Finding a Place for the Idea of God – An Abridged Overview of Parts IV-VII
And an Introduction to Part VIII:
Does a Positive Theological Difference Make a Difference??
A Positive Reply?

O.	Introduction

	I have decided to offer a 'shorter' version of the essays IV - VIII in order to concentrate on the main line of my argument, namely, if one was to argue for a positive theological difference and adopt a process type of position in this regard could one also argue for the relevance of that sense of the divine? Put quite bluntly, given the immensity of the cosmos what relevance could any sense of the divine in a process theology possess for us earth-dweller, mere metaphorical 'worms', in any theological vision of this world-of-life? [1]

	Please note, in keeping with the main title of this essay we are entering into a philosophical exploration of the idea of God, exploring the philosophical concept of the same. Moreover, we are conducting this exploration of 'sense' from a transcendental-phenomenological perspective without ontological commitments other than those being proposed from a merely theoretical point of view. [2]

	To facilitate this summary I shall conduct my argument in the main by quoting key sections from this series of papers. [3]

1.	The Conceivable Nature of the Divine and the Possibility of Divine Processes?

The (transcendental) unity of the Lifeworld is something we must accept because ‘what does not exist for us might as well not exist-for-us’! This unity implies a ‘oneness-of this world-of-life! A ‘oneness’ that is neither an absolute unity (which could not be thought) nor one in which there is no trace of forms of dynamic-integration in some form or other. Hence the process-nature of reality! That which is in a state of ongoing-unification (and ongoing self-unification?) (IV.67) 
[4]
	Now, ‘as below - so above’ with this qualification that novel forms of value emerge on every level of epistemological-ontological organization (and therefore cannot be reduced in an absolute sense) implying that we can only metaphorically envisage such forms of emergence, this ability escaping us to that same degree we find ourselves moving beyond our current psychic level of embodiment! (IV.68) [5]

	And in this light the theologian should ideally situate most of their discourse in the world of the here and now in so far as how the divine is thought to be found in the 'immediacy' of this here and now (a theme taken up in Part VIII). [6]
	
	Now, as this sense of the divine, realized through the sense of an ongoing self-unification of the lifeworld, ‘emerges’, ‘is realized through emergence’, it implies that this sense of the divine must be ‘embodied’, albeit with all the qualifications previously brought to bear on this re-invested expression (such as ‘emptiness’, ‘mutual interdependence’, non-substantiality, creativity, relative relational-orientation, etc.). (IV.69) [7]
	
The theological prejudice against ‘being embodied’ stems from, I believe, an unhealthy preoccupation with the human body set in the context of an ongoing cultural devaluation or disvaluation of the same? There should not be, per se, anything wrong in our being embodied in a body when transcendently the ego is but an appearance, albeit a transcendental one, a form of transcendental illusion. Through emptiness, through emergence properly understood, through mutual interdependence there can be no absolute self! A relative sense of self - yes! An absolute sense of self - no! Without an absolute sense of self there can be neither an absolute victim nor an absolute profiteer from the mere fact of our embodiment. In this neutral ‘vision’ ‘lies’ our freedom – because in this fact of our existence we are ‘free to be what we are able to be’, moreover, ‘there is naught there’ in any absolute sense that could be trapped in any gnostic or dualistic sense of an embodiment; cultural undercurrents from the past that still contaminate religious thinking in the West and haunt our appreciation of the role played by this continuation of the conceptual attitude in our existentially based interactions in this world-of-life. (IV.70) [8]

	If we provisionally grant ‘the sense of the divine’ some form of hypothetical existence (in whatever ‘metaphorical’ form or forms envisaged for the same), then that sense of the divine, what ever its format, must be ‘embodied’, must be in this world, in this world-of-life! Moreover, ‘what does not exist for us may as well not exist-for-us’! But in being able to envisage some form of the divine, and therein its ‘sense’ (as located somehow in our psychic mapping of the World) (and its associated forms of meaning and meaningfulness) that sense of the divine has therein ‘directly’ or ‘indirectly’ made its existential presence available to us if only through our envisaging of this sense of deity.  Moreover, now being in the world, in its own manner, this sense or senses of the divine must be able to enter into the processes of this world (because having emerged it cannot be absolutely isolated, in turn, from its participation in activity through the exercise of divine processes… and thus by this argument it would imply that a ‘pure’ passive sense of the divine cannot be envisaged. But where this line of exploration will take us I would like to take up in the next paper in this series of theological essays). (IV.71) [9]

	Could we grant some ‘sense of the divine’ some form of a provisional existence, and, what would happen is we could do this? (IV.72) [10]

	In my philosophical opinion, if that sense of the divine is logically entertainable (in some phenomenological sense), is relatively coherent (in its hermeneutical meaning) and is theoretically engageable (in existential practice) then the granting of provisional existence would become a de facto existence of that sense of the divine in that form or closely allied in some other proximate form or other. Then it only behooves us, or rather the theologian, to explain how this divide might be crossed in practice through various forms of dialectical-like rectification of this transformation between ‘mere possibility’ and ‘sheer actuality’ in order to clarify, through some form of modelling, ‘how’ this transition might have been crossed in ‘fact’. Now, this principle is not the mere legislation into existence of mere possibility! For a start, this type of philosophy does not entertain pure states of affairs neither epistemologically as idea, thoughts, perceptions, facts, etc., nor, does it entertain pure object-states, fields, entities, egos, worlds, etc., likewise in an ontological frame of reference where this catalogue of pure types is allowed to find pure representations. Because pure potentiality can not be thought nor found that which has potentiality must also possess some form of actual existence in some manner or aspect, in some degree or other, etc. You may laugh if I say that ‘the thought of a gold mountain’ means that ‘a gold mountain must exist’. How do we reconcile this state of possibility in a world of actuality? For a start, both ‘gold’ and ‘mountains’ are actual entities on this planet. Then, gold can be found in rocks, perhaps, we might ask ourselves ‘could there not be a mountain of almost pure gold somewhere on this planet, in this solar system, in this galaxy, in this cosmos?’ and now the odds have swung considerably in our favour. Moreover, may be on some wealthy Chinese scholar’s table in the past there once was a small gold mountain created as an aesthetic object to contemplate when otherwise engrossed in the affairs of state or in scholarship or whatever. Then, with that thought, could not such an object be fashioned? Be commissioned? By these possible manoeuvers therein establish in what fashion this transition could be effected. Hence the inescapable implication of a necessary potential-actual transition in evaluational appreciation once the relatively fundamental principle of correlativity is accepted!? (IV.73) [11]

	By the same arguments one might like to explore the possibility of divine actions, the possibility of processes of divine intervention, etc., (as previously envisaged through bifurcations in chaotic systems, etc.). But, again, let us look more closely into this type of process-activity in a future essay. (IV.74) (12)

2.  The Transcendental Unity of this One-World-of-Life?

	At this stage in our paper, much of our theological speculation has implicitly hinged on this perception of a transcendental unity of the lifeworld. What right have I to argue for this type of interpretation in our coming to an understanding of this transcendental concept? Moreover, as I cannot argue for either the absolute unity or the absolute disunity of the lifeworld, what difference does the invocation of this sense of unity then make in our consideration of this topic on ‘the emergent unity of the divine in some hypothetical form or other?’. Since, if the lifeworld for all practical purposes were to be considered as basically disunified, then what chance have we for proposing some form of  theological embodiment through processes of emergence (when what might eventually emerge might be none other than a feeble shadow of a cosmos)? (IV.75)[13]

	Let me take up this criticism in the next section where I will attempt to sketch out a set of theoretical proposals, in effect a theorem, for showing, by those arguments entailed, how we might be able to bridge this chasm between ‘a world with no vision of the divine’ and ‘a world with some vision of the divine’, i.e., positively establish that there is a theological difference (as introduced and examined in our last essay) in our understanding of the constitution of the lifeworld in general terms of reference. (IV.76) [14]

3.  Is There A Theorem that Establishes an Acceptance of Theological Difference?

It is my opinion that theological difference can be bridged in a critically conducted process ideology, i.e., a thoroughly critical re-vision of the lifeworld cannot escape the formulation and acceptance that the world is, in some measure, theologically constituted (if only minimally through some form of a residual passively-actively engaged sense of deity): (IV.77) [15]

i.	All relational parties are found within relational contexts, and those contexts likewise are in super-relational contexts, and so on, in effect these processes of emergence continuing  ad infinitum.
ii.	It follows that through higher levels of epistemological emergence that higher levels of self-awareness, or sentience, also arise, and so on, in effect these processes of emergence continuing ad infinitum.
iii.	What is relatively greater than our own level of highest epistemological functioning is relatively divine-like in nature.
iv.	Therefore, there must exist forms of divinity with a higher level of epistemological performance than us in this world-of-life.
v.	Because this world of life is ‘one’ world of life these forms and levels of divinity, in practice could engage with us human beings and vice versa if only as a possibility (because what does not exist for us might as well not exist-for-us!).
vi.	But pure possibility cannot exist, therefore this world must have a theological difference, i.e., be constituted with some sense of an active divinity emergently embodied within the same in some form or other.
vi.	Hence the divine exists in some form or other…. (IV.78) [16]

	What that form or set of forms, or ‘sense’, that that divine aspect might take in this world-of-life in an embodied format, and what ‘meaning’ and ‘meaningfulness’ might be derived from this state of affairs, etc., let us also explore in a future essay in this series! (IV.79) [17]

	In this paper, therefore, I believe I have adequately demonstrated one illustrative proof for the possible existence of the divine/Divine, namely, a process-position that argues from a re-vision of physics to a (meta-)physics of divine-totalities; hence the sub-title “From Physics to Theology”. This type of manoeuver has been popular of late although usually, in practice, it has been done in a reverse fashion, i.e., the pre-acceptance of dogmatic-like statements as to what God is pre-conceived to be (usually in a traditional, classical, incoherently formulated mode) and then a search for ‘signs’ of the divine - metaphorical footprints, signatures, fingerprints, etc., such ‘evidence’ being searched for in a physical vista of the cosmos with varying degrees of ‘attested’ success. (IV.80) [18]

4.   The Open-Ended Moral of Our Metaphor

As stated in our initial examination of our introductory anecdote, the use of metaphor, etc., is always a two edged sword - constructing with one hand and deconstructing with the other! (IV.81) [19]

	Our anecdote allows us to considered an embodied vision of the divine but what point has this wonderful theophany if our existence is only fleeting and doomed by a death that completely cancels out all sense of self-existence and all possible senses of a real self-achievement? Put quite bluntly, as an example, if the people in the time of the Old Testament truly believed that personal existence was that short period of time we had on this Earth, and that our existence was snuffed out like a candle in our death, and, that we would merely return to ashes and dust from whence we came, what point could a religion, with some sense of the theological, have but as a cargo cult in which desires not immediately met might be prayed for in the hope of their imminent realization? Of course our aspiration might not always be so personal and self-interested, they could be nationalistic, even altruistic? (IV.82) [21]

In response to this rhetorical gambit I would be inclined to answer that, contrary to received texts and their interminable interpretations and re-interpretations, I don’t believe, for even one moment, that many people, who were religious by persuasion, would actually entertain in their heart of hearts this bleak prospect that death meant the total destruction of their individual sense of self. But, then, if the Divine could be slow in showing its material blessings it could be just as slow in showing its displeasure? What then would stop the individual from adopting that course of action they feel to be in their best interests (if they could not be hindered and checked by earthly powers in the course of this endeavour)? If they thought they had a good chance of escaping divine punishment (and earthly punishment) for actions committed with evil intent that ended in evil consequences, what might then stop them from obeying these base instincts? So, the ‘demise of our worm’, even if allegorical, must literally figure in the calculations of the religious person in some manner or other. So, despite the argument that divine embodiment in some form must emerge within this world-of-life we are left in a state of existential despair and angst as to whether this divine existence has any point for us in how we are to live our life in this world-of-life?! Again, this particular issue will have to be taken up in a later essay, but suffice to say, our anecdote is not only a veritable can of worms but also a potentially poisonous piece of bait that could ruin our existence in this world and not allow us to enjoy the full potential we could enjoy through the self-re-imposition of non-existential religious strictures for no good purpose, that could harvest for us no real fruit in this short life of ours as puny actors hobbling and blinkered upon this ‘one’ stage of the world, a world so fickle and fleeting in its nature, and, yet, so overflowing with beauty and so full, for some, of divine mystery, divine promise and divine integrity?! (IV.83) [21]

5.   From ‘sense of self’ to ‘god’ to ‘God’ to ‘Godhead’? 

Numerous people of a theological persuasion, in a traditional, conservative religious framework, would argue, no doubt, that it would be wrong to conceive of the Divine as an embodied form in this (life-)world. I, personally, have no argument with this article of faith and historical prejudice other than to say that if this concept of the Divine is to make sense it is in the court of the proponent of such a thesis to try to do this for themselves. Let them try to successfully achieve this point of view first because in the course of history this sense of the Divine makes a mockery of its own cause being riven with passive contradictions and active self-contradictions. Of course we have the avenue of faith but let us not take a leaf from the work of Lewis Carroll and ‘try to believe a certain number of impossible things before breakfast’ because we have to live with them, their indigestion, for the rest of the day! However, this does not mean we have to perfectly explain each and every phenomenon that we meet in the course of our short existences because that too is equally an impossible task. Instead, let us take a middle path and attempt to discover sense, meaning and meaningfulness when and where ever it seems to beckon us. Indeed, this notion of an absolute deity might be rescued if treated as a powerful metaphor for the ultimate incomprehensibility of the World and not literally! Let me explain…. (IV.84) [22]

	In the course of this exposition I have argued, if only by implication, from a ‘sense of self’ to a ‘sense of the divine’ in a passive frame of reference which I then tentatively argued could not be purely passive in its engagement within the lifeworld. As a result an actively engaged sense of the Divine seems to appear, if not escape, rightly or wrongly, from out of my convoluted and torturous arguments. As the genie would now appear to have been released from this rusty philosopher’s lamp, despite having been rubbed in such a rough and uncouth manner, could we not ask just where this process of unfolding might end, if at all? Would it not be possible to entertain a sense of Godhead in which even the sense of the Divine has its foundations and which being ‘relatively more fundamental’ might possess all those attributes I have so thoroughly robbed a more traditional vision of the Deity? [23]

	But let me leave this question for a later day and instead let me move onto my next paper whose title was: Finding a Place for the Idea of God – Part V: Does Theological Difference Make a Difference?? [24]

7.   Does theological Difference Make a Difference?

	In the third essay of this series I introduced the concept of theological difference and argued that a theologian had to argue for a ‘vision of the world that included some sense of the divine’ rather than a vision without the same. In the fourth essay, from a process perspective, I argued that a sense of the divine could be hypothetically constructed from the ‘fabric of the life-world’, that the ‘idea’ of God was one that could be philosophically entertained. However, the problem that presents itself in this paper, a problem for the philosophical theologian, is this “does this vision of the divine make any difference in a religious frame of reference?” (V.1) [25]

To put this point as bluntly as possible let me metaphorically analogue what I am, correctly, calling into question here by retrieving this anecdote or simile of the worm as used in the last paper. (V.2) [26]

	Suppose, for the sake of argument, that that worm captured by the mother bird, and about to be eaten by her young chicks, accidentally falls back to the ground just after being snatched from that long blade of grass where it had this vision of God, albeit a sweat-soaked naked figure of a man, a Jainist monk, reflecting the light of the sun. Firmly convinced that this worm had seen God and that God heard its prayers for salvation, witness the fact of its not having been eaten by that bird and its chicks, and having fallen safely to the ground close to where it normally lived, and, from the earth shattering consequences of these experiences had decided to spread the ‘good news’, and therein converting a small population of fellow worms to this belief that God does actually exist, and can be seen, organizes a small choir of worms at this very moment to sing praises to this God. Now, suppose the local gardener passing by has a good sense of hearing and can just hear these worms singing extremely beautiful, yet strange, melodious, antiphonal ‘praises to the Lord’ with a precision acquired through long hours of practice and well-honed skill. What would that gardener make of this, what would they perhaps think? No doubt they would be bemused by this show of devotion, but, before long, would soon quickly re-attend to the world to hand in this world-of-life and in the process effectively forget about this choir of worms? “Such an effort, such a wasted effort” they might think to themselves if they bothered to reflect upon this situation at all?! Or worse, maybe capitalize on this unusual phenomenon and make a paying spectacle out of it along the lines of a flea circus? Yet, from the strain of trying to listen to this strange ‘music’, even that audience would soon effectively ignore such a display, or performance, if that would be the right word to adopt from a human perspective? (V.3) [27]

