Finding a Place for the Idea of God – Part I:
Is there a Phenomenological Way of Doing Theology?

	The earth beneath us appears to be there for us day by day. Stable, able to take our weight, unmoving… in essence the stage upon which we conduct our lives… a platform forgotten about, taken for granted. But, in the event of a massive earthquake, the quaking of this ‘solid’ ground, the idea of the ‘stability of the earth beneath us’ is perhaps as shaken up as is our ‘sense of self’. Moreover, our suddenly being brought face to face with the thought of our imminent ‘non-existence’ is more than enough to shatter our calm and composure; a state of terror compounded by a fear of possible injury, and the loss of our domicile, our possessions, our loved ones and friends. (1)

Within a second we would probably realize we are in the midst of an earthquake. I am sure that many of us under the same circumstances, in those few moments, would soon recover the nature of our religiosity; whether it be habitual, minimal, residual or otherwise. However, I would have thought it most unlikely that a person would ‘discover’ a sense of the religious in the very midst of that anomalous experience itself. On the other hand, such events, in reflection, might motivate us to re-investigate the nature of our existence in a more religious light and that therein we might discover, for oneself, a sense of the religious perhaps different to that previously experienced or thought about. 
      (2)
In ‘recovering’ a sense of the religious we might well ask are we merely ‘un-covering’ or ‘re-covering’ the true import of this type of experience? Then, on the other hand, in a ‘dis-covering’ of the sense of the religious are we, perhaps, ‘moving away’ from an engagement with the sense of the numinous rather than trying to move closer in our understanding of this type of phenomenon, or rather, phenomena; given that the supermarkets of religion in this complex world are seen collectively advertising the fact that there is a bewildering array of religious experiences to be had regardless of whether those experiences are authentic or non-authentic; truly representative of their alleged content? 
       (3)
	In this paper I am going to deal indirectly, and in general, with those types of religious experience that seem to implicate a sense of the divine, or at least, some sense of the numinous. I would like to establish that such a project, that deals with this type of experience, namely, a theology, when properly constructed, could have sense. The possession of sense being seen as ‘an interpretative coherence of meaning (and meaningfulness)’ that can be either directly (co-)experienced and/or indirectly both thought about and communicated (adequately to some extent or other) and which, at the same time, seems ‘to locate itself in the scheme of things that intersubjectively maps this world-of-life’. This paper is not concerned as to whether these theological projects, in their representation, interpretation, exploration and manipulation of these types of religious phenomena, have a valid content or ‘sense of location’ and/or possess a valid meaning and meaningfulness in themselves. Instead, I would like to argue, that if people are going to promote these types of projects as experientially valid then they need to establish them on the same sort of grounds as sketched out in this paper, i.e., in an open phenomenological format (which is not ‘merely speculative’ in nature). (4)

	As indicated in my introductory image of the earthquake, differentiation of the ‘re(-)covery’ and dis(-)covery’ of religious experience seems to imply at least two different attitudes towards religious experience without implying, I might add, that these two distinctive types of attitude are fundamentally separate. Indeed, quite the contrary! I would think that the recognition of a sense of the religious, in its recognition, development and thematization, would assist in the establishment of a sense of how that individual would define themselves religiously within this world, this world-of-life. That, in ‘religious emergencies’, the person, more likely than not, would fall back on a recovery of this presupposed sense of the religious and its implicit (re)evaluation of self-identity. That, in effect, a ‘re-covery’ of the religious life establishes for the religious person its initial genres of practice from which any novel sense of the religious ‘dis-covery’ must proceed (from the adoption and adaptation of such genres/hybrid genres, etc.). (5)

	As presuppositionally indicated in my introductory image of the earthquake I would propose that the phenomenon of religious experience, in some instances, is an experience of a sense of the divine or, at least, some sense of the ‘numinous’. As a type of religious experience, or more correctly, as a ‘set’ of religious types of experience, it implies that an examination of these types of experience can be conducted phenomenologically by virtue of the fact that their ‘appearance’ appear to adopt distinctive forms in religious experience. That, moreover, the ‘sense’ of a such a project (in general terms of reference or in a particular instance) implies that it too can be investigated phenomenologically, i.e., demonstrated as meaningful without a commitment to the epistemological and ontological validity of this type of project. (6)

My primary objective, therefore, in this paper is to establish that the ‘sense’ of the divine can be formulated as a meaningful project, and, that the theologian can, and perhaps should, establish this type of project in a careful, philosophically formulated, phenomenologically based framework or context (applying the necessary hermeneutical rules of analysis when and where appropriate). (7)

I.	Some Introductory Considerations

Too often people dismiss things on a priori grounds. They say, in effect, that I don’t believe ‘x exists’ and therefore ‘x does not exist!’ In this regard I am reminded of many a scientists’ claim that ‘astrology is just sheer nonsense,’ or words with the same force and conclusiveness. Now, that type of attitude is just not ‘scientific!’ Better, and more scientifically open, would have been a set of assertions that stated, more or less, that ‘I don’t believe astrology is valid, that I will, in normal circumstances, act in accordance with those beliefs, but, as I am currently in no position to say “yea” or “nay”, I will suspend my opinions in regard to that subject for the foreseeable future until such a time I am in a position to scientifically state, one way or the other, that this topic, as a discipline, is validly or not validly constructed.’ (8)

