Finding a Place for the Idea of God – Part III:
Is there an Existential Way of Doing Theology?

0.	Prologue (in the Form of a First Introduction)

In this third paper in this series Finding a Place for the Idea of God… the emphasis will be upon that aspect or idea of the experiential sense of the existential as defined through the third moment in our hermeneutic(-al)  circle as outlined in the first two papers. This third moment is ‘defined’ through its contrast with the first and second moments, namely, in and through its contrast with the senses of the analytical or reductive and the synthetical or re-constitutive. Through a ‘suspension’ of the reduction and re-constitution the sense of the existential present is allowed to speak through an existential excess created and re-created when the phenomenal experience of a ‘totality’ has the experiential sum of its parts subtracted from the same…. (1)

To start this third investigation into the philosophical nature of theological thought in general I have begun with a phenomenological examination of the phenomenon of what it means ‘to find something’ in the process linking this research with the nature of the hermeneutic circle as introduced in our first two papers. I have used this motif as a linking device throughout this paper in this hypothetical endeavour ‘to find’ an existential place for the idea of God. (2)

In the course of this paper a number of philosophical ideas will be explored. One important concept will be the concept of ‘theological difference’; the sort of argument that would be proposed by a theologian to the effect that ‘a vision of the world that entails the inclusion of some form of (the divine or) the Divine’ should take some form of precedence over ‘a vision of the world that excludes some sense of (the divine or) the Divine’. A tentative, or provisional, transcendental argument will be proposed to support of this contention that these two concepts, although of an equal ‘logical weight’ do not have the same ‘metaphysical weight’. (3)

 In the course of the exposition of this paper various philosophical problems and positions will be looked at through this lens of what it might mean for us to be ‘aware of’ or ‘to find’ some sense of the numinous interpreted as some form of an experience of the divine; this sense of the divine being ‘perceived’ as implicating, directly or indirectly, the actual divinity of the Divine when this stronger sense of divinity is treated as possessing an active, reflexive force of agency in its involvement with the world in some form or other. This paper will attempt to look philosophically at this type of experience (of finding a place for the sense) of the ‘divine’, in general, and this latter sense of the ‘Divine’, in particular, without absolutely arguing for or against the veracity of such claims. In other words, reports and claims of this type will be subjected to a thorough phenomenological suspension throughout and between those ‘brackets’ therein examined hypothetically! (4)

This paper will be structured under the following headings: (5)

1.   The Phenomenon of Finding (as a Second Introduction)
2.	The Dismissal of  Absolute Skepticism
3.   The Dismissal of Absolute Certainty
4.	The Necessary Acceptance of Provisional Truth by the Theologian
5.	Finding Authenticity
6.	Finding Conviction in our Convictions
7.	Finding an Authenticity in Religious Experience (of the Divine)
8.   The Concept and Potential Ramifications of Theological Difference
9.   Finding a Right Map for Making a Theological Turn
10. Conclusion: Can We Existentially Find a Place for the Idea of God?
      Epilogue

1.   The Phenomenon of Finding (as a Second Introduction)

	In this paper I would like to look at the ‘phenomenon of finding’, using this research as an integrating device for the exposition of this third paper in our series titled “Finding a place for the Idea of God….” (6)

	The phenomenon of finding, I believe, should first be seen as a ‘double phenomenon’ of finding, and, secondly, and even more correctly, should be regarded as a ‘triple phenomenon’ of finding. Let me elaborate upon this ‘phenomenological insight’. (7)

Treated as a ‘doubled up act of finding’ we have something more or less ‘physically’ found, and, then metaphorically, in the next breath, if we be so lucky, we find with some sort of ‘second sight’ or ‘insight’ what it is that we have actually found, i.e., the meaning of this act of discovery, or, even the mere fact that we have made an act of discovery itself. (8)

	As a ‘triple act of discovery’ we also discover the pro-found existential ramifications of this act of finding as a complex act of revelation regardless of whether that act is actually profound or superficial in its import, actually valid or invalid in the wider scheme of things. (9) 

In effect, what we have done here is to map out the dialectical stages we shall propose as constituting the process of finding in its phenomenological ideality, an ideal set of sequences wherein the experiential process of finding is mapped out upon the three dialectical moments of the hermeneutic circle, namely, the phenomenological, hermeneutical and the existential. Put simply, we first find ‘a-sense-of-place-for-that-found, discovering therein the ‘what it is’ and the ‘where’ and ‘when it is’. Then, we find out the meaning-for-us of that act of emplacement; find out what it means for us to have made this act of discovery. Finally, through some further form of deeper insightfulness we find revealed ‘before us’, in part or in whole, the ‘meaningfulness of the relationship’ between that ‘located sense of place’ and its ‘meaning-as-found-for-us’, i.e., ‘the meaning of its meaning’, its ‘existential import’… Or to put it more simply let me adopt the following image or scenario… (10)

	Imagine we are on a now empty train that had been full of people and we find a purse containing a small sum of money as we are about to leave a few stations further along the track. We are a poor student with practically no money to our name. There is no name on this purse, we did not see the person who dropped it, and, the sum of money is not a large sum, but enough to feed us for a few weeks. We also note that there was no one around to have seen us make this discovery. In this simple act of merely finding a lost purse what philosophical complexity should we discern beneath the overall simplicity of this act of discovery? (11)

	For a start, we recognized the object as a purse. I.e., we might say, we ‘re-cognized’ it as a purse, as ‘an object most likely lost’ on this very train here and now (unless, as a remote possibility, it was meant by some well-wisher to ‘be found by this poor student’). As a purse we recognize its meta-textual import as a receptacle for holding money, its ‘genre’ as an object primarily meant to hold money, i.e., to act as a purse. So not only have we found an object but we also understand what sort of object it is. So we look inside it! We find some money. We add the money up and find out how much was left in the purse. Then we find out, or start to find out, what meaningfulness this discovery has for us, namely, ‘enough food that could be bought to feed ourselves for a few weeks’. Given this necessary co-presence of the contextual no longer can we say ‘we simply found a purse with a few dollars inside it’! (12)

	So an ‘object’ is ‘located’. It is recognized, or rather re-cognized or re-found, discovered to have a certain meaning, as a meaning-for-us. Then the meaningfulness-for-us of this meaning is found in turn, that aspect of finding in its most profound sense. (13)

	As a double act of discovery we find something and then find out what it is. Say, for a moment, that purse, previously alluded to, was actually our own, having accidentally just been dropped by ourselves on the floor of the train. We see it or ‘find it’ beside our feet. Then we ‘find out’ that it was ‘our purse’ just dropped on the floor of the train. As a triple act of discovery we then find, within our vision of our own sense of self, what a profound sense of relief it is to have realized we could have permanently lost that purse along with the ramifications entailed for us therein. (14)

	Thus the phenomenon of finding is not just a simple process of finding something! Can we assume all processes of finding essentially mirror this threefold pattern? In effect, that the process of finding, as an act of understanding, is undertaken within a threefold embrace of the hermeneutic circle itself? I.e., that the object or object-state is found located in the world of the phenomenal (whether that be spatial, temporal or otherwise), and therein found hermeneutically to have been understood to have a certain meaning or set(s) or meanings, and, to declare ‘finally’ what meaningfulness this overall act of comprehension might profoundly have for us! As I perceive all acts of judgment and cognitive comprehension to take place in and through the auspices of this type of threefold transcendental machinery, situated within the ‘ideal’ embrace of the hermeneutic circle, I must answer this in the affirmative! (15)

	Quickly, for the sake of a superficial thoroughness, let me review some of the more prominent types of finding we should have found in our passage through this world-of-life. In this provisional list there is the ‘finding of something lost’ by ourselves or by someone else. Then there is the attendant ‘finding out that we have lost something’. Sometimes we ‘find something we didn’t know was lost’. Or, then again, we might ‘find something only to find out later something we didn’t know about it’ (e.g., that this blue and white piece of porcelain is a valuable Ming vase worth a fabulous fortune). Then there is ‘re-finding’ something (that is lost and for what ever reason found itself getting lost again). Or, ‘finding out’ that we were right or wrong in our earlier surmises about something, or, might have known but did not ‘know’ or ‘knew that we knew’ in the first place. Then those types of matters where an insightfulness is found, thought to have been discovered, correctly or incorrectly. And our later being able to confirm, or disconfirm, those intuitions, etc, etc. (16)

	In a similar vein we might also note that the phenomenon of finding is therein profoundly linked with the phenomenon of ‘insight’ and that these dialectical stages proposed in the ‘process of finding’ might be utilized to explain such problems as apparently believing in unfounded delusions and the forced maintenance of our beliefs re the same, the perception of illusion, the apprehension of hallucinations, the holding of contradictory beliefs or beliefs that are not fully integrated with respect to each other or into our overall way of life, our ability to tell lies, opening ourselves to misinterpretations, suppressing unwelcome pieces of information, finding ourselves in a position to experience a vision or re-vision of the ‘truth’, the general problem of self-deception, etc., etc. (17)

