Finding a Place for the Idea of God – Part II:
Is there a Hermeneutical Way of Doing Theology?

0.   Introduction

	Hermeneutics is a technical philosophical term with a wide range of meanings. For the sake of simplicity let us say it deals with interpretation, our trying to understand what a text means. (1)

Do we need to interpret a text? Before answering this question let me tell the following anecdote. I would like to paraphrase a section from Sartre’s play The Flies (1943). 
       (2)
	The protagonist asks the Gods for a sign to help him to decide as to whether he should kill his mother or not? He feels he has good reasons why he must do this but matricide is one of the worst crimes a Greek could commit.  He has a dilemma. Lo and behold a rock lights up! He thinks this is just the sign he has been waiting for and it means he should go ahead and kill his mother. However, when talking to his sister, she cautions him by saying that she thinks the sign means the opposite, namely, that he should not kill his mother. (3)

	In this anecdote we are presented with a ‘sign from the Gods’. But what does it mean? It would appear that the apparent meaning of this phenomenon must be interpreted in order for the imputed meaningfulness of that sign be made manifest as a sign. The sign, treated as a sign, does not say ‘go ahead and kill your mother’. Then on the other hand it doesn’t say ‘don’t go ahead with this plan to kill your mother’. The sign, if it is a sign, necessitates its interpretation! Furthermore, we should also ask ‘just who is the author of this ‘sign’?’. May be it was the work of some devil or some other jealous god wishing to mislead the protagonist? Lastly, we must also ask, ‘how do we know’ whether this phenomenon is something more than just a natural phenomenon, i.e., is intentionally authored and is meant to have meaning, act as a sign?’ Maybe the rock is luminescent for some reason or other and through natural reasons, purely coincidentally, it lights up just at this moment that question was rhetorically asks of the Gods? (4)

In reflecting upon this anecdote can you see, even more, ‘feel’ the dilemma the hermeneut is placed in when called upon to interpret the imputed religious meaning of some phenomenon whether it be a religious text or the textual report of some ‘religious’ phenomenon or a religious explanation (of, e.g., the ‘numinous’ and the consequent need for us to be religious in a certain prescribed way in the light of that imputed need given our (hypothetical) acceptance of that explanation)?! (5)

	In reflecting upon this anecdote and its intrinsic dilemma perhaps we should reformulate this question “do we need to interpret” by asking ourselves “can we interpret?” with the implication being that our ability to successfully interpret a text is, in itself, an illusion. So, what can our hermeneutical investigations hope for in this regard? (6)

	To conduct this philosophical investigation into this hermeneutical aspect of our theological topic, ‘finding a place for the idea of God’, let me first begin with an exploration of religious texts in general. Then let me look briefly at interpreting religious experiences followed by an examination of the interpretative role of explanations. To conclude let me show how these three types of interpretation individually fail us but might be better able to mutually cooperate in this type of task…? (7)

1.   Can Theology be ‘Grounded’ through the Close Readings of Religious Texts?

	First let me read a small section of the Bible where Moses confronts the burning bush: (8)

Exodus 3: 1-6 King James Version (KJV)      

1.	Now Moses kept the flock of Jethro his father in law, the priest of Midian: and he led the flock to the backside of the desert, and came to the mountain of God, even to Horeb.
2.	And the angel of the LORD appeared unto him in a flame of fire out of the midst of a bush: and he looked, and, behold, the bush burned with fire, and the bush was not consumed. 
3	And Moses said, I will now turn aside, and see this great sight, why the bush is not burnt. 
4	And when the LORD saw that he turned aside to see, God called unto him out of the midst of the bush, and said, Moses, Moses. And he said, Here am I. 
5	And he said, Draw not nigh hither: put off thy shoes from off thy feet, for the place whereon thou standest is holy ground. 
6	Moreover he said, I am the God of thy father, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. And Moses hid his face; for he was afraid to look upon God. 					Exodus 3: 1:6 King James Version (KJV)

This text initially reads as ‘a report about “a person who sees a burning bush”.’ But 
this first impression is undercut by a number of strange manoeuvres undertaken by this text. In common with many other religious texts, ‘what is given with one hand is taken away by the other’ without apparently intending a process of absolute contradiction or paradox. E.g., the ‘bush is burning’ but ‘the fire is not consuming the wood’. There is the appearance of burning but miraculously there is nothing burnt! So, the implication, among many, that might be drawn is that the rules of phenomenal time and space are being over-ruled by a power greater than that of the merely phenomenal? Now, that type of implication could be drawn because we are set up textually (and meta-textually) to make just such an inference. In this case the text quite bluntly tells us that this is how you are going to interpret that ‘non-burning “burning bush”,’ namely, as the sign of the presence of the Lord (through the Angel of the Lord in the fire/as fire). Moreover, that type of implication (or textual pronouncement to that effect) is reinforced by the introduction of the sense of the numinous, the ‘religious manner’ the text treats its interpretation of that so called ‘phenomenon’ of ‘burning’. In effect, I would argue, that a form of transcendental suspension has been introduced into the text through the text inscribing a certain region of that text with the depiction of an everyday type of phenomenon that, almost immediately, is de-inscribed by certain qualifications that undercut what claims might appear to have been made in that initial act of phenomenal description. All this is done in the implicit or explicit framework of an experience of the numinous, in some form or other, which portrays attitudes that in themselves are ambivalent, ambiguous, of-two-minds, paradoxical in experience and in description, even possibly indescribable in their essential nature. So Moses sees the burning bush is not burning and ‘fascinated’ by this proceeds to investigate this phenomenon, but, then realizing that this is holy ground, being told this, he ‘averts’ his gaze for fear of seeing God even though God was initially seen only by proxy, so to speak, in the form of the Angel of the Lord ‘in the fire’ (or ‘as fire’). Then the voice of God is heard, but no speaker is ‘seen’ for Moses is also fearful that he ‘might see’ the Lord. On one hand God is seen through the proxy of the Angel and on the other is heard as a ‘disembodied voice’ by virtue of Moses’ fear of ‘seeing the Lord’, the text leaving open whether it was possible for Moses to have seen the Lord in this situation? The text introduces and sustains a number of contrary states of affairs held in parallel resulting in an ongoing situation of tension, e.g., a non-burning ‘burning bush’, a curious fascination versus a fear of seeing the Lord, indirectly seeing the Lord by proxy in the form of the Angel of the Lord but directly hearing him, a movement from non-sacred ground to a sacred space…. Some of these parallels offering a contrast and others mutually undermining the contrast of the other through forms of erasure. (9)

	Although this Derridean-like scratching out of the text by the text itself may alter the denotation of the text it does so, it would seem, without the absolute cancellation of the connotations imported into that section of the text through the associated character of those items. If anything, au contraire, it seems to magnify them! The bush is burning, but wait a minute, there is nothing being burnt, so, there can be no real burning! These qualifications, cancellations, etc., rather than writing out this section of the text, in this religious context, actually help to magnify the connotational significance being imported into that act of reading, helping to magnify the ‘completely religious nature of the numinous’ alluded to therein. This is no ‘ordinary burning’, therefore, it must be an example of the extra-ordinary power of the Divine; a ‘religiously inspired “act of burning”, indeed, a sign from the divine, of the Divine(?)’ (10)