	Translated to a hypothetical sphere this rhetorical question is being asked “why would an almighty God need songs of praise, and any other form of devotion, from devoted creatures on the scale of things metaphorically equivalent to ‘worms’ in the light of their hypothetical ‘epistemological level of spiritual excellence’?” In other words, “does theological difference make a difference in a religious frame of reference?” Although we might now say the ‘idea of god’ from a philosophical point of view makes theological sense in a potential, hypothetical form of spiritual (epistemological-ontological) existence and thence must have some form of actuality to some degree or other, on the grounds that pure potentiality can be neither thought nor engaged, and, that granted, to some extent, what relevance could such an entity have in the religious live of an individual on this spec of dust on the edge of a galaxy itself on the edge of a galactic cluster in this relatively non-unique dark, far-flung corner of the cosmos? The concept of the divine should be granted as previously argued for but we should then inquire is the world theologically rich enough to sustain the relevance of such a concept? I.e., could the theologian successfully argue that there is some sense of the divine that could be found relevant in the course of our daily lives in such a manner that is theologically rich enough to sustain a significantly positive sense of religious value. God, divinity may well exist in a variety of forms, but, we must also ask “what relevance has this in ‘the life of the individual’?” And could it not be the case that even to ask such a question would only distort the way life should be led on the grounds that to even ask such a question is totally inappropriate to the ‘existential nitty-gritty of our existence as human individuals’ who should be interacting with other human individuals in a completely existentially engaged manner and who should also not be sidetracked from an existential engagement with their environment as well! That, in essence, to merely invoke the divine is to just sidetrack us in non-existential distortions and their consequent loss of value for the human community as can be witnessed in the negative consequences, to put it euphemistically, that religion has imposed upon people throughout recorded history? Need I mention historical terms such as ‘The Crusades’, ‘Jihads’, ‘holy wars’, the ‘Inquisition’, and, the sorry saga of a long litany of ‘crimes’ committed upon the religious and the non-religious alike by the religious. Crimes of an intensity that often directly reflect the degree the perpetrator was themselves religiously committed! Of course many fine deeds have been performed in the name of religion too, but, surely, we would not have had the former if the very fact of religion itself were absent from history? Indeed, the philosophical theologian must also privately ask this question “would the world be a better place without religion, a world in which ‘this horrible fact’ has ‘only distorted the structures of our human existence’ as recorded in our historical recollections? In essence these two types of question attack the very raison d’être of religion and the need for a religious life, namely, “does theological difference make a difference in a religious frame of reference, and, is there any overall positive advantage in arguing for and maintaining a place for religion and the practice of a religious life??!” (V.4) [28]

	Even if God, or various forms of divinity, were to exist what need have we for religion? (V.5) [29]

	Let me try to make sense of this challenge from a critical philosophical point of view, i.e., by adopting the ‘theological neutrality’ of a ‘transcendental-phenomenological perspective’ as entered into and maintained in this series of essays! In other words, in a neutral, transcendentally-suspended hypothetical-theological 'space' let us merely entertain what ‘sense, meaning and meaningfulness’ could be developed and argued for within those terms of reference. So, in response to this challenge of ours, let us see if we can entertain a coherent, relatively non-contradictory, meaningful response to these questions “what relevance can the concept of divinity perform in the course of our human existence, and, overall, would the world be a better place without some religious concept of divinity or some other equivalent? (V.6) [30]

7.   Can We Have a Meaningful Relationship with the ‘Divine’, and, vice versa?

	This type of question could be looked at from three points of view, i.e., from the perspective of the ‘sense of the divine invoked’ [sec.9], from the perspective of the ‘worshipper’ [sec. 10-11] and from the ‘existential’ perspective of the relationship itself [sec.12, etc.]. (V.7) [31]

Let me note here that in our transcendental investigations ‘the existence or absence of some invoked sense of the divine’ is irrelevant to the essential nature of our investigative discourse. Just as, in the same manner children can have a relationship with ‘Santa Claus’ or adults can talk about ‘the spirit of Xmas’, etc. We can still stand in a relationship to the ‘idea of certain entity’ even if the ‘class of that entity’ itself has no ‘member’ factually substantiated by that ‘class’. (V.8) [32]

As for the relationship that ‘God might have with people in this world’ this could only be approached indirectly through the use of metaphor, analogy, etc. Such theological ‘constructions’ can only be metaphorical, generalized and speculative. One might even be able to argue that ‘that which we don’t know can not be known as that which is unknown is unknown’. However, ‘since that which is unknown is unknown how then do we know that that is the case as it is possible that we might already know it, or get to know it, but not realize that we knew this fact along with the implications of this knowledge and/or acquaintance?’ These sorts of issues concern the religious topics of insight and enlightenment, revelation and religious comprehension, etc., and in this paper will be avoided if only circumnavigated. (V.9) [33]

	Now it is true that some individuals of a religious inclination do claim do be in a relationship of some form or other with some sense of the divine. How should we read that sort of claim through the lens of a transcendental-phenomenology? (V.10) [34]

	For a start we can note that such a relationship is often described as ‘personal’, that in some sense the person is having a personal relationship with some entity or force that presents itself with some sense of a personality, as another ‘person’, albeit with a divine nature, form or sense of presence. Such reports, subject to a transcendental suspension on our part, often claim that the person was ‘addressed’ and that they in turn were able or not able to address this ‘sense of person’ in return, albeit with the qualification that there is a differential in power relations involved between these two polarities of ‘the person addressed’ and ‘the sense of the divine that was able to address/to be addressed in return’. Some theologians might claim that because of the disparity in power between these two polarities that the ‘interaction’ is ‘translated’ on our behalf (by this sense of the divine) or ‘interpreted’ by ourselves individually and/or collectively by some other party or parties in order to make ‘sense’ of this perceived state of interaction. An analogy often used in an explication of this disparity is that love between a parent and a child. No doubt a series of other analogies can also be proffered in an attempt to make sense of this relationship both for the worshipper and their dissemination of this ‘fact’ to a sympathetic public congregation or relatively non-sympathetic audience. (V.11) [35]

	The first perspective could be dismissed as too inaccessible for the philosopher? What right have we to put ourselves in the metaphorical shoes of the Divine? The second perspective could also be dismissed as equally inaccessible, however, that would be a mistake to some extent by virtue of the fact that an acceptance of the life-world implies that individual experience can not be experienced privately in an absolute sense when in fact, by virtue of the communal nature of language, etc., the presence of a necessary meta-textual, intersubjective component guarantees the intersubjectivity of experience if not in complete practice at least theoretically. We might be lost for words but retrospectively we would be able to communicate something of what that experience meant to us, being communicated through the use of language, processes of simulation, induction, empathy, analogical resonance, metaphorically setting-the-other-person-up to comprehend something of that which was being expressed, etc. Even the mere fact of stating something like “I believe I have just had a religious experience” should be enough to signal to other person what was at stake here. They might ask in response to this sort of statement “what sort of religious experience did you have?” which in itself signals, through the existential ability to ask a question on something about that statement, namely, e.g., “what ‘type’ of religious experience did you have?”, rather than merely turning/re-turning the statement into a question, namely, e.g., “did you have a religious experience?” I.e., through acts of phenomenological mapping, hermeneutical interpretation and existential forms of simulated transmission, etc., albeit from a difference of perspective, forms of communication forever remain open theoretically and in hypothetical practice [although, one should add, that as ‘communication is a process’ this ‘act of understanding must take place in time’ even though ‘the act of comprehension itself might arise spontaneously in an epistemological change of phase’ as naturally occurs in acts of judgment, i.e., acting in an existential mode when not delivered in a pre-judged calculative mode]. (V.12) [36]

Some theologians might extend this ‘existential fact of our existence as inescapable participants in a language community’ to ‘our personal participation with God, and v.v.’, on the grounds that the life-world has a theological dimension that too is inescapable for both ‘God and the individual’, and ‘God and the community’. That this involuntary aspect of our already being in a process-of-interaction-with-the-Divine can also be seen to possess a voluntary aspect when the individual might elect to be in a voluntary relationship with some sense of the divine through a change of attitude and practice towards the same thought to be efficacious when adopted in this regard, etc. However, let me move on to an examination of the existential aspect of being-in-a-relationship from the perspective of the relationship itself. (V.13) [37]

A relationship as a relationship, in order to be a relationship, must be in a ‘process of relationship’ hence we should correctly deal with the third perspective, namely, the essential phenomenological nature of what it means to be ‘in a process of relationship’ regardless of whether (we wish to question the fact that) we are or are not in an actual relationship with an actual being of the divine in some form or other. (V.14) [38]

Now, if the epistemological characterization of the entity hypothetically involved in a relationship is too great, i.e., the disparity in ‘power relations’ is too great to be ‘entertained’, how can such a relationship be properly entered into? How could we have an existentially meaningful relationship with a worm qua ‘worm’ and v.v., or, that between ourselves and a divine entity-state qua ‘divine entity-state’ and v.v? How could we enter into a meaningful relationship that is not reciprocal, is not reciprocated by all the parties concerned? How could we 'meaningfully' enter into a relationship that only took place through the imposition of an act or a series of acts of sheer exploitation (whether enacted existentially on the behalf of that relationship or not)?! Could we re-approach this question by arguing that as the grounds for all relationships can never be between entities of an exactly equal power status it implies that disparity alone cannot disqualify the possible existence of such an existential relationship, such as occurs between a mother and her new born child, e.g., and, an individual and some exalted aspect of the divine once this hypothetical possibility is granted? Besides arguing for relatively deep invariant phenomenological patterns of behaviour in order to account for the ‘fact’ of that relationship let me examine if processes of mediation in some form or other can resolve this difficulty that this disparity of power relationships has presented to us? (V.15) [39]

	Perhaps a sizeable disparity in power relations in a ‘relationship’ can be ‘mediated’ in order to allow us to re-appraise what might be seen merely as taking place through an exploitative role wherein the apparent subjugation of the lesser parties in a relationship is indeed enacted, through such imposition, by those parties that possess a higher power status (regardless of whether this 'exploitation' is existentially conducted on the behalf of the relationship or not)? My intuition on this matter is that mediation can only have a symbolic value in this type of debate. Let me elabourate. (V.16) [40]

	E.g., we have three (egological) entities, namely, God, person 1 and person 2. Let us say, for the sake of argument, that person 1 has had a religious experience of conversion that allows them to experience the 'divinity of God' in some special manner as interpreted by person 1. Now, person 1 communicates this sense of privilege that they feel they possesses over person 2 to person 2. Then, if and when person 2 accepts that person 1 has this sense of privilege, and, they then find themselves in being alerted to this ‘fact’, they then wish to seek the same opportunity in part or in whole, and, they then find themselves entering into a relationship with this 'sense of the divine' it then follows that person 1 is no longer a mediator but, rather, a facilitator of this process of 'successful conversion'. Now person 1 can only communicate their ‘fact of a relationship with ‘God’’ to person 2 by virtue of their shared humanity so the potential successfulness of alerting person 2 to the same ‘sense of God’ can only be effected through this semblance of a common humanity. If we were to argue that this ‘fact of a relationship’ was purely put in place through the ‘election of God’ this does not alter our argument as to the humanity of person 1 because being found able to ‘suffer this election’ must be part of their humanity in so far as they were able, in turn, to ‘suffer this state of being elected’. Hence the mediational role played by person 1 with person 2 can only be effective by virtue of a shared humanity being effectively present between these two people for these two people. So the role of a mediator can only be effective if all the parties of that mediation in theory, if not in practice, possess the same potentiality of being able to enter into a relationship with the other two parties. Hence, the role of the mediator might alert other parties to this possibility it can only be put into practice by virtue of what is already in place even if the divine were to assist in this process through an act of election (because this aspect of their human nature must already possess this 'ability to enter into this type of interaction', and, that there exists, as a supplement, this constitutional ability to profit from an act of election if it were to be made). (V.17) [41]

	Put more simply, the role of a human mediator in a religious context can only be effective if a similar human constitution is shared by both human parties in which case the role of the mediator is not absolutely necessary, acting only as a facilitator in this process of interaction, i.e., bringing it to intentional thematization, hermeneutical reflection and self-conscious awareness (regardless of the 'correct' religious status of that process of 'religious involvement'). In other words, although one party might appear to act as a mediator they were in fact acting as a facilitator and not as a mediator which leaves us with the same problem as to how two or more parties can enter into a meaningful two-way process of interaction when there is an extreme disparity in power relations between some or all of those parties? That, therefore, the apparent role of mediation cannot philosophically resolve this problem of extreme disparity in power status. (V.18) [42]

	What constitutes a relationship? [43]

	What constitutes this sense of relational-space is the ongoing resolution of dissonance found within the consonance of that relational-space and this three-way relationship, between consonance, dissonance and resolution, collectively constitutes the ‘relationship’ of that relationship. (V.22) [44]

Should we not ask the following? [45]

…“with what and with whom are we not in a relationship with?!” …surely, our being in a relationship with everything merely robs this expression of ‘being in a relationship’ of all practical meaning (and all sense and meaningfulness too)! No doubt when we solve one problem another one will presents itself to us! At least we can take heart from the fact that as a ‘problem’ our recognition of a question/questions embedded in its problematicity, implies that an answer has already been to some extent formulated through the body of that question since for a question to be well-formed has already established the conditions, to a certain extent, for a resolution of that problematic-question. Or, so hopefully this digression on the theory on the formation of a question goes…. (V.24) [46]

And what implication does self-consciousness possess (in a process theology)? 
[47]
8.   An Egological Philosophy as an Archetypal Philosophy of Self-Consciousness

	All consciousness necessitates, to some degree, a corresponding sense of self-consciousness! Consciousness is of a consciousness of something, namely the intentional object-state, by a certain sense of self in appropriate keeping with the nature of that field of experience. A delicate dialectical dance is in operation here as everywhere in our phenomenological, hermeneutical and existential appreciations of the life-world. The ‘self’ is obviously not ‘that which it is conscious of’, and, yet, at the same time, that ‘self-consciousness’ cannot be absolutely divorced from ‘that which it is conscious of’. At the same time in our discernment of an object-state a ‘field of experience’ must also be differentially discriminated both from the same and from this ‘accompanying’ sense of self in attendance upon this dialectical process of contrast and discernment. Hence the dialectical interdependence of these three factors of an appropriately related ‘sense of self’, ‘field’ and ‘object-state(s)’ is reflected in the fact that the ‘sense of self’ mirrors, in some fashion or other, that of which it is aware, so, in the instance of a visual field, and visual perception therein, there is necessitated the presence of a ‘visual perceiver’, and, furthermore, an awareness of a ‘visual perceiver’, must, in turn, as an object of discrimination, imply a field of consciousness that involves the sense of a ‘meta-visual perceiver’ in turn, etc. (to the limited extent that this reflexivity need operate). (V.28) [48]

	Hence this overall sense of self, along with its various senses of self, cannot be seen as absolutely distinctive entities existing in their own right. Although I am not arguing for or against this discreteness of (a sense of) self, I would add that it is impossible for us to envisage this short-sighted absolutist ‘vision’ of the self or any other entity, object-state or field! What must be realized here is that the metaphor can never be held literally in an absolute (i.e., extreme) absolutist sense (i.e., absolutely literally). In normal non-philosophical parlance a metaphor is set up to ‘insightfully’ work for us, analogically giving us an insight into that being analogically imaged as a comparison. On the other hand, in a philosophical context we must realize that our metaphors, and rhetoric, have limits beyond which there is a natural breaking down, or deconstruction, of those metaphorical-rhetorical functions. An absolute vision of the life-world recognizes those natural limits, whereas, on the other hand, an absolutist ‘vision’ of the (life-)world tries to attempt the impossible, i.e., the complete literalization of the metaphorical images (and/or associated rhetorical functions) invoked in that ‘literary’ manoeuvre. (V.29) [49]