	Lastly, to end this second introduction, I should let you know why I have taken the trouble of illuminating some of the complexities that seem to constitute the essential nature of this phenomenon of finding. For a start, as indicated in the title of these papers, we are attempting to find ‘a place for the idea of God’. In the next section I am going to show that we cannot find a philosophical (or religious) position of absolute skepticism. Then, taking an opposite tack, the third section will show that we cannot find a philosophical (or religious) position of absolute non-skepticism, of absolute certainty or absolute conviction, outside an a priori framework. As a consequence I will argue in the fourth section that the theologian, like any other citizen of the life-world, must accept that their work is provisional and cannot be criticized by any member of the public for accepting this (existential) fact. In this light I will then continue to discuss what appears to be implicated in the ‘existential’ experience of ‘authenticity’, how we should find an authenticity of religious conviction in our provisional commitment, how we might find a demonstration of authenticity in religious experience (regardless of whether that does or does not implicate a sense of the divine or some sense of the Divine with a large’D’). In the final sections of this paper I will be arguing that the theologian can argue that there is a fundamental, transcendental(ly argued) theological difference between a ‘concept of the world without a sense of the divine’ and a ‘concept of the world whose integrity seems to suggest the implication of the same’. In the light of this argument for theological difference I will then tentatively investigate what might be involved in our making a theological turn in the reconstruction of our provisional ontological commitments and how we should see and live in this world-of-life if our worldview was to be treated to this type of religious re-constitution? (18)

2.	The Dismissal of Absolute Skepticism

In the situation of ‘finding a purse with money on a train’ could we be absolutely skeptical about this act of finding, etc? We could look at an object on the floor of the train that looks like a purse and say to ourselves ‘that might not be a purse’. But, in that process, we are not calling into question the fact of the floor of this train and that there is an object that looks like a purse. Or if even if we were to call into question this semblance of ‘an appearance of a purse’ the floor would still be there for us. In the exercise of a skeptical attitude our presuppositions themselves, those aspects that actually act presuppositionally to this act of skeptical reconsideration, cannot themselves be called into question in this very process of being skeptical! So the question ‘is there a purse on the floor?’ only calls into question the ‘appearance of a purse’. In other words to be skeptical means we cannot be absolutely skeptical since to be skeptical means we cannot be skeptical presuppositionally! An act of absolute skepticism, both in regard ostensively to the matter at hand and with respect to its presupposional basis is an impossible act to entertain in fact or even to consider hypothetically! To be skeptical is to question, but, in order to question, we cannot skeptically question, in the same act of questioning, the presuppositional basis that underlies and constitutes that very act of questioning of that which is being questioned. Presuppositions in turn can be questioned but only in turn, and, only in part! In this light we must conclude that absolute skepticism can play no part in our lives either practically or theoretically! Does this mean, then, that no one can be absolutely skeptical of the ‘fact’ of this life-world nor any ‘perceived or conceived part or aspect of it’? We can be relatively skeptical but never absolutely skeptical! I can call this appearance of a world, a world-of-life, into doubt but not absolutely. A presuppositional world-of-life would still have to exist for us presuppositionally in order to pose this type of question. And if the latter must also include the former then a world-of-life must exist for us in order for ourselves to be able to consciously form this notion of a world-of-life. In a similar vein, the idea of the Divine, the idea of God, could relatively be called into question, but, since the presuppositional grounds that would allow this question to be made cannot themselves be absolutely disqualified in the very act of entertaining that idea of negation it follows that the idea of the Divine, in what ever form, cannot be absolutely called into question. So, as the idea of the Divine, and the idea of God contained therein, cannot be absolutely called into question, given that there already exists this idea of the Divine in our intersubjective world of culture, it follows that no one in that culture can absolutely call this idea of the Divine into question in such a fashion as to absolutely deny the same. Therefore, regardless of whether we see ourselves as atheists or non-atheists, agnostics or non-agnostics, theists in some form or other or their negated equivalents, we cannot absolutely deny this idea, this place of the divine that already presuppositionally pre-exists in our cultural world-of-life. In the same manner that the life-world cannot be absolutely denied, likewise the sense(s) of self, the idea of the divine, the idea of the devil, the idea of reincarnation, the idea of the non-survival of the human entity after death, that the moon is green cheese, etc., etc! Humbled by such a defeat we must gracefully give up all notions of an absolute skepticism. This doesn’t mean, however, that we must absolutely accept the reality of such ‘entities’ that have positioned themselves presuppositionally in the intersubjective, intercultural matrix of our cultural life in this world-of-life. What is given up is our belief in an absolute skepticism, in our being able to be absolutely skeptical. The adoption of a relative skepticism is another matter entirely! (19)

	What are some of the consequences of this acceptance of a relative form of skepticism? A relative skepticism accepts the epistemological fact that the presuppositional basis of a question in that act of skepticism cannot itself be called into question in that particular act of questioning. That, as all questions must have an intact presuppositional basis it follows that no act of questioning can remove this de facto ‘ground of our being able to ask that question’, or, ‘find itself removed in total’ in deeper act of presuppositional enquestioning. Trivial as it may seem, the theologian can themselves neither absolutely shut this door onto their discipline nor have the door absolutely shut for them on their own, individual programs of research. But for the religious person finding an intimate relationship with the sense of the Divine and the acceptance of the mere possibility for such an encounter are two entirely different matters that, for them, should not be confused.  (20)

	In a similar fashion, but for different arguments, we cannot claim an absolute certainty and an absolute conviction in our own assortments of miscellaneous insights into this interpreted and pre-interpreted world-of-life! Let me now look more fully at this opposite side of our coin of absoluteness (in our determinations of the nature of the life-world and the grounds therein created and re-created for the derivation and maintenance of our convictions and their concomitant sense of commitment). (21)

3.   	The Dismissal of Absolute Certainty

	In a similar vein we can neither accept nor propose nor even entertain a philosophical or religious position that is asserted with the air of an absolute certainty (outside an analytical frame of reference). Our understanding of reality must always be viewed as a ‘work in progress’. On the other hand this does not remove us from entertaining various degrees of conviction about certain understandings we think we should entertain about the nature of the world. In essence, we can also claim that even if no view of reality can be absolutely disparate with the reality of that reality-itself-that-is-found-there-for-us-in-this-world-of-life at the same time it cannot be absolutely argued for! In other words, even though no vision of reality is, or could be, completely at odds with our collective vision of the world at the same time we cannot argue absolutely for the absolute existence (or absolute non-existence or absence) of that vision of the world. (22)

	So, to some extent then, the moon must be made of green cheese after all!? (23)

	Well, not exactly. The moon may not be a green cheese, but, like a green cheese, it too can be seen as a ‘material object’ that is ‘round’, ‘pock-marked’, ‘light’ in colour, etc. So even this view is not as absolutely off the mark as it might have initially seemed to our scientific sensibilities! Of course some views appear to be more off the mark than others, or, conversely, some views seem to be more on ‘target’ so to speak. And if this is the case how would we go about discovering the relative truthfulness or the relative untruthfulness of our current understanding of some apparent facet of reality? (24)
	
	The answer to this type of question is initially complicated by the fact that if one subscribes to the point of view that there can be no external world (and no internal world as well) what standard or standards do we have access to in order to quantify this degree of ‘coincidence’? In such a framework how could we ascertain the degree of truthfulness of this relative truthfulness/untruthfulness between our vision of the world and the life-world itself? (25)

	Being in the world-of-life means that we are already in a state of a direct engagement with what ever we find ourselves being engaged with. From the ‘immediate presence’ of this relationship we find in the ‘quality’ of that relationship all the evidence we need to hand to ascertain the apparent reality of that relationship in and through that relationship itself. In this relationship we ‘intuit’ the richness of the modalities that we find ourselves apparently being engaged with and the general number and manner of their purportment, i.e., how they metaphorically face us in our engagement with them and how we find ourselves being rhetorically embraced by the same, etc., etc. Put simply, in a relatively more real engagement, in an engagement that is apparently less virtual, it is the manner and number of modalities that we are collectively engaged with that will construct for us this overall intuition of how ‘more real’ this ‘reality’ is seen to appear-to-us-for-us. So dreams, e.g., are comparatively less vivid, less detailed and, in time, less satisfactory for us. So a dream ice-cream may be delightful to taste in the context of a dream in the long run it will not feed us and therein engage the modality of ‘our being actually fed’! (26)

On the other hand, in a vivid dream its very vividness indicates that our powers of gestalt appreciation are necessarily integrated to that same extent, and, that being the case, must also give us the necessary degree of depth to allow us to ‘know’ how relatively unreal such an image is despite its overall, superficial vividness because it will be found in experience that a lack of modal detail (in a modality of ‘detail’) is also discovered on ‘a closer inspection’ despite the apparent vividness of that overall dream experience which, at the same time, is also being constituted, hand in hand, within that experience, as something that is ‘known’ as being merely constructed by a ‘dreamer’ and not a ‘visual perceiver’. Otherwise, through the lack of gestalt integration in our psyche, our imagery, if present, will similarly reflect this lack of integration and be perceived to the same extent to lack a sense of ‘reality’, to be poverty stricken and surreal, to appear, in effect, ‘as if in a dream’... (27)

