Finding a Place for the Idea of God – Part VII:
On the Love of the Divine - Objective and/or Subjective Genitive(s)??

0.   Introduction

	In this essay the topic is divine love. First I will investigate the nature of love. Second I will investigate, hypothetically, what relation, if any, could possibly exist between some sense of the divine and this essential nature of love as previously investigated (and v.v) in the process attempting to determine if this 'love of the divine' could be an objective genitive and/or a subjective genitive, and, what possible manner of a relationship these two genitives might bear to each other? (1)

	The essential problematic is thus "what is the essential nature of love?", if there is such a thing, and, "what relation does this research bear to some sense of the divine (or Divine) in general (once we have accepted a positive theological frame of reference in which to argue this type of question assuming that we can ask this type of question)?". Our research continuing to operate under a global transcendental suspension as noted in previous papers, i.e., as an investigation of phenomenological 'sense' (meaning and meaningfulness) in hypothetical terms of reference without any absolute ontological and epistemological commitments, being conducted under a transcendental suspension as explicated elsewhere! (2)

	In our third essay the topic of theological difference was introduced - quite simply the difference that would exist between a 'vision of the world with some sense of the divine' on one hand, and, some 'vision of the world without any sense of the divine' on the other. A theologian, by practical necessity, being committed to giving their positive assent to the former, i.e., their envisioning of a (life-)world with some sense of the divine in some form of a relation with the same. As noted previously, we can treat the 'divine' as 'Divine' when our concept of divinity fulfils a number of conditions, namely, exercises a sense of self (or ego), was open to reflection and self-reflection, and, could be successfully motivated to purposively enter into an active re-arrangement of the phenomenal being of the life-world, i.e., leave behind through such an active manner of involvement with the (life-)world a deposition of intentionally determined textuality in some form or other. The life-world' being defined as 'the non-foundationally treated transcendental grounds of possibility wherein epistemologically-oriented and ontologically-oriented acts of intentional determination can re-constitute a phenomenal world - that-as-lived-in-by-a-community-of-sentient-beings, albeit from both their individual and collective points of view'. In the term life-world, 'life' indicates the epistemological orientation of this transcendental domain of possibility, and, 'world' indicates the ontological orientation of this transcendental domain of possibility, whilst the hyphen indicates the overcoming of this artificial dichotomy between the epistemological and the ontological 'aspects' [i.e., the noetic aspect of intentionality and the noematic aspect of intentionality and their necessary correlativity, and interdependence, (as per Edmund Husserl)]. (3)

	In the fourth essay it was argued that a positive acceptance of this theological difference could be reasonably argued for and adopted. In the fifth essay the question was asked "what difference does a positive theological difference make?" This question was then answered in the sixth essay - that a positive acceptance of its relevance must be adopted on the grounds that all relationships imprint themselves on the metaphorical 'body' or 'space' of that relationship and that the divine, in a process theology, should do likewise. This relevance, this relational input, as a 'performance, was declared to be of the same nature of love, i.e., that the relational facticity of this relationship that the divine, in all its possibilities, must have with the (life-)world, that 'value' beyond the mere sum of its parts, was indeed of such a form. Hence the continuation of our research in this seventh essay concerns itself with the ' hypothetical nature of this divine love' (as essential to the nature of that relationship). (4)

1.   Part I - On the Nature of Love

	The first point I would like to note is that as critical philosophers and/or critical theologians 'we should not dichotomously divide the phenomenal world into epistemological spheres and ontological spheres!' Rather, we should see all forms of identity in the life-world as occupying the middle ground wherein all forms of identity can be regarded as 'experiencing themselves and the rest of the world from their point(s) of view', i.e., as both actively and passively suffering 'their' unfolding of 'their course of development in the life-world'! Their sense of 'experience' reflecting the nature and level of their apparent epistemological self-organization in this world-of-life. So a rock experiences the world as a 'rock', a person experiences the world as a 'person' and any sense of the divine in turn would experience their being in the world as a 'divinity' in accordance with their level of epistemological self-organization and self-expression…. (5)

	What implications does (the transformation of) this way of re-seeing the world entail? (6)

	For a start, dichotomizing the world into 'inner' epistemological regions and 'outer' ontological regions means we cannot be treating and investigating the world in and through a critically conducted transcendental-phenomenological attitude with, as a result, all the philosophical problems entailed in and through the distortions maintained from the automatic exercise of this relatively fundamental kind of everyday natural attitude. In the literalization of this metaphor of an inner world of consciousness and an outer world of the so called 'external world' all concepts of 'body' are cast in a paradoxical position, namely as to whether they should be seen to belong or not to belong to either or both camps? Moreover, in our transcendental research, it is our intention to conduct our investigations through a critically conducted phenomenological lens; our mission being aborted by such 'fundamental' habits whose deployment correctly cannot even operate in an everyday empirical frame of reference except through an overlooking of this consequently paradoxical nature of 'body'; in our being ambiguously embodied 'in' this world-of-life when a phenomenological sense of being embodied is ignored. This literally oriented treatment of this word 'in', as 'in the world', being impossible to conduct ensures all the philosophical paradoxes that devolve from such nonsense will continue to appear and re-appear whilst we try to maintain the appearance of their working in the first place. Lastly, I would like to note that our 'one world metaphysics' of the 'life-world' allows us to treat this topic of love in one frame of reference and one frame of reference only which vastly simplifies the exposition of this research, not of course without creating its own problems that I hope to resolve in the unravelling of this discourse. In this light we can attempt to treat the 'love' between material bodies, between material bodies and egos, and, between egos or within an ego as on the same par, a state of affairs more or less demanded by a process theology that seeks to cut across the domains of the material, the egological and those of the divine (contra Descartes). At the same time effectively overcoming empirical and realist forms of privilege on one hand, and, rational and idealist forms of privilege on the other. This form of privileging arising though a prejudice to dissect the intentional act into an intentional object(-state) and an intentional subject and preferencing one or other with a consequent loss of transcendental perspective from such short-sighted oversight of this 'fundamental' correlativity) . Hence this critical desire of the transcendental phenomenologist to treat all parties as 'merely simulated' in the one world of the life-world and our perception of their apparent 'suffering' in this world-of-life, albeit from their particular point of view(s). (7)

	This same type of point, that the intentional act should not be subjected to an absolute bi-modal dichotomization, will now be adopted in all tri-modal terms of reference as exercised, e.g., through our tri-modal treatment of the hermeneutic circle whose exposition has been noted and alluded to in most of the essays of this series. Paralleling this hermeneutic circle we also have its archetypal treatment as devolving from the necessary triple interaction of  (transcendental) object(-state)s, worlds (or fields) and egos. Let me briefly elabourate. (8)

	The hermeneutic circle depends on the nature of the relationship between parts and wholes and v.v. It has been previously argued that we should also take into account that our existential 'entry' and 'exit' from the same (through the transcendental suspension) is dependent on the relationship in place between those parts and that whole under examination and that this aspect of our interaction is dependent on this moment also being present. In our entry into this type of investigation, indeed, any type of investigation, we might like to call it the first moment of our investigations. Then, from this moment, we can extract either the relative totality as our 'second' moment or some portion or part thereof (through an act of focus or meta-focus). Then on an exit from this aspect of our investigations we 'leave' via this state of unity between the parts-and-whole, so, in this regard, we might also like to refer to it as a 'third' moment. In quoting the harmonic rule "through preparation(al consonance), dissonance and resolution" we again could renumber and redefine these three moments. Regardless of our numerical denomination and redefinition of these moments as 'moments' they correctly are dialectical, non-sequential and co-extensive with each other with only the mind's overall orientation towards one or the other being relatively oriented in one or two or three of those three directions (and realizing in the latter effectively a transcendental suspension as a consequence of that state of overall balance). (9)

