Finding a Place for the Idea of God – Part VI:
What Relevance Does Theological Difference Possess??

0.   Prologue

	In the second last paper it was argued that not only could one propose the concept of theological difference philosophically, but, that theologically one could meaningfully argue for this difference as a theological 'fact'. 'Theological difference' was defined in the third paper as "the difference between a 'vision of the universe with a sense of the divine/senses of the divine' and a 'vision of the universe without any sense of the divine'." In the last paper, this difference experienced in the form of a possible relationship between some sense of the divine with an individual human ego/community of human egos was felt to involve a degree of difference in power differential that was thought impossible to cross or close. Hence the question was posed "what relevance, in a religious context, does the acceptance of a positive theological difference make?" If this general vision of a process-oriented sense of divinity entailed such an enormous difference in power, in its epistemological-ontological degree of self-organization, between itself and our state as a human being (on this mere spec of a planet on the edge of this galaxy on the edge of its galactic cluster, itself only one among billions of other clusters) what possibility could it have of entering into a relationship with us, and we with it, in a meaningful fashion? In a similar vein the value of religion itself was called into question - that, on de facto grounds at least, one could argue, in balance, the value of religion in the life of the human being, as an individual in a community (of communities), might well be negative?! (1)

	Although these two questions were not directly addressed it was noted that because it is the nature of a relationship to essentially 'imprint' itself upon the 'fabric' or 'body' of that relationship, i.e., throughout the entire extent of that relationship; within its own sense of 'space' (i.e., in its own distinctive sense of space-time), then it is implied that the essential nature of the divine, in all its levels of divinity, is intimately stamped upon the world and our passage through the same, both as an individual and as a community (of communities). Hence the divine, in all its forms, the 'fact' of theological difference granted, must have itself intimately involved within this world, with all its creatures therein, and, the passage of all forms of life as they individually and collectively move through this world-of-life. Or, to paraphrase an Islamic saying, "God is as close as one's jugular vein." (2)

	Having drawn this conclusion that, despite the near infinite difference, in epistemological-ontological self-organization, between some sense of the divine and ourselves, we could still argue that all senses of the divine intimately imprinted themselves upon the fabric, or 'body', of our sense of self-being and equally upon all other institutions whether religious in persuasion or non-religious in persuasion. We could still sceptically ask what relevance has this relationship/have these relationships for the individual as an individual in a community (of communities)? And it is this question I hope to address in this paperfrom a transcendental-phenomenologically neutral philosophical position. (3)

	In the last paper it was noted "that, a phenomenological reading of this divine tracing as a 'divine trace' would then give to us a way of seeing 'the hand that writes upon the book of this world', so to speak, to metaphorically use an anthropomorphic figure of speech." In resurrecting this concept of the world as a 'divine text', the realm of nature as a 'book', let me re-explore this type of metaphor to see what light, if any, might be thrown upon this question of theological relevance? Assuming that there is this hypothetical theologicalization of the life-world, let us run with this image of the world as a 'divine text' to see if we can sensibly answer this potential objection - just as if one were to see footprints in the snow might let one suppose that someone or something has made them even if we might never get to see who or what made those footprints in the first place? (4)

1.	What Might We Read if "the World was to be Seen as a 'Divine Text'?"

The first point I would like to make is that if the theologian were to run with this type of concept then their act of reading this 'divine text' should reveal and release a sense of hermeneutic value greater than that merely invested in that 'act of reading'. Moreover, this hermeneutic excess should be even greater than that revealed and released from the mere 'fact' of the systematization of that interpretative system itself. In our so called 'charitable interpretation' of systematic presentations that claim to accurately and insightfully map the constitution of our world it has been argued that all systematic presentations to some extent, as a measure of that systematization, will reveal and release a degree of value greater than that merely invested in that construction of those systems. That, in essence, all systems, to some degree or other, existentially map the world to that same extent. On the other hand, however, in ceasing to be merely charitable, we would expect a well-founded phenomenological vision of the life-world to reveal and release a considerably greater degree of value than that merely invested in its mere construction and from its mere systematization! That this greater differential of value, beyond the mere systematization of that systematic presentation, should be evident phenomenologically and/or hermeneutically and/or existentially, or, preferably, that value should be seen to involve all three of these dialectical modalities that constitute the hermeneutic circle in general (and, specifically, in the hermeneutic circle of theological comprehension as implicated in this type of discourse). (5)

	A second point I would like to make is that the life-world, and any subject or object therein can always be read through an infinity of perspectives. Just as a geologist would 'read' the landscape in one or other geologic fashion so too an artist might see the same through the lens of a particular artistic style and/or medium, etc. That, normally, these interpretations do not conflict with each other. In a similar manner, the theologian might wish to see the world through a certain metaphorical-rhetorical lens without necessarily conflicting with some other theologian's modus operandi (or that of a scientist, or any other way of viewing the life-world, etc.). In theory they both could be right, or, both could be wrong, or, one could be right and the other could wrong (or, one or other could be constructing a system just not relevant to the intentional task as apparently stated). The point that I am trying to make here is this - that in attempting to read the world through a theological lens means that that theologian has had to build themselves a theologically-oriented type of lens. Of course this concept of 'lens' is a metaphor, moreover, this type of lens itself is constructed from an assemblage of religiously treated metaphors that, hopefully, for the theologian, will accomplish the task they wish to have performed by that complex metaphorical construction. (6)

	As a consequence of adopting and using this systematic metaphorical construction the philosophical-theologian, and/or, theological-philosopher, must critically exercise this complex literary device with due regard to the manner and limitations of its nature, i.e., that its constitution is primarily and, essentially, metaphorical and should be treated as such! As a result the 'metaphor' should be critically treated as a metaphor, i.e., not as in a factual modality nor in any other non-metaphorical modality. A prime mistake made by the uncritical philosopher, or the uncritical theologian, or the uncritical lay-person, is to literalize the metaphor! Let me explain why 'it is wrong to uncritically literalize the metaphor', to treat metaphor in a literal, factual-like modality (or any other modality that is not metaphorical). (7)

2.	The Mistake of ‘Literalizing’ the Metaphor

Normally, a metaphor selectively analogues (or 'images') certain phenomenal features of a particular phenomenon, whose selection is usually understood meta-textually, which are then applied to some other phenomenon in such a manner to insightfully illuminate the nature of that subjected to this analogical comparison. This comparison is not meant to take place in a literal fashion, acting only as a literary device whose function is either understood or explained, this practice being reinforced by the existential excess created by that comparison assuming that that comparison is both apt and fruitfully insightful. As argued elsewhere the metaphorical equation is not constructed on the grounds of a factual identity but on a partial similarity, i.e., being based on 'likeness' which can be cashed out as both 'like and not like' . (8)

Metaphor, as a special type of comparison, is therefore based on ‘likeness’ whether the word ‘like’, or ‘as’, is expressed overtly, as in a simile, or left implicit. Likeness as just noted depends on a conjunctive suspension, namely, “both is ‘like’ and is ‘not like’.” Consequently, in order to preserve the metaphorical nature of a metaphor it can never be literalized, actualized or factualized. Maintaining the metaphor and insisting on it literally is to involve oneself in a contradiction whether that fact is realized or not! The ambivalence of a metaphor can be entertained metaphorically but when you literalize it the paradoxical nature of the metaphor, in its nature to be “both ‘like’ and ‘not like’”, invites the self-deconstruction of this segment of text and all that is made dependent upon it. However, the use of a linguistic expression that seems to involve the use of an overt or covert sense of ‘likeness’ complicates this picture because just as the verb “to be” can hide a multitude of sins so too can the same involve expressions that are correctly not metaphorical. Lets look at the following list of expressions using or possibly implying the word ‘like’ (some of which are not metaphorical in their primary orientation of apparent intent):

1.	The moon is a greeny-blue cheese.
2.	The world is an illusion.
3.	That person over there looks like Joe Bloggs.
4.	The world is one.
5.	Richard has the heart of a lion.
6.	The world looks like a beautiful painting.
7.	The physical world is the external world. ( 9)

       The first sentence could be read to mean either the moon ‘is’ a cheese or ‘is like’ a cheese. If it is only ‘like a cheese’ then it can not be ‘a cheese’ because the expression ‘like’ means both ‘like and not like’. Therefore, meant as a metaphor it could never be construed literally as a ‘fact’ without involving some form of a contradiction opening the text up to an eventual self-deconstruction if not an immediate act of deconstruction. Besides, if treated as a metaphor and then as a ‘fact’ we also have to then imagine a series of impossible things like a very huge cosmic cow or a very large flock of large cows (although we do have the ‘milkyway’) giving their milk to form the same, or, some cosmic situation where the complex organic constituents of cheese just happen to form under the violent conditions, under certain ‘circumstances’, that appear to constitute cosmological space. Only a child might insist that the moon 'was' a cheese (or, a cheese came from the moon). We could comprehend the factual state of affairs where a mass of cheese was put into a state of orbit about the earth, but, to insist that the moon in its enormity was the product of a milk-bearing mammal or mammals is to deconstruct such an identification through the absurdity of such a notion put into a realistic context! Hence the initial mode of primary intent would have been originally metaphorical as there has been no evidential mode, till recent, that would have allowed us, if it had been evident, to assert it ‘was’ cheese. The ‘shocking’ nature of this claim, at face value, contributing to the memorable nature of this metaphor before this comment became, effectively, a cliché. (10)

