Finding a Place for the Idea of God – Part V:
Does Theological Difference Make a Difference??

0.   Prologue

	In the third essay of this series I introduced the concept of theological difference and argued that a theologian had to argue for a ‘vision of the world that included some sense of the divine’ rather than a vision without the same. In the fourth essay, from a process perspective, I argued that a sense of the divine could be hypothetically constructed from the ‘fabric of the life-world’, that the ‘idea’ of God was one that could be philosophically entertained. However, the problem that presents itself in this paper, a problem for the philosophical theologian, is this “does this vision of the divine make any difference in a religious frame of reference?” (1)

To put this point as bluntly as possible let me metaphorically analogue what I am, correctly, calling into question here by retrieving this anecdote or simile of the worm as used in the last paper. (2)

	Suppose, for the sake of argument, that that worm captured by the mother bird, and about to be eaten by her young chicks, accidentally falls back to the ground just after being snatched from that long blade of grass where it had this vision of God, albeit a sweat-soaked naked figure of a man, a Jainist monk, reflecting the light of the sun. Firmly convinced that this worm had seen God and that God heard its prayers for salvation, witness the fact of its not having been eaten by that bird and its chicks, and having fallen safely to the ground close to where it normally lived, and, from the earth shattering consequences of these experiences had decided to spread the ‘good news’, and therein converting a small population of fellow worms to this belief that God does actually exist, and can be seen, organizes a small choir of worms at this very moment to sing praises to this God. Now, suppose the local gardener passing by has a good sense of hearing and can just hear these worms singing extremely beautiful, yet strange, melodious, antiphonal ‘praises to the Lord’ with a precision acquired through long hours of practice and well-honed skill. What would that gardener make of this, what would they perhaps think? No doubt they would be bemused by this show of devotion, but, before long, would soon quickly re-attend to the world to hand in this world-of-life and in the process effectively forget about this choir of worms? “Such an effort, such a wasted effort” they might think to themselves if they bothered to reflect upon this situation at all?! Or worse, maybe capitalize on this unusual phenomenon and make a paying spectacle out of it along the lines of a flea circus? Yet, from the strain of trying to listen to this strange ‘music’, even that audience would soon effectively ignore such a display, or performance, if that would be the right word to adopt from a human perspective? (3)

	Translated to a hypothetical sphere this rhetorical question is being asked “why would an almighty God need songs of praise, and any other form of devotion, from devoted creatures on the scale of things metaphorically equivalent to ‘worms’ in the light of their hypothetical ‘epistemological level of spiritual excellence’?” In other words, “does theological difference make a difference in a religious frame of reference?” Although we might now say the ‘idea of god’ from a philosophical point of view makes theological sense in a potential, hypothetical form of spiritual (epistemological-ontological) existence and thence must have some form of actuality to some degree or other, on the grounds that pure potentiality can be neither thought nor engaged, and, that granted, to some extent, what relevance could such an entity have in the religious live of an individual on this spec of dust on the edge of a galaxy itself on the edge of a galactic cluster in this relatively non-unique dark, far-flung corner of the cosmos? The concept of the divine should be granted as previously argued for but we should then inquire is the world theologically rich enough to sustain the relevance of such a concept? I.e., could the theologian successfully argue that there is some sense of the divine that could be found relevant in the course of our daily lives in such a manner that is theologically rich enough to sustain a significantly positive sense of religious value. God, divinity may well exist in a variety of forms, but, we must also ask “what relevance has this in ‘the life of the individual’?” And could it not be the case that even to ask such a question would only distort the way life should be led on the grounds that to even ask such a question is totally inappropriate to the ‘existential nitty-gritty of our existence as human individuals’ who should be interacting with other human individuals in a completely existentially engaged manner and who should also not be sidetracked from an existential engagement with their environment as well! That, in essence, to merely invoke the divine is to just sidetrack us in non-existential distortions and their consequent loss of value for the human community as can be witnessed in the negative consequences, to put it euphemistically, that religion has imposed upon people throughout recorded history? Need I mention historical terms such as ‘The Crusades’, ‘Jihads’, ‘holy wars’, the ‘Inquisition’, and, the sorry saga of a long litany of ‘crimes’ committed upon the religious and the non-religious alike by the religious. Crimes of an intensity that often directly reflect the degree the perpetrator was themselves religiously committed! Of course many fine deeds have been performed in the name of religion too, but, surely, we would not have had the former if the very fact of religion itself were absent from history? Indeed, the philosophical theologian must also privately ask this question “would the world be a better place without religion, a world in which ‘this horrible fact’ has ‘only distorted the structures of our human existence’ as recorded in our historical recollections? In essence these two types of question attack the very raison d’être of religion and the need for a religious life, namely, “does theological difference make a difference in a religious frame of reference, and, is there any overall positive advantage in arguing for and maintaining a place for religion and the practice of a religious life??!” (4) 

	Even if God, or various forms of divinity, were to exist what need have we for religion? (5)

	Let me try to make sense of this challenge from a critical philosophical point of view, i.e., by adopting the ‘theological neutrality’ of a ‘transcendental-phenomenological perspective’ as entered into and maintained in this series of essays! In other words, in a neutral, transcendentally-suspended hypothetical-theological 'space' let us merely entertain what ‘sense, meaning and meaningfulness’ could be developed and argued for within those terms of reference. So, in response to this challenge of ours, let us see if we can entertain a coherent, relatively non-contradictory, meaningful response to these questions “what relevance can the concept of divinity perform in the course of our human existence, and, overall, would the world be a better place without some religious concept of divinity or some other equivalent? (6)

1.	Can We Have a Meaningful Relationship with the ‘Divine’, and, vice versa?

	This type of question could be looked at from three points of view, i.e., from the perspective of the ‘sense of the divine invoked’ [sec.9], from the perspective of the ‘worshipper’ [sec. 10-11] and from the ‘existential’ perspective of the relationship itself [sec.12, etc.]. (7)

Let me note here that in our transcendental investigations ‘the existence or absence of some invoked sense of the divine’ is irrelevant to the essential nature of our investigative discourse. Just as, in the same manner children can have a relationship with ‘Santa Claus’ or adults can talk about ‘the spirit of Xmas’, etc. We can still stand in a relationship to the ‘idea of certain entity’ even if the ‘class of that entity’ itself has no ‘member’ factually substantiated by that ‘class’. (8)