	Looking at the same hermeneutic circle from an archetypal point of view we can see a metaphorical parallel between archetypal parts and archetypal objects (or states), archetypal wholes and archetypal fields or worlds, and, archetypal part-wholes relationships and archetypal egos. The overall interaction of these three dialectical moments realizing the overall relationship and its essential nature as manifested in, between and through those three moments. These moments having no individual existence being only treated as 'ideal'. In such a frame of reference the previous bi-modal treatment of the intentional act can be translated as a noematic axis between 'object' and 'whole' (or 'field') and a noetic axis between the former and the ego, or rather, the 'sense of ego' recognizing that these three moments are ideal 'poles' whose 'polarity' and can not be obtained (in any [absolutist] separate, non-interdependent form of identity). The point of this enlargement of our intentional terms of reference is, among other things, to introduce a parallel harmonic and gestalt reading of this phenomenon of the interaction between the parts and the whole, of analysis on one hand and synthesis on the other, which in turn, also gives us a phenomenological attitude and a hermeneutical attitude respectively and an existential attitude from a balanced, suspended interaction between the same (and our spontaneous access to the sense of the non-textual as discussed elsewhere). Then to complicate matters further from an interaction that involves the suppression of one or two of those polar moments we can also derive six fundamental types of judgment as discussed elsewhere (namely pre-essential essential judgment, essential aesthetical judgment, ethical judgment, pragmatical judgment, hermeneutical judgment and factual judgment). Let me say that it is through these various lenses that our topic of love will be better appreciated and that we need not be worried by this complicated scheme as it will be re-introduced only on a need to know basis. Should the reader wish they might like to refer to my first appendix where these parallel frames of reference in the reading of these three moments can be compared. (10)

	It should be noted, and stressed, at this point that the balanced adoption of these three modal poles will help us to maintain and exercise a transcendental suspension and therein allow us to more deeply investigate, phenomenologically, the essential nature of love. (11)

	Let me now examine the question whether our topic 'love' has one essential nature? I must answer this in the affirmative because I will offer as a first definition the (necessary transcendental) 'fact' that 'love' is the emergent totality of our three ideal moments. Let me explain. (12)

	Perceiving the 'relationship' engendered between our three moments as a 'totality', on the grounds that "the whole is greater than the sum of is parts", then allows us to perceive the 'difference' between that totality and its three moments as the relative facticity of that relationship. This facticity then being seen as the 'love', the relational binding, of that relationship. On these 'grounds' we could now argue that the 'ideal' nature of love can only possess one 'ideal form' albeit the 'fact' that each relationship to the degree it has this relational facticity has a 'unique expression' given the uniqueness of the contents of each individual relationship! Moreover, through the maintenance of a one-world frame of reference, through the transcendental balance of epistemological and ontological axes in our hermeneutic circle, it allows us to note that any party in a relationship must be considered to equally 'suffer' (in its aspectival form) be it an object (or state), a world (background or field) or an ego (in an overall sense, partial sense, a collection or institution, in a spiritual sense or treated as some form of an divine egological agent/non-agent). The implication being that our account, on transcendental grounds, should not need to differentiate any type of party in order to create a differentiated account of different types of love other than a taking into account the nature of the participating contents of that relationship. That, essentially, our topic has a unified flavour regardless of the constituents of any particular relationship allowing our exposition to proceed in this monothematic manner. (13)

	In the light of the previous paragraph we can now group together the following three types of relationships, namely interactions between material bodies, interactions between material bodies and egological agents, and, interactions between egological agents. With this integration of our topic we can note, however, that the 'quality of the love suffered' by the parties in a certain relationship is dependent upon their degree of epistemological organization; this monothematic blanket covering all hypothetical forms of divinity as might be envisaged in a process theology. On the other hand the 'quantity of love suffered' by a relational party is dependent upon the relational facticity of that relationship which can be defined as 'the emergent relational excess shared by that relationship equally from all points within the relational space of that relationship minus the sum of its material part(icipant)s considered from a relatively material perspective'. This definition will be looked at more closely later in this essay. Let me now look more deeply into the dynamics of a relationship to note that the mutual or non-mutual attraction suffered by participants in a relationship cannot be equated with the 'love' or relational facticity of that relationship. (14)

	As noted previously (in sections no.9-12) in accordance with my current understanding a relationship comes into existence through the co-presence of three ideal dialectical moments. In a harmonic frame of reference we might call them preparational consonance, dissonance and harmonic resolution. Or, in a gestalt frame of reference, mirroring the same order as enlisted in our harmonic frame of reference, we might call them the background field of consonance, foreground field of dissonance and their egological interaction. Or, in an archetypal phenomenology we might call them the (transcendental) World, the (transcendental) Object and the (transcendental) Ego. Or, again, from a textual point of view, we might call them the text, (intersubjective) meta-text and non-text (as already noted in footnote no. 5), paralleling, respectively, the domains of the phenomenological, the hermeneutical and the existential (and whose time-orientations are respectively past, future and present). In Appendix I I have tabulated these parallel frames of reference. (15)

Now, at this point I would like to make the following very important philosophical observation, namely, that the attraction experienced in a relationship is related to the 'love' 'suffered' in a relationship but is not equivalent as this type of experience alone does not, indeed, cannot account for the relational facticity of that relationship, this relational 'fact' being dependent on the interactions of all three moments! In a combined harmonic and gestalt frame of reference we might say that the first moment is related to the overall 'sameness' of that relationship and therein in the process forming a psychic background of consonance whereas the second moment concerns itself with the overall relative difference or dissonance which produces a sense of psychic foreground. Their interaction accounts for the degree of attraction or repulsion experienced between these two moments, these two poles or polar moments. Furthermore, a state of interaction already presupposes a relational state of affairs hence the attraction or repulsion entered into by these parties must either add to or subtract from the relational facticity already present. Thus the loving attraction experienced, i.e., suffered, by those relational parties either adds to or subtracts from that relational facticity already realized. So repulsion, e.g., as a disruption of that relationship, is a disruption of the degree to which that relationship is already in existence. Similarly, the presence of attraction that may contribute to the relational quantity of that relationship already operates in the context of an already dialectically established relationship. The point I am making here is that although the attraction or repulsion may respectively contribute or detract from a relationship the factual intensity of that relationship cannot be directly equated with the nature of this third moment. Put in human terms we might say that "lust is not love" or that "hate does not mean the necessary death of that relationship" on the grounds that relational facticity, i.e., the love present in that relationship, is established through the dialectical interaction of all three moments. Indeed, hate presupposes the pre-existence of a relationship, i.e., relational facticity or love and does not imply the necessary death of that relationship through the possibility of an ongoing resolution of this state of dis-ease. On the other hand, the complete satiation of lust, the complete neutralization of attraction, would contribute to the death of that relationship as the ongoing facticity of a relationship necessitates the ongoing presence of all three moments, the loss of any one of them contributing to the historical death of that relationship. (16)

In the light of this modelling can we make a distinction between a mutual (degree of) interaction and a non-mutual (degree of) interaction as suffered by the parties of a relationship, or, in other words, can we account for the philosophical concepts of authenticity/non-authenticity? It was argued by me some time ago that authenticity is the degree a relationship is being shared mutually by the participants of that relationship. However, this is difficult to quantify, as it stands, in those relationships that are essentially asymmetric but by no stretch of the imagination could be called inauthentic as in, e.g., the ministration of love by an attentive mother for her child. Whereas between two friends who have known each other for a long time and have a great fondness for each other this model of shared worlds, or overlapping spheres of co-mutual interest, might account for this perceived sense of a shared authenticity. Better, I believe, is to see the authenticity of a relationship as the degree it is in relational existence above and beyond the mere sum of its parts accepting the fact that all relationships, to be a relationship, must possess some degree of a relational excess or authenticity. However, through a greater degree of ongoing harmonic resolution there is a relatively greater degree of authenticity and it is this fact (as an existential/relational 'fact'), namely, the degree to which this relationship is a fact, that directly establishes this phenomenology of the relationship and the relative extent and manner of its authenticity. So our overlapping model could be re-envisaged as the relative extent a relationship surpasses its own mere materiality, the mere summation of its parts. Moreover, authenticity is engaged when this factual expansion of the relationship is realized through an existential transformation of its relative non-authentic material basis. The relationship becoming less of a fact to the same degree the quantity of  its factiticity is diminished. So in this light we should note, and note well, that the attractiveness of another party cannot, as it stands, account for the facticity of that relationship actually shared by those parties. Indeed, it is only to the degree that that attractiveness is mutually shared that that relationship is a mutual one or a non-mutual one, especially when for one or more of the parties the attraction is experienced with a negative value, i.e., as repulsion. The course of the interaction of these forces and their resolution or non-resolution accounting ultimately for the overall harmonic value of that relationship. In a similar fashion we can also note that the facticity of a relationship cannot be measured from an artificial examination of one or two of those moments but must entertain all three in and through a hermeneutic circle of comprehension. In this light a considerable degree of coincidence or similarity of interests between a set of parties, or a relative lack of dissonance, likewise does not directly establish a proportional degree of relational facticity as relational facticity, or love, can only come into relational existence in and through the ongoing harmonic interaction of all three dialectical moments. (17)