	I personally believe that many aspects of ‘classical’ astrological thought in practice do appear to have a significant degree of validity. Moreover, that because there is a body of positive statistical evidence already in existence science must properly evaluate the same before it can pass over this topic once more and merely dismiss it. Regardless of the validity or non-validity of astrological practice the primary point that I am making here still holds, namely, that it is wrong on pure a priori grounds to dismiss the validity of a particular topic. Of course, an affirmation, on a priori grounds, is equally ‘unscientific’! Although the merit of the practice of any project must, in theoretical terms of reference, first lie in its adequate, internal coherence of sense, a more accurate evaluation must be found through our appreciation of its facility to realize, in our critically structured investigations, a greater degree (of existential,) experiential value than that merely invested in our practice and/or investigation. In this paper I would like to show, in general, that a theological project can be coherent and possess ‘sense’. As for the meaningfulness of such a project it is obvious through the vast number of people that subscribe to this sort of enterprise that, at least for them, it also possesses a degree of meaningfulness as well. As for the validity of such a project I believe that certain observations and rules can be formulated, in general, that should be able to assist the theologian, professional or amateur, in their own assessment of the merits of their own particular formulation of this type of religious-philosophical task. That other pursuit, I must stress, is not the province of this paper. Indeed, this paper is not predicated on the existence or non-existence of God, rather, on the pervasive phenomenon, or phenomena, of theological projects in this world-of-life. (9)

	In my archetypal example of an earthquake, as an extreme, life-threatening situation for the person, a cluster of interrelated religious topics quite naturally arise, e.g., faith, prayer, belief in a deity, a claimed sense of personal interaction with the divine or numinous, a belief that fate can be changed, that the divine can enter into the course of history, etc., which, quite typically, characterize many aspects of what it means ‘to be religious’. Let me take up this idea of the divine, or in more neutral language, this sense of the numinous. (10)

	This expression was introduced by Rudolph Otto in his classic book The Idea of the Holy (Das Heilige) first published in 1917. Among other things it suggests a certain ambivalent parallel attractive ‘fascination’ and repellant ‘terror’ at the centre of some types of mystical experience. In my use of this expression I leave open whether it is actually an experience of the Divine. The fact that it is can be interpreted in this manner is enough for it to be so designated as numinous in nature. In other words, those types of experience that can be perceived or interpreted as involving the semblance of the presence of the divine, in some form or other, can be designated as numinous in their phenomenological presentation/representation; a sub-classification of mystical type experiences that is neutral as to the objectivity of its purported content. In effect this expression acts as an umbrella-phenomenon for a set of religious phenomena whose experiential reports can be treated to a phenomenological investigation, an examination of their essential features. Their ‘neutral’ treatment as numinous experience(-report)s allowing the phenomenologist to classify and examine their essential configuration as if already under a partial transcendental suspension. Further more, as the phenomenologist is usually examining reports that are second-hand they are in effect dealing with ‘texts’ (as ‘classically’ defined, i.e., formulated in language and deposited in a medium that preserves the same). Thus, as I have argued elsewhere, the phenomenologist is also a hermeneut - a practitioner of interpretation; interpreting both the interpretation put upon the numinous experience by the person reporting that type of experience and interpreting that type of report in the light of other reports that appear to be dealing with a similar sort of numinous phenomenon. Then, as this type of research is dealing with ‘experiential’ reports and their possible reproduction in experience, this research also involves a third element of the existential; the establishment of those pre-conditions that appear to induce the repetitive performance of the numinous phenomenon in question. (11)

	These three ‘moment’ of the phenomenological, the hermeneutical and the existential, as I have argued elsewhere, perform, in their simultaneous functioning, the creation of value in and through the hermeneutic(al) circle - the fundamental basis for all processes of understanding. In this paper, by extension, I will argue that they also form, in the exposition of a theological project, a hermeneutical circle of theological comprehension, i.e., both in the expression of a theological project and in its phenenological-philosophical examination all three moments, or aspects, must be present in some form or other. Otherwise both the presentation of that project and the representation of the same must be rendered defective! Indeed, without some basis in experience this type of project, and its examination, must be discharged as merely speculative! Without some form of interpretation the project can be dismissed as without meaning and suffer a loss of (existential) meaningfulness. Without some form of phenomenal presentation/representation the project, and its examination, cannot be located, given its ‘place’ in the distinctive panorama of the life-world. In the next five sections of this paper let me examine in greater depth each of these three moments and their collective functioning in this ‘hermeneutical circle of theological comprehension’. But, first, let me look more closely at what it means to investigate phenomena phenomenologically. (12)

