Finding a Place for the Idea of God – Part X:
Overview or Oversight - On the 'Death' of God??

0.   Introduction

	In this paper I am going to examine the theological implications stemming from the ramifications of a phenomenological understanding that value is created in the midst of the life-world and that through an ongoing re-simulation of that process all identity, be it theological or non-theological in orientation, is constituted in the same manner. (1)

1.    That the Life-World is the Transcendental Basis for the Creation of All Value

	As all value is created in and through the hermeneutic circle it follows that its creation is centred within the life-world, and, that that basis is transcendental in orientation. Let me explain what is meant here and then examine important ramifications relevant to our investigation of this topic. (2)

	The hermeneutic circle as examined in the course of this series of essays is, as previously noted, tri-polar in constitution. According to the perspective adopted to view the same we have, e.g., in an intentional frame of reference the intentional object(-state) v.v. the intentional field v.v. the intentional subject or intender. In a textual frame of reference we have, respectively, the sense of text, meaning of meta-textual genre, and, the meaningfulness of non-textual simulation, etc. As previously described each one of these moments is a type of suspension. A balanced interaction of all three moments realizes an ongoing overall transcendental suspension. Through such there is created/re-created an existential excess and that excess is value, defined through its origins as phenomenal sense, hermeneutical meaning and existential meaningfulness. As any one of these three aspects is negatively co-defined by the other two, all three moments being correlatively interrelated, it follows that no one moment-type can be absent in this simulation of value! Value being produced/re-produced through a simulated/re-simulated existential excess that emerges in the interactions thematized between these three ideal poles. Therefore, in this economy of value there can be no privileging of these three poles by virtue of the fact that their ideality is impossible to obtain in phenomenal/phenomenological reality. (3)

	Another way of cashing out these three dialectical poles between which value is constituted is to refer to the items focused on at the intentional object pole as an objects (be it a text in a classical sense or any non-classical text appropriated an objective manner), the intentional field  of genre (determination of intersubjective, meta-textual modes of activity) as others, and, the pole of transcendental subjectivity as ego (or egos when dealing with more than one agent). In this model it follows that value is not created within the ego (or a group of egos) but in the 'space' between the ego/s, objects and others. This space is none other than the simulation of the life-world as it is found there by-us and for-us. The consequences of this principle of inclusion are far reaching. (4)

	For a start, when we examining the apparent objectivity of knowledge, it follows that it cannot be formulated in such a fashion as to be separated from the reality of the interpretation adopted in our thematizing of that situation to hand. To insist or expect otherwise is to attempt the impossible and, therein, invite paradox and nonsense to masquerade as a paragon of philosophical virtue. In a similar fashion no interpretation of the world could be ever conducted without reference to, a, an interpreter, and, b, to the things of this natural world within which all its horizons of sense, meaning and meaningfulness are constituted! Or, in a similar vein, objects and others cannot be constituted without some form of reference to an individual or group of individuals (or to some institution acting by collective proxy). Let me restate what is being said here. (5)

	The life-world is the transcendental world of relativity, i.e., the relatively non-transcendental. In this 'space' the potentiality-actuality of relationships is realized and/or thematized. A simulation is effectively realized when all modalities normally associated with its phenomenology are co-realized. As all forms of value are realized in the midst of this 'space' it follows that all forms of theological value must also be realized and/or thematized within the ambit of the same, i.e., through the phenomenology of relationships. At the same time, there can be no privileging of objects, others and egos (be they divine and/or non-divine in epistemologically organized status) that involve the independent reificational extrapolation of the same. (6)

	In this simulated/re-simulated economy of value-production three principles need to be noted, namely, Inclusion, Balance and Intensity. The first has already been noted. Inclusion notes that these three ideal poles of objects, etc., cannot be obtained and therefore the process of independent privileging cannot be conducted in theory and should not be attempted in practice. Absolute privilege is ontologically, epistemologically and ontological-epistemologically impossible to perform. It just cannot be thought nor recognized nor could it be met (in that impossibly purified form on account of the unobtainability of that format). On the other hand conferring of degrees of qualified privilege can be conducted (as occurs in ordered analysis, etc., wherein judgments of an essential, aesthetical, ethical nature, etc., are performed through a simple or complex privileging/de-privileging of these ideal polarities of objects, etc.) to the extent that they are met in natural experience. On the other hand, in the second Principle of Balance, existential distortion is recognized if an overall transcendental suspension is not put in play through an equal weighting of these three poles or moments of objects, etc. Hence it behooves us develop our direct access to the simulations/resimulations of the life-world through the development and maintenance of this dynamic sense of equilibrium. Lastly, the Principle of Intensity states that the degree of engagement is dependent upon the intensity brought to that relationship of engagement and that the intensity of the resulting existential surplus is also dependent upon the degree of harmonization present in that process of interaction. Intensity in this respect also reflecting the 'integrity' of that process of interaction. Hence, overall intensity of the engaged process is a product that reflects the intentional intensity of interest brought to the process, the intensity of the existential excess realized in the harmonization of that interacting interest, and, the augmentation or diminishment of value brought to bear upon that process by the perception, or otherwise, of its contextual authenticity. (7)

	With this understanding to hand, namely, that the life-world is that world of value realized between these three ideal, absolutely unobtainable polarities of the objective, intersubjective and subjective we can draw the following conclusion as to the transcendental limits of identity be it non-theological or theological: that from an absolute point of view there can be no absolute value realized in purely objective, purely intersubjective and purely subjective terms of reference. The ramifications of this transcendental insight are important! (8) 

	For a start, we cannot insist on any form of identity being a mere object nor can we insist on it being a mere intersubjective state of affairs nor can we insist on it being a mere subject. Hence there can be no pure objects! Hence there can be no pure public space! Hence there can be no pure subjects! Thence a subject is both embodied in an objective space and embodied in an intersubjective 'space'! In this light, in dealing with a formulation of the Divine either hypothetical or non-hypothetical in orientation, there can be no formulation of a pure Divine object, no formulation of a pure Divine sense of intersubjectivity nor a formulation of a pure sense of Divine subjectivity! As below - so above! Thence human identity cannot manifest itself without some form of an objective embodiment in an interpersonal 'space' and cannot manifest itself at the same time without some form of an non-absolute subjectivity. In essence, all forms of identity are manifested as forms of simulation, given the simulation of persistence through re-simulation wherein identity is re-constituted within the parameters that set its associated existential descriptor, i.e., that complex description of the full modal complexion of that apparent state of identity in its simulated phenomenality in the uniqueness of its causal history and historical contextualization. Ideal extrapolations having no phenomenal existence beyond their metaphorically treated context of existential introduction. Let me examine this conclusion in more detail. (9)

	For a start, we must not conceive a simulation as being the simulation of a non-simulation; either in some form of a pre-simulated state of affairs or altogether as a state of affairs conceived of as ultimately non-simulatable (as anything-in-itself, etc.). In this respect a simulation is always a re-simulation. As the process of simulation is re-iterative and never purely iterative, on the basis of the apparent uniqueness of each perceive moment, it follows that iteration can never be a pure process of re-constitution. These relative shifts towards a close mere conformity and a not so close sheer conformity, in patterns of bare conformity, creating the harmonic function of that apparent state of affairs and the degree to which that state of re-constitution preserves its phenomenal sense of identity (and the phenomenal imprint of the same through textual deposition) and the creation therein of all forms of value, information, communication, etc. A theory of harmonization is here being signalled as discussed elsewhere in these essays (as the emergent relationship that arises between consonant mere repetition, dissonant sheer repetition in iterated patterns of bare repetition). Let me illustrate these points in the following metaphors and, therein, discern, at the same time, the role of metaphor, when properly set within the ambit of the hermeneutic circle, to not just analogue reality but to also directly simulate/re-simulate the same to that extent that that analogical framework is modally competent to do so. E.g., a photograph of yourself is a likeness that allows one to directly access that subject to that extent the modalities of the subject are imprinted upon the photograph, which, being a non-immediate textual deposition, is an essential snap-shot of yourself at that moment in time in that particular place (as appropriately pertains to your existential descriptor at that time). In this regard a colour photo will do a better job in its partial simulation of yourself… that a motion picture of yourself will do even better, etc. On the other hand in meeting you in the flesh I find, through geographical and temporal coincidence, my direct acquaintance with your yourself in and through your full modal complement to that extent that I am, myself, able to relate to you equally as a re-simulation qua re-simulation. So, I might not be able to divine your current thinking but will be able to ascertain something of your current mental state regardless of whether you are asleep or awake or faking the former (etc.). Because we are immersed in the transcendental ambit of the life-world and that will allow me to divine to some extent or other the nature of your objectivity, intersubjectivity and subjectivity, and v.v. Hence in this regard all ascriptions of objectivity, etc., must be provisional whether we are dealing with object-states in a scientific domain or some other non-theological domain. In the same manner, the Divine cannot be theoretically, practically or critically formulated as occurring in a pure realm of objectivity, etc! In what manner then is identity constituted in transcendental/non-transcendental terms of reference? (10)

2.    On the Transcendental and Non-Transcendental Constitution of Identity

	In the light of this transcendental research we have now pre-determined some of the transcendental limits imposed upon the phenomenal nature of phenomenological experience, namely, e.g., the impossibility of pure objectivity being formed and/or recognized, etc. But as 'limits' that cannot be obtained in reality/the reality of experience it follows that the transcendental aspect of experience can never be 'pure' (neither in form nor in content). Hence the implication of the relatively non-transcendental! Indeed, as argued in previous essays, the transcendental is the result of the transcendentialization of the relatively non-transcendental, and, that the non-transcendental is the result of the de-transcendentialization of the relatively transcendental. Hence from a theoretical point of view one can discuss transcendental limits, but, that in practical terms of reference, one can actually utilize the relative presence of the transcendental through a transcendentialization of the relatively non-transcendental, but, the same is never realized through the impossible transcendentialization of the relatively transcendental! From a critical perspective the re-establishment of an ongoing overall transcendental suspension establishes/re-establishes a sense of the critical. Thus it is in these theoretical, practical and critical terms of reference that we must deal with the constitution of identity be it theological or non-theological in orientation. In this regard we can draw no distinction in the phenomenal/phenomenological formation of identity as it is in the life-world, in this 'one' world-of-life, that the relatively divine/Divine and the relatively non-divine are to be equally met if the former is to be met and exists to be met; having argued (hypothetically and practically) in the first essay that the divine must be met in the phenomenal world either directly and/or indirectly (in order to do positive theological work since a form of the divine that is purely speculative is-not-there-for-us just as, to the same extent, we-can-not-be-there-for-it!)! (11)

	The constitution of value can be examined from an absolute transcendental point of view and a conventional non-transcendental point of view as long as we recognize the natural limits imposed upon both styles of examination. In the former we examine the ideality of the apparent constitution of the phenomenon/phenomena in question either hypothetically or non-hypothetically. A hypothetical examination is an examination of the ideality of type within the limits set by transcendental determination, i.e., as long as we do not insist on an absolute purity of form even though there is a relative purification of form in order to conduct that type of examination. A non-hypothetical examination is a phenomenological examination of the simulation/re-simulation of a certain phenomenal state of affairs and is primarily concerned with an actual exemplification of type, i.e., a prior determination of modal expectations and a concurrent exploration as to whether they are being currently met. (12)

	In an examination of personal identity, since identity in and through its constitution in the life-world must posses some form of ego-involvement even if only vestigial in the play of physical objects, etc., let me non-exhaustively look at a number of models that could be formulated for examination, and, then, from a relatively absolute point of view demonstrate the non-relational emptiness of all such conventionally appreciated identity (regardless of whether it is theoretically modelled, formulated in practical terms of reference or under critically conducted transcendental reflection). (13)

	I would like to propose a number of non-exclusive models for the modelling of personal identity (which I would like to examine more closely at some future point in time), namely, the computer model, the rubber-band model, the skyscraper model, the onion model, substrate model, the donation model…. (14)

	Various models will be tentatively put forward in the modelling of personal identity along with an indication of a critical appreciation of their limits of possible application. The first in this non-exhaustive list is the computer model. To illustrate this model let me tell the following very short story. Before going to sleep I set my radio-alarm clock for six in the morning. I wake up at five and decide to leave the alarm set just in case I go back to sleep. As expected the radio comes on at six exactly. It's as if the alarm clock itself 'woke up' at six if I am allowed to personify the inner workings of this device. Now, if the alarm-clock can turn the radio on may be the person can be seen as nothing much more than a more elabourate mechanism configured with software algorithms to instruct its hardware? Hence the computer model. Of course, like all analogies, there is the fallacy of the extend analogy! I set the alarm but what sets me? One might argue that others do this meta-textually, or our genetics does this for us, etc., but, as I suspect, new analogies will need to be imported in order to adequately justify this particular model and hence the limitations of this metaphor must be duly recognized and not (seriously) transgressed! (15)

	The rubber-band model uses an analogy to explain a number of observations about human identity. Generally, we all seem to possess the same emotional, cognitive, judgmental machinery, etc. These dispositions are correlatively disposed. E.g., the experience of being alert comes with a not feeling alert type of experience. E.g. the experience of feeling happy comes with the experience of not-feeling happy, and, the experience of feeling sadness comes with the experience of not feeling sad. As we cannot absolutely co-identity 'happiness' with 'not feeling sad', and, 'sadness' with 'not feeling happy', it is as if our correlative rubber band modelling has four states, namely, an activated positive/negative and non-activated positive/negative. So to the left of our rubber band we either pull the rubber band or leave it alone, and on the right side of the rubber band we can do the same. That, in essence, the human personality is essentially a bundle of rubber bands of certain activated/non-activated co-dispositional types of being in this life-world usually possessed by people when considered in general terms of reference. In this light we could say a person who is colour blind actually lacks or cannot access the machinery for them to determine aspects of colour differentiation or colour in any form other that shades of grey. That with this bundle of hypothetical dispositions we can be profiled when questions appropriately ask and determine the extent that those mirrored dispositions are present and accessible, and are being exercised or not being exercised. That, essentially, one is like a uniquely determined complex crystalline structure undergoing a certain degree of incremental transformational deformation in the normal course of our passage through this world-of-life (that essentially reflects where we have ‘come from’, where we are ‘probabilistically’ in the present and where we might most likely ‘be heading’ if currently conditions are not radically altered . However, the use of this metaphor, like all others, is subject to dialectical qualifications in the form of noting relevant psychic and non-psychic limitations, etc. E.g., how could this model explain changes in our dispositions through time or on a momentary basis, etc (since our dispositions appear to be structured, crystalized, stratified, often autonomously entertained on different levels of our epistemological organization, subject to chaotic influences, etc?)? (16)

	The skyscraper model merely notes that the nature of human experience is epistemologically organized and operative on the relatively limited autonomy of different levels of epistemological organization. So we have certain feelings, see particular things, think various thoughts and make miscellaneous judgments rightly or wrongly, etc. All the above to some extent or other with some degree of non-absolute autonomy. On the other hand, 'lower' epistemological structures are pre-conditionally necessary for the development of 'higher' structures so this model too has certain limitations as how could one be in different places in a tall building at the same time in order to explain the concurrence of identity or identities in one so-called entity? (17)

	In the onion model we have a re-configuration of the above model, but with the progressive removal of each layer we are progressively left with no form of identity at all. Just as an onion when peeled away finally disappears. So the onion has an apparent centre but no absolute centre. Furthermore, how could one onion develop a distinctive flavour when all onions, of the same species, more or less have the same taste (or does that common essential nature better reflect the human condition despite current political fashions to generally denigrate totalities, emergent organization, self-organizing structures, essential characteristics, etc?)? (18)

	In the substrate model we define identity as belonging to some substratum such as the soul or like or not like. But, again, this model has its limitations - for how could this model operate in those terms of reference if the identity of the substrate is not itself dependent upon the same metaphorical mechanism. If that is the case then it operates with an infinite regress, and, if not then our model is defective in this 'deeper' (or 'higher') aspect of its operations. Still, the substrate model can be made to work, like any other model, when it is limited, non-exclusively treated, open to other forms of modeling and adheres to the phenomenology already operative in the resident metaphor. (19)

	A donation model operates through the donation of identity from another source (such as the community, or the Divine in some form or other, or an over-self, etc., etc.). Again, this model must fail when taken seriously (i.e., literally in, therein, a transgression of their conventional limits)! We may be able to explain apparent identity but not the phenomenal method that that identity is realized since the mechanism, in this instance of donation, is unable to explain the presuppositional questions that need to be raised in order to understand the deeper functions of such a mechanism-type, such as, why, how, with what import, along with the equally problematic identity of the proposed donor, etc. A variant on this metaphor would be the participational model wherein through process of self-organization, resident political mechanisms like established law and legal mechanisms for the formation of innovative precedences, etc., changes in overall state are allowed to be instigated or make their entrances regardless of restricting forces like political conservatism or those opposite forces encouraging innovation, etc. Hence innovative processes like recognizable shifts in ‘common will’, changes in the meaning of the expression ‘rule of law’ (from a totalitarian reading to a democratic reading, e.g.), the development of a novel sense of cultural ethos, ‘observations’ as to the ‘flavour’ of the times, a general understanding of what overall fashion is currently dominant in a certain area of a culture, say clothes, books, science, e.g., etc. (20)

	However, mindful of those limitations attendant upon all forms of analogy metaphor still seem to have some circumscribed degree of value, i.e., some form of an existential excess. Moreover, cognizant of the fact that metaphor in its proper place within the hermeneutic circle is able to directly establish its simulated function within this world-of-life how do we account then for the role of the analogical when validly, properly and appropriately treated!? Before addressing this important issue let me look next at the role of metaphor from an absolutely-oriented transcendental point of view. (21)

	Although metaphors have some degree of usefulness in conventional terms of reference ultimately they must fail from an critical, absolutely oriented, transcendental perspective?! But is the metaphorical merely analogical in its textual functioning? Or, is this so-called failure, in effect, the very successfulness of the analogical to directly metaphor, through re-simulation, the existential fabric of this world-of-life through critically received processes of an ongoing overall transcendental suspension? Does this mean we still can have our cake and eat it so to speak - use metaphor which, although limited, when properly exercised will directly analogue this world-of-life? Taking away with one hand and giving back more with the other? What implications should we to draw from a provisional acceptance of this dialectical state of affairs? That the relativity of all identity is born in dependence upon the relevant configuration of the life-world and hence from an absolute point of view must be devoid of all absolute/non-relative mistreatment of the same! So, although a person qua their (self-perceived/other-perceived) semblance of personal identity may appear to have the ‘presence’ of a soul, they, along with all forms of identity (theological or non-theological in orientation, personal or non-personal in relative complexion) cannot exist from an absolute point of view! And ipso facto for any other explanation subjected to such absolutistic mistreatment of the analogical. Yet, on the other hand, given the critical treatment of those relative terms of reference identity can be simulated/re-simulated and cognized/re-cognized and comparatively co-determined in modal expectation and modal discovery/non-discovery, etc. Hence, given the correct transcendental attitude and adequate access to the existential descriptor of that under examination we can entertain a direct, valid state of re-simulated perception/apperception of the same! A fact guaranteed by the necessary transcendental being of the life-world as configured and experienced to that extent it can be experienced non-transcendentally through the simulation/re-simulation within the relevant hermeneutic circle of comprehension! (22)

	Our world of interpretation can never be absolutely wrong nor absolutely right! Therefore, to some extent we have an ongoing direct access to this world-of-life. And this access can be advanced through the purification of a critically conducted transcendental evaluation! In the light of this qualified optimism how are we to evaluate both this apparent failure of the metaphorical to not go beyond the appearance of its ‘mere simulation’ and yet at the same time to establish a simulated degree of direct contact with the apparent intentional object-state under interactive examination?? In attempting to answer this question let me re-examine this dialectical dilemma and in trying to ascertain what is obtainable and non-obtainable in phenomenological experience evaluate the phenomenal reality and ramifications of this complex philosophical position as to the rightful place of the metaphorical within this hermeneutic circle and the emergence therein to some degree of a direct, valid discriminative-determination of the phenomenal-phenomenological constitution of that under investigation in this world-of-life from the collective, cooperative cross-fertilization of theoretically, practically and critically orientated points of view. (23)

