Chapter VII - Oversight: Metaphors of Height and Depth.

	The word oversight by itself, outside a clearly defined context, has a number of meanings in which two important senses have quite opposite, or contradictory, significations. I have entitled this chapter with this word in order to use this aspect of ambivalence to umbrella two levels of analysis in the same chapter. Firstly, I would like to address an imbalance in the presentation of this thesis. Having postulated a symmetry between the deeper structure and function of the Neoplatonic and Buddhist-Wisdom Traditions and promoted an exposition that highlights this aspect of isomorphism a point is now reached when it would be necessary to focus our attention upon any counter-examples or objections, any problems or difficulties, that might arise in this regard. A recognition of this aspect of potential dissonance in this scheme of affairs must necessitate our either arguing for an acceptance of those differences discovered as insignificant for the tenability of this position or our going on to develop ways in which these apparent inconsistencies can be adequately accounted for or accommodated. Secondly, from the position of an acceptance of an affinity between these two systems we must start to ask ourselves what import this isomorphism in typology has for our individual understanding and appreciation of these two traditions?  Does our research in this matter substantially contribute in practise to a deeper understanding of this type of religious philosophy? 
	The first type of analysis is concerned with the question of oversight in the sense of what has been overlooked or missed out in our desire to support a certain position? The second type of analysis is concerned with the question of oversight in the sense of what is essentially the overall picture? In this chapter let me briefly outline a number of features that in their presence, absence or emphasis differ between these two traditions. Although many differences in style, background and development could be brought to our notice let me concentrate my efforts in this regard on those features that appear, on the surface, to contribute to and reflect a deeper more essential state of difference, a more fundamental discontinuity in comparative typology?
	In questioning the internal validity and evidence for the promotion of this concept of isomorphism I would like to borrow a concept from legal practice. In one form of legal examination we have the advocate versus the prosecution. The task of the prosecution consists in establishing that a particular instance or pattern of activity has occurred and that in accordance with a certain body of law that such a form of activity was illegal and thereby in need of some form of judgmental response. In order to effect a prosecution it is therefore necessary for the prosecution to dismantle the defense put forward by the defendant and in a similar fashion the defense must confront and oppose those arguments put forward by the prosecution. In this chapter I would like to investigate those aspects of these two traditions that would on the surface suggest fundamental differences in their comparative structural and functional topography and thereby, as a consequence, ostensively undermining the presentation of this case for an essential isomorphism. However, once I have established a prima facie need for such consideration, I would then like to show how these apparent inconsistencies that can be found can be satisfactorily accommodated. This process of harmonization will be effected through a number of stratagems that in turn will throw further light on the nature of this isomorphism and help us to come to better appreciate the depths of the affinity that can be found between these two contemporaneous traditions.
	In our critical examination of those features that might possibly differentiate the essential topography of these two traditions the following four aspects will be brought forward for our attention, namely, questions concerning the centralization/non-centralization of the divine or numinous, the presence/absence of emanation, the background of a mathematical-cosmological model of the universe versus the semantical-epistemological model and the presence/absence of metaphors of depth/height. 
	The last category on our list, an investigation into the presence or absence of metaphors of height and/or depth will be used to introduce the second half of this chapter. This last analysis will be conducted in greater detail using much of the methodology refined in the first half of this chapter. The application and reworking of these techniques will be used to illustrate this idea of oversight in the sense of a looking over an entire field of concern, in this case an overlooking of what has also been apparently overlooked.
	In our examination of these four areas of concern various methodological devices will be introduced in an attempt to harmonize and accommodate such apparently fundamental non-conformity. In this endeavour I shall not argue for a precise coincidence but rather an essential coincidence, one that essentially exposes these two traditions as instances of religious-philosophical systems that have made certain similar existential choices and developments, albeit subject to the unique influences of their respective cultural backgrounds, allowing themselves through forms of philosophical self-reflection to explicate and develop the consequences attendant upon such decisions in posture. Underlying the more superficial structures and functions presented by these two traditions our investigation will unfold this relatively novel philosophy of the absolute, seemingly held in common, and the manner in which each of these two systems reworks traditional material from their respective backgrounds in the light of this historical innovation.