As for the relationship that ‘God might have with people in this world’ this could only be approached indirectly through the use of metaphor, analogy, etc. Such theological ‘constructions’ can only be metaphorical, generalized and speculative. One might even be able to argue that ‘that which we don’t know can not be known as that which is unknown is unknown’. However, ‘since that which is unknown is unknown how then do we know that that is the case as it is possible that we might already know it, or get to know it, but not realize that we knew this fact along with the implications of this knowledge and/or acquaintance?’ These sorts of issues concern the religious topics of insight and enlightenment, revelation and religious comprehension, etc., and in this paper will be avoided if only circumnavigated. (9)

	Now it is true that some individuals of a religious inclination do claim do be in a relationship of some form or other with some sense of the divine. How should we read that sort of claim through the lens of a transcendental-phenomenology? (10)

	For a start we can note that such a relationship is often described as ‘personal’, that in some sense the person is having a personal relationship with some entity or force that presents itself with some sense of a personality, as another ‘person’, albeit with a divine nature, form or sense of presence. Such reports, subject to a transcendental suspension on our part, often claim that the person was ‘addressed’ and that they in turn were able or not able to address this ‘sense of person’ in return, albeit with the qualification that there is a differential in power relations involved between these two polarities of ‘the person addressed’ and ‘the sense of the divine that was able to address/to be addressed in return’. Some theologians might claim that because of the disparity in power between these two polarities that the ‘interaction’ is ‘translated’ on our behalf (by this sense of the divine) or ‘interpreted’ by ourselves individually and/or collectively by some other party or parties in order to make ‘sense’ of this perceived state of interaction. An analogy often used in an explication of this disparity is that love between a parent and a child. No doubt a series of other analogies can also be proffered in an attempt to make sense of this relationship both for the worshipper and their dissemination of this ‘fact’ to a sympathetic public congregation or relatively non-sympathetic audience. (11)

	The first perspective could be dismissed as too inaccessible for the philosopher? What right have we to put ourselves in the metaphorical shoes of the Divine? The second perspective could also be dismissed as equally inaccessible, however, that would be a mistake to some extent by virtue of the fact that an acceptance of the life-world implies that individual experience can not be experienced privately in an absolute sense when in fact, by virtue of the communal nature of language, etc., the presence of a necessary meta-textual, intersubjective component guarantees the intersubjectivity of experience if not in complete practice at least theoretically. We might be lost for words but retrospectively we would be able to communicate something of what that experience meant to us, being communicated through the use of language, processes of simulation, induction, empathy, analogical resonance, metaphorically setting-the-other-person-up to comprehend something of that which was being expressed, etc. Even the mere fact of stating something like “I believe I have just had a religious experience” should be enough to signal to other person what was at stake here. They might ask in response to this sort of statement “what sort of religious experience did you have?” which in itself signals, through the existential ability to ask a question on something about that statement, namely, e.g., “what ‘type’ of religious experience did you have?”, rather than merely turning/re-turning the statement into a question, namely, e.g., “did you have a religious experience?” I.e., through acts of phenomenological mapping, hermeneutical interpretation and existential forms of simulated transmission, etc., albeit from a difference of perspective, forms of communication forever remain open theoretically and in hypothetical practice [although, one should add, that as ‘communication is a process’ this ‘act of understanding must take place in time’ even though ‘the act of comprehension itself might arise spontaneously in an epistemological change of phase’ as naturally occurs in acts of judgment, i.e., acting in an existential mode when not delivered in a pre-judged calculative mode]. (12)

Some theologians might extend this ‘existential fact of our existence as inescapable participants in a language community’ to ‘our personal participation with God, and v.v.’, on the grounds that the life-world has a theological dimension that too is inescapable for both ‘God and the individual’, and ‘God and the community’. That this involuntary aspect of our already being in a process-of-interaction-with-the-Divine can also be seen to possess a voluntary aspect when the individual might elect to be in a voluntary relationship with some sense of the divine through a change of attitude and practice towards the same thought to be efficacious when adopted in this regard, etc. However, let me move on to an examination of the existential aspect of being-in-a-relationship from the perspective of the relationship itself. (13)

A relationship as a relationship, in order to be a relationship, must be in a ‘process of relationship’ hence we should correctly deal with the third perspective, namely, the essential phenomenological nature of what it means to be ‘in a process of relationship’ regardless of whether (we wish to question the fact that) we are or are not in an actual relationship with an actual being of the divine in some form or other. (14)

Now, if the epistemological characterization of the entity hypothetically involved in a relationship is too great, i.e., the disparity in ‘power relations’ is too great to be ‘entertained’, how can such a relationship be properly entered into? How could we have an existentially meaningful relationship with a worm qua ‘worm’ and v.v., or, that between ourselves and a divine entity-state qua ‘divine entity-state’ and v.v? How could we enter into a meaningful relationship that is not reciprocal, is not reciprocated by all the parties concerned? How could we 'meaningfully' enter into a relationship that only took place through the imposition of an act or a series of acts of sheer exploitation (whether enacted existentially on the behalf of that relationship or not)?! Could we re-approach this question by arguing that as the grounds for all relationships can never be between entities of an exactly equal power status it implies that disparity alone cannot disqualify the possible existence of such an existential relationship, such as occurs between a mother and her new born child, e.g., and, an individual and some exalted aspect of the divine once this hypothetical possibility is granted? Besides arguing for relatively deep invariant phenomenological patterns of behaviour in order to account for the ‘fact’ of that relationship let me examine if processes of mediation in some form or other can resolve this difficulty that this disparity of power relationships has presented to us? (15)

	Perhaps a sizeable disparity in power relations in a ‘relationship’ can be ‘mediated’ in order to allow us to re-appraise what might be seen merely as taking place through an exploitative role wherein the apparent subjugation of the lesser parties in a relationship is indeed enacted, through such imposition, by those parties that possess a higher power status (regardless of whether this 'exploitation' is existentially conducted on the behalf of the relationship or not)? My intuition on this matter is that mediation can only have a symbolic value in this type of debate. Let me elabourate. (16)