II.   	Phenomenological Considerations
	The expression ‘transcendental’ (as in the expression ‘transcendental suspension’) is not to be confused with the expression ‘transcendent’ (nor for that matter with this latter expression’s opposite of ‘immanent’). In representationalist theories the things themselves are defined as transcendent to experience, i.e., as beyond their experiential representation. In many theological projects the sense of the divine is defined in a similar manner. In philosophical usage the term ‘transcendental’ can be found to have many interrelated and non-interrelated senses. For ‘simplicity’ let me define it as: that essential constitution in its essential configuration that, by (transcendental) necessity, uniquely characterizes a particular, distinctive type of phenomenon. Or, more broadly, let me define it as: that structural-content that constitutes, by necessity, distinctive phenomenal formation and their phenomenological reception; that our access to the transcendental is through the ‘transcendental suspension’ and that the latter is arrived at through the entertained balance of all experiential polarities distinctively expressed in and through that type of phenomenon under examination. Although the complexity of this latter definition would appear to be anything other than simple this definition is, in effect, merely stating (the existential fact) that ‘essential constitution’ is ‘explored’ through the use of the ‘transcendental suspension’ which is realized through a balancing of all polarities that constitute its phenomenal expression and phenomenological re-expression (through the re-simulation of that phenomenon). In practical terms all value judgments, in the form of various prejudices (as pre-judgments) that locate the ‘psychic place in the life-world’ of that phenomenon under examination, i.e., its ‘sense’, are re-written in parallel with their contrary-prejudices. E.g., if we are dealing with matters of ‘existence’ we supply the possibility of the ‘non-existence of the same’ to counter-balance the initial ascription of existence (in some form or other, factual, possible, metaphorical, mythical, etc.). By these means ‘bracketing out’ such non-transcendentally suspended considerations, in the process leaving a residue of the essential configuration of the phenomenon itself as it appears to us. Likewise doing the same, when and where relevant, with considerations of essential identity, aesthetical considerations, ethical prescriptions, pragmatical observations, (meta-textual) hermeneutical formulations, etc. This balancing act also extends into the epistemological aspect of its expression. E.g., if our initial focus is with conceptual ‘content’ we balance that with a focusing on conceptual ‘process’; the aspect of the ‘conceptual’, in its entirety, is in turn balanced with a variety of non-conceptual modalities, e.g, connotational analysis that looks at emotional aspects of the text (with an internal balancing of the same), consequential analysis (looking at all probable pathways ‘equally weighted’ that might be activated in an appropriate response to the nature of our primary text), perceptual analysis, etc., etc. These considerations are dealt with elsewhere and need not concern us too much in the course of this paper. (13)

	Because theological projects usually define the sense of the divine as transcendent and transcendental phenomenological considerations are averse to this sense of the transcendent, through (in effect a balancing of the transcendent with the immanent in) the transcendental suspension, and the transcendental phenomenologist privileges this transcendental treatment imposed upon the sense of the transcendent, transcendental phenomenologists are normally regarded as philosophers who would, more often than not, discount the work of theologians. The theological projects of the latter are therefore usually, in effect, ‘de-privileged’ by the same. Put in less diplomatic language the transcendental philosopher is often thought of as a professional who would relegate the work of the theologian to the intellectual sideline, although not necessarily relegating the idea of the divine to the same sin-bin. (14)

	As a consequence of this de-privileging it would appear that the transcendental phenomenologist has obvious problems dealing with any form of transcendence be it divine or otherwise. Moreover, their de facto privileging of the immanent, in accordance with my own understanding, will also, eventually, undermine the course of their project. On the other hand, paradoxical as it may seem in a traditional theological perspective, the theologian too has problems with a sense of the divine that is defined as ‘purely transcendent’, as ‘wholly other’, etc! If the ‘Divine’ is to be defined as ‘ultimately and absolutely beyond’ we may well ask what meaning and meaningfulness that type of concept could possibly possess for us mere mortals? If the theologian wants ‘to have their cake and eat it at the same time’ they must fudge this ultimate transcendency thesis! E.g., they might say in general terms of reference that ‘the ultimate is mediated by x’, or, ‘that the ultimate pervades the immanent as well’, and so on. In effect watering down this ultimate transcendency thesis. Furthermore, it can be argued quite succinctly that if God-does-not-exist-for-us then God-may as-well-not-exist-for-us!! Finally, I would also like to argue on epistemological-gestalt grounds that the idea of ‘pure transcendence’ in its purity cannot be thought, cannot be entertained (in practice or by default). That no concept can be thought apart from that which gives it its sense of contrast and psychic place in this world-of-life. ‘Transcendent’ must be thought in conjunction with that which is ‘non-transcendent’, i.e., e.g., the sense of the ‘immanent’, etc. Although, theology is notorious in asking us to think ‘impossible things before breakfast’ I might hasten that much of traditional philosophy too is predicated on just such impossible leaps of faith! If we must jump, more often than not like lemmings I might add, at least let us do so with the hope of getting to the ‘other side’ rather than plunging ourselves straight into this abyss of nonsense and meaninglessness and its eternal linguistic controversies that must forever engage the denizens of these nether regions, which, I must sadly reflect, are never that too far away from us, who, as  ‘bearers of language’, seem to find themselves burdened by such ‘contracted’ horizons! (15)

	So, if the phenomenologist wishes to practise as a ‘sense-clarifying phenomenologist’ they must productively re-work the landscape of ‘classical’ phenomenology! Equally, the theologian who wishes to be critically heard and appreciated, and not made fun off by their own fraternity, or by people whose projects are defined as in opposition to the same, they, in turn, must rework the traditional landscape of theology! Of course, it goes without saying, therefore, that a person who wants to engage in both projects must exercise both disciplines validly and appropriately before they can even start to make some progress one way or the other in this complex endeavour regardless of whether they be committed phenomenologists or theologians, or, both phenomenologists and theologians!  But, before I proffer a few quick suggestions to both camps in this regard, let me quote the first paragraph from a paper I recently read in order to reinforce some of these concerns I have for the practice of classical phenomenology both with respect to itself and with respect to its approaching this topic of the critical formulation and/or evaluation of the (various) sense(s) of the theological. This paper is titled Emmanuel Levinas: God and phenomenology and is authored by Philip Blond who is also the editor of the collection titled Post-Secular Philosophy: Between philosophy and theology in which this paper is to be found. (16)

	At the beginning of his paper he quotes Edmund Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, tr. W.P. Alston and G. Nakhnikian, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic, 1964, p. 4:

		I must accomplish a phenomenological reduction:
		I must exclude all that is transcendently posited.