	In the Neoplatonic context the sense of the divine can be textually felt or perceived as an ever present reality about which various philosophical problems and positions are unraveled or displayed for our inspection. With a hint of disrespect we come forward to examine the property and nature of the divine only to retreat respectfully in an awareness that our appreciation at that point can only be provisional. To use the metaphor of light the One is too bright in reality for us to be able to directly perceive or conceive of its nature in the same way we entertain the things of this world. 
	On the other hand in our Buddhist text the centrality of the numinous might be better compared to the nature of an astronomical black-hole. There is no explicit centrality of the divine but for all that as an implication its existence can indeed be felt! To extend the metaphor of the black-hole a little further we could say that just as the boundary between this type of object and its surrounding space, i.e. its event-horizon, is subject to rapid rotation and thereby instrumental, through the rotation of its magnetic fields, etc. in the creation of intense radiation, black holes can indeed be seen, or rather, their interaction with their environment can be viewed. In a similar fashion, metaphorically, this boundary or event-horizon can be textually seen to indicate that reality that hides behind this encircling panorama of lesser divinity or numinosity. Although indicated the numinous itself is maintained, on one hand, in a rigorous and exhaustive fashion as inexpressible, unthinkable, unknowable, empty, etc. and, on the other hand, as that intuition that realizes the reality of reality to be Thusness, Suchness, the Tathagata, the perfection of wisdom, Nirvana, etc. Although posed as a continual contradiction this state of tension between the unthinkable and the intuition (prajna) of the perfection of wisdom dissolves when these two sets of distinctions are treated respectively from a relative and an absolute point of view. Indeed many internal and inter-comparative inconsistencies can be diffused when this distinction, as a critical technique, is brought to bear upon the relevant situation for its deployment. However, with respect to this Buddhist text of The Perfection of Wisdom in 8,000 Lines, and similar texts in this type of genre, we are left with a yawning chasm of agnostic proportions yet with all the hallmarks of a numinous presence. In the religious cosmology of the text we find Bodhisattvas as being able to create their own worlds for the enlightenment of entities reborn within.

Furthermore, in a foodless waste also a Bodhisattva should not be afraid. He should arm himself with the thought: "I will exert firm vigour, I will purify my own Buddha-field in such a way that, after I have won enlightenment, in that Buddha-field there will be no foodless wastes, and none will be ever conceivable."

	We are informed in this text that there are many Buddha-fields, for all purposes practically infinite in number, that these worlds can be conjured up and that from the absolute point of view there can be no difference between those that are illusory and those that are real. Moreover, the implication can be rightly drawn that this world of ours is also, in some sense, a Buddha-field and therefore the province of some current or future Buddha-like figure or Bodhisattva.
	There is a tendency therefore to treat this world and all others as being the mentally produced provinces of spiritual beings. That being the case it follows that this world along with all the others have their locii centered in these equally numerous spiritual entities? Do these centers themselves exist in isolation or independence from each other, or are they in turn centered in some higher form of reality? On this point this text states....

So fond are the Tathagatas of this perfection of wisdom, so much do they cherish and protect it. For she is their mother and begetter, she showed them this all-knowledge, she instructed them in the ways of the world. From her have the Tathagatas come forth.... It is in this sense that the perfection of wisdom generates the Tathagata, and instructs them in this world.

	We need not treat this metaphor in any other manner than that of the metaphorical but if an analogy can be drawn from its message it could well be that this unity of the world, through the perfection of wisdom, from the absolute point of view, does indeed possess a non-pluralistic ground or nature. As the text tells us the Suchness of the skandhas, the Suchness of the Tathagatas, the Suchness of the world is....

is just one single Suchness....

	This idea of oneness, the unity of reality, is more hinted at in this text and is left relatively implicit. We are not meant to extract a literal meaning from it but for all that this sense of the unity and uniformity of the world
appears to possess the type of characteristics that the numinous is said to possess, namely, for example, those simultaneous co-occurring aspects of mysterium as fascination and tremendum as fearfulness. With respect to these two aspects co-present in the state of religious awe we can note the following quotation.

When this deep perfection of wisdom is being taught he (the Bodhisattva) does not become cowed, or stolid, nor does he turn his back on it; he will not tremble, be frightened, or terrified; he does not hesitate, or doubt, or get stupefied, but he plunges right into it, becomes resolutely intent on it, and delights in its vision and hearing.

	These two aspects are in a sense to be transcended. Our correct vision of the world is then an experience of that world that is calmly quiet....

And how does the perfection of wisdom show up the world for what it is? She shows that the world is empty, unthinkable, calmly quiet. As purified of itself she shows up the world, she makes it known, she indicates it.