Of course, if we knew we had a fake painting signed “Leonardo da Vinci" and it was brilliantly painted in the style of the master then we might be able to get away with this deception. But, of course, once others realized it was only ‘like the work of the master’ then we could no longer non-deceptively insist on this exact identification. In a similar fashion, sentence no. 3, “that person over there looks like Joe Bloggs”, might be construed as metaphorical when in fact the sentence intends a question (questioning the transition between a state of possiblity and actuality in the realization and recognition of a fact), namely “this might be Joe Bloggs or it might not be Joe Bloggs?” in which case we have a disconjuctive suspension and not a conjunctive one necessary for the expression of a metaphor as previously noted. (11)

Literalizing a metaphor gets us into trouble, and, is one of the worst things a philosopher should try to inflict on themselves and their public! For example, saying Richard the Lionheart has a heart like that of a lion is not meant to mean that he has had a transplant of a lion’s heart, only that he exhibits certain commendable moral features like bravery, courage, nobility, a certain regal je ne suis pas, etc. So, if we wouldn’t normally try to treat a metaphor like this literally, as an actual fact, then why must some philosophers, not worth their salt I might add, try to literalize other comparisons that are primarily meant, introduced and construed in a metaphorical sense such as “the world is an illusion” in sentence no. 2; “the physical world is the external world” in sentence no. 7; and, “the world is one (or One)” in sentence no. 4. Let me look more closely at these three philosophical-religious ‘metaphors’ before outlining both a method to circumnavigate this apparent linguistic chaos and the formulation of certain rules for determining the nature of our treatment of a metaphor in so far as determining what legitimately we can and cannot do with the same. (12)

		If the world was an 'illusion' and that was a 'fact' then in such 'reality' its 'truth' also implies its 'non-existence' and hence the 'falsity of that claim' both through the non-existence of our being able to make it and the non-existence of the same, namely, this world in which we made this ‘impossible’ claim. In other words, to insist on the use of this metaphor in a literal and/or factual frame of reference is to insist on a contradictory state of affairs, indeed, the more we insist on a literal state of identification the more this ‘paradox’ at the center of this metaphor becomes a paradox, must surface in a state ready to deconstruct our short-sighted blindness in this regard! All oversight on this matter existing in an unstable state ready to fall apart when the emotional energy of our claim, however deep-seated as a prejudice, is not sufficiently applied to our short-sighted reading of this now completely paradoxical state of affairs (and ‘resisted’ because of this fear of instability?). (13)

In a similar fashion, to say that there is an 'external world' implies that there is an 'internal world' (and a set of internal worlds equal in number to the number of sentient beings able to think in this metaphorical manner). Now, as a metaphor this does seem to throw some light on the nature of our consciousness as 'a person-‘in’-the-world' in a non-critical, non-philosophical frame of reference. But, to insist on this 'nonsense' in a literal and/or factual frame of reference is to try to do one more impossible thing (“before breakfast” so to speak). Let me explain. To run this metaphor in this literal fashion one has to regard the body as both in the world and internal to our consciousness. By overlooking this dual identification placed upon our understanding of ‘the body’ we might think we could run with this metaphor and ‘see’ ourselves as in ‘the real world’, in the so called 'objective world'. But we have the same type of problem that presents itself to the so called 'empirical philosopher' who insists that our ideas and perceptions somehow perfectly correspond with real 'unseen' entities in the real world when 'to see' that there is this state of correspondence impossibly demands a form of intuition beyond that given to us in an 'empirical' modality as first defined, and ‘preferred’, by this type of uncritical philosopher. So, to defuse this dual identification of the body, if one were to insist the body is in the world but consciousness was not part of this external world, then that would leave us with the Cartesian style of dilemma of how consciousness could interact in the first place with a body, and vice versa. Or, if one were to see the body as in consciousness, then the question is how then can the person be in the external world too?! Then, again, if one is still wedded to this nonsense and insists on some form of an identification between these two modalities of the internal and the external, as hybrid-like aspects of each other, then 'I rest my case' and state we have returned to accepting the metaphor and its ambivalent territory embedded at the core of its conjunctive suspension either explicitly or in some de facto manner. (14)

Let me look at a further example apposite in the light of our hypothetical process theology, namely, the idea that through the unification and theologicalization of the life-world we can say that this self-unity of the life-world is one, i.e., the One, the Divine, the Soul or what ever else you might wish to call it. Correctly, we are being metaphorical by saying the life-world 'is' One, etc. Incorrectly, we are abusing the metaphor, taking it beyond the limits of its deployment, if we were to insist on 'a' literal and/or factual Oneness operating as a unique entity that can absolutely stand apart from this world-of-life, etc. So, when someone claims that the One exists, that the life-world 'is' One, the use of existence, the use of a copular can only indicate metaphorical existence and only a metaphorical or analogical style of existence. Implying, theologically, that any form and degree of transcendence hypothetically or speculatively ascribed to some sense of deity (Deity) must be met with an equal degree of immanence too! So, such language must remain, be seen and be treated as metaphorical along with all the internal ambivalence [embedded in its core analogical enstructuralization centred on this conjunctive suspension that defines the phenomenological nature of a metaphor]. Consequently, to use this type of metaphor we must run with it as a metaphor and not proceed beyond the limits of its deployment [and therein commit this type of transcendental mistake, with its consequent transcendental confusion, to paraphrase Kant]. (15)

	Let me now re-capitulate, what has just been argued on this topic, before formulating any rules thought appropriate in this aspect of our research so that we can then continue freely on our way through this exploration of the philosophical and religious relevance of a theological way of seeing the life-world. (16) 

The normal use of metaphor forbids its literal treatment. Moreover, metaphorical identification cannot be treated factually. If we were to be investigating a factual claim using the expression 'like' or some other synonym then we must suspect its use in a rhetorical mode, or in an existential mode, rather than one of a metaphorical nature. As the metaphorical structure is centred around the ambivalence of a conjunctive suspension we must realize that to literalize and/or factualize the same is only to involve ourselves in some form of a paradox, set of contradictions, etc. That, the extent that this dissonant state of affairs is not 'seen' equals the extent that we are being ‘blind’ to this ambiguous state of affairs and wrongly re-writing it through a short-sighted monocular lens of dogma along with the enforcement of all forms of emotional ontological commitment entailed in that form of ontological and/or epistemological legislation. (17)

Metaphor should be treated as metaphorical! Only on a deep transcendental level of epistemological functioning can we envisage a transformation between it and the rhetorical, and, the factual-like claims of ‘self’ embedded in a sense of the existential as entailed, altogether, in the deeper transcendental dynamics of the hermeneutic circle (by virtue of the fact that the metaphorical 'image' is never read purely in and through a metaphorical lens but, through these three dialectical moments that constitute the hermeneutic circle). It is on this deeper level of epistemological functioning that the internally dissonant nature of metaphor, the enquestioning of the rhetorical trope, etc., are resolved, find an ongoing form and self-expression of resolution that manifests itself through our determination of sense, meaning and meaningfulness within the natural limits of reason, understanding and comprehension, pragmatic utility, communication, etc. (realized in and through this hermeneutic circle of comprehension [that ‘grounds’ all forms of comprehension]). (18)

How do we know when we are dealing with a metaphor and the type of ‘likeness’ implied (meta-textually)? Nearly twenty-five years ago I faced this same type of problem when trying to understand the distinctive uses implicit in the use of the verb “to be” in all its forms. In response to this philosophical problem, and the types of philosophical problems that proliferated from forms of mis-identification between these types of existence, I proposed a six-part grid in order to differentiate the following types of distinctive judgments, namely, pre-essential judgments (including logical, lexical, syntactical, mathematical equations, etc.), essential judgments (including coherent pre-essential equations) as primarily aesthetical judgments, ethical judgments (of a deontological nature), pragmatical judgments, hermeneutical judgments (as semantic in orientation, as descriptions of fields, environmental considerations, states of possibility, etc.) and factual judgments. Again, I would like to do the same, but, this time, in regard to the overt or covert adverbial use of ‘likeness’ (in this modal modification of the verb to be). First I will differentiate what sense or senses of likeness might be involved and then ask whether this function is being primarily used in a metaphorical sense, and, whether the exercise of that function is being correctly adopted. By these means critically noting what type of likeness is meant, whether a metaphor is primarily intended and the critical nature of the limits circumscribed by our delineation of the particular types of metaphorical intentions demonstrated (meta-textually, i,.e., hermeneutically) as apparently being intended (in those initial modes of primary introduction). (19)

	To do this task I will ask the reader to note what are the primary intentional motives apparent behind a certain expression in the light of its context. This we will treat as the initial mode of apparent metaphorical introduction. These intentions being made manifest in asking and replying to the question “what mode appears to produce the greatest degree of sense, meaning and meaningfulness with a priority of emphasis on sense. So in our list statement no. 5 seems to suggest a primary ethical connotation as noted previously through the implicit commendations of courage, leadership, etc. On the other hand, statement no. 6, “the world looks like a beautiful painting”, obviously seems to be operating in an aesthetic frame of reference, etc. Hence by these means we can tell, to some extent, usually non-problematically, that such and such a type of judgment is implied [and that such and such an ‘order’ is thereby intended]. (20)