	Why can our ‘knowledge’ of the world never be absolutely certain, and, our conviction in the same be likewise? (28)

	The world of experience does not reproduce for us a ‘representation’ of the world! Our experience of the world is as a re-presentation, a re-simulation of the same, a simulation of a simulation… The world cannot be trapped as a reflected image in some cosmic mirror, rather it is lived, lived as a re-presentation, as a presentation of a presentation and as such cannot be reproduced only re-produced. Experienced in an act of re-presentation, as a simulation of a simulation, it can only have its own reality, not be ‘real’ to that extent that it mirrors some reality that pre-exists its own simulation. Because it is a ‘simulation’ it cannot simulate what cannot be simulated. And as a re-simulation it is can only simulate what has been simulated, is being simulated; finding its place, its meaning and meaningfulness of this re-simulation through the mediation of a hermeneutic circle, and, that all value therein created and re-created is developed through the surplus of value developed within the auspices of that hermeneutic circle! The greater the value of that surplus the more real the semblance of that simulation appears to possess. Hence the semblance of reality is always a work in progress and that our convictions re the same must always reflect the provisional nature of this existential fact! (29)

	On the other hand, under normal or usual conditions, in our passage through the life-world, our vision of the world is more than adequate for the job to hand and that, as a consequence, our convictions will reflect this existential state of affairs likewise. ‘Existential’ because it can only be through the existential moment in our hermeneutic circle that the life-world can be engaged and finally re-engaged, and be fully engaged to that extent authentically. To this extent all engagement is authentic! Because the existential moment is an experience of the ‘relationship’ between the current phenomenon under examination and its experienced/experiential background, as an appropriate gestalt-field, that therein and there between allows us to thematize the existential meaningfulness of that situation. Authenticity being eclipsed to that extent pre-set meanings are allowed to re-interpret or pre-interpret the same, our attention is allowed to be distracted from the task to hand, other extraneous motives cloud our appreciation, or, we enter into this process of research in bad faith, i.e., with a lack of good faith; an adequate degree of good faith necessary for us to satisfactorily complete that current program of research. Or at least realize that that research program could not be adequately completed in the current state of our research assuming that hypothetically it was possible to complete in the first place. (30)

	Hence, authenticity demands that our research programs be seen as provisional, as works in progress, as works of progress that can be made to progress further in our research into the constitution of the life-world. In the midst of the possibility of this appreciation of further progress are born our convictions bearing various degrees of adequacy or inadequacy! In this exposition let me now allude to a harmonic theory of judgmental appreciation in order to demonstrate how convictions are phenomenally generated as convictions qua convictions. (31)

	In an act of judgment, whether it be of an act of perception, memory, imagination or something more abstract, there is the phenomenal field appropriate to the nature of that under review. In this phenomenal field, in our focusing on this aspect of human experience, there is a further focusing on the ‘perceived’ contents found within that field. In focusing on that content at that level it is seen as different from the overall background of that field. Therein that content in this act of review must be ‘felt’ as distinct, different, in effect, as dissonant in that particular field of attention. But that sense of dissonance cannot be absolute. At the same time it must also reflect the general nature of that field, which through its overall sense of uniformity, must be experienced as relatively consonant. In that particular field ‘consonance plus dissonance will find a certain degree of resolution’ by virtue of the fact that that dissonance cannot be absolutely different from the nature of that field otherwise it could not arise within that particular field. So through the relativity of its dissonance a provisional act of resolution is entered into. Therein, in re-finding a place for that which is relatively dissonant in that field, a certain degree of harmony, or ‘fitting in’, is also re-discovered through its relative or provisional re-incorporation within that field. The nature of that fit being reflected in the ‘nature’ of our convictions re that fit. The ‘re-confirmation’ of that fit further reinforcing the nature of our conviction re the same. So, e.g., if we believe the moon is made out of moon rock, and we see a piece brought back from the moon, and we believe it was truly brought back from the surface of the moon, our conviction that the moon is indeed made out of rock (and not green cheese) is further reinforced. In repeating this process we become even more convinced that the moon is indeed made out of rock. Our convictions in this instance being authentically constituted and regarded because of the near perfect fit we find between this belief and our other beliefs belonging to this ‘field of experience’, and, the authentic manner it would appear we have adopted in order to arrive at this conclusion. Until such a time we need to believe otherwise our conviction is in this instance both adequate and authentic in the nature of its realization. But, however adequate and authentic the nature of our convictions, they must remain provisional, only relatively certain. For all we know the moon might have been constructed as a huge artificial satellite with only a ‘sprinkling’ of moon rock over the global surface of its veneer. Of course I am not suggesting it is, only, that in entertaining this possibility as a possibility, and currently having no way to disprove or prove the same, we cannot exclude this particular possibility, only one more among an infinite series of other possibilities, in order to demonstrate the relativity and the provisional nature of our judgment in this instance. But, even though our ‘knowledge’ in this regard must be philosophically treated as provisional, in the living world of experience there is no need for concern as our convictions would indeed serve us well (that in actuality it would be better for us to entertain this type of belief to that extent our convictions ‘force us to conform to that possibility’ (unless one is actively engaged in the process of practising a transcendental suspension in our phenomenological researches which is a different matter altogether)). (32)

	In essence, an absolute certainty, of a non-a priori nature, cannot be claimed on the grounds that our discernment of truth was entered into as a ‘work in progress’; because we are acquainted with re-presentations of truth and not true representations (of the so called external/internal world(s)). Moreover, our appreciation of ‘our appreciation of an apparently true re-presentation’, etc., can only determine a certain, provisional degree of ‘adequacy’ or ‘inadequacy’ in this regard (through our ‘resolution and determination’ of that process of appreciation, etc.) (and with regard to its meta-appreciation, etc.). However, for most of the time, the provisional nature of our determinations in effect, can be conveniently overlooked. (33)

What consequences do these implications have for the limits that should be imposed upon theological exposition? (34)

4.   	The Necessary Acceptance of Provisional Truth by the Theologian

	In the light of this previous exposition on the phenomenological nature of our convictions it behooves the theologian to realize that they too must operate, like all the denizens of this life-world, between the limits set by the impossibilities of an absolute skepticism and an absolute certainty. Hence, in this respect, the theologian cannot be criticized for sticking between these natural limits that flag the potential possibility of human thought. So, e.g., a theologian may believe in ‘the existence of God’ they cannot argue for the absolute existence of the same, or, express the ‘fact’ that they have an absolute conviction in this same regard! A conviction, of course, can be expressed, but only a provisional one. The fact of having a conviction in this regard should not be under examination, that would be expected, only the adequacy or inadequacy of that belief should be the subject of our enquiry, or at least, made the subject of enquiry by that theologian themself. How is such an enquiry undertaken authentically? (35)

5.	Finding Authenticity

	Authenticity is realized when we find ourselves living in conformity with the nature of the life-world! Let me briefly elaborate what is meant by this formula. (36)

	As circles within circles experience is intentionally constituted through the auspices of the hermeneutic circle. Gestalt backgrounds are experienced as ‘wholes’, focalized aspects of a background are experienced through the dissonance of their ‘particularity’, and, the relationship between these two aspects creates a ‘sense of self’ in keeping with the nature of that particular gestalt field itself being focused upon. The appropriate balance and functioning of these three aspects of the hermeneutic circle, as previously discussed, will allow acts of judgment to authentically manifest themselves with the appropriate degree of conviction re the same and whose adequacy is stamped through the ‘forging’ of its manufacture; each act of judgment being delivered with a stamp that equally reflects the degree of authenticity that was entered into during the realization of that act of judgment! Like official hallmarks impressed upon pieces of silver the authenticity of those pieces become bespoken for in this regard. In a similar vein no processes nor products of judgmental acts can be either completely inauthentic or completely authentic. Between these limits degrees of authenticity are stamped upon the production of those acts of judgment. So, by closely inspecting the nature of those judgements we, at least theoretically, should be able to discern the authenticity of their delivery. And how is this act of discernment performed? Intuitively! Through the metaphorical ‘taste’ we find in sampling the re-simulated nature of that judgment. And how do we perform this tasteful act of discernment? Through the adequate reconstitution or re-simulation of that act of judgment subjected to a sufficient degree of transcendental detachment and distance within the context of our entire experience as a human individual in the intersubjective embrace of the life-world! Quite simple really! Because that is what we do, in part or in whole, every wakeful moment our intentional lives are spent within this world-of-life! 
(37)

	In effect, this skill is already mastered by the person every moment they ‘overcome the natural attitude’ through the necessary presence of the exercise of a transcendental attitude that gives birth to an act of judgment. All it behooves us to do is to refine our practice in this natural art of judgment and develop an existentially aware judgmental discernment that accompanies this act of judgment. Therein, in the process, developing and re-developing our authenticity as a-person-living-in-this-world-of-life. (38)