	The centralization of the sense of the divine or the numinous is not an explicit feature of this text, nor this genre of philosophy, but for all that this type of religious reality is treated as being a palpable experience for the religious person, an object of devotion, a sense of presence, an edge that evokes feelings of fear and elation, terror and fascination. Plotinus is equally vague about the nature of the divine, for him likewise on this subject there can be no adequate language, no verbal expression that can do this aspect of reality justice. By redefining the sense of the divine as the numinous much of this controversial aspect in the general philosophy of Buddhism, Mahayana or non-Mahayana, can be profitably circumvented. 
	The religious aspect of Buddhist cosmology is hierarchically structured with a complex philosophy of Bodhisattvas-Buddhas superimposed upon a more traditional scheme of affairs involving thirty-three levels of divinities. Along with worlds like our own, Buddha-fields and miscellaneous hells we find all this relativity pervaded, under-pinned and over-arched by the sense of the absolute whose atmosphere threads all these disparate facets together to form that one world of reality that is equally unstained by such notions, a reality that is empty, where even that emptiness itself is empty, is just one single Suchness....
	The metaphor of a blackhole is a fruitful analogy to choose for a number of reasons. Much of the discussion in an absolute religious-philosophy centers not so much upon the absolute itself but on an area of concern that surrounds this center of religious reality. This event-horizon is a necessary pre-condition for the exposition of an absolute position in the first place and only through its transcendence through some form of negation or the extrapolation of an analogy can the sense of the absolute itself be obliquely referred to. Even in the transcendence of this horizon its preservation is still called for, after this process of transformation or intellectual transportation, in order to maintain an ongoing meaningful dialogue with the absolute however rarefied such a conversation. If one's attention in this matter were theoretically allowed to disappear inside this sphere of the absolute for the religious person standing outside all possibility of salvation, along with the need for such, would seem to disappear. If black-holes are astronomical objects that can indeed be physically investigated, albeit indirectly, it can only be through the interaction of this event horizon with the surrounding space that such an endeavour could be accomplished. This sphere of light and radiation is in truth a substitution for the reality of the black-hole itself and in the ambit of our meta-phor a link with traditional theologies. Looking towards such a reality we see a world of light, looking into such a reality through this event-horizon, we can only find ourselves being met with an inscrutable darkness, passing though this horizon, if we were allowed to take our metaphor further, would leave us silent as to the nature of that which was ineffable? As poetically inclined as this metaphor may lend itself to association in practice such an image does allow us to integrate theologies of light with theologies of darkness, the utilization of the via negativa allowing us to head in either direction in this regard? Although the Buddhist is practically silent in this tradition about the centralized nature of the numinous both these two traditions are theologies of light. In Plotinus this metaphor also appears to be treated as an experiential description. In this regard Plotinus is not unique. A investigation into the types of Buddhist meditational practices, whose descriptive language uses metaphors of light, by this type of tradition currently extant would, I believe, help us to better understand the presence of this type of language in its association with absolute philosophy and might help us in the process to better appreciate this common denominator underlying the experiential dimension in this type of religious philosophy?
	This apparent difference between these two traditions on the subject of the centralization of the divine, I believe, can be accounted for along the following lines. Firstly, using the absolute-relative distinction allows us to correctly compare those aspects that can be found to be comparable. Moreover, this distinction can also take into account the following subtlety, namely, those distinctions concerning the absolute or relative realized respectively from the absolute point of view and the relative point of view. Secondly, we can make the distinction as to what is explicit in our texts and that which is relatively implicit and in this fashion discover if there is any real comparative discrepancy between those facets of our research under review. Thirdly, by clarifying and mapping the structural and functional territory of these two traditions as seems to be in evidence from our textual appreciation we should find ourselves being placed on a firmer ground for our being able to examine such questions as to the degrees of similarity and dissimilarity most likely thought to be present (before this critical clarification). Our metaphor of the black-hole and its event-horizon highlighting for us in a vivid image the need to accurately assess our cosmological, philosophical, experiential and theological geographies in this regard. 
	Our second approach, that of determining what is relatively explicit and/or implicit in our texts, being an important tool in the resolution of any apparent discontinuity between these two traditions, e.g. on the subject of the centralization, or otherwise, of the divine. This task was also further facilitated through the substitution of the idea of the numinous for the sense of the divine. To follow up this technique of discerning the relatively implicit/ex-plicit it should be stressed that both aspects need to be soundly argued for on textual grounds with that aspect of the implicit also meeting adequate criteria for logical, or consequential, connection to or grounding in that text or set of texts under review. Those implications thought to be present in a text need to be not only explicated but also defensibly demonstrated, shown to follow from some form of definition or as a consequence of some type of position, description or decision, etc. when adequately presented by the body of that text (although the definitive appreciation of that text must ultimately be trans-textual)!
	On this subject of the centralization, or otherwise, of the sense of the numinous I believe it is possible as outlined here to defend the position that there is an implicit centralization in this regard in this tradition of Buddhism. When we review the historical contexts that engender these two traditions it would be very hard for us not to detect this increasing emphasis upon the element of the divine or numinous and associated practices of devotion that increasingly make themselves felt in their respective parts of the world, a world characterized by the well developed extent of reciprocal trade permanently in place between these two regions in this period of time.