	The impossibility of there being a world-for-us of pure objectivity implies that there can be no external world. Similarly, the impossibility of there being a world-for-us of pure subjectivity implies that there can be no internal world. This leaves us with either no-world or a one-world metaphysics. The former makes no sense (or at least very little sense). On the other hand a pure 'one-world metaphysics' would also be an easy candidate for deconstruction leaving us with only an effective, non-absolutistic, one-world metaphysics and thereby not ruling out, indeed a ruling in, a multi-world variation within the same (in order to account for non-pure actuality and varying degrees of potentiality, etc.). With this apparent 'simplicity' to hand we have the medium, if not the means, for relating all phenomena with each other (although our hermeneutic interest is usually only interested when this process of interaction is seen to produce a substantial degree of an existential excess in value). With this background 'simplicity' we now need to note how it is possible for us as a self-conscious phenomenon to interact with other phenomena whether objectively oriented or subjectively oriented (or intersubjectively oriented)? My response to this question is to non-systematically argue for a number of preconditions, namely, the necessary condition of a one world metaphysics as just noted, a foundational-like holism, some degree of a co-incident epistemological organizational correspondence (through embodiment and an intersubjective environment), and, an ongoing overall transcendental suspension that lets us re-simulate a simulation of our relational frame of reference with other potentially available relational frames of reference). Let me elabourate in detail what I mean here. (24)

	This first pre-condition has already been argued for. That-there-for-us must be there-for-us! If it is not there-for-us it may as well not-be there-for-us! This one world-of-life being the life-world constituted between those polarities of the objective, subjective and intersubjective. In this realm of the relational all relational processes find their re-simulation, etc., through the iterative re-constitution of their simulation in and through intentional consciousness. Hence the phenomenal/phenomenological nature of this world-of-life is trans-objective, etc., and, both trans-epistemologically subjective and trans-ontologically objective. Now, as all relationships have a relatively similar essential state of being that pervades the totality of that relationship within the limits of its interaction, albeit from its own perspective at that 'point' in that relationship, it follows that the life-world is flooded with these apparent essential flavours and in some measure through its participation in this complex world of interrelational affairs this world of the life-world holistically represents the same, albeit from its point of view within that relatively unlimited mix. The difference being that the life-world can have no absolute limits although it will present itself as limited from our perspective(s) within this world-of-life (by virtue of our phenomenological sense of perspective(s) and that our power(s) of perception/apperception are also limited). And this leads us to my second point here, namely, that the life-world is holistically configured, as a consequence, on the relational 'ground' of all relationships. (25)

	In a holistic configurement of the life-world we have in effect one medium through which all forms of relationship can meet to some extent through such a commonality of medium. This point is important because I will argue that through an overall transcendental suspension we realign ourselves within those relationships under focus within the operative centre of the life-world itself and therein establish-for-us our direct contact between those relationships with respect to both form and content through their mutually 're-centred' re-simulation! (26)

	Some degree of a co-incident epistemological organizational correspondence (through a common level of embodiment and a common intersubjective environment) allows us to increase this degree of relational empathy by virtue of the fact that we can relate directly to that aspect of our epistemological hierarchy shared in common. E.g., because I am embodied I can meet another body as one body to another. Similarly, if that body also centres an egological subject then I would possess even greater grounds for a process of interaction in and through a greater number of modalities that are shared in common; a process augmented if a similar humanity/culture/language is also shared! (27)

	Lastly, as an overall transcendental suspension centres us within the life-world it effectively centres this world-of-life as it is constituted/re-constituted for-us; a process that cannot be solipsistic by virtue of its necessary implication in an equally intersubjectively-oriented (and objectively-oriented) life-world. These many facets and factors contributing to the forever open, interactive medium of the life-world and therein a relational 'space' where all relationships are entered into directly in terms of those modalities available for us that would allow the same. So, I have a direct relationship with a 'photo of your brother' (and thence an indirect relationship with your brother) and a direct relationship with you 'yourself' holding this photo of your brother here in this room by virtue of a coincidence in our existential descriptors at this moment in time and place (plus the fact that I intersubjectively understand what is meant by such concepts as 'myself', 'yourself', 'photo', 'brother', etc.). Now, let us re-look at the role of metaphor in this scheme of direct perception/apperception. (28)

	Metaphor qua metaphor cannot be literally entertained. On the other hand, utilized within the hermeneutic circle, and subjected to a valid, proper and appropriate treatment, in their total context recreate an expression of value which through simulation/re-simulation allows us to deal directly with that so imaged/imagined (to that extent modalities are available for this process of interactive exchange [along with a general trading of information,. etc., through a variety of exchange mechanisms, etc.]). (29)

	By these means reality is simulated. The reality of that reality being appreciated through this ability to interact directly with the intentional object-state(s) by virtue of this multi-modal simulation made available to us through the transcendentally suspended hermeneutic circle. Our ability of being able to determine ontological/epistemological status through an appreciation of the modal mix available to us in the light of that expected, etc. So, e.g., the photograph of a person is appreciated as a 'photo of a person' whilst the 'person' so photographed is appreciated as a person if our existential descriptors, etc., allow us to interact directly or in which modalities we are interacting directly (as when on a mobile phone talking to them or seeing them through binoculars, etc). (30)

	Hence in this scheme we do not need a representational philosophical point of view in order to engage with the reality of the phenomenon or phenomena to hand, whether it be a personal or non-personal, e.g., etc., and to be able to ascertain to what extent our directness of interaction is available to us at that moment of time (since the current psychic integrity of our constitution is reflected in the gestalt integrity of that being re-constituted by-us and therein assisting us in our discrimination of the non-real, surreal and the relatively real). (31)

	Let me now look more closely at the transcendental basis of identity, especially with respect personal identity. (32)

	The person cannot be a mere body nor a pure ego nor a social construct, etc! Moreover, as all metaphor cannot literally determine identity as metaphor qua metaphor (through the fallacy of the extended analogy, the non-literalness of metaphor, etc.) it follows that even the sense of person from an absolute point of view can have no absolute existence (but not ruling out the phenomenal appearance of a self-conscious entity in relative, conventional terms of reference). The phenomenal sense of a person comes about through dependence upon a set of necessary and non-necessary conditions. The non-necessary conditions spelling out the specific form or content of those necessary conditions. It is not necessary to be in either Sydney or Melbourne next week but you currently have to be in one place in the here and now and that is determined through the existential descriptor as it evolves sequentially through time. That being the case it implies that there can be no absolute sense of self, no absolute meaning nor absolute meaningfulness. Only in conventional terms of reference can a particular existential descriptor be nominated and differentiated through its 'unique' passage through this world-of-life. But, however unique that existential sequence it is still only nominated in conventional discrimination whilst entirely lacking an invariant 'substance'. Hence, from an absolute point of view, one should announce the death of the individual! The individual is no more and never was - what has died is the idea of the unchanging person, an eternal invariant transcendental ego, an actor behind the mask where as there is only the convenient socialized  mask that covers a set of masks and nothing else!! Our interaction with others being only the fiction of one mask 'talking' to another…. (33)

	To sum up what insights seem to be evident at this point? As noted in this essay these three principles of Inclusion, Balance and Intensity seem to offer an adequate theoretical account of how value in the life-world is realized? However, in a practical frame of reference is the first principle operative in our interaction with a non-ego implicated object, say a rock. What would it mean, e.g., if it was suggested one could have a conversation with a rock in the same manner as one might have a conversation with another person or even a pet animal, say a cat or dog? It seems that although this theoretical account may be correct in practice there is, normally, a natural privileging of modalities in this regard. We see the rock, we can touch it and may decide to throw it but we don't normally converse with it and expect it will do the same in reply! Only within the genre of fairy stories are people going to talk to rocks like Alibaba in One Thousand and One Nights. Furthermore, it is a hermeneutic rule or practice to only follow up those (modalities or) avenues of textual approach that are going to engage us with a return on our psychic capital and through such return ensure our interest in that topic till such a time this existential excess is no longer forthcoming or is eclipsed by the 'interest' elicited in our undertaking a new project. On the other hand, in engaging with a rock as a rock qua rock this natural privileging of the rock in its apparent objectivity (at the ‘expense’ of a subjective/intersubjective privilegings) still does not absent the fact that as agents there is our ego involvement in a pre-figured manner that allows us to understand what it normally means to be ‘engaged with a rock’. Moreover, this natural privileging can still be operating under a properly and appropriately conducted overall transcendental suspension… a critical state of reflective suspension noting the excess of transcendental value from our natural privileging of that state of affairs as an object-state and therein the validity of this form of an adjustment in the nature of the balance of our interaction with the same. This natural adjustment in transcendental balance alerting us to the in-depth fact that all value is as a 'simulation of value' wherein we find ourselves, in an effectively induced overall transcendental suspension, equally evaluating the 'value of that simulation'. That, in this medium of the life-world a theologian, etc., must theoretically, practically and critically establish their open working concept of a theology and therein establish what work that edifice would be able to support regardless of whether they are correct and/or incorrect in these matters. That in practical and critical terms of reference the validity of their labours should find therein an existential richness if and when an appreciation of the Divine were to be engaged (directly and/or indirectly), and v.v., on the grounds that engagement with the ‘real’ is always modally richer, both quantitatively and qualitatively, than with its ‘merely’ apparent simulation, even though no simulation can be merely simulated since the embrace of the life-world is such to also include and encompass the patent reality of its mis-simulations of reality (within the reality of the life-world) or rather, effective states of non-reality (despite, and because of, their perception or rather mis-perception). But, this form of discrimination must be left to the critical theologian, etc., to re-assess both for themselves and for their congregations (since even the relative reality or relative non-reality of those re-assessments must also reveal their relatively intrinsic degree of ‘reality’ or ‘non-reality’ in the degree of apparent authenticity, or otherwise, stamped upon both those reports and their reassessments!). In other words, the existential richness of an experience, or set of experiences, whether phenomenal or phenomenological in orientation, whether hermeneutical and/or existential in orientation(s) in its natural privileging/non-natural mis-privileging, should be evident upon experience or retrospective reflection (directly or by proxy) since the textual depositions of such an ‘event’ become public territory in some measure or other and those depositions upon scrutiny should reveal the degree to which they are forced together on an a priori-like basis rather than discovered synthetically a posteriori and thereafter and therein given a transcendental synthetic a priori-like sense of a provisional indubitability in (a non-textually) simulated state of provisional self-assurance (as witnessed in the not-textual performance of the hermeneutic circle subjected to an adequately pre-informed, critically conducted, ongoing, overall transcendental suspension in the very context of the life-world itself [to the extent that it can embrace an appreciation of itself through its own apparent ongoing re-self-contextualization]). (34)

3.    On The Hypothetical Simulation of Theological Engagement

	With these insights to hand what are we allowed to say about theological engagement. First, we need to agree on certain particular classificational types of divinity, if only hypothetically. Then, we need to note the second and third parties, etc., in a relationship with the former, and, as to whether these parties are theologically oriented or not theologically oriented, and, to what extent there is a power differential between those parties? Upon this basis the theologian and/or critical philosopher, etc., can consider what theological work is permitted, if only in principle, between these different ontological/epistemological states. Let me look more closely at these considerations in the light of this exposition to date. (35)

	In the previous essay such a general scheme was outlined. Furthermore, such a concept was pronounced not only feasible but also as necessarily non-hypothetical! But, to what extent the divine as the Divine (through the possession of a concomitant epistemological organization greater than that possessed by ourselves by a number of orders in magnitude) actually manifested itself in the life-world should be left to the theoretical, practical and critical investigations of a theologian, etc. (since it was equally feasible that concomitant 'power' of this Divine agency could equally fail all traditional expectations being only a pale 'shadow' of itself, and/or, was unable to do any of the theological work traditionally ascribed to such an aspect of the life-world (through the necessary, but not necessarily effective, theologicalization of the life-world)! In a tentative exploration of this field let me propose a number of hypothetical mechanisms through which processes of divine engagement could be initiated and conducted intentionally/non-intentionally/pre-intentionally/trans-intentionally, etc., by a divine sense of presence and/or by human agency with respect to each other (in a hypothetical divine-non-divine interaction). (36)

	The theologian must ask "In what manner are we equipped to recognize the interaction of the Divine should that event occur?" Presupposed in such a scheme is the Divine, their ability to interact with the human agent, the ability of the human agent to intentionally recognize both this divine-experience as a special type of experience and as an experience of the Divine. The absence of one or more of these four preconditions must seriously call into question the reality of this type of phenomena (here being treated hypothetically). On the other hand, in what manner and to what extent, if at all, is privileging some forms of experience as divine in orientation allowed to operate in the critical course and climate of our appreciation since all forms of appreciation involve the central placement of an overall transcendental suspension wherein all forms of privilege are theoretically bracketed in the suspension itself?! However, as just recently noted, natural privileging of experience occurs when we engage those avenues of approach, in and through the overall transcendental suspension, that appear to supply a greater investment on our psychic energy and therein a greater degree of an existential excess in value in the course of that interested concern. This normally happens naturally in our ordered analysis, when, e.g., we decide to examine the ethicality of our actions and behaviour, etc., or, decide upon a course of action and look to a balance between the pragmatical and the deontological, i.e., finding a balance between the practical and 'doing our duty'. As previously noted  when we engage with a rock we don't engage it in a conversation, or, if we did talk to a rock, we don't normally expect it to converse with us in reply. Preconditions three and four also require us to note a certain experience as 'special' and to 'recognize' its origins as Divine (although this does not imply that these special experiences need necessarily be experienced as special despite this automatic appellation in the light of their imputed origins). This concept of natural privileging should be able to theoretically assist us in this focusing of our recognition, etc. How is this act of natural privileging achieved hypothetically - just what mechanisms can a theologian employ in order to recognize a certain experience as 'special' and 'of the Divine'? (37)

	One could imagine the following scenario? Imagine if one was suddenly struck down by a beautiful light and one were to interpret this as the 'hand' of the Divine (or some other metaphor implicating divine agency). The suddenness and strangeness of this experience easily earmark it as "special'! As to our imputation of its divine origins this 'interpretation' presupposes that we are already acquainted with the genre or genres of Divine-like experiences or at least the treatment of special experiences as Divine-like regardless of the reality and validity of this type of classification or classifications! Obviously, in order to 'recognize' some particular type of experience as implicating divine agency implies that we must already be privy to such a concept, even if only embryonic in formulation or thematization. However, we might still be a party to a strange and special experience that we might believe is hallmarked as 'divine in origination' yet our first two preconditions are entirely absent, namely, the existence of the Divine and their revealed presence to that person in and through that particular experience and who had interpreted that experience as implicating these first two preconditions. Furthermore, on reflection, one must assume that without our last two preconditions no experience, however special or non-special, is going to be perceived as hallmarked as divine in origination if we had no concept of the Divine and their ability to intervene in human experience in the first place. Should we suspect a vicious circle here? Special experiences of a certain kind or kinds is/are declared 'religious' because of Divine intervention which is imputed to exist because of their ability to intervene and reveal themselves through special religious-type experiences, etc?? Quite frankly, as it stands we would have a vicious circle! But, then, the same accusation could be levelled at the hermeneutic circle so to possibly rescue the former we could well borrow from a defense of the latter? Let me later look into this defense and the possibilities this might have for the hypothetical preservation of a theological interpretation of the life-world (on the grounds of the all-inclusive nature of the life-world, the emergence of value and the emergent cross-fertilization of other hermeneutic circles in supporting or not supporting our current primary hermeneutic circle and its establishment of an overall existential excess as a provisional resolution in this regard, etc.). The primary point I am trying to make here is this - that the conceptual apparatus for this type of discrimination of phenomenal experience, special or otherwise, must already be preconditionally present in order for one to be able to make this type of announcement that a certain experience implicates a divine dimension being revealed in and through its phenomenology and phenomenological experience, and, that such privileging in our experience of this type of engagement can still remain transcendentally valid, at face value, as long as the overall transcendental suspension is neither disrupted nor unbalanced by the involvement of such privileging. That, in essence, privileging remains natural when the natural attitude is not allowed to intrude in that exercise, and, the interpretive genre intuitively felt or thought to best deal with that type of phenomenon is appropriately adopted and adapted with due care for and regard to that situation to hand! The proper exercise of natural privileging in and through the overall transcendental suspension assisting us in the greater formation of value through the additional realization of an existential excess that self-critically declares itself as provisionally valid, proper and appropriate to the interpretative nature of that apparent phenomenon (to the best of our current knowledge)! Let me explore this important mechanism of the concept of natural privileging in the context of religious-like experience in greater detail. (38)

	Ideological privilege is promoted when the pre-conditional, conditional and post-conditional conceptual apparatus is not adequately encompassed by the transcendental qualification of an epoche that suspends such conceptual content through a neutralization of its imputed reality. In effect, we are then treating our conceptual material as 'merely' hypothetical in its depiction of its general and particular content specifications. In this instance our topic is 'the nature of the Divine and its interaction in the world with the relatively non-divine'. At no point in this exercise do we add "that the Divine exists and that the nature of this interaction is as follows…" But a topic by necessity necessitates that it focuses on something or other and it is at this point that our prejudices as forms of prejudgment are allowed to operate in order to present just such a topic for transcendental treatment. But, equally, it is at that point that our prejudices are then no longer allowed to operate independently. Furthermore, on the other hand, although our treatment is practically hypothetical in our transcendental treatment of it, as previously argued we can entertain no 'mere' or 'pure' hypothetical situation through the impossibility of being able to entertain such absolute ideality and, thus, we must ask ourselves is the transcendental project a process of treatment that can actually be performed? But, then, without a transcendental project there could be no natural, non-transcendental projects! So, as correlative processes of performance, they must co-depend upon each other for their very existence! As argued in previous essays, the transcendental as the existential depends upon the existentialization of the non-existential, i.e., the relatively non-transcendental; and never the existentialization of the existential, or, the transcendentialization of the transcendental. Hence the transcendental treatment of the relatively non-transcendental is a type of purification rather than a process of transformation although the net result of this process takes on that type of character. A process of purification implies the presence already to hand of that to be exposed and separated from what otherwise has metaphorically and/or literally contaminated it. Interestingly, one could regard this process as either metaphorical or as literal in nature (since they seem to amount to the same thing?). In this concentration of our interest on the essential form of that value-to-hand we are attempting to clarify the sense, meaning and meaningfulness of that under examination. But never in such a manner as to completely de-contextualize its particularity. Such a focus effectively re-looks at that genre of activity that describes and prescribes the phenomenal/phenomenological, hermeneutical and existential value of that essential form. Context declaring what is to be more focused upon in our natural privileging of our approach to that content. Hence one may conclude that transcendental treatment is a privileging of the essential form of that under investigation and therein an attempt to expose the phenomenal/phenomenological nature of its meta-textual modes of behaviour implicated in the entertainment of the same. Transcendental treatment being a form of privilege hence transcendental privilege, but, the trick of such a process of reflection is that it also simultaneously de-privileges itself at the same time otherwise one would be trapped in the (overall) transcendental suspension. Thence, the balance of this process and its overall sense of a non-privileging of experience through this process of a simultaneous parallel de-privileging of content, etc! Now, what light does this cast on natural privileging and the natural privileging implicit in a hypothetical process of theological treatment wherein certain 'special' experiences, or even experience in general, are/is treated in and through a theological scheme in some form or other? In other words, what is the nature of the relationship between natural privileging, ideological privileging, transcendental privileging and de-privileging, and, how do we differentiate between the same in practice and therein critically appreciate whether one's research is transcendentally conducted authentically or inauthentically conducted non-transcendentally (since authenticity is here equated with the practice of a relatively transcendental style of performance in our treatment of natural experience?) (39)

	Ideological privilege, in the form of prejudgments/prejudices, allows us to come to the topic to hand. Hence the importance of the natural attitude in its presentation of the content to be focused upon and therein 'purified' with the exposure of its essential-transcendental form that phenomenologically constitutes that genre or set of genres operative with that phenomenal content, operating therein as modes of behaviour in this world of life. Transcendental privileging allows us to conduct this process of suspension, reduction and reconstitution that opens up to us a deeper appreciation of the epistemological organization operative in the phenomenological constitution normally functioning in that type of state of affairs as currently under such reflection. But, as the overall suspension itself would reduce us to a state of complete psychic paralysis a parallel state of de-transcendental privileging allows us to leave the same at the same time, etc. Within this paralleled process natural privileging is adopted in the light of the genre/essential form of that under focus in order to fruitfully conduct and conclude this style of research. In this regard there is absolutely no difference between transcendental research and processes of judgment other than the critical manner in which the latter is exercised! This critical treatment treating prejudice as prejudice, running parallel anti-processes in order to induce a transcendental purification and consequent exposure of the essential constitution of the genre/s involved in the former. Natural privilege operating with those genre/s in mind in order to further evaluate the phenomenological nature of that to hand in the light of the configuration of ordered analysis that best clarifies this transcendental/non-transcendental specificity exhibited in that critically conducted investigation. Those investigations also being conducted in a self-critical fashion by virtue of the power of that style of research to automatically re-focus on the phenomenal/phenomenological constitution of that under investigation. Appropriate practice being rewarded with proper results, and, properly conducted research being rewarded with appropriate forms of value and consequent behaviour…. (40)