	So, is it ‘in setting out this way’ that authenticity is to be found? No! Preconditionally and prior to the judgmental act we could say ‘we are setting out to find authenticity’ but experientially, and existentially, we do not find authenticity, the spirit of authenticity finds us!! When the appropriate preconditions are in place we are ‘found’ by the ‘spirit of authenticity’ resident in the existential core of that relationship. This ‘spirit’, the ‘living integrity of that relationship’ then finds, through processes of hermeneutic surplus created and re-created within the hermeneutic circle, the ability to metaphorically ‘speak to us’. Then, reflection is no longer ‘mere reflection’ but also an ‘activity’, an ‘instruction’ or virtual ‘command’, which, as a ‘response’, involves experiencing a spontaneous activity that flows from the centre of that relationship in conformity with the nature of that relationship and by such means allows us to find, in turn, an authenticity of being through our being able to conform to the very nature of the life-world itself. Hence the formula as presented at the start of this section that states authenticity is realized when we find ourselves living in conformity with the nature of the life-world! That is, living in this world (of life) in a process of harmony whose degree of harmonization is such as ‘to be found experienced’ as being ‘in a state of harmony’ (through an existentialization of the harmony that by necessity is already resident at the core of our activity in this world as ‘an individual monad in an already transcendentally established ‘community of monads’’). (39)

6. 	Finding Conviction in Our Convictions

	When do our convictions stand convicted? (40)

	How do we find an authenticity in our convictions? By finding that the entire hermeneutic circle is enacted in good faith in the realization of those convictions! By that I mean, no acts of bad faith are wittingly allowed to enter into those three dialectical moments that constitute its creativity, that produce and re-produce that surplus of value, meaning and meaningfulness that overflows from the very centre of our intentional being. Now, the provisional nature of our research programs means we are capable of missing the mark, but, be that as it may, in entering in to our being in the world in an attitude of good faith implies an openness to acts of self-deception that might otherwise be allowed to mislead us. At each of these three ideal points on this hermeneutic circle we maintain the necessary degree of self-vigilance! (41)

In the phenomenological perspective, from its time orientation of the past, the analytical and reductive, we don’t restrict our openness to the categories and content of this world-of-life on an a priori basis. (42)

Similarly, in a hermeneutical perspective we don’t necessarily accept the fact of our categories and their content in our topic under the pressure and duress of (expectations born/borne in) our cultural and intercultural beliefs and practices. (43)

Lastly, in an existential perspective we don’t treat, or mistreat, the provisional nature of our research as anything other than ‘provisional’ despite the production and reproduction of a sense of conviction that might or might not develop in the course of that research. Although our ontological (and religious) commitments will mirror the nature of our received convictions we will at no stage treat them as if a closed book, as pronouncements signed and sealed for all eternity. Otherwise ‘our convictions would stand convicted’ being produced and reproduced in a medium contaminated by acts of bad faith. (44)

	Or, put another way, we leave open all a priori categories and content (such as the possibility of the existence of the divine, eg.); we don’t merely subscribe to positive public opinion or our own opinion (as to the ‘proven fact’ of God’s existence, e.g.); and we treat the productivity of our research programs as provisional (so our ‘final’ conclusion as to the existence or non-existence of God is always left open, e.g.). By such means effectively putting in place the necessary presence of a transcendental suspension (reduction and reconstitution) as the necessary condition(s,) (preconditions and postconditions) for the establishment of an act of judgment (and its delivery of judgmental content). In its complexity an act of judgment finds the delivery of judgmental content through the auspices of this hermeneutic circle. (45)

	Born in this sense of conviction, reflecting the degree to which a hermeneutic/existential surplus is realized, an overall sense of commitment is thematized and incorporated in the sedimentation that constitutes our intentional psyche. The authenticity of that sedimentation reflecting the authenticity or lack of authenticity allowed to enter into the constitution those convictions that, in sedimentation, go to constitute this overall sense of identity and history realized in this intentional sense of self! (46)

7.	Finding (an) Authenticity in Religious Experience (of the Divine)

	Regardless of the contents of an act of judgmental discernment what is conducted authentically is authentically conducted regardless of whether we are experiencing a religious type of experience or a non-religious type of experience, regardless of whether a religious experience is a religious experience of some sense of the divine or is a religious experience that does not involve some sense of the divine. What is authentically experienced (with the appropriate degree of transcendental ‘depth’) is authentically experienced regardless of pre-judgmental content and post-judgmental outcomes. In this light the theologian should be tolerant and respect ‘all forms of authenticity’ realizing that all forms of experience are in their existential core authentic, in conformity with the being and nature of the life-world (as perceived or simulated, or more correctly, re-presented rather than represented). (47)

	At the same time in opening ourselves up to the authenticity of experience, regardless of whether it is a religious experience or a non religious experience, regardless of whether it is a religious experience of a some sense of the divine or a religious experience without some sense of the divine, all authentic experience finds for us, in turn, an authenticity of being in this world-of-life. An authenticity by virtue of the fact that authenticity at the same time is opening us up to our being able to live in conformity with this world-of-life in accordance with our ability to appreciate this authenticity of spirit that breathes through the course of all our relationships, be they important or relatively unimportant. And it by such means, already demonstrated as a fact, that we have already found a degree of harmony in our lives that allows us to live this individual life of ours, to some degree or other, as a life already lived in a relatively harmonious community of other individuals living their life in a similar fashion with us. Not that this is an ideal community, it is, nevertheless, a community that is already to some extent harmoniously engaged with each other (even in the very midst of social chaos and the evils of war, eg., our ‘social’ behaviour maintains an existential core of harmonious performance in all aspects of its intentionality which through forms of ‘enlargement’ becomes the grounds for possible modes of conflict resolution, etc.). However in its ideality, in its existential core, this community is foundered on this spirit of authenticity that breathes at the very centre of our relationships regardless who or what faces us and whom or what we face in turn. That only our sensitivity to this aspect of our relationships and its actual existential refinement allows us to find a greater authenticity in our own being-in-this-world, or rather, permits a deeper authenticity to ‘find us’ in our openness to the nature of this world-of-life…. (48)

8.	The Concept and Potential Ramifications of Theological Difference

	In this paper I argued earlier, in effect, that the authenticity of a relationship is stamped upon the very fabric of that relationship and all that devolves therein from it. That, in a ‘close reading’ or re-examination of that relationship, through an inspection of its productivity, we should be able to discern in the printing ‘imprinted’ upon that fabric the existential nature of its ideal or essential being, the phenomenological nature of its-being-with-us-in-this-world-of-life. In the same way we might ask ourselves could the ‘being of the divine’, its hypothetical existence granted, in the same fashion be found imprinted upon that material and relational fabric formed in the world subjected to this type relationship? (49)

With this type of speculation in mind I would now like to discuss my concept of theological difference, and, tentatively, propose a transcendental-type of argument that would assert that this difference is not fundamentally symmetrical, i.e., between ‘a world without some sense of the divine’ and ‘a world with some sense of the divine’; that various philosophical arguments could be run that would appear to favour the latter position; allowing us to further refine our understanding of the nature of this sense of the divine and the possible manner it might imprint itself upon the fabric of the world; suggesting the possibility that given an adequate hermeneutic frame of reference we might find ourselves being able to adequately read these footprints, or fingerprints, of  the divine; and thereby possibly allowing us to engage ourselves with the question as to the whether this divinity is merely some virtual sense of the divine or an actual sense of the Divine that can act in its own right as an agent with some form of (self-)intentional being or its analogical equivalent??? (50)

	The concept of theological difference can be viewed from two directions. (51)

From the perspective of the theologian there is the question “What difference does the acceptance, or rejection, of the idea of the divine (or Divine) have for the person, as a religious person, in the world?” (52)

Then, the same question, more or less, can be asked in a metaphysical perspective “Is there a (transcendental) difference between ‘a concept of the world that involves no sense of the divine’ and ‘a concept of the world that involves a sense of the divine’?” (53)

	The first question can flow from the second and is more the preserve of the theologian. The theologian asking themselves, in effect, does the concept of god matter? or why the idea of god should be seriously entertained?! (54)

The second question is a deep question engaged on a presuppositional level that attempts to look beyond the merely logical nature of this question. Although these two alternatives, in their possession of logical ‘sense’, seem to possess the same equivalence in logical ‘weight’, the deeper question is being posed, namely, do these two alternatives actually possess the ‘same weight’ in logical, ontological and epistemological perspectives, i.e., in a metaphysical perspective (i.e., as viewed from a transcendental perspective). That, in effect, it is being suggested that a transcendental argument (through a global suspension of all commitments) could be constructed that in running would argue for an asymmetrical relationship between these two ‘logically equal’ possibilities in favour of the view that the world must also subsume, to some degree, the implication of some ongoing sense of the divine in its incorporation?! Is this type of question a valid question to ask? Are we allowed to actually formulate a transcendental type of argument in the 21st Century? (55)

	By ‘transcendental argument’ I mean ‘the necessary acceptance of the (metaphysical) position involved in that argument in order to be able to actually entertain the construction of other arguments when the latter could not be entertained logically, ontologically and epistemologically without the former’. E.g., some concept of an intentional ego is involved in our considering whether a certain agent might have intentionally performed a certain action ‘x’. So, in order to ask ‘if a certain agent performed x’ a transcendental argument is already running to the effect that ‘an agent is capable of performing an act like-x, an x-like act, logically, ontologically and epistemologically’, i.e., meta-physically. (56)