	Once the centralization of the numinous, in some form or other, is accepted we may well ask ourselves if it is not obvious, for all that, that the Neoplatonic emphasis on emanation is notably absent from the Buddhist-Wisdom Tradition? Would we not have here, in this respect, one instance of an important structural and functional discontinuity between these two traditions?
	The technique of extracting the explicit and explicating the implicit would, I believe in this regard, fail us. However by introducing the distinction of what is actual in a tradition and that which is potential we might well be able to harmonize this discrepancy through an investigation of the temporal development of those traditions under review. This diachronic perspective allows us to examine the evolution of such systems and thereby to perceive in what manner they allow particular elements and facets to evolve in their respective environments. The terms of reference in such an examination should also allow us to investigate the influence these traditions have upon closely allied systems to discover if this general degree of synchroncity is promoted in time or diminished. Our investigation of the potentiality of a particular system is none other than an investigation of that which is temporally implicit within our sphere of concern. 
	Under such consideration we should also take into account those aspects present in a system's structure whose emphasis actually counteracts the development of this potentiality and whose actual expression is only able to emerge or re-emerge when that emphasis or emphases are openly counteracted, diminished or removed. In the Buddhist-Wisdom Tradition the emphasis or axiomatic stress placed upon the principle of the substanceless nature of reality (dharmas) would indeed counteract an emphasis placed on the creation or emanation of a material universe. However, with the diminishment of a realistic point of view and the substitution of an idealistically orientated perspective this prejudice would effectively be to some degree surmounted or obviated? This tendency for the world to be treated as an illusion, as previously discussed under the concept of illusionism, as a textual feature would appear to be more marked in our Buddhist text. Such a feature paves the way for a later emanationally orientated vision of the world or universe and such a tendency would appear to become more explicit in the later developments of the Yogacara? In our Buddhist text we can note the follow quotation as representative of this tendency for the materializational-treatment of thought or mentalization of the world.

Just so the Tathagata has taught that all dharmas (realities) are like a dream.

	This parity between the world of illusion and the illusion of a world as previously noted does not dismiss the world as a mere illusion but rather introduces degrees of reality, accepting only that reality that is absolutely transcendent and/or immanent as absolutely real. This
Suchness is then given a theological-like complexion through its equation with the Tathagata (Buddha) - a vague mystically treated concept along the lines of a general Buddha-nature that grounds or encompasses all manifestation of Buddha-like and Bodhisattva-like figures and activity. As previously noted this tendency in the idealistic treatment of the world or worlds also allows these exalted figures to rearrange the appearance of reality within these worlds and even to the extent of bringing them into or out of existence. Moreover the unification of these divine-like creators and their creative manifestations is metaphorically implicit in the concepts of the perfection of wisdom, Tathagata, or Suchness, expressions that indicate in this type of philosophy the sense of the absolute, an aspect that in religious experience is regarded as numinous-like.

The Suchness of these dharmas and the Suchness of all these dharmas, and the Suchness of the Tathagata are simply this one single Suchness. There is no division within Suchness. Just simply one single is this Suchness, not two, nor three.

	A contrary tendency in the Enneads would appear to be the attempt to materialize spatially and temporally, subject to much qualification, the sense of the absolute qua numinous as it presents itself to, or in, the world and by some means, analogically at best, bridge this philosophical and ontological gulf between the transcendent (and immanent) One and its emanation. This tension between the Absolute and the Relative is one of the hallmarks of an absolute philosophy and is equally present in both traditions. Emanation is but one aspect of the dialectical-like harmonization that is attempted in this regard, along with other concepts that involve illusionism, devotionalism, the presence of spiritual mediators, etc.
	In the Neoplatonic schema there appear three main levels of being, namely, the One, Nous and the Soul. In our Buddhist text there is already a division between the Dharma-bodies (and by implication the singular Dharma-body of the Tathagata) and the non-Dharma-embodied. Such a term is more applied to a carefully controlled discussion on the nature of the Buddha but in so far as the epithet of the Tathagata is synonymous for both the Buddha (or an individual Buddha-like figure) and the sense of the Absolute this distinction more correctly treats an aspect of reality. In short time this distinction between the Dharmakaya and the non-Dharmakaya becomes subdivided in a tripartite scheme, namely, the Dharmic Body (dharmakaya), the Body of Bliss or Enjoyment (sambhogakaya) and the Body of Manifestation, Transformation or Appearance (nirmanakaya). An interesting comparison could be conducted in this area of doctrine, in the light of the Neoplatonic classification, in order to assess to what degree these tripartite schema might structurally and functionally parallel each other?

For a Tathagata cannot be seen from his form-body. The Dharma-bodies are the Tathagatas and the real nature of dharmas does not come and go.