	So, I am not arguing for any absolutist ‘vision’ of the self as some discrete entity existing in its own right! Merely, a ‘sense of self’ that arises through a mutually dependent, multi-polar association of object-states, fields, meta-fields, etc., in conjunction with various senses of self whether considered to some extent either individually or collectively. In effect, this Buddhistic vision of the life-world (through a mutual-interdependence) argues that all entities, etc., are essentially ‘projections’ constructed in consciousness that mirror these mutually-interdependent processes that give rise to the phenomenal appearances of an overall sense of self, and its various ‘lesser’ senses of that same self, various senses of other selves, object-states, fields, consciousness, self-consciousness, thought and language, our experiences as living in a community (of communities), of being in a world-of-life, etc., etc. (V.30) [50]

	As I argued previously, the phenomenal nature of a relationship in relational space is internally perceived phenomenologically as the same, equally from all ‘points’ within that relational sense of space, albeit from the apparent perspective of that ‘point of view’. This was guaranteed by the fact that in the ongoing resolution of that relationship the essential nature of that relationship holistically permeates the entire field of that relationship with the same phenomenological flavour as found to be characteristic of its phenomenal being. Now, as the (actual) relationship of all (possible) relationships is the life-world, the non-absolutisitic ‘ground’ of all relationships (in a non-absolute foundational sense!), it follows that our appreciation of this life-world, in and through all phenomena phenomenologically-as-entertained-therein-by-us, must re-present this sense of ‘unity’ of the life-world in such a manner that we should be able to find it ‘imprinted’ upon the fabric-of-the-world-as-it-is-to-be-found-there-for-us! Now, although this sense of unity can never be absolute, as unity is achieved through an ongoing process of resolution, and, this ‘imprint of unity’ can only be perceived as a ‘trace’ in a non-relational perspective, we must ask ourselves can this ‘divine tracing’ be appreciated given, and granted, this theological reading of the life-world is itself questionable? So, at this point in our ‘simple’ argument we must consider whether we can actually entertain a ‘theologicalization of the life-world’, and, in such a presentation find good reasons for hypothetically accepting this theological ‘re-vision of the world’? (V.40) [51]

	As a short summary in the form of four proposition let me sum up these recent points just noted. ‘That the imputation of a divine aspect of the life-world should be found imprinted on each and very part of the same discriminated therein!?’ and, ‘That, given the right ‘lens’, i.e., the appropriate hermeneutic frame of reference, we should hopefully find that this ‘existential fact’ of the life-world to be self-evident?!’ ‘That even our ‘passage through this world’ should be characterized by the same!?’ and, ‘Hence the theological relevance this aspect of the life-world must have for-us??’ These four propositions being treated ‘as under a suspension’ in such a manner that the veracity, or otherwise, of these statements is not under current consideration (our current concern being only interested in discerning whether these statements are formed with a viable coherence in sense, meaning and meaningfulness). (V.41) [52]

9.   A Theologicalization of the Life-World?
	
	As I have just argued, a theological reading of the life-world would allow us to expect that a tracing of this unity would be imprinted on the phenomenal fabric of our world. That, a phenomenological reading of this divine tracing as a ‘divine trace’ would then give to us a way of seeing ‘the hand that writes upon the book of this world’, so to speak, to metaphorically use an anthropomorphic figure of speech. So, without being prejudiced by such metaphors and the types of religious beliefs that promote the same, let us proceed to ask just what ingredients would be necessary, if only hypothetically, to allow us to successfully bake this (type of process) theological cake. Without too much icing being added to this endeavour let me state what conditions have to be met to enable us to support this hypothetical proposal that "the life-world could be read in a theological light". (V.42) [53]

	This list is quite simple although, I might add, the devil is in the fine detail. The following six features must all be realized, if only hypothetically, i.e., in such a fashion as to make philosophical sense individually, sequentially and collectively. (V.43) [54]

1.   The ‘unity’ of the life-world must be present and must be demonstrable (at least from a transcendental perspective). (V.44) [55]

2.   This ‘unity’ must present itself as conscious to some degree or other. (V.45) [56]

3.   That consciousness must be demonstrated to be ‘self-conscious’ to some extent. (V.46)  [57]

4.   That that degree of self-consciousness must surpass that characteristic of the human ego. (V.47) [58]

5.   Penultimately, that that self-consciousness is in some form of a relationship with human egos. (V.48) [59]

6.   Finally, that that ‘relationship’ is in some sense ‘relevant’ in the life of a human agents. (V.49) [60]

	These six conditions being summarized in the following formula – “unity, consciousness, self-consciousness, transcendence, interrelationship and relevance”. Let me now argue that these six conditions can be individually, sequentially and collectively entertained hypothetically, allowing us to return then to the relative simplicity of our previous argument, as indicated in section 40, which argued to the effect “that the unity of the life-world is imprinted on the fabric of the world, and, that in reading it we are able to divine this theological input if only in theory”. (V.50) [61]

	The first argument, on ‘the unity of the life-world’, can be demonstrated by the adoption of various transcendental-style arguments. E.g., we could argue from a phenomenological observation of the world that "all phenomena in being perceived as distinctive phenomena must be unified to some extent and be involved in a ongoing act of unification because without such resolution their phenomenal presentation could neither continue nor be phenomenologically entertained in both conscious and self-conscious experience", etc. In the same vein, we could then argue that without such ‘transcendental unity’ even this argument itself, effectively conducted or defectively conducted, could not be run philosophically, etc. Hence, in conclusion, the transcendental unity of the life-world must first be in place before any experience in the life-world could be realized. Moreover, that this unity can be ‘seen’ when and where ever we inspect the phenomenal nature expressed in the life-world through this transcendental lens of the phenomenological because all phenomenal identity and the phenomenological experience of that identity demands this unity of presentation and self-presentation, furthermore, there must be 'one' world-of-life, i.e., one-world-of-life, in order for us to be able to share our perspective on ‘this’ world with others, etc., in this realm of transcendental intersubjectivity and transcendental objectivity. (V.51) 
          [62]
	The sense of the epistemological arises out of the hierarchicalization of relatively immanently oriented ‘material’. Through this natural stratification of reality the sense of an epistemological transcendence arises in relation to its correlative ontological enstructuralization. Therein simulating, to some degree or other, the actual presence of consciousness, in some form or other, to some degree or other. Hence in this light even a rock, or a mere pebble, should be viewed as conscious even though, in this instance, barely ‘conscious’ in the overall scheme of things. (V.52) [63]

	The demonstration of this consciousness (created/re-created in the hierarchical enstructuralization of some segment of the life-world) automatically signals a certain form and degree of self-consciousness through the degree of unity apparent in that field of discriminating consciousness (from the point of view of a meta-field of appreciation wherein the field of consciousness itself is self-consciously discriminated; a reflexive process that needs no excessive reduplication through localized transformational recurrence despite the fact that every hierarchical level of epistemological organization would set upits own sense of conscious-self-conscious recurrence). A consciousness that discriminates object-states in a particular field of consciousness automatically develops an interrelated sense of self-consciousness. As the ‘existence’ of each moment in this hermeneutic circle of comprehension depends on all its other correlative moments it follows that the ‘conscious’ discrimination of object-states and/or fields implies the necessary presence of a self-consciousness to some extent or other as well, even though that self-consciousness may barely be ‘self-conscious’ in the overall scheme of things. (V.53) [64]

	Through the sheer unity of the life-world and its encompassing all forms of life on this world (and anywhere else) it follows that all egological entities, etc., are inescapably bound and inextricably linked within its ‘open’ ambit; ‘open’ by virtue of the nature of its horizons always remaining entertainable for-us as open horizons; if only theoretically and not ‘practically’, although the absence of pure theory also implies some degree of practical access must already be in play. (V.54) [65]

	As the life-world transcends a mere object-state, its field of presentation, the discriminative ‘conscious’ in the relationship between the same, its implication of a ‘self-conscious awareness’ of the former, and, incorporates all human entities within its confines, and their communities in all their complexity, and, the vastness of the cosmos within its phenomenological/phenomenal embrace, it stands to reason that its sense of self-consciousness, as reflected in every fraction of it, must by virtue of this all-encompassing embrace transcend that level of self-consciousness demonstrated by any individual egological representation of that life-world whether human or non-human. Hence the necessary existence of qualified ‘degrees of divinity’ relative to our own level of spiritual-epistemological self-expression of which some must exceed that demonstrated, albeit imperfectly, by ourselves in this one-world-of-life along with an open-ended process sense of divinity some what more along the lines of the theological concept of the Godhead which will be looked at in a future paper). Hence the necessary presence of relevance must be assumed by virtue of the fact that this theological aspect permeates all processes and all the content of those processes even if we were currently unaware of this significance. But then the question must arise how relevant is that relevance in our daily lives? As a large fraction of the people of this world don’t hold theological beliefs, or no longer hold the same, this important question must be addressed and will be taken up in the next essay of this series where it will form a central problematic in our ongoing phenomenological-theological research. (V.55) [66]

	Hence these six factors, I believe, have been both successfully argued for individually, sequentially and collectively! 'Collectively' by virtue of the fact that they were argued as a sequence: transcendental unity realizing consciousness, consciousness of consciousness realizing self-consciousness, that self-consciousness in all its forms and levels of divinity surpassing human levels of self-consciousness, incorporating all forms of consciousness it super-instantiates human consciousness, and, being present throughout the life-world it inescapably and inextricably implicates itself in the course and passage of human existence regardless of whether we are aware of this 'fact' or not. Hopefully this complex argument arises to the challenge presented by this complex thesis. Well, that is al least my hope. In the process we have thus provisionally established, if only in outline, the philosophical sense of the hypothetical existence of an ongoing sense of the Divine (more along the lines of a Godhead), and, by implication, various ‘lesser’ senses of the divinity (of which we must include ourselves and all other living organisms and communities). (V.56) [67]

	We can now ‘safely’ return, if only hypothetically, to our ‘simple argument’ that argues to the effect “that the unity of the life-world is imprinted on the fabric of the world, and, that in reading it we are able to divine this theological input if only in theory”. (V.57) [68]

10.   Can We Divine The ‘Character’ of This ‘Imputed Theological Difference?

	The Gnostics and their ilk argued that the material world was evil, a place of entrapment where the sparks of the spirit became imprisoned. On the other hand Neoplatonic philosophers, and others influenced by their systematic thought, reasoned that although the world may be imperfect it was still a 'beautiful world', in some measure reflecting the spiritual unity that allowed this world to express itself, reveal itself as this incredible cosmos in all its infinitely intricate complexity. Now, I am not arguing that we should adopt this type of religious metaphysics but ask you, in a moment of philosophical contemplation, to look at the beauty of this universe as revealed through current astrophysical researches, e.g., etc. Vast tracts of space are now understood to form long filaments spilling with galaxies teaming with worlds that should, on such tremendous odds, be filled with forms of life even more dazzling than those found on this humble spec of space called ‘Earth’. This entire cosmos apparently demonstrating the same degree of fractal symmetry across the perceived immensity of its phenomenal embrace indicating a self-organized structure… stamped with a theological-like countenance? What should we conclude from our interpretations of such observations? At least a humble openness to its majestic display and perhaps a hope that this visible evidence of a cosmic unity is none other than the imprint of the Divine in ‘their’ theologicalization of the life-world?? (V.58) [69]

12.	  But Does Theological Difference Make a Difference, Have any Relevance?

Although in the fourth essay  we argued that a positive theological difference could be philosophically entertained, we also found that the vision of the Divine therein sketched appeared to have no relevance for us in our daily lives through the disparity in power relations that such a relationship, such an apparently impossible relationship, would have for-us! In this essay I have partially argued the contrary, “that this relevance must be relevant” if only by virtue of the fact that the entire life-world is imprinted with this sense of the divine and, therein, 'evidence', if not proof, that this disparity between the sense of the divine and this everyday world have in some demonstrable measure been overcome (indeed, in such a manner to suggest that this 'disparity' was more a transcendental  'illusion'?). On the other hand we must still question what real relevance might, or must, this ‘virtual relevance’ have for-us in the passage of our daily lives? This problematic issue will be dealt with in the next essay in this series but let me preview a possible resolution of this puzzle by offering the following thoughts: If a relationship comes into relational existence, in accordance with our relational philosophy, through the ongoing resolution of dissonance, what ‘dissonance’ would need to be overcome in a divinely orientated relationship by an individual or a religious community of such individuals (or even for that matter by the divine party or parties ‘equally’ participant in such a relationship)? Then, what characteristics could be hypothetically derived from the nature of this type of relationship, or, any type of relationship for that matter, that we find to be apposite for our research in this topic of phenomenological-theology, a theology also hermeneutical and existential in its ambitions? A possible candidate for this research might well be found in the topic of ‘love’, looking at its essential phenomenological nature as phenomenally found present in all its infinite variety of forms. But, with these last few thoughts, and, my admission of many doubts that I still have with this type of enterprise,  let me end this essay by indicating that a real conclusion has not yet been arrived at nor should be hopefully expected in any immanent fashion! (V.59) [70]

That theological difference does, on this account, make a difference, but, what that difference is must be explored elsewhere. (V.60) [71]

	The sixth essay continues this quest for personal theological relevance and is titled: Finding a Place for the Idea of God – Part VI: What Relevance Does Theological Difference Possess?? [72]

12.   Theological Relevance?

	In the fourth paper it was argued that not only could one propose the concept of theological difference philosophically, but, that theologically one could meaningfully argue for this difference as a theological 'fact'. 'Theological difference' was defined in the third paper as "the difference between a 'vision of the universe with a sense of the divine/senses of the divine' and a 'vision of the universe without any sense of the divine'." In the fifth paper, this difference experienced in the form of a possible relationship between some sense of the divine with an individual human ego/community of human egos was felt to involve a degree of difference in power differential that was thought impossible to cross or close. Hence the question was posed "what relevance, in a religious context, does the acceptance of a positive theological difference make?" If this general vision of a process-oriented sense of divinity entailed such an enormous difference in power, in its epistemological-ontological degree of self-organization, between itself and our state as a human being (on this mere spec of a planet on the edge of this galaxy on the edge of its galactic cluster, itself only one among billions of other clusters) what possibility could it have of entering into a relationship with us, and we with it, in a meaningful fashion? In a similar vein the value of religion itself was called into question - that, on de facto grounds at least, one could argue, in balance, the value of religion in the life of the human being, as an individual in a community (of communities), might well be negative?! (VI.1) [73]

	Although these two questions were not directly addressed it was noted that because it is the nature of a relationship to essentially 'imprint' itself upon the 'fabric' or 'body' of that relationship, i.e., throughout the entire extent of that relationship; within its own sense of 'space' (i.e., in its own distinctive sense of space-time), then it is implied that the essential nature of the divine, in all its levels of divinity, is intimately stamped upon the world and our passage through the same, both as an individual and as a community (of communities). Hence the divine, in all its forms, the 'fact' of theological difference granted, must have itself intimately involved within this world, with all its creatures therein, and, the passage of all forms of life as they individually and collectively move through this world-of-life. Or, to paraphrase an Islamic saying, "God is as close as one's jugular vein." (VI.2) [74]

	Having drawn this conclusion that, despite the near infinite difference, in epistemological-ontological self-organization, between some sense of the divine and ourselves, we could still argue that all senses of the divine intimately imprinted themselves upon the fabric, or 'body', of our sense of self-being and equally upon all other institutions whether religious in persuasion or non-religious in persuasion. We could still sceptically ask what relevance has this relationship/have these relationships for the individual as an individual in a community (of communities)? And it is this question I hope to address in this paperfrom a transcendental-phenomenologically neutral philosophical position. (VI.3) [75]

	In the last paper it was noted "that, a phenomenological reading of this divine tracing as a 'divine trace' would then give to us a way of seeing 'the hand that writes upon the book of this world', so to speak, to metaphorically use an anthropomorphic figure of speech." In resurrecting this concept of the world as a 'divine text', the realm of nature as a 'book', let me re-explore this type of metaphor to see what light, if any, might be thrown upon this question of theological relevance? Assuming that there is this hypothetical theologicalization of the life-world, let us run with this image of the world as a 'divine text' to see if we can sensibly answer this potential objection - just as if one were to see footprints in the snow might let one suppose that someone or something has made them even if we might never get to see who or what made those footprints in the first place? (VI.4) [76]