Now, having decide what type(s) of judgment is(/are) involved, the next question is “is this use of comparison primarily metaphorical or non-metaphorical in nature?” (21)

To answer this question all we need to do is show that the basic structure of a metaphor is actually involved in its apparent use [as just defined by its ordered determination]. Or, more simply, is it being comparative in a non-exclusive manner, i.e., without demanding some form of an absolute identification (between the linguistic parties involved in the use of ‘is’ rather than is ‘like’]. E.g., if we say that the world is an illusion and just a mere illusion then we are making an exclusive, one hundred percent identification between ‘the world’ and ‘illusion’. The prior use of our six-part grid determining the nature of its apparently intended type of judgmental field in which it is meant to operate, e.g., as a mathematical-like equation, or, as a possibility, or, as a ‘fact’ i.e., the possibility or fact that “the world is an illusion and just an illusion” (from the absolutist/absolute perspective of some sense of an Absolute). (22)

As far as demonstrating what limits the metaphorical [the rhetorical and the existential] have, let me repeat, as previously noted, that on a deep transcendental level of epistemological organization, the presence and function of the hermeneutic circle demands that no ultimate distinction can be made between the metaphorical and the non-metaphorical [i.e., the rhetorical and/or the existential]. That, in essence, all critical philosophical research must remain in the province of the provisional! (23)

To summarize this difficult section I shall formulate the following rules (as provisional guidelines in this matter).

1.  Determine in which of the six orders the expression-in-its-context appears to possess the greatest degree of (phenomenological) sense, (hermeneutical) meaning and/or (existential) meaningfulness.

2.   Determine if the expression is primarily metaphorical in nature by the presence of a non-exclusive comparative identification based on a conjunctive suspension.
 
3.   Ensure that all critical distinctions are critically maintained, i.e., provisionally and not absolutely (i.e., not absolutistically since an Absolute Philosophy maintains a transcendental suspension, etc., and, therefore, cannot literalize either metaphorical, rhetorical or existential structural-processes, expressions, etc.).

4.   Demonstrate, through deconstruction, etc., that expressions whose initial mode of primary presentation was metaphorical cannot be literalized, actualized, factualized, etc. (although noting that in deeper levels of epistemological-ontological organization and functioning these distinctions, correctly, can only be treated as provisional).  (24)

These rules helping the critical philosopher to avoid this classic mistake of ‘literalizing’ the metaphor. With these guidelines to hand we shall now look into the use of metaphor in a theological context, observing its use and how this question of theological relevance might be settled through such an investigational approach. (25)

3.   The Use of Metaphor in the Construction of a Theological 'Lens'

	The implication of this research, just to hand, is that the work of the theologian when operating in a theoretical arena is in the metaphorical sphere and like any other philosopher or non-philosopher they should not illegitimately literalize the metaphor! With this critical limitation in mind let us ask ourselves how such a theoretical project might be conducted from a theoretical-phenomenological point of view, i.e., how might, or should, the theologian operate in their use of the metaphorical? (26)

	I have already argued that the process nature of reality would seem to suggest and imply that a hypothetical theologicalization of the life-world in its emergent sense of divinization should be left imprinted upon the body of its sphere of being, namely, the very fabric of the world, and, that all levels and aspects of such divinization should, at least hypothetically, be found there if we knew 'how to read' this ‘book of nature’ with its divine writing imprinted thereon? A metaphorical ‘book’ where the thelogicalization of the life-world is, from a transcendent point of view, over-written, and, from an immanent point of view, is simultaneously under-written. The theoretical (and non-theoretical) correlativity of this concept pair (of transcendency-immanency) demanding an equal transcendent and immanent phenomenlogical treatment(s) (as maintained through the theoretical and practical use of the transcendental suspension [demanding this co-reading even if covertly appreciated and not overtly appreciated by the same or some other ‘reader’]). (27)

	Moreover, as the metaphorical is itself a form of suspension, namely, a conjunctive suspension between the ‘is like’ and the ‘is not like’, it could be argued that left in a metaphorical state our reading of that metaphor is already in a state of transcendental suspension(?). However, as the metaphorical is only one of the three moments in our hermeneutic circle (and our hermeneutic circle of theological comprehension – on the grounds that all forms of understanding are structured on the dialectical nature of this transcendental ‘territory and machinery’) one should quickly add that a transcendental suspension correctly comes into full being only when all three dialectical moments are given an equal introduction, thematization and inter-cooperative balance. But, then again, to successfully or adequately ‘read’ a metaphor means that we have already gone beyond the merely metaphorical through an insertion of the metaphor into this transcendental machinery of the hermeneutic circle. Put technically, I would argue that the metaphorical ‘text’ is put into its apparently appropriate rhetorical meta-textual ‘context’ (‘appropriateness’ in our reading of ‘context’ being determined through a comparative appreciation of the relative release of hermeneutic value in that process of ‘recontextualization’) and experienced from an ongoing existentially suspended balance of the same then allows us to read the existential non-textual dimension of that textual-complex which, then put into a tri-modal state of balance allows us to then truly read the ‘not’-textual dimension of the text as a simulation of the life-world from an intentional point of view, i.e., as a phenomenon-in this-world-of-life as that constituted-both-there-for-us-and-by-us. Put more simply, the metaphorical text is read metaphorically, rhetorically, and spontaneously through a balance of the same, i.e., is read phenomenologically, hermeneutically and existentially as demanded by the three moments of the hermeneutic circle. In other words, the successful reading of a metaphor cannot be conducted purely in metaphorical terms of reference the important implications of which will be brought out later in this paper! (28)

	Let us now ask what value a ‘metaphorical’ reading might possess when conducted in and through the hermeneutic circle, and, what possible light might be cast on the adoption of metaphor critically exercised by the theologian? Just what could they hope for in this regard? (29)

	A metaphor is meant to be used in an insightful fashion, help us to better understand the nature of the world, help us to see it afresh… As the title to this section suggests, I am considering the use of metaphor by the theologian as a possible sort of metaphorical ‘lens’. In a sense this meta-metaphorical literary device, ‘image’ or concept of a ‘lens’ is something we can ‘look through’ but not literally! As just indicated, to be able to read this metaphor assumes it can serve a useful role in the success of this task, i.e., release more hermeneutic value that that invested in the use of this (meta-)metaphor, i.e., makes the assumption that the process possesses the potential for the release of a hermeneutic excess, the entire 'image' needing to be appropriately inserted into a properly exercised hermeneutic circle. Hence the properly exercised ‘meta-metaphorical’ use of this image of a ‘lens’ must also be appropriately treated hermeneutically and existentially (whether that be done in an overtly scrutinized format or a covertly implied format)! From a metaphorical perspective we perceive that this meta-metaphor of a ‘lens’ cannot be treated literally. What insightful implication can be drawn and what critical reservations are cast, in turn, from hermeneutical and existential perspectives within the ambit of this hermeneutic circle? Let me make some suggestions dealing with each of these ‘moments’ respectively. (30)

	What reservations does our hermeneutic point of view have for our critical research in general and for the theologian in particular? As the underlying nature of the hermeneutic is rhetorical, constructed through the use of a dis-conjunctive suspension that ‘grounds’ the nature of a question, and, as our enquestioning modality is not absolutely isolated from its metaphorical answer delivered through the (re-)production of an existential insighfulness, it follows that that sense of questioning cannot be absolute, i.e., absolutely formulated and absolutely resolved except provisionally and/or analytically. In other words, a definitive answer implies an analytical formulation as a response to the nature of that question. Being only analytically ‘definitive’ through an arbitrary act wherein each identity is inserted into a pre-formulated equation (of expectation). On the other hand, any other form of answer, reply, resolution must be provisionally constructed as all value, i.e., all sense, meaning and meaningfulness, is delivered through the ongoing simulation of that hermeneutic circle, not its cessation! These senses of the metaphorical, the rhetorical and their existentially balanced cooperation imply that the question can never be absolutely formulated (except analytically in a pseudo-absolute formulation) nor absolutely answered (except analytically through some form of a pseudo-absolute resolution). Hence all research in general cannot be absolutely formulated nor absolutely resolved – the question, in real non-analytical terms, can neither be perfectly asked nor perfectly answered! And when answers are realized they can never be absolutely definitive. ‘Resolution’ can only arrive at a provisional reply. Resolution of a rhetorical proposition(al complex) cannot be effected in and through the adoption of a pure rhetorical/hermeneutical point of view. Hence the metaphorical answer of a rhetorical proposition (a proposition ‘turned around’ into the form of a question) can never be realized in pure rhetorical terms of reference, thence the implication of an existential dimension as argued for in the functioning of our hermeneutic circle. (31)