	E.g., we have three (egological) entities, namely, God, person 1 and person 2. Let us say, for the sake of argument, that person 1 has had a religious experience of conversion that allows them to experience the 'divinity of God' in some special manner as interpreted by person 1. Now, person 1 communicates this sense of privilege that they feel they possesses over person 2 to person 2. Then, if and when person 2 accepts that person 1 has this sense of privilege, and, they then find themselves in being alerted to this ‘fact’, they then wish to seek the same opportunity in part or in whole, and, they then find themselves entering into a relationship with this 'sense of the divine' it then follows that person 1 is no longer a mediator but, rather, a facilitator of this process of 'successful conversion'. Now person 1 can only communicate their ‘fact of a relationship with ‘God’’ to person 2 by virtue of their shared humanity so the potential successfulness of alerting person 2 to the same ‘sense of God’ can only be effected through this semblance of a common humanity. If we were to argue that this ‘fact of a relationship’ was purely put in place through the ‘election of God’ this does not alter our argument as to the humanity of person 1 because being found able to ‘suffer this election’ must be part of their humanity in so far as they were able, in turn, to ‘suffer this state of being elected’. Hence the mediational role played by person 1 with person 2 can only be effective by virtue of a shared humanity being effectively present between these two people for these two people. So the role of a mediator can only be effective if all the parties of that mediation in theory, if not in practice, possess the same potentiality of being able to enter into a relationship with the other two parties. Hence, the role of the mediator might alert other parties to this possibility it can only be put into practice by virtue of what is already in place even if the divine were to assist in this process through an act of election (because this aspect of their human nature must already possess this 'ability to enter into this type of interaction', and, that there exists, as a supplement, this constitutional ability to profit from an act of election if it were to be made). (17)

	Put more simply, the role of a human mediator in a religious context can only be effective if a similar human constitution is shared by both human parties in which case the role of the mediator is not absolutely necessary, acting only as a facilitator in this process of interaction, i.e., bringing it to intentional thematization, hermeneutical reflection and self-conscious awareness (regardless of the 'correct' religious status of that process of 'religious involvement'). In other words, although one party might appear to act as a mediator they were in fact acting as a facilitator and not as a mediator which leaves us with the same problem as to how two or more parties can enter into a meaningful two-way process of interaction when there is an extreme disparity in power relations between some or all of those parties? That, therefore, the apparent role of mediation cannot philosophically resolve this problem of extreme disparity in power status. (18)

	In order to explore how a resolution of this type of problem might be realized let me conduct an examination of the following research. Let us look more closely at three areas of our phenomenological research that need to be philosophically explored more deeply, namely, a philosophy of the relational, a philosophy of the ego(logical) and an integrated philosophical combination of these two philosophies. (19)

2.   A Relational Philosophy as an Archetypal Philosophy of Relationships

I feel I need, at this point, to look more closely at a philosophy of relationships, and a philosophy of the ego, along with their conjunction, in order to understand what might be meant when two entities that possess self-consciousness are considered as standing in a relationship to each other, especially if there is a marked power differential between those two parties. Previous reflections on the phenomenological nature of relationships has shown me that the world of relationships can not be treated as on a par with the way we ‘normally’ treat (or mistreat) empirical object-states, (and/or egological entities, etc.,) e.g. Let me demonstrate this relational difference between an existential relationally-oriented attitude and a non-existential non-relationally oriented attitude. (20)

A relationship is between two or more parties, those parties being 'parties' by virtue of that relationship. Each relationship is unique being constituted by those parties and by the phenomenological nature of those parties alone. Now, to enter into a relationship already in existence implies the nature of that relationship must alter by the fact of that ‘entry’. Often, however, our entry into an already existent relationship does not seem to alter that relationship by much for those parties already present in that relationship – but this need not be the case as entry could radically alter the nature of that initial relationship. Through interaction what is constituted is the relational space or body of that relationship which is shared by those parties and those parties alone. This space is not to be confused with empirical space-time. For a start, it cannot be directly viewed unless one is already a party to that relationship. In viewing that relationship from within that relationship, in a relational mode, the overall flavour of that relationship is found to have the same ‘taste’ from any point within that relationship. In other words, through ongoing resolution the essence of that relationship uniquely permeates that relational space from every point within that space, holistically, in a manner that directly reflects that ongoing process of inter-relational-interaction. Once one has an essential grasp of the nature of a relationship only the quality of that understanding can be altered, not its metaphorical substance. In a similar manner the salty taste of brine can not be altered by the addition (or minor loss) of more salt, or, the relative, limited subtraction and or addition of water. Once it is seen to be salty it remains a salty experience for us whenever that ‘water’ is tasted; as long as those limits for appearing ‘salty’ are not subverted. (21)

	What constitutes this sense of relational-space is the ongoing resolution of dissonance found within the consonance of that relational-space and this three-way relationship, between consonance, dissonance and resolution, collectively constitutes the ‘relationship’ of that relationship. (22)

	These resolutional dynamics accepted we are then led to ask how can a relationship be entered into by parties of different type since one of the factors stated above is for consonance, i.e., a lack of difference? But, to varying degrees, we might argue that this is a problem between any two parties which cannot be the same [by virtue of the uniqueness of the relationship they must have with respect to themselves]. Moreover, the requirement of ‘dissonance’ would suggest that ‘difference’ is required [which would lead us to ask how any entity could have a relationship with respect to itself? Answer: because an entity is in a state of change, at least in its empirical basis in the reality of the life-world, it implies that through the difference of current potentiality versus current actuality there is already a state of difference internal to the object-state and hence, through time and space, there is possibility of being able to exist with respect to itself in the ongoing unity that constitutes its sense of presence in empirical space-time]. My resolution of this problem is to argue that there can be no absolute difference between types and their classified entities because all typological difference can be arbitrated through the very constitution of the life-world itself and the avenues of ‘mediation’ that that ‘ground’ then opens up to us in this regard. Of course, such ‘mediation’ is not mere mediation, as argued against previously, but (sheer) mediation in the form of a two way path for interaction between such states and/or entities in such a manner that a process of connection is established regardless of its existential value, merit or worth. Joking, but with a serious ‘point’ to make, I could state I am in a relationship with Julius Caesar. I could be reading his Histories, visiting the places in Rome where he lived when alive, note the fact that I am drinking a glass of water in which there would be at least 10, 000 molecules of water that would have inhabited his body when he was alive. May not make for much of a relationship but still one in a variety of senses. Furthermore, as Julius Caesar participated within the ‘living’, existential ambit of the life-world within which I am equally a participant it must be through such a ‘ground’, however tenuous and unrewarding, that I too find myself in such an inescapable relationship and therein inextricably linked with this Roman emperor, to name but one…! (23) 

Such an example, as just argued for, must lead us on to ask “with what and with whom are we not in a relationship with?!” Surely, our being in a relationship with everything merely robs this expression of ‘being in a relationship’ of all practical meaning (and all sense and meaningfulness too)! No doubt when we solve one problem another one will presents itself to us! At least we can take heart from the fact that as a ‘problem’ our recognition of a question/questions embedded in its problematicity, implies that an answer has already been to some extent formulated through the body of that question since for a question to be well-formed has already established the conditions, to a certain extent, for a resolution of that problematic-question. Or, so hopefully this digression on the theory on the formation of a question goes…. (24)