13.   What Might We Read if "the World was to be Seen as a 'Divine Text'?"

The first point I would like to make is that if the theologian were to run with this type of concept then their act of reading this 'divine text' should reveal and release a sense of hermeneutic value greater than that merely invested in that 'act of reading'. Moreover, this hermeneutic excess should be even greater than that revealed and released from the mere 'fact' of the systematization of that interpretative system itself. In our so called 'charitable interpretation' of systematic presentations that claim to accurately and insightfully map the constitution of our world it has been argued that all systematic presentations to some extent, as a measure of that systematization, will reveal and release a degree of value greater than that merely invested in that construction of those systems. That, in essence, all systems, to some degree or other, existentially map the world to that same extent. On the other hand, however, in ceasing to be merely charitable, we would expect a well-founded phenomenological vision of the life-world to reveal and release a considerably greater degree of value than that merely invested in its mere construction and from its mere systematization! That this greater differential of value, beyond the mere systematization of that systematic presentation, should be evident phenomenologically and/or hermeneutically and/or existentially, or, preferably, that value should be seen to involve all three of these dialectical modalities that constitute the hermeneutic circle in general (and, specifically, in the hermeneutic circle of theological comprehension as implicated in this type of discourse). (VI.5) [77]

	A second point I would like to make is that the life-world, and any subject or object therein can always be read through an infinity of perspectives. Just as a geologist would 'read' the landscape in one or other geologic fashion so too an artist might see the same through the lens of a particular artistic style and/or medium, etc. That, normally, these interpretations do not conflict with each other. In a similar manner, the theologian might wish to see the world through a certain metaphorical-rhetorical lens without necessarily conflicting with some other theologian's modus operandi (or that of a scientist, or any other way of viewing the life-world, etc.). In theory they both could be right, or, both could be wrong, or, one could be right and the other could wrong (or, one or other could be constructing a system just not relevant to the intentional task as apparently stated). The point that I am trying to make here is this - that in attempting to read the world through a theological lens means that that theologian has had to build themselves a theologically-oriented type of lens. Of course this concept of 'lens' is a metaphor, moreover, this type of lens itself is constructed from an assemblage of religiously treated metaphors that, hopefully, for the theologian, will accomplish the task they wish to have performed by that complex metaphorical construction. (VI.6) [78]

	As a consequence of adopting and using this systematic metaphorical construction the philosophical-theologian, and/or, theological-philosopher, must critically exercise this complex literary device with due regard to the manner and limitations of its nature, i.e., that its constitution is primarily and, essentially, metaphorical and should be treated as such! As a result the 'metaphor' should be critically treated as a metaphor, i.e., not as in a factual modality nor in any other non-metaphorical modality. A prime mistake made by the uncritical philosopher, or the uncritical theologian, or the uncritical lay-person, is to literalize the metaphor! (VI.7) [79]

14.   The Use of Metaphor in the Construction of a Theological 'Lens'

	The implication of this research, just to hand, is that the work of the theologian when operating in a theoretical arena is in the metaphorical sphere and like any other philosopher or non-philosopher they should not illegitimately literalize the metaphor! With this critical limitation in mind let us ask ourselves how such a theoretical project might be conducted from a theoretical-phenomenological point of view, i.e., how might, or should, the theologian operate in their use of the metaphorical? (VI.26) 
         [80]
	I have already argued that the process nature of reality would seem to suggest and imply that a hypothetical theologicalization of the life-world in its emergent sense of divinization should be left imprinted upon the body of its sphere of being, namely, the very fabric of the world, and, that all levels and aspects of such divinization should, at least hypothetically, be found there if we knew 'how to read' this ‘book of nature’ with its divine writing imprinted thereon? A metaphorical ‘book’ where the thelogicalization of the life-world is, from a transcendent point of view, over-written, and, from an immanent point of view, is simultaneously under-written. The theoretical (and non-theoretical) correlativity of this concept pair (of transcendency-immanency) demanding an equal transcendent and immanent phenomenlogical treatment(s) (as maintained through the theoretical and practical use of the transcendental suspension [demanding this co-reading even if covertly appreciated and not overtly appreciated by the same or some other ‘reader’]). (VI.27) [81]

	Let us now ask what value a ‘metaphorical’ reading might possess when conducted in and through the hermeneutic circle, and, what possible light might be cast on the adoption of metaphor critically exercised by the theologian? Just what could they hope for in this regard? (VI.29) [82]

	A metaphor is meant to be used in an insightful fashion, help us to better understand the nature of the world, help us to see it afresh… As the title to this section suggests, I am considering the use of metaphor by the theologian as a possible sort of metaphorical ‘lens’. In a sense this meta-metaphorical literary device, ‘image’ or concept of a ‘lens’ is something we can ‘look through’ but not literally! As just indicated, to be able to read this metaphor assumes it can serve a useful role in the success of this task, i.e., release more hermeneutic value that that invested in the use of this (meta-)metaphor, i.e., makes the assumption that the process possesses the potential for the release of a hermeneutic excess, the entire 'image' needing to be appropriately inserted into a properly exercised hermeneutic circle. Hence the properly exercised ‘meta-metaphorical’ use of this image of a ‘lens’ must also be appropriately treated hermeneutically and existentially (whether that be done in an overtly scrutinized format or a covertly implied format)! From a metaphorical perspective we perceive that this meta-metaphor of a ‘lens’ cannot be treated literally. What insightful implication can be drawn and what critical reservations are cast, in turn, from hermeneutical and existential perspectives within the ambit of this hermeneutic circle? Let me make some suggestions dealing with each of these ‘moments’ respectively. (VI.30) [83]

	What reservations does our hermeneutic point of view have for our critical research in general and for the theologian in particular? As the underlying nature of the hermeneutic is rhetorical, constructed through the use of a dis-conjunctive suspension that ‘grounds’ the nature of a question, and, as our enquestioning modality is not absolutely isolated from its metaphorical answer delivered through the (re-)production of an existential insighfulness, it follows that that sense of questioning cannot be absolute, i.e., absolutely formulated and absolutely resolved except provisionally and/or analytically. In other words, a definitive answer implies an analytical formulation as a response to the nature of that question. Being only analytically ‘definitive’ through an arbitrary act wherein each identity is inserted into a pre-formulated equation (of expectation). On the other hand, any other form of answer, reply, resolution must be provisionally constructed as all value, i.e., all sense, meaning and meaningfulness, is delivered through the ongoing simulation of that hermeneutic circle, not its cessation! These senses of the metaphorical, the rhetorical and their existentially balanced cooperation imply that the question can never be absolutely formulated (except analytically in a pseudo-absolute formulation) nor absolutely answered (except analytically through some form of a pseudo-absolute resolution). Hence all research in general cannot be absolutely formulated nor absolutely resolved – the question, in real non-analytical terms, can neither be perfectly asked nor perfectly answered! And when answers are realized they can never be absolutely definitive. ‘Resolution’ can only arrive at a provisional reply. Resolution of a rhetorical proposition(al complex) cannot be effected in and through the adoption of a pure rhetorical/hermeneutical point of view. Hence the metaphorical answer of a rhetorical proposition (a proposition ‘turned around’ into the form of a question) can never be realized in pure rhetorical terms of reference, thence the implication of an existential dimension as argued for in the functioning of our hermeneutic circle. (VI.31) [84]

	….in essence, what I am trying to say, is that the inescapable use of the hermeneutic circle of comprehension implies, demands, that our interaction ‘within’ this world-of-life, and all ‘provisional entities and states’ found therein, is simulated and merely simulated! Simulation is qua simulation; a simulation of that already simulated, never a simulation of that ‘not simulated’ - as something to be ‘found’ before that act of simulation! Hence simulation is always a re-simulation! From an intentional perspective, it is only from a re-produced retention of intentional activity (and a protention of intentional expectations) that consciousness can ‘fix’ a ‘something’ to be thought about, etc., i.e., actually establish the ‘presence’ of a discernible intention, in an intentional act, in the first place. Hence simulation is merely simulated – never a simulation of that prior to this act of simulation as a ‘pre-simulated’ something or as a something or other that, ‘in-itself’, is not-simulated. That sort of nonsense of the thing-itself, etc., figures in various absolutist versions of so called philosophy such as representationalism, rationalism, idealism, realism, objectivism, etc., ad nauseam! E.g., as critical philosophers (and theologians) we are not travelling along this sort of ‘path’, or rather, cul de sac, that the representationalist thinks they are travelling along by insisting that ideas and/or perceptions somehow reflect, represent, what exists in a so-call ‘external world’. Please dismiss this type of patent nonsense perpetrated through the literalization of the metaphor! Our recognition of the life-world realizes the fact that we are collectively ‘immersed’ in ‘one’, ‘open’ world-of-life - a transcendental dimension wherein all phenomena are phenomenologically constituted, the metaphorical ‘ground’ wherein all forms of value, and excesses in the same, are ‘grown’ and ‘thereupon’ released subjectively, inter-subjectively and objectively without any form of an absolute dichotomy between these three domains.  Simulation is, therefore, always mere simulation! Simulation is always a re-simulation of a simulation, a re-simulation of a re-simulation. As a re-simulation of a re-simulation there is implied the fact that we are always, therein, ‘directly’ involved with that state-of-affairs being re-simulated. All relationships demand our direct involvement for how else could we be involved with the same! Even instances of our so-called ‘indirect involvement’ demand our direct involvement, albeit, as a metaphorical ground upon which we might be able to enter directly in some relatively more fundamental form or other. So my knowing ‘b’ who knows ‘c’ whom I don’t directly know implies that I could know ‘c’ directly, say find an introduction through person ‘b’ in fact, or, theoretically argue that as c’s interaction within the lifeworld is within the same life-world our direct interaction is also pre-given as a fundamental fact even if that ‘fact’ of our existences may throw little light on ‘our’ being within the same life-world (even when divided historically and where divided geographically, etc.). (VI.35) [85]

	Running the same types of arguments, on the simulated nature of the life-world, in a theological frame of reference would allow the theologian to produce (or rather re-produce) a similar style of argument with a similar set of consequences, albeit from a theological perspective. In the light of the above they could argue, e.g., that all relationships with some sense of the divine, with any sense of the divine, must be fundamentally direct in nature. Hence through a theologicalization of the life-world our relationships with all senses of the divine must be direct, and, vice versa – that any relationship(s) some (possible) sense of the divine (Divine) might have with-us/for-us would exhibit the same existential characterization , namely, this sense of relational directness(?)! Hence, once positive theological difference is accepted, theological difference(s) must be also accepted as relevant to our being-in-this-one-world-of-life through the relational directness of all relationships whether we are aware of that (existential) ‘fact’ or not!? Moreover, theological difference must be accepted because for the world to have value, i.e., possess any forms of sense, meaning and meaningfulness, implies an excess of value must be present, i.e., that theological difference must actually be present in this value-producing-theologicalization of the life-world!(?) That, in essence, the existence of a(ny) surplus of value implies that the (metaphorical) ‘oneness of the life-world’ must be in evidence as a surplus over the mere summation of the life-world qua life-world. To put this last argument in a reversed form we might say that given a surplus of value is always available to us this ‘existential fact’ must imply that the unity of the life-world must emerge to the same extent that this surplus also emerges – in the light of that emergent modality. Hence the theologicalization of the life-world is a fait accompli! Of course, as this argument stands, this does not imply that truly wonderful forms of divinity must exist beyond that already manifested in and through the unfathomable mysteries to be found in the being of another person, or in the ‘depths’ of our very own self, or in the continual surprises to be found in store for us as communities and other institutions evolve with ‘a life of their own’, or in the sublime experiences to be had in our reflections upon the natural grandeur of the landscape and/or cosmos… To successfully argue beyond those terms of reference additional arguments would need to be appropriately and adequately put in place? (VI.36) [86]

	Another implication, with a profoundity of ramifications, can also be discovered from the critical adoption of this (transcendental, i.e., phenomenological-hermeneutical-existential) concept of simulation! Just as we cannot literalize the metaphor so too we cannot absolutely dismiss the same as a simulation of reality in some form or other! Let me establish a valid argument in this respect and illustrate its potential theological ramifications in this regard. (VI.37) [87]

15.   On the Non-Absolute Dismissal of Metaphor!

	The intention of this argument is to show that each and every metaphor cannot help but be an insightful lens upon the reality of the world, this world-of-life, and, in a theological perspective, that all analogies used to ‘illustrate’ some sense, i.e., aspect or level, of the divine in all its hypothetical forms cannot fail to possess some residue of truth regardless of whether the quantum of that residue be significant or insignificant in phenomenal extent. In other words, we cannot dismiss our use of metaphor as completely non-literal, as something merely abstract and without some basis in factual reality. Somehow they must also successfully ‘image’ the world despite the fact that we cannot adopt a literalization of that metaphor! I.e., our metaphor must ‘metaphor’, be metaphor, act as metaphor, in other words, simulate the simulated reality that is the reality of that phenomenal-reality-that-is-there-for-us! How is this possible? Let me elabourate. (VI.38) [88]

	In practice, if I am correct both the philosopher and non-philosopher, both the theologian and the non-theologian, must walk a tightrope between the impossible literalization of the metaphor and the absolute non-dismissal of this ability of metaphor to also validly image to some extent or other that aspect of the phenomenal world being focused upon by that metaphorical lens. The impossible literalization of the metaphor accepted (through the impossible literalization of the conjunctive suspension at the center of the metaphor) let me construct two arguments that forbid the opposite absolute dismissal of the metaphorical ability to also act as a metaphorical lens upon the phenomenal constitution of the world as expressed through this world-of-life. Following that I will then construct a simple argument that allows us to navigate between these two impossible polar extremes of an absolute literalization of the metaphor and their absolute non-dismissal as nothing but mere literary fictions. (VI.39) 
           [89]
	Using a type of argument put forward by the philosopher Georg Gadamer we must equally argue against both the absolute successful interpretation of any one text and any opposite claim that we have an absolute inability to hermeneutically deal with any particular text (because of the differences between languages, different forms of cultural expression, the intricate language-games and life-skills involved in the performance of different occupations in this world-of-life, absence of appropriate forms of hermeneutic training, the inability to 're-construct' intentional formation, lack of 'self'-control in the formation of our texts, in the reading of ‘our’ texts, etc., etc.). 
          (VI.40) [90]
The 'ability' to absolutely interpret a text would necessitate our being able to exactly reconstruct the intentional intent behind the formation of that particular text under our hermeneutic scrutiny and, at the same time, have absolute evidence that this task of 're-construction' has been perfectly achieved. This overall ability to absolutely re-produce the intentional formation of a text is something we most decidedly do not possess (even with the re-interpretation of our own textual production) nor could such a perfect skill ever exist (for a number of reasons that this essay will demonstrate, chief of which is the 'transcendental fact' that no aspect of the hermeneutic circle can be absolutely non-polar in orientation on the grounds that this would involve an absolute contradiction in terms and a collapse of the hermeneutic circle and all value derived therein). We do possess, however, the ability to provisionally reconstruct a text given that that text is well-formed and in a language possessed by the interpreter or that there exists to hand a translation adequate for this task. Or, expressed in a simple formula we might like to say that the text is open to a relatively successful interpretation when it is adequately well-formed, appropriately well-informed and is found to be easily accessible to being well-performed! Yet, despite the adequate presence of these three factors, simulation as the re-simulation of a (re)simulation can never be perfectly achieved. Both our ability to communicate and be understood is conducted as a process that takes time, and effort, to complete. We do not possess an infinite amount of time to conduct our process of communication and/or enter into a hermeneutic process of interpretation, nor do we possess an infinite amount of energy to conduct a thorough effort in our 'grappling' with that text! Thankfully, a text is usually often meaningfully engaged without the need to resort to lengthy periods of time to spend interpreting them nor with considerable degrees of intellectual effort also needing to be expended in this process. Hence for these reasons, the intentional re-production of a text can never be perfect and as a process must engage both time and effort when it appears we have the ability to 'read' the same. As soon as no relative hermeneutic excess is apparent over that additional 'psychic effort' being invested in our process of interpretation it is at that point that we cease to engage that text and hence its process of interpretative translation automatically ceases. Thus we must rule out our ability to absolutely interpret a text - because we are never in a position to claim that we have completely understood that text and therein absolutely re-produced its intentional intent. In effect, this tension between the invitation to interpret a text and the realization of that promise can never be perfectly realized. But this margin of error rarely concerns us as the relative degree of hermeneutic excess released in our translation of the text usually determines the degree of trust we will place in its provisional interpretation and therein appear to guarantee, to that same extent, the final provisional translation adopted in our reading of that text. (VI.41) [91]