What reservations does our existential point of view have for our critical research in general and for the theologian in particular? As just argued the ‘resolution’ of a question must be conducted in trans-rhetorical terms of reference because the answering of a question cannot be conducted in rhetorical terms of reference, nor for that matter, in terms of its mere metaphorical answering! Hence the implication of an existential dimension in which the resolution of this tension between the metaphorical and the rhetorical, a resolution that then must be thus both trans-rhetorical and trans-metaphorical in nature (although remaining within the ambit of the hermeneutic circle). With these critical qualification in mind what implications does this have for research in general and for theology in particular? For a start resolution, in turn, can be neither absolutely formulated nor absolutely determined hence the forever provisional nature of all forms of research! Moreover, it indicates that all forms of resolution, in some sense, are also realized analytically, albeit provisionally. In effect, these three moments of our hermeneutic circle produce/re-produce, i.e., simulate, a resolution engendered through their transformation, inter-translation, etc., of the tension that arises through their contrast and therein realizing this third moment of the existential wherein a sense of resolution is experienced in the ongoing spontaneity of this ‘eternal’ present. The metaphorical is enquestioned rhetorically, the rhetorical is existentially resolved through a metaphorical answer. These three moments being but progressive reflections of each other, albeit from phenomenological, hermeneutical and existential points of view (within the ambit of this hermeneutic circle). Of course our research may be provisional that does not mean it cannot be adequate to the task set for it, indeed, even successful! With this type of insight into the nature of the hermeneutic circle let me draw what ramifications should be drawn with the theologian in mind. Indeed, in what way the use of metaphor, etc., can act as a ‘lens’, act in our phenomenological research upon the phenomenal world, and, perhaps also, as a ‘lens’ upon the hypothetical theologicalization of this life-world?!  (32)

	I have a number of tentative avenues with which to approach this goal. Let me attempt this task through a re-investigation of the concept of simulation. (33)

4.   That (the Theologicalization of) the Life-World is “Merely ‘Simulated’!”

	That the forever provisional nature of our research, the fact that our research must be forever enquestioned, means that no resolution of our research can be attempted in a dogmatic fashion. Of course formulae could be formulated, methodologies can be outlined, etc., still, at no time can we be dogmatically dogmatic! Moreover, our interaction ‘with’ and ‘within’ the life-world necessarily involves our immersion in this hermeneutic circle of comprehension. Through the ambit of such an ‘institution’ the world, in ‘part’ and in ‘whole’, is given its value-for-us, namely, its phenomenological sense (or ‘location’ in a comprehensive cultural-intercultural mapping of the life-world), its hermeneutical meaning and existential meaningfulness. In and through this (transcendental) institution our-being-in-the-world is given its value – a sense of value derived from an excess of value discovered by-us for-us there-in-this-life-world. In effect, in our working ‘in’ this life-world more value is released than that invested in our passage through this world-of-life. In a charitable interpretation of this passage through this one-world-of-life even the most way-off, outlandish interpretations of the world will still produce, rather, re-produce, an excess of value, albeit a value whose quantum from a wider, more appropriate reading of the life-world is relatively diminished. So if a ‘scientist’ were ever to say, e.g., “the moon is a greeny-blue cheese”, this modelling of reality through such a comparison in those terms of reference cannot be absolutely dismissed from a scientific point of view, or any other way of viewing the life-world, as even this metaphorical comparison will still possess some form of value in this regard, even if only a minute modicum in comparison to that great excess of value released in the current state of scientific research. The moon does look like a pale round cheese with holes, craters, similar to those now recognized as being on the surface of the moon. Of course more value is to arise from a negative point of view by ‘demonstrating’ theoretically, etc., that a the moon is not a ‘cheese’, that those craters on the moon are not from ‘bubbles’ but from ‘impacts’… What I am trying to say here is that in simulating the moon through some form of a metaphorical modelling, regardless of the model adopted, an ‘excess’ of value can still be found in focusing that particular metaphorical ‘lens’ upon that particular target. Of course, it should be relatively easy to show that some lenses are more effective in delivering a greater excess of value and thereby produce, rather, re-produce, a greater quantum of value at the same time (as well as assisting in the 'continuation' of an 'ongoing research program'). In our comparative evaluation of these various quanta of excess values released in our research programs we can adopt various pragmatic criteria, or, focus individually on and/or in conjunction with those other ordered aspects as noted previously such as issue from judgments of a pre-essential orientation, aesthetical orientation, ethical orientation, etc. (34)

	In essence, what I am trying to say, is that the inescapable use of the hermeneutic circle of comprehension implies, demands, that our interaction ‘within’ this world-of-life, and all ‘provisional entities and states’ found therein, is simulated and merely simulated! Simulation is qua simulation; a simulation of that already simulated, never a simulation of that ‘not simulated’ - as something to be ‘found’ before that act of simulation! Hence simulation is always a re-simulation! From an intentional perspective, it is only from a re-produced retention of intentional activity (and a protention of intentional expectations) that consciousness can ‘fix’ a ‘something’ to be thought about, etc., i.e., actually establish the ‘presence’ of a discernible intention, in an intentional act, in the first place. Hence simulation is merely simulated – never a simulation of that prior to this act of simulation as a ‘pre-simulated’ something or as a something or other that, ‘in-itself’, is not-simulated. That sort of nonsense of the thing-itself, etc., figures in various absolutist versions of so called philosophy such as representationalism, rationalism, idealism, realism, objectivism, etc., ad nauseam! E.g., as critical philosophers (and theologians) we are not travelling along this sort of ‘path’, or rather, cul de sac, that the representationalist thinks they are travelling along by insisting that ideas and/or perceptions somehow reflect, represent, what exists in a so-call ‘external world’. Please dismiss this type of patent nonsense perpetrated through the literalization of the metaphor! Our recognition of the life-world realizes the fact that we are collectively ‘immersed’ in ‘one’, ‘open’ world-of-life - a transcendental dimension wherein all phenomena are phenomenologically constituted, the metaphorical ‘ground’ wherein all forms of value, and excesses in the same, are ‘grown’ and ‘thereupon’ released subjectively, inter-subjectively and objectively without any form of an absolute dichotomy between these three domains.  Simulation is, therefore, always mere simulation! Simulation is always a re-simulation of a simulation, a re-simulation of a re-simulation. As a re-simulation of a re-simulation there is implied the fact that we are always, therein, ‘directly’ involved with that state-of-affairs being re-simulated. All relationships demand our direct involvement for how else could we be involved with the same! Even instances of our so-called ‘indirect involvement’ demand our direct involvement, albeit, as a metaphorical ground upon which we might be able to enter directly in some relatively more fundamental form or other. So my knowing ‘b’ who knows ‘c’ whom I don’t directly know implies that I could know ‘c’ directly, say find an introduction through person ‘b’ in fact, or, theoretically argue that as c’s interaction within the life-world is within the same life-world our direct interaction is also pre-given as a fundamental fact even if that ‘fact’ of our existences may throw little light on ‘our’ being within the same life-world (even when divided historically and where divided geographically, etc.). (35)

	Running the same types of arguments, on the simulated nature of the life-world, in a theological frame of reference would allow the theologian to produce (or rather re-produce) a similar style of argument with a similar set of consequences, albeit from a theological perspective. In the light of the above they could argue, e.g., that all relationships with some sense of the divine, with any sense of the divine, must be fundamentally direct in nature. Hence through a theologicalization of the life-world our relationships with all senses of the divine must be direct, and, vice versa – that any relationship(s) some (possible) sense of the divine (Divine) might have with-us/for-us would exhibit the same existential characterization , namely, this sense of relational directness(?)! Hence, once positive theological difference is accepted, theological difference(s) must be also accepted as relevant to our being-in-this-one-world-of-life through the relational directness of all relationships whether we are aware of that (existential) ‘fact’ or not!? Moreover, theological difference must be accepted because for the world to have value, i.e., possess any forms of sense, meaning and meaningfulness, implies an excess of value must be present, i.e., that theological difference must actually be present in this value-producing-theologicalization of the life-world!(?) That, in essence, the existence of a(ny) surplus of value implies that the (metaphorical) ‘oneness of the life-world’ must be in evidence as a surplus over the mere summation of the life-world qua life-world. To put this last argument in a reversed form we might say that given a surplus of value is always available to us this ‘existential fact’ must imply that the unity of the life-world must emerge to the same extent that this surplus also emerges – in the light of that emergent modality. Hence the theologicalization of the life-world is a fait accompli! Of course, as this argument stands, this does not imply that truly wonderful forms of divinity must exist beyond that already manifested in and through the unfathomable mysteries to be found in the being of another person, or in the ‘depths’ of our very own self, or in the continual surprises to be found in store for us as communities and other institutions evolve with ‘a life of their own’, or in the sublime experiences to be had in our reflections upon the natural grandeur of the landscape and/or cosmos… To successfully argue beyond those terms of reference additional arguments would need to be appropriately and adequately put in place? (36)

	Another implication, with a profundity of ramifications, can also be discovered from the critical adoption of this (transcendental, i.e., phenomenological-hermeneutical-existential) concept of simulation! Just as we cannot literalize the metaphor so too we cannot absolutely dismiss the same as a simulation of reality in some form or other! Let me establish a valid argument in this respect and illustrate its potential theological ramifications in this regard. (37)
5.   On the Non-Absolute Dismissal of Metaphor!