	Translated into a theological arena our question then becomes – in formulating a concept of the world “is it possible to formulate a concept of the world without the necessary implication in some form or other of a concept of the divine?” Can we truly think the concept of ‘the world’ without some (overt or covert) sense of the divine or parallel equivalent? (57)

	Many people, adopting a modern reductionist, scientific viewpoint, would almost automatically answer “that modern physics can be conducted without any reference to a sense of God or the divine in some form or other”. Modern education, it would seem, is also predicated on just such a secular premise. Superficially, it is my belief, they would be right to voice this opinion. Physics books need have no reference to an idea of the divine, at least overtly. But it is on a non-overt level that I think they fail to appreciate what, transcendentally, is at stake here! Let me elaborate. (58)

	The concept of ‘the world’ must possess integrity in order to be ‘a’ concept. Presuppositionally the ‘world’ is ‘the’ world and its integrity is fundamental to our thinking this concept logically, ontologically and epistemologically (i.e., metaphysically). This does not mean we think logically of an absolutely integrated world – because that cannot be thought; integrity is thought in and through a process of integration. Nor can we think of a world that is absolutely non-integrated - for under those conditions it would not be a world, a world that is ‘a’ world. Not being logically thinkable, a world completely lacking integrity equally cannot be entertained; neither epistemologically nor ontologically. In other words, we are metaphysically wedded to a concept of the world that is integrated to some extent or other, i.e., must possess some degree of integrity in the thematization of its identity (as ‘the’ world or ‘a’ world in ‘the life-world’) both with respect to the concept itself and for the person who experiences that sense of their being in ‘a’ world. (59)

	The ‘concept of the world’ implies that ‘the world’ must, by necessity, possess some degree of integrity. That granted (transcendentally), is it not conceivable that this degree of integrity could be experienced as some sense of the divine, if only in principle or in theory? If the world is appreciated as ‘a’ world it implies that to some extent this integrity can be experienced, is being experienced. And that granted, if only hypothetically, might it not be the case that with some form of deeper appreciation this integrity of the world could be ‘seen’ as an aspect of reality possessing divine integrity if only in principle? As this logical-epistemological possibility cannot be ruled out I believe our entertaining of the ontological concept of ‘the world’ implicates, if only theoretically, this sense of the divine to the extent that the 'integrity' of the world could be viewed in a spiritual light as possessing some form of ‘spiritual integrity’. To think ‘world’ is to think of its ‘integrity’ and that this ‘sense of integrity’ could both be and be experienced as an ‘aspect of the divine’ in some form or other. The designation of ‘divine’ by virtue of the fact that its integrity is greater in degree, quantitatively and qualitatively, than the psychic integrity of an individual person or community of individuals, etc., because of its inclusion of the same. That the ‘integrity’ of the world could both be and be experienced would possibly appear to implicate a sense of the divine by virtue of the fact that this ‘integrity' vastly transcends the psychic integrity of an individual person, moreover, by their inclusion in the world in a (monadic) community of (monadic) individuals the integrity of this integrated aspect of the world must equally transcend the psychic integrity of that type of community likewise – hence its implication as ‘divine’ through the sheer relative greatness of this transcendence (without necessarily ruling in or out the openness or limits on this sense of World). In other words, ‘that wholes are greater than the sum of their parts’, and, in effect, ‘that our experience of a whole is greater than the totality of our individual experiences of its parts’. (60)

Moreover, the following type of distinction should be noted, that as a consequence of the previous argument “that the whole is greater than the mere sum of its parts” this relational ‘excess’, of the whole over the mere sum of its parts, is experienced as an ‘existential excess’ by virtue of the experiential fact that this relational contribution cannot be discovered reductively nor synthetically but only through the ‘existential suspension’ of both the analytical reductive suspension and the synthetical reconstitutive suspension.  That is, only through entertaining both ‘the whole’ and the metaphorical subtraction of ‘the sum of its parts’ is the relational excess experienced as an ‘excess’ which therefore cannot be just an experience of the synthetic totality of that state of affairs nor something that could be discovered reductively (as in a reductionist-type of science, e.g.)!.  Hence the ‘existential’ nature of this aspect of our research – the third moment in our hermeneutic circle – that aspect of experience that stands in relation to synthesis and analysis but at the same time cannot be read purely in the light of either party! That in effect the real ‘integrity’ of a system, correctly, should not be viewed as just the synthetic totality of that system (when either directly experienced or analogically represented symbolically). This excess in experience is normally ‘read’ as ‘presence’, a ‘sense of presence’ whose ‘value, meaning and meaningfulness’ is created and re-created within the confines of this hermeneutic circle, and, where conversely ‘absence’ can be read as the relative lack of presence or as the relative lack of an existential excess. (61)

	Such an argument does not, of course, argue for a form of Divinity (with a sense of the Divine) in the more classical theological sense. However, this argument once accepted in its transcendentality would by the creation of such a conviction induce a theological turn wherein certain aspects of the integrity of the world could be viewed in experience as manifesting to some degree, whether appreciated or not appreciated, a relatively incontrovertible sense of the divine (because this ‘integral excess’ cannot be reduced nor synthetically attributed, and, hence must be uniquely apportioned to that individual relationship itself; through the ‘self-apparent interdependent uniqueness of all relationships’?). (62)

	In a similar fashion, if an argument (with the necessary transcendental flavour) could be erected to show that this sense of the divine also possessed some sense of agency in its involvement in this world (and with respect to this implied sense of a Divine Self) it could then be seen, via this Theological shift (with a large ‘T’) to implicate some sense of the ‘Divine’.  But my arguments, as outlined in this paper, are not dependent upon this second ‘Theological shift’ (with a large ‘T’ – a theological topic whose transcendental possibility will be looked at in depth in a later paper in the perspective of a process theology). (63)

	What are the ramifications of this concept of theological difference (with a small ‘t’)? As stated at the beginning of this section this concept can be viewed from two directions. From the perspective of the theologian it was asked “What difference does the acceptance, or rejection, of the idea of the divine (or Divine) have for the person, as a religious person, in the world?” Of course it behooves the theologian to impress upon us that there is just such a difference, or, at least, a belief and ensuing commitment in the intentional object-state presented/re-presented by such a concept should make a difference in our religious lives…? (64)

An initial inspection of this position, even with a modicum of criticism, should reveal at least two problems. First, there are a number of religions on this planet that overtly do not subscribe to this theological description of the world. Second, even if this description were to be accepted, would it not be fallacious to insist that this ‘description’ should also have an ‘injunctive force’ and impel some form of a ‘commitment’ (and that even this last statement, as a meta-statement, itself ‘must’ lack an injunctive force in turn, etc.)? Would this type of an uncritical ‘observation’ not invoke some form of a naturalistic fallacy? (65)

In response to the first criticism I believe it would be very hard to find a religion that does not possess at least some covert form of a recognition of a sense of the divine or numinous. There may be no overt formulation along theological lines, however, in a covert format an argument might be made for some form of an implicit theological-like formulation that for various reasons has been left unnamed, unidentified, undefined, non-described, merely implied, etc. Even if the numinous is treated as non-theological, phenomenologically many of the features of that type of experience regarded as the summun bonum of that religious philosophy could still be subsumed under a theological rhetoric as mysterious, awe-inspiring, fascinating, highly personal, experienced as if in a personal relationship, etc., etc. (66)

In response to the second criticism I believe that, although on a relatively superficial level we should make a distinction between various essential, essentially different, kinds of judgment acts, on a relatively fundamental level all forms of judgment utilize the same transcendental machinery! That in effect all distinctive forms of judgment can be compared, and, distinctive fields can be subjected to forms of transformation that allow us to explore what remains invariant under such shifts in the psychic location of our attention and comprehension. This does not imply, however, that such forms of deep investigation would necessarily be productive of value, insight, self-illumination, etc. So in a deeper frame of reference, given the above, matters of a descriptive nature and/or of a factual nature can be compared with matters of an ethical (or injunctive) nature and vice versa. That in a properly conducted transcendental format (that allows us to ‘mirror’ this higher, more organized, level of function more deeply embedded in the transcendental-epistemological processes that constitute our intentional being) there is an overcoming of relatively superficial fallacies that distinguish between apparently incommensurable forms of distinctive value judgments (as exhibited, e.g., between ethical ‘duty’ and pragmatic ‘utility’, etc., etc.) (67)

Hence, in theoretical terms of reference, we could argue hypothetically that in accepting this concept of theological difference on a deep epistemological level of experience a shift in value commitments would, indeed should, occur. I.e., if one were to accept this concept, that one should privilege a theologically involved description of the world, then it should flow as a matter of course that our ‘ontological commitments’ along spiritual lines would reflect the nature of this theological involvement in the light of how we envisage that that type of involvement might take (if at all). All commitments, in the first place, being seen as the resolution realized to date of any tensions resident in that world view. Resolution of our commitments being realized through the resolution of tensions cognitively realized and appreciated between our various belief-claims through their greater integration and overall harmonization. (68)