On the opposite tack, in our engagement with a text, because the direct nature of that engagement, however minimal our hermeneutic appreciation of that text, we can still to some extent directly engage with it. All relationships involve our direct engagement with that being engaged with. Indeed, our full membership in the life-world implies that we are in direct engagement with the entirety of this life-world, albeit from the point of view adopted in our engagement with that text(ual aspect of the life-world under focus) in which we, as a living subjective textual fragment of this same life-world, in turn, must find reflected within that text(ual aspect) the entirety of the life-world, albeit from its imprinted point of view. In our appreciation of a text, as a text qua intentionally determined text, our realisation of that text as a 'text', as the deposited productivity of a distinctive intentional determination, either authored or co-authored, implies that our engagement has already being productive, namely, our minimal initial recognition of that text as a 'text', i.e., as an intentionally informed product that offers the promise of its intentional deposition being able to be adequately re-produced and therein understood. E.g., we may be in a foreign land and ask a question of one of the inhabitants. They can sense, or should be able to sense, that we are 'asking a question', that we are asking for help in some form or other. Their refusal to understand this request cannot be used as evidence in this regard that 'they do not understand' since their saying or indicating that they "do not understand" indicates enough of the fact that they do understand but cannot be bothered to continue in this process of ongoing interpretation for reasons they may or may not be able to express if pressed to account for this dismissal. They already have some degree of understanding - that that person is 'seeking some form of assistance' while the second person conveys to the first that they 'do not wish to understand them and therein assist them'. Engagement with a text and/or the emitter of that text can, therefore, never be dismissed as absolutely impossible despite the minimal resonance (and maximum resistance) we might find with that text and/or emitter of that text. In a similar fashion our reading of metaphor with a re-reading of the world likewise cannot be absolutely dismissed! To adequately argue for this proposition I will need to introduce my second argument centred on the phenomenological nature of simulation. (VI.42) [92]

	All acts of simulation are entertained, actively and/or passively, through the medium of the hermeneutic circle of comprehension. In this hermeneutic circle metaphorical formation and appreciation constitutes one of those three moments that collectively constitute the formation and re-formation of that dialectical activity, i.e., the simulation of the life-world (and any re-simulation of the same deposited textually as an imprint upon the 'fabric' of the world). Now, the life-world, in part or in whole, is phenomenologically constituted as a phenomenon there-for-us by-us through the auspicious of the hermeneutic circle and vice versa. Metaphor analogically mirror phenomena in the life-world and being a (constitutional) part of the life-world (in its constitution there for us), and in our appreciation of the same, it implies that we cannot absolutely divorce metaphor from the very nature of the life-world. Hence, to this extent, although metaphor may primarily be seen as 'imaging' the world they must also directly constitute the same. Thence metaphor may analogically 'present' the world they must also 're-present' it too. Thus all textual devices in their re-presentation of the life-world must also present it! So concepts, etc., as picture-tools cannot just be pragmatic devices but must also, in some fashion or other, present the true nature of the world at the same time. Of course this does not mean that we are fully aware as to how this modal ordering, and modelling, is being achieved, only, that in some measure, that this must be the case. (VI.43) [93]

	Expressed in a different manner we might wish to add to this argument the fact that as the entirety of the life-world is imprinted on any textually deposited fragment of the same, albeit from its imprinted point of view, then all metaphor must be capable of focusing as a 'metaphorical' lens upon any textual fragment of the life-world, albeit with positive degrees of successfulness reflecting the relative appropriateness of that modelling given the relevancy of such an endeavour in the light of the meta-textual-context or contexts that release relatively greater degrees of hermeneutic excess in value creation. In other words, the adoption of any metaphor will illuminate any aspect of the life-world we wish to focus upon using the same, however, only those metaphors properly constructed and used in an appropriate manner will effectively and productively illuminate that under such 'focus'. Because the life-world is simulated in and through the auspices of the hermeneutic circle, or any other heuristic device that 'models' the transcendental constitution of the same, it follows that as the metaphorical is an integral aspect of this type of 'transcendental lens' that metaphor will do just that, moreover, as argued, that as any textual fragment of the life-world reflects the entirety of the life-world, albeit from its imprinted point of view, it follows that any metaphor will illuminate to some degree or other any textual fragment focused upon. That this holistic reflection of the life-world (through quantum limitations on the limits of minimal informational re-production) essentially takes on a grainy, discrete monadic-like 'appearance'. Monadism being established through 'simulation' while monadic dimensions are established by the extent of the relational field. On the other hand metaphorical utility, i.e., being re-productive of value (re-)formation (through the illumination of phenomenological insightfulness, hermeneutical excess and existential meaningfulness) is established through the metaphorical context, as situated within the hermeneutic circle, being well-formed, well-informed and open to being read in a well-performed manner through the clear meta-textual adoption and adaptation of current meta-textual conventions (as determined inter-textually and through a fruitful appreciation of their function in practice). (VI.44) 94]

	This argument of the non-absolute dismissal of the metaphor(ical reading of simulated 'reality') essentially argues that as a picture-tool the metaphor must 'picture' 'reality' to some extent, to that extent a non-metaphorical aspect or component can be discerned within that metaphorical-complex. This artificial 'residue' is guaranteed on the grounds that metaphor cannot function in a pure metaphorical mode. The hermeneutic circle demands its incorporation within an overall tripolar modality also involving a meta-textual rhetorical aspect and a non-textual existential aspect. This being the case, given the adoption of these terms of reference, should we not define the not-metaphorical aspect or aspects operating within these terms of reference as merely 'rhetorical' and 'existential' in complexion? With the implication that one should read the 'not-metaphorical' as being divided between the rhetorical and the existential and not as being in some fashion 'literal' or 'factual' or 'real', or, as quazi-literal, etc? This would be correct if it were not for the 'fact' that the 'hermeneutic circle' is synonymous with the 'life-world' (in its transcendental ideality, i.e., as it appears to transcendentally mirrors its ability to phenomenologically constitute the phenomenal world) and that through simulation there can be no difference… hence the metaphorical in its non-pure metaphoricality cannot but not help 'to image' the world in a 'direct fashion' hence the appropriateness of this meta-concept of a "metaphorical 'lens'"… to the extent that metaphor can 'truly' and 'directly' reveal the essential nature of the world through 'that act of imaging'. (VI.45) [95]

	Now, let me construct a simple argument to show how we manage to navigate this territory between the non-absolute literalization of the metaphor and the absolute dismissal of the metaphor's ability to 'directly read' the phenomenal constitution of that 'reality' being simulated. Put succinctly, it is through the appropriate functioning of the hermeneutic circle (in its existentialization of the simulated process) that this 'middle path' is 'without effort' naturally navigated! Or, put more technically, through putting in place the types of transcendental suspensions that establish our three polarities of the metaphorical (as a phenomenological polarity and its invocation of a conjunctive suspension), the rhetorical (as a hermeneutical polarity and its invocation of a dis-conjunctive suspension) and resolution of this tension between the former (as an existential polarity through the invocation of a 'suspension' of these two previous suspensions maintained in a state of ongoing balance) that an overall transcendental suspension is relatively put into effect and which, therein, spontaneously establishes the ongoing 'direct reading' of simulated 'reality' through the realization of the not-textual aspect of value formation (wherein textual sense, meta-textual meaning and non-textual meaningfulness can be approached, 'extracted', etc.). The 'relative effortlessness' of this existentialization of the relatively non-existential 'material' under examination being achieved through the delivery of an excess in value that, re-invested in the 'body of that examination', maintains our 'psychic interest' in the same till such a time that that investment ceases to be productive of an excess in a value, or, our priorities are re-adjusted and the focus of our interest shifts to a new topic or set of topics. (VI.46) [96]

	Before I look more closely at this meta-concept of a "metaphorical 'lens'" what other implications can be drawn from the philosophical 'fact' that there can be no one pure polar aspect within the hermeneutic circle, etc. For a start "from non-absolute rhetoricalness it follows that there can be no absolutely scepticism, and, "from non-absolute existentialness there can be "no existentialization of the existential - only an existentialization of the relatively non-existential!" Both of these consequential 'insights' into the functioning of the hermeneutic circle have important ramifications for the theologian…. (VI.47) [97]

16.   A General Rule for Determining Absolute and Relative Limits of Metaphor

	Let me make this series of observations. First, that the non-literalization of a metaphor is an absolute ruling. Under no circumstances is a metaphor to be treated literally, factually, etc. On the other hand, for a metaphor to simulate the reality of the life-world it must do just that, namely, metaphorically simulate some aspect of the life-world. This understanding of its identity could be formulated as a relative rule, namely, that the metaphor must 'metaphor', must be a metaphor, must act as a metaphor. Hence, when dealing with this moment of the metaphorical we can formulate our previous two rules as having absolute and relative consequences, respectively, in our determination of the limits in the functioning of that moment. Hence, that moment being phenomenologically constituted negatively by our other two moments it follows that what goes for one must go for the other two moments in this regard (archetypally). So, in continuing our investigations into the natural limits of the rhetorical and the existential let us make use of this rule that states, in effect, that a moment has both absolute limits and relative limits, namely, respectively, that “it cannot be absolutely what it is not” and “must be what it is” in accordance with its dialectical nature! (VI.48) [98]

17.   On the Impossibility of a Pure Scepticism

	The second moment we are going to look at is that of the rhetorical which can also be described in orientation as hermeneutical, meta-textual, field-oriented, etc. Essentially it is the asking of a question, an enquestioning. From an absolute point of view, because this moment cannot be extracted from the hermeneutic circle in a pure polar form, it follows that we cannot ask the absolute question, i.e., just ask a pure question without some implicit understanding of a 'metaphorical' answer in a potential process of an 'existential' resolution. As a result it also follows that we cannot be absolutely sceptical, merely ask a question without some form of an implicit answer, etc. Of course we can question something, anything for that matter, it is just that we cannot merely enquestion it, subject it to an absolute process of questioning. It follows therefore, that for both the philosopher and the non-philosopher, that for both the theologian and the non-theologian, we cannot be absolutely sceptical with the implication that in any question there is a residue of truth that cannot be dismissed because, in a sense, all question are formulated from within the existential context of the life-world and must in some measure reflect that reflection of reality! Hence the Aristotelian preference of potentiality over actuality is wrong since the potential is always cast in the light of the actual without an absolute dismissal of the same from within its re-formulation of 'our perception' of the actual! E.g., to contemplate the 'possibility' of a gold mountain we remove from the simulated actuality of the life-world as collectively understood the factually observable entities of something or somethings that were truly 'golden' and truly 'mountainous' to consider whether the intersection of these two sets can find a similar actual status (as yet not discovered). From an absolute point of view the rhetorical cannot be absolutely enquestioned. Then, from a relative point of view we need to insist that the rhetorical must be rhetorical, act in a rhetorical manner in keeping with its nature to be rhetorical with the implication that the rhetorical must, in an ongoing fashion, continue to continually enquestion that state of affairs under investigation whilst remaining the topic of our current investigations. In other words, for the hermeneutic circle to function, the question must continually enquestion its topic for investigation, continually testing all previous acts and products realized in previous and current acts of resolution and thereby contribute to the existentialization of our research and therein, through an overall transcendental suspension, realize a simulation of reality more in accordance with the reality of its simulation! In effect, establishing the relative authenticity of our (not-textual) reading through that overall transcendental suspension assuming this textual process is well-formed, well-informed and well-performed! 
         (VI.49) [99]

18.  Focusing on this Meta-Concept of a 'Lens'…

	From this deeper understanding of the functioning of the hermeneutic circle we are now in a better position to understand how metaphor act as a 'metaphorical lens', and, in a theological setting, what can be metaphorically seen through this 'lens' and what cannot be 'seen' through the same. (VI.51) [100]

	First, from a systematic point of view, looking at (all) possible senses of the divine in general and in particular, by virtue of their re-simulation in and through this hermeneutic circle (of theological comprehension) it follows that no formulation can be treated in an absolute absolutist manner. It follows therefore, e.g., that no particular sense of the divine is the result of the greatest degree of perfection (unless 'perfection' is meaningfully and arbitrarily pre-set at some value which then implies that some other sense of the divine could then be defined as better than that previous sense of the divine as formerly defined, etc.). (VI.52) [101]

	Second, using our threefold absolute and relative aspects as embedded in our rulings as just examined we might like to note the following in the order as they were previously introduced. (VI.53) [102]

	From an absolute point of view, all metaphors must not, indeed, cannot be meaningfully treated in a completely literal manner. Hence they cannot be factualized! On the other hand, however, metaphor must to some extent mirror the reality upon which they were formulated in the first place. So all metaphors possess a residue of truth being re-simulations of the reality of the life-world as the reality of that re-simulation! Meaning?! That in some manner they must re-simulate the reality being simulated through the use of that metaphor when and where that metaphor is able to productively perform this simulation cum re-simulation. So, e.g., seeing the transcendent enstructuralization of some phenomenon as divine in orientation, to that same extent, means that in that same manner this 'sense of the divine' is actually being re-simulated. At the same time, through the operation of an overall transcendental suspension in the hermeneutic circle an equal immanent treatment must also, in effect, be overtly or covertly conducted in order to establish the authenticity of that same re-simulation. (VI.54) [103]

	From and absolute point of view, all rhetorical exercises must not, indeed, cannot be meaningfully treated in an absolute form hence we can never be completely sceptical about anything whether that be the existence and consequences of some sense of the divine or something else that is not regarded as divine in aspect or orientation. Moreover, regardless of the nature of our topic existential value, in part, can only arise through the ongoing, continual enquestioning of both questions and answers, etc. So, e.g., the question of divine existence in some form or other must be continually enquestioned in a relative, non-absolute fashion for the value of our theological research, or any other type of research, to bear a productive fruitfulness! 
        (VI.55) [104]
	From and absolute point of view, all understandings in the nature of the existential process must not, indeed, cannot be meaningfully treated in an absolute form hence we must never ‘perceive’ the existential as coming into existence through the existentialization of the relatively existential! A major consequential implication here would be the recognition that the existentialization of a process, its relative spiritualization, can never be achieved through the existentialization of the relatively divine qua relatively divine. Only through an existentialization, spirtualization of the relatively non-existential, non-spiritual, can there be a productive rendering of value. The implication here being that all theologies must involve the process-oriented existentialization of the relatively non-existential and not some existentialization of the already relatively existential or 'spiritual'. Or, in more simple language, any sense of the divine formulated in a theological setting must come about through the spiritualization of the relatively non-spiritual and not through a spiritualization of that already spiritually treated from a spiritual point of view. Hence the relative functional necessity for a 'process-theological' understanding in this regard! (VI.56) [105]

	With these (tentative) insights to hand let us re-look at this metaphor of 'the divine book of nature' to the extent that the unity of the life-world, the ongoing unification of the same, is seen as imprinting itself upon that with which it is related as a process-basis, through which it finds its emergent sense of existence. (VI.57) [106]

19.  On a "Reading of the 'Divine Book' of Nature"

	It has already been argued that the ongoing transcendent-orientation of the life-world is equivalent to a relative theologicalization of the life-world with the qualification that as the hermeneutic circle simulates/re-simulates the reality of the life-world through the 'reality' of that simulation/re-simulation it follows that an equal an opposite immanent treatment needs to be also conducted if not overtly at least covertly. Moreover, these parallel readings also need to be conducted through an ongoing state of overall state of balance in order to simulate/re-simulate the overall transcendental suspension operative at the centre of the hermeneutic circle and therein at the centre of all understanding of the life-world. With these insights to mind how might we conduct this ‘reading’ of ‘the divine book of nature’ that therein, hopefully, we might meet face to face those senses of the divine in reality that should be found therein given this philosophical tendency to read the transcendent enstructuralization of reality as essentially divine in orientation on the understanding that 'value' is released only through this parallel theologicalization of the life-world (equally mirrored by it parallel immanentization). Our 'theoretical definition of the divine, in this regard, needing to find some form of non-theoretical instantiation as 'promised' by this metaphor of a "metaphorical 'lens'"! How might this be achieved if it could be achieved? Taking once more the hermeneutic circle as the 'key' to how this might be done let me show how, in theory at least, we may indeed be able to read this 'Divine Book of Nature' by closely understanding the limitations imposed upon us by the very nature and limitations of the hermeneutic circle as understood to date! (VI.58) [107]