	The intention of this argument is to show that each and every metaphor cannot help but be an insightful lens upon the reality of the world, this world-of-life, and, in a theological perspective, that all analogies used to ‘illustrate’ some sense, i.e., aspect or level, of the divine in all its hypothetical forms cannot fail to possess some residue of truth regardless of whether the quantum of that residue be significant or insignificant in phenomenal extent. In other words, we cannot dismiss our use of metaphor as completely non-literal, as something merely abstract and without some basis in factual reality. Somehow they must also successfully ‘image’ the world despite the fact that we cannot adopt a literalization of that metaphor! I.e., our metaphor must ‘metaphor’, be metaphor, act as metaphor, in other words, simulate the simulated reality that is the reality of that phenomenal-reality-that-is-there-for-us! How is this possible? Let me elabourate. (38)

	In practice, if I am correct both the philosopher and non-philosopher, both the theologian and the non-theologian, must walk a tightrope between the impossible literalization of the metaphor and the absolute non-dismissal of this ability of metaphor to also validly image to some extent or other that aspect of the phenomenal world being focused upon by that metaphorical lens. The impossible literalization of the metaphor accepted (through the impossible literalization of the conjunctive suspension at the centre of the metaphor) let me construct two arguments that forbid the opposite absolute dismissal of the metaphorical ability to also act as a metaphorical lens upon the phenomenal constitution of the world as expressed through this world-of-life. Following that I will then construct a simple argument that allows us to navigate between these two impossible polar extremes of an absolute literalization of the metaphor and their absolute non-dismissal as nothing but mere literary fictions. (39)

	Using a type of argument put forward by the philosopher Georg Gadamer we must equally argue against both the absolute successful interpretation of any one text and any opposite claim that we have an absolute inability to hermeneutically deal with any particular text (because of the differences between languages, different forms of cultural expression, the intricate language-games and life-skills involved in the performance of different occupations in this world-of-life, absence of appropriate forms of hermeneutic training, the inability to 're-construct' intentional formation, lack of 'self'-control in the formation of our texts, in the reading of ‘our’ texts, etc., etc.). (40)

The 'ability' to absolutely interpret a text would necessitate our being able to exactly reconstruct the intentional intent behind the formation of that particular text under our hermeneutic scrutiny and, at the same time, have absolute evidence that this task of 're-construction' has been perfectly achieved. This overall ability to absolutely re-produce the intentional formation of a text is something we most decidedly do not possess (even with the re-interpretation of our own textual production) nor could such a perfect skill ever exist (for a number of reasons that this essay will demonstrate, chief of which is the 'transcendental fact' that no aspect of the hermeneutic circle can be absolutely non-polar in orientation on the grounds that this would involve an absolute contradiction in terms and a collapse of the hermeneutic circle and all value derived therein). We do possess, however, the ability to provisionally reconstruct a text given that that text is well-formed and in a language possessed by the interpreter or that there exists to hand a translation adequate for this task. Or, expressed in a simple formula we might like to say that the text is open to a relatively successful interpretation when it is adequately well-formed, appropriately well-informed and is found to be easily accessible to being well-performed! Yet, despite the adequate presence of these three factors, simulation as the re-simulation of a (re)simulation can never be perfectly achieved. Both our ability to communicate and be understood is conducted as a process that takes time, and effort, to complete. We do not possess an infinite amount of time to conduct our process of communication and/or enter into a hermeneutic process of interpretation, nor do we possess an infinite amount of energy to conduct a thorough effort in our 'grappling' with that text! Thankfully, a text is usually often meaningfully engaged without the need to resort to lengthy periods of time to spend interpreting them nor with considerable degrees of intellectual effort also needing to be expended in this process. Hence for these reasons, the intentional re-production of a text can never be perfect and as a process must engage both time and effort when it appears we have the ability to 'read' the same. As soon as no relative hermeneutic excess is apparent over that additional 'psychic effort' being invested in our process of interpretation it is at that point that we cease to engage that text and hence its process of interpretative translation automatically ceases. Thus we must rule out our ability to absolutely interpret a text - because we are never in a position to claim that we have completely understood that text and therein absolutely re-produced its intentional intent. In effect, this tension between the invitation to interpret a text and the realization of that promise can never be perfectly realized. But this margin of error rarely concerns us as the relative degree of hermeneutic excess released in our translation of the text usually determines the degree of trust we will place in its provisional interpretation and therein appear to guarantee, to that same extent, the final provisional translation adopted in our reading of that text. (41)

On the opposite tack, in our engagement with a text, because the direct nature of that engagement, however minimal our hermeneutic appreciation of that text, we can still to some extent directly engage with it. All relationships involve our direct engagement with that being engaged with. Indeed, our full membership in the life-world implies that we are in direct engagement with the entirety of this life-world, albeit from the point of view adopted in our engagement with that text(ual aspect of the life-world under focus) in which we, as a living subjective textual fragment of this same life-world, in turn, must find reflected within that text(ual aspect) the entirety of the life-world, albeit from its imprinted point of view. In our appreciation of a text, as a text qua intentionally determined text, our realisation of that text as a 'text', as the deposited productivity of a distinctive intentional determination, either authored or co-authored, implies that our engagement has already being productive, namely, our minimal initial recognition of that text as a 'text', i.e., as an intentionally informed product that offers the promise of its intentional deposition being able to be adequately re-produced and therein understood. E.g., we may be in a foreign land and ask a question of one of the inhabitants. They can sense, or should be able to sense, that we are 'asking a question', that we are asking for help in some form or other. Their refusal to understand this request cannot be used as evidence in this regard that 'they do not understand' since their saying or indicating that they "do not understand" indicates enough of the fact that they do understand but cannot be bothered to continue in this process of ongoing interpretation for reasons they may or may not be able to express if pressed to account for this dismissal. They already have some degree of understanding - that that person is 'seeking some form of assistance' while the second person conveys to the first that they 'do not wish to understand them and therein assist them'. Engagement with a text and/or the emitter of that text can, therefore, never be dismissed as absolutely impossible despite the minimal resonance (and maximum resistance) we might find with that text and/or emitter of that text. In a similar fashion our reading of metaphor with a re-reading of the world likewise cannot be absolutely dismissed! To adequately argue for this proposition I will need to introduce my second argument centred on the phenomenological nature of simulation. (42)

	All acts of simulation are entertained, actively and/or passively, through the medium of the hermeneutic circle of comprehension. In this hermeneutic circle metaphorical formation and appreciation constitutes one of those three moments that collectively constitute the formation and re-formation of that dialectical activity, i.e., the simulation of the life-world (and any re-simulation of the same deposited textually as an imprint upon the 'fabric' of the world). Now, the life-world, in part or in whole, is phenomenologically constituted as a phenomenon there-for-us by-us through the auspicious of the hermeneutic circle and vice versa. Metaphor analogically mirror phenomena in the life-world and being a (constitutional) part of the life-world (in its constitution there for us), and in our appreciation of the same, it implies that we cannot absolutely divorce metaphor from the very nature of the life-world. Hence, to this extent, although metaphor may primarily be seen as 'imaging' the world they must also directly constitute the same. Thence metaphor may analogically 'present' the world they must also 're-present' it too. Thus all textual devices in their re-presentation of the life-world must also present it! So concepts, etc., as picture-tools cannot just be pragmatic devices but must also, in some fashion or other, present the true nature of the world at the same time. Of course this does not mean that we are fully aware as to how this modal ordering, and modelling, is being achieved, only, that in some measure, that this must be the case. (43)

	Expressed in a different manner we might wish to add to this argument the fact that as the entirety of the life-world is imprinted on any textually deposited fragment of the same, albeit from its imprinted point of view, then all metaphor must be capable of focusing as a 'metaphorical' lens upon any textual fragment of the life-world, albeit with positive degrees of successfulness reflecting the relative appropriateness of that modelling given the relevancy of such an endeavour in the light of the meta-textual-context or contexts that release relatively greater degrees of hermeneutic excess in value creation. In other words, the adoption of any metaphor will illuminate any aspect of the life-world we wish to focus upon using the same, however, only those metaphors properly constructed and used in an appropriate manner will effectively and productively illuminate that under such 'focus'. Because the life-world is simulated in and through the auspices of the hermeneutic circle, or any other heuristic device that 'models' the transcendental constitution of the same, it follows that as the metaphorical is an integral aspect of this type of 'transcendental lens' that metaphor will do just that, moreover, as argued, that as any textual fragment of the life-world reflects the entirety of the life-world, albeit from its imprinted point of view, it follows that any metaphor will illuminate to some degree or other any textual fragment focused upon. That this holistic reflection of the life-world (through quantum limitations on the limits of minimal informational re-production) essentially takes on a grainy, discrete monadic-like 'appearance'. Monadism being established through 'simulation' while monadic dimensions are established by the extent of the relational field. On the other hand metaphorical utility, i.e., being re-productive of value (re-)formation (through the illumination of phenomenological insightfulness, hermeneutical excess and existential meaningfulness) is established through the metaphorical context, as situated within the hermeneutic circle, being well-formed, well-informed and open to being read in a well-performed manner through the clear meta-textual adoption and adaptation of current meta-textual conventions (as determined inter-textually and through a fruitful appreciation of their function in practice). (44)