	A literal interpretation of this text therefore cannot be entertained! Today, we might wish to read this type of text as metaphorical; mythical; symbolic; as an experiential guide to the sense of the numinous; as a text of faith, a text to be read in the light of our faith, as a test of that faith. But the richness of this type of text is also going to fail each of these types of readings in turn. Because the text tells us that ‘Moses witnessed this event of the burning bush’ how can it be treated as purely mythical, etc. Then, again, should we read the ‘voice of god heard by Moses’ as only a metaphor, a mythical device, a symbolic process, something to be just believed, etc? But the text doesn’t allow us to say that type of thing unequivocally! Indeed, to read the text in any one of these alternative readings is to go against the text’s very meta-textual instructions to us as to how we should read it, among other things, as an ‘historical account of something momentous that really did happen!’ The text tells us that Moses actually ‘heard’ this voice of the Lord and such a phenomenon in this light is not metaphorical, mythical etc! So, just as a literal reading must fail us, in turn, a non-literal reading will also, it seems, do the same likewise for us! (11)

Attending to the phenomenon of that religious type of text as a phenomenon in its own right necessitates our acceptance of it as a ‘numinous text’, a text that at face value cannot be read in a literal or a non-literal fashion; i.e., should be read as a religious text that transcendentally suspends its own processes of inscription (as a textual process of description and/or prescription)? A much richer way of reading this type of numinous text is to adopt a multi-aspectival set of readings set within the auspices of a transcendental reading of the sense of the numinous to that extent this type of text appears to imply that type of complex reading. Let me elaborate. (12)

	The religious nature of a text is indicated by that text. Meta-textually the text tells you this is a religious text. A passage from the Bible tells us this extra-textually by being set within the ‘The Bible’. Intra-textually a text tells us this by explicitly stating this aim (meta-textually through titles, scene settings, etc.). In the above passage we are told that Moses had ‘came to the mountain of God’, etc., being told this place was holy and that he should take his shoes off. Both the ‘fascinating’ but ‘fearful’ duality of the numinous experience is being directly alluded to. Moses wants to come closer to look more closely at this phenomenon but then averts his gaze. This type of text then uses a number of strategies that, in effect, create/recreate a religious sense of the numinous through various forms of implicit and/or explicit erasure. (13)

In a religious text this could be done through the use of metaphor either novel in nature or relatively refreshened, i.e., conventional in nature but treated in a novel manner and/or in a strange juxtaposition. In the text above we have the juxtaposition of a ‘tree’ or ‘bush’ and its apparent ‘burning’, both images, as metaphors, having a religious pre-interpretation; i.e, in the right type of context, as items with sacred connotations. Moreover, metaphorical language itself has an embedded duality when to be metaphorical means being set up in a certain context where that subjected to the meta-textually driven meaning of the image ‘is both like and not like’ that image in a certain conventionally pre-determined fashion. Hence, to this extent, a metaphor is also a natural form of erasure. (14)

The use of analogies, not to be taken in a literal mode, operating in the same fashion as that exercised through the use of metaphors. (15)

This type of religious philosophy can also be found using long lists of names that also act as pseudo-denotational/connotational maps, in effect carving out a psychic territory for the idea of the numinous. In the above text we have a short list of allusions through the ‘mountain “of” God’, the ‘Angel “of” the Lord’, the place where there is ‘holy ground’, he who ‘calls out from the midst of the burning bush’, ‘God of thy father, etc.,’ etc. (16)

Of a more negative theological nature we have the burning bush that is not burning, the God that should not be seen (if it could be directly seen) although we have the privileging of  ‘the voice’ that ‘should be heard’, etc. Although this text is not overtly written in a negative theological style (as was developed and emphasized in texts from around the start of this current era) as demonstrated other forms of erasure are in place. 
     (17)
What are the consequences of such strategies! As previously indicated I believe such practices instigate a religious type of transcendental suspension. Essentially ‘everyday beliefs’ are put out of action and in their place a sense of the numinous is carved out and set up to be viewed in a positive light through the preservation and recovery of those positive connotations presented and reinforced in that text. In the aporia of the transcendental suspension the simulation of the numinous is indicated, alluded to, etc. But the transcendental suspension must also itself be suspended, lest we be trapped in the potential paralysis of that suspension, reactivating therein a ‘literal reading’ of that text albeit with all the qualifications imposed through its religious transmutation. Suffice to say that this aspect of our topic cannot be done justice to in the confines of this paper. That, in general or in particular, treatment of these forms of erasure must be treated cautiously, and, examined from a number of aspects when and where an additional sense, meaning and meaningfulness can be found to be profitably adduced. (18)

So, hermeneutically speaking, what can we conclude from a ‘close reading’ of this type of religious text, from this type of numinous text in general, one that has the sort of features as listed above? For a start, I think we can infer that a religious text, of this type, is not going to literally describe the nature of God. Certainly not directly, as if God were another phenomenon to be found in the world! To this extent a close reading will not reveal a direct descriptive account of the nature of God. In other words this type of text is going to fail us as a direct reference for the formulation of a theology from a hermeneutic point of view! As it stands, without hermeneutic treatment in the form of commentaries, monographs, handbooks, formulations of doctrine, etc., this type of text cannot spell out for us unequivocally how to formulate a theology that is relatively rational, systematic and coherent without having recourse to this secondary literature as listed above. 
    (19)
In the light of this relative failure should we not perhaps inquire ‘if an interpretation of religious experience might be better able to help us in this quest for the finding of a place for the idea of God’? Would this area of our research be of more assistance in helping us to more firmly ‘ground’ our theology in the reality (of our experience) of the life-world? (20)

Please note by this expression “‘ground’” (in its scare quotes) is meant ‘our being able to give more weight to our topic in the form of properly constructed arguments, our being able to give an adequate overall account of that hypothesis, and, our being able to give some form of a reasonable verification with respect to the  imputed ‘reality’ of that type of theological state of affairs.’ In other words, relatively good reasons why a relatively reasonable person might entertain this type of theological hypothesis or at least view it as an enterprise that ‘could’ be entertained. (21)

 2.   Can Theology be ‘Grounded’ through Interpretation of Religious Experience?  

	Alas, let me say from the outset that there can be no hope of finding, purely in and through religious experience, and our mere interpretation of the same, a place for the idea of God that is adequately ‘grounded’ (in the sense just articulated). In this sole endeavour our failure is assured! Let me demonstrate this. (22)

	How can the truth of a proposition, albeit as a report of a religious-like experience, be vouched for in and through that same proposition assuming it has a content that appears to have been non-analytically, non-self-referentially vouched for? Let us look at the following statement-type: (23)

	“This experience x is a true, religious experience of the Divine…”

I would like to read this as follows:

This ‘experience’ is called ‘experience x (as an experience of x)’ 
(Transformation 1-2)
	‘Experience x’ is called ‘a religious experience.’ (Transformation 2-3)
	‘This religious experience x’ is truly ‘a religious experience (of) x.’ 
(Transformation 3-4)