	What light could this theoretical explanation behind this complex dance of privileging throw on our hypothetical theological research? Nothing other than the fact that this is how it should be done!(?) A complex dance where we manoeuvre between ideological privileging, transcendental privileging/de-privileging and natural privileging in order to ascertain a phenomenological clarification of our topic and therein a clarified, direct simulation of that under focus in and through the very midst of the life-world itself (as it presents itself through the transcendental auspices of the hermeneutic circle wherein all forms of value are imagined and recognized, engaged and appreciated, realized and find re-direction of our involvement in this world-of-life as we live our-lives-with-others) regardless of whether our topic is theologically oriented or non-theologically oriented. Let me examine the hypothetical instantiation of the latter as it might be found to reveal itself in this world, or, at least, hypothetically what might be meant by such 'a process of revelation and the revelation of such a process'…. (41)

	Where do we start? Does religion have a place for us to begin when so many different, and often conflicting, competing belief systems are trying to convert our attention in this regard through an insistence on our adopting their forms of ideological preference? Then, not all forms of religious life can be equally described as theologically oriented in the nature of their religious aspirations? So can we begin? For the person who is already religious they best start, in my opinion, with a formulation of their own religious beliefs followed by a suspension of the same through entertaining their parallel contravention. We are not asked to believe the opposite state of affairs only to entertain it in order to effect this relatively fundamental neutralization of an overall transcendental suspension. Then, picking up on the clarification of value that results from this degree of focus and balance our reflections should then allow natural forms of privileging to kick in and therein be allowed to simulate themselves in order to see where they might conclude in their simulation in this world-of-life as simulated in and through the midst of the life-world itself as simulated/re-simulated in and through the hermeneutic circle of comprehension. The implication being that the reality of our topic should directly manifest itself in the midst of such research although our current powers of appreciation may not be able to allow us to make the necessary self-criticisms in order to arrive at the revealed truth of the matter-to-hand. Because there is no ultimate instantiation of the metaphor of an outer external world and inner mental worlds it follows that our research, on what ever topic, not only mirrors the reality of that research but actually allows us to engage directly with the reality of the same!? Or so theory would inform us in this vision of the life-world? Let us adopt this 'critical' procedure in the examination of a theologically oriented topic in the hope of seeing if we can indeed follow through in this very same manner and in the process directly engage with the Divine (on the grounds that a 'mere' hypothetical theologicalization of the life-world must be just as untenable as the entertainment, in some form or other, of a 'pure' theologicalization of the life-world)? Can we be optimistic in this regard when we are simultaneously surrounded by rampant religious dogmatism in all its forms and an all-pervasive secular skepticism towards all manifestations of the religious as exercised by the non-religiously inspired (regardless of which side, ultimately, has a more truthful understanding of reality in this regard?)? (42)

4.    A Specific/General Simulation of the Divine - What Can Be Said If At All??

	So, ideally, we should begin with that form of religious aspiration that is best understood by oneself, or, of a form in our culture well understood even if our assent as to its 'reality' is not given. This would be the first step of presenting our ideological privileging. (43)

The second step of transcendental privileging involves subjecting the same to a state of transcendental parallelization in order to induce an ongoing overall transcendental suspension. (44)

A third step of natural privileging follows on from an exhibition of the genre as phenomenologically exposed in order to discover and examine what additional value is realized as a result of a fine tuning of this complex process. Of course in dealing with any systematic presentation, and intentional presentation demands a certain degree of integrity in the formation of the same, some degree of value beyond that invested will be released regardless of the competence or incompetence of that system under transcendental focus. However, in this charitable treatment of our research, apparent elements of non-integrity in the text under investigation should soon reveal themselves when critically focused upon. In effect, our research takes on a deconstructive flavour when exposed with patent contradictions, etc. On the other hand, conflicting structures could also be read as potential transcendental suspensions when genre considerations seem to demand this type of interpretation (as can be found in the negative theological formulations of an absolute style of textualization). In a similar light the asking of rhetorical-like questions and/or the systematic use of pointed analogies (constructed with a definitive point being provocatively read back into the text?) could also be read in a similar specialized manner, i.e., as inducing or indicating the need for a transcendental reading of those tropes as forms of a transcendental suspension. Because transcendental privileging involves a counter-parallelization of the text it follows that an incompetent or incoherent set of beliefs in parallel will remain the same under such treatment, i,e,,an equally incompetent or incoherent set of beliefs; not that an attempted idealization of reality can be given either our absolute assent or absolute non-assent as argued previously on the grounds that such could be neither theoretically thought nor recognized in practice. Furthermore, the correlative nature of the intentional functioning of the gestalt field implies that no text can be produced/re-produced in an uni-focal, non-equivocal manner. Then again, the consequences of our research necessitate ‘grounds’ whose relative integrity will allow us to persevere in the exploration of our  topic (both as to its privileged transcendental identity and its non-transcendental practicality) (45)

Lastly, we simulate a path along which our natural privileging might lead us or might not lead us in order to ascertain the relative competence of that system in part and in whole in that regard. Sampling an ‘integrated’ part of that 'whole' in order to understand the essence of that whole and therein, in the sampling of this fragment, provisionally discovering  and/or uncovering the hypothetical competence of the imputed totality of which that part is a part of that whole and not apart from it. But this essential snap shot, when both conducted properly and appropriately interpreted, can be naught other than the reality of which it is but a selectively arrived at vision of the same… there being no ultimate difference between this 'vision of reality' and the 'reality of this vision' from the simulated ultimacy of this transcendental-like point of view!? Are we allowed to hold this omni-present one-world point perspective in this regard, and, even if we were to grant ourselves this disposition to some degree or other to 'directly' view reality does the relative unapproachability and incomprehensibility of our topic effectively obscure what reality it might have and the form that that reality might truly take in this world-of-life?! Let me examine these issues more closely and in the process also provide a defense of the hermeneutic circle when properly and appropriately conducted in and through an overall transcendental suspension in the critical light of our necessary dependence upon the same…? (46)

	In summary, our research would first involve the presentation of our ideological privileging. In a transcendental privileging of that text that same text and its counter-text are run side by side re-enacting in the process points of deconstruction and/or forms of transcendental suspensions if genre considerations appear to demand that latter style of reading. Then, in our engagement with the genre of that text forms of natural privileging realize additional degrees of value from our critical reading of the meta-textual inputs of that text. The overall transcendental suspension revealing the critical value of that text through our reading of it in that critical light. (47)

	How would a re-simulation of our understanding of the Divine be of assistance to us in this quest to read texts (in this case of a religious theological flavour) and, at the same time through critical reflection, find not just the exposure of the conceptual content of this type of text but also its relatively truthful representation in the very reality of this one-world-of-life? Would not one be guilty here of re-introducing a representational vision of the life-world when throughout these essays just such a vision has been shown to be both empirically incompetent and philosophically incoherent?! To preempt such criticism let me reply that by a relatively truthful 'representation' is more correctly meant a 're-presentation'. Immersed in this one-world-of-life implies that we already have some degree of an understanding of reality per se. We cannot be absolutely wrong in our comprehension of this world-of-life! Equally, we cannot be absolutely right! We live in between these two impossible to obtain ideals with the implication that to some extent or other we are already in possession of a relatively correct understanding of reality. That it only behooves us to purify that process of understanding in order to better appreciate the ‘real’ nature of reality… and this is done through a critically appreciative process of re-presentation. Reality is re-presented, and hopefully, a theological enterprise is no different in this task of clarifying our 'vision of reality' in our realizing the 'reality of that vision'!? (48) 

	Not too long ago explorers in the new world would seriously set out to look for a place called Eldorado, and the fabulous wealth in gold supposedly waiting in store there. But no such place was ever discovered. Do we, in our theological research, equally quest in vain? For a start, much gold, and silver, was found in the New World so one might argue that there might here have been no Eldorado there had to be in its stead at least a series of mini-Eldorados! Then, confirmation of the fact, by default, that Eldorado was a mythical location was, in itself, a form of progress. In this task of simulation as a process, hopefully, of re-simulation, it is not my aim to definitively declare whether a theology, in some form or other, was a viable option or not. I shall leave that type of consideration for the theologian, and their congregation(s), to contemplate. Instead, let me look at the apparent phenomenology that would be involved in determining the reality of that type of vision. What are the intentional origins of that type of perspective upon the panorama of the life-world, what are its intentional genres of manifestations in so-called 'religious experience' (to the extent that that type of task appears open to us), and, what are the apparent intentional consequences performed by such theological 'work' implicated in our preconditional and conditional forms of analysis (and thence their post-conditional implications and imputations; the latter often being subjected to a greater degree of emphasis, e.g., the usual emphasis on ‘salvation’ in most traditional religious frames of reference)? The theologian then attempting a critical synthesis of the same in the form of an ongoing provisional overview. (49)

Let me now stick a few toes in the water, so to speak, and put into practice, for a short time, these pre-conditional, conditional and post-conditional approaches to the intentional constitution of such a systematic presentation/re-presentation of a theological perspective upon the apparent integrity of the life-world. (50)

	Where does one normally find an introduction to a theological interpretation of the life-world? What are the origins of theological concepts? They cannot be first met in religious experience on the grounds that even if we had theological experiences, experiences of some sense of the Divine, we would be in no position to recognize them as such. On phenomenological probabilities it would appear that they are culturally transmitted through religious practices, e.g., reading of religious texts, performance of religious ritual, etc. Behind such practices certain concepts are promulgated as 'reason's for the same. Moreover, through the creation of cognitive rifts and their concomitant sense of cognitive dissonance along with supplied religious techniques for diminishing such tensions through their harmonization religious concepts are induced and therein re-transmitted as seemingly 'viable' forms of life (along with their genres of expected behavioral activity). By a cognitive rift is meant the creation of a new perspective on how 'we should interpret reality' that appears to have advantages over more traditional ways of seeing the world. These advantages therein promoting some form of a transformation through cognitive induction that either accepts the new religious vision of the world, rejects that new vision of the world in favour of a more traditional stance, or, more correctly, as to what truly happens, adopts and adapts a partial accommodation of that new vision as viewed through the lens of the more traditional point of view in the process taking up an attitude that either relatively accepts the need for those changes involved or relatively rejects that same need, or, adopts a product of acceptances and rejections some where more in between. By these means so-called 'higher religions' have carved out niches or superstructures for themselves upon the many strata that make up traditional religious life and practice (themselves an ongoing re-transmitted fossilized version of their cultural history and the religious changes of phase created in and between periods of accelerated religious change from animistic beginnings to shamanistic practices, pagan influences, etc., etc.). Into this cultural re-continuation a theology re-introduces the need for this style of religious overlay through a semi-systematic collection of various metaphors that magnify various aspects of daily life, e.g., potter, creator, gardener, judge, father, mother, chief priest, king, friend… along with various atmospheric phenomena like light, sun, thunder, wind, air, earthquakes… along with various concepts of theological 'work' like, e.g., prayer, the need for salvation, a need to recognize the need for salvation, concepts of sin, ignorance, etc., etc. From out of this play of metaphor we arrive at myth, a genre of meta-narrative that integrates and spells out a religious drama that illustrates the set of points that associated religious point of view finds promoted and wishes to promote through a vicarious re-living of that particular myth or cycle of myths. Such myths being interpreted and re-interpreted by an orbit of peripheral texts specializing in that 'dialectical' task; additional orbits of text interpreting inner orbits along more practical lines such as ritual, ethical practices, rules of penance, etc. (51)

	As an experiment let me re-create a religious framework centered on the myth of The 'Gods as Gardeners' in Their Role of 'Helpers of Mankind'. Within these artificial confines let me look at the role of metaphor and myth from pre-conditional, conditional and post-conditional perspectives as just previously alluded to (in paragraph no. 49), etc., and, evaluate what the nature and role of this vision of the life-world is vis-à-vis the reality of the phenomenological life-world where it is intersubjectively regarded as ‘real’, i.e., true or valid, in the context of those cultural/trans-cultural terms of reference. In essence, asking ourselves how could a metaphorical vision of reality centred in the life-world not depict some form of reality, but, at the same time, being able to discern the relatively ‘unreal’ as the ‘unreal’ and the relatively ‘real’ as the‘real’? (52)

	In the mystical excesses of New Age thought many old religious ideas have been re-appropriated and re-promoted. One of those religious images, or concepts, is that the Gods (what ever their provenance, character and/or technology) put mankind on this planet and will, from time to time, weed us out, improve the stock, overseer our spiritual development… That, in essence, we are but a gardening experiment for them… a task conducted with some sense of an even higher purpose in the total religious scheme of things for both them and us…? Now, for many people this point of view is an attractive one because it ‘tells us’ that life does have some meaning or sense of purpose, and, some degree of value whilst, at the same time, not over-valuing our role in this scheme of things although hinting that some people on earth are ‘chosen’ to live here with an innate sense of mission implanted through some form of spiritual affinity with these ‘gardeners’, and, will, therefore, find a greater degree of valuation through such ‘perceived’ proximity. The implication being, often, that those who believe this sort of thing must be of this special category of human being who have some affinity with these ‘gardeners’. These ideas tuning into a wide panorama of new age beliefs ranging from space ships, alien abductions, reincarnation, past-life therapy, messengers, apocalyptic scenarios, pagan theology, etc., etc. (53)

	Now the point of my simulation of the general features of this type of new age world-view is neither to promote this type of vision nor to deny it. Rather, I wish to operate with it under an overall transcendental suspension in order to ascertain what ‘reality’ such a vision of reality might possess if only hypothetically, and, how one might go about trying to ascertain the ‘degree of reality’ a particular version of this type of belief might actually possess to the extent that it appears to validly interpret so-called evidence marshaled in its favour? In the process also finding, hopefully, some insight into why this particular style of belief is found ‘attractive’ in this Contemporary era, etc. Lastly, it my contention that even the most psychotic beliefs actually do mirror reality in some form or other to some degree or other and, therefore, cannot be completely written off nor, for that matter, be totally accepted! That, in some considerable measure, our sanity of our life-as-lived together in our passage through this world-of-life depends upon a proper respect and treatment of such views by both those sympathetic to them and those either neutral or antipathetic to the same! (54)

	In an open-ended ‘simulated’ investigation of this type of belief that proposes ‘the presence of gardeners of mankind’ what are the relatively essential features of this type and style of new-age world-view, and, the probable range of variations built upon its analogical foundations along with other commonly associated archetypal-like belief systems often run in parallel with it? (55)

	This analogical system or myth runs in the form of a brief, essential sketch, archetypally, like this: Mankind has been put here on this planet with some spiritual-like mission that possesses some form of an evolutional-like flavour. They who have put us here are, effectively, ‘gardeners’ – overseers from another world or dimension and, therefore, possess a higher degree of spirituality along with its concomitant sense of spiritual-like powers. Involved in this process of ‘gardening’ is some form of an asymmetry in perceptual power, etc., i.e., they can ‘see’ us, but, normally, we do not ‘see’ them, etc. However, some people are aware of this state of affairs and, therein and thereby, can be marked out as ‘special’, i.e., partaking in some measure of the spiritual-like nature of the ‘gardeners’ and capable, thereby, of being (the messengers’) messengers, prophets, evolved enough to tune into this cosmic scheme of things with its implicit sense of mission, etc. Those people who hold this type of belief must be more in tune with ‘spiritual’ matters and implicitly must automatically partake of this ‘spiritual re-evaluation through association’. This myth operating in association with alien visitations and/or reincarnational panoramas and/or pagan theologies and angelologies, etc., etc…. (56)

	Now the metaphor of the gardeners does have a literal basis in our world-of-life to the extent that the phenomenology of gardening is rooted in common understanding of this life-world. But, to what extent, if at all, can we go beyond this metaphor to some form of trans-literal reality wherein we have real gardeners in this sense of ‘physically’ looking after humanity? Of course, the serious theologian, or an equivalent of some persuasion or other, could adopt and adapt reversed ontological arguments, etc., in order to explore the possibility of the instantiation of this metaphorical concept in our-world-as-lived. Still, the metaphor, in its place within the hermeneutic circle, subjected to a properly and appropriately conducted overall transcendental suspension not only portrays literal reality but can also do so literally through an act of simulation/re-simulation in this one world-of-life. But, to be able to claim this type of direct access to the positive instantiation of such a metaphorical concept certain phenomenal limitations, rules of evidence, hermeneutic guidelines need to be in place otherwise anyone’s fantasy is as good as anyone else’s, and, grounds for consensus could only be manufactured through forms of co-authored domination wherein one party was able to induce a similar fantasy, delusion or hallucination, or at best, a similar mis-interpretation of what might have been shared between them if more appropriately interpreted. In these essays I have spent some time exploring just what might constitute limitations in this regard. Many of these ideas have been refracted through this complex concept of value herein discussed. Furthermore, the definition of value as that excess of value that is left after a reduction of its basis, or basic inputs, automatically arms us with a critical measure as to its value, or meta-value, by virtue of this excess. This excess finds itself psychically reinvested in the ‘body’ of that being evaluated and this sense of ‘presence’ impresses upon us its apparent value by virtue of this excess. On the other hand, this excess still does not guarantee its permanent evaluation in this light only a provisional reading in this regard. Should an alternative reading arise in the ‘final analysis’ the relative excess of both readings will eventually decide the issue but, then, again, only provisionally. Only the totality of our field of knowledge maintains a degree of overall stability against which individual contributions are continually being reassessed. The overall value of any project within it being continually re-assessed in and through all the inputs contributed by the properly and appropriately conducted hermeneutic circle whose critical economy will reflect all object-states, the cultural worlds of others and one’s own perspectives brought to bear on our-passage-through-this-world-of-life… although, from time to time, there will be the occasional earthquake from which segments of that ground will never be the same and call for some form of a radical re-construction…. (57)
	To what extent is such a project co-authored and projected with a sense of reality far greater than it deserves? Although the transcendental phenomenologist should persist with the instantiation of a global suspension, common sense will, from time to time, insist that the real fruitfulness of a certain project is currently lacking enough merit to re-continue those investigations. Would that not be the case here? In this same light one must suspect that this religious metaphor of gardeners is also blessed with a similar lack of suitable evidence or adequate information that might be regarded as useful to the grounding of that project? But, if all metaphor are to say something about this world-of-life then what is it that is being said here when the ostensive purport of such a construct is not being adequately met if at all? For a start we might reason that such metaphors could well be more mirrors of our own being in the world and that we could well ask what might be reflected there? For a start this myth seems to suggest that the human condition is currently flawed and in need of some form of treatment. What that treatment might be or could be is open to speculation. What could these 'gardeners' do in this instance besides 'watering and weeding'? The latter option is not inviting and the former is not spelt out other than to suggest that we may be in need of some form of radical re-configuration? A process of transformation that hints at a religious-like process of salvation, the form that that salvation takes being more often than not left open as to how we should interpret its conceptual vagueness, indeed, it is as if we are being apparently introduced to another set of religious-like concepts, metaphors and myths and that following therein through this maze and matrix of beliefs our way of seeing the world would then be positively re-constituted in a religious or religious-like fashion. In some sense we are being met by a substitute religion, or at least by a set of supplementary beliefs. So such structures may well be revealing more about us than their ostensive re-portrayal of the world. Again, these myths seem to be operating across the induction of a cognitive rift - creating a religious need and therein meeting that need with a certain ideological way of re-seeing the world that 'promises' a positive re-evaluation of the person who makes that crossing. That, in many ways, this need is merely a re-writing of the traditional genres like salvation, etc., albeit in all its historical complexity (and therein invoking pagan ideals, selectively re-written aspects of higher religions both exotic and non-exotic in orientation, scientific imports, etc.). (58)

	As a critical philosophers exercising the overall transcendental suspension it is not our place to argue the reality or non-reality of such beliefs. On the other hand, in exercising our intuitions we may well find such 'religious' projects, on the whole, as not very well earthed in the reality of our lives as lived in this world-of-life! Being like mirrors that reflect more the reality, or rather the unreality, of our own existences questing for meaning in a variety of quests some of which may well be relatively unproductive and non-authentic. On the other hand, if all value, i.e., all sense, meaning and meaningfulness, is realized in and through the hermeneutic circle how could any project find a worthwhile sense of value in the mere simulation of such an economy? Or, in converse, if we do seem to find our way through this world-of-life by such means how is it possible for people to hold such 'nonsense' when all such nonsense should reveal itself as just that - as nonsense! The problem, I believe, is that in a charitable view of relatively systematic and non-systematic beliefs all such 'systems' are indeed going to validly interpret the world to some extent or other! However, we should look for a Darwinian fitness of beliefs rather than shop for what item or items may appear attractive to us however superficial, or deep, their apparent charms and blandishments of self-worth we might accept in our adopting those particular points of view. So, all metaphors, all concepts and myths, etc., do indeed mirror the world for us to some extent or other, however, that reality-there-for-us needs to be adequately discriminated from that unreality-that-is-also-there-for-us. Such a critical meta-project needs to be properly and appropriately conducted within the totality of the life-world as we find it there-before--for-us! As our only critical access, our only entrance and exit, to the life-world is in and through the transcendental treatment of the hermeneutic circle properly and appropriately conducted how are we to escape the charge of circularity involved in this type of process - that we merely retrieve what we merely inserted into such a process. That, in essence, there is no existential excess, at best, only the simulated illusion of such, and, at worst, a mish-mash of positive and negative value with no definitive method for separating the same!? (59)