	He then starts his paper by noting:

	It was Husserl who, by wishing to locate the ground of Being wholly in beings, forbade God to phenomenology, ending his Cartesian meditations with Augustine’s Delphic motto, ‘Do not wish to go out, go back into yourself. Truth dwells in the inner man.’ The promise of phenomenology was for Husserl a promise to save cognition from contradictions and sceptisism. And for Husserl cognition risked contradiction because knowledge divided itself by attempting to reach the beyond itself to something transcendent to it. Consequently Husserl sought to end the separation of transcendence from immanence by abolishing faith in any reality transcendent to human experience. As a result, cognition was prevented from acknowledging anything external to itself, and all that could not or would not present itself as evidence (Evidenz) to immanent cognition was assumed not to be. In this respect phenomenology remains a discipline founded on the prohibition of transcendence and theology, not least because God cannot show Himself to a human consciousness that claims itself to be the sole determinate of all that it experiences. And this erasure of God from phenomena takes place because for Husserl, and for the new science of phenomenology, the world is now the creation of human rather than divine intentionality. (End of quotation)

	Paraphrasing this paragraph we could say that, in effect, the epoche, in theory, is suppose to confine the attention of the phenomenologist to the realm of the immanent. Certainly to the sphere of that being experienced. But transcendence cannot be that easily dismissed. In accordance with my understanding of the phenomenological project, all essential experience is indicative of it being ‘transcendentally structured and constituted’ in keeping with the distinctive nature of its essential character and all essential features therein incorporated. Moreover, as essence itself is hierarchically structured and thematized in the totality of the epistemological structures of the psyche it follows that essence itself is hierarchically structured within this overall map of the life-world. That, therefore, this enstructuralization implicates the presence of the transcendent. In turn, that which is enstructured is relatively immanent; meaning and meaningfulness being synthesized and thematized between these two ideal polarities of the transcendent and the immanent. Moreover, our access to the transcendental, through the transcendental suspension, is re-effected for us through our being able to re-invoke and replicate this balance re-realized between these and all other essentially relevant phenomenological polarities necessary for the re-simulation of that phenomenon under examination and that thereby give it its essentially definitive ‘place’ or ‘sense’ in the ‘space’ (i.e., its core ‘spatial’ location) in the essential ‘topography’ of the life-world (in its ‘open-endedness’ but culturally-dependent intersubjective, hierarchically-structured configurement of meta-textual genres). Consequently, I would argue that the phenomenological investigation should abandon not only the hypothetical realm of ‘pure transcendence’ but also the hypothetical realm of ‘pure immanence.’ Instead, the critical ‘neo-phenomenologist’ should attend to that realm of experience that intersects these two idealities of the transcendent and the immanent wherein the world-of-life is intersubjectively lived out by-us-for-us. (17)

III.  	The Phenomenological Treatment of this Topic

	In our phenomenological treatment of this topic two fundamental terms will be placed under a transcendental suspension, namely, the sense of the creation as the realm of the phenomenological, i.e., the range of phenomena as found in the life-world, and, the sense of the divine as the theological whether that be some sense of a divinity or divinities, the sense of the godhead; the actuality, possibility or illusion of any or all of the same, etc., etc., whose imputed existence when experientially ‘visited’ will be descriptively subsumed neutrally under the expression of the ‘numinous. (18)

	The creation in the sense of the phenomenal can be seen, at least initially, to range over a region in logical meaning encompassing that realm of phenomena created at some point in time, that created many times, created continually or continuously, or not at all, and, that which only appears to have been created in any of these senses. (19)

	On the other hand the sense of the divine as the theological can be seen to encompass limited divinity and/or limited divinities and/or a sense of the unlimited godhead or only the mere appearance of some or all of the same. (20)

The theological can also be re-defined in term of its existential relationship with the sense of the person. Whether that be in conscious or non-conscious terms of reference, whether that be in personal or non-personal terms of reference. (21)
	
	By a transcendental suspension is meant, in line with my previous research, the entertained balancing of all polarities, identities, functions, etc., through being simulated in parallel with their contraries in theoretical and/or practical terms of reference, etc. 
    (22)
	What can be entertained in logical terms of reference therefore appears to be conceivable. Therefore what cannot be entertained, directly or indirectly, cannot be a subject here for investigation. (23)

	The following can be ruled out of court when properly analyzed: 

1.	Phenomena that don’t change,
2.	Phenomena that cannot be interacted with even indirectly, and,

3.	Some sense of the Divine that has no relationship with some sense of the phenomenal, 
4.	An absence of interaction even with its own sense(s) of self (regardless of its epistemological status). (24)
	
Because interaction implies:

1.	Change (because all relational processes involve the same),
2.	Interaction (because that part of the world that-is-not-there-for-us, directly or indirectly may as well not-exist-for-us!).