	 Here we have in effect four transformational states: 1, 2, 3, and 4. Transformation 1-2 involves a judgment of identity. Transformation 2-3 involves a judgment of predication or contextual/relational appreciation, and, transformation 3-4 involves making a verificational judgment about the transformations 1-2-3. Now, how can a complex statement like this, in effect, verify itself non-analytically? If this statement is to be read as true because it states that it is ‘true’, guarantees its own truth, we have an analytical-type statement that, in effect, tells us nothing beyond the realm of that statement itself! For it to be non-analytically verified it must be inserted into a propositional context in such a manner that in that context’s list or lists of statements this particular complex propositional statement can be seen to be in some form of harmony within that listing found therein assuming an adequate degree of harmony can be seen in that list as a whole in that particular regard. Then, assuming such harmony is present, and the text itself is effectively non-self contradictory, we can then provisionally accept that statement is true in that system of listed propositions (subjected to this degree of relative formalization). (24)

But it would be short-sighted to assume that there can only be a non-representational ‘coherence’ account of truth. That account could also be re-written in a semantic form, namely, x is true if and only iff x1 is true in the meta-language equivalent of the object-language sentence. We might like to treat each transformational state in this complex proposition to the same type of meta-treatment. Hence ‘this is an experience x (of x)’ (in the object-language) because ‘this is an experience x (of x)’ in the meta-language is true. Then, ‘this is a religious type of experience’ (in the object-language) because ‘this is a religious experience’ in the meta-language is true. And finally, ‘this is a religious experience x (of x) is true’ (object-language) because ‘this is a religious experience x (of x) is true’ in the meta-language is true. And the reasons for holding this set of transformational transition between the object-language and the meta-language? That must be another matter (being, correctly, the province of that theologian themselves)! 
     (25)
	Not wishing to digress any further let me, in the form of a summary, state these problematic areas for truth discernment as noted above with respect to this type of religious statement that attempts to report a numinous-like experience: (26)

1.	Problems of identity,
2.	Problems of contextual/predicational/relational ascription,
3.	Problems of overall truth determination.

I would like to now demonstrate how this type of religious report concerning a religious-like experience has certain fatal difficulties in trying to discharge its intentions in a framework that is dominantly experiential (i.e., in existential-experiential terms of reference without direct recourse to in-depth phenomenological-hermeneutical considerations of sense and meaning). (27)

	Let me first look at problems associated with matters of identification and contextual ascriptions of a religious nature. (28)

	Let us say, for the sake of argument, that a ‘vision of a mother and child’ could be seen by the passers-by in and through the damp, morning moisture sitting on a window pane somewhere in China. Now a religious person, who was a Buddhist, might say this was a miraculous image of Guanyin. On the other hand a Christian might think this was of the ‘Virgin Mary with the child Jesus’. If it was just an image of a ‘mother and child’ how could one interpretation prevail over the other? Now, it just so happened that on the eve of Mothers’ Day a very happy and proud husband drew on that window pane with his finger, dipped in detergent, a figure of his wife and their new child in the hope his wife would see it in the morning. Knowing this, being the author of this image, he then tells the arguing crowd now gathered outside that this image was neither an image of Guanyin nor the Virgin Mary but an image of his lovely wife and their new born child. In such a context this experience also can now no longer be seen as a religious one! (29)

	A religious experience that is seen as an experience of God is equally a problematic one! Bypassing the controversial content of such an experience even the ascription of it as a ‘religious experience’ is problematic. Let us say, for the sake of argument, that a person experiences a brilliant white light that seems to be both in the space about them, if they were to open their eyes, and inside their own head at the same time, and, that this is interpreted as a blessing from God, or, as a revelation of God, etc. Now, this type of experience has been described by both religious and non-religious people. Some physiologists, e.g., merely believe it to be either the consequence of a lack of oxygen to the brain or too much oxygen to the brain. So what might be considered to be a religious experience for one person might well be seen merely as a physiological disturbance to some other. This is not disputing, however, that for a religious person this type of experience might still be interpreted by them in a religious frame of reference even if aware, at the same time, of its possible physiological basis. (30)

	Now what guarantees the veracity of this type of religious report?! For the sake of argument let us say a religious person hears, or has the impression they are hearing, a voice in their head that says “I am the Lord your God, this is your Heavenly Father speaking to you -------- --------!” The person concerned might naturally think they are having a profound religious experience. Or that they might be going mad. Now, I am not disputing the possibility of God speaking to individuals, like Moses when he was confronted by the burning bush, but this phenomenon of hearing a voice, that cannot be heard by others, occurs in a number of psychiatric disorders. So, today, I am sure the person would also wonder if they might be going mad? It would certainly be advisable to keep quiet about this type of phenomenon. Psychiatric disorders are also met with a number of other ‘dysfunctional features’. However, let us for the sake of the argument say that this person is a well-functioning individual with no trace of a psychiatric disturbance and who genuinely believes some power is ‘silently’ talking to them. In these circumstances what would they be allowed to assume? For a start they should question the authenticity and author of that apparent communication. The voice says it is ‘the voice of God’ but should that be accepted at face value? What if it were the devil that was speaking, or, a ghost, a subliminal message inserted into them by some Protestant evangelical television programme, a device the Catholic church has implanted in order to improve church attendance… or merely some creative depth-aspect of their own overall sense of self? This list is infinitely open-ended although many of the ‘possibilities’ would deconstruct their own chances for acceptance. (31)

As good advice the Bible states “you shall know them through their own fruits!” In the burning bush text as quoted we have the same type of problem when God declares “I am the God of thy father, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob.” In this instance “God has given ‘proof’,” i.e., through the non-burning burning-bush, and, gives further ‘proof’, through the ten plagues visited upon the Egyptians soon to be mentioned in this text’s religious narrative. This statement, thus, given the pressure of this meta-textual self-interpretation, would then be interpreted and ‘accepted’ at face value if the validity of this relationship between text and meta-text/context was accepted by the reader of that text. However, merely taken at face value, the recipient of such a communication has no way of knowing how to interpret and test this type of communication. So, even if God did truly speak to you in some fashion or other the wise person would not be able to say “yea” or “nay” given those limited terms of reference! Only in the appropriate ‘context’ can this be done if this could be done; if this form of appreciation as an interpretation could itself be properly entertained and appreciated (the possibility of this type of meta-judgment I would like to leave open, and suspended, as I do not currently wish to rule in or out the possibility and self-validation of this type of ‘communication’)?! (32)

In the market place when given a cheque we seek to determine its authenticity, i.e., seek to ascertain who was the author of that promise to pay, and, the name and nature of the bank against which that promise is to be exercised. In a similar fashion the non-analytical veracity of a religious-like experience can not be adduced from a superficial inspection of that experiential report itself either for that person concerned or for a second party made privy to such experiential details. One would want to know the relevant, essential history and context in which that claim could be best appreciated. So one must conclude that religious-like experiences taken at face value are equally unable to ‘ground’ the formulation of a theological enterprise! That no religious experience should be taken absolutely at face value, neither by the person concerned nor by the audience of such a person even if that person honestly recounted to them the nature of that religious type of experience as it appeared to be experienced by them. (33)

Let me now turn to the role of explanation as a form of interpretative understanding and investigate whether this field in and of itself could help us ‘ground’ the formulation of a theological enterprise through the explanatory power of such an endeavour? (34)