	Let me now look into a physics of interaction noting the differences that manifest when, in an ideal frame of reference, there is only one primary party, two primary parties or more than two primary parties in the context of a relational space. (18)

	Starting with a set of three or more primary parties we have in a effect a system whose course cannot be non-chaotically determined unless the orbits of those parties inscribe a non-chaotic pattern (such as e.g., in the unlikely event that three or more planets were found on the same orbit scattered equidistant from each other and were found to be travelling with the same speed/acceleration on that same pathway). Systems, thus, in the main are chaotic affairs whose determination is usually conducted in such a frame of reference. On the other hand two primary parties in a relation constitute what might best be called a current which normally operates in a deterministic frame of reference (if left undisturbed). Then, one primary party in a relational field constitutes an emission which also normally operates in a deterministic frame of reference (if left undisturbed). These three distinctions of systems, currents and emissions are artificial distinctions as, correctly, on a deeper level or in a greater context they are but three ideal (archetypal) facets or aspects of all relationships and ideally mirror the nature of our three moments, i.e., in the following order of resolution, consonance and dissonance. Moreover, in the relative breaking up of a system we get either one party emissions, two party currents and/or other systems of more than two parties. In the relative breaking of a current we get one party emissions (unless we can create new two party currents and/or three or more party systems in that relational breaking). In this light we might say that in quantum entanglement an emission only comes into effect in the breaking of that entanglement perceived thus as a current whose information is perfectly spread about the entirety of that current's space or length. This information spontaneously self-organizing itself in the event of the breaking of that current. Ultimately, however, this breaking and non-breaking, or re-formation of relationships, is merely the shifting of relational contexts where an emission can never be a pure emission, a current can never be a pure current and a system can never be a pure system - worlds within worlds within worlds! With this in mind we should realize, therefore, that no relationship because of its systematic implication, can ever be treated and determined in pure non-chaotic terms of reference. Hence the eternal mystery and continual surprise the world must have in store for us… and the 'life' all relationships must possess (however inauthentic some of them might be for us in our everyday lives). (19)

	To summarise this examination let me re-note briefly the following. (20)

	The 'love' apparent in a relationship is the result of all three ideal moments co-existing and is directly proportional only to the relational facticity of a relationship, i.e., the extent a relationship has emerged beyond its mere materiality, the mere sum of its participants and/or parts. No relationship, therefore, can be completely inauthentic or completely authentic as authenticity is relative and reflects the existential/non-existential transformation as manifested through its emergent degree of relational facticity. Love, therefore, can never be the mere attraction in a relationship, nor, for that matter, does 'hate' or repulsion imply the necessary death of a relationship (as  attraction or repulsion are only the net effect of the interaction of our first two moments of consonance and dissonance without considering our third moment of resolution). On the other hand the cessation of any one of these three moments is the relative death of that relationship, in effect, the creation of a new relationship and/or the exposure of its deeper relational context. The presence of a systematic basis to a relationship contextually and/or presuppositionally invites the expression of an inevitable chaotic component into the coursing of that relationship. The relative breaking of a system creating new systems, currents and/or emissions whilst the breaking of relative currents creates a state of emission (unless additional inputs establish new currents and/or systems). So, in this light, the relationship between two people might be treated as a current, or the relationship between three people might be treated as a system consisting of three interrelated currents, etc. Authenticity/non-authenticity of a relationship being defined in relative terms of reference with respect to the relative overall emergence/de-emergence of the relational facticity of that relationship. (21)

	Let us now investigate the hypothetical nature of divine love. (22)

2.   Part II - On the Nature of Divine Love

	Rather than laboriously arrive at a conclusion, or a set of possible conclusions, in this investigation, let me simply announce that all forms of love are expressions of divine love!  Therefore, let me, instead, now interpret what this surprising statement might mean, and, from that interpretation, display what premises and arguments might allow me to so confidently proclaim such an apparently controversial (and apparently meaningless) statement. (23)

	In the context of a process theology 'all forms of divinity' can be defined as 'those states of affairs whose epistemological level of organization is greater than that of a certain individual and/or community of individuals'. In this light a religious institution cannot be treated as divine. On the other hand, overlooking this rider "is greater than that of a certain individual and/or community of individuals" any state of affairs could be treated as relatively more divine than some other through the possession of a relatively greater level of epistemological (self-)organization. In this regard it follows that as the relational integrity of a state through emergence is greater than that possessed by its mere material basis it follows that that relational facticity, its 'love' or relational binding energy, must be relatively more divine, more spiritual than its material basis. Hence the rationale behind this statement that proclaims "all forms of love are expressions of the divine". A process theology subsuming all relationships in a relationship with the emergent senses of the divine that emergently manifest in such a scheme. Let me look more closely into the ramification of this type of position and some of the philosophical problems that might arise from its adoption. (24)

	For a start we have four inter-linked problems - how do we evaluate this relational facticity, and, can this relational facticity be considered apart from its material 'facticity', and, in what sense can relationships be in a state of relationship with other relationships, and, to what extent can relationships, meta-relationships, etc., be subsumed in the relationship (or relational 'ground') of all relationships a.k.a. the Divine (as equated in one earlier definition)???? (25)

	In the previously examined formula "what is the x of x" it was declared to be 'non-x' or 'not x'! E.g., "what is the whiteness of whiteness?" cannot be a colour but the 'whiteness' of white, i.e., its colourness or meta-whiteness; hence the non-equivalence in meta-status between 'the relationship' and 'the relationship of a relationship'. In this light the relationship of a relationship is effectively 'not a relationship' but a 'meta-relationship' or a 'non-relationship'/'not-relationship' causing us to then ask "can a meta-relationship relate with either a relationship (and v. v) or  some other meta-relationship?" Then we need to ask ourselves "can we successfully divide or separate a relationship from its material basis (and v.v)?" That, essentially, these four problems are inter-linked. Let me look more closely at this linkage in the context of these four types of problems. (26)

	In my various expositions on the subject of a transformational treatment-retreatment philosophy various tools for dealing with this relationship between parts and wholes, between analysis and synthesis, have been formulated. One of the insights looked at there is the ability of the relational synthesis and/or the relational analysis to be retreated back on to the material meta-level from whence that relationship evolved or emerged. By such means we could argue that there is no need for the 'relationship of a relationship' to interact with some other 'relationship' or 'relationship of a relationship' on the level of this meta-relativity by virtue of the fact that all forms of meta-relativity can be transformed, i.e., retreated, back on to their initial level of relative materiality. So the handle of a spade and the shovel section of a spade can unite to form a spade that functions on the level of the materiality of its handle and head not just on a meta-material level even though, epistemologically, from a relational state a relationally oriented entity 'first' emerges from that interaction, in this case of relational synthesis. In a sense the meta-materiality, the meta-relational nature of this interaction, can through retreatment re-express itself on the same level of its materiality as found in its handle and head. And this is as one might expect. A spade digs the world yet the spade emerges as something different from its mere handle and shovel, in a sense these emergent properties take on a material transformational retreatment in the light of its material basis of those parts. Hence it is not necessary for a spade to interact with only the meta-relational, i.e., other 'spades' et al. Could we now argue, in the light of this examination treated as an analogy, that all senses of the divine find themselves imprinted upon the materiality of the world, albeit with these emergent properties, all senses of the spiritual, etc., and hence find their sense of emergent interaction on the level of the material albeit with these emergent properties that must distinguish it from the merely material basis as found in a naive physics or metaphysics, etc? Hence the re-definition of the 'spiritual' as that which has its origin of expression in higher levels of meta-orientation (regardless of whether that is based in matter-matter interactions, matter-egological interactions, and/or inter-egological/intra-egological interactions). (27) 

	What does it mean to enter into a relationship, and, what is 'shared' in a relationship in and throughout its sense of 'relational space' or 'body'? In my opinion, through some form of an exchange mechanism, what is shared is essentially information, albeit information based in some material form of denomination whether that be in particulate matter, dialogical information as produced/re-produced in a conversation, tokens (like money), gifts, unwritten obligations, etc., etc. Moreover, through the performance of the act of 'sharing' the very act itself acquires a new meaning or meaning-overlay. A gift of money in the form of coins is a gift expressed through the donation of coins to the recipient of that act of gift-giving. In an economic context those coins are no longer merely coins but 'money', being overlaid with this relational-oriented aspect of meaning. They find their current currency through the meta-nature of their perceived context (even if one were left alone on a desert island the possibility that they would be used as money on a return to civilisation could still be entertained and perhaps hoped for). Let me, with more detail, elabourate on the archetypal nature of exchange mechanisms wherein this 'information' is exchanged. (28)