5.    A Defense of the Hermeneutic Circle as Non-Vicious in Circularity

	On one side, the hermeneutic circle is a phenomenon wherein parts and wholes are interrelated and allowed to make sense in the light of each other, and on the other side, I am also arguing that the hermeneutic circle itself is the very grounds for our being able to do phenomenological research in the first place in so far as all interpretations of phenomena and all phenomena of interpretation are conducted in and through its auspices. Hence we have this dilemma - to verify the validity of this method is the very method for the determination of such value in the first place. Somehow, we seem to escape this circularity by virtue of a surplus of value realized though the utilization of such a device, the degree of that surplus usually being in some direct proportional sense to the assurance given thereby through the same unless a new way of seeing that same phenomenon manages to completely eclipse all the value associated with the former way of seeing that phenomenon or set of phenomena. But, if this economy of value can realize value that is invalid then should we not question the validity of this economy? Indeed, if the reality of that value and the value of that reality can be invalidated, and therein merely simulated and therein found later to be false, even with this so-called assurance of an existential excess what hope have we to determine the apparent truth or falseness of that currently being investigated when we are practically reduced to and left in a state of pure suspicion, sheer questioning? Being a circular process we would then merely enmesh ourselves in a circularity of argument as things stand! Indeed, erected on such grounds there is then no difference between scientific evidence or theological speculation, factual accounts and the virtuality of fictional narratives as found in novels, etc., unless by some other means we are to find, as we must, the road to a reasonable evaluation of the reality or non-reality of that to hand?! (60)

	But, do we really need to worry? Since, in the long term, the revelation of truth is a progressive affair must mean, in practical terms, that we may not be right now at some point in time we will have a better understanding of that situation to hand and therein its correctly corresponding, or rather ascribed, truth-value in so far as our appreciation will better ‘match’ the reality of that-to-hand. Further more, we are in a position to doubt the truth-value of a certain state of affairs but that does not entitle us to question everything in the same manner at the same time! In the totality of the stories we tell about reality our overall picture of reality does indeed picture the same to some extent or other (since we live in this one-world-of-life-before-others). We may not be, cannot be in absolute harmony within the life-world and with-others but our overall 'picture' of reality is in fact a reasonable picture of 'reality'. Metaphor in and through the hermeneutic circle do indeed ‘metaphor’ the world, i.e., metaphorically depict this world, and are not just literary devices that cannot be treated literally! That the degree of the existential excess revealed in our research is generally a good reflection of the reality of that research in this respect of its mutually meeting this one-world-of-life as lived-before-others. Then, we have this guarantee, that we can never be absolutely wrong! This guarantee also comes with the following qualification, namely, that we can never be absolutely right, and, even if we are right with respect to certain truth claims we can never claim an absolute certainty in that regard! Furthermore, our suspicions are generally validated when we find an unclear picture, a lack of evidence, a true circularity of mere argument, a diminished sense of an existential excess either contrary to expectations or in agreement with the same! So, somehow or other, the circularity of the hermeneutic circle cannot be a vicious one! Indeed, through the overall transcendental suspension we find the life-world simulates our direct access to this world-of-life within this one-world-of-life!!  (61)

	Let me now examine in detail why I don't perceive the hermeneutic circle to be a vicious exercise in mere circularity even though we should guard against the use of arguments that are merely circular in both detail and in form. I will do this under four headings starting with a logical point of view, a textual point of view, a phenomenological-intentional point of view and a transcendental-holistic point of view. (62)

	The logical point of view merely notes that we have participants or parts, and, we have totalities or wholes. However, to correctly understand the proper logical dynamics of this process of interaction we need to review this aspect through the following three lenses of the textual, etc. So let me attend to this logical level of investigation last. (63)

	The textual point of view is a hermeneutical point of view. Textual parts are reviewed in the light of textual totalities. Textual parts are determined as parts by virtue of their relative encompassment by textual wholes. Parts can be signs, letters, words, paragraphs, etc. And with respect to the former we have systems of signs, words, paragraphs, pages and chapters, books, volumes, etc. So our elements can be interchangeable and are determined through a relativity of context. Furthermore, all textual elements are give a holistic contrast in the context of their meta-textual treatment. So, e.g., this handwritten page has the form of a letter, and, in contrast, this page of printing has the form of a page in a book, etc. The meta-textual aspect of textuality being the 'form' of that text, i.e., that set of conventions that allows us to ascertain what that type of text is. The phenomenon of the text and the interpretative aspect of the meta-text forming the first two moments of our hermeneutic circle. The existential moment of the non-textual occurring when text and meta-text seem to unlock that textual phenomena through their interaction with each other in an existential excess of value (as occurs, e.g., when we are reading a novel and the text seems to come to life and absorb our interest and invest our reading with a dividend greater in value than the psychic energy merely invested in that act of reading). This meta-textual aspect can be seen as the form of that text or its type, as a set of intersubjective conventions for reading that type of text, as the context for reading a fragment of that text within the conventional context of how its appears to socially demand how it is to be read, etc. This textual approach suggesting that the mere circularity between textual whole and textual fragment/text and its apparent meta-textual conventions is transcended, and collectively transcendental (through incorporation within the transcendental embrace of the hermeneutic circle) through the simulation/re-simulation of a non-textual surplus of value (that is irreducible to the former textual aspects). Since this relationship between both textual parts and textual whole, and, the textual content and meta-textual conventions, cannot be reduced to either party hence this excess in value from this interrelationship is in addition to that value invested in this textual process of interpretation. (64)

	From a phenomenological-intentional point of view we can look at this process of textual interpretation in the light of a gestalt psychology, namely, a gestalt field as meta-textually determined, the intentional focusing on the 'text' (whether classical like a written text, a book, or, non-classical in nature like a photo, footprints on a beach, fingerprints at a crime scene; or, a hybrid text like advertizing when text and images are mixed, etc.). A third element or moment is the addition of a textual observer and/or inscriber as a reader and/or writer. Although dependent upon a gestalt field and its foregrounded focus it cannot be reduced to either of these gestalt aspects (since the identity of the observer and/or inscriber is the negation of these other two parties of field and focus hence this pole of agent is not reducible to the same either individually or collectively). From this irreducibility it follows that this element of an existential excess is indeed an excess over its dependent factors (of field and focus). Hence the non-vicious, indeed, productive, nature of this excess realized in the context of the hermeneutic circle! (65)

	Returning to a logical perspective we can now see that a non-relational logic dealing merely with parts and wholes could not adequately account for either its textual phenomenology nor its intentional phenomenology. Furthermore, without an adequate understanding of the phenomenological, hermeneutical and existential components of this relationship a logical understanding of the hermeneutic circle might well be led into believing it could only be vicious in the nature of its apparent fruitfulness. Other perspective dealt elsewhere such as harmonic readings, distinctive repetitive readings, temporal readings, etc., will further enrich our logical outlook on this phenomenological understanding, etc., and the utimately non-vicious nature of  the hermeneutic circle. (66)

	From a transcendental-holistic perspective one now should realize that the hermeneutic circle is central to theoretical, practical and critical understandings of the same. That all value is created/re-created within the ambit of the hermeneutic circle and that all intentionality, etc., cannot escape the confines of the same (other than through the overall transcendental suspension [wherein our ‘freedom’ is both taken away from us and returned in an augmented fashion through the creation/re-creation of an existential surplus of value!]!). In essence this defines the very nature of the transcendental, or, rather, the nature of the relationship between the relatively transcendental and the relatively non-transcendental [having elsewhere defined a process of existentializaiton as the transcendentialization of the relatively non-transcendental]! (67)

	What is it that allows the hermeneutic circle to simulate the world through the world of its simulation, and, allows us to directly participate with object-states, others and and our own various senses of self in this one-world-of-life? The very economy of the life-world is created/re-created between these same ideal polarities. As argued elsewhere all three poles are necessary for the realization of value. Furthermore, they thematize this world-of-life as found there-for-us by-us. But, in this so-called one world-of-life how do we account for the real and the unreal, and, how do we account for the fact that my experiences are only had by me and cannot be shared by others and, thereby, appears to contradict the unity and integrity of this so-called one-world-of-life? Let me stress again that reality is a full or adequate meeting with the modal spectrum associated with a certain type of phenomenon or set of phenomena and expected to be re-met in meeting again with an instantiation with that same type of phenomena. So, e.g., a dream apple only exercises a certain number of phenomenal modalities associated with appleness and in the process of our ‘eating it’ in our dreams it cannot satisfy our embodied sense of hunger, etc. As for pain, we can tell someone that we are experiencing pain and we hope they know what we are talking about. All texts have a meta-textual component and this element is intersubjective in orientation despite all phenomenal experiences being perceived and experienced from a certain point of view (or set of views, e.g., when re-entertained in memory or from different vantage points in the imagination, etc.). In this respect the entertaining of phenomena and their interpretation is no different whether it be pains or perceptual objects, etc. I do not experience your pain nor do I see through your eyes except metaphorically. On the other hand, the intersubjective aspect of the meta-textual wherein we adopt conventions and adapt them to the experiences to hand implies a necessary public aspect still being present in this transcendental economy of the creation/re-creation of the same hence both self-awareness and communication of the cognitive content is a transcendental possibility by virtue of this transcendental commonality of the life-world regardless of whether its ‘intentional object’ is intersubjectively accessible nor not! So, the argument for one-world-of-life does not mean I can directly participate in your pains and perceptions, etc., but it does mean I know more or less what you are talking about, hopefully, when you communicate with me, and v.v. All experience is aspectival but this does not mean that we all inhabit self-contained solipsistic worlds of our own ‘making’ since each and every perspective intersects in this one world-of-life. Moreover, the concepts of an ‘external world’ and a multitude of ‘inner worlds’ do not make philosophical sense except in a vague metaphorical fashion; certainly not in any form of a critically conducted philosophical investigation! E.g., just where does the ‘external world’ stop and one’s own ‘internal world’ start, and v.v., etc? The non-metaphorical body is not a house with windows, etc! Adopt such a metaphor if you wish but don't exercise it in a critical philosophical frame of reference as it can do no critical philosophical work since the metaphorical cannot be treated literally except in a short-sighted state of near philosophical blindness. What is ruled by 'like' cannot be treated, rather mis-treated, as 'is'! If the 'soul' lived in this 'house' would its eyes be windows, etc., implying a vicious infinite regress. No, the world is simulated and not seen per se, but, that simulation is directly simulated within this one-world-of-life. Furthermore, through re-simulation, we are allowed us to deal with its intentionally through acts of perception, memory, visualization, etc. Textual depositions of the same on interpretation being able to re-simulate an intersubjective meta-textual outline of the intentionality apparently behind the creation of the original content and form of that re-simulated simulation, albeit from this re-simulated ‘re-interpreted’ point of view. In this deconstruction of a bankrupt representationalism we re-discover what the naïve realist took for granted but in an enriched frame of reference that allows us to communicate with each other, think for ourselves and critically review and test where our current interpretations have taken us in 'our' understanding of the world. The fruitfulness of such an exercise always being ‘a work in progress’ even if we are currently in a position to safely ‘know’ that the fruits of our labours have been successful or in vain. (68)

	Hence our logical understanding of the relationship between wholes and parts, and v.v., must also be understood through these three lenses of the textual, the phenomenal as re-constructed intentionally and the existentially holistic (and all the other frames of reference through which the hermeneutic process can be viewed such as the harmonic, temporal, etc.). Otherwise the impoverished logical treatment of the hermeneutic circle would indeed appear to only realize an ongoing, unproductive cycle of deferment… even though the exercise of the logical itself as a phenomenon should when properly examined reveal that the logical exercise of the hermeneutic circle is equally a textual phenomenon, etc., and thence fruitfully realized in the same manner as all phenomena of interpretation and the interpretation of all phenomena! Going around in circles in not the mere going around in circles since the re-appreciation of each circuit exponentially thematizes our accumulated understanding of that circuit as embedded in the accelerated richness of that associated gestalt field and thence the increasing richness of appreciation that must result from a re-investigation of that focused upon in that particular field of pre-re-reflected upon experience (through simulation as re-simulation where we recognize that being simulated through its re-cognition in the evaluative light of its realized existential excess and its evidential contextual-self-appreciation of the same in the light of modal expectation associated with its distinctive phenomenology, interpretative conventions, existential histories [of relevant existential descriptors, etc.] etc). (69)

	If what we deal with in this world-of-life are simulations met through re-simulation then is the world no more than some idealistic dream or illusion even less substantial than frothy bubbles in a stream, dancing mirages of water in the distance before the thirsty traveler, mere shadows mistaken for real objects, the semblance of people when we meet no more than complex puppets or robots as if playing roles in a four dimensional television show compounded from a swirling sea of pixels or similar? And into this mix of fantasy and fabrication are our theological investigation (albeit from a hypothetical transcendental point of view of a theoretical possibility) no more than what dreams are made of… a tale told by an idiot… full of sound and fury… signifying nothing…? (70)

	Let me answer this rhetorical question with a rhetorical yes and a rhetorical no! Both a yea and a nay! Through emptiness there can be no substantial existence whether it be of object-states, other people and other sentient-like beings, or, one's own overall sense of self (or some particular facet of self-likeness found within that overall sense of self). And this lack of substantial privilege must also apply to both the Divine and idea of the Divine! On the other hand, through dependence (upon conditions) and interdependence (realized through the re-investment of an existential excess of value within the distinctive ambit of dependent identity) the nature of the life-world in its entirety of sense, meaning and meaningfulness is realized and re-realized, i.e., thematized as a world-of-value. Such a process of realization being realized in and through this interaction between all associated conditions [when devoid of all metaphysical extrapolations beyond their resident metaphors]… and in this matter the envisualization, thematization and realization of the Divine, in all its various possibilities of form and content, from what ever perspective, must equally find an existence in this world-of-life hence, hypothetically the transcendental viability of this topic or type of topic must be conducted in those same terms of reference (as must also be applied to this one-world-of-life). Let me argue for this in more detail and note the important ramifications of this complex perspective upon the necessary theologicalization of the life-world that follows from this transcendental position(?) (71)

6.	What is the Role of Simulation if Everything is Simulated?

If everything is simulated we might well ask the question what is not simulated, or, how is simulation given its meaning through contrast if there is nothing to give it this necessary degree of contrast? To answer this question I would like to re-examine the phenomenal concept of essence? On one level I would like to re-define this phenomenological concept and, at the same time, show that this sense of essence is essentially without essence? In this dialectic I would like to show that there is a middle path through this question of the problematic nature of the essential. But, first, let me answer this associated question how does the concept of simulation find its necessary process of gestalt differentiation in order to take on the phenomenal appearance of a sensible concept, i.e., a concept with sense? (72)

	First, the metaphor of simulation involves 'that pre-simulated reality to be simulated' and 'the simulation that results from the same'. This could be done, e.g., through the use of a mirror in so far as the reflection appears to be a simulation of that reflected in that mirror. Or, we could invoke a drawing or a photograph or similar as the primary model in this regard. (73)

Then, this model can become more sophisticated by invoking the idea of cyber space, e.g., where we can simulate on a computer screen a certain state of affairs that has no parallel in the pre-simulated world, the world prior to that simulation of this virtual state of affairs. Of course, we recognize that simulated states of affairs as a simulation when we find ourselves making sense of the same and therein forming the opinion that this set of appearances can be closely aligned with certain states of affairs experienced prior to or after this process of simulation. In this second version there is no true presimulated prototype subjected to a process of simulation. (74)

	In a third version I am going to argue that there is only simulation and nothing that can be found before the process of simulation that can be treated as the pre-simulational prototype. In this model, a refinement of our metaphor of simulation, there are only processes of simulation. This process gaining its value (its textual sense, meta-textual meaning and non-textual meaningfulness) through different types of repetition involved in the totality of the process wherein there is constituted/re-constituted the value of that simulation and the simulation of that value. Needless to say that totality is organized within the hermeneutic circle (wherein all relevant hermeneutic circles are engaged in the creation/re-creation of that value (through those three moments of the phenomenological, hermeneutical and the existential). Within this [overall] orbit [of orbits] processes of mere repetition involving practically no change form a consonant meta-textual background, i.e., a gestalt field whose essential nature is a reflection of that associated commonality. On the other hand through processes of sheer repetition the introduction of noticeable increments of change alerts us to this degree of difference through a focusing on that part of the gestalt field. Then, through a process of various repeated patterns of change, 'set up' patterns of bare repetition, the third moment of our hermeneutic circle is realized and along with it an associated sense of self in keeping with the nature of that field is also themitized. Through these subtle differences in repetition we arrive at simulation as defined in this third sense. Moreover, there is the contrast between simulation as the constitution of a phenomenon or set of phenomena; re-simulation as the simulation of a process of simulation; and, resimulation as the re-simulation of a prior process of simulation/re-simulation as in the re-visualization in memory of something from our past or the mere simulation of a virtual situation, etc. By these means creating internal and external forms of contrast that allow us to insist on this omni-present world of simulation otherwise known as the life-world. In this non-representationalistic vision of the world reality is defined through a meeting with a full or adequately representative compliment of expected modalities associated with that particular type of phenomenon or set of phenomena as previously discussed. (75)

	Through the apparent integrity of the life-world all relationships are directly experienced regardless of whether those relationships are actual in the sense as just re-defined above or virtual through an incomplete meeting of modal expectations or a complete meeting of a pre-constructed limited set of modalities, e.g., as experienced in cyber-space or an engagement with a relationship merely re-constructed and therein entertained indirectly. This sense of the virtual having those three senses of the illusory, the merely constructed and the merely re-constructed. The first sense of the virtual includes phenomena like dreams, fantasies, delusions and hallucinations, etc. The second sense includes forms of simulation that intend only themselves such as, e.g., computer simulations, etc. The third sense involves indirect relationships, e.g., "A knows B who knows C, but, A has not met C and only 'knows of' C". The actual, as defined above, is also simulated as it is, directly and fully, within this one world of life. It can also be simulated through processes of resimulation as in photos, drawings, in the cinema, 'actual' memories (of memories judged as meeting their full or adequate modal compliments in keeping with the naute of their itnentional object-states), etc., hence a resimulation of actuality, i.e., the relatively actual on the grounds as previously argued that we can be neither absolutely certain nor absolute uncertain about a particular state of affairs as to its (sixth order) status as an actually 'valid' fact. Hence this more precise way of saying qualified by the use of the expression 'relative' as in relative-actual, relative-possible, relative-absolute, etc. (76)

	Using this qualifier of 'relative', in contrast to the sense of the 'absolute' (not to be confused with the inauthentic, non-overall transcendentally suspended contrast of the 'absolutist'/'absolutistic'), let me now redefine this concept of the essential. The idea of the essential is to be found first in it phenomenological sense as introduced by Husserl: as a distinctive phenomenal aspect or totality whose typological limits can be discerned through eidetic reflection; transcendental suspension, transcendental reduction, etc. In the light of this background, and my subsequence re-interpretations of it as outlined in these essays and elsewhere, I am going to re-define the nature of the essential without presupposing an absolutist concept of essence in a non-phenomenological, metaphysical style, frame or type of reference. To do this I will associate the word 'absolute' with the 'transcendental', or more correctly, the 'transcendentally oriented'. (77)

	Invoking these terms 'relative' as 'non-transcendentally oriented', and, 'absolute' as 'transcendentally oriented' and relating them with themselves and each other gives us the following four categories, namely, the Absolute-Absolute; the Relative-Absolute; the Absolute-Relative; and, the Relative-Relative. Next, I would like to dismiss the first and fourth categories as impossible to appropriately contemplate and hence empty of exemplars through an unobtainability of content. This first dismissal being achieved through the impossibility of the transcendental being transcendentialized as the ‘transcendental’ is the ‘transcendentialization of the relatively non-transcendental’. This category of eternally invariant entities is misguidely the preserve of metaphysicians who set out to try to extrapolate their metaphysical inventories beyond the metaphorical deployment of their resident metaphors. The same argument applying in reverse to the Relative-Relative, namely, this second dismissal being achieved through the impossibility of the non-transcendentally oriented, i.e., the relative, being de-transcendentialized as the ‘non-transcendental’ is already the ‘de-transcendentialization of the relatively transcendental’. This category of unpatterned flux can only realize a state of complete meaninglessness and nonsense and therein rules out the thorough skeptic who might wish to set out to reside in this empty category. So we are left with the (non-absolute) categories of the Relative-Absolute and the Absolute-Relative. Let me define what type of essential-like configurations fall under each of these categories and the reason why I have adopted this typology. (78)