21.   Re-Discovering the Living Text

	The scientific attitude is ostensively reductive as would be expected in its focusing on the phenomenological aspect of our hermeneutic circle. With its emphasis on the analytic, the retrospective, the dissonant, the psychic sense of foreground and its focus on the intentional object-state we are left with an inspection of the textual, indeed the 'death' of that text as a text through the retrospective deposition of that text; a text 'imprinted' with an essential snapshot of that textual process through that text's relationship with the living textual process in which it was engendered and, thereupon, in ‘death’, left discarded. But texts, all texts, are never produced/re-produced in purely textual terms of reference! So, even the scientific attitude cannot be purely reductive as we would expect from our investigations into the functional nature of the metaphorical. Similarly, a rhetorical enquestioning of the process only re-produces a sense of synthesis, a sense of the meta-textual, a sense of context and the inter-textual, etc. Such a situation, in this orientation, becomes something static, relatively unchanging and as our understanding of the world is derived from an existential resolution of this tension between this phenomenological aspect of the metaphorical and the hermeneutical aspect of the rhetorical it follows, as already argued, that we must also invoke an existential sense of resolution in our ability to read a text what ever its description as to type! This last moment develops a sense of the non-textual, our ability to see through a text as if it were not textual to the simulation of the simulation re-engendered by a re-simulation of these textual dynamics at the very centre of the hermeneutic circle! Lastly, it was noted that, through an overall transcendental balance being put in place between these three moments, the text is often satisfactorily recovered, i.e., re-supplied with an adequate degree of a transcendental excess (in apparent concordance with its ‘intent’) wherein the value of that text is effectively re-created and experienced as 'not a text', in a not-textual orientation! In the state of an overall transcendental suspension we find ourselves meeting/re-meeting the living text, a living simulation of a text that is able to engage us through a transcendental excess of value (over that merely invested in a writing and/or reading of the ‘integrity’ of that text, etc.). (VI.59) [108]
 
	In a similar manner, I would argue, the text of nature is also engaged, engages us in a living re-creation of itself wherein the ongoing unity of the life-world as presented/re-presented is therein re-discovered through this living semblance/resemblance of 'life'. And this is not something supernatural or extra-ordinary, but, in truth, the way we normally go about our passage through this world of life albeit with the imperfections, and relative lack of an authenticity, that all too easily characterize our existence as human, all too human… (VI.60) [109]

	Authenticity of spirit is recovered through a sympathetic/empathetic realignment with the dynamics operative in this circular hermeneutic-world-of-life! In our everyday reading of this 'divine book of nature' through the relatively authentic recovery of value, the theological nature of the life-world, through the process of its theologicalization, is also recovered! Hence the relatively more full re-valuation of a text in our relatively more full re-evaluation of the same is delivered through our appropriate re-engagement with this circular hermeneutic-world of-life that established the deposition of that text whether it be a text in a classical mould of 'writing' or a non-classical text of 'art' or the creation of a text in 'an artful reading of nature'. But, regardless of the initial nature of that text under focus our full realization of the sense, meaning and meaningfulness of its 'value' cannot be obtained through an imperfect realization of that hermeneutic circle invoked in its reading. Hence a scientific-like focus on the relatively reductive will not achieve this for us. Nor will a mere contextualization of that text achieve this degree of insight for us. Nor our merely entering into a playful spirit that seeks only to understand its apparent harmony without recourse to how that harmony was realized through an ongoing resolution of the metaphorical and rhetorical facets, etc. (VI.61) [110]
	
…and what must we find in this authentically re-instituted re-orientation towards the text as a 'living text'? Living in this circular hermeneutic-world-of-life what might 'the divine book of nature' have 'to say'? Can ‘intent’ be therein found and if so communicate such thought through language (or silence?) by positive and/or negative means?? (VI.62) [111]
21.   On the Essential Nature of all Relationships

Personified, resolution realized at the center of our circular hermeneutic-world-of-life, in effect, simulates the degree of 'love' entered into by those parties through that ongoing act of resolution! 'Love' can be defined as ‘that ongoing attraction (re-)experienced that binds that relationship together and therein gives to it its relative sense of authenticity and integrity’, and which, through its deposition of ‘texts’ and our reading of their ‘imprinted reflection’ of that ‘living relationship’, under examination allows us in part to essentially re-simulate both their intensity and their unique set of emergent modalities that form the essential ‘spirit’ of that ‘living relationship’. On an impersonal basis it is this binding energy that establishes the excess of value re-realized at the center of that relationship. In the invocation of a personal dimension it is re-viewed in a less metaphorical light as that actual 'love engendered in and through that personal relationship'. By 'extension' all potential forms of divinity must take this type of fact into account, in essence, an ontology of transcendent-immanent synthesis mirroring those forms of epistemologically-oriented synthesis already accounted for (like animals, people, communities, etc.) and for all those forms argued for on more speculative grounds through extrapolation linked through the ongoing theologicalization of the life-world wherein value is created and/or re-created in ever higher levels of epistemological-egologcial synthesis(?). The more personal the nature of that orientation re-simulated the greater that sense of the divine therein also re-simulated and that this one factor, namely ‘love’, can be (metaphorically) ‘seen’ as the magic ingredient, realized through resolution, that unites and integrates this entire hierarchy of ‘divine’ being, this entire life-world, this one-world-of-life! (VI.63) [112]

	To answer, therefore, the opening question "what relevance does theological difference possess?" we could reply that if the 'fact' of theological difference is accepted then we could propose that this 'relevance' is essentially this metaphorical 'love' imprinted upon the text of the world and open to experience through a re-realization of the text as a 'living text' when properly and appropriately attended to through the totality of the hermeneutic circle as engaged through this circular hermeneutic-world-of-life. From a theoretical point of view the theologian could argue for the above, but, in practical terms of reference, the critical philosopher could counter-argue “does such a complex position actually reveal an excess 'hermeneutical excess' greater than that merely invested in the adopting of such a position and an experiencing therein of its degree of systematization and what ever resonances such internal metaphors in this type of system might possess for a person already sympathetic to this type of world-view?” I would like to answer this type of question in the remaining essays of this series under an examination of such concepts of  'divine love(?)', an ontology of possible forms of divinity, 'continuing and extending the divine conversation(?)', how a theologian might deal with the subject of 'death', etc., to see what hypothetical avenues the theologian might have to hand in attempting to answer this type of question of "how theological difference is to be actually read in experience?" that they, naturally, would feel duty-bounty to answer. 
       (VI.64) [113]
	But, first, let me critically explore, from a hypothetical perspective, this new theologically-oriented dimension of "divine 'love'" in the next paper in this series of essays subtitled: On the Love of the Divine - Subjective Genitive and/or Objective Genitive?? (VI.65) [104]

22.   What Is the Essential Nature of Divine Love?

	The essential problematic is thus "what is the essential nature of love?", if there is such a thing, and, "what relation does this research bear to some sense of the divine (or Divine) in general (once we have accepted a positive theological frame of reference in which to argue this type of question assuming that we can ask this type of question)?". Our research continuing to operate under a global transcendental suspension as noted in previous papers, i.e., as an investigation of phenomenological 'sense' (meaning and meaningfulness) in hypothetical terms of reference without any absolute ontological and epistemological commitments, being conducted under a transcendental suspension as explicated elsewhere! (VII.2) [115]

	And the reader who wants to explore this topic further might like to read this section of this seventh essay. [116]

23.   On the Nature of Divine Love

	Rather than laboriously arrive at a conclusion, or a set of possible conclusions, in this investigation, let me simply announce that all forms of love are expressions of divine love!  Therefore, let me, instead, now interpret what this surprising statement might mean, and, from that interpretation, display what premises and arguments might allow me to so confidently proclaim such an apparently controversial (and apparently meaningless) statement. (VII.23) [117]

	In the context of a process theology 'all forms of divinity' can be defined as 'those states of affairs whose epistemological level of organization is greater than that of a certain individual and/or community of individuals'. In this light a religious institution cannot be treated as divine. On the other hand, overlooking this rider "is greater than that of a certain individual and/or community of individuals" any state of affairs could be treated as relatively more divine than some other through the possession of a relatively greater level of epistemological (self-)organization. In this regard it follows that as the relational integrity of a state through emergence is greater than that possessed by its mere material basis it follows that that relational facticity, its 'love' or relational binding energy, must be relatively more divine, more spiritual than its material basis. Hence the rationale behind this statement that proclaims "all forms of love are expressions of the divine". A process theology subsuming all relationships in a relationship with the emergent senses of the divine that emergently manifest in such a scheme. Let me look more closely into the ramification of this type of position and some of the philosophical problems that might arise from its adoption. (VII.24) 
        [118]
	For a start we have four inter-linked problems - how do we evaluate this relational facticity, and, can this relational facticity be considered apart from its material 'facticity', and, in what sense can relationships be in a state of relationship with other relationships, and, to what extent can relationships, meta-relationships, etc., be subsumed in the relationship (or relational 'ground') of all relationships a.k.a. the Divine (as equated in one earlier definition)???? (VII.25) [119]

	In the previously examined formula "what is the x of x" it was declared to be 'non-x' or 'not x'! E.g., "what is the whiteness of whiteness?" cannot be a colour but the 'whiteness' of white, i.e., its colourness or meta-whiteness; hence the non-equivalence in meta-status between 'the relationship' and 'the relationship of a relationship'. In this light the relationship of a relationship is effectively 'not a relationship' but a 'meta-relationship' or a 'non-relationship'/'not-relationship' causing us to then ask "can a meta-relationship relate with either a relationship (and v. v) or  some other meta-relationship?" Then we need to ask ourselves "can we successfully divide or separate a relationship from its material basis (and v.v)?" That, essentially, these four problems are inter-linked. Let me look more closely at this linkage in the context of these four types of problems. (VII.26) [120]

	In my various expositions on the subject of a transformational treatment-retreatment philosophy various tools for dealing with this relationship between parts and wholes, between analysis and synthesis, have been formulated. One of the insights looked at there is the ability of the relational synthesis and/or the relational analysis to be retreated back on to the material meta-level from whence that relationship evolved or emerged. By such means we could argue that there is no need for the 'relationship of a relationship' to interact with some other 'relationship' or 'relationship of a relationship' on the level of this meta-relativity by virtue of the fact that all forms of meta-relativity can be transformed, i.e., retreated, back on to their initial level of relative materiality. So the handle of a spade and the shovel section of a spade can unite to form a spade that functions on the level of the materiality of its handle and head not just on a meta-material level even though, epistemologically, from a relational state a relationally oriented entity 'first' emerges from that interaction, in this case of relational synthesis. In a sense the meta-materiality, the meta-relational nature of this interaction, can through retreatment re-express itself on the same level of its materiality as found in its handle and head. And this is as one might expect. A spade digs the world yet the spade emerges as something different from its mere handle and shovel, in a sense these emergent properties take on a material transformational retreatment in the light of its material basis of those parts. Hence it is not necessary for a spade to interact with only the meta-relational, i.e., other 'spades' et al. Could we now argue, in the light of this examination treated as an analogy, that all senses of the divine find themselves imprinted upon the materiality of the world, albeit with these emergent properties, all senses of the spiritual, etc., and hence find their sense of emergent interaction on the level of the material albeit with these emergent properties that must distinguish it from the merely material basis as found in a naive physics or metaphysics, etc? Hence the re-definition of the 'spiritual' as that which has its origin of expression in higher levels of meta-orientation (regardless of whether that is based in matter-matter interactions, matter-egological interactions, and/or inter-egological/intra-egological interactions). (VII.27) [121]

	What does it mean to enter into a relationship, and, what is 'shared' in a relationship in and throughout its sense of 'relational space' or 'body'? In my opinion, through some form of an exchange mechanism, what is shared is essentially information, albeit information based in some material form of denomination whether that be in particulate matter, dialogical information as produced/re-produced in a conversation, tokens (like money), gifts, unwritten obligations, etc., etc. Moreover, through the performance of the act of 'sharing' the very act itself acquires a new meaning or meaning-overlay. A gift of money in the form of coins is a gift expressed through the donation of coins to the recipient of that act of gift-giving. In an economic context those coins are no longer merely coins but 'money', being overlaid with this relational-oriented aspect of meaning. They find their current currency through the meta-nature of their perceived context (even if one were left alone on a desert island the possibility that they would be used as money on a return to civilisation could still be entertained and perhaps hoped for). Let me, with more detail, elabourate on the archetypal nature of exchange mechanisms wherein this 'information' is exchanged. (VII.28) [122]

	As just stated what is exchanged is information. The exchange of information is always in and through a material format of some form or other plus the 'perception' of a meta-frame of reference that allows those parties, participating in that kind of relationship, to 'suffer' the sense, meaning and meaningfulness of that act of relationship. So coins are perceived as 'money'.  On the other hand, if we were a collector of coins we might see them instead as 'items we would be interested in or not interested in as additions to our collection' (or as the 'indirect means to enlarge our collection through their eventual swapping or cashing in'). So in a relationship something must be exchanged and that exchange must be information in some material-oriented format. Moreover, that exchange must be relatively 'mutual' for all those parties participating in that 'particular' relationship. (VII.29) [123]

	E.g., say someone gives another person a gift of some form or other and the other person accepts the same without any recognition of the gift as a gift and the donor of that gift as the donor. Is there a relationship in play here? On very minimal grounds we might say we have two people involved in a transference of property but certainly not as two people involved in a relationship beyond the exchanged material. No real information, or material information, has been 'exchanged' by the recipient of that gift (the gift being merely taken). The gift was accepted but not acknowledged as a gift qua gift so no real exchange took place. Let me look more closely at this idea of mutuality of exchange in the following analogy. (VII.30) [124]

	Suppose a group of people are in a circle and throwing a very heavy ball from one member of the group to another. What sort of group, or relationship, do we have here? A ball throwing-and-catching group! How does this group function? That is dependent upon the size of that ball and the rules of its deployment. All this then effects the outward manifestation of the group - too close they can no longer throw the ball to each other, and, too far away and they can no longer catch it. What information is shared then? Certain ideal parameters between those two extremes of being two close and too far away, playing by certain rules (predefined before the 'game' and/or ongoingly defined during the same) such as watching out for the ball and determining to whom they would/should throw it in turn…. (VII.31) [125]

	To some extent the relationship is symbolised by that ball-in-play in the previous example. In some measure the parameters of that relationship were controlled by the nature of that ball. On the other hand other parameters would be left invariant regardless of what type of ball was exchanged in which case the nature of the ball is not a necessary consideration. E.g., the rules for determining throwing and catching are not absolutely dependent upon the nature of that ball where the substitution of, e.g., a tennis ball or a golf ball could be adopted without radically effecting these other types of parameters although not without effecting the manifestation or phenomenal appearance of that relationship. In nuclear physics we have exchange mechanisms that seem to be directly related to the nature of the 'particles' exchanged. But are all relationships dependent on a material vector for this exchange of (a multi-directional flow of) information (even in virtual relationships?)? E.g., in a conversation, or in an act that recognises mutual obligations between all the parties in their relationship without an overt exchange of gifts, is there here too the implication of a material vector? Let me examine this important question more closely. (VII.32) [126]