	Emanation for Plotinus is a process of a very special nature in which the universe in various levels informs lower levels without the relatively higher level actually being directly involved in some form of movement or activity. The higher level through an over-abundance of energy, an excess of being or power, metaphorically overflows to create a mirror-like copy of itself, albeit on a less exalted scale of being. This inexhaustible super-abundance of being is effortless allowed to spill over as if from a fountain or spring, this process essentially repeating three times until the realm of matter is reached or more correctly informed, the latter being more correctly a realm essentially of non-being. This material realm of non-being as a concept appears to meet some resonance in the Buddhist concept of emptiness (sunya). For example, Plotinus compares matter in a very Buddhist fashion as like the reflection of something (or a face) in a mirror....

If, then, there is, something in a mirror, we may suppose objects of sense to be in matter in precisely that way: if in the mirror there is nothing, if there is only a seeming of something, then we may judge that in Matter there is the same delusion....

	In a similar vein we can note the same type of comparison....

For all dharmas are empty in there own-being, they have none of the properties of a living being, they have no life, no individuality, no personality, they are like an illusion, a dream, an echo, a reflected image.

	Likewise the inexhaustible nature of the Neoplatonic absolute as a concept can also be recognized in the Buddhistic description of the inexhaustible nature of Suchness.

For this Suchness which the Tathagata has fully known, is inexhaustible, and he has described as inexhaustible after he has fully known it.

	Emanation for Plotinus is a complex concept that attempts to understand, almost through analogy, the nature of the relationship of the Absolute and the Relative from the point of view of the Absolute. On the other hand much of Buddhist philosophy tries to comprehend the nature of the Absolute from the point of view of the relative, i.e. through an analysis of the Relative. From an analytical realization of the nature of the Relative to be empty an understanding of the nature of the Absolute is intimated, our acquaintance with the Absolute being recognized through the additional realization that the nature or essence of the Relative is equivalent to and coincident with the essence of the Absolute. The five skandhas are perceived as empty, all dharmas are perceived as empty, the Absolute, whether it be called Suchness, the Tathagata, Nirvana, etc. is perceived also to be empty hence the nature of the Absolute and the nature of the Relative cannot be anything else other than the same (samata). This approach is an attempt to comprehend the Absolute from the point of view of the Relative. This difference in bias between these two traditions, I believe, can account for much of the apparent difference or asymmetry between these two systematic philosophies and is a reflection of a more fundamental (but not absolute) difference, namely, a difference in cultural background. Whilst the Graeco-Roman world is fascinated by a `scientific-like interest' in a world of space and time and allows a mathematical-logical construction to dominate its exposition and collection of various forms of information in contrast the Indo-Buddhist world is one that models itself on a semantical-logical language model. The pithy aphoristic grammar of Panini would be the archetypal model for the Hindu-Buddhist world in their exposition of a field of knowledge or information. In general for the Buddhist this is also coupled with an immanent and process-orientated interpretation of the world. 
	An interesting observation that could be made at this point is that The Perfection of Wisdom literature is cast in the form of a platonic dialogue, or as a series of mini-dialogues operating in the same type of fashion, perhaps originating as a stylistic feature borrowed from the Graeco-Roman world? However, embedded in much of the `dialogue' are aphoristic-like formulae that appear to betray an incomplete assimilation of this format if indeed it was borrowed from a platonic model? The addition of various dramatic images and settings reinforcing the religious content of the text and in a sense, through its elevation to the levels of the numinous, of the gods and the super-human, usher in a more cosmopolitan type of scripture, one with a more universal religious appeal? 
	Plotinus, it would seem, does spend much time in his analysis of time and space and the manner in which the One relates to the same? On the other hand the Buddhist would appear to be more interested in the language of his exposition in so far as a critique of the same is often the center of their focus along with a critique of the nature of the relationship between words and their corresponding destinations in the world. A prime example of this tendency in language critique is the devastation wrought by the famous dialectician Nagarjuna. It should be pointed out that this observation is more one of a bias in emphasis and that both traditions exercise much similarity in technique and subject matter. Plotinus also offers us a critique of language and logical predication, finding an inadequacy in their treatment and exposition of the Absolute. Likewise this Buddhist text is not without an interest in an analysis and critique of the spatial, temporal and causal.
	In the second half of this chapter let me conduct a more detailed analysis of a notable textual difference between these two traditions that will highlight for us this difference in bias and cultural background. With such oversight let me exhibit this difference, a difference more in style rather than content, demonstrating in the process the close intellectual resonance that can be observed between these two contemporaneous traditions.