	Certain essential features appear to be relatively intrinsic to the constitution of a phenomenon or set of phenomena. I.e., in noting the degree of complexity necessary to adequately describe of the existential descriptor of a particular phenomenon or set of phenomena some essential-like features of its characterization appear to be necessary in the configuration of that identity. E.g., X was born a male in such and such a place at such and such a time and named X. These four features appear to be absolutely determined and relatively invariant if not absolutely invariant in more practical terms of reference. Then again, X may have been distinctly (or indistinctly) born as a male baby, but, who, in growing up, decides to sexually re-aligned himself as 'herself. In this instance one may re-assume that the essential essence of maleness of x was not as deeply seated as hitherto supposed (by those her do not know of this desire for 'her' sexual re-alignment). It is with this (parallel) conceptual realignment that sometimes occurs that I am re-exploring this concept of a non-absolute re-alignment between Relative-Absolute, and, Absolute-Relative categories of essential treatment. Now the first of these categories, the Relative-Absolute deals with predicative-oriented forms of essentiality that are relatively more intrinsic to the constitution of that phenomenon or set of phenomena under investigation. Conversely, the Absolute-Relative concerns itself with the relatively more fluid relationally oriented 'predication' whose association with their logical subject is more 'accidental' in nature. But, then, again, the continual performance of a certain type of conventional activity, say the playing of cricket, may well influence people in their perception of that person being referred to to such an extent that even when permanently reduced, say, to a wheelchair, for whatever reasons, they are still seen as a cricketer because of the name they made for themselves in that game. Again, this non-absolute distinction of essentiality between these two categories concerns predicationally-oriented attributes and relationally-oriented attributes with a gray area in between wherein some classifications may or may not traverse from one side to the other. Hence, with these various caveats in place, we can now, hypothetically, re-constitute an identity by noting which features of its existential descriptor are relatively invariant and predicatively-oriented, etc., and any re-assessments one might have to make in this provisional road map for the constitution of identity be it personal or non-personal in orientation, abstract or particular, theologically oriented or non-theologically oriented, etc. (79)

	Now, let me look at the essence of essence (which has been declared in previous essays, to be, in essence, non-essence or no-essence or not-essence)! (80)

	All identity is essentially empty (using the Buddhist concept of sunya). Identity has no invariant substantial substructures, primary matter (such as simple atoms), eternally essences, ideal forms, etc., etc., grounding its phenomenal manifestation since in our first dismissal we have ruled out this metaphysical category of the Absolute-Absolute and its invariant essences. Such can neither be thought nor entertained as real in any way! Moreover, such an unobtainable state of affairs could not be recognized even if it had some form of an extra-metaphorical existence! In this light, or rather lack of it, there can be no such entities such as entities possessing intrinsic self-existence, a substantial soul, simple atoms, an eternally unchanging deity, etc., etc. In our second dismissal we have also ruled out our fourth category of the Relative-Relative and its completely skeptical negative nihilism. What identity we have to hand is essentially conventional in its distinctive mapping within the life-world, this is conducted in a linguistically bound manner, and, this is realized and thematized between these two categories of the predicationally oriented Relative-Absolute and the relationally oriented Absolute-Relative with no absolute demarcation, in effect, between these two mutual poles of 'fluid' identificational simulation. Furthermore, a type of provisional self is realized between these two idealities in keeping with the nature of the intentionality therein being synthesized, analyzed and appreciated. (81)

	Identity is simulated and thematized between ideal unobtainable principles of identity and difference. It is contextually dependent upon conditions and cannot be described/prescribed by the invocation of metaphysical inventories (except, perhaps, when cautiously and critically deployed in a metaphorical mode subject to an ongoing overall transcendental suspension?). All identity is simulated non-representationally! It is constructed/re-constructed through fluid-like predicationally oriented and relationally oriented processes of meta-textual adoption and phenomenological adaptation in keeping with the nature of the simulation to hand through the simulation of that nature to hand, i.e., those phenomenological-hermeneutical essential constructs as just outlined. Empty of impossible attribution it is conventionally described/prescribed and by virtue of the integrity of the life-world we can directly engage with the same regardless as to whether our simulations are conventionally real and non-virtual (and ‘actual’) or conventionally non-real and virtual. All identity is constituted thus implying that a viable theology must also present a vision of the Divine that too must be directly entertainable if only in theory, or, i.e., hypothetically! It being left to the critical theologian and their congregations to show that this access is indeed practically open, and can be demonstrated by some means or other, in order for them to announce some viable form of access with the same (along with those critical methods adopted and adapted for a critical appreciation of the theoretical and practical nature of that type or types of approach)! But such ambitions need to be addressed through an investigation of the concept of theological work, applying itself both in general and in particular terms of reference in this regard in order to ascertain critically the viability of and access for such theological value! (82)

	Let me re-state my arguments as to why there can be no absolute-absolute form of essence eternally invariant in the constitution of any phenomenal form of identity. For a start, essence is experienced phenomenologically, hermeneutically and existentially. Such supposedly 'invariant-like characteristics' of identity through being dependent upon conditional-processes implies that it cannot be invariant neither in theory nor in practical fact, i.e., actually eternal in its configuring and configuration of identity! Similarly, a skeptical mistreatment of simulation as mere change can equally be ruled out of court on the grounds that identity cannot be obtained when absolutely reduced to a complete state of nihilistic flux as might be attempted, misguidedly, in the promotion of an extreme form of relativism! Thence essence is the phenomenal appearance of distinctive identity being formed in the life-world according to the progressive realization of its historical conditions, etc. This constitution of identity being prescriptively realized and descriptively thematized in the interplay of provisionally denominated logical subjects subjected to relatively fluid processes of predicationally oriented and relationally oriented attribution. And this applies to all forms of identity whether it be non-theologically oriented or theologically oriented!! (83)

	What are the non-theological and theological implications and ramifications of this fluid-like vision involved in the simulation of identity in the life-world as a simulation qua simulation? (84)

First, let me announce this First Conclusion, namely, that the sense, meaning and meaningfulness of the idea of self, i.e., its value, can have neither an absolute-absolute reading of an invariant substantiality nor a relative-relative reading of a mere nihilistic state of relativistic flux! That, in essence, there is both essentially no substantial sense of self, etc., nor a mere, purely un-patterned stream of being whose being would then be no more than an absolute nothingness; an impossible state of affairs that would be completely destructive of all forms of value should even its mere suggestion be contemplated. Hence the death of the idea of self (and the successful re-birth of a phenomenally viable sense of self whose integrity entails many contributing provisional senses of self within in a fluid vision of an overall sense of self that must still be constrained within certain limitations in keeping with overall nature of its existential descriptor)! (85)

My Second Conclusion is this, namely, that what applies to all forms of identity, and therein to personal identity, must also apply ipso facto to all forms of theological identity! Hence the equal death of the idea of the Divine! (86)

From this complete absence both of invariant essence and provisional-essential absence we should realize this Third Conclusion, namely, that much of what the world is psychotically addicted to, globally or otherwise, is just not there in the lived-reality of the life-world, and, that the realization of this existential fact, through an elimination of these sins of (absolute-absolute) commission and (relative-relative) omission, that the realization of the undistorted nature of the being of our existence-before-others(-and-the-Divine?) implies a therapeutic and spiritual realization as to how things are (if only by default?)! (87)

	How do we answer the question posed in this section of this essay: “What is the role of simulation if all is simulated?” Should we conclude that simulation is nothing but ‘mere’ simulation – that everything is nothing but an illusion, or, at least, not much more? That the type of philosophy being promulgated here is some variant of an idealism? Such a conclusion would be warranted if it were not for the fact that in our being in this world-of-life our passage through the life-world is one imbued with a world-of-value, a world of surplus value that becomes re-invested in this economy of engagement; the overflowing of this value re-investing all participants in this economy – object-states, others and our own senses of self realized in and through such ‘fruitful’ forms of engagement. In this world-of-life we should not seek for the intrinsic value of ‘things’ because there is none! We need to be ‘open’ to this world-of-value there-for-us as constituted by-us. In this light all forms of identity are simulated in an economy of value whether non-theologically oriented or theologically oriented!! Hence all may be a ‘process of simulation’ this can be no ‘mere act of simulation’ since this world-of-value is none other than this world-of-life. Moreover, through the persistent insistence on an ongoing overall transcendental suspension these short-sighted philosophical games of idealism, realism, etc., are all thoroughly put to the side! Such appellations are just not applicable! Furthermore, this critical, open attitude towards the life-world has no place for metaphysical extrapolations or super-impositions projected into the phenomenal-phenomenological being of the life-world nor does it have any time for those who try to argue for a negative, unpatterned nihilism of a valueless and value-destroying relativism! Rather, through the open acceptance of a world-of value our insistence upon an ongoing overall transcendental suspension allows us to critically engage the economy of value realized in this engaged world-of-life. Indeed, in and through the integrity of this ‘one’-world-of-life our passage through this life-world must reflect both this same pattern of integrity along with all investment in value contributed by ourselves in our living engagement with this universal economy of value! Hence the life-world may be simulated this simulation can be no ‘mere’ simulation and will indeed reflect, and bear upon, the manner of our intentionality within this all-encompassing sphere of being-in-its-becoming an integrating-integrated complexity of value-there-for-us!! Hence the simulation of value and the value of this simulation and the impossibility of our reducing this world-of-engagement to either ‘value’ or ‘simulation’!!! (88)

Let me now examine in detail the implications and ramifications of these Three Conclusions as just previously noted and the important consequences they have for the creation and exercise of both a critical philosophy and a critical theology..!! (89)

7.    On the Inevitable Death of (the Idea of) 'God'!

	God is dead! God save (the) God! Does this destruction of all inventories of metaphysical, extra-metaphorical descriptions/prescriptions of the Divine, etc., spell the complete death of the Divine or does their funeral merely make space only for an impractical, theoretical negative theology? Or, with this fait accompli, is the theologian ‘shown the door’, so to speak, to either the means for viably accessing the Divine or the means for assessing the impossibility of such a topic and thence the non-viability of that entire discipline from a practical religious point of view?! Subject to a transcendental suspension, in this regard, I am not entitled to just say a “yea” or a “nay”… except to say both a “yea” and a “nay”!! From the perspective of a “nay” these ten essays have effectively spelt out the transcendental conditions under which a transcendental theology is both theoretically viable and not viable. From the perspective of a “yea” various arguments in these essays, individually and collectively, have gone beyond a merely hypothetical sphere of operation and have taken on an apparently viable life of their own? But, whatever sphere of operation the reader may wish to adopt and adapt, or not adopt and adapt, let an overall transcendental suspension remain in place in order to insulate us from these sins of commission and omission as indicated above wherein, respectively, we commit ourselves to forms of psychotic distortion through clinging to ontological and/or epistemological forms of metaphysical speculation, or, subject ourselves to a complete loss of value through the adoption of ridiculous forms of a negative nihilism through insisting on a completely relativist mistreatment of the life-world! In contrast, the fruitfulness of the hermeneutic circle simulates our direct embrace of the life-world and its direct embrace of us through our ongoing discovery and thematization of an existential excess of value, overflowing from the centre of all our relationships, that is forever non-materially, i.e., spiritually, realized for-us by-us in order to discover and be discovered by the phenomenal totality of all of our relationships by virtue of their having an effective ‘life of their own’ in the inter-collectivity of this ‘living’-world of life..! This observation being my Third Conclusion as previously noted. But, let me now look more closely at my Second Conclusion in the light of the First before outlining and examining what is to be gained, I believe, from the adoption (and personal adaptation) of this type of critically exercised Transcendental Theology. (90)

	The First Conclusion notes that the ‘presence’ of the self cannot be reduced to some form of a metaphysical substance or entity. The dialectics of the hermeneutic circle need no metaphysical entities to function, indeed, forbids their ideal ideality through an inability of its three ideal polar moments of ever being obtained either individually, coupled or collectively. Similarly, any misguided attempt to work in the opposite direction of a metaphysical synthesis, through a process of de-reduction, must equally fail! Even though the totality of a relationship is ‘psychically’ greater than the sum of the parts through emergence, etc., the investment of this excess is divested within the ‘body’ of that relationship (in the context of all its relationships, i.e., in the context of the life-world) and the apparent integrity of its identity is not expressed, cannot be expressed, through the invocation of such impossibilia. This expression of all forms of identity are all equally ‘real’ regardless as to whether they are non-virtual or virtual (as previously defined) and need no metaphsyical input in order to establish this existential fact of phenomenal being (in so far as the being of all phenomena is the phenomenon of all being) without distinction. In this light we can declare all forms of identity to have the same essence, but as the essence of that essence is empty in order for it have an apparent essentility it implies that that essence is emptiness (where even emptiness is empty!)! The world ‘works’ through an absence of metaphysical entities! Metaphysical essences, in an absolutely-absolute category, could never do the work that was intended for them, indeed, they could not even come into existence to be viable in the first place. So, let us unreservedly dismiss the same. On the other hand, let us be attentive to the fact that such fictions are attractive and come to some in-depth understanding, as a phenomenon, as to why they have mesmerized most of mankind, and, unfortunately, have completely fascinated most philosophers (and theologians) with their delusive distortions of the reality-of-the-life-world which is there-for-us through the non-metaphysical machinations of the hermeneutic circle! Already magical and mysterious the life-world-awaits-there-for-us to experience and reflect upon this wonderful existential richness of value that is to be found in and through our passage through this inexhaustible world-of-value. We have no need for metaphysical nonsense, in fact, psychically and spiritually, we are much better off without its distortions of the life-world! Hence our need to inaugurate a transcendental purification and refinement of our being in this world-of-life through the ongoing instigation and preservation of an overall transcendental suspension. And in this task we need to reduce all metaphysical contaminations to their resident metaphors in order to facilitate the existential functioning of this hermeneutic circle at the phenomenal center of all forms of transcendental value and identity formation operative in a progressive clarification of this world-of-life! Hence, although the metaphysical is to be recognized and neutralized, the resident metaphors in such constructions are to be re-used and re-cycled in this relatively non-distorted economy of a hermeneutic circle subjected to such transcendentialization. Our uncontrolled and distorted fascination with these metaphors accounting for this tendency to project the metaphysical onto the apparent phenomena met in the course of our passage through this world-of-life whether they be everyday or fantastic, whether treated as secular or sacred in orientation. Now, this transcendental ‘insight’ into the non-metaphysical formation of identity and the metaphysical deformation of that process of identity-formation implies that as all forms of identity are realized in this manner it follows that theological formulations must equally be subjected to such transcendental guidelines in the manufacture of a relatively undistorted simulation of identity regardless of the viability of such thematizations and as to whether they correctly inhabit virtual or, hopefully, non-virtual realms of phenomenal being (in the relatively ‘real’ existence of the Divine in all the forms of its/their manifestations). Hence a proper understanding of this First Conclusion establishes the Second Conclusion (namely, in effect, that the Divine could not be formulated in metaphysical frames of reference!)! (91)

Thence this apparent ‘death of self’ is the equal ‘death of God’!! But neither of these ‘deaths’ has a corpse!  How embarrassing! Through an absolute (non-absolutist) lack of metaphysical essence in any form what so ever, this emptiness of emptiness can then ‘loudly declare’ “all that is actually possible is now possibly actual” dependent, of course, on the course of the necessary conditions being in place in order for it to manifest this type of phenomenal identity, that type of phenomenal identity, etc. Thus in this light a viable theology should take note of what is transcendentally necessary in acts of commission and omission in order for theological identity to be hypothetically viable and, hopefully, in a form to sustain the type of theological work a theologian might traditionally and/or non-traditionally hope to articulate and subscribe to…. (92) 

	Of course such death is inevitable! Indeed, preordained, since all metaphysical identity extrapolated beyond its metaphorical level of deployment is merely the semblance of a corpse how ever life-like it might be made to appear through the cosmetic art of short-sighted philosophers and theologians. Freed from such distortions the ‘illusion’ of a corpse ‘magically’ dissolves but this absence of a cadaver to bury is no excuse for canceling our celebration of the wake! Just as ‘magically’ there is no-one left to bury such a fiction or celebrate a wake with or without the corpse – as if to dust the edifices of great men have tumbled back into the desert of the metaphysical imagination, and, in its place let us celebrate in this garden of the life-world the fact that the ‘reality of reality’ will forever surprise us and fill us with true wonder at this living-beauty of this life-world whose integrity philosophers and theologians will, perhaps should, naturally ‘perceive’ as Divine through the greater excellence of its epistemological organization than the shadowy parts of our own conventional, non-virtual selves apparently dancing within the freedom of its embrace..?? But, hopefully, my metaphor should be seen in this rhetorical light – that the idea and ideal of the Divine is a viable one as long as all forms of metaphysical distortion are removed from its ‘metaphorical embodiment’… that we have no where else to start on this road to a theological interpretation of the life-world other than through such metaphor… so let the theologian take up this challenge to tradition in order to revive what might have been viable in such a tradition… and produce a theology that has value for-us-in-this-world-of-life and can do real theological work!! I.e., ensure a cogent network of concepts in their articulation of the Divine that can actively contribute to an enriched, valid interpretation of our passage through this world-of-life as we live our life before others and before this apparent ‘vision’ of the Divine…? (93)

8.   On the Overcoming of 'Death' Through Re-Simulation

	If the ego is a fiction what then is the nature of death if there is nothing substantially there that could be born let alone die as argued for in a complete rejection of all metaphysical entities exercised beyond the level of their metaphorical deployment?! In contrast it is obvious that ‘death’ is the sign of a ‘change of state’ but how radical is this cleavage between ‘being alive moments before death’ and this change of state titled ‘after death’? And what role does or should our observations and speculations on ‘life and death’ play in the philosophical formulation of a religious philosophy, and vice versa?! Let me address this complex problem in the hypothetical light of a transcendental phenomenology, etc., as centred in my treatment of the hermeneutic circle as outlined and thematized in the course of these theological essays. (94)

	It is my intuition that a religious philosophy must address this issue of ‘death’ in some form or other in order for it to take on this mantle of being a ‘religious philosophy’? In confronting our apparent ‘finiteness’ we naturally gravitate to those systems of belief that tell us that, although we may be finite, and limited by such appearance, we do indeed possess a value greater than that which is merely apparent, and, that we do indeed possess or could possess a worthwhile place in this cosmos by virtue, directly and/or indirectly, of the Divine nature immanently and/or transcendently manifested as a numinous state resident within and/or outside this cosmos. Hence this ‘world’ is no mere world but a ‘world of value’, and by virtue of its relationship, through epistemological organization, to the form and formation of the Divine, in all ‘its’ variety, must also be a ‘living world of value’ and a ‘world of value for the living’, ‘and’, hopefully, ‘for the dead too!’ So, by such observations and/or arguments one might quickly arrive at an apparently obvious understanding of the transcendental nature of this ‘world-of-life’. Of course, one would most likely be mistaken since in the absence of an overall transcendental suspension one’s philosophical or theological enterprise would most likely not be transcendental in complexion (unless it was accidentally or intentionally constructed on parallel lines wherein the senses, etc., of expressions like ‘imminent’ were indeed actually paralleled by their correlatives, in this case the sense, etc., of the ‘transcendent’..!). (95)

Sitting on this dividing line between observation and speculation, confronting this territory beyond the metaphorical deployment of our metaphors found useful in this enterprise, and, hopefully not falling from this perch, let us see to what religious ramifications might follow from our theological treatment of the life-world within these critical limits of the transcendental born from the careful imposition of an overall transcendental suspension? (96)

	First let me cite the type of reply needed to an objection that the overall transcendental suspension, or any other for that matter, is only a cognitive, intellectual trap which, once having fallen into, allows of no real escape through the inherent paradoxes, all-embracing contradictions in this seething seas of eternal aporias resident within the maelstrom of this linguistic black hole waiting all too eagerly to swallow the personal identity of those misfortunate individuals fallen within its twisted, misshapen psychotic distortions of reality..? So, what hope have we..?! (97)

	But, there… you are out..!! No longer trapped within the suspension! (98)