	In a conversation between, say, two parties; where those two participants are not involved in a monologue directed at the other, how is information communicated and shared? Through the media of language and/or non-verbal communication, that in a real conversation we have an ongoing dialogue. A 'speech' is entered into by one of those parties. It is then recognised by the other party who in turn returns a speech containing a recognition of the former speech (and where and when relevant a recognition of previous speeches on that topic) with additional input in the form of new information and/or the re-formulation of old information. In effect we have a circuit of information from whose totality we are presented with a dialogical excess, i.e., from the totality of information transmitted and received minus the actual amount of information transmitted and received we are presented with a difference which characterises the nature of that conversational relationship. Normally, when that ongoing excess ceases to be an ongoing excess the conversational relationship is historically terminated at that point or soon after. In the light of this examination can we claim that there is still the presence of a material vector? How is that information transmitted if not dependent on a material vector? Thus, in this light, we must consider the transmission of verbal/non-verbal information to be materially dependent on the material nature of that conversation. The transmission and reception of this conversation is dependent on audible sound waves and/or visible waves of light (along with the meta-rules and their predictive expectations that, in turn, tell us just what material aspects of that conversational process might possess information that might shape the content of its topic). Then, in the case of an act of signalling that symbolically recognises mutual obligations as having been then entered into by all the parties in that relationship without an overt exchange of gifts reinforcing that act can we analyse this type of (interpersonal) relationship in the same manner? An act of relating to an other remains an act of exchange even if the exchange is that only of obligations. In such a situation do we still need to invoke a material vector in the transfer, or exchange, of information? Yes - through the exercise of the pre-arranged signal or signals that materially represent that exchange of information and which are physically uttered or emitted into that discriminated context and whose recognition, in turn, is materially signalled (and v.v.). At some point in time a certain conventional code must be predetermined as to what symbolises this exchange of mutual obligations so that in the transmission of the appropriate signal or signals this recognised exchange of obligations is initiated, recognised and mutually confirmed! In the advent of this signalling and its mutual recognition we should come to see the essential nature of that relationship as having undergone a relatively radical sense of difference, a sense of transformation even if not overtly manifested at the time of that relational transition whether that be in tangible gifts or the emission of signals (e.g., of an aural and/or visual nature, etc.). In effect that relationship in this world-of-life has all its constituent parts or parties changing course in some manner or other (beyond a completely deterministic frame of reference). A transition that cannot escape a transmission of information conveyed by some relatively simple or complex form of a material vector. Moreover, an excess is obtained through this informed process of a dialogical excess conveyed and recognised by individual material vectors. So, e.g., two friends come together, wink at each other and shake hands meaning, for them, that they will do x at some point in the future… Winking and shaking hands being in the context of this relationship material vectors for the communication and recognition of information. This mutual transmission of information resulting in an investment in that relationship, a change of direction, some form of a change or a resistance to change in its phenomenal manifestation… The continuance of that relationship resulting in an ongoing re-investment of information. Hence this dialogical excess invested in a relationship takes place in and through a materially oriented change in its relational manifestation in this world-of-life. Thus, through relational change the 'body' too of a relationship is altered, changed, being an indivisible reflection of (the coursing of) that relationship. That, through an ongoing creation/re-creation of a relational excess an ongoing relational investment directly finds itself being put in place in the 'body' or 'space' of that relationship through the 'spilling over' of this excess of value (there being no ultimate difference, except in meta-perspective, between the relative object-text and its meta-textual interpretation through a mutual interdependent correlativity between these two polarities [through the unobtainable ideality of all poles and mutual process of correlativity between the same]). (VII.33) [127]

	Now, let me deal with the two interrelated problems of "what is this relational excess?" and, "how do we measure its phenomenal manifestation?" given its phenomenal manifestation takes place through the ongoing investment of that relational excess in that re-materialized relationship. (VII.34) [128]

	Upon reflection it stands to reason that the course of a relationship is the course of that relationship - how are we to know what is and what is not being invested in that relationship from, in and through this sense of relational excess? It would seem that the only way we might be able to determine what that 'difference' was, is or will be, short of being a direct participant in that relationship if that was a possibility open to the investigator of that relationship, is to be in a position where one is able to determine what probably belongs to its textual imprint and what probably belongs to its meta-textual orientation? With this information to hand we might then be in a position to determine the nature of this difference, i.e., determine to what extent there is a meta-textual excess and to what extent that excess is textually invested in an ongoing re-coursing of that relationship. As noted elsewhere, this relational excess is the totality of that relationship minus the sum of its parts. What does this mean? In our example of the spade (or a broom) the handle and the head of that spade come together to form a spade. Surely the individual weight of the handle and the individual weight of the head are the same as the weight of that overall implement? What difference then is there?! What is to be noted is the emergence of new properties (and the relative loss of old properties). So, we now have a new tool where before that implement to hand was not adequately expressed or just not to hand. Thus this relative richness in the emergence of new properties is to be taken into account. In effect we now have a greater modal richness through such a textual re-arrangement of the life-world and the greater freedom or greater loss of freedom that might or might not be granted to us or taken from us as a result of this transformational transition between having 'the near useless parts of a tool' or its 'absence' and 'the now useful coupling of those parts in an implement-to-hand'. In this regard we could therefore investigate and relatively quantify this emergence of new value, these novel forms of emergent value. Moreover, we can also in parallel evaluate the relative effects this absence/presence could have upon the course of our own existence in this world-of-life or observe and/or speculate what difference might be there for some other person once their sense of perspective on this world of life is also more or less taken into account . Furthermore, as already noted this relational excess is invested in the body of that relationship, in the coursing of those parties in that relational space pertaining to that transformed state-of-affairs. (VII.35) [129]

	How do we determine if a property is an emergent property that contributes to this textually materialised aspect of relational excess? A list of logical properties could be prepared either descriptively (through a phenomenological examination) and/or prescriptively (through an appeal to principles, definitions, etc.) and /or predictively (through the determination of probabilities associated with the phenomenal nature of the same, etc.). Then emergent properties can be determined through discovering which of those properties could not be meaningfully reduced. E.g., a broom could not function if it were just as a handle nor function successfully if we were only able to use its head. Therefore, being a 'broom' meant it could not be reduced to some part of that broom such as its handle or its head with the implication to be drawn that a broom was an emergent property when what was meant in being a broom was examined in this frame of reference that examined a broom qua a broom. This is a relatively simple example, in more complex situations we find a complex of emergent properties, in the process noting that what is emergent and what is not emergent is context dependent. A better example might be that of a 'rich' literary text where a few propositions re-produce a wealth of meaning through implication, irony, emotive connotation, symbolic pluralism, forms of analogy, etc. The mere content of that text subtracted from its overall resonant richness re-producing a relational excess that cannot be reduced merely to the propositions entailed in that text... it being the task of a critical literary criticism to both interpret that relational excess through a literary articulation of that richness and demonstrate through such focus that the relational/existential richness of that text (discovered respectively not-textually/non-textually) is, indeed, relatively great. (VII.36) [130]

	At this point in time it is now necessary to examine how an act of relationship is performed (archetypally and in practice). (VII.37) [131]

	As previously alluded to, a relationship comes into existence through three ideal moments of which resolution is but one of those moments. Resolution is the resolution of dissonance, difference, competition, etc., being noticed in a consonant field or gestalt background. Consonance is inherently repellent (which is why it constitutes a field through self-expansion and can never be, therefore, purely consonant because even the slightest difference in its tenor would naturally constitute a sense of a minimilistic dissonance). On the other hand dissonance is never pure dissonance by virtue of the fact that it both fascinates and disturbs its audience, being returned to a consonant field through a resolution performed through the medium of this ambivalence. The relationship between the dissonant material and the meta-field invoking this two-way nature of an exchange in order to reinstate its relationship. The analogy of a detergent might be apposite here. Oil and water do not successfully mix. On the other hand a detergent can mix them by virtue of the fact that one end of the detergent molecule is oil-attractive and the other end of that same molecule is water attractive. By this intervening medium, of the detergent, oil and water can be made to appear to mix, hence deposits of oil and grease can be made to dissolve from hands and dishes, etc. In a similar fashion because of the provocative, dual-nature of dissonance (to be both like and unlike the nature of the field wherein it acts as relatively dissonant) we can appeal to its harmonic potential by seeking to find some form of a consonance-in-the-midst-of-its-dissonance in that field of consonance and therein finding our selves in a psychic position to experience its reintegration back into that field of consonance, finding ourselves able to re-experience the re-integration of this disconnecting factor through this facet of consonance in the relatively impure dissonant structure when appealed to through an ongoing act of harmonic resolution. These same dynamics also operate in our hermeneutic circle. Our three moments needing to be balanced with respect to each other in the realization of an overall transcendental suspension (through the three types of transcendental suspension that constitute the dynamics of that theoretical and practical device). With this being the case what implications can be drawn to assists us in our coming to understand how relationships are realized, performed and terminated, i.e., produced and re-produced as historical states-of-affairs, etc? (VII.38) [132]

	With this parallel model of the hermeneutic circle to mind it stands to reason that for the relationship to persist these three moments also need to persist in time though processes of re-iteration (hence the distinctive re-iterations of our three moments as well). If relative dissonance is resolved the relationship, put in place through the act, or performance, of resolution would come to an end. Therefore, dissonance must be psychically re-introduced through processes of 'sheer' re-iteration in order for an ongoing act of resolution to persist. Similarly the background field must remain present through its own form of distinctive 'mere' re-iteration. Furthermore, resolution needs to be actively re-engaged in an ongoing fashion through its distinctive processes of patterns of 'bare' re-iteration. With this model in mind, therefore, we can note that the reintegration realized through the moment of resolution needs, for its persistence, the ongoing presence of consonance and the ongoing re-introduction of dissonance and an existentially oriented pattern of ongoing resolutional performance. Moreover, for this pattern of resolution to be mutual (for all parties present in that relationship) this performance must be equally weighted with respect to the presence of a background field and the psychic weight of dissonance being continually re-introduced before that field. The existential moment of resolution determining the need for a psychic balance of resolution with respect to the other two moments of consonance and dissonance. Hence these three moments need to remain in a state of ongoing balance. Hence, the consummation of this resolutional reintegration (e.g., as in the exhaustion of lust) would result in the historical cessation of that resolutional performance and hence the 'death' of that relationship (if that relationship was just one of seeking mere consummation). Moreover, conversely, in the ongoing resolutional performance of that relationship an existential balance must be dynamically maintained between these three polar aspects of an (archetypal) relationship without an imbalanced emphasis being placed upon that act of resolutional performance! As argued in our last essay, the existentialization of a relationship is dependent upon an existential transformation of the relatively non-existential, being continually dependent upon the latter as a necessary precondition for this process to occur and to continually maintain its simulated sense of 'presence' as a phenomenon. (VII.39) [133]

	In the light of our previously noted typology of emissions, etc., let me describe these three ideal moments in those terms before looking at complex intentional object-states through this same lens. (VII.40) [134]

	Dissonance is effectively an emission through its sense of a disturbance at a distance through difference. On the other hand the background field is essentially a system and therefore must be made up of more than two consonant elements realizing a commonality through similarity. Then, furthermore, the nature of the relationship between a dissonant emission and its related background field must effectively be a current (whose relative strength is essentially determined through the potential difference across that space between the emission and the field coupled to the efficiency of that process of discharge over a certain period of time). (VII.41) [135]

	Now, how do we relate this type of typology with elements of emission, etc introduced into the field of a relationship. With one element we have the situation as just examined for the moment of dissonance in our hermeneutic circle. In the introduction of two object-states in front of a background field we are effectively presented with a current between those object-states whose nature  is determined through the overall net nature of their interaction(s) - relative differences between the same accounting for the nature of that current. So, e.g., two oppositely charged particles would form a positive(ly engaged) current through their effective neutralization of each other, whereas, two particles, with the same charge, would form a negative current by virtue of its resultant accumulation of an increased density of repulsive presence although the current fact of at least a vestigial relationship in some form or other also implies at least some minimal form of a relational interaction for repulsion to operate from within. Then, an assembly of object-states would form a system whose nature is the net overall charge of that system plus any emergent factors arising through that complex process of interaction. (VII.42) [136]

	With this research now to hand what implications can we draw for this topic of determining the essential nature of love through these insights into the nature of resolution, etc? (VII.43) [137]

	The binding intensity or relational facticity of a relationship is enacted through this third moment of resolution and its intensity reflects the degree a relational excess is invested in the materialized dynamics of that interaction. This excess in play, in turn, reflects the degree of existentialization realized through this third moment which being the ongoing existential transformation of the relatively non-existential implies that a state of balance must be in play between all three moments, i.e., consonance, dissonance and resolution. With a loss of balance between these three moments the circle, this productive/re-productive cycle, grinds towards a halt, and, the effective absence of anyone of these three moments is the effective death of that relationship (although processes of conservation imply processes of continuity in some form or other on that same meta-level of deployment and/or on other levels of epistemological (self-)organization). (VII.44) [138]

	Let us now model the interaction between two individuals who have some degree of affection for each other. (VII.45) [139]

	We know from the discussion of this typology of emissions, etc. that the interaction between two object-states in a field is ostensively that of a current, and, that currents normally function in a deterministically calculatable fashion. However, it is a generally accepted observation that human beings are usually unpredictable and creatures of chaos and that as a consequence to treat others as 'human' means we must accept this ever-present element of indeterminacy in our everyday dealings with each other. Hence we must treat other people, and our very own sense(s) of 'self', as inherently unpredictable and often chaotic in character. Consequently, our overall sense of self should be treated as a system of interacting senses of self with the further implication that people should not be treated as 'simple' states, as mere bodies or minds, but as systematic organisms possessing this complex sense of self, these complex senses of self and their varying degrees of interaction. Moreover, in interaction our 'systematic' sense of self in interaction with someone else's systematic sense of self opens that complex 'systematic' relationship itself up to chaotic behaviour and this is as one would expect in the spontaneity of an existentially oriented relationship. Indeed, the degree of spontaneity in a relationship is a direct reflection of its existentialization, its authenticity of self-organization, its systematic enpowerment, etc. (VII.46) [140]

	Let me now briefly look at interpersonal relationships of more than two bodies or parties, and, how an entity might be envisaged as being able to have a relationship with themselves. (VII.47) [141]

	A complex interaction between three or more parties could be simplified as a set of currents between those parties equal to the number of individual micro-relationships entailed in that complex systematic relationship. However, such a calculation can only roughly estimate this overall quantum or degree of relational facticity, the estimated intensity of its apparent presence, its footprint, in this world-of-life. 'Apparent' by virtue of the fact that all phenomena are not absolutely independent from all other phenomena (especially from those with a similar nature). Then, again, the apparent quantum or degree of relational facticity can be evaluated through being engaged in a direct interaction with the same. Because of the apparent unity of the life-world, this 'one-world-of-life, in theory, if not in fact, all relationships in principle can remain open to us, allow our discriminative and simulated act of entry wherein we can experience directly the relational nature of that relationship and therein evaluate its current nature. These two methods could be described as ‘relatively external’ and ‘relatively internal’ to the relational space of that relationship itself. (VII.48) [142]

	In the situation of evaluating an integrated complex system, such as one's own sense of self, how might one come to an understanding of how that could be put into practice? Again no absolutely independent (self-)relationship can be argued for. As thinking-creatures-in-a-community-of-such-entities, and, that there can be no boundaries which could absolutely separate the life-world from us and, v.v., it stands to reason that from our current perspective no relatively internal nor any relatively external simple or complex sense of self could, in principle, remain closed to us. Hence our ability to actually and/or virtually enter into the logical space of any relationship! By virtually is mean a non-alignment of our overall sense of a transcendental-empirical self with the full temporal and spatial coordinates of our apparent phenomenal existence as an agent in this world-of-life. On the other hand an actual, non-virtual relationship is conducted through the effective coincidence of an overall transcendental sense of self with the evidential coordinates of our apparent existence in this communal sense of a lived life-world along with its existential richness of appropriate modalities apparently open to us. On the other hand it should be noted that there can be no absolute distinction between the relatively virtual and the relatively actual nor, for that matter, between the relatively immanent and the relatively transcendent as both sets of aspects need to be present and dynamically balanced in an existentially oriented act of self-reflection realized through the authenticity that flows from a properly entered and conducted global transcendental suspension. (VII.49) [143]