So, among the many theologically involved visions of the world which should we chose if we find ourselves accepting this privileging of the theological over the non-theological? Or do we need to absolutely chose? (69)

9. 	Finding the Right Map for Making a Theological Turn (with a small ‘t’) 

	The right map is a no-map… (70)

	If we were to go into a shop selling maps would it make sense to ask for a map that maps out the relationship particular maps have with each other, in effect a meta-map, a map that would help us to evaluate individual maps? It would be a very strange map indeed! On the other hand we could go into that same shop and ask, say, for the best map of Sydney, in order to choose one that better suits our purpose or need for a map of Sydney. But if the map seller did not know what our needs were in this regard how could they give us the ‘best map of Sydney’ if they had a number of quite different maps, all of an equal quality, to chose from? (71)

	Now a map is a symbolic portrayal of the world whose representation is created from a certain type of perspective in order to fulfil certain types of needs. In a similar fashion we might say (meant in a non-reductionist fashion), from a superficial perspective, that the variety of religions found in the market place are also created from certain types of perspectives in order to fulfil certain types of needs. Moreover, as no map totally mis-represents the nature of the world no religion in its religious representation of the world could do likewise. Conversely, as no map can absolutely mirror the world no religion either could completely mirror the world from its spiritual point of view. Still, granted that all religious philosophies to some extent successfully mirror the world should we not ask which philosophies might ‘better mirror the world’? Without a doubt let us be tolerant of all forms of religion, but, let us at the same time learn how to exercise a sense of discrimination that would let us come to appreciate which philosophies do this task more successfully, at least from our own points of view! So, asking for a meta-map in this regard is not as nonsensical as it might have first seemed. But would it me a map? Indeed yes, but, one should not confuse a map with a meta-map, yet, at the same time, one should appreciate that all ‘maps’ map regardless of their meta-status! Furthermore one should also realize that different maps are constructed through the lenses of essentially different types of judgment (hence essential (or phenomenal) maps, aesthetical maps, ethical maps, pragmatical maps, hermeneutical maps, factual maps, and, permutations and subdivisions of the same, etc.). (72)

	What makes a ‘map of x’ a ‘map’ of x? For a start for ‘x’ to be mapable ‘x’ must be in a state that can be mapped, i.e., must already exist as a potentially mapable entity, that to some extent has already been mapped. Then, the relationship between a ‘map of x’ and ‘x’ is one in which an isomorphic invariance is entertained between both ‘maps’ to the extent that there is at least a minimal isomorphic invariance between the meta-map of ‘the map of x’ and the map of  ‘x’. This territory of ‘core invariance’ allows us to experientially entertain this epistemological/ontological  transition between the meta-map of the map of x and the map of ‘x’ and vice versa. In other words, without having to propose or deny an external world, we are entertaining a symmetrical transformation between both simulated parties in such a manner that the internal relationships that appear to constitute the relative object-language of ‘x’ are mirrored, in those essential regards, on the meta-level of the ‘map of x’. Hence in mapping the world we are only mapping what has already been mapped, in effect only re-mapping it. To that extent each individual understanding of the world must reflect all other understandings, to some degree or together, by virtue of the fact that the ‘genre’ of mapping is psychically centreed in the public domain; that our appropriation and adaptation of the same must also reflect this fact of our pre-access to this behaviour of mapping and map reading. And to this extent all our tools for the investigation of the life-world must equally mirror that world, this world-of-life. So a spade used for digging the garden ‘tells’ us that the world , in some manner ‘is a place that can be dug’. So if our tools, our maps reflect the world, and vice versa, what consequences should we be able to draw from this understanding of the world? (73)

	For a start, if the divine, or Divine, enters into phenomenal existence an imprint, or fingerprint, of the divine, or Divine, should be able to reveal itself given the right interpretative framework, due diligence in this regard, and our ability to hermeneutically recognize the revelation of this apparent ‘presence’, at least in theory. Of course, if one of those conditions is not met then this project would meet with its failure, an individual failure that does not necessarily invalidate this type of investigation however. Therefore, given the right mapping of the life-world, the right interpretation of this mapping, the relative presence or absence of the divine, or Divine, should be able to present itself, by proxy, for our enquiry. Given the culturally diverse forms of theological formulation that seem to inhabit any particular cultural milieu it stands to reason that this task is not going to be easy one nor one that could be disposed of in too quick an manner through a blanket rejection of this type of investigation! (74)

	Now, given that this mapping of the world-of-life is constituted in intentional consciousness through a focus of our attention within the appropriate field(s) of attention and that our sense of self, in turn, is constituted through a mutual contrast and negation with the same, as with each of these three facets of our hermeneutic circle, it follows that through such interdependence no non-relative aspect of that relationship could be isolated except provisionally. In other words, if all value, meaning and meaningfulness is realized through their mutual interaction and that even our (various) sense(s) of self is/(are) likewise thematized through such gestalt contrast then it follows that all forms of value, meaning and meaningfulness have no non-relative substantial form (or format). As no absolute value, etc., can be revealed it then follows that there can be no absolute forms of value, etc! Thus, on realizing the provisional nature of our intentional constitution and its constitution of this world-of-life as a world constituted by-us, for-us, as a cultural-world-of-life, it follows that despite the existential richness of this cultural-life-world, our world-of-life is essentially one constituted with a fundamentally nihilistic flavour! All three moments of our hermeneutic circle are only dialectical moments characterized through their continual ongoing transcendence of the other two, etc. So the sense of an ego, whether our own or someone else’s, is in effect simulated through its interdependent contrast with that which it is not. So, similarly, the sense of a world, or the sense of an object(-state) are both equally only simulations likewise in this intersubjective-subjective arena of the life-world.  In effect, therefore, through the provisional, non-absolute nature of all forms of intentional experience, our experience in this world-of-life is one that is simulated and all that is met therein is equally simulated. Nothing is met that is not simulated, and all that is simulated is essentially (no-thing,) nothing! Only the non-absolute, provisional simulation of a thing is simulated and re-simulated in the apparent continuity of the experiential stream of phenomenal experience that therein simulates phenomenal existence. But this nihilistic vision need not be a negative one! Let me briefly elaborate upon this very important distinction. (75)

	As all intentionally constituted experience is simulated it implies that all simulated experiences, qua simulations, are equally as real or unreal as all other instances of simulation. However, in experience not all instances of simulation have the same ‘sense of reality or unreality’ in our experience of those acts of simulation. E.g., dreams are somehow seen as dream-like, whereas, acts of perception are seen as non-dream-like, etc. If all were a simulation how do we account for this difference in ‘phenomenal’ reality (and the apparently intersubjective nature of the reporting of certain forms of experience such as the ‘shared’ perception of sense objects?)? (76)

	As argued elsewhere it is the ‘modal richness of the presentation’ that allows us to ‘intuit the relative realness’ of that presentation, what modalities it apparently has access to, what permission and advantage it gives us in our finding an access to the same. Moreover, the deconstruction and absence of both an ‘external world’ and an ‘internal world(s)’ does not imply or mean the deconstruction and absence of the life-world! Therein all object-states are directly ‘perceived’ in intentional consciousness from their ‘point of view’ as ‘seen’ from ‘our own individual point of view’. Hence the relativity and intersubjectivity of our passage through this world-of-life, wherein non-virtual and virtual phenomena can be constructed or reconstructed in and through our mutual intentional existences. So we can ‘compare’ our perceptions of an apple tree being seen by more than one person, e.g., and, ‘reconstruct’ for some other person what we might have dreamt about last night, the intensity and location of our experiences of pain, etc. (77)

	Now, a negative nihilism is predicated on an attitude of ‘nothing but’! We are nothing but our bodies, our bodies are nothing but atoms and molecules, and, the same are nothing but a near virtual world of fundamental particles, states and forces flashing into and our of existence at the same time, etc. Therefore, there can be no fundamental meaning as the world is essentially nothing, empty. A negative style of nihilism has an abundant miscellany of arguments to produce this type of analysis. On the other hand, and often completely overlooked or outrightly misinterpreted, a positive nihilism recognizes that in our passage through the world-of-life, through the hermeneutic circle, etc., there is created and re-created an ‘existential excess of value, meaning and meaningfulness’ that cannot be reduced, or dismissed, in the same fashion that a negative nihilist would like to adopt. The positive nihilist accepts the arguments of the negative nihilist but also perceives the necessary role played by the existential aspect of our hermeneutic circle. So the world may be ‘empty’ but it is also ‘a wonderful emptiness potentially full of value, meaning and meaningfulness’! So, our understanding of the life-world, constituted in intentional experience, may well be treated as provisional, imperfect, empty, aspectival, fragmentary and flawed, nevertheless, through our appreciation of the ‘relational excess’ generated in our relational experiences, our transcendental suspension of the suspensions embedded in the hermeneutic circle, and, our resultant ‘direct perceptions’ within our relationships within the life-world the positive nihilist also perceives the world full of value, meaning and meaningfulness, indeed, as a world overflowing with a richness of being, a richness found in direct proportion to the existential manner of our purportment entered into within this world-of-life! (78)