…and the sense of the Divine, what ever its formulation, demands:

3.	Its meaningful phenomenal involvement (because that sense of the Divine that-is-not-there-for-us, directly or indirectly, may as well not-exist-for-us!),
4.	Some form of intentional interaction or intervention with phenomenal subjects (even if the appearance of ‘intentions’ on the part of a Divine agent are only metaphorically analogued or imagined), i.e., that this sense of the Divine possesses some semblance of a self. (25)

	Phenomena (as defined in my micro-essay In Authentic Space, Part II) are primarily emitted, systematically encompassed or allowed to interact through the form of a current. In secondary terms of reference all three modes can be found to co-occur with each other (both ontically {logically and factually} and epistemologically). (26)

	The theological can be limited to the sense of a divinity or divinities, or unlimited with respect to the sense of the godhead, or, linked only to the appearance or illusion of the same. All of the above taking personal and/or non-personal forms of direct/indirect interaction with phenomenal subjects. (27)

	Granted that an individual person has an established appearance phenomenally, then the extrapolation of this type of affairs could not be used to rule out in logical terms of reference a sense of divinity that is like some person (or thing). Hence metaphors of ‘mothers’ and ‘fathers’ could be considered literally acceptable but only in limited terms of reference. (28)

	But that which is limited is limited and consequently cannot perform that which has its origins directly in some sense of the unlimited. The theologian, therefore, must make the following choices in this regard – accepting one of these options, accepting both options (or rejecting these options and in the process rejecting the formulation of the theological project itself, or implying that the theological project cannot be directly formulated, only alluded to through significant ‘indications’, analogies, the via negativa, etc.). (29)

	But it is conceivable that the personal and non-personal could be co-joined, i.e., a sense of godhead that also has a limited ‘face’ so to speak. That interaction with the unlimited, in this type of situation, were in some sense mediated. (30)

IV.   The Hermeneutical Treatment of this Topic

	How do know, one might well ask, when we encounter a God-experience, an experience with an imputed interaction with some sense of the Divine? (31)

In our inspection of a bowl of fruit how do we distinguish the bananas from the apples, the lemons from the limes, etc? First, we invoke the genre of ‘fruit’ to discern what is ‘not fruit’ in the bowl and then we invoke the appearance of various kinds of fruit in order to discern, through an adequate degree of similarity, which types of fruit can be found in this bowl. (32)

In the same manner an imputed experience of the divine must first begin in and through the invocation of religious genres already to hand for that religious person/and the ‘hearer’ of that religious person! By such means, whatever the novelty of the experience, it can be so judged in accordance with your adoption and adaptation of these (met-textual) genres of interpretation. This experience would then be naturally evaluated by various relatively fundamental forms of classification under the headings, e.g., of intensity, novelty, existential richness, have we met this type of experience before; what interpretational classification do we find the person, reporting this phenomenon, initially using in regard to that type of experience, and, what was the nature of its initial context, i.e., was the person in or not in a religious frame of reference prior to this experienced event, e.g., walking along the street, reading scripture, dancing in the temple, taking hallucinatory drugs, mediating, praying, merely out shopping, etc., etc. (33)

	Then, no doubt, the person involved and/or the person examining this type of report would want ‘to look more closely’ at this ‘type of phenomenon’ as it appeared to present itself, or, as it was represented by the person or persons who claim to have experienced the same; the report-giver being directly or (indirectly, i.e., hypothetically) questioned, etc. Both the direct experiencer and the indirect experiencer setting out to evaluate its essential constitution and attempting to appreciate its ramifications in the wider sphere of experience in general. In other words, setting about ‘to (re-)interpret’ this type of experience regardless of whether they directly or indirectly experienced the ‘simulation’ of the same. Both parties also perhaps seeking possible options as to how that type of experience might be re-simulated. In effect, in an effort to come to a general understanding among these parties, attempting an equation, or some form of coincidence, between its simulated presentation and representation in memory, its representation in a (series of) communicated report(s) and its resimulated re-presentation in experience that appears to have re-simulated the same type of phenomenon. (34)

	These distinctions and equations need to be noted. Furthermore, those hermeneutic forms of understanding, as (performative) genres of experience, traditional or otherwise, brought to the living and re-living of this experience, also need to be carefully and critically noted. (35)

	Proceeding more deeply into this hermeneutic territory, this ‘text’ qua text needs careful, critical hermeneutical evaluation and to do this I shall supply a set of hermeneutic rules that might help us in this task. (36)

Lastly, if this examination survives our critical hermeneutical treatment of the text as a text, our ascertainment of its ‘imputed implication of the sense of the divine itself’ must meet with out critical appreciation to that extent that we are in a position to ascertain, evaluate and appreciate such. And this task I must leave to the professional or amateur phenomenologist of religious experiences in general and in particular (either as a practitioner and/or as an ‘observer’). (37)

Now various rules in general can be supplied by the critical hermeneuticist to assist the hermeneut in the critical exercise of their practice. Let me briefly outline some of these techniques and observations:

1.	The existential richness of a text is greater than that merely invested by both 
the ‘writer’ and ‘reader’ of that text in their writing/reading (re-writing) of that text, but, if that existential richness is not much greater than that imported in its investment then it follows that that text has little to offer our self beyond a literal, a priori reading of its surface. (38)