3.   Can Theology be ‘Grounded’ through the Power of Religious Explanation?

	Explanation infiltrates everything we do and think! We look at a coffee cup and know that a ‘cup’ is ‘a hollow object for holding fluid, often for the purposes of drinking from’. In our psychic map of the universe we know of and use the genre of ‘cupness’. In a similar fashion the theological ideas of god, the gods, angels, demons, etc., have been carved out for us by society in and through the media of language, art, architecture, traditions, etc. This theological region of our psychic mapping need not be considered valid by an individual person, nevertheless, its negation is meaningful by virtue of the fact that its ‘sense’, its ‘location in this map of the life-world’, in some sense or other, is understood. This person could say “there is no one god, there are no gods, angels and demons”. In effect this region in our map is considered as a possibility but not as an actuality. Interestingly they could then turn around and say “I am god, you are all gods”. In a sense intimating that the theological mapping in the psyche in some way deals with some sense of the person albeit in a religious frame of reference; indicating that this theological region should ideally be concerned in some fashion with personality, intentionality, consciousness; although not necessarily in exactly the same form as found through experience in our interaction with other people. In this light, one might say that the religious idea of divinity does not then need to be re-located by the theologian, needing only to be re-defined, have its ‘sense’ of definition further refined. And this ‘sense’ is located in our overall psychic mapping of the life-world through the explanatory role that such types of concepts are set up to explain, in the process resolving various puzzles, points of tension, various problematic regions found and re-created in this intersubjective arena of the world. So language is a reflection of this world as seen by a participant, group of participants in that world, a world that potentially encompasses all worlds of culture. Let us now look at the ‘sense’ of the concept of ‘god’ as an explanatory mechanism. (35)
	
	Words are in effect ‘tools’, ‘picture-tools of our world’, in some manner reflections that simulate this ‘sense’ or facet of the life-world. The theological concept of ‘god’ is there for some reason or other because it does work for us, or, does work for some of us. And that work is primarily explanatory! Very few people have religious experiences that occupy most of the day. Similarly, very few people have the opportunity, or desire, to read religious texts all day. On the other hand, religious explanations are there for those that wish to avail themselves of them all day long, at any time of the day. If we have a profound moral decision to make it can be read through the filter of some religious frame or other. If we wonder why the world exists we can read that problem through the same type of filter. If we wonder what value, what religious value our existence might possibly possess, against the backdrop of the immensity of this cosmos, again we can apply the same type of filter. Let me look more closely at this religious transmutation or transformation of value; this reading of value through the filter of a religious frame of reference. (36)

	In work previously done by myself I have analyzed ‘value’ under six headings, namely, essential, aesthetical, ethical, pragmatical, hermeneutical and factual. Very quickly let me illustrate these six types of value subjected to a religious transformation or interpretation. Religious frames of reference that reflect the development of living religious traditions express their existential depths through addressing these six type of value as listed. Let me briefly deal with each in turn. (37)

	In essential acts of judgment we are interested in the phenomenon qua phenomenon. In the process delineating its ‘sense’ in this psychic mapping of the life-world. Just as ‘hammers’ are seen as ‘created’ so too the ‘world’ can be treated as ‘created’. Being ‘created’ necessitates a ‘creator’. Now, ‘knowing’ the ‘world is created’ means that ‘we’ are created too within this world, i.e., given a place, a sense of ‘being at home’, with, as a theological consequence, that we too must therefore have ‘some form of intrinsic value’ and ‘purpose’ in this divine ‘plan’, in this ‘realm of the Lord’.. Now we can feel part of this specially created world and realize that it too is our true ‘home’ in this sense carved out for us by this religious frame of reference…. (38)

	I am not saying that this is the only religious way of ‘seeing the world’. But this type of religious treatment can resolve a number of existential worries, although, no doubt, creating a new series of ‘religious problems’ in its wake as well. E.g., the idea of sin means, if this interpretation of the world is accepted, that we are now ‘sinners’ and as sinners we then need to adopt those measures that will lessen that sense of guilt (or shame), a sense of devaluation or disvaluation created by that religious frame of reference. Then, adopting those features that will lessen this ongoing sense of disvaluation will give us in its stead a positive sense of re-valuation. This sense of relief further reinforcing the now ‘apparent need’ for the correct adoption of that religious frame of reference, etc., in the first place. (39)

	Obviously, when allowed to operate, the explanatory role of religion can be a profound force in the construction and reconstruction of our psyche’s passage through this world of life! (40)

	In dealing with aesthetic value a religious person might say “the beauty of the world reflects the beauty of the Divine” (an aspects that features in both Neoplatonic and Christian thought but not in Gnostic thinking). In effect saying something like, e.g., this tree is beautiful, being created, because it reflects the Divine as the Creator. Therefore this beauty is beautiful because it reflects the beauty of the Divine, and that all beauty reflects the same. With the implicit understanding that the individual too is like the Divine when they more aptly ‘reflect’ the same. (41)

	In regards to ethical value the use of religious prescriptions can re-read that ethical situation through the lens of that religious tradition being adopted. As much as you disagree with me I will not kill you as my religious beliefs tell me that that is not the best way to deal with disagreement. Or, then again, as a hypothetical possibility, my religious beliefs as currently interpreted (by myself) might suggest that that could be the best way for dealing with religious disagreement - witness the use of torture in witch and heresy trials and the murdering of those individuals that did not (quickly) recant and conform to their social expectations imposed upon them by others. Hopefully, nobody here uses that type of drastic method in conflict resolution?! (42)

	In the pragmatical sphere religion must work for us and work for us it does through various mechanisms. But in the interaction of various points of view(s) held by people, institutions, etc., we sometimes must ask “for whom is this type of attitude essentially working for?” Although the individual can be given a sense of ‘psychic relief’ that ‘relief’ may not always be in the best interests of that individual or their social milieu in the short term and/or the long term. (43)

	In hermeneutical considerations one frame of reference is looked at through some more encompassing frame of reference. Then, when one can move from the former to the latter, in a ‘process of the transformation of our understanding’, one enters into a process of re-understanding that ostensively enlarges our vision of the world and our sense of  ‘place’ to be found therein. The intended religious re-evaluation of the world imported by a religious frame of reference is therefore, in this light, hermeneutic. (44)

	Lastly, factual considerations help to ground the individual in the experiential reality of this world-of-life. Hopefully, religious aspirations in this light will help us in this task, be of an existential assistance to us in this regard?!  In essence, factually ground the reality of our religious conviction (or expose this lack of a factual basis for them?). (45)

	Now, each of the above types of value as a ‘religious value’ is realized through a ‘religious transformation of individual aspects or combinations of the six aspects of value in general’ as introduced above. In effect, an instance of value, simple or complex in nature, is subjected to a transformation through the filter of some type of a religious frame of reference. So if the world, e.g., is perceived as created then we are seen as being created too (with all the positive and negative consequences attendant upon such a transition in belief structures). In an ethical situation we might wish to respond in a certain religiously prescribed manner as we may feel or think that that is the right way to approach this type of moral situation. As ‘prescribed’, or ‘proscribed’, so too should our behaviour be like the same, be in conformity with such injunctions? Of course, often, the world of everyday life is more complex than our ideal religious treatment of it might have us believe and we must discount or recount various principles found operating within this field of ethical anomaly. That too being done in the light of our religious beliefs, if present, through the example of precedents, where this process of discounting must take place in order that a fully determined ethical process of intentionality could then be put into effect. We can walk down one side of the street at any one time, we cannot walk down both sides of the street at the same time so to speak! Contradictions are indeed entertained in the lives of individuals but in full consciousness there is a tension that, in being experienced, sets out to seek some form of a resolutional process (even if only in the form of a disengagement from its more direct experience in that previous, relatively increased critical and self-reflective state of consciousness). (46)