	Escape from this world of the potentially psychotic is achieved, normally, every moment of the day when the suspension of the suspension is itself suspended… and that suspension, in turn, is suspended… and so on…! (99)

	By such means, in this one-world of the world-of-life, we meet all things and all persons as one simulation to another in the direct embrace of this one world-of-life! Because no entities (as relatively sentient beings or relatively insentient beings; either individually-oriented or non-individually-oriented) and no frames of reference have any form or trace of a resident substantiality (belonging to the impossible classification of the Absolute-Absolute, also known as the absolutely-absolute) it implies that there can only be one world ‘to be trapped in’, and, that through forms of existential excess, through such consequent forms of valuation and re-valuation, attendant upon our actions, our intentionality, etc., (and the consequent consequences this has for viable processes of existential evaluation/re-evaluation) personal identity is personally empowered, or, rather, re-empowered and, therein, released from this illusion of bondage! We are forever transcendentally free regardless of our current empirical bondage (through our enslavement by others and institutions, through our own commodification and manipulation of others in turn, or, found consequent upon the distortions of illness whether medical and/or mental in a nature, or, incidental upon the natural mistreatment of reality through an ‘ever-present’ global psychosis because of our addiction to unobtainable absolutely-absolute metaphysical entities, etc.…)! Furthermore, through an absence of the negative influences of a pure relativism, from a complete rejection of the Relative-Relative category, also known as the relatively-relative, reality is allowed to be conventionally and conditionally patterned (despite, and because of, this equal rejection of the metaphysical mis-deployment of the metaphorical [as would be non-virtually resident in the absolutely-absolute category if it were at all obtainable!])! Hence the ‘life-world’ is both a ‘world-of-identity’ and a ‘world-of-value’! Moreover, being indivisibly a unification of the unobtainable ontological pole and the unobtainable epistemological pole (through their equal dialectical unobtainability) it too is a ‘living’-world-of-value! Hence the necessary theologicalization of this life-world, this one-living-world-of-life!! But, let me revisit this aspect of our theology at the end of this essay. For the moment let us return to this theme of ‘death’, or, rather, its intrinsic ‘absence’ in this world-of-life. (100)

	“What then is death?” and “What are its ramifications for the continuation and/or non-continuation of personal identity?” Can this question be given a transcendentally descriptive/prescriptive form and explication? Surely, by virtue of the transcendental dis-conjunctive suspension already resident within the format of a question this question already has a resident transcendental form, indeed, the existence of the same is necessary for the very understanding of the value of that proposition in and through its dialectical ‘asking and answering’ within the ambit of the hermeneutic circle. In its articulation of value-for-us sense, meaning and meaningfulness collectively realize the imposition of a transcendental ‘order’ upon the resolution of that reply which, being issued upon the same grounds as the question, realizes the appropriate answering of that question to some degree or other, and, therein, re-thematizing the ‘definition’ of that question, etc! So let us proceed in this ‘transcendental direction’ and attempt this process of ongoing explication…. (101)

	Death could well be defined as a "change of state". The question remains, however, is that change of state a radical discontinuity or a non-radical discontinuity like, e.g., sleep? In order to investigate this question more closely the nature of identity, and the nature of personal identity in particular, need to be properly and appropriately examined. By 'appropriate' I am implying here a transcendental phenomenological investigation, etc. By 'proper' is meant the correct and valid conduct of those investigations. It is not my expectation that those investigations will find a final, definitive formulation. However, it is my expectation that many models on this topic of identity will find themselves ruled out on closer examination. A collective synthesis of reversed ontological arguments being contrived to demonstrate what forms of competing theorization remain to be integrated into an ongoing process of dialectical-like integration in this regard. Just as various, different metaphorical models of reality can directly 'image' the 'reality' of the life-world in the same manner various seemingly competing models of identity can be cross-referenced in this dialectical manner (unless further research reveals the relative non-competence of those aspects when re-treated individually). (102)

	To these ends I would like to note a number of observational-expectations that could be treated as provisional principles in this regard (being intuitively and/or theoretically derived from our phenomenological research, etc.). Let first post my observational-expectation and then derive a principle from the same. Then, let me retrospectively argue for the same in the light of our current research. (103)

	I would like begin with the expectational-observation of embodiment or materialization. All forms of information are based in a certain material medium or media. E.g., photos can stored on the undeveloped film, in the form of negatives, as printed out photographs, remain in a digital format on the hard disc drive or cd-rom or floppy disc or a homepage, etc. Regardless of whether we are old-fashioned photographers or digital recorders information is still embodied in some form of a material format regardless of the medium chosen for this task. Hence this type of principle could be stated along the following lines: Potentially accessible information is dependent upon the manipulation of a medium or media for the storage of the same within that medium or media even though that information cannot be reduced to the mere nature of the same without a loss of that information (unless its dissemination is instigated prior to this destruction of its information bearing medium or media). The economy of value is dependent upon a text, i.e, the materialization or embodiment of that information. That information being read through the correct realignment of its meta-textual conventions. Then, text plus meta-text through a balanced suspension realizes the non-textual simulation of that text. An overall transcendental suspension mirroring the operations of a hermeneutic circle, and v.v. (104)

	A second observational expectation that I would like to note is the phenomenal/phenomenological fact that identity is found persisting through time by means of processes of iteration/re-iteration implying a principle of iterative persistence. This type of process is understood, negatively, as non-absolutist and non-metaphysical in orientation, and, positively, as interdependently conditional. Unobserved metaphysical 'phenomena'  like cause and effect, soul, God, etc., belonging to the absolutely-absolute category, are complete dismissed as nonsense and only read, if at all, metaphorically. Treated as simulations-for-us through re-simulation since through re-simulation the simulation is allowed to remain or appear otherwise it intentionally disappears. Then, because there is only one life-world, that simulation is able 'to appear' by virtue of this process of re-simulation both from our point of view and from its point of view, etc. (in all modalities expected with that type of phenomenology). From this meeting of points of view simulation is simulated-for-us through this overall process of re-simulation. That, essentially an economy of (loosely interpreted) object-states, egos and others all have to be co-present for the value of that simulation to persist in phenomenal time. Resimulation being the resumption of a process of re-simulation (as previously defined) (as in, e.g., when we wake up and start a new day). This leads into my next expectational principle. (105)
	
	Identity is treated as persisting after periods of its non-direct thematization through processes of a constituted/re-constituted re-simulated-continuity. In the continuation of personal identity there is assumed that a continuity of the unique existential descriptor is in place even though, as in sleep, e.g., there appears to  be a 'temporary' loss of its conscious-intentional connectedness. If death is treated as on par with sleep, and this comparison is here only meant hypothetically, then similar mechanisms of continuity must be in place to explain both. Of course questions still remain as to whether through processes of transformation an identity has been preserved and whether that identity is the same identity? This leads me to make the following observation and cast it too as an expectation paralleling a principle in this regard? (106)

	That as the simulated preservation of personal identity also demands the preservation of a reflexive self-appreciative component it follows that, in general, all forms of a relationship involve the same characteristic, namely, a reflexive component. That only in advanced forms of epistemological organization is there these overt aspects of appreciation and self-appreciation. But, being the very nature of the gestalt field in its archetypality implies that the greater the level of epistemological organization the greater the sense of (pre-intentional) appreciation and (intentional) self-appreciation. (107)

	Furthermore, the transference of information, and thence identity, from one medium or set of media to some other medium or set of media is adequately conducted when the above four expectational principles are taken into account and that that transfer of information maintains an adequate (error-correctable) invariance of transformational isomorphism. (108)

Lastly, just as the hermeneutic circle has within it a series of hermeneutic circles so too are there a(n infinitely) overlapping series of hermeneutic circles into which that hermeneutic circle under investigation is itself inserted some of which will be currently relevant to those investigations. I find the following re-appraisal apposite in this regard. Poets in non-tropical climes are often nostalgic in the season of Autumn. Falling leaves are a potent symbol of death, each leaf representing the death of one more individual person. But, there is another way of seeing this same situation. Just before the 'death' of the leaf the goodness of its life, in the form of sugars and other substance synthesized during the time of its existence, are withdrawn back into the body of the tree. Then the leaf dies but its 'spirit' has first already withdrawn (back) into the tree. Like all metaphors there is the fallacy of the extended analogy. Our metaphors can only work so far. Too often our explanations are reductive and only reductive. Moreover, all reductive explanations suffer in a loss of existential richness proportional to the degree that that reduction was carried out. Hence this inability to adequately account for the system of information subjected to that degree of reduction. Reductions can throw some light on systems but they cannot directly account for the systematic nature of that system as they essentially operate in a counter-productive opposite direction. Hence this sixth principle of non-reductive emergence. (109)

	So, in considering identity, whether personal or non-personal, theological or non-theological, it is my belief that these six principles need to be taken into account in some form or other. From a consideration of such transcendental expectations identity is not only simulated but re-simulated (and hopefully resimulated in the situation of a loss of current transmission?)? (110)

	Given this complex philosophy on the constitution of identity we also stand in need of a mechanism or series of mechanisms for the determination of co-identificational co-isomorphism, i.e., between two more identities, in different moments of time, we can say they are essentially the same identity. How do we identity an identity as the same identity as another identity and therein postulate a connectedness that links all of these identities within the same existential descriptor and therein as temporal expressions of the same identity? Even though all identity is subject to change, in some form or other, (if only in correctable and/or non-correctable errors in transmission) the preservation of identity necessitates a degree of transformational invariance. Hence between any temporal identity expression we can say they are the same through noting the above six expectational principles and the presence of a co-indentifictional co-isomorphism and thence between the same the preservation of that identity. But, for sure, the constitution of identity is a controversial area as witnessed in the many philosophic and religious disputes that have arisen over just such issues! (111)

	To conclude this section let me note some final points. First, despite the complete absence of all absolutely-absolute metaphysical entities like soul, etc., the continuity of life is still a 'miracle'. If personal identity can continue in the absence of the same then perhaps there is hope for us in the after-life (and the before-this-life?) should this state of affairs wherein identity in some form or other, on a deep(er) level of isomorphism, be found preserved without an overt form of embodiment. If such a state could be hypothetically or evidentially be demonstrated some level of embodiment would have to be exhibited (as per the first expectational principle of embodiment). Moreover, the preservation of identity necessitates forms of iteration/re-iteration as must also be present in this current life in the here and now. Hence the argument for the survival of personal identity in any form must implicate processes of simulation/r-simulation as was argued above. Hence the overcoming of death, should that be a viable process, would take place through processes of re-simulation, and, in this light one might claim we are overcoming 'death' every moment of the day we re-continue to live in this world-of-life. Then, "as below so too above", to turn this expression around, leaves us with the implication that the Divine identity must follow the same transcendental rules that apply to all forms of identity. Thence the death of god is not only a slogan but must also be a fact, a fact the theologian should also take into account (by processes other than its traditional denial). Lastly, I only need mention in passing that the list of models for the establishment of identity noted earlier in this essay can also be re-written through the lenses of various transcendental requirements as just noted. The relationship between the Divine and the non-Divine also needs to be formulated in this same light. (112)

Hence, we must assume, that there can be no real death as there is absolutely nothing there that could die. On the other hand, we die every moment of the day and that death is no more than this continual change of state. The question then becomes - is death (in its primary meaning) as a change of state a relatively radical discontinuity or a relatively non-radical discontinuity (like, e.g., sleep?)? (113)

	Lastly, one must consider the relationship between this topic of death and religious philosophy (both in general and in particular) and how each is treated in the 'mutual' light of the other… Pascal may wager that a bet on the Divine is a sure bet regardless of the existence or the non-existence of the same. However, it may well be that to focus on some hypothetical hereafter, at the expense of the existential reality of the here and now, can only foster an ontological psychosis in the manner as previously described with an intensity proportional to the degree this distortion of reality is entertained (regardless of whether this state of the hereafter exists or does not exist!)! If a ‘religious life’ is led without expectation of a ‘reward’ in some form or other then the ‘goodness’ done should, normally, be its own reward. This is not automatic but an existential fact of life in so far as people can be ‘selfless’ and look after each other in an appropriate and proper manner. Then, in such a world the surplus good we do to others will be returned by others, and, hopefully, when we might be in such need we will be the proper recipient of such appropriate charity. Still, this world is an unpredictable sphere of being, and, furthermore, some people, parasitic upon the goodness of other, will try to take advantage of this type of situation. Hence the need for the appropriate and proper distribution, and degree, of such selfless giving to others. A fact that can only be put into practice through the proper exercise of an informed, overall transcendental suspension (of the total economy involved in the creation of such value). Thence, for oneself, one must weigh up this religious ‘promise’ of a future life in the hereafter in some form or other since the very devotion to this fact may well lead to unintended non-religious consequences in this very life (through the psychotic-psychological distortions attendant upon such ontological commitments)! So, in this light such beliefs are probably best ‘overlooked’ and certainly should not be over-emphasized!! (114)

	In asking how this advice of ‘overlooking’ can be put into practice the answer is quite simple – through the overall transcendental suspension! A practice that happens every moment of the day – the only difference being in how resolute we are in ensuring that this process is both instigated in a balanced manner and that such dynamic equilibrium is maintained in an ongoing fashion. This sense of a ‘psychic balance’ being realized dynamically and never on a pure momentary basis (since even the momentary nature of self-existant moments is an illusion). Suffice to say that this is an art that we already have a handle on and all that is called for is some degree of active-reflection, i.e., the (‘selfless’) entry into our reflections in such a manner that we existentially participate in them rather than ‘suffer’ their mere dictation (or let them 'suffer' our dictation). At the same time this form of entry is essentially empty of ego and its super-impositional reification of metaphysical entities by virtue of its exercise in and through the overall transcendental suspension itself resident in all forms of value (as already argued by implication through the dialectical nature of hermeneutic circle itself). Although empty of the illusion of the apparent positivity of the absolutely-absolute (and the negativity of the relatively-relative) because these putative categories and their contents are impossibilia it follows then that phenomena appear as phenomena and in such a fashion our life is presented to us through its ongoing re-presentation. In such a fashion we are continually (and continuously) overcoming the illusion of death even though there is no-thing there in a putative substantial metaphysical mode that could die! Such is life and such is death – there being ultimately no absolute difference between the same! Without existential fear through a recognition of the absence of an inherent ego and its non-cognitive treatment in and through an undistorted state of judgment we become naturally resolute through the ongoing resolution conducted for us by this ongoing state of an overall transcendental suspension. Without a so-called metaphysically ‘real’ ego how could there be ‘real’ fear and hence even this phenomenon of fear needs to be non-fearfully accepted as a fait accompli. But, this cannot be accomplished in a cognitive manner – so one cannot say “let me be resolute”… and this existential state of affairs can only be realized through the integrity of our total transcendentally experienced sense of 'self' within the 'totality' and 'integrity' of the life-world! Still, this is something that all people have access to although only naturally focused through the resoluteness of oversight exercised through the overseeing of the overall transcendental suspension is so far as it is allowed ‘an apparent life of its own’. (115)

	Each fleeting moment of life simulated, each fleeting moment of death simulated… without life there can be no death and when there is no death there can be no death…! (116)

	Let me now investigate this claim "that there is a necessary theologicalization of the life-world" regardless of what 'work' this concept might entail or might not entail in a religious frame of reference and the 'value' of such a hypothetical 'reality' in its intersection with the life of an individual?? (117) 

9.	The Non-Hypothetical Reality of a Theological Dimension In the Life-World? 

It is a wonder that different things in this world, with seemingly very little in common, can interact. Then, it is even more of a wonder that these various different sorts of relationships can also interact and therein through their simulations simulate, by default, the apparent integrity of this one-world-of-life. Into this world of relationships we find an existential richness of being resident in each and every locus of identity found therein. Some forms of identity being more rich in the metaphorical fabric of their being than other centres of identity. But, each identity is limited by being centred in some manner or other and by virtue of its distinctive modal nature and through the fact that identity has limits as to the extent of its sphere(s) of its operations in the life-world. Thus we must ask “How is the Divine to be identified?” and “Should we not ask how it too is limited by centre(s), modalities and the extent of its influence in this world-of-life assuming the non-hypothetical existence of the same?” Then, if the Divine is open-ended how could it have an identity, or, if it's limited by identity how could it remain open-ended? Should this type of problem be addressed, or, should the problem itself be dismissed if the problem itself can be shown to have no basis in phenomenal/phenomenological reality? I think the latter to be more appropriate - let me explain. (118)

	Each individual person is centred uniquely in the life-world in so far as their existential descriptor would have described and currently describes a unique set of spatio-temporal coordinates. To be human means to normally possess a gamut of modalities in keeping with the nature of this category. Then, the range of a human being is usually limited to the surface of this planet with more power usually being exercised in the vicinity of that individual (although in this technological age this power can be broadcast over a greater area, e.g., as in being able to ring a friend's mobile from one's own, etc.). Now, if this model of identity is, more or less, standard how would it apply, hypothetically, to theological identity? By looking at the human model can we also argue for an open-ended sense of identity despite this simultaneous relative closure of identity through the imposition of limitations? Imagine the following thought experiment? Imagine a human being completely disappearing from this world in such a manner that the mass of their body has been completely destroyed without its conversion to an equivalent amount of energy. This sudden collapse would send shock waves through the universe and 'upset' the entire world and with it the entire fabric of the life-world. The point of this thought experiment being that the individual may be limited in identity yet they are dependent in their apparent interdependence upon the totality of the cosmos, and v.v., and hence their relationship with the world is open-ended in this sense. 'Limitations' cannot mean 'merely limited'. By logical extension, the Divine could be limited in some particular aspect this does not in itself imply a lack of an open-endedness in some other aspect of being, etc. Indeed, though apparently interdependence, the entire world is in dependence upon the entire world… Now, we need to ask what meaning does this word 'entire' possess, and, in exactly the same vein, what do words encompassed in this same concept like 'one', 'unity', 'integrity', etc., also possess in common (on the assumption that we are dealing with the same concept)? Should such expressions be treated non-metaphysically and literally or metaphysically and non-literally? In my opinion we can take a middle path in this if we are careful not to confuse these differing spheres of operation in the formation and expression of identity both in their logical ideality and their dialectical-practicality. Metaphor read outside the hermeneutic circle cannot be treated in an ideal logical mode of identity centred on equivalence. On the other hand, within the hermeneutic circle, metaphors actually help us ‘to metaphor’ the world hence this dialectical-practical aspect in which the world is directly simulated by-us for-us through the role of metaphor within the overall context of the hermeneutic circle. In the same light, this sense of the so-called 'unity' of the life-world is also 'experienced', namely, as a metaphor and as a metaphorical device through whose assistance we are assisted in our 'seeing' this 'world' as indeed 'a' world without which there could be no sense of world to be experienced in the first place. This transcendental argument also being extended to the other two moments of the hermeneutic circle in order to account for object-states (and their individual senses of identity) and one's own sense of self (and its overall embracing of, but not absolutely reaching, an overall sense of self or ego along with the many senses of the other/s). Thence this economy of value… In this light what are we allowed and what are not allowed ‘to read into’ this concept of 'unity', 'oneness', 'integrity', etc. Such concepts acting, in this creation of value, as transcendental concepts? 'Transcendental' by virtue of its experience in an ongoing, overall transcendental suspension, and, by virtue of its necessity as an ingredient in the formation and expression of all forms of identity! Thus, such concepts of the ‘oneness of the life-world’, etc., are not only conceptual but also experientially necessary in our very being able to engage with our engagement in this world-of-life in and through this economy of value created therein…. Framed within experience and at the same time framing experience itself! (119)

Let me state that it is my opinion that this sense of unity, etc., should not be treated as an absolutely-absolute metaphysical category. All such items can be ruled out. Conversely, a so-called counter-critical relatively-relative reading cannot, in fact, be engaged and thence must also be ruled out (by ruling itself out). Now, as a result of this clarification, I am going to suggest that this transcendental sense of 'unity' can be read in both a relatively-absolute sense and in a absolutely-relative sense. In the former, I would argue that this sense of non-absolute unity is necessary in order to account for the integrity of identity found within this world-of-life. Then in the latter category, of the absolutely-relative, I would argue that in some sense this integrity is an accidental feature in the sense that there is a degree of integrity and that this degree can fluctuate. E.g., when the individual starts to loose their gestalt sense of a psychic integrity they go towards a state of sleep and ultimately deep sleep. In the reverse direction they wake up, become more alert, etc. In this light also arguing by extension for a fluctuating sense of integrity as present, hypothetically, in this complex concept of the Divine (as being hypothetically sketched out in these essays)? On the other hand, from a relatively-absolute point of view I am going to state that all forms of identity possess an equivalent degree of integrity in order to appear as that particular identity (and not some other, etc.). The degree and flavour of that identity, be it Divine or non-divine, ultimately expressing the relationship between these two aspects of the relatively-absolute and the absolutely-relative (the mid-point between the same engaging the appropriate senses of 'self' engaged in such a process). (120) 

	So, this integrity of the life-world is experienced and through its experience the sense of ‘the world’ is made apparent, a transcendental sense of world. What exactly then is this ‘integrity’ other than the ongoing unity of this one world-of-life, which, being greater than my own overall sense of self (and operating directly in this one world of the life-world) must implicate a divine state of being which being greater than my own degree of epistemological organization must be none other than the Divine! Hence the necessary theologicalization of the life-world, an existential fact of our passage through this world when ever we meet with instances of oneness, integrity, unity, etc. Hence the Divine is not lost to experience but must be present in the very directness of our engagement with the apparent unity of that experience what ever the nature of that experience (since all experience must be constituted with that [current] degree of unity, to some degree or other, in order for it be experienced as ‘an’ experience)! Hence this necessary theologicalization of the life-world cannot be treated, in this type of transcendental perspective, in a hypothetical modality. Such ‘unity’ transcending both ontological and epistemological distinctions in this regard hence its implication in the constitution and re-constitution of all forms of experience! But does this omnipresence of Divine unity have any value in the theological work it might do in a particular religious frame of reference, and, what is the value (or meta-value) of such a pre-interpreted religious concept as ‘the Divine’ for that religious person? The Divine may have ‘its finger in every pie’ does ‘the hand that moves that finger’ do any work, have any form of value for the religious person? What value does this Divine have for-us-in-this-world-of-life? The Divine could be but no more than a mere shadow… whose shade need not register in our lives… At this point let me resume my hypothetical, transcendentally suspended research: in examining these various concepts (of work and value, e.g.) let me treat them as proposals whose transcendental form is to assessed in the light of its theoretical viability, etc. Defective proposals emitted by theologians, and there are no historical shortage of the same, with no form(s) of a dialectical and/or logical and/or metaphorical redress in their defense, obviously being allowed to fall by the wayside so to speak…. (121)

	Let me now restate this argument for the necessary theologicalization of the life-world in a more succinct form: 

1.	The world-of-life must be ‘the’-world-of life since there must be one-world-of-life constituted for-us by-us; other worlds being merely facets or aspects of this one relational sea of interrelationships.