E.g., if we were to witness a hypnotist getting a subject to believe that they were ‘a Martian who had come to Earth’, and ‘that they could speak English’, and, ‘in English they could tell us what it was like for a Martian to live on Mars, and, what it was like for a Martian to be on Earth’, we would not believe what was being said however existentially rich and convincing that account might appear on a superficial level. Because we would know that ‘the garbage invested in the text’ equals exactly ‘the garbage divested by that text!’ In other words, except by those truly fooled by this event, we know that the text is nothing but the imaginative ravings of the hypnotized prompted by the suggestions of the hypnotist. We don’t get much more information from this textual situation beyond what we already ‘know’ (although obviously such a situation has a certain entertainment value along with a sense of amazement that can be experienced in watching this ‘textual illusion’ apparent in such an event). Put more succinctly. Our investment in a text must be met with a greater dividend. A ‘poverty stricken text’ loosing quickly our interest unless it can re-create our interest in some other form. (39)

In my work as a psychiatric nurse I have witnessed a large number of patients writing various types of texts ostensively with an inspired flavour. One old fellow with a long white beard was ‘taking dictation from the space ships overhead, in preparation for God’s future governance over the Earth.’ Another wrote about being an ‘ASIO operative working for the New Zealand Government,’ etc. When the opportunity came for me to read this type of literature one had little reason to doubt, generally, that what ‘you got was what you saw, nothing more - nothing less!’, i.e, ‘just words!’ The first person hearing ‘voices’ merely wrote down what he was ‘hearing’, and as far as we know, and it was certainly never demonstrated, there were no space ships with which he was in contact with. The hypothesis that he was ‘merely transcribing his auditory hallucinations’ had a greater merit, a greater existential richness to it, than a literal reading that took that text at face value. In the other case it was obvious that this individual was, first, disturbed, and, second, that his sense of the metaphorical had broken down with his automatic non-discriminating identification of ‘like’ with ‘is’, i.e., his fantasy of being ‘like an ASIO operative’ meant for him that ‘he was an ASIO operative’. And that these observations about the nature of these textual productions were actually more meaningful, more fruitful, more productive and predictive, than the utterance of the initial texts taken at face value. (40)

2.	This brings me to a second rule, namely that if there is a meta-textual reading that is richer than a superficial reading of a text, and, that this meta-textual reading opposes this superficial reading of that text, then, our support should more naturally be given to the meta-textual reading that overrides that initial textual reading. 
   											    (41)
	E.g., we see the sun ‘rising’ each morning and ‘setting’ in the evening. But, now, those who have a modern, scientific education override that text by perceiving that the horizon is moving relative to the sun and not vice versa. (42)

3.	A text needs to be internally coherent and cohere externally in the world of the inter-textual unless valid reasons can be found to privilege the former. (43)

	Under textual pressure and inter-textual coherence most people in the ancient world interpreted the ‘sun as rising’, etc. In a geocentric perspective that could still be seen as valid if left in those relatively restricted terms of reference, but, in a solar-perspective that would now not be considered to be the case. (44)

4.	In hermeneutic understanding ‘apparent intentions’, as ‘essential configurations’, are reinforced through repetition, and, weakened through the deconstructive repetition of those facets that seem to oppose those former processes of iteration (and re-iteration). (45)

	The text in its presentation, or as a phenomenon treated as a text, has its ‘authorial’ intentions usually reinforced through repetition, and, undermined in the same fashion. Moreover, the integrity of the text, necessarily present to some degree, reveals the state of that integrity throughout the space of that text (just as a mountain has its mountainous-ness present all round and over it). And the relative (degree of) integrity of all phenomena is similarly in evidence when ‘closely read’. (46)

5.	The ‘apparent integrity’ of the text directly reflects the ‘apparent integrity of 
that which produces it (and reproduces it)’. (47)

Too often when one ‘knows’ a politician is lying we see their loss of integrity reflected in their texts. Or, when we find a translator producing a translation that doesn’t seem to make much sense in English and we in turn have to translate this piece of ‘English’ it would appear that they too were not too clear in what the original text might have meant. Similarly, when one is searching for the thematization of one’s arguments and until they are clear, to the author’s own self, that lack of clarity will also be evident in their related text too! (48)

6. 	Hermeneutic pressure is re-created when a meta-textual reading of the text is in harmony with a textual reading of that same text and vice versa. (49)

	A text is ‘set up’ to be primarily read in a certain way, or set(s) of ways, in keeping with the meta-textual genre expectations suggested through the form of that text or through meta-textual inserts giving instructions on how the text is meant to be read, e.g., the insertion of definitions, or, when the text tells you it is going to change direction conclude, etc. (50)

	A number of other rules could be formulated. But that would be best conducted in the actual attempt of trying to interpret a particular text and therein demonstrating more effectively the point being made by this relatively formal type of interpretative approach. A practice, I must add, that is not to be seen as an exercise in absolute formalism, rather,  as an offering to be inserted within our hermeneutic circle (of theological comprehension) in our continual revisiting those relevant texts and our hopefully finding therein, in our re-reading, a deeper comprehension of those texts. (51)

V.	The Existential Treatment of this Topic

	That which does not interact directly or indirectly with us, and vice versa, has no direct or indirect existence for us! Such an entity or entities would be pure speculation and should be considered as such, i.e., as an impossible object to entertain! (52)

	Therefore an existentially meaningful theology must involve at least the semblance of our experiential interaction with some sense of the Divine! That:

 That-which-does-not-exist-for-us may as well not-exist-for-us! (53)
	
	Hence the division of our topic into the two domains of the merely theoretical and the non-theoretical or experiential, i.e., with respect to the latter: that type of religious experience that, when hermeneutically interpreted, seems to imply the interactive existence of the Divine in some form or other; the authenticity and facticity of such an experience being critically appreciated within a hermeneutical circle of theological comprehension! Let us now attend to the latter aspect of our topic, namely, the necessary experiential dimension of our hypothetical theology. (54)

	Having now established the theoretical possibility of our topic (in general terms of reference subject to an overarching transcendental suspension) let us now look at ways theological meaning and meaningfulness might be ‘realized’ through the implication of this form of the hermeneutic circle. The hermeneutic circle, as I have argued elsewhere, being seen as central to the very gestalt formation of cognitive, intentional thought-processes, indeed as being central to the nature of all types of thought processes. I will attempt to do this through the introduction of this heuristic device that I believe should be made central to the theological enterprise what ever its intentions or format. This device, modeled on the hermeneutic(al) circle, as articulated by Heidegger among others, is called by myself the hermeutical circle of theological comprehension. (55)

VI.	The Hermeneutical Circle of Theological Comprehension

The last three sections of this paper have dealt with the phenomenological treatment, the hermeneutical treatment and the existential treatment of this topic respectively. It is my contention that these three aspects naturally form a hermeneutic circle of understanding. For some time now I have argued that the hermeneutic circle consists of three moments and not two. Let me briefly elaborate. (56)

	In the context of a sentence there is a ‘sentential pressure’ to have words read in the context of that sentence in such a manner as to deliver the maximum appearance of definitive sense. In such a context words can lose some of their natural ambiguity as is evidenced in the different meanings that can be given to the same word in a dictionary, or, the specific identification made in the use of indexicals like the word ‘this’ when the referent is clearly spelled out. Similarly, in the context of a paragraph, a sentence is subjected to a similar pressure that, under normal circumstances in a well-formed text, ascribes a greater degree of clarity to the sentences in that paragraph. And so on in the context of the totality of that text, and even beyond, when a text is subjected to a reading that involves the demonstration of an overt inter-textual pressure. (57)

	What I am trying to say here is that ‘textual bits’ are read in ‘textual contexts’ and vice versa (and likewise with respect to ‘textual contexts’ and ‘super-textual contexts’, etc.). Ostensibly, this dance appears to take place between two dance partners. However, I would argue that it would make better sense to invoke a third party, a dialectical moment that is the balanced, transcendental suspension of the two former parties and which allows us ‘to enter and leave’ the ‘psychic confines’ of this hermeneutic circle.  Now this threefold pattern can be read through various lenses, e.g., gestalt, temporal, reciprocal processes of synthesis and analysis. In the latter perspective we can ‘perceive’ three moments, namely (not listed with any preferential sense of order) analysis, synthesis and the balanced suspension of analysis-synthesis. In a temporal perspective we could name them (in keeping with the previous non-preferential order) as past, future and present. In a gestalt frame of reference we might name them as a foreground focalization of interest, background field and the ongoing ego-involved relationship between these two ideal polarities of the gestalt field. It just so happens that I can also describe these three aspects respectively as phenomenological, hermeneutical and existential; the same order as they have been introduced in this paper. And as synonyms for these three terms I could also substitute respectively essential, reductive, analytical textual considerations; rhetorical, re-presented, synthetical meta-textual considerations; and experientially-engaged non-textual considerations (i.e., as the balanced suspension of the textual versus the meta-textual and vice versa; that type of moment in which we seem to actually ‘forget’ we are reading a text in our ‘engaged’ reading of that text - hence this implication of a ‘non-textual’ aspect). (58)

	I have argued elsewhere that all meaning and meaningfulness is created and re-created through these three ideal moments. And just the same considerations must apply to this topic of the theological! (59)

	Under the moment of the phenomenological we find ourselves dealing with essential, phenomenal considerations, i.e., matters of sense, phenomenological distinctness–of phenomenal presentations and re-presentations be they found in types of numinous experiences or in our texts about the same, etc. (60)

	Under the moment of the hermeneutical we investigate textual considerations of ‘meaning’ of a more meta-textual nature; therein investigating genre expectations and transformations in the same, examining (meta-level) questions of sense’, i.e., meaning, applying our intuitive abilities through the effective use of our formalized skills as exemplified in the appropriate and productive utilization of our hermeneutic rules in the context of this distinctive hermeneutical circle of theological comprehension, etc. (61)

	Under the moment of the existential we investigate non-textual aspects of meaningfulness wherein the text is simulated or re-simulated; therein investigating types of numinous-reports, directly or indirectly, in the light of our phenomenological, hermeneutical and existential disciplines, etc. (62)

	In the full functioning of this hermeneutical circle of theological comprehension we try to make sense of theological projects in and through the ‘apparently intended totality’ of their meaning and meaningfulness. Nothing mystical is intended here! But if it were to be the case that the Divine in some form or other should drop in on us, so to speak, it would have to take place through just this type of intentional process-structure, at least to the extent, in retrospect, we were to realize that ‘we had been so apparently entertained’. (63)