	Now, a criticism of religious explanation as a ‘religious explanation’ is that this religious transformation of value must take place through some form of an analogical frame of reference. E.g., the world is created because it ‘appears to be created’ or it is seen ‘as if it were created’. The explanation is correctly not literal but metaphorical, our mistake is to treat it as if it were literal. So the beauty of the world ‘appears as if it were’ a reflection of the beauty of the great Creator (or Emanator). To mistake the literal interpretation for the metaphorical is a mistake regardless of whether in fact we were correct to make that ascription or not. What is metaphorical is not literal and vice versa.  Somehow or other this transformation proceeds because we overlook the nature of that transition or transmutation. Or, we find that such a transition is possible between the metaphorical and the literal in the depths of our psyche! Let me look more closely at these two possibilities. (47)

Can we logically and epistemologically make this transition from the literal to the metaphorical? E.g., when we see a new colour, a shade of house paint never before seen on the walls of a house, we might say that it is like a shade, say, somewhere between azure and emerald. We could even give this shade a name of our own, or, inquire as to the name given to it on the tins of paint used to paint these walls. Here it would seem that we can indeed go from the metaphorical ‘like’ to the literal ‘is as such’ and thence to the supplying of a ‘name’. But, this type of transformation does so through the realization of evidence and good reasons outside the immediate context of our examination! We may have never seen that exact colour before but we seek its place metaphorically in our psychic mapping of colour-experiences. Then we tentatively accept this new colour as a new colour in our psychic spectrum of colours and perhaps even find a name for it too. However, it would appear that in a religious frame of reference there is little if any evidence for the ascriptions seized upon. In a superficial examination of the explanation little if any new material is found present, more often than not, to allow us to safely make this transition from the metaphorical to some new sense of the literal. So, the world might look like it is created by the Creator, beyond this self-perceived sense of a psychic satisfaction found in the application of our explanation what else is there that would allow us to confirm, non-analytically, that that explanation is not just speculation and mere extrapolation into a literal, empirical frame of reference? (48)
Alas, as a frame of reference, in and by itself, our use of religious explanations is going to absolutely fail us if we were to be completely honest with ourselves philosophically! The religious metaphors might work well for us in a religious frame of reference but as metaphors they should not be treated as ‘literal’ in this circumscribed dimension of the explanatory! So can the formulation of a theology be relatively grounded in this dimension of the religious explanation? No, for the reasons as just outlined! (49)

Alas, is there any hope for this degree of a ‘relative-grounding’ in the formulation of a reasonable theology? Certainly this cannot be done through the interpretation of religious texts dealing with some numinous-like state of affairs, nor through texts dealing with numinous-like experiences, nor through the use of religious explanations to explain our use, or otherwise, of those religious explanations! (50)

	Earlier, in this paper, it was asked ‘do we need to interpret a text?’ Then, later, this question was turned around to read ‘can we interpret?’ Are we able to interpret a text, are we able to interpret anything for that matter? As previously stated this rhetorical question asks, in effect, if interpretation was merely an ‘illusion’? Even if some god were to ‘light up a rock for us’ when we were to ask the gods a question how could this phenomenon be interpreted, be found a religious value in conformity with the true nature of that phenomenal process of religious signification if religious significance should indeed be present? Even if a god were to ‘light up a rock for us’ we would be just as lost as if that rock were not to light up for us. What point asking for signs when we can neither interpret them nor know if they were significant in the first place? Must we then rip this paper up at this point and move onto some other philosophical topic whose investigations of its subject matter might prove to be positively profitable? (51)

	To proceed with this topic it now seems that I have nothing to loose, other than my reputation as a philosopher. Nevertheless, let me proceed into these uncharted waters! Because I believe there is a tentative, provisional way out of this dilemma! Namely, through the adoption of a middle path that steers a direction between these three types of hermeneutic activity, indeed, utilizes them at the same time, engages their cooperation while ensuring that we do not run aground - neither on the right bank of dogmatism nor on the left bank of a negative nihilism! (52)

	The fact is that in our living in this world-of-life we do indeed need to interpret and that most of the time, it would appear, we get it right, more often than not, actually succeed at doing this correctly and successfully! Our survival in this world depends on this ‘being in touch with reality’! How then does one interpret this world? And what light might this insightful research cast upon our topic of the theological? (53)

	For a start all processes involved in the thematization of ‘sense, meaning and meaningfulness’ are created and re-created through the use of the hermeneutical circle (as introduced in the first essay of this series). The very formulation of our intentions and their transmissions to others through texts of various forms depends upon this very type of mechanism. ‘Sense’, in its more particular definition (as defined in this set of papers) is developed through processes of a reductive-analysis, i.e., a narrow focusing of some gestalt field or other within its corresponding psychic mapping of our collective sense of the life-world. On the other hand, and in contrast, the hermeneutic search for ‘meaning’ is realized through a re-constructive-synthesis of the appropriate gestalt field(s). Then from the balanced interaction of these two field-orientations of overall analysis and synthesis the (non-textual) experience of the existential as an ‘experience’ is in turn ‘then’ realized. These three ‘moments’ collectively contrasting each other and creating/re-creating a surplus of value whose measure is ‘in direct proportion to the productive richness of excess value realized in those investigations’. Now, I would argue, that any topic, and the formulation of a theology would be included here, should be thematized through the auspices of the appropriate hermeneutical circle of value creation. In the same fashion our topic of the formulation of a theology should be conducted through the auspices of a theological circle of hermeneutical comprehension and in this task our three disciplines of interpreting religious texts, interpreting religious-like experience and the interpreting the nature of religious explanations should, cooperatively and collectively, be mutually engaged! Through the ‘realized mutual harmony’ developed therein the world, more often than not, is safely navigated and negotiated. In a similar fashion, and in no other way, our theological researches should be approached! (54)

	In this harmonization of our topic for investigation ‘within the living embrace of the life-world itself’ a process of harmonization is realized through the mutual cooperation of these three facets of the hermeneutical circle. To conclude this essay let me look more closely at this ‘process of harmonization’ in general terms (and the same type of process of harmonization that would be involved in the relative-grounding of the formulation of a working theological hypothesis). In this receptive light, moreover, our six fields of value creation should also be taken into account, explicitly or implicitly, in order to relatively ‘ground’ our theology upon the full nature and compass of the psyche (along with all other aspects of the same that can be made to substantially comment on our theological topic). To this extent the in-depth probing of the psyche must also be investigated in order to understand how these six distinctive and relatively incommensurable ‘types of value’ can be accommodated in the deeper reaches of our psyche. In the process relatively ‘re-grounding’ the archetypal nature of our psychic self-interaction in this vision of the life-world, albeit as a life-world now theologically re-formulated. (55)