	In my reading of these two traditions one textual difference came to my attention that demanded a careful, and some considerable, investigation, namely, the difference between these two traditions in their use of metaphors of height and depth. Not that one type of metaphor is unknown in the other tradition but that the frequency of their incidence was quite considerably different. To account for this anomaly seemed to call for a more penetrating structural and functional analysis, assuming that my premise of a more fundamental isomorphism between these two traditions was indeed correct. Why should one tradition, namely the Buddhist Wisdom Tradition, stress metaphors of depth whereas the Neoplatonic Tradition as represented in the writings of Plotinus should seem to have a profound dislike for such a metaphor? Moreover, the Buddhist text rarely envisages a metaphor concerning height whereas such a use of metaphorical language is more frequently entertained in the Enneads.
	The epithet of deep in the Perfection of Wisdom in 8,000 Verses can, in certain sections, be found to be frequently repeated over a number of pages. Why is this term emphasized and what significance might this repetition have? For example we read....

Deep is the essential original nature of dharmas.
Because it is isolated.
Deep is the essential nature of perfect wisdom.
Because its essential nature is pure and isolated, therefore has the perfection of wisdom a deep essential nature....
Deep, O Lord, is the perfection of wisdom.
Through a depth like that of space.
Hard to understand, O Lord, is the perfection of wisdom.

	To use my distinction of the explicit/implicit it would be safe to say that this usage of metaphorical depth is explicit. On the other hand there would seem to be no fully developed use for a metaphor of height although the natural course of language has such a feature quietly inserted into the text at various points.  Such an aspect cannot be ruled out as not present. Its implicit presence, however, seems to hide behind a number of innocent expressions rather than be brought to prominence through one terminological expression as in the use of the epithet deep. References to metaphors of height include....

i.	The idea that salvation and spirituality is graduated with the spiritually advanced occupying a higher more heavenly-like level of experiential reality.

....even then it is hard for him to get to the Buddha-Level.

ii.	The idea of movement upward into higher regions in the successful application of meditation, mindfulness, reflection, etc.

When he courses thus, a Bodhisattva surpasses the coursings of all other persons .... and so he gains an insuperable position.

....all beings should raise their thoughts to full enlightenment....

iii.	The metaphorical representation of achievement as a terrace or dwelling with enlightenment at the top.

....Bodhisattvas who want to dwell in the highest building, who want to dwell in the dwelling of the Tathagata, should dwell in the dwelling of perfect wisdom.

The thought of a Tathagata who considers this depth of dharma, and who seated on the terrace of enlightenment....

	The above allusions to height are difficult to find and are scattered throughout the text. Generally their presence is more implicit in scope and seem to arise from the nature of natural language rather than from a deliberate theoretical interest. 
	On the other hand in the Enneads there is prejudice built into the Neoplatonic system against the idea of depth (bathos). Through emanation the deepest levels of the process reach down into that which is practically non-existent, namely, the material world. This level is informed by the forms (collectively associated in Nous), mediated via the world of Soul. However, for all that, the use in natural language of the metaphorical associations of depth for the profound, as a sentic structure, surfaces from time to time (in the same innocent fashion as metaphors of height infiltrate in a non-integrated non-terminological fashion our Buddhist text). E.g. we find the following statement uses this expression of depth metaphorically for in the next clause we would find an immediate contradiction if the previous clause was to be taken literally in the light of this emanational schema.

Soul must be sounded to the very depths, understood as an emanation from Intellectual-Principle and holding its value by a Reason-Principle thence infused.

	This natural use of metaphorical depth is likewise entertained in the following quotation.

This is the deeper meaning of the profound passage, where we read....

	In a picturesque metaphor of a wave Plotinus, true to the structure of his emanational scheme, sees the process of ultimate intuition as a transcending of the intentional world of Nous....

....the quester holds knowledge still of the ground he rests on but, suddenly, swept beyond it all by the very crest of the wave of Intellect surging beneath, he is lifted and sees, never knowing how; the vision floods the eyes with light....

	In the above quotation it would appear that this intuition can still reflect, as a possibility, upon that intellectual life that surges beneath it. The process of reflection would appear therefore to head in an opposite direction to that of an intuitive aspiration. However to have the latter, as an occurrence, would suggest the necessary priority of this reflective substratum if only in the form of its possibility to be returned to after the intuition. As Plotinus suggests this heightened state of experience is like a wave and as such is fully dependent upon the body of water that constitutes the surging of this wave, i.e. aspirational consciousness is dependent upon some form of reflective consciousness. Taking this idea a little further gives us a clue in how to deal with the emanational prejudice against the idea of depth. As the soul is treated as that which has unfortunately descended into this body in this world then the connotation of depth imparted by such a scheme, apart from natural metaphorical language usage, must generally be negative. A way round this problem might be therefore to retranslate this discredited metaphor by some other image that still imparts to it the same overall consequences as would be imparted to the term depth as in its Buddhist context. In the same way as we substituted numinous for the sense of the divine perhaps we could find one or more terms that would inter-mediate between these two traditions in this regard and in the process reconfirm our opinion and faith in an effective degree of fundamental essential isomorphism or continuity between these two systems of religious thought. An inspection of the use of the word deep in its Buddhist context should uncover, I would be inclined to believe, the following assemblage of implicated allusions, namely, inner, profound, mysterious, non-superficial, reflective, powerful, centered, source, integral or core, etc. Armed with this list we now can see that we no longer have on board the connotations of chaos, darkness, materiality, voidness, meaninglessness, etc. that would travel with the term deep if it were to be inserted in this emanationally dominated scheme and meant to operate philosophically beyond its natural metaphorical usage. This translational technique should defuse much of the criticism in this regard as to the general absence of an equivalent terminologically important expression with the same denotational content as the word deep or depth. It would seem an unnecessary step at this point to establish the general validity of this list? In a cursory reading of Plotinus we should quite quickly discover for ourselves the relative importance of these terminological facets. Likewise in a retranslation back into our Buddhist text the preservation of the same type of significance should prevail. Rather, more importantly, we should seek to discover what motivates an emphasis in one tradition on metaphorical expressions centered on depth and in the other on those relating to height. This inequality of emphasis in the distribution and polarization of these two terms in both traditions calls for some explanation. In lieu of some lengthy and laboured analysis on such a task compare the following two quotations, the first from the Buddhist Wisdom Tradition and the second from Plotinus.