Common sense must realize that not all relationships are equal even if all relationships are ‘open’ to us, if only in principle. The degree of being a ‘relationship-for-us’ establishes the apparent existential facticity of that relationship as a relationship-there-for-us. This value is evaluated, theoretically, in the following fashion by ‘noting’ the facticity of the relationship-as-it-is-there-for-us minus the sum of the individual facticities of those parties (found to-be-there-for-us) that constitute that relationship on the grounds that a relationship is greater than ‘the sum of its parts’ and that this difference, its relational difference, is equal to its effective facticity for that person entering experientially into that relationship and being able to experience that unique relationship from its own point of view. To the extent this can be done this establishes the facticity of that relationship-as-it-is-to-be-found-there-for-us. So a relationship must possess both an absolute degree of existential facticity (the existential intensity to which that relationship is in a relationship with (in) itself) and a relative degree of existential facticity to that degree that it can be currently experienced by us. Hence, by these standards my relationship with Julius Caesar is of such a low intensity as to not effectively count as a ‘relationship’ in the normal scheme of things. This relational difference (considered in either an absolute mode or a relative, contingent mode) is also, therefore, its emergent value (considered either from an absolute auto-relational, point of view or from a relative, context-dependent, point of view) since this excess in existential value emerges from that relationship primarily from the point of view of that relationship in a logical form consonant with the phenomenological nature of that relationship. (25)

	Ideally, for practical purposes, relationships between different types of objects are not normally entertained if their differences are too great to be worth our while to be entertained as (if) in a ‘relationship’. This qualification accepted, how do we account for relationships between disparate objects and/or objects belonging to different classes of objects? (26)

	Because we are embodied-in-this-one-world-of-live all objects and entities, past, present and future, remain open to us even if only theoretically and, more often that not, not practically. Through such ‘mediation’, and its (actual-virtual) facilitation, all phenomenological experience is mediated-for-us by this one-world-of-life. So the question becomes “how is this relational space experienced?” and more precisely, “how is the relational space between disparate objects and entities of the same type and/or different types to be entertained both in theory and in practice?” Because the epistemological and ontological inputs into this type of question cannot be separated it implies that we must now explore, in adequate depth, this ‘other’ epistemological, and egological, dimension as a dialectical ‘aspect’ of the life-world. Hence our ability to experience the relative uniqueness of a relationship also necessitates an understanding of this egological dimension. (27)

3.   An Egological Philosophy as an Archetypal Philosophy of Self-Consciousness

	All consciousness necessitates, to some degree, a corresponding sense of self-consciousness! Consciousness is of a consciousness of something, namely the intentional object-state, by a certain sense of self in appropriate keeping with the nature of that field of experience. A delicate dialectical dance is in operation here as everywhere in our phenomenological, hermeneutical and existential appreciations of the life-world. The ‘self’ is obviously not ‘that which it is conscious of’, and, yet, at the same time, that ‘self-consciousness’ cannot be absolutely divorced from ‘that which it is conscious of’. At the same time in our discernment of an object-state a ‘field of experience’ must also be differentially discriminated both from the same and from this ‘accompanying’ sense of self in attendance upon this dialectical process of contrast and discernment. Hence the dialectical interdependence of these three factors of an appropriately related ‘sense of self’, ‘field’ and ‘object-state(s)’ is reflected in the fact that the ‘sense of self’ mirrors, in some fashion or other, that of which it is aware, so, in the instance of a visual field, and visual perception therein, there is necessitated the presence of a ‘visual perceiver’, and, furthermore, an awareness of a ‘visual perceiver’, must, in turn, as an object of discrimination, imply a field of consciousness that involves the sense of a ‘meta-visual perceiver’ in turn, etc. (to the limited extent that this reflexivity need operate). (28)

	Hence this overall sense of self, along with its various senses of self, cannot be seen as absolutely distinctive entities existing in their own right. Although I am not arguing for or against this discreteness of (a sense of) self, I would add that it is impossible for us to envisage this short-sighted absolutist ‘vision’ of the self or any other entity, object-state or field! What must be realized here is that the metaphor can never be held literally in an absolute (i.e., extreme) absolutist sense (i.e., absolutely literally). In normal non-philosophical parlance a metaphor is set up to ‘insightfully’ work for us, analogically giving us an insight into that being analogically imaged as a comparison. On the other hand, in a philosophical context we must realize that our metaphors, and rhetoric, have limits beyond which there is a natural breaking down, or deconstruction, of those metaphorical-rhetorical functions. An absolute vision of the life-world recognizes those natural limits, whereas, on the other hand, an absolutist ‘vision’ of the (life-)world tries to attempt the impossible, i.e., the complete literalization of the metaphorical images (and/or associated rhetorical functions) invoked in that ‘literary’ manoeuvre. (29)

	So, I am not arguing for any absolutist ‘vision’ of the self as some discrete entity existing in its own right! Merely, a ‘sense of self’ that arises through a mutually dependent, multi-polar association of object-states, fields, meta-fields, etc., in conjunction with various senses of self whether considered to some extent either individually or collectively. In effect, this Buddhistic vision of the life-world (through a mutual-interdependence) argues that all entities, etc., are essentially ‘projections’ constructed in consciousness that mirror these mutually-interdependent processes that give rise to the phenomenal appearances of an overall sense of self, and its various ‘lesser’ senses of that same self, various senses of other selves, object-states, fields, consciousness, self-consciousness, thought and language, our experiences as living in a community (of communities), of being in a world-of-life, etc., etc. (30)

	Returning to this problem of how disparate objects and types can interact, I believe we can best approach this type of topic through reworking material already explored in my expositions of harmonic theory and in my numerous attempts to understand the function of metaphor in metaphorical theory. Let me elabourate (in a form that does not need our actual returning to this previous research). (31)