4.   What is the Harmony of Harmony?

	A number of years ago I was to ask this type of question – “what is the x of x?” In seeking a resolution of this puzzle various ways of answering it helped me to make a link between ‘harmony’ and ‘truth’ on a deeper level (of epistemological organization) to that expressed through particular types of value, and, which, in turn, allowed me to link, in depth, all processes of value-formation, indeed, forced me to articulate the same type of position, namely, that all forms of value, in essence, utilize the same type of ‘transcendental machinery’. (56)

	In all this the critical philosopher has to walk a fine line between ‘the confusion of relatively incommensurable types of value’ and the mistaken belief that ‘between relatively incommensurable aspects of the psyche there can be no in-depth forms of accommodation’. Let me elaborate. (57)

	E.g., judgments of perceived beauty and intuited ethical appreciation are like oil and water. On a relatively superficial level they should not be confused! On a deeper level, however, they can augment or undermine each other. Let me simply illustrate this deeper, existential fact. Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar is a wonderful play. But no skillful production of it that involves the actually intended death of that person playing Julius Caesar is going to get my vote, my recognition of approval. Quite the contrary! This is not to adopt the less extreme position that ethically suspect behaviour in the depiction of a drama or some other work of art is by itself going to disestablish the overall aesthetic merit of that work of art. As an observation this is generally not seen to be the case regardless of how we may or may not define the nature of the ‘aesthetic’. But if one of these (transcendental) fields of value is seriously undermined, all of these fields are similarly effected. We are also presented with the brute fact that different works of art have degrees of ‘aesthetic merit’ (and ‘entertainment value’) and that some form of a consensus can be reached re the same as witnessed in the relative attendance levels that films receive with respect to each other, or, the attendance numbers at block-buster exhibitions of paintings by famous artists despite the power of advertising (to the extent that those exhibitions that poorly represent the work of an artist are usually not as well reviewed and visited). Although I should add, in this test of time, attendance figures should not be used to directly quantify this degree of merit, and, should be merely used to attest to or witness this qualitative presence of  ‘merit’ (and ‘value’).  Moreover, on this topic, we might also like to note and reflect that the ‘stuff’ of drama is the ‘aesthetics of human relationships’. The tension and resolution of that (interpersonal and intra-personal) dissonance, through the interactions of those characters, contributes to the aesthetics of that dramatic work of art as, in principle the resolution of dissonance contributes to the merit (and value) of all works of art (as an integrated harmonic resolution of those dissonant features found in the ‘body’ of that world of art). The perception of this deeper level of ‘harmony’ between these (transcendental) fields of the ethical and the aesthetical allows us to recognize the role that that level of ‘harmony’ plays between those two fields and, by extension, all distinctive, relatively incommensurable (transcendental) fields of value. So on this deeper level of our investigations, e.g., the deontological nature of the ethical can be related to the field of the pragmatical when under superficial, normal circumstances they should not be confused. In a similar fashion the naturalistic fallacy that involves the confusion of essential descriptions and/or factual statements with ethical discernments in turn can be overcome, etc. But only on this relatively deeper level of our investigations. Therefore, with this insight into a deeper, archetypal harmony operating at the basis of all value creation (and re-creation) let me quickly sketch the ramifications this has for an appreciation of value in general and for the formulation of a theology in particular. Moreover, we should also accept the fact that at no stage do we, or can we, reify these six modalities. Their separate treatment can only be provisional, an illusion. Indeed, in some sense, the ‘absolute separate particularity’ of these three polarities of ego, intentional object-state, and the relevant gestalt field should also be seen as an ‘illusion’. As a consequence these three polarities and these six modalities of the essential, etc., must be treated as mutually interacting! That, the in-depth treatment of any topic should take each of these facets into account in the relatively non-superficial treatment of that topic! Indeed, each of these facets (polarities and modalities) contributes inputs and outputs in the more balanced functioning of the hermeneutic circle, ensuring the experiential delivery and intersubjective re-experience of a surplus of value that will contribute to our richer, existential appreciation of that topic. Otherwise there could be no hermeneutic circle and no surplus of value generated therein to enrich our lives in this world of life. Hence, on a deeper level of epistemological functioning, there will be some degree of transformational invariance between these cooperating aspects of the psyche that in turn contribute to the relative integration and integrity of that psyche. The quality of our research reflecting that sense of integrity. (58) 

	Value is created and re-created in a field of value. All fields can be archetypally investigated from three polar points of view, namely, from the perspective of the field qua field, the object-states discerned in and through, or against, that field, and, the provisional fiction of the so called ‘perceiver’ of that field. Privileging one or two of those polarities will contribute to our perception of the corresponding type of value generated therein. So, e.g., privileging an ego related investigation is primarily an ethically oriented investigation; in an ethically oriented state of reflection ethical ‘value’ is created or re-created. Through the harmonic resolution of ego-oriented ethical dissonance ethical value is created subjectively or re-created intersubjectively. And so on and so forth with respect to the other five fields of value creation and re-creation. (59)

	Let me return to this question “what is the harmony of harmony?”, or, more simply, “what is value?”, “what is the value of value?” and the role this type of insight might have for the formulation of a working theology (potentially an existentially ‘grounded’ ‘theology in progress’?). (60)

	To offer a quick answer to that type of question I would like to say that ‘the harmony of harmony’ is the ‘value of that harmony’, not so much harmony itself, but our consequential perception of that created/re-created sense of harmony. And the ‘value of value’ is such that “that ‘value’ ‘takes us somewhere’ and ‘allows us to feel at home at the same time’ in this passage of transformation”. To some degree we are allowed to both have our cake and eat it. Things, in effect, are seen to change and stay the same at the same time! Hence in our interaction with the life-world the life-world in its ongoing thematization becomes enriched-for-us. Although there is the experience of novelty at the same time, in this process of transition, we are also made to feel at home in this ‘re-vision’ of the life-world. (61)

	Now, what implications are to be found in this reformulation of the theological-type of enterprise and its use of the theological circle of hermeneutic comprehension? Everything! Without this utilization of this hermeneutic circle no sense of value could be created, theological or otherwise, nor, of course as a consequence, any sense of a surplus of hermeneutic value in a theological perspective or any other perspective! Without this realization of ‘value’ and a ‘surplus of value’ that type of project could not commence and then go on to make some form of an existential progress in the ‘progress of that project’. Let me elaborate. (62)