	This argument of the non-absolute dismissal of the metaphor(ical reading of simulated 'reality') essentially argues that as a picture-tool the metaphor must 'picture' 'reality' to some extent, to that extent a non-metaphorical aspect or component can be discerned within that metaphorical-complex. This artificial 'residue' is guaranteed on the grounds that metaphor cannot function in a pure metaphorical mode. The hermeneutic circle demands its incorporation within an overall tripolar modality also involving a meta-textual rhetorical aspect and a non-textual existential aspect. This being the case, given the adoption of these terms of reference, should we not define the not-metaphorical aspect or aspects operating within these terms of reference as merely 'rhetorical' and 'existential' in complexion? With the implication that one should read the 'not-metaphorical' as being divided between the rhetorical and the existential and not as being in some fashion 'literal' or 'factual' or 'real', or, as quazi-literal, etc? This would be correct if it were not for the 'fact' that the 'hermeneutic circle' is synonymous with the 'life-world' (in its transcendental ideality, i.e., as it appears to transcendentally mirrors its ability to phenomenologically constitute the phenomenal world) and that through simulation there can be no difference… hence the metaphorical in its non-pure metaphoricality cannot but not help 'to image' the world in a 'direct fashion' hence the appropriateness of this meta-concept of a "metaphorical 'lens'"… to the extent that metaphor can 'truly' and 'directly' reveal the essential nature of the world through 'that act of imaging'. (45)

	Now, let me construct a simple argument to show how we manage to navigate this territory between the non-absolute literalization of the metaphor and the absolute dismissal of the metaphor's ability to 'directly read' the phenomenal constitution of that 'reality' being simulated. Put succinctly, it is through the appropriate functioning of the hermeneutic circle (in its existentialization of the simulated process) that this 'middle path' is 'without effort' naturally navigated! Or, put more technically, through putting in place the types of transcendental suspensions that establish our three polarities of the metaphorical (as a phenomenological polarity and its invocation of a conjunctive suspension), the rhetorical (as a hermeneutical polarity and its invocation of a dis-conjunctive suspension) and resolution of this tension between the former (as an existential polarity through the invocation of a 'suspension' of these two previous suspensions maintained in a state of ongoing balance) that an overall transcendental suspension is relatively put into effect and which, therein, spontaneously establishes the ongoing 'direct reading' of simulated 'reality' through the realization of the not-textual aspect of value formation (wherein textual sense, meta-textual meaning and non-textual meaningfulness can be approached, 'extracted', etc.). The 'relative effortlessness' of this existentialization of the relatively non-existential 'material' under examination being achieved through the delivery of an excess in value that, re-invested in the 'body of that examination', maintains our 'psychic interest' in the same till such a time that that investment ceases to be productive of an excess in a value, or, our priorities are re-adjusted and the focus of our interest shifts to a new topic or set of topics. (46)

	Before I look more closely at this meta-concept of a "metaphorical 'lens'" what other implications can be drawn from the philosophical 'fact' that there can be no one pure polar aspect within the hermeneutic circle, etc. For a start "from non-absolute rhetoricalness it follows that there can be no absolutely scepticism, and, "from non-absolute existentialness there can be "no existentialization of the existential - only an existentialization of the relatively non-existential!" Both of these consequential 'insights' into the functioning of the hermeneutic circle have important ramifications for the theologian. First, however, let me formulate a more general rule for understanding how our two rules of ‘the non-literalization of the metaphor’ and ‘the non-absolute dismissal of the metaphor to act as a metaphor in its simulation of the life-world’ can be interrelated. Then, with this more general rule to hand, let us approach our other two moments in this hermeneutic circle to explore what implications can be found in our investigating these two other directions in a similar manner before re-focusing our attention on this ‘meta-concept’ of a ‘lens’. (47)

6.   A General Rule for Determining the Absolute and Relative Limits of Metaphor

	Let me make this series of observations. First, that the non-literalization of a metaphor is an absolute ruling. Under no circumstances is a metaphor to be treated literally, factually, etc. On the other hand, for a metaphor to simulate the reality of the life-world it must do just that, namely, metaphorically simulate some aspect of the life-world. This understanding of its identity could be formulated as a relative rule, namely, that the metaphor must 'metaphor', must be a metaphor, must act as a metaphor. Hence, when dealing with this moment of the metaphorical we can formulate our previous two rules as having absolute and relative consequences, respectively, in our determination of the limits in the functioning of that moment. Hence, that moment being phenomenologically constituted negatively by our other two moments it follows that what goes for one must go for the other two moments in this regard (archetypally). So, in continuing our investigations into the natural limits of the rhetorical and the existential let us make use of this rule that states, in effect, that a moment has both absolute limits and relative limits, namely, respectively, that “it cannot be absolutely what it is not” and “must be what it is” in accordance with its dialectical nature! (48)

7.   On the Impossibility of a Pure Scepticism

	The second moment we are going to look at is that of the rhetorical which can also be described in orientation as hermeneutical, meta-textual, field-oriented, etc. Essentially it is the asking of a question, an enquestioning. From an absolute point of view, because this moment cannot be extracted from the hermeneutic circle in a pure polar form, it follows that we cannot ask the absolute question, i.e., just ask a pure question without some implicit understanding of a 'metaphorical' answer in a potential process of an 'existential' resolution. As a result it also follows that we cannot be absolutely sceptical, merely ask a question without some form of an implicit answer, etc. Of course we can question something, anything for that matter, it is just that we cannot merely enquestion it, subject it to an absolute process of questioning. It follows therefore, that for both the philosopher and the non-philosopher, that for both the theologian and the non-theologian, we cannot be absolutely sceptical with the implication that in any question there is a residue of truth that cannot be dismissed because, in a sense, all question are formulated from within the existential context of the life-world and must in some measure reflect that reflection of reality! Hence the Aristotelian preference of potentiality over actuality is wrong since the potential is always cast in the light of the actual without an absolute dismissal of the same from within its re-formulation of 'our perception' of the actual! E.g., to contemplate the 'possibility' of a gold mountain we remove from the simulated actuality of the life-world as collectively understood the factually observable entities of something or somethings that were truly 'golden' and truly 'mountainous' to consider whether the intersection of these two sets can find a similar actual status (as yet not discovered). From an absolute point of view the rhetorical cannot be absolutely enquestioned. Then, from a relative point of view we need to insist that the rhetorical must be rhetorical, act in a rhetorical manner in keeping with its nature to be rhetorical with the implication that the rhetorical must, in an ongoing fashion, continue to continually enquestion that state of affairs under investigation whilst remaining the topic of our current investigations. In other words, for the hermeneutic circle to function, the question must continually enquestion its topic for investigation, continually testing all previous acts and products realized in previous and current acts of resolution and thereby contribute to the existentialization of our research and therein, through an overall transcendental suspension, realize a simulation of reality more in accordance with the reality of its simulation! In effect, establishing the relative authenticity of our (not-textual) reading through that overall transcendental suspension assuming this textual process is well-formed, well-informed and well-performed! (49)

8.   On the Impossibility of an Existentialization of the Existential

	Applying the absolute aspect of our ruling to the moment of the existential, which can also be described as judgmental in orientation, egological in orientation, etc., means that the existential must be existential, act in an existential manner. I.e., cannot be purely existential with the implication that the existentialization cannot come into a state of pure existence as 'existentialization' is 'an existentialization of the relatively non-existential'! From a relative point of view we need to insist that the existential be existential with the implication that the existential needs to be continually re-existentialized through this existential transformation of the relatively non-transcendental! In a theological context, the theologian should insist that any relationship perceived as entering into some form of a ‘continuing conversation with some sense of the divine’ should be subject to these same types of rules, i.e., subject to a continual re-existentialization through an existentialization of the relatively non-existential! Moreover, this is assisted through the ongoing enquestioning of that sense of the divine without also being absolutely sceptical, and, without a literalization of the metaphor yet also insisting that the metaphorical aspect of our hermeneutic circle is also (re-)simulating the reality of the life-world through the current 'reality' of that (re-)simulation. In all, important consequences for both the formulation and critique of a theology, and, in effect, the way a metaphorical 'lens' is situated within the productive ambit of the hermeneutic circle! (50)

9.  Focusing on this Meta-Concept of a 'Lens'…

	From this deeper understanding of the functioning of the hermeneutic circle we are now in a better position to understand how metaphor act as a 'metaphorical lens', and, in a theological setting, what can be metaphorically seen through this 'lens' and what cannot be 'seen' through the same. (51)

	First, from a systematic point of view, looking at (all) possible senses of the divine in general and in particular, by virtue of their re-simulation in and through this hermeneutic circle (of theological comprehension) it follows that no formulation can be treated in an absolute absolutist manner. It follows therefore, e.g., that no particular sense of the divine is the result of the greatest degree of perfection (unless 'perfection' is meaningfully and arbitrarily pre-set at some value which then implies that some other sense of the divine could then be defined as better than that previous sense of the divine as formerly defined, etc.). (52)

	Second, using our threefold absolute and relative aspects as embedded in our rulings as just examined we might like to note the following in the order as they were previously introduced. (53)

	From an absolute point of view, all metaphors must not, indeed, cannot be meaningfully treated in a completely literal manner. Hence they cannot be factualized! On the other hand, however, metaphor must to some extent mirror the reality upon which they were formulated in the first place. So all metaphors possess a residue of truth being re-simulations of the reality of the life-world as the reality of that re-simulation! Meaning?! That in some manner they must re-simulate the reality being simulated through the use of that metaphor when and where that metaphor is able to productively perform this simulation cum re-simulation. So, e.g., seeing the transcendent enstructuralization of some phenomenon as divine in orientation, to that same extent, means that in that same manner this 'sense of the divine' is actually being re-simulated. At the same time, through the operation of an overall transcendental suspension in the hermeneutic circle an equal immanent treatment must also, in effect, be overtly or covertly conducted in order to establish the authenticity of that same re-simulation. (54)