	As just stated what is exchanged is information. The exchange of information is always in and through a material format of some form or other plus the 'perception' of a meta-frame of reference that allows those parties, participating in that kind of relationship, to 'suffer' the sense, meaning and meaningfulness of that act of relationship. So coins are perceived as 'money'.  On the other hand, if we were a collector of coins we might see them instead as 'items we would be interested in or not interested in as additions to our collection' (or as the 'indirect means to enlarge our collection through their eventual swapping or cashing in'). So in a relationship something must be exchanged and that exchange must be information in some material-oriented format. Moreover, that exchange must be relatively 'mutual' for all those parties participating in that 'particular' relationship. (29)

	E.g., say someone gives another person a gift of some form or other and the other person accepts the same without any recognition of the gift as a gift and the donor of that gift as the donor. Is there a relationship in play here? On very minimal grounds we might say we have two people involved in a transference of property but certainly not as two people involved in a relationship beyond the exchanged material. No real information, or material information, has been 'exchanged' by the recipient of that gift (the gift being merely taken). The gift was accepted but not acknowledged as a gift qua gift so no real exchange took place. Let me look more closely at this idea of mutuality of exchange in the following analogy. (30)

	Suppose a group of people are in a circle and throwing a very heavy ball from one member of the group to another. What sort of group, or relationship, do we have here? A ball throwing-and-catching group! How does this group function? That is dependent upon the size of that ball and the rules of its deployment. All this then effects the outward manifestation of the group - too close they can no longer throw the ball to each other, and, too far away and they can no longer catch it. What information is shared then? Certain ideal parameters between those two extremes of being two close and too far away, playing by certain rules (predefined before the 'game' and/or ongoingly defined during the same) such as watching out for the ball and determining to whom they would/should throw it in turn…. (31)

	To some extent the relationship is symbolised by that ball-in-play in the previous example. In some measure the parameters of that relationship were controlled by the nature of that ball. On the other hand other parameters would be left invariant regardless of what type of ball was exchanged in which case the nature of the ball is not a necessary consideration. E.g., the rules for determining throwing and catching are not absolutely dependent upon the nature of that ball where the substitution of, e.g., a tennis ball or a golf ball could be adopted without radically effecting these other types of parameters although not without effecting the manifestation or phenomenal appearance of that relationship. In nuclear physics we have exchange mechanisms that seem to be directly related to the nature of the 'particles' exchanged. But are all relationships dependent on a material vector for this exchange of (a multi-directional flow of) information (even in virtual relationships?)? E.g., in a conversation, or in an act that recognises mutual obligations between all the parties in their relationship without an overt exchange of gifts, is there here too the implication of a material vector? Let me examine this important question more closely. (32)

	In a conversation between, say, two parties; where those two participants are not involved in a monologue directed at the other, how is information communicated and shared? Through the media of language and/or non-verbal communication, that in a real conversation we have an ongoing dialogue. A 'speech' is entered into by one of those parties. It is then recognised by the other party who in turn returns a speech containing a recognition of the former speech (and where and when relevant a recognition of previous speeches on that topic) with additional input in the form of new information and/or the re-formulation of old information. In effect we have a circuit of information from whose totality we are presented with a dialogical excess, i.e., from the totality of information transmitted and received minus the actual amount of information transmitted and received we are presented with a difference which characterises the nature of that conversational relationship. Normally, when that ongoing excess ceases to be an ongoing excess the conversational relationship is historically terminated at that point or soon after. In the light of this examination can we claim that there is still the presence of a material vector? How is that information transmitted if not dependent on a material vector? Thus, in this light, we must consider the transmission of verbal/non-verbal information to be materially dependent on the material nature of that conversation. The transmission and reception of this conversation is dependent on audible sound waves and/or visible waves of light (along with the meta-rules and their predictive expectations that, in turn, tell us just what material aspects of that conversational process might possess information that might shape the content of its topic). Then, in the case of an act of signalling that symbolically recognises mutual obligations as having been then entered into by all the parties in that relationship without an overt exchange of gifts reinforcing that act can we analyse this type of (interpersonal) relationship in the same manner? An act of relating to an other remains an act of exchange even if the exchange is that only of obligations. In such a situation do we still need to invoke a material vector in the transfer, or exchange, of information? Yes - through the exercise of the pre-arranged signal or signals that materially represent that exchange of information and which are physically uttered or emitted into that discriminated context and whose recognition, in turn, is materially signalled (and v.v.). At some point in time a certain conventional code must be predetermined as to what symbolises this exchange of mutual obligations so that in the transmission of the appropriate signal or signals this recognised exchange of obligations is initiated, recognised and mutually confirmed! In the advent of this signalling and its mutual recognition we should come to see the essential nature of that relationship as having undergone a relatively radical sense of difference, a sense of transformation even if not overtly manifested at the time of that relational transition whether that be in tangible gifts or the emission of signals (e.g., of an aural and/or visual nature, etc.). In effect that relationship in this world-of-life has all its constituent parts or parties changing course in some manner or other (beyond a completely deterministic frame of reference). A transition that cannot escape a transmission of information conveyed by some relatively simple or complex form of a material vector. Moreover, an excess is obtained through this informed process of a dialogical excess conveyed and recognised by individual material vectors. So, e.g., two friends come together, wink at each other and shake hands meaning, for them, that they will do x at some point in the future… Winking and shaking hands being in the context of this relationship material vectors for the communication and recognition of information. This mutual transmission of information resulting in an investment in that relationship, a change of direction, some form of a change or a resistance to change in its phenomenal manifestation… The continuance of that relationship resulting in an ongoing re-investment of information. Hence this dialogical excess invested in a relationship takes place in and through a materially oriented change in its relational manifestation in this world-of-life. Thus, through relational change the 'body' too of a relationship is altered, changed, being an indivisible reflection of (the coursing of) that relationship. That, through an ongoing creation/re-creation of a relational excess an ongoing relational investment directly finds itself being put in place in the 'body' or 'space' of that relationship through the 'spilling over' of this excess of value (there being no ultimate difference, except in meta-perspective, between the relative object-text and its meta-textual interpretation through a mutual interdependent correlativity between these two polarities [through the unobtainable ideality of all poles and mutual process of correlativity between the same]). (33)

	Now, let me deal with the two interrelated problems of "what is this relational excess?" and, "how do we measure its phenomenal manifestation?" given its phenomenal manifestation takes place through the ongoing investment of that relational excess in that re-materialized relationship. (34)

	Upon reflection it stands to reason that the course of a relationship is the course of that relationship - how are we to know what is and what is not being invested in that relationship from, in and through this sense of relational excess? It would seem that the only way we might be able to determine what that 'difference' was, is or will be, short of being a direct participant in that relationship if that was a possibility open to the investigator of that relationship, is to be in a position where one is able to determine what probably belongs to its textual imprint and what probably belongs to its meta-textual orientation? With this information to hand we might then be in a position to determine the nature of this difference, i.e., determine to what extent there is a meta-textual excess and to what extent that excess is textually invested in an ongoing re-coursing of that relationship. As noted elsewhere, this relational excess is the totality of that relationship minus the sum of its parts. What does this mean? In our example of the spade (or a broom) the handle and the head of that spade come together to form a spade. Surely the individual weight of the handle and the individual weight of the head are the same as the weight of that overall implement? What difference then is there?! What is to be noted is the emergence of new properties (and the relative loss of old properties). So, we now have a new tool where before that implement to hand was not adequately expressed or just not to hand. Thus this relative richness in the emergence of new properties is to be taken into account. In effect we now have a greater modal richness through such a textual re-arrangement of the life-world and the greater freedom or greater loss of freedom that might or might not be granted to us or taken from us as a result of this transformational transition between having 'the near useless parts of a tool' or its 'absence' and 'the now useful coupling of those parts in an implement-to-hand'. In this regard we could therefore investigate and relatively quantify this emergence of new value, these novel forms of emergent value. Moreover, we can also in parallel evaluate the relative effects this absence/presence could have upon the course of our own existence in this world-of-life or observe and/or speculate what difference might be there for some other person once their sense of perspective on this world of life is also more or less taken into account . Furthermore, as already noted this relational excess is invested in the body of that relationship, in the coursing of those parties in that relational space pertaining to that transformed state-of-affairs. (35)