	When I say “the moon is like a green(y-blue) cheese” what am I tying to say here metaphorically? How, on one hand, can the moon be compared with a cheese, on the other hand (as if, in turn, this image of a cheese being on this hand and ‘the moon being on the other hand’ could itself be entertained literally?). Surely the thought of such a comparison is laughable! Indeed, this may well be how this metaphor was first entertained (in a nursery rhyme?). But, like cliches, metaphors through repetition soon become fossilized in the sedimentation of our language and loose the startling ‘literary aura’ that they may have first presented themselves with. In this instance our cheese has two phenomenal features that allow us to make this imaginative metaphorical ‘comparison’. For a start it is round and of a green, or greeny-blue, complexion; both characteristics seen in the appearance of the moon. Moreover, if it is a cheese with round crater-like cavities, like certain varieties of Swiss cheese, then our metaphor could enlist this third comparatively similar feature. From our experience of these three phenomenal features which remain relatively invariant when our mind moves from this type of cheese to that perception of the moon, and vice versa, we then find ourselves in a position to say that the moon is indeed ‘like’ a green(y-blue) cheese (and 'not like' the same). In other words, in thinking about this type of cheese and our memories of how the moon appears to us, we find three specific features (of relative transformational-invariance) that generally remain relatively invariant in this transition, as would be found it we were to morph one of those objects into the other, or vice versa. Then, because the mind finds ‘stability of identity’ in these islands of similarity it quite normally assumes that we are dealing with similar types of objects. Discounting those differences, as seems to happen in a psychosis, or wishful thinking in a non-critical form, and the mind then quite ‘naturally’ jumps to the conclusion that we are dealing with the same ‘type of object’, that the moon is not only ‘like’ a cheese, and vice versa, but that the moon ‘is’ a cheese (although we then do not go on to say that the cheese is a moon under the directional-influence of the metaphorical process re-created by that metaphor?)! Going this last step, therefore is a process of literalization and/or identification, in which we make the non-metaphorical transition that treats the compared intentional objects as equivalent, if not substantially, or materially, at least by class. So, in this instance, we say that this moon is not only ‘like’ a cheese but also ‘is’ a cheese; if we were to believe the ‘claims’ made by this state of literal identification. (32)

	In harmonic theory we might go about an explanation in this alternative fashion (in a manner that offers another way of reading ‘metaphorical similarity’, i.e., establishing a transformational invariance in a metaphorical transformational reading of certain phenomena subjected to this type of comparison). In harmonic theory I argue for the necessary co-existence of three dialectical facets or moments, namely, a consonant field, a limited dissonant object-state within that field and a sense of resolution between these two polarities (that in effect establishes the sense of self re-viewing this type of comparison and which, as an act of judgment, will be experienced through the spontaneity of that resultant act of resolution dependent upon the existential characterization, or authenticity, found in that process of enharmonization). Claiming, seriously or non-seriously, that “the moon is like a green(y-blue) cheese” is a provocative thing to say. This is the dissonant! Cheeses are found on earth and the moon is found in the sky, wouldn’t you need an almighty large cow, or, a large number of cows, or some other female milk-bearing mammal, in order to produce this huge quantity of ‘cheese’. So, saying that the moon is a ‘cheese’ is being provocative! Now provocation, as a technical term, is that state of affairs, experienced as an object-state, which can be both experienced as dissonant in its associated field of consonance through relative difference between it and that field, and, that which can be resolved, and is being resolved, in and through a process of enharmonization in that field of consonance. Dissonance, to be dissonant, demands that it be provocative!  I.e., that relative sense of dissonance must have, simultaneously, these two faces of ‘being dissonant’ and ‘being able to be resolved’. How is this achieved? Through the discovery of a transformational invariance that modifies our appreciation of that dissonant feature in such a manner that that dissonance can no longer be conceived of as absolutely dissonant (when, in fact, it could not be experienced as absolutely dissonant in the first place. In other words, to be experienced as ‘dissonant’ guarantees its relative, non-absolute dissonance along with the potential ‘further resolution’ of that act of provocation in that same field of consonance). This region of transformational invariance allowing the mind to resolve, re-integrate that dissonant force, or aspect, back into that relatively consonant background from which it arose in the first place as relatively dissonant. The successfulness of this process of resolution establishing the existential facticity of this relationship under review, i.e., its relational facticity. In the light of our currently examined metaphor we might note that this metaphorical identification entered into does not receive a great degree of resolutional endorsement, whereas, on the other hand, our cheese, or cheeses in general, and, the ever recurring fact of the moon are relational entities with whom we have a much more profound sense of relationship with and from this sense of existential richness we find ourselves accepting the actual existence of cheeses and the moon (but not a moon that is a cheese beyond a metaphorical mode of entertainment). (32)

	Now, what light does this throw on our problem of ‘entering into a relationship with an entity greatly disparate in nature from the phenomenal nature of ourselves, and that entity being able to do likewise with us in a reciprocal manner’? To outline the manner of my resolution of this type of problem I will now need to integrate the research done in our relational philosophy and egological philosophy (whose integration we might like to call an integrated interrelational-egological philosophy). (33)

4.	 An Integrated Interrelational-Egological Philosophy

The concept of transformational invariance just previously dealt with was looked at through the lenses of metaphorical theory and harmonic theory. Both approaches were conducted in a hypothetical-logical space whereas, as a transcendental phenomenologist, it would be better conducted as processes whose content is best seen, or regarded, as being constituted in the phenomenological space-time of the life-world wherein all phenomenal subjectivity, intersubjectivity and objectivity, and all relations between the same, are constituted in and through phenomenal experience as critically appreciated phenomenologically (hermeneutically and existentially). All phenomena-there-for-us, and all relations between the same, are constituted in and through experience – such phenomena being critically appreciated phenomenologically (hermeneutically and existentially), i.e., as phenomenal ‘object-states’ constituted in and through consciousness (as hermeneutical ‘fields’ and existential ‘senses of self’ also being treated as being constituted in and through consciousness). It is through the all-embracing-collectivity of the life-world in its ‘apparent’ subjectivity, intersubjectivity and objectivity, that experience is constituted for-us by-us. ‘Apparent’ to the extent that we can only deal with that-as-it-phenomenally-presents-itself-to-us (all else being practically non-existent, not existing-for-us in this regard). Hence this (transcendental) philosophy of the life-world neither has the need for, nor deals with, that ‘beyond appearance’ as presented in various absolute, or rather ‘absolutist’, variants of ‘so-called philosophy’ regardless of what side of the idealist/non-idealist divide they mistakenly set out to operate from within. In this light let it be noted, therefore, that we have no need for a realm of the noumenal (after Kant) nor for a so-called empirical realm of material objects (after various versions of British ‘empiricism’) nor for ‘the real world hiding behind the play of appearances’ (after some versions, or misinterpretations, of the Vedanta?), nor for that matter, any sense of deity literally conceived of ‘as wholly other’ (beyond the making of some non-literal, metaphorical point)! As discussed in the first essay of this series, “that which does not exist for us might as well not exist for us!” is a maxim that we should take to heart in the course of our research, whatever the topic of that research! (34)

What light does an integrated interrelational-egological philosophy, as here conceived, throw upon the problematic nature of our research, and, how is this state of integration achieved? (35)