	From and absolute point of view, all rhetorical exercises must not, indeed, cannot be meaningfully treated in an absolute form hence we can never be completely sceptical about anything whether that be the existence and consequences of some sense of the divine or something else that is not regarded as divine in aspect or orientation. Moreover, regardless of the nature of our topic existential value, in part, can only arise through the ongoing, continual enquestioning of both questions and answers, etc. So, e.g., the question of divine existence in some form or other must be continually enquestioned in a relative, non-absolute fashion for the value of our theological research, or any other type of research, to bear a productive fruitfulness! (55)

	From and absolute point of view, all understandings in the nature of the existential process must not, indeed, cannot be meaningfully treated in an absolute form hence we must never ‘perceive’ the existential as coming into existence through the existentialization of the relatively existential! A major consequential implication here would be the recognition that the existentialization of a process, its relative spiritualization, can never be achieved through the existentialization of the relatively divine qua relatively divine. Only through an existentialization, spirtualization of the relatively non-existential, non-spiritual, can there be a productive rendering of value. The implication here being that all theologies must involve the process-oriented existentialization of the relatively non-existential and not some existentialization of the already relatively existential or 'spiritual'. Or, in more simple language, any sense of the divine formulated in a theological setting must come about through the spiritualization of the relatively non-spiritual and not through a spiritualization of that already spiritually treated from a spiritual point of view. Hence the relative functional necessity for a 'process-theological' understanding in this regard! (56)

	With these (tentative) insights to hand let us re-look at this metaphor of 'the divine book of nature' to the extent that the unity of the life-world, the ongoing unification of the same, is seen as imprinting itself upon that with which it is related as a process-basis, through which it finds its emergent sense of existence. (57)

10.  On a "Reading of the 'Divine Book' of Nature"

	It has already been argued that the ongoing transcendent-orientation of the life-world is equivalent to a relative theologicalization of the life-world with the qualification that as the hermeneutic circle simulates/re-simulates the reality of the life-world through the 'reality' of that simulation/re-simulation it follows that an equal an opposite immanent treatment needs to be also conducted if not overtly at least covertly. Moreover, these parallel readings also need to be conducted through an ongoing state of overall state of balance in order to simulate/re-simulate the overall transcendental suspension operative at the center of the hermeneutic circle and therein at the centere of all understanding of the life-world. With these insights to mind how might we conduct this ‘reading’ of ‘the divine book of nature’ that therein, hopefully, we might meet face to face those senses of the divine in reality that should be found therein given this philosophical tendency to read the transcendent enstructuralization of reality as essentially divine in orientation on the understanding that 'value' is released only through this parallel theologicalization of the life-world (equally mirrored by it parallel immanentization). Our 'theoretical definition of the divine, in this regard, needing to find some form of non-theoretical instantiation as 'promised' by this metaphor of a "metaphorical 'lens'"! How might this be achieved if it could be achieved? Taking once more the hermeneutic circle as the 'key' to how this might be done let me show how, in theory at least, we may indeed be able to read this 'Divine Book of Nature' by closely understanding the limitations imposed upon us by the very nature and limitations of the hermeneutic circle as understood to date! (58)

11.   Re-Discovering the Living Text

	The scientific attitude is ostensively reductive as would be expected in its focusing on the phenomenological aspect of our hermeneutic circle. With its emphasis on the analytic, the retrospective, the dissonant, the psychic sense of foreground and its focus on the intentional object-state we are left with an inspection of the textual, indeed the 'death' of that text as a text through the retrospective deposition of that text; a text 'imprinted' with an essential snapshot of that textual process through that text's relationship with the living textual process in which it was engendered and, thereupon, in ‘death’, left discarded. But texts, all texts, are never produced/re-produced in purely textual terms of reference! So, even the scientific attitude cannot be purely reductive as we would expect from our investigations into the functional nature of the metaphorical. Similarly, a rhetorical enquestioning of the process only re-produces a sense of synthesis, a sense of the meta-textual, a sense of context and the inter-textual, etc. Such a situation, in this orientation, becomes something static, relatively unchanging and as our understanding of the world is derived from an existential resolution of this tension between this phenomenological aspect of the metaphorical and the hermeneutical aspect of the rhetorical it follows, as already argued, that we must also invoke an existential sense of resolution in our ability to read a text what ever its description as to type! This last moment develops a sense of the non-textual, our ability to see through a text as if it were not textual to the simulation of the simulation re-engendered by a re-simulation of these textual dynamics at the very centre of the hermeneutic circle! Lastly, it was noted that, through an overall transcendental balance being put in place between these three moments, the text is often satisfactorily recovered, i.e., re-supplied with an adequate degree of a transcendental excess (in apparent concordance with its ‘intent’) wherein the value of that text is effectively re-created and experienced as 'not a text', in a not-textual orientation! In the state of an overall transcendental suspension we find ourselves meeting/re-meeting the living text, a living simulation of a text that is able to engage us through a transcendental excess of value (over that merely invested in a writing and/or reading of the ‘integrity’ of that text, etc.). (59)
 
	In a similar manner, I would argue, the text of nature is also engaged, engages us in a living re-creation of itself wherein the ongoing unity of the life-world as presented/re-presented is therein re-discovered through this living semblance/resemblance of 'life'. And this is not something supernatural or extra-ordinary, but, in truth, the way we normally go about our passage through this world of life albeit with the imperfections, and relative lack of an authenticity, that all too easily characterize our existence as human, all too human… (60)

	Authenticity of spirit is recovered through a sympathetic/empathetic realignment with the dynamics operative in this circular hermeneutic-world-of-life! In our everyday reading of this 'divine book of nature' through the relatively authentic recovery of value, the theological nature of the life-world, through the process of its theologicalization, is also recovered! Hence the relatively more full re-valuation of a text in our relatively more full re-evaluation of the same is delivered through our appropriate re-engagement with this circular hermeneutic-world of-life that established the deposition of that text whether it be a text in a classical mould of 'writing' or a non-classical text of 'art' or the creation of a text in 'an artful reading of nature'. But, regardless of the initial nature of that text under focus our full realization of the sense, meaning and meaningfulness of its 'value' cannot be obtained through an imperfect realization of that hermeneutic circle invoked in its reading. Hence a scientific-like focus on the relatively reductive will not achieve this for us. Nor will a mere contextualization of that text achieve this degree of insight for us. Nor our merely entering into a playful spirit that seeks only to understand its apparent harmony without recourse to how that harmony was realized through an ongoing resolution of the metaphorical and rhetorical facets, etc. (61)
	
…and what must we find in this authentically re-instituted re-orientation towards the text as a 'living text'? Living in this circular hermeneutic-world-of-life what might 'the divine book of nature' have 'to say'? Can ‘intent’ be therein found and if so communicate such thought through language (or silence?) by positive and/or negative means?? (62)

12.	  On the Essential Nature of all Relationships

Personified, resolution realized at the centre of our circular hermeneutic-world-of-life, in effect, simulates the degree of 'love' entered into by those parties through that ongoing act of resolution! 'Love' can be defined as ‘that ongoing attraction (re-)experienced that binds that relationship together and therein gives to it its relative sense of authenticity and integrity’, and which, through its deposition of ‘texts’ and our reading of their ‘imprinted reflection’ of that ‘living relationship’, under examination allows us in part to essentially re-simulate both their intensity and their unique set of emergent modalities that form the essential ‘spirit’ of that ‘living relationship’. On an impersonal basis it is this binding energy that establishes the excess of value re-realized at the centre of that relationship. In the invocation of a personal dimension it is re-viewed in a less metaphorical light as that actual 'love engendered in and through that personal relationship'. By 'extension' all potential forms of divinity must take this type of fact into account, in essence, an ontology of transcendent-immanent synthesis mirroring those forms of epistemologically-oriented synthesis already accounted for (like animals, people, communities, etc.) and for all those forms argued for on more speculative grounds through extrapolation linked through the ongoing theologicalization of the life-world wherein value is created and/or re-created in ever higher levels of epistemological-egologcial synthesis(?). The more personal the nature of that orientation re-simulated the greater that sense of the divine therein also re-simulated and that this one factor, namely ‘love’, can be (metaphorically) ‘seen’ as the magic ingredient, realized through resolution, that unites and integrates this entire hierarchy of ‘divine’ being, this entire life-world, this one-world-of-life! (63)

	To answer, therefore, the opening question "what relevance does theological difference possess?" we could reply that if the 'fact' of theological difference is accepted then we could propose that this 'relevance' is essentially this metaphorical 'love' imprinted upon the text of the world and open to experience through a re-realization of the text as a 'living text' when properly and appropriately attended to through the totality of the hermeneutic circle as engaged through this circular hermeneutic-world-of-life. From a theoretical point of view the theologian could argue for the above, but, in practical terms of reference, the critical philosopher could counter-argue “does such a complex position actually reveal an excess 'hermeneutical excess' greater than that merely invested in the adopting of such a position and an experiencing therein of its degree of systematization and what ever resonances such internal metaphors in this type of system might possess for a person already sympathetic to this type of world-view?” I would like to answer this type of question in the remaining essays of this series under an examination of such concepts of  'divine love(?)', an ontology of possible forms of divinity, 'continuing and extending the divine conversation(?)', how a theologian might deal with the subject of 'death', etc., to see what hypothetical avenues the theologian might have to hand in attempting to answer this type of question of "how theological difference is to be actually read in experience?" that they, naturally, would feel duty-bounty to answer. (64)

	But, first, let me critically explore, from a hypothetical perspective, this new theologically-oriented dimension of "divine 'love'" in the next paper in this series of essays subtitled: On the Love of the Divine - Subjective Genitive and/or Objective Genitive?? (65)

							        Noël Tointon, Sydney, 12.6.02.

