrasted with the relative unreality of the changing fragmentary nature of the empirical. With the full advent of absolutism, however, much of this apparent dichotomy in either tradition, between the relative and the absolute is resolved, through advocating an absolute-relative distinction in which, correctly, the Absolute transcends all empirical-like appellations of a relative nature. In other words the sense of the absolute is so constructed that it attempts to totally transcend dichotomies, e.g. change versus changelessness, etc. and thereby defuse these types of dilemmas that are made to interpose between forms or dharmas and the empirical world.
	The concept of two truths is made explicit in this Buddhist context, on the other hand, in the Neoplatonic context this necessary feature is left relatively implicit and blurred by the maintenance of a still dominant and central role for the forms both individually and collectively as Nous. However in Plotinus' final account the forms must go, loose their role as absolutely ultimate entities. In this regard forms must take on something of the disvalued, illusive and emanationally derived nature previously handed out to those entities in the realm of the everyday world. For Plotinus the process of emanation can be likened to the metaphor of one face being seen as many images in a mirror whereas from the absolute point of view reality is one, has one face. In the same manner but not to the same degree forms must also be treated. In searching for this One Plotinus tells us to strip away the alien and the metaphor is adopted in illustration of this of the purification of gold ore in the quest for pure gold. Another metaphor is also adopted from the enactment of the mysteries in the progressive removal of layers of garments until such a time is reached that the aspirant is left completely naked, symbolically pure. By implication the reality of reality is a transcendent and immanent unified whole that is distorted, if not concealed, by intellectual processes. It follows that by stripping away such concretion reality itself finds itself revealed. As I have stated before, in connection with this type of position between the real and the apparent, both of these two traditions have a heavy emphasis on the theoretical need for purity as a necessary first condition for the achievement of insight or wisdom, for the development and reception of spiritual intuition. 
	It is at this point that I would like to conclude this chapter by indicating the intimate connection that can be made between these isomorphic religious elements of purification, insight, analysis involving the use of the via negativa, devotional practices and this type of absolutism. 
	To begin with purification appears to have two spheres of application, namely, a more archaic level, derived from the desire for ritual purification, with an emphasis on a physical and moral purity predating the advent of philosophical absolutism and a more important aspect superimposed on the first of an intellectual-spiritual purification through the performance and exercise of a restructured and insightful pattern of thought. The increasing emphasis on the element of the intellectual necessary for the development of this type of sophisticated philosophical thinking, and dependent therefore on a reasonably high level of education, induces a number of important psychic changes both psychologically and socially. Increased educational standards assist in the general development of the ability for a society to enter more deeply into processes of reflection along with the increased powers of criticism concomitant with this. Psychologically this increased tendency for reflection is also reinvested in more thorough processes of self-criticism producing and inducing a greatly enhanced sense of conceptual-self or egotistic-self along with the potential for the expression of individuality that flows from such an exercise and appreciation (although paradoxically, at least superficially, a critical society attempts to straight-jacket deviant forms of individualistic behavior it considers to be ideologically unsound, thence the vehemence of the Reformation and Inquisition, e.g.). When this tendency reaches a critical degree of maturity cognitive criticism of self reaches an intensity of awareness that realizes the full dissonance of cognitive inconsistency that otherwise would not be intellectually appreciated as such. This discrepancy being discovered between the various historically and culturally accumulated compartments and layers of religious beliefs and practices that collectively constitute the religious psyche of a society and its individuals. Between the ideality of religious theory and practice and the social truth of the matter a vast distance is experienced. Critical intellectual emphasis placed upon ideal perfectionist tendencies exaggerating the intensity of this experience of cognitive dissonance and widening this perception of religious inadequacy. This gulf or rift is discovered, through processes of reflection, to occur within and between idealistic-prescriptive based attitudes and realistic-descriptive based attitudes of a society and/or individual and is experienced as an intense form of cognitive dissonance. In reaction to this relatively new critically-extreme perspective, in an attempt to diminish and overcome this sense of dissonance and inadequacy, there develop new forms of social activity ushering in e.g. processes of reformation, etc. indicating what I have previously termed as a reformational-type mentality. This sees unleashed patterns of behavior, both socially and psychologically, that one finds in periods of religious and political iconoclasm, revolution and reformation along with their new emphasis on the word (in a rational non-magical sense) and not the image, their emphasis on ideological purity, behavioral and moral consistency, their emphasis on individuality along with intense social conformity.