Integration is achieved through the integrated nature of the life-world as its already integrated sense of ‘presence’ presents to us! In the ‘open confines’ of the life-world the horizon of our attention takes into its ‘embrace’ a world of others, a world of fields and object-states all constituted in and through ‘our’ own sense of transcendental subjectivity, and, that that ‘subjectivity’, in turn, is found already to have been integrated in and through the transcendental intersubjectivity and transcendental objectivity of thelife-world. That this pre-given ‘unity’ of this transcendental sense of the life-world, through this process of ongoing unification through the resolution of all apparent difference, allows us to enter into an appreciation of this world-of-life through the ‘revelation’ of the phenomenal richness that this ‘world’ has-there-for-us! This life-world is that-there-for-us and therein constitutes our overall sense of self and our overall sense of a self being as an egological being in a community (of communities) in this ‘one’ world-of-life… and it is through this transcendental sense of unity of the life-world that all parts and aspects of this world-of-phenomena can be phenomenologically experienced by-us for-us. Hence this phenomenological experience of disparity, between object-states and/or fields and/or egological entities can be overcome. To the extent that a sense of disparity can actually be experienced it is to that same extent that it can be overcome in and through the embrace of the life-world itself! I might add, if only in theory and not in perfect practice (although pure theory too can not be obtained theoretically)! Just as I previously argued, in our harmonic philosophy, that our experience of dissonance implies that we have already experienced it in a provocative sense, i.e., as not-absolutely dissonant and in a process of potential resolution in that associated field of experience, so too must the sense of disparity have opened up to us already a vision of its own possible resolution in the wider scheme of things, a process, by rights, already under way. This revelation of resolution presenting itself to us when, with (pre-intentional/intentional) effort, we have opened ourselves up to ‘the potential fact of this revelation’ being able to make ‘an actual fact of itself’ more fully. Noting that these expressions ‘potential’ and ‘actual’, and all other correlative expressions and polarities, should never be treated in an absolutist fashion, i.e., absolutely literally! All hope for reasonable thinking and philosophy deconstructs in any attempt ‘to literally treat the metaphor!’, and, any claim to have completely subverted the (phenomenal/phenomenological) laws of thought ‘should be laughed at despite our tears’… for such impossible ‘thought’ is the true source of all misery! (36)

5.   The Theological Application of Our Interrelational-Egological Philosophy?

	In the light of the above, how should we understand the possibility of a relationship between egological entities of greatly disparate status? In other words, how could there be, hypothetically, a ‘meaningful’ or ‘relevant’, relationship between some ‘sense of the divine’ and ‘the sense of our own humanity’? (37)

In relationships between disparate senses of self, the ‘relationship’ is realized, both ontologically and epistemologically, through a resolution of the dissonance experienced between the same (and within the same). This is allowed through the necessary existence of those features that remain invariant under processes of relational transformation, and, those processes of transformation, whether entered into or not, are permitted by the non-mediational ‘mediation’ of the very life-world itself. How is this ‘possibility’, never to be treated as a ‘mere’ possibility, to be entertained and therein engaged as a ‘promise’ beyond the semblance of a promise? As already intimated, the dissonant experience already offers the promise of its resolution thus the semblance of a promise of resolution can never be taken as an ‘empty promise’ even if it currently cannot be put into an overall state of effective transformational operation.

	Can we take ‘this talk of a promise’ seriously? Beyond the metaphor without being expected to cash it in literally in a non-metaphorical manner?! Of course this begs the question whether we can have an existentially disparate experience with some sense of the divine in the first place in order to interpret and believe that ‘the posting of that apparent promise’ could be ‘signed by the divine hand’ and ‘even sealed with a divine kiss’ so to speak? What guarantee have we that there is ‘some sense of the divine’ and that among of all our disparate types of experiences we could possibly have we might find even one, and just one alone, that might indicate the hypothetical existence of such a relationship? (38)

	Hypothetically, we might just be able to argue for a recognition of the ‘revealed fact’ of this promise, and the ‘revelation’ of its guarantee, through the following simple philosophical manoeuvre? Of course whether we wish to take this style of argument on board is left to your esteemed discretion. I now suggest you fasten your philosophical seat-belts and let me see if I can wriggle my way out of this philosophical trap without falling into another one, this time one more of my own making? (39)

	As I argued previously, the phenomenal nature of a relationship in relational space is internally perceived phenomenologically as the same, equally from all ‘points’ within that relational sense of space, albeit from the apparent perspective of that ‘point of view’. This was guaranteed by the fact that in the ongoing resolution of that relationship the essential nature of that relationship holistically permeates the entire field of that relationship with the same phenomenological flavour as found to be characteristic of its phenomenal being. Now, as the (actual) relationship of all (possible) relationships is the life-world, the non-absolutisitic ‘ground’ of all relationships (in a non-absolute foundational sense!), it follows that our appreciation of this life-world, in and through all phenomena phenomenologically-as-entertained-therein-by-us, must re-present this sense of ‘unity’ of the life-world in such a manner that we should be able to find it ‘imprinted’ upon the fabric-of-the-world-as-it-is-to-be-found-there-for-us! Now, although this sense of unity can never be absolute, as unity is achieved through an ongoing process of resolution, and, this ‘imprint of unity’ can only be perceived as a ‘trace’ in a non-relational perspective, we must ask ourselves can this ‘divine tracing’ be appreciated given, and granted, this theological reading of the life-world is itself questionable? So, at this point in our ‘simple’ argument we must consider whether we can actually entertain a ‘theologicalization of the life-world’, and, in such a presentation find good reasons for hypothetically accepting this theological ‘re-vision of the world’? (40)

	As a short summary in the form of four proposition let me sum up these recent points just noted. ‘That the imputation of a divine aspect of the life-world should be found imprinted on each and very part of the same discriminated therein!?’ and, ‘That, given the right ‘lens’, i.e., the appropriate hermeneutic frame of reference, we should hopefully find that this ‘existential fact’ of the life-world to be self-evident?!’ ‘That even our ‘passage through this world’ should be characterized by the same!?’ and, ‘Hence the theological relevance this aspect of the life-world must have for-us??’ These four propositions being treated ‘as under a suspension’ in such a manner that the veracity, or otherwise, of these statements is not under current consideration (our current concern being only interested in discerning whether these statements are formed with a viable coherence in sense, meaning and meaningfulness). (41)