	How do we determine if a property is an emergent property that contributes to this textually materialised aspect of relational excess? A list of logical properties could be prepared either descriptively (through a phenomenological examination) and/or prescriptively (through an appeal to principles, definitions, etc.) and /or predictively (through the determination of probabilities associated with the phenomenal nature of the same, etc.). Then emergent properties can be determined through discovering which of those properties could not be meaningfully reduced. E.g., a broom could not function if it were just as a handle nor function successfully if we were only able to use its head. Therefore, being a 'broom' meant it could not be reduced to some part of that broom such as its handle or its head with the implication to be drawn that a broom was an emergent property when what was meant in being a broom was examined in this frame of reference that examined a broom qua a broom. This is a relatively simple example, in more complex situations we find a complex of emergent properties, in the process noting that what is emergent and what is not emergent is context dependent. A better example might be that of a 'rich' literary text where a few propositions re-produce a wealth of meaning through implication, irony, emotive connotation, symbolic pluralism, forms of analogy, etc. The mere content of that text subtracted from its overall resonant richness re-producing a relational excess that cannot be reduced merely to the propositions entailed in that text... it being the task of a critical literary criticism to both interpret that relational excess through a literary articulation of that richness and demonstrate through such focus that the relational/existential richness of that text (discovered respectively not-textually/non-textually) is, indeed, relatively great. (36)

	At this point in time it is now necessary to examine how an act of relationship is performed (archetypally and in practice). (37)

	As previously alluded to, a relationship comes into existence through three ideal moments of which resolution is but one of those moments. Resolution is the resolution of dissonance, difference, competition, etc., being noticed in a consonant field or gestalt background. Consonance is inherently repellent (which is why it constitutes a field through self-expansion and can never be, therefore, purely consonant because even the slightest difference in its tenor would naturally constitute a sense of a minimilistic dissonance). On the other hand dissonance is never pure dissonance by virtue of the fact that it both fascinates and disturbs its audience, being returned to a consonant field through a resolution performed through the medium of this ambivalence. The relationship between the dissonant material and the meta-field invoking this two-way nature of an exchange in order to reinstate its relationship. The analogy of a detergent might be apposite here. Oil and water do not successfully mix. On the other hand a detergent can mix them by virtue of the fact that one end of the detergent molecule is oil-attractive and the other end of that same molecule is water attractive. By this intervening medium, of the detergent, oil and water can be made to appear to mix, hence deposits of oil and grease can be made to dissolve from hands and dishes, etc. In a similar fashion because of the provocative, dual-nature of dissonance (to be both like and unlike the nature of the field wherein it acts as relatively dissonant) we can appeal to its harmonic potential by seeking to find some form of a consonance-in-the-midst-of-its-dissonance in that field of consonance and therein finding our selves in a psychic position to experience its reintegration back into that field of consonance, finding ourselves able to re-experience the re-integration of this disconnecting factor through this facet of consonance in the relatively impure dissonant structure when appealed to through an ongoing act of harmonic resolution. These same dynamics also operate in our hermeneutic circle. Our three moments needing to be balanced with respect to each other in the realization of an overall transcendental suspension (through the three types of transcendental suspension that constitute the dynamics of that theoretical and practical device). With this being the case what implications can be drawn to assists us in our coming to understand how relationships are realized, performed and terminated, i.e., produced and re-produced as historical states-of-affairs, etc? (38)

	With this parallel model of the hermeneutic circle to mind it stands to reason that for the relationship to persist these three moments also need to persist in time though processes of re-iteration (hence the distinctive re-iterations of our three moments as well). If relative dissonance is resolved the relationship, put in place through the act, or performance, of resolution would come to an end. Therefore, dissonance must be psychically re-introduced through processes of 'sheer' re-iteration in order for an ongoing act of resolution to persist. Similarly the background field must remain present through its own form of distinctive 'mere' re-iteration. Furthermore, resolution needs to be actively re-engaged in an ongoing fashion through its distinctive processes of patterns of 'bare' re-iteration. With this model in mind, therefore, we can note that the reintegration realized through the moment of resolution needs, for its persistence, the ongoing presence of consonance and the ongoing re-introduction of dissonance and an existentially oriented pattern of ongoing resolutional performance. Moreover, for this pattern of resolution to be mutual (for all parties present in that relationship) this performance must be equally weighted with respect to the presence of a background field and the psychic weight of dissonance being continually re-introduced before that field. The existential moment of resolution determining the need for a psychic balance of resolution with respect to the other two moments of consonance and dissonance. Hence these three moments need to remain in a state of ongoing balance. Hence, the consummation of this resolutional reintegration (e.g., as in the exhaustion of lust) would result in the historical cessation of that resolutional performance and hence the 'death' of that relationship (if that relationship was just one of seeking mere consummation). Moreover, conversely, in the ongoing resolutional performance of that relationship an existential balance must be dynamically maintained between these three polar aspects of an (archetypal) relationship without an imbalanced emphasis being placed upon that act of resolutional performance! As argued in our last essay, the existentialization of a relationship is dependent upon an existential transformation of the relatively non-existential, being continually dependent upon the latter as a necessary precondition for this process to occur and to continually maintain its simulated sense of 'presence' as a phenomenon. (39)

	In the light of our previously noted typology of emissions, etc., let me describe these three ideal moments in those terms before looking at complex intentional object-states through this same lens. (40)

	Dissonance is effectively an emission through its sense of a disturbance at a distance through difference. On the other hand the background field is essentially a system and therefore must be made up of more than two consonant elements realizing a commonality through similarity. Then, furthermore, the nature of the relationship between a dissonant emission and its related background field must effectively be a current (whose relative strength is essentially determined through the potential difference across that space between the emission and the field coupled to the efficiency of that process of discharge over a certain period of time). (41)

	Now, how do we relate this type of typology with elements of emission, etc introduced into the field of a relationship. With one element we have the situation as just examined for the moment of dissonance in our hermeneutic circle. In the introduction of two object-states in front of a background field we are effectively presented with a current between those object-states whose nature  is determined through the overall net nature of their interaction(s) - relative differences between the same accounting for the nature of that current. So, e.g., two oppositely charged particles would form a positive(ly engaged) current through their effective neutralization of each other, whereas, two particles, with the same charge, would form a negative current by virtue of its resultant accumulation of an increased density of repulsive presence although the current fact of at least a vestigial relationship in some form or other also implies at least some minimal form of a relational interaction for repulsion to operate from within. Then, an assembly of object-states would form a system whose nature is the net overall charge of that system plus any emergent factors arising through that complex process of interaction. (42)

	With this research now to hand what implications can we draw for this topic of determining the essential nature of love through these insights into the nature of resolution, etc? (43)

	The binding intensity or relational facticity of a relationship is enacted through this third moment of resolution and its intensity reflects the degree a relational excess is invested in the materialized dynamics of that interaction. This excess in play, in turn, reflects the degree of existentialization realized through this third moment which being the ongoing existential transformation of the relatively non-existential implies that a state of balance must be in play between all three moments, i.e., consonance, dissonance and resolution. With a loss of balance between these three moments the circle, this productive/re-productive cycle, grinds towards a halt, and, the effective absence of anyone of these three moments is the effective death of that relationship (although processes of conservation imply processes of continuity in some form or other on that same meta-level of deployment and/or on other levels of epistemological (self-)organization). (44)

	Let us now model the interaction between two individuals who have some degree of affection for each other. (45)

	We know from the discussion of this typology of emissions, etc. that the interaction between two object-states in a field is ostensively that of a current, and, that currents normally function in a deterministically calculatable fashion. However, it is a generally accepted observation that human beings are usually unpredictable and creatures of chaos and that as a consequence to treat others as 'human' means we must accept this ever-present element of indeterminacy in our everyday dealings with each other. Hence we must treat other people, and our very own sense(s) of 'self', as inherently unpredictable and often chaotic in character. Consequently, our overall sense of self should be treated as a system of interacting senses of self with the further implication that people should not be treated as 'simple' states, as mere bodies or minds, but as systematic organisms possessing this complex sense of self, these complex senses of self and their varying degrees of interaction. Moreover, in interaction our 'systematic' sense of self in interaction with someone else's systematic sense of self opens that complex 'systematic' relationship itself up to chaotic behaviour and this is as one would expect in the spontaneity of an existentially oriented relationship. Indeed, the degree of spontaneity in a relationship is a direct reflection of its existentialization, its authenticity of self-organization, its systematic enpowerment, etc. (46)