	On a deep level of epistemological functioning the hermeneutical circle represents, or rather re-presents, the entire transcendental machinery at our disposal for the thematization of our understanding of the life-world. In a theological interpretation of the life-world the same type of machinery must be at work! This is not a mystical type of statement (although it could be extended to implicate such a dimension?). It is a statement that simply says that for value to arise it must be generated between all the facets of a gestalt field, namely, the sense of an intentional object-state, a gestalt field and the perception of a perceiver appropriate to the nature of that field. And for the formulation of our theology to make sense it must be based on exactly the same structures necessary for the functioning of the human understanding. Moreover, to make existential sense it must also, in some sense, act in conformity with the nature of the life-world if it indeed were to have an intersubjectively ‘grounded’ theological complexion, implication or aspect. Even pure speculation must have some ‘basis in reality’, find adequate intersubjective ‘grounds’ that will allow any reasonable person in that culture to come to an understanding of what is meant in the transmission of that ‘speculation’. But, that form of conformity, based on an understanding of the metaphorical, must also progress into some form of a ‘literal understanding’. Moreover, for the validity of that theological formulation to progress beyond its mere literal interpretation and appreciation it must further progress into the sphere of the ‘evidential’, i.e., have some basis in our understanding of reality, be in some form of an evidential conformity with reality as it has come to be understood by that individual (in and through the public, non-private, cultural lenses of that society). And that task I must leave to the non-speculative theologian if such a task can be adequately demonstrated by the same! However, in defence of such a project, in theoretical terms of reference, let me say that the surplus of value that needs to be realized in both literal and evidential spheres cannot be absolutely analyzed, reduced, and/or, synthesized or reconstructed, etc! This surplus of value cannot be rendered absolutely self-accountable! It cannot be absolutely demonstrated, neither by the person to them self nor to someone else. It must, in effect, be taken on trust in keeping with the quality of that trust that it inspires in us. Just as a ‘good’ poem cannot be rendered completely accountable (as to why it is a ‘good’ poem) how much more the world of life itself with or without a theological re-interpretation?! This je ne sais quoi has to be experienced by the person themselves and although in the re-performance of the work of art, the project of hand, etc., it can be ‘set up’ and therein be allowed to speak to us of itself that use of language is almost without words so to speak. Of course the nature of that ‘set-up’ will forever remain controversial! Only in our experience of the surplus of value ‘re-demonstrated’ in the examination of our project will we be able to intuitively formulate a forever provisional ‘yea’ or ‘nay’, grant or deny some form of conformity of our project with our re-vision of reality. In this, as with all things, we develop a sense of trust, a provisional trust that reflects the richness and integrity of that apparent surplus of value! (63)

5.   Realizing this je ne sais quoi?

	This aspect of the je ne sais quoi, or existential mystery, must always be found to lurk around the performance of our projects. But let it be noted that a ‘good’ poem, an existentially, well-formed poem, has a good je ne sais quoi, and, a not so good poem, one that is received without comprehension and the experience of aesthetic merit, which it might just have or not have, is felt to be relatively absent in the same! But, of course, as a bad poem is boring, it does not necessarily follow that an apparently boring poem is necessarily a bad poem – because the latter might be currently misunderstood. The (transcendental) access to the aesthetic domain of an art work, or, the existential import of a project, lies in what aspects or aspects of the psyche this ‘existential’ value is being created and re-created. Obviously intellectual projects are further removed in the psyche than those more basically centred, in our experiential embodiment, in and through images or emotions or physical movement, rhythms and other forms of immediate interaction, etc. (64)

	Now a good je ne sais quoi is one that is experienced as having a rich and integrated sense of ‘being’ along with the ‘presence’ of a rich existential import. This aspect of ‘value’ in its profundity is both experienced as ‘original’ and something with which we happily feel at home with despite the apparent novelty of that valued state of affairs. The fact that it cannot be directly articulated in words does not stop us from directly experiencing it in its wordless sense of totality (non-textually and not-textually). Just as judgments are experienced in their relative totality so too is the richness, presence and being of the life-world experienced in a similar wordless fashion. Only retrospectively do we attempt to give a voice to such an experience. (65)

	To conclude let me quickly summarize the theoretical consequences this type of position has for the formulation of a viable theology (if such a project can be found to be demonstrated as being in some form of a conformity with the nature of the life-world?) and the manner such a project should be realized intersubjectively. (66)

6.	Conclusion – A New Beginning

To conclude this rather convoluted essay let me summarize the final points I would like to make and then briefly sketch out what arguments would be made for those points (rather than present my arguments in some depth and then summarize them). In many ways these points I hope to raise are provisional and tentative, effectively signal a re-beginning of this topic, perhaps even a new beginning? (67)

1.	The hermeneutic surplus experienced in a theological perspective, this religious sense of the je ne sais quoi, must be evaluated on its own terms. 

2.	The well-rounded theological formulation should re-treat the life-world to a theo-
logical-hermeneutical re-definition that:

i.	Deals adequately with this theologicalization of the life-world, i.e., makes room for the phenomenological concept of the theological treatment of the life-world, therein creating the space for the sense of the Divine and its experiential interaction as numinous in nature.

ii.	Deals adequately with the direct and/or indirect theological interaction and consequent treatment of the three polarities of the gestalt field that, in effect, ‘ground’ the (transcendental) necessity of the theological-hermeneutical circle and its constitution of theological sense, meaning and meaningfulness.
 
iii.	Deals adequately with the direct and/or indirect theological interaction and consequent treatment of the six modalities that are constituted within the ambit of the (theological-)hermeneutical circle, namely, the essential, aesthetical, ethical, pragmatical, hermeneutical and the factual.

3.	That, as aspects of the hermeneutical circle (of theological comprehension), the (meta-textual) hermeneutical appreciation of religious texts, the (non-textual) hermeneutical appreciation of religious experiences and the (textual) hermeneutical appreciation of religious explanations must mutually be found to collectively support each other in the formulation of a viable theological project.

4.	That in the final exposition of a well-balanced theological perspective on the life-world the existential ‘meaningfulness’ component of our expositional treatment must be evidentially rich enough to withstand all charges of a ‘systematic, speculative a priorism’.

	Let me now explain some of the more obvious ramifications of the above. (68)