6.   A Theologicalization of the Life-World?
	
	As I have just argued, a theological reading of the life-world would allow us to expect that a tracing of this unity would be imprinted on the phenomenal fabric of our world. That, a phenomenological reading of this divine tracing as a ‘divine trace’ would then give to us a way of seeing ‘the hand that writes upon the book of this world’, so to speak, to metaphorically use an anthropomorphic figure of speech. So, without being prejudiced by such metaphors and the types of religious beliefs that promote the same, let us proceed to ask just what ingredients would be necessary, if only hypothetically, to allow us to successfully bake this (type of process) theological cake. Without too much icing being added to this endeavour let me state what conditions have to be met to enable us to support this hypothetical proposal that "the life-world could be read in a theological light". (42)

	This list is quite simple although, I might add, the devil is in the fine detail. The following six features must all be realized, if only hypothetically, i.e., in such a fashion as to make philosophical sense individually, sequentially and collectively. (43)

1.   The ‘unity’ of the life-world must be present and must be demonstrable (at least from a transcendental perspective). (44) 

2.   This ‘unity’ must present itself as conscious to some degree or other. (45) 

3.   That consciousness must be demonstrated to be ‘self-conscious’ to some extent. (46) 

4.   That that degree of self-consciousness must surpass that characteristic of the human ego. (47)

5.   Penultimately, that that self-consciousness is in some form of a relationship with human egos. (48)

6.   Finally, that that ‘relationship’ is in some sense ‘relevant’ in the life of a human agents. (49)

	These six conditions being summarized in the following formula – “unity, consciousness, self-consciousness, transcendence, interrelationship and relevance”. Let me now argue that these six conditions can be individually, sequentially and collectively entertained hypothetically, allowing us to return then to the relative simplicity of our previous argument, as indicated in section 40, which argued to the effect “that the unity of the life-world is imprinted on the fabric of the world, and, that in reading it we are able to divine this theological input if only in theory”. (50)

	The first argument, on ‘the unity of the life-world’, can be demonstrated by the adoption of various transcendental-style arguments. E.g., we could argue from a phenomenological observation of the world that "all phenomena in being perceived as distinctive phenomena must be unified to some extent and be involved in a ongoing act of unification because without such resolution their phenomenal presentation could neither continue nor be phenomenologically entertained in both conscious and self-conscious experience", etc. In the same vein, we could then argue that without such ‘transcendental unity’ even this argument itself, effectively conducted or defectively conducted, could not be run philosophically, etc. Hence, in conclusion, the transcendental unity of the life-world must first be in place before any experience in the life-world could be realized. Moreover, that this unity can be ‘seen’ when and where ever we inspect the phenomenal nature expressed in the life-world through this transcendental lens of the phenomenological because all phenomenal identity and the phenomenological experience of that identity demands this unity of presentation and self-presentation, furthermore, there must be 'one' world-of-life, i.e., one-world-of-life, in order for us to be able to share our perspective on ‘this’ world with others, etc., in this realm of transcendental intersubjectivity and transcendental objectivity. (51)

	The sense of the epistemological arises out of the hierarchicalization of relatively immanently oriented ‘material’. Through this natural stratification of reality the sense of an epistemological transcendence arises in relation to its correlative ontological enstructuralization. Therein simulating, to some degree or other, the actual presence of consciousness, in some form or other, to some degree or other. Hence in this light even a rock, or a mere pebble, should be viewed as conscious even though, in this instance, barely ‘conscious’ in the overall scheme of things. (52)

	The demonstration of this consciousness (created/re-created in the hierarchical enstructuralization of some segment of the life-world) automatically signals a certain form and degree of self-consciousness through the degree of unity apparent in that field of discriminating consciousness (from the point of view of a meta-field of appreciation wherein the field of consciousness itself is self-consciously discriminated; a reflexive process that needs no excessive reduplication through localized transformational recurrence despite the fact that every hierarchical level of epistemological organization would set upits own sense of conscious-self-conscious recurrence). A consciousness that discriminates object-states in a particular field of consciousness automatically develops an interrelated sense of self-consciousness. As the ‘existence’ of each moment in this hermeneutic circle of comprehension depends on all its other correlative moments it follows that the ‘conscious’ discrimination of object-states and/or fields implies the necessary presence of a self-consciousness to some extent or other as well, even though that self-consciousness may barely be ‘self-conscious’ in the overall scheme of things. (53)

	Through the sheer unity of the life-world and its encompassing all forms of life on this world (and anywhere else) it follows that all egological entities, etc., are inescapably bound and inextricably linked within its ‘open’ ambit; ‘open’ by virtue of the nature of its horizons always remaining entertainable for-us as open horizons; if only theoretically and not ‘practically’, although the absence of pure theory also implies some degree of practical access must already be in play. (54)

	As the life-world transcends a mere object-state, its field of presentation, the discriminative ‘conscious’ in the relationship between the same, its implication of a ‘self-conscious awareness’ of the former, and, incorporates all human entities within its confines, and their communities in all their complexity, and, the vastness of the cosmos within its phenomenological/phenomenal embrace, it stands to reason that its sense of self-consciousness, as reflected in every fraction of it, must by virtue of this all-encompassing embrace transcend that level of self-consciousness demonstrated by any individual egological representation of that life-world whether human or non-human. Hence the necessary existence of qualified ‘degrees of divinity’ relative to our own level of spiritual-epistemological self-expression of which some must exceed that demonstrated, albeit imperfectly, by ourselves in this one-world-of-life along with an open-ended process sense of divinity some what more along the lines of the theological concept of the Godhead which will be looked at in a future paper). Hence the necessary presence of relevance must be assumed by virtue of the fact that this theological aspect permeates all processes and all the content of those processes even if we were currently unaware of this significance. But then the question must arise how relevant is that relevance in our daily lives? As a large fraction of the people of this world don’t hold theological beliefs, or no longer hold the same, this important question must be addressed and will be taken up in the next essay of this series where it will form a central problematic in our ongoing phenomenological-theological research. (55)

	Hence these six factors, I believe, have been both successfully argued for individually, sequentially and collectively! 'Collectively' by virtue of the fact that they were argued as a sequence: transcendental unity realizing consciousness, consciousness of consciousness realizing self-consciousness, that self-consciousness in all its forms and levels of divinity surpassing human levels of self-consciousness, incorporating all forms of consciousness it super-instantiates human consciousness, and, being present throughout the lifeworld it inescapably and inextricably implicates itself in the course and passage of human existence regardless of whether we are aware of this 'fact' or not. Hopefully this complex argument arises to the challenge presented by this complex thesis. Well, that is al least my hope. In the process we have thus provisionally established, if only in outline, the philosophical sense of the hypothetical existence of an ongoing sense of the Divine (more along the lines of a Godhead), and, by implication, various ‘lesser’ senses of the divinity (of which we must include ourselves and all other living organisms and communities). (56)