2.	This life-world must equally transcend and be immanent in the interdependent conjunction of the non-ideality of the ontological mode and the non-ideality of the epistemological mode!

3.	Because there can only be one world-of-life all experience therein must be epistemological organized to some degree or other!

4.	Because the life-world encompasses both my transcendental sense of psychic unity and the transcendental unity of all others and of all other object-states thence its open-ended sense of transcendental unity must be greater than any part pointed to in this life-world!

5.	Thence its ‘Divine’ status even though all facets of the Divine through the limitations of identity cannot equal this open-ended sense of the Transcendental!

6.	Hence all forms of integrity, unity and oneness, etc., are holistic intimations of the open-ended Divine Unity and should be seen in this (metaphorical) light!

7.	All forms of integrity, unity and oneness, etc., are coming into existence through harmonic processes of resolution, hence the forward direction of the theological imperative placed upon the same!

8.	Our experience of the Divine being experienced in and through harmonic processes of resolution hence this reversed aspect of the theological imperative!

9.	That this intimation of the experience of the Divine is overseen through the auspices of an ongoing overall transcendental suspension as happens every moment of the day!

10.	Hence the necessary ongoing unity of the life-world must be Divine and that such divinity must be expressed in and through the necessary theologicalization of the world – as One-World-of-Life! (122)

	Rather than go through these various axioms individually let me focus on some of the key concepts articulated within this list. Ideally, this list has no true sequence – ideally we could start from any one of them and through noting their presuppositional arguments, and the part they play in this overall theoretical scheme, we could then go on to demonstrate any other of these  propositions. First let me look at these twin concepts of the forward aspect of the theological imperative and the reversed aspect of the theological imperative. (123)

	The theological imperative is the deep transcendental emphasis placed upon the need for resolution in order that a relationship can come into existence and therein remain in phenomenal existence in the manner most fitting for it! Only through resolution is identity realized. Only through an ongoing process of resolution is identity re-simulated. This establishes the relatively-absolute characterization of that state of affairs. In a dialectical contrast the current absolutely-relative characterization of that state of affairs establishes the current degree of integrity being attained by that state. I.e., the degree of an existential excess being invested in that state through the degree to which it is able to realize its relatively-absolute characterization. In the example of a rock just sitting there on the ground there may not be much difference between these two types of characterization. In contrast, an individual person has much more scope for instantiating and realizing a complex existential excess and finding that re-invested in the body of their relationships. The imperative nature of this theological concept is the demand for some form of integrity to operate on and between all actively engaged levels of its epistemological organization since without this type and degree of resolution it could not have that associated type and degree of modal characterization. This integrity has a theological implication in so far as the Divine is realized in and through such resolution although never limited to any particular limited situation. As a consequence of this process of instantiated resolution this accompanying degree of integrity experienced in and through its resimulation and/or re-simulation ‘should’ be interpreted and experienced as relatively divine in orientation! Hence the concept of a reverse(d) theological imperative in so far as this integrity (created in the forward theological imperative) is experienced and interpreted as a form of Divine integrity (which through essential holism, in turn, ‘reflects’ the Divine Totality to that extent it can be experienced through such ‘interpretation’). Thence, in the reversed theological imperative all instances of integrity should be experienced as forms or aspects of the Divine Integrity, i.e., as an aspect of the Divine wherein the Divine is able to ‘enter’ into this world-of-life and allows us to ‘enter’ into the Divine through the re-simulation of that relationship. But, it should be noted that the imperative (both forwards and backwards) qua imperative can only to be viewed in and through the auspices of the overall transcendental suspension! Such ‘entry’ being both metaphorical and experiential in nature, but, through the overall transcendental suspension, can be neither metaphysical nor dogmatic in nature! Furthermore, such ‘access’ being virtual when established indirectly (through an indirect form of relationship) and non-virtual when established directly (through a direct relationship). (124)

	What is being established in this ‘proof’. To begin with not as much as might first appear. From the world we go to a world-of-life. From the ongoing unity of the same we travel to a concept of its divine integrity. Thence to its Divine status by virtue of its much greater degree of epistemological organization through its inclusion of all forms of identity whether ego-oriented or non-ego-oriented, etc. Hence my concern and hope for the critical theologian that they properly and appropriately continue this research and therein find ways and means for determining various modus operandi for it operation in various religious-like frames of reference, and, thence, to establish a basis for an understanding of its potential to transcendentally chart the possible course of theological work, and, the ability therein to evaluate the theological value of the same! By theological work is meant the ability of this concept of the Divine to operate in a religious-like frame of reference, whether that be traditionally oriented or non-traditionally oriented, and therein establish the theoretical and non-theoretical practical relevance of this concept in the life of the individual person and in the life of the community. Hopefully this project will be critically conducted on the same type of transcendental basis as exercised in these essays, i.e., as conducted in and through the auspices of an ongoing, appropriately, properly and thoroughly exercised overall transcendental suspension, etc., wherein the preparation, fruitful products and critique of all research is neither metaphysically formulated nor dogmatically declared!! (125)

	So what has this 'proof' achieved? Does it succeed in establishing "the necessary theologicalization of the life-world"? As noted in an earlier essay the concept of proof is perhaps too strong and the word 'demonstration' might be better used. Then, again, this 'proof' is meant to operate on a transcendental level of argument and not on a level that is logical, metaphorical, evidential or dialectical in nature (and certainly not on a metaphysical level!)! By 'transcendental' is meant that which is necessary in the constitution of experience itself. Here I am arguing that integrity, unity, etc., has to be present in the formation of a viable sense of identity. Furthermore, because there is no absolute distinction to be made, or could be made, between an ontological realm of phenomenal existence and an epistemological realm of phenomenalogical existence then it follows that what applies to the latter must apply to the former, and v.v. Lastly, the non-absolute, ongoing integrity, etc., of the life-world implies w.r.t. 'itself' that "a qualified form of divine existence whose epistemological organization is greater than those egologically oriented identities its subsumes" would indeed imply that it must be worthy of this title 'Divine'. In essence this is my 'proof' or transcendental demonstration. Am I entitled to argue in this manner? Implicit in this frame of reference is this sense of a theological imperative - i.e., as integrity is realized through ongoing harmonization, and, that the same is demanded on the part of the Divine (and inter alia 'ourselves') in order for it to assume and maintain that consequent degree of unity, integrity, etc. Moreover, it follows, that in re-constituting an identity through re-simulation this integral flavour is experienced (in reverse). Hence, in our experience of this sense of identity we are experiencing the Divine directly, albeit by proxy. In this light all sense of identificational integrity is an experience of the Divine albeit of the Divine in part, hence only as a token of the overall totality and thence by proxy. However, in and through an essential holism the Divine must also stamp its overall open-ended sense of identity on this regional sense of integrity, and, by proper and appropriate forms of interpretation this deeper aspect. Reflecting the epistemological organization of the Divine must also be resident in localized forms of relatively discrete instances of identificational integrity. In a recognition that the absolutely-absolute categories and identities of the metaphysical can have no place in our philosophy (and theology) it follows that all forms of identity must also be read in the same non-substantial light. Identity then follows from the coursing of the relevant and applicable conditions pre-conditional to the unfolding of its consequences as they develop in the unraveling of that identity. Of course, as already noted on a number of occasions, this 'proof' as it stands does not and cannot do theological work either of a traditionalist persuasion or of a non-traditionalist persuasion. Furthermore, this vision of the theological resident in all forms of integrity as it stands cannot evaluate the value (or existential merit of these proposals and interpretations in the life of the individual, individuals, groups, organizations, institutions, nations, etc.). However, a few clues seem to be cast about us as to how one might travel along that type of path that would be allowed to enable us to sensibly formulate, i.e., transcendentally re-configure and re-evaluate the values of such proposals(?).  (126)

	Let me now conclude this essay, indeed, this series of essays, by re-reading the title of this essay in the light of our wanderings through this collection of essays…. (127)

10.	Conclusion: Overview or Oversight – On the ‘Death’ of God?!

Adherence to a traditionalist concept of the Divine is a recipe for a metaphysical death sentence. A viable theology could never be built upon such non-sense… hence the inevitable recognition that such a deity is dead, was already dead, indeed, was still-born! But, in contrast, there is a vision of the Divine that is viable philosophically speaking although might not be so viable theologically speaking (if the theologian cannot account for a viable sense of theological work and methods for ascertaining the theological value of the same). This vision is built upon the intuitive recognition that the Divine is both 'resident' in and 'realized' in and through all instances of integrity and unity that constitute identity, and, that the life-world itself is an instance par excellence of the same! Indeed, by transcendental necessity, is 'the self-supporting foundations' for the very presentation/re-presentation of the life-world itself through its power to 'locate' all forms of re-simulation and interrelational processes of interdependence therein. Those 'foundations' being metaphorical in nature and non-metaphysical in tenor, being neither reductively oriented in the course of their realization nor merely synthetically oriented in our aspirations towards the same. (128)

How is the end of metaphysical speculation realized? Through the proper and appropriate utilization of an ongoing, overall transcendental suspension! Under its aspices all phenomena are read as phenomena, etc. Through the utilization of the hermeneutic circle, as outlined in these essays, I would argue that a transcendental perspective or 'ultimate point of view' would find that the 'phenomenon of interpretation' is then no more than the 'interpretation of phenomena'. Speculation now has a positive role in so far as it merely begins with our prejudices, our pre-judgments and our speculations, that we therein allows to begin this process of the overall suspension itself (by supplying  the content for suspension). Then, the balance of the 'phenomenon of interpretation' with 'the interpretation of phenomena' introduces us to the meaningfulness of the existential moment (realized through this balanced suspension of the phenomenological moment and the hermeneutical moment). In the same manner the metaphors resident (in our metaphysical categories and forms of identity) are then allowed 'to speak' and (in this 'vocation') directly 'metaphor' the world-found-there-for-us-by-us through this entire hermeneutic circle, itself a veritable can of worms in so far as there are hermeneutic circles on and between all levels of epistemological organization. (129)

Into such a transcendental theological-philosophy the nearly dead metaphysical idea of God, I would like to tentatively argue, gives way to an experiential concept of a living sense of the Divine. Again, would one be allowed to make this type of sweeping claim (that would then open the doors to an exposition that would take on this concept of theological work, i.e., a theology that perceives the sense of the divine as having sense, meaning and meaningfulness, i.e., value, in the life of the individual and community, etc?). Let me briefly, but provisionally and still hypothetically, explore this potentially exciting philosophical panorama without declaring it to be either a realistic vista or an unrealistic mirage…? (130)

	The life-world is the conjunction of two correlative modalities, namely, the ideality of the epistemological polar modality and the ideality of the ontological polar modality hence this coming together of 'life' and 'world'. Such a degree of fundamental correlativity demands a deeper level of interdependence and transformational isomorphism. The transcendental nature of the life-world is exposed as such through the overall transcendental suspension. There we are presented with the open-ended confines of identity formation, the potential of infinite horizons and perspectives, dimensions and points of view. Into this world of re-simulation we find identity is allowed to maintain some sense of a relatively-absolute identity versus an absolutely-relative identity. The integrity of the latter fluctuating and representing the absolutely-relative dimension in this regard. A 'streaming of simulation' through re-simulation that is never divorced from reality (defined through the mix of modalities normally associated with that type of object-state, and, the extent to which they are being realized directly and non-virtually). The simultaneously cross-read "experience of ‘reality’" and the "'reality' of that experience" always being interpreted through the total economy of the hermeneutic circle (and therefore its additional parallel readings through an activation of all six orders, i.e., of the essential, aesthetical, ethical, pragmatical, hermeneutical and factual aspects of value-formation, and, therein, the re-simulation of a directness of access to the phenomenal/phenomenological formation of that relatively simple or complex identity!). How is this transcendental dimension exposed through the adoption and adaptation of the overall transcendental suspension? Essentially, it is my belief, that this would occur through a process of re-alignment, a possibility opened up to us through the removal of the distortion and ‘psychosis’ attendant upon the degree metaphysical commitments are 'clung to'. This 'removal' is realized through the overall psychic deconstruction of those metaphysical commitments proportional to the degree they are affirmed or negated outsdie the overall trasncendental suspension. As a result of such de-metaphysicalization of the life-world, and, the development of this alignment through and upon the common levels of epistemological organization that are available between different and ‘differing’ centres of apparent egological phenomena (i.e., e.g., different instantiations or manifestations of the Divine whether it be ourselves, those entities below us in the degree of their epistemological function such as animals and children, or, those more exalted ‘entities’ presented/re-presented in the ‘opposite direction’). Now, I would like to argue metaphorically that in this process of realignment, or centering, we essentially co(r)-respond with the integrity currently being found instantiated within the life-world and that degree of integrity authentically being re-created in the very centre of our own egological sense of 'overall' being. This 'correspondence' being promoted through the degree to which the overall transcendental suspension is in play and the degree to which we have self-promoted our own sense of integrity through ongoing resolution along with a discovery and exercise of this existential fact of an epistemological commonality in some degree or other engaged throughout the open-extent of the life-world. Moreover, we are allowed to interpret the same to that extent that we have pre-developed our ability to experience, recognize and interpret this 'semblance' of divinity? As a paradox this is experienced in the same measure to that extent that we sacrifice our sense of a (substantial, metaphysical sense) of self in and through the overall transcendental suspenion that we are 'allowed' to recover the same, albeit in this more 'attuned' or 'perfected' and less distorted form. That, in such a transcendentally oriented state (through a transcendentalization of the relatively non-transcendental) there is an equivalence between overviewing and oversighting! I.e., a 'seeing over' and an 'oversighting of'… Between these two forms of 'supervision' our 'world of vision' now becomes a transcendental 'vision of the world', namely, the life-world, and, therein, in and through its integrity our meeting through the auspices of the theological imperative an intimation of divinity and its call for a spirtualization of our being (through ‘allowing’ or putting spontaneously ‘to work’ that current instantiation of the theological imperative that now confronts us in and through this ‘felt-need’ for our assisting this harmonization of the life-world whether that ‘situation’ be ‘self-promoted’ ethically, aesthetically, pragmatically, etc., etc?)? By overviewing is meant the ability to see over those phenomena to hand and gain an essential understanding of what it is to be seen in such an overall manner. By oversighting is meant the ability to no longer see entities and all forms of identity as self-subsistant-like entities, etc. Through this 'seeing' and 'not seeing', in a state of balance, this transcendental apperception is promoted through a refinement of what is already there in the 'course' of ordinary experience. (131)

Here I am only tentatively and provisionally setting out a number of concepts and their hypothetical thematization that seem to be proper and appropriate in this context? Into this heady mixture we would need to develop an overall theory of truth that would take into account this trans-epistemological-ontological divide, the three moments of the hermeneutic circle, the four types of textuality, these six orders, etc., taking all this to heart (in a theological scheme that critically employs putative proposals concerning the parallel fields of theological work and theological value) without invoking an absolutely-absolute style of metaphysical distortion in our reading of how they are deeply interconnected by the same transcendental mechanics (that constitutes the very dynamics of the hermeneutic circle)! In such a territory we would need to carefully and critically explore and evaluate a plethora of concepts dealing with the personal constitution of identity, the nature of authenticity and spirituality (centred in the non-reductive creation/re-creation of an existential excess of value), the dialectics of divine participation as seem to be possibly implicated in this concept of divine re-alignment, etc… But, perhaps the determination of this territory is best left to a careful and critical breed of creative theologians and their congregations to intuitively ascertain, formulate and evaluate these domains of theological work and theological value for themselves..?! Such specialist operating from either within a traditional setting or outside a traditional setting or, more likely, and naturally, from a combination of both, and, hopefully, entering into a dialogue with each other in a spirit of authentic openness to whatever that ongoing, provisional vision of 'Truth' might be ('revealed') to them… what ever it might be or might not be, those to-be-formulated existential insights 'found' and eventually 'recovered' as there-for-us-by-us with what ever help we may find 'given-to-us' in this task (inthat process of revelation)..? Such a transformation being arrived at through this 'in-sight' and therein opening us up to our doing divine work too through our existential participation in this world-of-life with-others and before-others, and, as one-before-the-Divine in so far as the Divine must ‘stand’ before us, or, rather, we-before-it, in its many forms of divine instantiation and therein being thematized in and through our communion with this sense of a non-wholly Other… through this overall process of a transcendental re-alignment…? (132)

So, what can we safely take as ‘gospel’ when through the exercise of the overall transcendental suspension we must forever regard our own understandings of the life-world to be ‘forever suspect’. Moreover, in the same manner, we should treat all the many 'tales told by others' to be just as suspect? Wither belief! Wither faith! To what extent can we be ‘religious’ or should we then be ‘religious’ at all? When being religious is its own reward, without our seeking a reward, through the leading of a good life and our enjoying the good fruits that normally would flow from the same (albeit in and through a properly and appropriately conducted overall transcendental suspension) - that, indeed, would seem to be a valid way to live one’s life (before others)! In this we would need to have some forms of belief as to what is the ‘good life’, and, from that, some form of faith that we could conduct ourselves in keeping with our beliefs and that we should be so doing that? On the other hand, placing an absolute bet on an after life, or anything else, would seem to warp one’s life in the here and now and thence let it take on a ‘psychotic’ flavour to the same extent as already noted in this essay and elsewhere. Then, again, am I allowed to positively conclude this one fact of our existence that a theological vision of the life-world is not only a possibility but also is an actuality despite what theologians and their congregations might do to this topic, to put it lightly, when they do to that topic what they should not be doing, or, might not be doing what they should be doing when, on both counts, the theological imperative would seem to insist that they should be doing otherwise (e.g., dogmatically over-indulging in metaphysical speculations, etc.)!! (133)

In our trying to philosophically clarify the immensity of this theological region of endeavour we should set out to utilize and elucidate only those proper and appropriate methods refined for that type of task, and, in the process, constantly test and re-suspend what seemingly valid results may arise for us in this task of theological formulation in these twin fields of theological work and the evaluation of theological value. 'Work', perhaps, being seen through pre-conditional, conditional and post-conditional lenses, i.e., as arising through processes dependent and interdependent upon the relevant conditions interpreted in the proper and appropriate manner, i.e., again repeating myself, in and through a thoroughly exercised, ongoing overall transcendental suspension! Realizing from an 'ultimate' transcendental point of view that there is no Divine Substance, and, at the same time realizing from a 'non-ultimate' non-transcendental point of view that the ‘illusion of substance’ is of the Divine regardless of the nature of the latter’s content and possible manifestations!! That, we should perceive the mysterious being of our own sense(s) of self in that same light and through our dependence with and interdependence from others find a recognition of our own divine status in this same regard and with 'that in mind' seek those forms of communion that better assist us in our thematization of this insight… forever ready to stand corrected, correctly making a qualified stance in the overall transcendental suspension, understanding what seems to stand-there-before-us, ready to withstand all forms of adversity in this wonderful-world-of-life, and, hopefully, standing up when ‘called’, when and where ever necessary, as we re-make a resolute stand before others and all senses of a non-absolutist, non-wholly Other within the living unity and integrity of ‘this’ life-world, this One-World-Of-Life.!!! Finding the 'death of God' through our own 'death of self' and through re-simulation of an existential excess of value engaging the ‘spiritual’ integrity of a fulfilled life filled with ‘this’ overflowing intimation of Divinity.??? (134)

	I now bring this series of essays to a conclusion by noting there can be none, certainly no absolute sense of a conclusion. In a qualification of this state of an openness to the Truth, as received in and through the overall transcendental suspension, as happens every moment of our intentional lives, I do not believe my labours in this topic to have been in vain. Without doubt I have come to this 'conclusion' that the ‘idea of God’ does have value, i.e., possesses phenomenological sense through finding a complex place for the complex concept of the Divine in our psychic mapping of the life-world, possesses hermeneutical meaning in religious texts and possesses an existential meaningfulness in and for the lives of the those who are religious inclined in that overall direction. Moreover, my research seems to suggest that our understanding of the life-world should also take into account a theological dimension, in some form or other, to some degree or other, and, that such should be considered even if only to be properly and appropriately rejected. However, presently, this necessary implication of a theological dimension does not necessarily demand that this aspect can do any form of viable theological work with any valuable, to-be-valued sense of theological value although both the traditional and the non-traditional theologian, naturally, would want to dispute that current provisional qualification of mine. In this task I wish them well…. (135)

							       Noël Tointon, Sydney, 24.12.03.