	Let me now briefly look at interpersonal relationships of more than two bodies or parties, and, how an entity might be envisaged as being able to have a relationship with themselves. (47)

	A complex interaction between three or more parties could be simplified as a set of currents between those parties equal to the number of individual micro-relationships entailed in that complex systematic relationship. However, such a calculation can only roughly estimate this overall quantum or degree of relational facticity, the estimated intensity of its apparent presence, its footprint, in this world-of-life. 'Apparent' by virtue of the fact that all phenomena are not absolutely independent from all other phenomena (especially from those with a similar nature). Then, again, the apparent quantum or degree of relational facticity can be evaluated through being engaged in a direct interaction with the same. Because of the apparent unity of the life-world, this 'one-world-of-life, in theory, if not in fact, all relationships in principle can remain open to us, allow our discriminative and simulated act of entry wherein we can experience directly the relational nature of that relationship and therein evaluate its current nature. These two methods could be described as ‘relatively external’ and ‘relatively internal’ to the relational space of that relationship itself. (48)

	In the situation of evaluating an integrated complex system, such as one's own sense of self, how might one come to an understanding of how that could be put into practice? Again no absolutely independent (self-)relationship can be argued for. As thinking-creatures-in-a-community-of-such-entities, and, that there can be no boundaries which could absolutely separate the life-world from us and, v.v., it stands to reason that from our current perspective no relatively internal nor any relatively external simple or complex sense of self could, in principle, remain closed to us. Hence our ability to actually and/or virtually enter into the logical space of any relationship! By virtually is mean a non-alignment of our overall sense of a transcendental-empirical self with the full temporal and spatial coordinates of our apparent phenomenal existence as an agent in this world-of-life. On the other hand an actual, non-virtual relationship is conducted through the effective coincidence of an overall transcendental sense of self with the evidential coordinates of our apparent existence in this communal sense of a lived life-world along with its existential richness of appropriate modalities apparently open to us. On the other hand it should be noted that there can be no absolute distinction between the relatively virtual and the relatively actual nor, for that matter, between the relatively immanent and the relatively transcendent as both sets of aspects need to be present and dynamically balanced in an existentially oriented act of self-reflection realized through the authenticity that flows from a properly entered and conducted global transcendental suspension. (49)

This self-authenticity is experienced as 'love', the relational faciticity of that apparent relationship under examination. Moreover, given the hypothetical 'presence'/'absence' of the divine (or Divine) it follows, at least theoretically, that the same in principle must remain open to us! Hence, all relationships can be entered into including those of a divine nature (the hypothetical existence of the divine in all its forms of manifestation being tentatively accepted once a positive theological difference is accepted [as in all probability it could well be accepted on the strength of such grounds]). And what implications, therefore, does this theoretical openness of  the life-world possess, in and through its progressive theologicalization, for the critical philosopher, for the critical theologian, for the religious lay-philosopher…?! (50)

	…nothing other than the relational fact that there can be no ultimate difference between an objective genitive and a subjective genitive, and, that with respect to the hypothetical nature of divine love the same applies likewise and lifewise! Namely, in ultimate terms of reference, that the objective love of the divine (or Divine) can be no different from the subjective love of the divine (or Divine) hence creation/re-creation of an objective genitive must be reflected in the creation/re-creation of a subjective genitive, and v.v…! (51)

	Let me now re-argue this conclusion in greater detail, and, in the process demonstrate what religious consequences might hypothetically be seen to flow from its tentative embrace. (52)

At the beginning of the second section of this essay I boldly stated that all forms of love are expressions of divine love! This argument proceeds, more or less,  as follows:

1.	Given the acceptance of a positive theological difference
2.	Because the possibility of the same implies its necessary existence in some form or other
3.	And all forms of identity are relationally generated
4.	And that all relational excess is effectively of the same nature as 'love'
5.	It follows through this theological unification of the life-world
6.	That the greater the quantity and quality of this loving relational excess that is found to be present the relatively closer, epistemologically, that identity is to the relatively divine.
7.	Hence as this relational aspect is relatively closer to this sense of divinity, this sense of the divine, it follows in this one world-of-life that all forms of love, in effect, are expressions of divine love! 
8.	Given the integrity of the theologicalization of the life-world.
9.	Moreover, given this theological unity of the life-world it follows that if there is a loving relationship then that relational excess, 'love', is shared by its participating parties.
10.	Then, in the egological examination of that relationship it follows that an objective genitive and a subjective genitive centred in the same relationship must overlap the same psychic territory of that relationship
11.	Hence their mutual co-identity when considered from the point of view of that relationship! (53)

Or, to put this argument in the format of a set of sentences we might more succinctly say: In a relationship the relational excess, i.e., love, is generated by the parties concerned and is spread equally throughout that relational space, albeit perceived from the point of view of those parties therein. It therefore follows that for those parties, with respect to this relational excess, that the essential content of an objective genitive concerned with this same topic is equal to the essential content of a subjective genitive concerned with that same topic, and v.v., regardless of the participants in that relationship. (54)

	Or, as our topic is 'divine love' in its genitive form, i.e., 'the love of the divine' along with the ambiguity of that statement as to whether we are referring to 'our love of the divine' or 'that love possessed by the divine for us', it follows, hypothetically, that there can only be one love between the same, albeit only a difference in perspective, hence the equivalence between this objective genitive and subjective genitive in this respect. It now behoves us, at this point in time, to ask two further questions 'can one party in this relationship influence how another might come to experience or re-experience this relational excess or 'love'?' and 'how does one party in a relationship come to see the 'trace', 'presence', and/or 'absence', of another party?' More specifically, with respect to this particular topic of divine love, these two questions can be rephrased in the following manner - 'can a person in their interaction with the divine influence the divine in any form?', and 'can a person in their interaction with the divine perceive the divine, as the divine qua divine, in some form or other?' Let me remind the reader/audience that under the umbrella of a transcendental suspension our research will continue to consider such questions in a hypothetically frame of reference! In the conclusion to this essay let me consider the second question first. (55)

3.   Conclusion

	Hypothetically, the phenomenological sense of the divine, its 'place' in a mapping of the life-world, could be defined as 'that relationally oriented in the hierarchical context of this hypothetical theological treatment of the relative unity of the life-world'. With this definition in mind it stands to reason, in any desired interpretation, perception and/or realization of the same, that the object of our focus should be relationally oriented. Therefore, the sense of the divine could not be 'focused upon' in a reductive manner. Therefore, the divine could not be 'directly' perceived through any one of our senses; furthermore, the divine could not be 'directly' perceived through a telescope nor through a microscope nor some other scientific instrument, but, on the other hand, the 'trace' of the divine, the materialized manner of its rooteded in this world-of-life might be indirectly engaged either partially and/or contextually. As discussed elsewhere, the essential nature of a relationship is imprinted on the relational space, or body', of that relationship. Hence its imprinting on the material fabric of that relational space. Perception and the appropriate interpretation of that imprint alerting us, by 'reverse engineering', as to the essential nature of that relationship. Hence the divine in being in a necessary relationship with the world, for it to be there-for-us, implies that it leaves a 'trace' upon the fabric of this world. But this aspect of our reply must be analysed elsewhere after an examination of what is needed for a valid interpretation be first formulated. Before examining these two other types of perception dealing with 'presence' and 'absence' let me follow up the implications of this point that as the divine is relationally oriented, by definition, it should be the case that only through an examination of the relational in orientation will we find, if we are to find, an appropriate path to succeed in this endeavour. (56)