	We can now ‘safely’ return, if only hypothetically, to our ‘simple argument’ that argues to the effect “that the unity of the life-world is imprinted on the fabric of the world, and, that in reading it we are able to divine this theological input if only in theory”. (57)

7.   Can We Divine The ‘Character’ of This ‘Imputed Theological Difference?

	The Gnostics and their ilk argued that the material world was evil, a place of entrapment where the sparks of the spirit became imprisoned. On the other hand Neoplatonic philosophers, and others influenced by their systematic thought, reasoned that although the world may be imperfect it was still a 'beautiful world', in some measure reflecting the spiritual unity that allowed this world to express itself, reveal itself as this incredible cosmos in all its infinitely intricate complexity. Now, I am not arguing that we should adopt this type of religious metaphysics but ask you, in a moment of philosophical contemplation, to look at the beauty of this universe as revealed through current astrophysical researches, e.g., etc. Vast tracts of space are now understood to form long filaments spilling with galaxies teaming with worlds that should, on such tremendous odds, be filled with forms of life even more dazzling than those found on this humble spec of space called ‘Earth’. This entire cosmos apparently demonstrating the same degree of fractal symmetry across the perceived immensity of its phenomenal embrace indicating a self-organized structure… stamped with a theological-like countenance? What should we conclude from our interpretations of such observations? At least a humble openness to its majestic display and perhaps a hope that this visible evidence of a cosmic unity is none other than the imprint of the Divine in ‘their’ theologicalization of the life-world?? (58)

8.	Conclusion: Does Theological Difference Make a Difference?

Although in the last essay we argued that a positive theological difference could be philosophically entertained, we also found that the vision of the Divine therein sketched appeared to have no relevance for us in our daily lives through the disparity in power relations that such a relationship, such an apparently impossible relationship, would have for-us! In this essay I have partially argued the contrary, “that this relevance must be relevant” if only by virtue of the fact that the entire life-world is imprinted with this sense of the divine and, therein, 'evidence', if not proof, that this disparity between the sense of the divine and this everyday world have in some demonstrable measure been overcome (indeed, in such a manner to suggest that this 'disparity' was more a transcendental  'illusion'?). On the other hand we must still question what real relevance might, or must, this ‘virtual relevance’ have for-us in the passage of our daily lives? This problematic issue will be dealt with in the next essay in this series but let me preview a possible resolution of this puzzle by offering the following thoughts: If a relationship comes into relational existence, in accordance with our relational philosophy, through the ongoing resolution of dissonance, what ‘dissonance’ would need to be overcome in a divinely orientated relationship by an individual or a religious community of such individuals (or even for that matter by the divine party or parties ‘equally’ participant in such a relationship)? Then, what characteristics could be hypothetically derived from the nature of this type of relationship, or, any type of relationship for that matter, that we find to be apposite for our research in this topic of phenomenological-theology, a theology also hermeneutical and existential in its ambitions? A possible candidate for this research might well be found in the topic of ‘love’, looking at its essential phenomenological nature as phenomenally found present in all its infinite variety of forms. But, with these last few thoughts, and, my admission of many doubts that I still have with this type of enterprise,  let me end this essay by indicating that a real conclusion has not yet been arrived at nor should be hopefully expected in any immanent fashion! (59)

That theological difference does, on this account, make a difference, but, what that difference is must be explored elsewhere. (60)

							           Noël Tointon, Sydney, 6.5.02.

Key Points

1.	In the acceptance of a positive theological difference does this vision of the divine make any difference in a religious frame of reference. (1)
2.	Some theologians might extend this ‘existential fact of our existence as inescapable participants in a language community’ to ‘our personal participation with God, and v.v.’, on the grounds that the life-world too has a theological dimension that too is inescapable for both ‘God and the individual’, and ‘God and the community’. (13)
3.	A relationship as a relationship, in order to be a relationship, must be in a ‘process of relationship’. (14)
4.	The apparent role of mediation cannot philosophically resolve this problem of extreme disparity in power status (but can act as a facilitator). (18)
5.	What constitutes this sense of relational-space is the ongoing resolution of dissonance found within the consonance of that relational-space and this three-way relationship, between consonance, dissonance and resolution, collectively constitutes the ‘relationship’ of that relationship. (22)
6.	All consciousness necessitates, to some degree, a corresponding sense of self-consciousness! (28)
7.	Consciousness is of a consciousness of something, namely the intentional object-state, by a certain sense of self in appropriate keeping with the nature of that field of experience. (29)
8.	Dissonance, to be dissonant, demands that it be provocative, i.e., that relative sense of dissonance must have, simultaneously, these two faces of ‘being dissonant’ and ‘being able to be resolved in a process that some extent is already under way. (32)
9.	To the extent that a sense of disparity can actually be experienced it is to that same extent that it can be overcome in and through the embrace of the life-world itself! 
    (36)
10.	All hope for reasonable thinking and philosophy deconstructs in any attempt ‘to literally treat the metaphor!' …and all such impossible 'thought' is the true source of all misery! (36)
11.	‘That the imputation of a divine aspect of the life-world should be found imprinted on each and very part of the same discriminated therein!?’ and, ‘That, given the right ‘lens’, i.e., the appropriate hermeneutic frame of reference, we should hopefully find that this ‘existential fact’ of the life-world to be self-evident?!’ (41)
12.	That even our ‘passage through this world’ should be characterized by the same pattern of divine imprinting!?’ and, ‘Hence the theological relevance this aspect of the life-world must have for-us??’ (41)
13.	The following six features must all be realized, if only hypothetically, i.e., in such a fashion as to make philosophical sense individually, sequentially and collectively. (43)

Namely…
1.   The ‘unity’ of the life-world must be present and must be demonstrable (at least from a transcendental perspective). (44) 
2.    This ‘unity’ must present itself as conscious to some degree or other. (45) 
3.   That consciousness must be demonstrated to be ‘self-conscious’ to some extent. (46) 
4.   That that degree of self-consciousness must surpass that characteristic of the human ego in its level of epistemological organization. (47)
5.   Penultimately, that that self-consciousness is in some form of a relationship with human egos. (48)
6.   Finally, that that ‘relationship’ is in some sense ‘relevant’ in the life of a human agents. (49)

14.	These six conditions being summarized in the following formula – “unity, consciousness, self-consciousness, transcendence, interrelationship and relevance”. (50)
15.	That the unity of the life-world is imprinted on the fabric of the world, and, that in reading it we are able to divine this theological input if only in theory(?) (57)
16.	 That theological difference does, on this account, make a difference, but, what that difference is must be explored elsewhere. (60)