Summary of Key Concepts, etc.

1.	That value is created in the midst of the life-world and that through an ongoing re-simulation of that process all identity, be it theological or non-theological in orientation, is constituted in the same manner. (1)
2.	All value is created in and through the (economy of the) hermeneutic circle it follows that its creation is centred within the life-world (through equivalence), and, that that basis is transcendental in orientation. (2)
3.	For a start, we cannot insist on any form of identity being a mere object nor can we insist on it being a mere intersubjective state of affairs nor can we insist on it being a mere subject. Hence there can be no pure objects! Hence there can be no pure public space! Hence there can be no pure subjects! Thence a subject is both embodied in an objective space and embodied in an intersubjective 'space'! In this light, in dealing with a formulation of the Divine either hypothetical or non-hypothetical in orientation, there can be no formulation of a pure Divine object, no formulation of a pure Divine sense of intersubjectivity nor a formulation of a pure sense of Divine subjectivity! As below - so above! (9)
4.	That the relativity of all identity is born in dependence upon the relevant configuration of the life-world and hence from an absolute point of view must be devoid of all absolute/non-relative mistreatment of the same! (22)
5.	Hence, given the correct transcendental attitude and adequate access to the existential descriptor of that under examination we can entertain a direct, valid state of re-simulated perception/apperception of the same! A fact guaranteed by the necessary transcendental being of the life-world as configured and experienced to that extent it can be experienced non-transcendentally through the simulation/re-simulation within the relevant hermeneutic circle of comprehension! (22)
6.	Hence, from an absolute point of view, one should announce the death of the individual! The individual is no more and never was - what has died is the idea of the unchanging person, an eternal invariant transcendental ego, an actor behind the mask where as there is only the convenient socialized  mask that covers a set of masks and nothing else!! Our interaction with others being only the fiction of one mask 'talking' to another…. (33)
7.	It seems that although this theoretical account of the transcendental suspension may be correct in practice there is, normally, a natural privileging of modalities in this regard. We see the rock, we can touch it and may decide to throw it but we don't normally converse with it and expect it will do the same in reply! (34)
8.	That, in essence, privileging remains natural when the natural attitude is not allowed to intrude in that exercise, and, the interpretive genre intuitively felt or thought to best deal with that type of phenomenon is appropriately adopted and adapted with due care for and regard to that situation to hand! The proper exercise of natural privileging in and through the overall transcendental suspension assisting us in the greater formation of value through the additional realization of an existential excess that self-critically declares itself as provisionally valid, proper and appropriate to the interpretative nature of that apparent phenomenon (to the best of our current knowledge)! Let me explore this important mechanism of the concept of natural privileging in the context of religious-like experience in greater detail. (38)
9.	Ideological privilege is promoted when the pre-conditional, conditional and post-conditional conceptual apparatus is not adequately encompassed by the transcendental qualification of an epoche that suspends such conceptual content through a neutralization of its imputed reality. In effect, we are then treating our conceptual material as 'merely' hypothetical in its depiction of its general and particular content specifications. In this instance our topic is 'the nature of the Divine and its interaction in the world with the relatively non-divine'. At no point in this exercise do we add "that the Divine exists and that the nature of this interaction is as follows…" But a topic by necessity necessitates that it focuses on something or other and it is at this point that our prejudices as forms of prejudgment are allowed to operate in order to present just such a topic for transcendental treatment. But, equally, it is at that point that our prejudices are then no longer allowed to operate independently. (39)
10.	What light could this theoretical explanation behind this complex dance of privileging throw on our hypothetical theological research? Nothing other than the fact that this is how it should be done!(?) A complex dance where we manoeuvre between ideological privileging, transcendental privileging/de-privileging and natural privileging in order to ascertain a phenomenological clarification of our topic and therein a clarified, direct simulation of that under focus. (41)
11.	In summary, our research would first involve the presentation of our ideological privileging. In a transcendental privileging of that text that same text and its counter-text are run side by side re-enacting in the process points of deconstruction and/or forms of transcendental suspensions if genre considerations appear to demand that latter style of reading. Then, in our engagement with the genre of that text forms of natural privileging realize additional degrees of value from our critical reading of the meta-textual inputs of that text. The overall transcendental suspension revealing the critical value of that text through our reading of it in that critical light. (47)
12.	Then, we have this guarantee, that we can never be absolutely wrong! This guarantee also comes with the following qualification, namely, that we can never be absolutely right, and, even if we are right with respect to certain truth claims we can never claim an absolute certainty in that regard! Furthermore, our suspicions are generally validated when we find an unclear picture, a lack of evidence, a true circularity of mere argument, a diminished sense of an existential excess either contrary to expectations or in agreement with the same! So, somehow or other, the circularity of the hermeneutic circle cannot be a vicious one! Indeed, through the overall transcendental suspension we find the life-world simulates our direct access to this world-of-life within this one-world-of-life!!  (61)
13.	Thence essence is the phenomenal appearance of distinctive identity being formed in the life-world according to the progressive realization of its historical conditions, etc. This constitution of identity being prescriptively realized and descriptively thematized in the interplay of provisionally denominated logical subjects subjected to relatively fluid processes of predicationally oriented and relationally oriented attribution. And this applies to all forms of identity whether it be non-theologically oriented or theologically oriented!! (83)
14.	First, let me announce this First Conclusion, namely, that the sense, meaning and meaningfulness of the idea of self, i.e., its value, can have neither an absolute-absolute reading of an invariant substantiality nor a relative-relative reading of a mere nihilistic state of relativistic flux! That, in essence, there is both essentially no substantial sense of self, etc., nor a mere, purely un-patterned stream of being whose being would then be no more than an absolute nothingness; an impossible state of affairs that would be completely destructive of all forms of value should even its mere suggestion be contemplated. (85)
15.	My Second Conclusion is this, namely, that what applies to all forms of identity, and therein to personal identity, must also apply ipso facto to all forms of theological identity! Hence the equal death of the idea of the Divine! (86)
16.	From this complete absence both of invariant essence and provisional-essential absence we should realize this Third Conclusion, namely, that much of what the world is psychotically addicted to, globally or otherwise, is just not there in the lived-reality of the life-world, and, that the realization of this existential fact, through an elimination of these sins of (absolute-absolute) commission and (relative-relative) omission, that the realization of the undistorted nature of the being of our existence-before-others(-and-the-Divine?) implies a therapeutic and spiritual realization as to how things are (if only by default?)! (87)
17.	Thence this apparent ‘death of self’ is the equal ‘death of God’!! But neither of these ‘deaths’ has a corpse!  How embarrassing! Through an absolute (non-absolutist) lack of metaphysical essence in any form what so ever, this emptiness of emptiness can then ‘loudly declare’ “all that is actually possible is now possibly actual” dependent, of course, on the course of the necessary conditions being in place in order for it to manifest this type of phenomenal identity, that type of phenomenal identity, etc. Thus in this light a viable theology should take note of what is transcendentally necessary in acts of commission and omission in order for theological identity to be hypothetically viable and, hopefully, in a form to sustain the type of theological work a theologian might traditionally and/or non-traditionally hope to articulate and subscribe to…. (92)
18.	By such means, in this one-world of the world-of-life, we meet all things and all persons as one simulation to another in the direct embrace of this one world-of-life! Because no entities (as relatively sentient beings or relatively insentient beings; either individually-oriented or non-individually-oriented) and no frames of reference have any form or trace of a resident substantiality (belonging to the impossible classification of the Absolute-Absolute, also known as the absolutely-absolute) it implies that there can only be one world ‘to be trapped in’, and, that through forms of existential excess, through such consequent forms of valuation and re-valuation, attendant upon our actions, our intentionality, etc., (and the consequent consequences this has for viable processes of existential evaluation/re-evaluation) personal identity is personally empowered, or, rather, re-empowered and, therein, released from this illusion of bondage! We are forever transcendentally free regardless of our current empirical bondage (through our enslavement by others and institutions, through our own commodification and manipulation of others in turn, or, found consequent upon the distortions of illness whether medical and/or mental in a nature, or, incidental upon the natural mistreatment of reality through an ‘ever-present’ global psychosis because of our addiction to unobtainable absolutely-absolute metaphysical entities, etc.)! Furthermore, through an absence of the negative influences of a pure relativism, from a complete rejection of the Relative-Relative category, also known as the relatively-relative, reality is allowed to be conventionally and conditionally patterned (despite, and because of, this equal rejection of the metaphysical mis-deployment of the metaphorical [as would be non-virtually resident in the absolutely-absolute category if it were at all obtainable!])! Hence the ‘life-world’ is both a ‘world-of-identity’ and a ‘world-of-value’! Moreover, being indivisibly a unification of the unobtainable ontological pole and the unobtainable epistemological pole (through their equal dialectical unobtainability) it too is a ‘living’-world-of-value! Hence the necessary theologicalization of this life-world, this one-living-world-of-life!! But, let me revisit this aspect of our theology at the end of this essay. For the moment let us return to this theme of ‘death’, or, rather, its intrinsic ‘absence’ in this world-of-life. (100)
19.	One must weigh up this religious ‘promise’ of a future life in the hereafter in some form or other since the very devotion to this fact may well lead to unintended non-religious consequences in this very life (through psychotic-psychological distortions attendant upon such ontological commitments)! So, in this light such beliefs are probably best ‘overlooked’ and certainly should not be over-emphasized!! (114)
20.	In asking how this advice of ‘overlooking’ can be put into practice the answer is quite simple – through the overall transcendental suspension! A practice that happens every moment of the day – the only difference being in how resolute we are in ensuring that this process is both instigated in a balanced manner and that such dynamic equilibrium is maintained in an ongoing fashion. (115)
21.	The Divine is not lost to experience but must be present in the very directness of our engagement with the apparent unity of that experience what ever the nature of that experience (since all experience must be constituted with that [current] degree of unity, to some degree or other, in order for it be experienced as ‘an’ experience)! Hence this necessary theologicalization of the life-world cannot be treated, in this type of transcendental perspective, in a hypothetical modality. Such ‘unity’ transcending both ontological and epistemological distinctions in this regard hence its implication in the constitution and re-constitution of all forms of experience! (116)
22.	Restatement of this argument for the necessary theologicalization of the life-world in a more succinct form: 

1.	The world-of-life must be ‘the’-world-of life since there must be one-world-of-life constituted for-us by-us; other worlds being merely facets or aspects of this one relational sea of interrelationships.

2.	This life-world must equally transcend and be immanent in the interdependent conjunction of the non-ideality of the ontological mode and the non-ideality of the epistemological mode!

3.	Because there can only be one world-of-life all experience therein must be epistemological organized to some degree or other!

4.	Because the life-world encompasses both my transcendental sense of psychic unity and the transcendental unity of all others and of all other object-states thence its open-ended sense of transcendental unity must be greater than any part pointed to in this life-world!

5.	Thence its ‘Divine’ status even though all facets of the Divine through the limitations of identity cannot equal this open-ended sense of the Transcendental!

6.	Hence all forms of integrity, unity and oneness, etc., are holistic intimations of the open-ended Divine Unity and should be seen in this (metaphorical) light!

7.	All forms of integrity, unity and oneness, etc., are coming into existence through harmonic processes of resolution, hence the forward direction of the theological imperative placed upon the same!

8.	Our experience of the Divine being experienced in and through harmonic processes of resolution hence this reversed aspect of the theological imperative!

9.	That this intimation of the experience of the Divine is overseen through the auspices of an ongoing overall transcendental suspension as happens every moment of the day!

10.	Hence the necessary ongoing unity of the life-world must be Divine and that such divinity must be expressed in and through the necessary theologicalization of the world – as One-World-of-Life! (122)

23.	The theological imperative is the deep transcendental emphasis placed upon the need for resolution in order that a relationship can come into existence and therein remain in phenomenal existence in the manner most fitting for it! Only through resolution is identity realized… As a consequence of this 'forward' process of instantiated resolution this accompanying degree of integrity experienced in and through its resimulation and/or re-simulation ‘should’ be interpreted and experienced as relatively divine in orientation! Hence the concept of a reverse(d) theological imperative in so far as this integrity (created in the forward theological imperative) is experienced and interpreted as a form of Divine integrity (which through essential holism, in turn, ‘reflects’ the Divine Totality to that extent it can be experienced through such ‘interpretation’). (124)
24.	So what has this 'proof' achieved? Does it succeed in establishing "the necessary theologicalization of the life-world"? As noted in an earlier essay the concept of proof is perhaps too strong and the word 'demonstration' might be better used. Then, again, this 'proof' is meant to operate on a transcendental level of argument and not on a level that is logical, metaphorical, evidential or dialectical in nature (and certainly not on a metaphysical level!)! By 'transcendental' is meant that which is necessary in the constitution of experience itself. Here I am arguing that integrity, unity, etc., has to be present in the formation of a viable sense of identity. Furthermore, because there is no absolute distinction to be made, or could be made, between an ontological realm of phenomenal existence and an epistemological realm of phenomenalogical existence then it follows that what applies to the latter must apply to the former, and v.v. Lastly, the non-absolute, ongoing integrity, etc., of the life-world implies w.r.t. 'itself' that "a qualified form of divine existence whose epistemological organization is greater than those egologically oriented identities its subsumes" would indeed imply that it must be worthy of this title 'Divine'. In essence this is my 'proof' or transcendental demonstration. (126)
25.	Adherence to a traditionalist concept of the Divine is a recipe for a metaphysical death sentence. A viable theology could never be built upon such non-sense… hence the inevitable recognition that such a deity is dead, was already dead, indeed, was still-born! But, in contrast, there is a vision of the Divine that is viable philosophically speaking although might not be so viable theologically speaking (if the theologian cannot account for a viable sense of theological work and methods for ascertaining the theological value of the same). (128)
26.	How is the end of metaphysical speculation realized? Through the proper and appropriate utilization of an ongoing, overall transcendental suspension! (129)
27.	That, in such a transcendentally oriented state (through a transcendentalization of the relatively non-transcendental) there is an equivalence between overviewing and oversighting! I.e., a 'seeing over' and an 'oversighting of'… Between these two forms of 'supervision' our 'world of vision' now becomes a transcendental 'vision of the world', namely, the life-world, and, therein, in and through its integrity our meeting through the auspices of the theological imperative an intimation of divinity and its call for a spirtualization of our being (through ‘allowing’ or putting spontaneously ‘to work’ that current instantiation of the theological imperative that now confronts us in and through this ‘felt-need’ for our assisting this harmonization of the life-world whether that ‘situation’ be ‘self-promoted’ ethically, aesthetically, pragmatically, etc., etc?)? By overviewing is meant the ability to see over those phenomena to hand and gain an essential understanding of what it is to be seen in such an overall manner. By oversighting is meant the ability to no longer see entities and all forms of identity as self-subsistant-like entities, etc. Through this 'seeing' and 'not seeing', in a state of balance, this transcendental apperception is promoted through a refinement of what is already there in the 'course' of ordinary experience. (131)
28.	In such a territory we would need to carefully and critically explore and evaluate a plethora of concepts dealing with the personal constitution of identity, the nature of authenticity and spirituality (centred in the non-reductive creation/re-creation of an existential excess of value), the dialectics of divine participation as seem to be possibly implicated in this concept of divine re-alignment, etc… But, perhaps the determination of this territory is best left to a careful and critical breed of creative theologians and their congregations to intuitively ascertain, formulate and evaluate these domains of theological work and theological value for themselves..?! Such specialist operating from either within a traditional setting or outside a traditional setting or, more likely, and naturally, from a combination of both, and, hopefully, entering into a dialogue with each other in a spirit of authentic openness to whatever that ongoing, provisional vision of 'Truth' might be ('revealed') to them… what ever it might be or might not be, those to-be-formulated existential insights 'found' and eventually 'recovered' as there-for-us-by-us with what ever help we may find 'given-to-us' in this task (inthat process of revelation)..? Such a transformation being arrived at through this 'in-sight' and therein opening us up to our doing divine work too through our existential participation in this world-of-life with-others and before-others, and, as one-before-the-Divine in so far as the Divine must ‘stand’ before us, or, rather, we-before-it, in its many forms of divine instantiation and therein being thematized in and through our communion with this sense of a non-wholly Other… through this overall process of a transcendental re-alignment…? (132)
29.	Then, again, am I allowed to positively conclude this one fact of our existence that a theological vision of the life-world is not only a possibility but also is an actuality despite what theologians and their congregations might do to this topic, to put it lightly, when they do that topic which they should not be doing, or, might not be doing what they should be doing when, on both counts, the theological imperative would seem to insist that they should be doing otherwise!! (133)
30.	Realizing from an 'ultimate' transcendental point of view that there is no Divine Substance, and, at the same time realizing from a 'non-ultimate' non-transcendental point of view that the ‘illusion of substance’ is of the Divine regardless of the nature of the latter’s content and possible manifestations!! That, we should perceive the mysterious being of our own sense(s) of self in that same light and through our dependence with and interdependence from others find a recognition of our own divine status in this same regard and with 'that in mind' seek those forms of communion that better assist us in our thematization of this insight… forever ready to stand corrected, correctly making a qualified stance in the overall transcendental suspension, understanding what seems to stand-there-before-us, ready to withstand all forms of adversity in this wonderful-world-of-life, and, hopefully, standing up when ‘called’, when and where ever necessary, as we re-make a resolute stand before others and all senses of a non-absolutist, non-wholly Other within the living unity and integrity of ‘this’ life-world, this One-World-Of-Life.!!! Finding the 'death of God' through our own 'death of self' and through re-simulation of an existential excess of value engaging the ‘spiritual’ integrity of a fulfilled life filled with ‘this’ overflowing intimation of Divinity.??? (134)
31.	I now bring this series of essays to a conclusion by noting there can be none, certainly no absolute sense of a conclusion. In a qualification of this state of an openness to the Truth, as received in and through the overall transcendental suspension, as happens every moment of our intentional lives, I do not believe my labours in this topic to have been in vain. Without doubt I have come to this 'conclusion' that the ‘idea of God’ does have value, i.e., possesses phenomenological sense through finding a complex place for the complex concept of the Divine in our psychic mapping of the life-world, possesses hermeneutical meaning in religious texts and possesses an existential meaningfulness in and for the lives of the those who are religious inclined in that overall direction. Moreover, my research seems to suggest that our understanding of the life-world should also take into account a theological dimension, in some form or other, to some degree or other, and, that such should be considered even if only to be properly and appropriately rejected. However, presently, this necessary implication of a theological dimension does not necessarily demand that this aspect can do any form of viable theological work with any valuable, to-be-valued sense of theological value although both the traditional and the non-traditional theologian, naturally, would want to dispute that current provisional qualification of mine. In this task I wish them well…. (135)