First, the je ne sai quoi must be evaluated on its own terms! This means it cannot be reductively analyzed. The relative reduction of sense, meaning and meaningfulness can be illuminating, whereas, on the other hand, the absolute reduction of the same can only result in the absolute destruction of significance! The relative, partial reduction of sense, etc., should never be mistaken for some form of an absolute reduction or vice versa. Correctly the significance of the hermeneutic surplus, the je ne sais quoi discovered in our examination, should be realized through its re-simulation. Only through the ‘fully-engaged’ reading of the totality of a ‘good’ poem, e.g., can the intuitive experience of the full import of that poem be received and appreciated. In the same fashion the hermeneutic import of a theological enterprise can only be appreciated through the simulated engagement of its essential constitution, in other words, in and through our adequate hermeneutic re-construction of the same. This necessitates the formation of an adequate text (or set(s) of texts), and, the appropriate application of our full resources in our re-constitution of the sense, meaning and meaningfulness of that ‘text’. ‘Relative reduction’ plays a part in that circular hermeneutic process but only in that moment (of retrospectivity) dealing with the phenomenological, sense, the analytical, textual, etc. Once the hermeneutic surplus is being demonstrated through its re-simulation it must then be taken at ‘face value’. The perceived existential richness of that (re-)simulation can then be appreciated in its own right. The re-simulation exhibiting its own depth and richness of presentation in such a manner that our appreciation if its relative sense of worth or value can be intuited from the quality of its own fabric, and, the metaphorical ‘cut’ of that fabric. In this type of reflection all exposition is granted some degree of existential depth and richness, some degree of conformity with our own current understanding of the open constitution of the life-world. In this, the fabric of our fantasies and our dreams will have their corresponding degrees of existential richness, or rather, relative poverty, etc. In like fashion, scientific theories, the minutiae of scientology, theoretical complexity of Freudian psychoanalysis, etc., etc., will in turn be experienced with their own unique re-presentational –hermeneutic-surpluses, etc. Only an indirect qualitative comparison, a process conducted intuitively as a matter of taste, will allow us to say to ourselves that our experience of this particular simulation is ‘perceived’ as richer than some other particular re-presentation. Just as one poem can be indirectly compared to another in terms of their apparent inherent poeticality so too can one theological vision be compared to some other - almost as if by default. Although each ‘system’ in direct comparison to some other must superficially be like ‘chalk’ and ‘cheese’ we ‘know’ that cheese is understood as tasting much better than chalk even if we, as an individual, don’t particularly like cheese! “By the woof and weave of our constructions shall we know them”. By their integrity, richness, conformity with the reality of the life-world, by their existential impact, by their definition in sense, meaning and meaningfulness, etc! And this is intuitively appreciated in our ongoing engagement with the re-simulation of that particular ‘system’. 
     (69)
	Second, as sense, meaning and meaningfulness are simulated and re-simulated through the auspices of the hermeneutical circle (on and between various levels and aspects of the psyche within intersubjectively understood conventional genre-settings) it follows that our formulation (or re-formulation) of a theological project must take into account the overall sense of the non-theological formulation of the life-world; the three gestalt polarities of the sense of intentional object-states, the meaning of invoked gestalt-fields and the meaningfulness of ego-involved-states between intentional object-states and their relevant gestalt-field(s); and, the six modalities that should equally constitute the detail of that theological re-formulation of the life-world. In the thematizational definition of this project the ‘sense of the Divine’ should also be entertained as equally having a ‘gestalt-oriented type of constitution’. In this ongoing process of phenomenal engagement our ‘perception’ of the world should be treated as ‘textually’ given, i.e., given in the form of a text; as a ‘text-there-for-us’ to be retrospectively analyzed as a re-presentation from the past. Because the ‘text’ can only be maintained before our current state of awareness through a processes of re-iterative re-presentation or retention. Similarly, the gestalt field-nature of the relevant background against which we re-constitute our simulation must be meta-textually projected, or driven, through processes of protention. Then, the re-perception of all ego-like forms of involvement must take into account the spontaneous, existential nature of this third aspect of our hermeneutical circle, etc…. 
     (70)
	Third, as shown in the first half of this paper, the hermeneutical appreciation of  religious texts, the hermeneutical appreciation of religious experiences and the hermeneutical appreciation of religious explanations individually, from within their own sphere of influence, cannot be used to support the formulation of a viable theological enterprise. However, as participant aspects that mirror the three major (dialectical) ‘moments’ of our hermeneutical circle, these three aspects must collectively stand together in their support of each other. Only by such means can the formulation of a theology create the necessary degree of a hermeneutic surplus to invest its speculative integrity in such a manner that the possible presentation of evidential grounds could be reasonably entertained. To some degree this already occurs in the usual presentation of a theology. However, in the critical presentation of a theology we much insist on this being conducted in a deliberate and organized fashion (which in turn may allow us to find the necessary degree of existential support, as noted in the next and last point, wherein we may possibly pass beyond a merely speculative level in theoretical engagement?). (71)

Lastly, as I stated in my second and third points, the exposition of a well-balanced theological enterprise must be existentially rich enough to withstand charges of a ‘systematic, speculative a priorism’. In other words, our theology must ‘say something’ informative about the life-world and our interaction within this ‘life-world’ along with our interaction with the sense of the Divine therein formulated! As a systematic(-like) project it must withstand charges of being merely ‘systematic’, of being merely ‘speculative’ and being merely formulated as a series of a priori equations where we are told nothing more than what is injected into those sterile formulae. No rich, in-depth vision of a hermeneutic surplus in conformity with our re-vision of the life-world can be realized without regard to those types of conditions as noted under our four points! (72) 

Ultimately, the theologian must formulate a theology that hermeneutically takes into account the need for the realization of a hermeneutic surplus that is ‘set-up’ to be re-discovered in our re-simulation of that exposition. But, can the theologian, using hermeneutical procedures as outlined in this paper, actually meet these necessary preconditions as entailed in these four points listed and briefly discussed above? Can the theologian realize the necessary degree of existential richness in their relatively systematic, non-speculative, non-apriori formulations? Can they demonstrate, through a re-simulated engagement with their exposition, intersubjective grounds evidentially rich enough for us to take them seriously? Let me investigate some of these issues in my next paper: Finding a Place for the Idea of God – Part III: Is There an Existential Way of Doing Theology? (73)

							         Noël Tointon, Sydney, 21.4.01.

A Summary of the Major Points Presented by this Paper

1.	Religious signs, etc., need forms of religious interpretation.
2.	There are three forms of religious hermeneutics, namely, the hermeneutical appreciation of religious texts, the hermeneutical appreciation of religious experiences and the hermeneutical appreciation of religious explanations.
3.	But individually these three forms of hermeneutics fail us in the interpretation of religious signs, etc., and the formulation of a viable theology.
4.	Religious texts are notoriously difficult to logically pin down in their definition of the nature of the Divine. Often it is only the secondary literature in the form of commentaries, handbooks, etc., that tries to attempt this, albeit as a secondary literature.
5.	Our hermeneutic appreciation of religious experiences, in and by themselves, cannot authenticate the nature of their purported content!
6.	In a similar fashion, religious explanations, as explanations qua explanations, cannot go beyond the relatively a priori nature of their formulation.
7.	It was argued that the harmony between intentional object-states, gestalt fields and intentional ‘intenders’ established the creation and re-creation of value, i.e., the value of phenomenological sense, hermeneutical meaning and existential meaningfulness.
8.	These three moments of the hermeneutic circle are equally reflected in the these three types of theological hermeneutics (as mentioned in the second heading of this summary) (with the acceptance that phenomenological treatment of the life-world, in general and in particular, treats our experience of that life-world as a ‘text’ in this broad sense).
9.	Therefore, the viable formulation of a theology must enlist the mutual cooperation of these three types of hermeneutical orientations.
10.	Hence a well-balanced hermeneutical-theological enterprise must deal with the thelogicalization of the life-world as found in a non-religious format, and, enlist the cooperative harmony between these three polarities and six modalities as noted in this paper.
11.	That the realization of a hermeneutic surplus, a theological je ne sais quoi, must be intersubjectively entertained to some degree in the re-simulation of that theological enterprise.
12.	That only the intuitive perception of an existential richness, and conformity with the nature of the life-world, etc., will allow us to re-consider that particular theological project in an evidential perspective, a task that needs to be demonstrated as viable by a hermeneutical-theologian both theoretically and practically.

A Map of the Hermeneutical Circle W.r.t. ‘Polarities’ and ‘Modalities’

(Ethical Modality)

(tr. suspension)
Ego Polarity
*

(Aesthetical Modality)				(Pragmatical Modality)

(Life-world)

*							*
Object-State Polarity 				World/Field Polarity
    (tr. reduction) 						   (tr. re-constitution)

(Essential Modality)				          		      (Hermeneutical Modality)

(Factual Modality)