It is hard to fathom, hard to see, hard to understand. The thought of a Tathagata who considers this depth of dharma and who, seated on the terrace of enlightenment, has just won full enlightenment, is inclined to care-free action, and not to the demonstration of dharma.
So it is. Deep certainly is this dharma I have full known.... This dharma which I have full known is deep through the depth of space, the depth of self....

	Seeking Him, seek nothing of Him outside; within is to be sought what follows upon him; Himself do not attempt. He is, Himself, that outer, He is encompassment and measure of all things; or rather He is within, at the innermost depth; the outer, circling around Him is....
	Such a power, author of Intellectual-Principle, author of being - how does it lend itself to chance....
	What is present in Intellectual-Principle, though in a far transcendent mode....

	The last part of this second quotation may offer itself as a clue. It might well be that a religious or cultural difference ensures that an inequality in emphasis is applied to this pair of metaphors depth-height. Taking up our investigations in the light of this hypothesis it would appear that a transcendent emphasis upon the nature of the absolute reinforces the usage of metaphors of height, whilst conversely, an emphasis on the immanent nature of the absolute would selectively stress metaphors of depth. As previously argued elsewhere this dichotomy of the transcendent-immanent nature of the absolute cannot be short circuited or disconnected and as a consequence metaphors of both height and depth will surface despite this historical institutionalized preference for either a transcendent mode or an immanent mode. That being the case and assuming a transcendent bias in Neoplatonic ontology it would seem safe to presume a preference for metaphors of height in this regard. Indeed the abundance of explicit metaphors of height would seem to bear this insight out. 

....the essential man outgrows Being, becomes identical with the Transcendent of Being. The self thus lifted, we are in the likeness of the Supreme: if from that heightened self we pass still higher...

	But as it has been argued elsewhere the sense of the transcendent cannot be made meaningful without an associated sense of the immanent also being present (however potential, de-emphasized or implicit such a presence may be). In this respect the Buddhist expression of a terrace of enlightenment (as quoted in the third last quotation) mirrors this idea of a transcendent mode. Likewise, e.g. Neoplatonic ideas of the Absolute being like a spring, the roots of a tree, the core or source practically parallel the use of the Buddhist expression of deep.
	The reductive-phenomenological tendencies in traditional Buddhist analysis have aimed for an understanding of the immanent nature of things. In an attempt to realize both the identity and continuity of a distinctive type of phenomenal event they postulated dharmas very early in the development of this tradition. By the beginning of the present era this analysis itself became critically subjected to the same type of analysis with the result that dharmas themselves were philosophically treated and logically revealed to be equally empty, i.e. to possess no permanent sense of the substantial. Such thorough phenomenalistic reduction effectively deals with the immanent sense of the absolute. In the integrational and trans-discriminational tendencies of the Neoplatonic the opposite trend is put into effect with a development of the transcendent sense of the absolute. However, as has been argued elsewhere, the sense of the transcendent can have no meaningful significance without the implication in some form of an association with the sense of the immanent. The fundamental insight discovered by the absolute philosopher, as a consequence of this type of position, is that there is an equation between the immanent and the transcendent. A new philosophical and religious dimension is entered into along with the discovery of new questions and new answers to old questions. The result of this startling synthesis is an overview of religious and philosophical thought that creates an entirely new perspective on traditional debate and its institutionalized controversies. Old topics are now put to the side and a new philosophical tension is revealed between the sense of the Absolute and the sense of the Relative. From the midst of this revolution traditional thought is subjected to a critical and transformational re-evaluation in the light of this absolute perspective. A new dimension in religious and philosophical thought is revealed, the practical consequences of which cast a new light on traditional practice. A re-emphasis on religious experience sees the development and transformation of devotional practices with an emphasis therein on the intense personal nature of the such experience. Thence is met a new dilemma for the numinous is interpreted, in one sense, as an encounter with the personality of the absolute whereas philosophically the absolute is intellectually perceived as trans-personal; transcending the limitations of the spatial, the temporal, the causal and the sense of self, whether that sense of self be divine or otherwise. 