	Now, an acceptance of this style of analysis, as presented by the positive nihilist, implies that a theology too can be found full of existential value, meaning and meaningfulness if the formulation(s) argued for by the theologian are grounded in and through this tripartite division of the hermeneutic circle treated collectively. The existential theologian accepts the type of arguments presented by the negative nihilist but also argues that there is more than meets the eye, or short-sighted vision, of that type of blinkered practitioner! The vision of the theologian may well be treated as ‘provisional, imperfect, empty, aspectival, fragmentary and flawed’, nevertheless, in this life-world there is also to be found a sense of presence that can inspire the discovery of an incredible, wonderful sense of value, meaning and meaningfulness in the very fabric of the world itself. In this light the theological treatment of the world is just one way the interplay of ‘presence and absence’ is to be grappled with from a more global perspective; an attempt to find meaning in how the living fabric of the world is somehow woven as if from one material, by one hand, lends itself as a gift, reveals and conceals itself at the same time. Just as metaphors have to be transcended to be appreciated (through our moving on in the hermeneutic circle from the reductive suspension to the rhetorical re-constitutive suspension) in a similar fashion our metaphor and rhetoric of a theological nature also have to be transcended. Then, our transcendence, in turn, of their joint negations (of the metaphorically reductive and the rhetorically re-constitutive) in turn opens us up to the existential insight of the third moment in this hermeneutic circle of theological appreciation; opening ourselves up to a discovery of the meaningfulness pregnant in the current relationship under investigation (whether that be entertained in a theological mode or in a secular non-theological mode). Then, it only behooves us to enter into the balanced suspension of the hermeneutic circle itself for us to find ‘our freedom to think and our freedom to be’ – to find ourselves actively embracing, and being embraced by, this living-world-of-life! A ‘living’ world-of-life by virtue of the existential fact that an excess of life is found in this world that can be neither reduced to the collection of its apparent parts nor their collective totality. An ‘excess that is lived’ that must be ‘spiritual’ by nature because it can be neither reduced to this collection of ‘material’ parts nor to the collection of those ‘material’ parts treated in their totality! (79)

How is this recognition of a ‘spiritual dimension’ to be understood? Does our recognition of this spiritual dimension of our being implicate a sense of the divine (or a sense of the Divine with a large ‘D’?)? This sort of question is not going to be investigated and resolved in this paper, suffice to say, however, that it is my belief that this concept of theological difference, when deeply thought about, does seem to weight the scales in favour of a theological treatment of the life-world. In making this theological turn (with a small ‘t’) what sort of religious commitment, resolution and response might one expect to flow from this type of position? (80)

How we should cash in this sort of ‘insight' I will be looking at in future papers in this series. It should be stated, however, that, as things stand, this embryonic theological treatment of the life-world does not support the more classical or traditional forms of theology, rather, supports the recognition of a need for an openness to the sense of the numinous that is expressed through religious experiences that seem to capture a sense of the ‘existential integrity’ of the life-world; that which seems to reveal therein a non-material, spiritual dimension to our-being-in-the-world! (81)

	The possibility of this first theological turn granted what implications can be drawn with respect to the title of this paper Finding a Place for the Idea of God – Part III: Is there an Existential Way of Doing Theology? (82)

10.  	Conclusion: Can We Existentially Find a Place for the Idea of God?

	In this paper there has been a surfeit of philosophical argumentation that will not have been easy to digest and critically appreciate on a first hearing or reading! Therefore let me take the most important bones of my argument and try to connect them together to form at least a rational skeleton of an argument. (83)

	I would like to do this concentrating on the sequence of the following six concepts already introduced in the course of this paper, namely, the existential moment, positive nihilism, theological difference, theological turn, the import of a spiritual dimension, and, possibilities for, and ramifications of, a theological commitment. (84)

	The existential moment has been described as the third moment of our hermeneutic circle (and the third moment of our hermeneutical circle of theological appreciation). Let me look at this from a ‘textual point of view’. A text is that ‘which has been inscribed upon the fabric of the world’. It is something that has happened. In our passage through the life-world it is the ‘residue’ that is left over, or ‘deposited’, in our intentional making a passage through this world-of-life. Whether as a classical text like ‘writing a letter’ or as a non-classical text like walking along a beach and ‘leaving our footprints’ on the edge of the tide our intentionality involves the adoption of a meta-text or genre of intentional activity and adapting it to the situation-to-hand. In the two examples mentioned that would involve writing a specific letter to someone or other, and, walking this way and not that way along the beach. In order to ‘read’ this text we need to ascertain the involvement of an intentional mode of activity, a genre of human behaviour, that would allow us to perceive the presence of an intentionality that was once exercised in the formation of a certain textual deposition in its impression upon the fabric of the world. This meta-textual aspect of textual formation is intersubjective in its appreciation and is future-oriented through its powers of prediction as to how one should conform in the exercise of that particular genre of activity. So, when one is walking along the beach our footprints are usually only separated by a few ‘feet’. When we find this type of prediction being confirmed we find our perception of genre also to have been confirmed. Now, when we ‘read a text’ a third aspect of textuality is presented, namely, the sense of the non-textual. Too often, philosophically, this third aspect is overlooked, not recognized, misunderstood or just ignored, etc! This existential ‘third moment’ is rooted in the present and involves a sort of metaphorical ‘seeing through of the text’. In our absorption with a text that is readable for us we find ourselves forgetting that we are reading a text. In reading a novel, e.g., when we are actually reading it with much enjoyment we are not consciously focused on the fact that we are reading. Indeed, as soon as we start to think that type of thought we have begun to disengage from that text to hand. It is a bit like in music, as I have too often found, that the moment I am thinking ‘I am playing well’ it is at that moment, or one very soon after, that I start making a mess of that piece of music. So, in our existential engagement with a text the sense of the text as a text qua text is temporarily lost for us. It is as if we are reading a non-text, or, not reading. Now, all three moments are defined through their mutually interdependent contrast with each other and so a balance between all three aspects or moments is called for. When that state of ongoing balance is realized I would suggest there is further refinement of this sense of the non-textual experience from the existential point of view, namely, an experience of the not-textual wherein there is discovered no absolute distance between the ‘virtual’ author of that text and the ‘actual’ reader of that text (just as would occur, to some extent, for the author when engaged in reading back over their own texts). What has been argued for here is that the third moment in the hermeneutic circle is existential and non-textual in nature, and, is an aspect that is overlooked more often than not (especially by postmodern philosopher in their preoccupied concentration upon meta-textual features like edges, margins, titles, introductions, definitions, summaries, conclusions, etc.). (85)

	Because each of these three moments (of the hermeneutic circle) involved in the reading of a text mutually define each other we can neither seek nor claim that there exists a ‘pure text’, an ‘ideal meta-text’ nor a perfect non-textual act of sheer reading. But, rather than assuming negative nihilistic consequences for this inability of ours to find a pure text, etc., we should instead adopt a positive nihilistic position. In an act of reading there is to be discovered an excess of value, meaning and meaningfulness generated at the centre of that activity in direct proportion to the fruitfulness of that act of reading. This excess is the ‘existential difference discovered between our appreciation of the parts of a text and the overall totality of that text’. Our appreciation of the import of this non-texutal aspect or moment (and its refinement in the ongoing balance of the not-textual aspect of an act of reading) should bring us to a positive nihilistic understanding of how value, meaning and meaningfulness is created and re-created in our reading of reality, in and through those relationships we enter into within this world-of-life. (86)

	In a simplified understanding of the complex concept of theological difference we argued for the existential fact that to think the concept of the world is to have to think also of its integrity (both as a concept and as the object-state subsumed within that concept). But integrity was not understood as the ‘mere totality of a state of affairs’. Rather, it was seen as that excess felt to be present in the existential integrity of that object-state directly experienced through that relational-situation-to-hand. (87)

Hence, on a global scale, it was suggested that the existential integrity of the world could be seen as ‘non-material’ or ‘spiritual’ in nature and, therein, as relatively divine in complexion(?) Therefore, between the logically equivalent possibilities of ‘a world without some sense of the theological’ and ‘a world with some sense of the theological’ it was felt, on balance, that the latter could (and should?), to some extent, be given some form of preference or privilege? (88)

	Lastly, when this latter preference is given an appropriate degree of privilege, in its wake should follow some form of a consequent theological commitment (at least to this sense of the divine, this experience of the ‘spiritual’ when ‘interpreted’ as an experience of the divine integrity of the life-world). How then, one might ask, does one go about seeking this experiential and existential sense of the spiritual and finding perhaps therein this sense of the divine? In answer to this question let me say, tentatively, that through our recognition of this ‘genre of activity’ as a genre qua genre there is the recognition that this type of activity is already carved out for us in the public domain and it is there that we must start taking up, in an appropriate fashion, current and received religious practice to hand found to be sympathetic to this type of quest. Then in this adoption adapting meta-textual practice(s) that would most likely give us a fruitful, ongoing access to some form of a resolution of this question. (89)