This self-authenticity is experienced as 'love', the relational faciticity of that apparent relationship under examination. Moreover, given the hypothetical 'presence'/'absence' of the divine (or Divine) it follows, at least theoretically, that the same in principle must remain open to us! Hence, all relationships can be entered into including those of a divine nature (the hypothetical existence of the divine in all its forms of manifestation being tentatively accepted once a positive theological difference is accepted [as in all probability it could well be accepted on the strength of such grounds]). And what implications, therefore, does this theoretical openness of  the life-world possess, in and through its progressive theologicalization, for the critical philosopher, for the critical theologian, for the religious lay-philosopher…?! (VII.50) 
        [144]
	…nothing other than the relational fact that there can be no ultimate difference between an objective genitive and a subjective genitive, and, that with respect to the hypothetical nature of divine love the same applies likewise and lifewise! Namely, in ultimate terms of reference, that the objective love of the divine (or Divine) can be no different from the subjective love of the divine (or Divine) hence creation/re-creation of an objective genitive must be reflected in the creation/re-creation of a subjective genitive, and v.v…! (VII.51) [145]

	Let me now re-argue this conclusion in greater detail, and, in the process demonstrate what religious consequences might hypothetically be seen to flow from its tentative embrace. (VII.52) [146]

At the beginning of the second section of this essay I boldly stated that all forms of love are expressions of divine love! This argument proceeds, more or less,  as follows:

1.	Given the acceptance of a positive theological difference
2.	Because the possibility of the same implies its necessary existence in some form or other
3.	And all forms of identity are relationally generated
4.	And that all relational excess is effectively of the same nature as 'love'
5.	It follows through this theological unification of the life-world
6.	That the greater the quantity and quality of this loving relational excess that is found to be present the relatively closer, epistemologically, that identity is to the relatively divine.
7.	Hence as this relational aspect is relatively closer to this sense of divinity, this sense of the divine, it follows in this one world-of-life that all forms of love, in effect, are expressions of divine love! 
8.	Given the integrity of the theologicalization of the life-world.
9.	Moreover, given this theological unity of the life-world it follows that if there is a loving relationship then that relational excess, 'love', is shared by its participating parties.
10.	Then, in the egological examination of that relationship it follows that an objective genitive and a subjective genitive centred in the same relationship must overlap the same psychic territory of that relationship
11.	Hence their mutual co-identity when considered from the point of view of that relationship! (VII.53) [147]

Or, to put this argument in the format of a set of sentences we might more succinctly say: In a relationship the relational excess, i.e., love, is generated by the parties concerned and is spread equally throughout that relational space, albeit perceived from the point of view of those parties therein. It therefore follows that for those parties, with respect to this relational excess, that the essential content of an objective genitive concerned with this same topic is equal to the essential content of a subjective genitive concerned with that same topic, and v.v., regardless of the participants in that relationship. (VII.54) [148]

	Or, as our topic is 'divine love' in its genitive form, i.e., 'the love of the divine' along with the ambiguity of that statement as to whether we are referring to 'our love of the divine' or 'that love possessed by the divine for us', it follows, hypothetically, that there can only be one love between the same, albeit only a difference in perspective, hence the equivalence between this objective genitive and subjective genitive in this respect. It now behoves us, at this point in time, to ask two further questions 'can one party in this relationship influence how another might come to experience or re-experience this relational excess or 'love'?' and 'how does one party in a relationship come to see the 'trace', 'presence', and/or 'absence', of another party?' More specifically, with respect to this particular topic of divine love, these two questions can be rephrased in the following manner - 'can a person in their interaction with the divine influence the divine in any form?', and 'can a person in their interaction with the divine perceive the divine, as the divine qua divine, in some form or other?' Let me remind the reader/audience that under the umbrella of a transcendental suspension our research will continue to consider such questions in a hypothetically frame of reference! In the conclusion to this essay let me consider the second question first. (VII.55) 
         [149]

25.   What Can We Conclude in this Regard?

	Hypothetically, the phenomenological sense of the divine, its 'place' in a mapping of the life-world, could be defined as 'that relationally oriented in the hierarchical context of this hypothetical theological treatment of the relative unity of the life-world'. With this definition in mind it stands to reason, in any desired interpretation, perception and/or realization of the same, that the object of our focus should be relationally oriented. Therefore, the sense of the divine could not be 'focused upon' in a reductive manner. Therefore, the divine could not be 'directly' perceived through any one of our senses; furthermore, the divine could not be 'directly' perceived through a telescope nor through a microscope nor some other scientific instrument, but, on the other hand, the 'trace' of the divine, the materialized manner of its rooteded in this world-of-life might be indirectly engaged either partially and/or contextually. As discussed elsewhere, the essential nature of a relationship is imprinted on the relational space, or body', of that relationship. Hence its imprinting on the material fabric of that relational space. Perception and the appropriate interpretation of that imprint alerting us, by 'reverse engineering', as to the essential nature of that relationship. Hence the divine in being in a necessary relationship with the world, for it to be there-for-us, implies that it leaves a 'trace' upon the fabric of this world. But this aspect of our reply must be analysed elsewhere after an examination of what is needed for a valid interpretation be first formulated. Before examining these two other types of perception dealing with 'presence' and 'absence' let me follow up the implications of this point that as the divine is relationally oriented, by definition, it should be the case that only through an examination of the relational in orientation will we find, if we are to find, an appropriate path to succeed in this endeavour. (VII.56) 
         [150]
Let me examine the following example as a correlative example of what I am trying to say here. In looking at a broom we cannot find the broomness of that broom in either its head or handle. Moreover, correctly the broomness of the broom cannot be inspected merely by observing the broom as a mere object in the world. How are we to know that object as a broom through its mere inspection? Only by observing a broom in a broom context, on a number of occasion, and inferring the properties of what-it-means-to-be-a-broom in a broom-context, or, actually already knowing the meta-textual conventions of what is meant when we consider a broom to be a broom, can we move on so to speak and understand what a broom-like-object is. This understanding can never be purely reductive, indeed, being realized in and through the auspices of a hermeneutic circle implies that our discrimination is a product of textual reduction, meta-textual reconstitution and non-textual existential experience. Hence our merely seeing a broom is not going to tell us it is a broom if we don't already possess all three of these (correlative) senses of the phenomenological, the hermeneutical and the existential along with an overall sense of all three through a sense of the not-textual wherein we directly engage with the intentional object itself as an object, albeit as an object(-state) in the life-world and not in the so called 'external world' (or 'internal world'). In opposition to this relational way of seeing things someone might object and say that even in the broom-head one can still see a broom, indeed, use it to sweep albeit with some difficulty. In reply we might like to add that if the object was a clock its sense of unity would be less likely be found in its parts unless one already realized the nature of those parts through a meta-understanding of the genre of clock. Then, again, if we were to examine a living organism of even greater complexity than a clock we would have an even greater difficulty, if not the impossibility, of understanding what that object is in its relationship with us in and through this world-of-life. Hence the relationally oriented is not appreciated through the reductive treatment of our senses either assisted or non-assisted (by scientific instruments, etc.). (VII.57) 
         [151]
	A 'trace', as previously argued, is the imprinted deposition of a relationship upon the material fabric of its relational space. So a coal-miner's activities of being a coal-miner will leave an imprint of having been a coal-miner upon the body of that miner. Or, if one were a long-time prize fighter in boxing one might expect to find injuries in keeping with this person's profession upon their face such as, e.g., cauliflower ears, etc. I recently read in a paper that drivers falling asleep at the wheel of their cars usually leave little or no tire marks in the course of their accidents on the road. In the light of this comment we might like to say that a 'trace' is deposited intentionally, semi-intentionally (like the sleeping car driver) and non-intentionally. On the other hand, in keeping with the nature of a process theology (as explored in these essays) we might prefer to make no absolute distinction between 'intentional traces' and 'non-intentional traces' and instead perceive only degrees of epistemological organization (so in this light we might say a rock has its own degree of epistemological organization and that a human being has a higher degree of epistemological organization and that a divine entity of some form or other has a relatively higher degree, etc.). A 'trace', therefore, is essentially the material fabric that appears to have some discernible sense of identity. Our ability to discern identity alerting us to the fact that we must have some idea as to the meta-nature of the relationship involved in order to appreciate the specific nature of its particular genre of identity. Our appreciation of this meta-nature allowing us to interpret that identity as a type of phenomenon in keeping with the nature of that type of phenomenon. Hence our ability to discern the nature of 'traces' is necessarily depend upon this meta-knowledge of genres. So, an interpretation of 'theologically-oriented traces' would necessitate this prior meta-textual knowledge and the ability to use such a discipline… but such a topic I will have to examine elsewhere. (VII.58) [152]

	Instead, let me now focus on a 'direct establishment' of theological identity, at least in a theoretical (and hypothetical) framework. In this regard I would like to briefly look at the provisional concepts of  'presence' and 'absence'. If we were to meet someone we might say we experience their sense of 'presence'. 'Presence' is a transcendentally treated concept that does not imply that there is an actual substantial presence only the phenomenon of the presentation of a distinctive sense of a-being-met-there by some person or community who find themselves being witness to its existential distinctness, uniqueness along with an element of freedom or indeterminable ness or unpredictableness (as directly indicative of the degree of the epistemological organization presented by that object-state met in that encounter or series of encounters). On the other hand, having met this sense of presence and then finding it currently absent, contrary to expectations,  now presents us with the phenomenon of 'absence'. (VII.59) [153]

	In the 'one' world metaphysics of the life-world there can be no true representations, only re-presentations. Furthermore, it must mean that we are both ‘in direct contact with those object-states experienced in those processes of simulation (or, i.e., as processes of re-simulation)’ and ‘experientially aware that we are in a process of direct contact (through our discriminative reflections)’. All is simulated and all is re-simulated. There is no 'pre-simulation' nor 'that which is not simulated of which the re-simulation is a simulation of, etc.'! Moreover, in a theological frame of reference the same rules of engagement must apply! Furthermore, on retrospection the same types of 'rules of interpretation' will again have to apply, be formulated, be implicitly or explicitly expressed, etc. (VII.60) [154]

	On the assumptions that there is a positive theological difference, that are we resident in the one-world-of the life-world, that all relationships must imprint themselves upon the material fabric of the world we are now left with the remaining aspects of this first question, namely, how are we to retrospectively interpret what it might mean to encounter the 'trace', the 'presence' and/or the 'absence' of the divine or the Divine in our passage through this world-of-life? Moreover, do we, with this set of assumptions, as listed above, need to continue to make this distinction between a sense of 'the divine' and a sense of 'the Divine' wherein the latter is egologically constituted with both a passive and an active disposition, etc., i.e., constituted in such a manner that they, through acts of will, can egologically intervene within the course of the material world rather than merely register its impingement upon what would be a lesser sense of divinity? As theological treatment of the life-world in its formation of  divinity must be greater that the collective epistemological organization of human individuals and communities it follows that we must assume, once the ‘divine’ exists, that the Divine must exists in various forms reflecting the possession and transcendence of these degrees of epistemological organization. Despite the mere theologicalization of the life-world through its hierarchical epistemological organization this egologically implicated hierarchy must reflect this hierarchical theological formation. All levels of theologicalization finding an imprint upon the material fabric of the world, however, this 'fact' needs to be ascertained interpretively through a retrospective appreciation of the same. Suffice to say that it is through the entirety of the hermeneutic circle, in the recognition of a relationally oriented state of affairs, and through recognition of epistemological complexity that this ‘re-cognition’ should come to the fore. With these issues in mind let me now move onto our other question to be entertained in this conclusion, namely, 'can a person in their interaction with the divine influence the divine in any form?' (VII.61) [155]

	As a simple answer to this question let me state the principle that "a relationship is constituted in through its participating parties and must reflect all changes that occur in the body of that relationship but not necessarily changing its essential nature and the genres of those interactions in the process". Hence, we must assume, that our changing contributions to a relationship with the Divine must alter the form of that relationship both from our own point of view and the point of view of the Divine as the-other-as-also-there-before-us, although we cannot conclude that its capacity to act has been altered or activated to a degree necessitated through the nature of that interaction to also be the-other-as-also-there-for-us (be it through a petition, a mantra, a prayer, an act of magic, a process of ritual,  or the disciplines of meditation or any other 'spiritual' exercise, etc.). With this hypothetical reply to this hypothetical question let now look at the asymmetrical nature of the relationship between a devoted mother and her child to see what light, if any, might be cast in such an asymmetrical relationship as that must exist hypothetically between the Divine and our own sense of self. (VII.62) [156]

	As argued previously, through the coincidence of the objective genitive and the subjective genitive from the perspective of the relationship itself, from the relational point of view of that 'loving mother and her child' there can be no real difference from 'the love experienced by the child for its mother' and 'the love experienced by the mother for her child' from the perspective of that relationship itself! That being the case, that relational love, the relational excess re-created within that relationship, although experienced from the point of views of the direct participants within that relationship, must be experienced in the form of an ongoing dialogue given the 'fact' that the process nature of the relationship, as put into effect by its participating parties, must reflect these changing inputs brought to that relationship though these changing contributions! In other words, all changes contributed by the participants of a relationship must be simulated/re-simulated in and through the form of a dialogue despite what ever asymmetries might be found in that relationship. And this is as we would expect. The mother loves her child and that child, to some extent, must be able to experience that affection in the manner that it is able to do so. So, even if mother nursed a toy baby thinking it was a child, despite her delusion and the object of her attention being a baby doll, in some insignificant, minor sense that doll will be able to register and share in that misdirected affection, albeit not in the manner that a real baby would. Through forms of intervention the child smiles, the mother smiles and soon they both come to know how to smile together, and, not before too long the baby has acquired the genre of 'smiling to another person', etc., hence from this simple example we can see how a dialogue could be entered into despite the asymmetries in the epistemological status between these two individuals! (VII.63) [157]

	…let me note that this understanding of a relational philosophy inclines us to envisage the possibility of a ‘dialogue’ between all the parties of the relationship and that in a theologically implicated relationship the same principle must apply. In the next essay let us see what might be implied in 'an ongoing dialogue with the Divine' despite the asymmetrical nature of the same, and, just what implications this must have for a theologian in their understanding of what might be meant by 'the process of continuing this process of a divine dialogue…? A divine relationship grounded in 'love', found 'through love', left open-ended through 'the boundless nature of love' in all its profoundness… a relationship experienced and interpreted through the auspices of the hermeneutic circle (of theological comprehension) in its entirety… from its own relational point(s) of view..!? Hence the concept of a divine conversation… and the associated concept of a continuing of the divine conversation… Asking ourselves in the process what form or forms this ‘dialogue’ might take, and, how do we know when we are actually entering into a dialogue with the Divine…? (VII.64) [158]

	In the eighth essay "On Extending the Divine Conversation" (at this point intime as yet unwritten) let me note the following points ion the form of a provisional conclusion to this summary of parts IV to VIII. [159]

26.   Provisional Conclusion?

	Because all relationships are realized in and through a process 'in a state of process' I have felt this metaphor of the 'divine conversation' as apt as long as the sense of conversation is not taken too literally. In this light, even if the divine were able to speak to us in 'words spoken' the same should not be taken too literally. Moreover, as long as our gestalt sense of personal integrity is intact those 'words' spoken and/or intuitions re the same should find themselves transparent enough to be divined for what they correctly mean, seem to mean apparently. …and even if this process of hermeneutic divination cannot be accomplished still we are in a position to at least appreciate that the sense of the divine is a necessary participant in the very here and now that confronts us. Like a many flavoured cake all levels of the divine should find their manifestation in the very 'here and now'… a task for the hermeneutical theologian and those religiously sympathetic to this type of perspective. So let us who desire this type of insight develop our eyes and ears, develop both a critical philosophy and an intuitive philosophy in this regard… and realize to what extent the divine does (or does not) cast a long shadow upon the ground of the world, this world-of-life, and therein reflected in each and every point or atom… from each and every perspective… for each everyone of us… given an ability to discern this pervasion of the divine throughout this phenomenal reality, this reality of the phenomenal… that in essence there could be no absolute distinction between the divine and the non-divine… and that in our own natures we too must be of the divine… if only we could live up to such a integral possibility of our being in this world of life… to be discovered through the spiritual manner of how we should authentically 'purport' ourselves in this one-world-of-life..!? With such provisional insights let us re-continue this critical quest for theological meaning and significance at a future date in order to ascertain the import and relevance of such research…. [160]

							Noël Tointon, Sydney, 12.10.02.