Purification has The Good for goal.... one becomes to self and to all else, at once seen and seer; identical with Being and Intellectual-Principle and the entire living all...

....the perfection of wisdom remains without discrimination. Because that perfection of wisdom is so constituted that it lacks all discrimination.

	If I am correct in this matter then much of the discontinuity or asymmetry between these two traditions is more apparent than substantial reflecting only a cultural difference in the way these two worlds like to do philosophy and expound their religious point of view? In our oversight over these two traditions we find both of them place a heavy emphasis upon the need for and creation of the proper and most appropriate attitudes for the spiritual treatment of our daily existence. This spiritual redirection reinterprets much of the terminology of the traditional religious philosophy indigenous to their respective regions but from a transcendental and existential-like point of view. An ethically-open attitude, e.g. is adopted that seeks to find the most appropriate course of action as the need arises for such deliberation. In Sanskrt the term for this is upaya, which is normally translated as skill in means or . Such a concept is also implicit in Plotinus? Behind this desire for an existential and transcendentally appropriate ethical interaction is a taste or intimation of the possibility of and the need for salvation. Motivating this ethical approach is the perceived need for a purification of one's existence as a logically necessary step prior to one's personal realization of this state of salvation. Mixed in with this approach is a devotional attitude that is generally non-specific in its direction or object of attention (devotionalism). The sense of the numinous is more felt than intellectually described or dogmatically defined. The idea of salvation is equally pervaded with a sense of the amorphous and indefinable (salvationalism). Salvation being more treated and perceived as a process to be effected rather than a goal to be described. Throughout all the trials and tribulations of such a process both traditions bask in an atmosphere of optimism in distinct contrast to dualistic, gnostic and traditional-institutionalized forms of religious practice equally present and influential in their midst. For all the distance between these two traditions, with respect to culture and geography, structurally and functionally a profound affinity can be observed that is perhaps witness to the fact that on the stage of human history there can be no real boundary to the passage of new ideas. The slow infiltration, adoption and adaptation of religious and philosophic innovation must be a permanently continual, if not continuous, process whose momentum for change must, without doubt, oscillate from one direction to some other in the course of human history and patronage. For all that, all interaction must subsist and be underwritten by a mutual two-way reciprocity in interaction as is to be found in the common bond and essential nature of all relationships.
	Interestingly enough this Buddhist Wisdom text opens, in a traditional fashion as in the earlier Sutras, with this particular one being set on the upper slopes of Vulture Peak. This setting is perhaps symbolic of the Buddhist emphasis upon a reductive-reflective type of attitude. From the heights, so to speak, of the spiritual the enlightened mind looks down upon the relative world in an attitude that is essentially reflective and reductive in scope. The ethical attitude that corresponds to and accompanies this type of stance is that of compassion. In reflective contemplation it would seem natural for the person so engaged to also entertain such a dispassionate attitude towards the world. On the other hand in an environment that emphasizes aspirational tendencies the key ethical attitude would be one that emphasizes the loving disposition, a state of affairs that would find its redirection towards the sense of the numinous in the form of devotion. The forces at work behind this inequality in the distribution of metaphors of height and depth to be found within both of these traditions also seem to bear a direct responsibility for this accompanying asymmetry in the advertisement of the appropriate general ethical stance that should be adopted. In a similar fashion to the qualification that the sense of the immanent cannot be thought apart from the sense of the transcendent one must recognize that the compassionate attitude cannot be exercised without a devotional attitude, both aspects being present, effectively in some form (implicit or explicit), to some degree (emphasized or de-emphasized) and having the potential for this aspect to be promoted in the temporal course of that tradition. Through such a qualification this additional asymmetry between these two traditions can be reperceived to be non-fundamental to the spirit of both. Thus this isomorphism can be preserved in the light of such differences and, moreover, be used to go on to account for such apparent comparative anomalies. Although such an oversight allows us to more deeply appreciate this form of absolute philosophy, however, some disturbing questions still remain that are central to the structural and functional form of this type of religious philosophy. These problematic areas stand in need of an urgent review (or overview) in order to find a resolution that satisfactorily allows us to conclude this legal-like investigation into whether these two traditions share, in actual fact, the same copyright even though some associated trademarks or brandmarks may seem to be different or not present, or, although present may even seem to be at variance with the product represented?