Appendix I - Applying Our Rules for Determining and Treating Metaphor

	Applying the rules developed in Section 2 to the following seven statements we can get the following analysis as an example of their application:

1.	The moon is a greeny-blue cheese.
2.	The world is an illusion.
3.	That person over there looks like Joe Bloggs.
4.	The world is one.
5.	Richard has the heart of a lion.
6.	The world looks like a beautiful painting.
7.	The physical world is the external world. ( 9)

The first statement can be determined as in the first order (10) i.e., as a pre-essential set of essentials, moreover, as there is no logical reason why the moon could not be a greeny-blue cheese it can also take on 20 essential status as a coherent (aesthetic) thought, etc. However, as the primary intent seems to be the 'imaginative' speculation that the 'real' moon is a greeny-blue cheese it takes on a 50 status in the absence of creditable evidence. Furthermore, as it stands this sentence could be read metaphorically in the sense that the moon is both like a greeny-blue cheese and not like a greeny-blue cheese. Read as a metaphor it cannot be maintained in an existent and evidential  60 order as an 'actual fact'. To insist on this translation/transformation to the 60 would subject it to the forms of deconstruction as noted in this paper, namely, by what mechanism could this cheese have been formed, etc.

Statement no.2 again seems to intend that the 'world' is an illusion, hence its 50 possibility is being entertained in the presence of speculation and in the absence of evience. It could be read metaphorically - that the world is bothlike an illusion and not like an illusion. This conjunctive suspension needs to be maintained otherwise we deconstruct in a manner as outlined in the paper, i.e., through various papadoxes, e.g., if this statement is correct then it could not be uttered, etc., unless the illusoriness alluded to is present on a textual level and not on a meta-textual level, or, something similar to that effect. Still the metaphor needs to be maintained because of this meta-textual differentiation of perspectives (i.e., illusory on one meta-textual level, non-illusory on some other meta-textual level).

	Statement no. 3 is meant in a 50 frame of reference as a possible state of affairs that might be actual, i.e., 60 factual. The statement is effectively asking a question hence it's based on a rhetorical, non-metaphorical disconjunctive suspension.

	"The world is one" is primarily intended as a 60 religious claim. Should be read as a metaphor, i.e., the world is both one and not one. Should be maintained as a metaphor, otherwise it deserves to be deconstructed.

	Statement no. 5 is, obviously, a metaphorical claim whose primary order of intent is in a 30 ethical mode. Ridiculous consequences follow from a non-metaphorical reading of the same.

	Statement no.6 is, obviously, a metaphorical claim whose primary order of intent is in a 20 aesthetical mode. Ridiculous consequences follow from a non-metaphorical reading of the same.

	The last statement, on the necessary existence of a so-called 'external' world, tries to achieve a 60 status when it cannot make a 20 status let alone a 50 status as a possible fact. Operating as a metaphor can give it a limited, non-literal 60 status. To move beyond its metaphorical deployment will, as already argued, open up this expression to forms of deconstruction insightfully made visible to its proponents once the blind adherence to its apparent ontological commitments are weakened. The philosophical ramification of this ontological commitment involve people saying that they can do things they also say they cannot do, a fact overlooked, in the process producing innumerable controversies, paradoxes, contradictions, philosophical cul de sacs, etc., with bankrupt spiritual philosophies in attendance upon the same.

	
Key Points

I.    From an Overall Perspective

1.   In making the assumption that there is a theological difference, that the world with a sense of the divine can be entertained rather than a vision of the world without any sense of the divine, the question, in the previous paper, was asked - does theological difference make a difference? 
2.  This question above was answered, hypothetically, in the affirmative on the grounds that all relationships leave a textual imprint of the same upon the relational body of that relationship with the implication that the 'theologicalization of the life-world' would leave just such an imprint!
3.   The question this essay then asked was "what relevance does theological difference possess?"
4.   This question was answered by noting that as all relationships come into existence through the resolution of tension in the context of its field(s) of consonance and that all 'resolution' is essentially 'love', here treated as a metaphor, it followed that this relevance, if it was to be found, would most likely be found in this phenomenological aspect of all relationships.
5.   In a non-personal relationship this 'love' or 'binding-energy', as a surplus of value re-invested back into the body of that relationship, would be non-personal in orientation.
6.   On the other hand, in personal relationships this 'love' would be experienced also in personal terms of reference.

II.   From a Technical Philosophical Perspective

1.   Theological difference would suggest that the world could be seen as a 'divine text'.
2.   But reading a text should deliver an excess of hermeneutic value in our being able to read it - can the theologian argue for an excess 'hermeneutic excess' in their reading/our reading of this 'divine text' imprinted upon the 'book of nature'?
3.   Metaphor can be tentatively treated as metaphorical 'lenses' in their simulation of the world.
4.   That it is a mistake to literalize the metaphor.
5.   That it is also a mistake to absolutely dismiss the power of metaphors to 'simulate' the life-world.
6.   That on a deep transcendental level of epistemological organization, the presence and function of the hermeneutic circle demands that no ultimate distinction can be made between the metaphorical and the non-metaphorical.
7.   That, in essence, all critical philosophical research must remain in the province of the provisional!
8.   Four rules for dealing with the metaphorical were proposed, namely, determining primacy in cognitive order, determining if the expression is used metaphorically, that all distinctions are maintained in a provisional light, that non-adherence to these three rules can be demonstrated through deconstruction, etc.
9.   The theoretical (and non-theoretical) correlativity of the concept pair of transcendency-immanency demands an equal transcendent and immanent phenomenlogical treatment as maintained through the theoretical and practical use of the (overall) transcendental suspension.
10.  That the forever provisional nature of our research, the fact that our research must be forever enquestioned, means that no resolution of our research can be attempted in a dogmatic fashion.
11.  That the inescapable use of the hermeneutic circle of comprehension implies, demands, that our interaction ‘within’ this world-of-life, and all ‘provisional entities and states’ found therein, is simulated and merely simulated!
12.  Once positive theological difference is accepted, theological difference(s) must be also accepted as relevant to our being-in-this-one-world-of-life through the relational directness of all relationships whether we are aware of that (existential) ‘fact’ or not!?
13.  That the text is open to a relatively successful interpretation when it is adequately well-formed, appropriately well-informed and is found to be easily accessible to being well-performed!
14.  That a dialectical moment has both absolute limits and relative limits, namely, respectively, that “it cannot be absolutely what it is not” and “must be what it is” in accordance with its dialectical nature!
15.  That for both the philosopher and the non-philosopher, that for both the theologian and the non-theologian, we cannot be absolutely sceptical with the implication that in any question there is a residue of truth that cannot be dismissed because, in a sense, all question are formulated from within the existential context of the life-world and must in some measure reflect that reflection of reality!
16.  That the existential must be existential, act and be maintained in ongoing existential manner. 
17.  That 'existentialization' is 'an existentialization of the relatively non-existential' and not an 'existentialization of the relatively existential'.
18.  In the state of an overall transcendental suspension we find ourselves meeting/re-meeting the 'living text', a living simulation of a text that is able to engage us through a transcendental excess of value.
19.  Authenticity of spirit is recovered through a sympathetic/empathetic realignment with the dynamics operative in this circular hermeneutic-world-of-life!
20.  'Love' can be defined as ‘that ongoing attraction (re-)experienced that binds that relationship together and therein gives to it its relative sense of authenticity and integrity’, and which, through its deposition of ‘texts’ and our reading of their ‘imprinted reflection’ of that ‘living relationship’, under examination allows us in part to essentially re-simulate both their intensity and their unique set of emergent modalities that form the essential ‘spirit’ of that ‘living relationship’
21.  The more personal the nature of that orientation re-simulated the greater that sense of the divine therein also re-simulated and that this one factor, namely ‘love’, can be (metaphorically) ‘seen’ as the magic ingredient, realized through resolution, that unites and integrates this entire hierarchy of ‘divine’ being, this entire life-world, this one-world-of-life!
22.  To answer, therefore, the opening question "what relevance does theological difference possess?" we could reply that if the 'fact' of theological difference is accepted then we could propose that this 'relevance' is essentially this metaphorical 'love' imprinted upon the text of the world and open to experience through a re-realization of the text as a 'living text' when properly and appropriately attended to through the totality of the hermeneutic circle as engaged through this circular hermeneutic-world-of-life!