	It would appear, however, that the birth of absolutism arose with the initial development of this increased cognitive awareness and not with its more developed reformational phase. Under these initial circumstances emphasis is on a more scholastic approach with a desire for systematization without an awareness of an intense cognitive dissonance that would be felt if critical tendencies were more extremely developed. Although a gulf has widened between the sense of the numinous (experienced as an ideal) and the sense of the profane (that seen as the empirical every day world) this distance is not experienced in the self-critical and extreme manner of the reformational phase. Here the emphasis develops on the image, both metaphorically and visually, along with the development of a sense of the devotional. This cognitive separation between the sense of the sacred and the profane creates the psychic need for its bridging and closure. This need, induced by this process of dichotomization, is met through a more personalized form of religious experience and this finds itself expressed though various forms of devotionalism, the intensity of which reflects the degree to which this dichotomization between the sacred and profane is cognitively developed and is critically reflected upon.
	It is therefore no accident that this period of history sees the development of a number of novel features in keeping with this relatively new non-extreme development of individualism. For example we may witness Plotinus' interest in psychological questions, St. Augustine's innovative autobiographical approach in his Confessions, development of the religious image in the form of a person (as a trans-human-divine religious leader), an increased interest in devotion-al practices and increased interest in religious experience outside the framework of state-orientated ritualism.
	Hand in hand with this increased cognitive awareness was the development of the intellectual environment for sustaining the critical development of negative theology and its criticism of traditional and less individualistic forms of religious expression. Emphasis shifts from venerated religious icons to religious icons subject to adoration along with a non-exclusive division between emotional forms of religious expression and more intellectually-orientated approaches. Both devotional and analytical approaches claim to overcome this psychic rift cognitively felt to occur between this absolute sense of the numinous and the spiritual deficiencies of the profane. Although both the Neoplatonic and the Buddhist Wisdom Traditions include a prominent emphasis on the element of the devotional true emphasis in both traditions in the final analysis can be seen to reside most decisively with the intellectual and its analytical tendencies. Therein philosophical behavior is not treated as a mere passive exercise in describing the numinous and prescribing religious behavior but as an essential step in the very engagement with this sense of the numinous developed in this type of absolutism. In this transcendental awareness of the Absolute it is claimed that both the elements of intellectual awareness and behavioral appropriateness are born in the same insight or intuition that reveals the numinous or absolute. Thus although both traditions fail to directly describe this sense of the Absolute and articulate its inherent prescriptive consequences, and this failure is guaranteed both by the nature of this pursuit and through admissions to this effect, religious contact with and experience of this sense of the numinous, it is claimed, still remains an open possibility that the person can entertain and with perseverance realize. Analysis of the world and one's condition therein is therefore not a mere prelude on the path to enlightenment but one of the very doors by which the same is to be gained. The nature of that analysis is heavily invest-ed with the use of the via negativa. It would appear therefore that negative theology, utilized as a process of analysis, has both an ostensively visible negative dimension and a relatively implicit positive experiential dimension and that this latter aspect is claimed in some way to assist the religious person in their coming to experience the absolute reality of the numinous. 
	I began this chapter with the hope that by inspecting the nature of those religious entities claimed by these two traditions to be spiritually closer to the essential nature of reality we might find ourselves in a better position to positively understand the nature of the respective absolutes these two contemporaneous traditions entertain and measure the degree of isomorphism, if any, in their comparative correspondence. Furthermore it was hoped that an indirect appreciation of experiential claims might throw some light on the nature of the numinous found in this type of absolutism. It would appear that to continue with this ambition we must investigate both the nature of the negative theological process and the experiential relationship between such analysis and insight in effect coming to explore both the negative and the positive dimensions of the via negativa.
	To conclude this chapter let me point out a concurrence of these themes of purification, analysis, insight, devotionalism in the following brief quotations....

We come to this learning by analogies, by abstractions, by our understanding of its subsequents, of all that is derived from the Good, by the upward steps towards it. Purification has The Good for goal; so the virtues, all right ordering, ascent within the Intellectual, settlement therein, banqueting upon the divine....

What, then, is Philosophy?
Philosophy is the supremely precious.
Is Dialectics, then, the same as Philosophy?
It is the precious part of Philosophy.... Dialectics does not consist of bare theories and rules: it deals with verities,....

She (the perfection of wisdom) is identical with all-knowledge (sarvajnata). She never produces any dharmas, because she has forsaken the residues relating to both kinds of coverings, those produced by defilement and those produced by the cognizable.

A source of illumination is the perfection of wisdom.
From purity.