	That all processes of finding, in their fullest sense, must involve the complete use of the hermeneutic circle, and, that all forms of theological investigation must likewise utilize the same transcendental machinery - therein thematizing phenomenal ‘value’, hermeneutic ‘meaning’ and existential ‘meaningfulness’ along with any mutual ‘surplus’ or ‘excess of insight’ created and re-created in and through this appreciation of the life-world. (90)

	Hence, to conclude, I would like to state that, to date, I do believe ‘we can find a place for the idea of god’ (at least with a small ‘g’), and, that ‘there does exist an existential way of doing theology’! Indeed, that all pursuits, whether theological or non-theological in nature, must involve an existential way of being engaged as demanded by the transcendental depths of our intentional being, the degree to which our purportment, in its authenticity, is found to be in conformity with this ‘one’, ‘living’, ‘spiritual’, ‘communal’ realm-of-existence that constitutes this life-world, this one-world-of-life!!!  (91)

Epilogue

	For both the religious person and the non-religious person an understanding of the concept of positive nihilism is of some importance because, under the now feeble onslaught of dated forms of an outmoded modernism and the brash, short-sightedness of extreme forms of postmodernism, contemporary culture has yet to properly pick itself up and learn to dance with a new pluralistic vibrancy only barely indicated in the twitchings and cries of the corpse of current culture that will not, should not, indeed, cannot roll over and die. In this age of globalization world culture will become both international yet proudly national and localized, community re-oriented, personalized, distinctively varied… Although paying lip-service to international fashion trends it will overlay the same with the stamp of its locality both ‘geographical’ and ‘mental’ in aspiration, in the process psychically overcoming and transforming barriers to time and space, race and  culture, education, profession, sexuality, politics, religion…. (92)

To end this paper I would like to discuss ‘my analysis of the sport of soccer’ as a metaphor as to how we need to see the world differently, and, existentially realize therein the world of ‘value, meaning and meaningfulness’ that there is to be found, to find and be found by, in this ‘one’ world-of-life. (93) 

	The negative nihilist would tell you that the game of soccer is ‘nothing but’ ‘two teams playing with a soccer ball on a soccer pitch of a certain size, following certain rules’, etc. But this type of analysis cannot tell you why some people enjoy participating in and/or watching this game. Moreover, the negative nihilist need not stop there and could ‘go on’ to inform their audience that the soccer ball is ‘merely molecules of rubber or plastic that are virtually nothing, empty of substance’… that the person is ‘merely a body with various instinctual drives’, etc. Of course reality is not captured by this pessimistic reductionism and we should not be taken in by such superficial, yet attractive, shadows of an argument. Now, while the positive nihilist would accept these inventories of description and definition as a starting premise, rather than as a finished argument, they would go on to state and show that a whole world of difference can be realized through overlaying it with the concept of interdependence - that value, meaning and meaningfulness are realized in the life-world through a mutual nexus of interrelationships. In other words, through our relationships an existential world is opened up to us whose ‘experiential excess’ cannot be reduced to the longwinded inventories trotted out by the negative nihilists. Although as ‘nihilists’ the positive nihilist still provisionally accept the reductive listings of their ‘colleagues’ they accept that a positive realm of value, etc., is to be found in a world of interdependent interrelationships. Moreover, they remain ‘nihilist’ because they do not regard or treat this world of relational value, etc., as something that is directly substantial, etc. So the relational ‘process’ of the ‘game’ although ‘directly experienced’ is not regarded by them to be some ‘thing’ that is primarily ‘in’ the world although, of course, it indirectly leaves its ‘imprint’ upon the ground, so to speak, when we look at a well worn pitch made worse by inclement weather. In essence, ‘positive’ by virtue of the excess of value that is to be directly realized in this world of relationships, this life-world, and, ‘nihilists’ by virtue of the fact that they do not regard this world of value etc., to be something that can be dissected or analyzed in a reductionistic and substantialistic fashion. That, indeed, this world of value, this life-world, cannot be appreciated without our direct, relationally-oriented, existential living in this ‘one’ world-of-life…! (94) 

And this ‘world of difference’ imports a whole gamut of experience whose ramifications are completely overlooked by the negative nihilist and the non-nihilist! The former with their soulless pessimism, and, the latter with their stale displays of bankrupt debates between miscellaneous concocted versions of realism versus idealism and vice versa. Together, these relics can only lead the culturally blind further down the spiritual cul de sac that still characterizes much of current culture in contrast to the embryonic flowerings of a nascent contemporary culture rooted in an existential attitude to the creation and re-creation of value, etc!  Indeed, in time, a culture that will recognize and cherish this truly lived dimension of the spiritual!!! (95)

							         Noël Tointon, Sydney, 27.8.01.

A Summary of the Major Points Presented by this Paper

1.	The sense of the ‘existential’ was defined as ‘the third moment of the hermeneutic
circle’ (as introduced in our earlier papers).
2.	A phenomenology of finding was outlined that revealed a threefold structured that mirrored our hermeneutic circle.
3.	The concept of theological difference was formulated on the grounds that there is a metaphysical asymmetry which privileges ‘a vision of the world that entails some sense of the divine’ over ‘a vision of the world that entails no sense of the divine’.
4.	A distinction was made between a passive sense of the divine with a virtual sense of mere divinity like some automatic, cosmic computer… and, an active sense of the Divine that possesses an actual sense of self-agency….
5.	An absolute skepticism was dismissed on the grounds that a skeptical act could not be entertained on a presuppositional basis treated in the same manner.
6.	An absolute certainty was also dismissed on the grounds that our discernment of truth was entered into as a ‘work in progress’; because we are not acquainted with representations of truth, or true representations, only a process of re-simulation whose appreciation cannot be absolutely entertained, only subjected to further processes of appreciation, etc., and meta-appreciation, etc.
7.	That thematization can only be entered into through an ongoing process of appreciation wherein our resolutions entered into can only be considered as relatively adequate or inadequate in the contexts of their utilization.
8.	But we do have direct access to our relationships wherein ‘truth’, etc., is realized through an excess of value, meaning and meaningfulness, hence the provisional nature of our research programs despite the natural formation of our convictions and their consequent sense of commitment (through processes of judgmental ‘resolution’).
9.	That the research of a theologian can only be treated as provisional.
10.	Authenticity is realized when we find ourselves living in conformity with the nature of the life-world (distortions of a cultural, neurotic, psychotic and/or psychopathic nature in the epistemological hierarchy of the psyche being reflected in types of inauthenticity corresponding to the distinctive nature of those types of distortion involved).
11.	That, correctly, the existential ‘spirit of authenticity’ finds us!
12.	When do our convictions stand convicted? When acts of resolution are inauthentically realized.
13.	At the existential core of all experience, whether non-religious or religious in nature, resides the spirit of authenticity hence no experience, whether non-religious or religious in nature, should be treated as in a state of absolute non-conformity with the nature of the life-world. 
14. 	Hence the basis for our recognition of a blanket religious tolerance (to be qualified only by our appropriately conducted exercise of a transcendental discrimination).
15.	Theological difference was formulated from two perspectives, namely, that of the theologian who asks questions like “does the concept of god matter?”, or, “should the idea of god be seriously entertained?”… and the metaphysician who perceives a metaphysical asymmetry between certain parallel positive and negative logical state(ment)s regarded as logically symmetrical.
16.	The ‘concept of the world’ implies that ‘the world’ must possess some form of integrity that is neither absolute nor absent.
17.	An existential excess is experienced when the synthetic totality in experience has subtracted the experiential sum of its particular parts. Hence, although the existential moment is related to the synthetic and the analytic, it cannot be reduced merely to either party.
18.	Acceptance of a theological difference results in a theological turn (just as Theological difference results in a Theological turn).
19.	All forms of distinctive value are actually commensurable on some level or other of transcendental discernment (but that such accommodation need not be productive of a profoundness in insight).
20.	All forms of mapping involve a mapping between mappable items and not otherwise (as there can be no mapping of that which is not already mapped to some extent).
21.	The right map for making a theological turn is a ‘no-map ‘(or a non-map/not-map) because all mapping is of a ‘simulation’ of ‘reality’, mapping our ‘relationships’ (which can be considered from a positive nihilistic point of view to constitute ‘no thing’).
22.	Some form of theological difference (or Theological difference) granted then it follows that in our relationships that directly or indirectly involve this aspect of reality we should find imprinted on their existential fabric that sense of the theological (or Theological) (?)
23.	That there is a (life)world of difference between a negative nihilism and a positive nihilism (because only the latter recognizes the existential excess simulated and re-simulated in the relational ‘space’ of the life-world).
24.	A ‘spiritual’ dimension is implicated in our passage through this world when our passage through the life-world of our relationships is seen as ‘relational, lived and non-material….’
25.	We should distinguish between the sense of the current world and the sense of the contemporary world where the latter is rooted in an existential attitude to the creation and re-creation of value, etc., wherein we recognize and cherish this ‘lived dimension of the life-world... that constitutes our spiritual appreciation of this ‘one’ world-of-life.