Let me examine the following example as a correlative example of what I am trying to say here. In looking at a broom we cannot find the broomness of that broom in either its head or handle. Moreover, correctly the broomness of the broom cannot be inspected merely by observing the broom as a mere object in the world. How are we to know that object as a broom through its mere inspection? Only by observing a broom in a broom context, on a number of occasion, and inferring the properties of what-it-means-to-be-a-broom in a broom-context, or, actually already knowing the meta-textual conventions of what is meant when we consider a broom to be a broom, can we move on so to speak and understand what a broom-like-object is. This understanding can never be purely reductive, indeed, being realized in and through the auspices of a hermeneutic circle implies that our discrimination is a product of textual reduction, meta-textual reconstitution and non-textual existential experience. Hence our merely seeing a broom is not going to tell us it is a broom if we don't already possess all three of these (correlative) senses of the phenomenological, the hermeneutical and the existential along with an overall sense of all three through a sense of the not-textual wherein we directly engage with the intentional object itself as an object, albeit as an object(-state) in the life-world and not in the so called 'external world' (or 'internal world'). In opposition to this relational way of seeing things someone might object and say that even in the broom-head one can still see a broom, indeed, use it to sweep albeit with some difficulty. In reply we might like to add that if the object was a clock its sense of unity would be less likely be found in its parts unless one already realized the nature of those parts through a meta-understanding of the genre of clock. Then, again, if we were to examine a living organism of even greater complexity than a clock we would have an even greater difficulty, if not the impossibility, of understanding what that object is in its relationship with us in and through this world-of-life. Hence the relationally oriented is not appreciated through the reductive treatment of our senses either assisted or non-assisted (by scientific instruments, etc.). (57)

	A 'trace', as previously argued, is the imprinted deposition of a relationship upon the material fabric of its relational space. So a coal-miner's activities of being a coal-miner will leave an imprint of having been a coal-miner upon the body of that miner. Or, if one were a long-time prize fighter in boxing one might expect to find injuries in keeping with this person's profession upon their face such as, e.g., cauliflower ears, etc. I recently read in a paper that drivers falling asleep at the wheel of their cars usually leave little or no tire marks in the course of their accidents on the road. In the light of this comment we might like to say that a 'trace' is deposited intentionally, semi-intentionally (like the sleeping car driver) and non-intentionally. On the other hand, in keeping with the nature of a process theology (as explored in these essays) we might prefer to make no absolute distinction between 'intentional traces' and 'non-intentional traces' and instead perceive only degrees of epistemological organization (so in this light we might say a rock has its own degree of epistemological organization and that a human being has a higher degree of epistemological organization and that a divine entity of some form or other has a relatively higher degree, etc.). A 'trace', therefore, is essentially the material fabric that appears to have some discernible sense of identity. Our ability to discern identity alerting us to the fact that we must have some idea as to the meta-nature of the relationship involved in order to appreciate the specific nature of its particular genre of identity. Our appreciation of this meta-nature allowing us to interpret that identity as a type of phenomenon in keeping with the nature of that type of phenomenon. Hence our ability to discern the nature of 'traces' is necessarily depend upon this meta-knowledge of genres. So, an interpretation of 'theologically-oriented traces' would necessitate this prior meta-textual knowledge and the ability to use such a discipline… but such a topic I will have to examine elsewhere. (58)

	Instead, let me now focus on a 'direct establishment' of theological identity, at least in a theoretical (and hypothetical) framework. In this regard I would like to briefly look at the provisional concepts of  'presence' and 'absence'. If we were to meet someone we might say we experience their sense of 'presence'. 'Presence' is a transcendentally treated concept that does not imply that there is an actual substantial presence only the phenomenon of the presentation of a distinctive sense of a-being-met-there by some person or community who find themselves being witness to its existential distinctness, uniqueness along with an element of freedom or indeterminable ness or unpredictableness (as directly indicative of the degree of the epistemological organization presented by that object-state met in that encounter or series of encounters). On the other hand, having met this sense of presence and then finding it currently absent, contrary to expectations,  now presents us with the phenomenon of 'absence'. (59)

	In the 'one' world metaphysics of the life-world there can be no true representations, only re-presentations. Furthermore, it must mean that we are both ‘in direct contact with those object-states experienced in those processes of simulation (or, i.e., as processes of re-simulation)’ and ‘experientially aware that we are in a process of direct contact (through our discriminative reflections)’. All is simulated and all is re-simulated. There is no 'pre-simulation' nor 'that which is not simulated of which the re-simulation is a simulation of, etc.'! Moreover, in a theological frame of reference the same rules of engagement must apply! Furthermore, on retrospection the same types of 'rules of interpretation' will again have to apply, be formulated, be implicitly or explicitly expressed, etc. (60)

	On the assumptions that there is a positive theological difference, that are we resident in the one-world-of the life-world, that all relationships must imprint themselves upon the material fabric of the world we are now left with the remaining aspects of this first question, namely, how are we to retrospectively interpret what it might mean to encounter the 'trace', the 'presence' and/or the 'absence' of the divine or the Divine in our passage through this world-of-life? Moreover, do we, with this set of assumptions, as listed above, need to continue to make this distinction between a sense of 'the divine' and a sense of 'the Divine' wherein the latter is egologically constituted with both a passive and an active disposition, etc., i.e., constituted in such a manner that they, through acts of will, can egologically intervene within the course of the material world rather than merely register its impingement upon what would be a lesser sense of divinity? As theological treatment of the life-world in its formation of  divinity must be greater that the collective epistemological organization of human individuals and communities it follows that we must assume, once the ‘divine’ exists, that the Divine must exists in various forms reflecting the possession and transcendence of these degrees of epistemological organization. Despite the mere theologicalization of the life-world through its hierarchical epistemological organization this egologically implicated hierarchy must reflect this hierarchical theological formation. All levels of theologicalization finding an imprint upon the material fabric of the world, however, this 'fact' needs to be ascertained interpretively through a retrospective appreciation of the same. Suffice to say that it is through the entirety of the hermeneutic circle, in the recognition of a relationally oriented state of affairs, and through recognition of epistemological complexity that this ‘re-cognition’ should come to the fore. With these issues in mind let me now move onto our other question to be entertained in this conclusion, namely, 'can a person in their interaction with the divine influence the divine in any form?' (61)

	As a simple answer to this question let me state the principle that "a relationship is constituted in through its participating parties and must reflect all changes that occur in the body of that relationship but not necessarily changing its essential nature and the genres of those interactions in the process". Hence, we must assume, that our changing contributions to a relationship with the Divine must alter the form of that relationship both from our own point of view and the point of view of the Divine as the-other-as-also-there-before-us, although we cannot conclude that its capacity to act has been altered or activated to a degree necessitated through the nature of that interaction to also be the-other-as-also-there-for-us (be it through a petition, a mantra, a prayer, an act of magic, a process of ritual,  or the disciplines of meditation or any other 'spiritual' exercise, etc.). With this hypothetical reply to this hypothetical question let now look at the asymmetrical nature of the relationship between a devoted mother and her child to see what light, if any, might be cast in such an asymmetrical relationship as that must exist hypothetically between the Divine and our own sense of self. (62)

	As argued previously, through the coincidence of the objective genitive and the subjective genitive from the perspective of the relationship itself, from the relational point of view of that 'loving mother and her child' there can be no real difference from 'the love experienced by the child for its mother' and 'the love experienced by the mother for her child' from the perspective of that relationship itself! That being the case, that relational love, the relational excess re-created within that relationship, although experienced from the point of views of the direct participants within that relationship, must be experienced in the form of an ongoing dialogue given the 'fact' that the process nature of the relationship, as put into effect by its participating parties, must reflect these changing inputs brought to that relationship though these changing contributions! In other words, all changes contributed by the participants of a relationship must be simulated/re-simulated in and through the form of a dialogue despite what ever asymmetries might be found in that relationship. And this is as we would expect. The mother loves her child and that child, to some extent, must be able to experience that affection in the manner that it is able to do so. So, even if mother nursed a toy baby thinking it was a child, despite her delusion and the object of her attention being a baby doll, in some insignificant, minor sense that doll will be able to register and share in that misdirected affection, albeit not in the manner that a real baby would. Through forms of intervention the child smiles, the mother smiles and soon they both come to know how to smile together, and, not before too long the baby has acquired the genre of 'smiling to another person', etc., hence from this simple example we can see how a dialogue could be entered into despite the asymmetries in the epistemological status between these two individuals! (63)