	Now some people might argue that all philosophical ‘circles’ are vicious. However, I would argue that our progressive movement around this circle, in both directions, simultaneously, is productive of sense, meaning and meaningfulness to that extent our participation in this circle engages us in a ‘surplus’ of sense, meaning and meaningfulness! This existential ‘excess’ itself characterizing, experientially, the intensity of the existential moment to that same degree! In the reading, and re-readings, of a ‘text’ sense, meaning and meaningfulness are engaged to that extent that the re-reading of the text keeps us involved through the presence of a surplus of value, a dividend that must richly exceed the degree of value imported into our reading of that text in the first place. A rich text richly rewarding this investment, and re-investment, of psychic interest. (64)

VII.	Conclusion (?)

	Thus, in this dialectical fashion as outlined, through the (transcendental) auspicious of the hermeneutical circle of theological comprehension, as long as a theological project is internally coherent, I can see that it is possible for a theological project to make sense, possess meaning and meaningfulness. A state of affairs attested to by a large percentage of the population of this planet. It is my belief that this exposition of mine should be able to help us make better sense of this type of project, help us to appreciate the apparent merits of its exposition whatever the manner of its formulation, whatever the nature of its presuppositions and whatever the consequences claimed for your belief in that system. I have argued only that we can find a ‘place’ in this life-world, this one-world-of-life, for the ‘idea’ of the Divine. I have not defined, or rather refined, the nature of that ‘idea’. Various apparently internally coherent possibilities are left open! In the sequels to this paper this type of task will be looked at more closely among a number of other things. In this exposition I have also argued that this hermeneutical circle of theological comprehension must also equally involve hermeneutical and existential inputs! More-over, as a ‘neo-phenomenologist’, I have re-defined the nature of the path a phenomenologist should take in order to correctly approach the transcendent and the immanent, or rather, the nature of their intersection as met in our engagement within this world-of-life. That, indeed, there is a phenomenological way of doing theology, and, that a coherent theology should be conducted in such a fashion as outlined in this paper; along with a critical recognition of the need for hermeneutical and existential forms of appreciation as well! (65)

							       Noël Tointon, Sydney, 24.12.00.

Summary of Main Ideas Presented in this Paper

1.   The distinction between the re(-)covery and dis(-)covery of the religious attitude, and, the fact that our approach towards, and expression of, the latter is through the adoption and adaptation of genres found with the former. (Paragraphs 2, 3, 5, 6)

2.   The primary objective of this paper being to establish that the ‘sense’ of the divine can be formulated as a meaningful project, and, that the theologian can, and perhaps should, establish this type of project in a careful, philosophically formulated, phenomenologically based framework or context. (4, 7)

3.   The validity of any project should not be established/disestablished on a priori grounds. (8, 9)

4.   In our phenomenological examination of the sense (or idea) of the divine we shall use the neutral expression of the numinous. (3, 10, 11)

5.   That the hermeneutic(al) circle is constructed from ‘three’ moments of analysis, synthesis and the balanced suspension of the former two moments. (55-58)  In the same fashion a hermeneutical circle of theological comprehension can be formulated. (4ff3, 12, 55-64)

6.   The expression sense being given a simple definition of making sense, possessing meaning and meaningfulness. (e.g., 7) In a more technical sense sense is defined as the psychic location in the essential topography of the life-world (the life-world being seen as the intersection of the transcendent and immanent process orientations). Determination of sense therefore takes place in a phenomenologically oriented process. On the other hand meaning and meaningfulness respectively take place in hermeneutically and existentially oriented processes. (9, 17, 58, 60-62, 65)

7.   The implication that a ‘text’ is just not ‘a mere inscription’ and involves, in acts of writing/reading, many other aspects, e.g., the meta-textual, etc. (i.e., non-textual, not-textual, con(-)textual, inter-textual, etc., etc.). (12, 13, 41, 43, 49, 49ff31, 58, 61)

8.   The sense of the transcendental is defined as: 1. The necessary essential configuration of a phenomenon. 2. That approached through the transcendental suspension. 3. And that this suspension is (re-)created through the balanced entertainment, in parallel, of all essential(ly relevant) aspects of that phenomenon. (13, 17, 64-65)

9.   Transcendental projects are opposed to the (impossible) sense of the purely transcendent (and should be equally opposed to projects that involve the (equally impossible) sense of the purely immanent). (14-17)

10. Theological projects should not be defined in a(n impossible) purely transcendent mode. Moreover, that-which-does-not-exist-for-us may as well not-exist-for-us! (52-54) Implying that theology should possess an experiential/existential aspect. (25, 52-54)

11.  The range of sense of the divine can be hypothetically defined as: that which encompasses limited divinity and/or limited divinities and/or a sense of the unlimited godhead or only the mere appearance of some or all of the same, etc. (20-21, 25-30)

12.  The sense of the divine should be constructed in such a fashion that ensures the divine is able to interact with the realm of phenomenal subjects (and objects) (and v.v.). (18-19)

13.   Interpretation of a text or set of texts is always possible and can be approached informally through the application of applicable hermeneutic(al) rules. (31-51)

14.  That the hermeneutical circle of theological comprehension is not a ‘vicious circle’ when it engages a ‘surplus’ of value (sense, meaning and meaningfulness). (64-65) Implicating, therefore, phenomenological, hermeneutical and existential inputs/outputs! (64-65)

15.  Thus, in the light of this paper, it is possible to rule out certain types of theological projects as defective! At the same time leaving open the hypothetical possibility of this type of project in general terms of reference!