	To finally conclude let me note that this understanding of a relational philosophy inclines us to envisage the possibility of a ‘dialogue’ between all the parties of the relationship and that in a theologically implicated relationship the same principle must apply. In the next essay let us see what might be implied in 'an ongoing dialogue with the Divine' despite the asymmetrical nature of the same, and, just what implications this must have for a theologian in their understanding of what might be meant by 'the process of continuing this process of a divine dialogue…? A divine relationship grounded in 'love', found 'through love', left open-ended through 'the boundless nature of love' in all its profoundness… a relationship experienced and interpreted through the auspices of the hermeneutic circle (of theological comprehension) in its entirety… from its own relational point(s) of view..!? Hence the concept of a divine conversation… and the associated concept of a continuing of the divine conversation… Asking ourselves in the process what form or forms this ‘dialogue’ might take, and, how do we know when we are actually entering into a dialogue with the Divine…? (64)

							Noël Tointon, Sydney, 15.8.02.
Appendix I - Parallel Modalities in the Description of Relational Moments

      Modality		Moment I 	 	Moment II  		Moment III

1.	Harmonic Frame	Preparational	 	Dissonance		Harmonic
      of Reference:	  Consonance				  	  Resolution

2.	Gestalt Frame	Background		 Foreground 		Egological
      of Reference:           Field of 		   Field of		  Interaction
      Consonance	    Dissonance

3.   Phenomenological   World		Object			Ego
      Frame of reference:

4.	Textual Frame	Meta-Text		Text			Non-text
      of  reference:

5.   Domain:		Hermeneutical 	Phenomenological 	Existential

6.   Characteristic	Meaning		Sense			Meaningfulness
      Sphere of Interest:

7.	Time 		Future			Past			Present
      Orientation: 

8.	Physical 		Systems		Emissions		Currents
      Interaction:

9.	Nature of		Mere repetition	Sheer repetition	Bare repetition
Repetition:

10.	Literary		Rhetorical		Metaphorical		Resolutional 
Nature:								            ('Turn')

11.	Physical		Space (expansive)	Space (contractive)	Time
Frame of Reference:

12.	Investigative	Synthetic/		Analytic/		Suspended
Style:		  Re-constitutive	  Reductive

13.	Intentional	Protention		Retention		Simulation
Style:

Appendix II - A Summary of the Main Point of this Essay

1.	That as critical philosophers and/or critical theologians 'we should not dichotomously divide the phenomenal world into epistemological spheres and ontological spheres!' Rather, we should see all forms of identity in the life-world as occupying the middle ground wherein all forms of identity can be regarded as 'experiencing themselves and the rest of the world from their point(s) of view', i.e., as both actively and passively suffering 'their' unfolding of 'their course of development in the life-world'! (5)
2.	The 'quality of the love suffered' by the parties in a certain relationship is dependent upon their degree of epistemological organization; this monothematic blanket covering all hypothetical forms of divinity as might be envisaged in a process theology. On the other hand the 'quantity of love suffered' by a relational party is dependent upon the relational facticity of that relationship which can be defined as 'the emergent relational excess shared by that relationship equally from all points within the relational space of that relationship minus the sum of its material part(icipant)s considered from a relatively material perspective'. (14)
3.	Starting with a set of three or more primary parties we have in a effect a system whose course cannot be non-chaotically determined unless the orbits of those parties inscribe a non-chaotic pattern. Two primary parties in a relation constitute what might best be called a current which normally operates in a deterministic frame of reference (if left undisturbed). One primary party in a relational field constitutes an emission which also normally operates in a deterministic frame of reference (if left undisturbed). These three distinctions of systems, currents and emissions are artificial distinctions as, correctly, on a deeper level or in a greater context they are but three ideal (archetypal) facets or aspects of all relationships and ideally mirror the nature of our three moments, i.e., in the following order of resolution, consonance and dissonance. (19)
4.	That all forms of love are expressions of divine love	! (23)
5.	In the context of a process theology 'all forms of divinity' can be defined as 'those states of affairs whose epistemological level of organization is greater than that of a certain individual and/or community of individuals'. In this light a religious institution cannot be treated as divine. On the other hand, overlooking this rider "is greater than that of a certain individual and/or community of individuals" any state of affairs could be treated as relatively more divine than some other through the possession of a relatively greater level of epistemological (self-)organization. (24)
6.	The exchange of information is always in and through a material format of some form or other plus the 'perception' of a meta-frame of reference that allows those parties, participating in that kind of relationship, to 'suffer' the sense, meaning and meaningfulness of that act of relationship. (29)
7.	As a relational fact that there can be no ultimate difference between an objective genitive and a subjective genitive, and, that with respect to the hypothetical nature of divine love the same applies likewise and lifewise! Namely, in ultimate terms of reference, that the objective love of the divine (or Divine) can be no different from the subjective love of the divine (or Divine) hence creation/re-creation of an objective genitive must be reflected in the creation/re-creation of a subjective genitive, and v.v…! (52)
8.	At the beginning of the second section of this essay I boldly stated that all forms of love are expressions of divine love! This argument proceeds, more or less,  as follows:

1.	Given the acceptance of a positive theological difference
2.	Because the possibility of the same implies its necessary existence in some form or other
3.	And all forms of identity are relationally generated
4.	And that all relational excess is effectively of the same nature as 'love'
5.	It follows through this theological unification of the life-world
6.	That the greater the quantity and quality of this loving relational excess that is found to be present the relatively closer, epistemologically, that identity is to the relatively divine.
7.	Hence as this relational aspect is relatively closer to this sense of divinity, this sense of the divine, it follows in this one world-of-life that all forms of love, in effect, are expressions of divine love! 
8.	Given the integrity of the theologicalization of the life-world.
9.	Moreover, given this theological unity of the life-world it follows that if there is a loving relationship then that relational excess, 'love', is shared by its participating parties.
10.	Then, in the egological examination of that relationship it follows that an objective genitive and a subjective genitive centred in the same relationship must overlap the same psychic territory of that relationship
11.	Hence their mutual co-identity when considered from the point of view of that relationship! (53)

9.	Or, to put this argument in the format of a set of sentences we might more succinctly say: In a relationship the relational excess, i.e., love, is generated by the parties concerned and is spread equally throughout that relational space, albeit perceived from the point of view of those parties therein. It therefore follows that for those parties, with respect to this relational excess, that the essential content of an objective genitive concerned with this same topic is equal to the essential content of a subjective genitive concerned with that same topic, and v.v., regardless of the participants in that relationship. (54)
10.	Or, as our topic is 'divine love' in its genitive form, i.e.,  'the love of the divine' along with the ambiguity of that statement as to whether we are referring to 'our love of the divine' or 'that love possessed by the divine for us', it follows, hypothetically, that there can only be one love between the same, albeit only a difference in perspective, hence the equivalence between this objective genitive and subjective genitive in this respect. (55)
11.	That as the divine is relationally oriented, by definition, it should be the case that only through an examination of the relational in orientation will we find, if we are to find, an appropriate path to succeed in this endeavour. (56)
12.	A 'trace' is the imprinted deposition of a relationship upon the material fabric of its relational space. If we were to meet someone we might say we experience their sense of 'presence'. 'Presence' is a transcendentally treated concept that does not imply that there is an actual substantial presence only the phenomenon of the presentation of a distinctive sense of a-being-met-there by some person or community who find themselves being witness to its existential distinctness, uniqueness along with an element of freedom or indeterminableness or unpredictableness (as directly indicative of the degree of the epistemological organization presented by that object-state met in that encounter or series of encounters). On the other hand, having met this sense of presence and then finding it currently absent, contrary to expectations, now presents us with the phenomenon of 'absence'. (54)
13.	As theological treatment of the life-world in its formation of divinity must be greater that the collective epistemological organization of human individuals and communities it follows that we must assume that the Divine must exists in various forms reflecting the possession and transcendence of these degrees of epistemological organization. Despite the mere theologicalization of the life-world through its hierarchical epistemological organization this egologically implicated hierarchy must reflect this hierarchical theological formation. All levels of theologicalization finding an imprint upon the material fabric of the world, however, this 'fact' needs to be ascertained interpretively through a retrospective appreciation of the same. Suffice to say that it is through the entirety of the hermeneutic circle, in the recognition of a relationally oriented state of affairs, and through a recognition of epistemological complexity that this recognition should come to the fore. (61)
15.	What might be implied in 'an ongoing dialogue with the Divine' despite the asymmetrical nature of the same, and, just what implications this must have for a theologian in their understanding of what might be meant by 'the process of continuing this process of a divine dialogue…? Asking ourselves in the process what form or forms this ‘dialogue’ might take, and, how do we know when we are actually entering into a dialogue with the Divine…? (64)