Finding a Place for the Idea of God – Part VIII:
On Continuing and Extending the 'Divine Conversation'??

0.   Introduction

	As a non-systematic introduction to this eight essay a short paper was written titled: An Introduction to Part VIII: Subtitled - Dead or Alive?: The Examination and Intersection of Three Arguments In a Skeleton Format For an Positive, Actual and Personal Theological Difference? I will use the Summary in Section 6. as a basic text to establish the theme of this essay, namely, an exploration of the significance of the concept of a divine conversation as a divine dialogue with the phenomenal, specifically ego-oriented entities such as ourselves. To do this I will write a detailed commentary on the ten points entailed within that document in the process exploring the presuppositonal philosophies at work in the complex argument and thereby critically testing the links and overall consequences of the same. Once this has been established I will then look more closely at this topic of a dialogue on the grounds that a theological position, along with its imputed existential significance, must argue for this type of a two-way interactive process in order to establish the meaningful existence for-us of such a philosophy. (1)

1.	  Commentary on the Summary in Ten Points

The text is as follows - the addition of footnotes classifying the types of philosophies that will be looked at presuppositionally in order to better attempt the successful running of this type of argument: 

(6.)   Basic Summary of this Complex Argument (in Three Dimensions)

1.	We can envisage a world with some sense of the divine and, in contrast, a world without the same. This is the concept of theological difference!
2.	Both possibilities cannot be absolutely actualized hence the reality of the matter must lie between (and at least one of those possibilities is able to be envisioned, namely, a relative sense of world by itself without going to the trouble of envisaging some sense of the divine in association with the same; therefore, we are presuppositionally starting from a position of actualized/actualizable-possibility)!
3.	Therefore, the necessary existence in some form or other of both a positive and a negative theological difference; but, a ‘sense of a world with some sense of the divine’ minus a ‘mere sense of world’ gives us a positive theological residue! Hence our ‘horizontal first dimension’!
4.	Because all relationships are themselves in a (presuppositionally necessary) relational context it implies that all relationships are epistemologically-like-oriented in organization (on par with the non-substantial emergence of personal identity [mistakenly reified in the form of an absolutistic sense of ego]). Hence the implication of a vertical second dimension’!
5.	But the possibility of personal identity entailed in this ‘vertical second dimension’ cannot remain as a ‘pure possibility’ hence its possible-actuality in some form or other!
6.	And this possible-actuality in some form or other not being merely simple, as simples cannot be thought in a pure form, correctly implies that it must take some form of a trans-simple-complex format! Hence the personal third dimension!
7.	But such a ‘non-substantial complex entity’ must be in a relationship with itself hence the implication of a process theological complexion and thence our 'fourth dimension'!
8.	Hence the implication of a holistic ongoing divine conversation(al two-way 'dialogue') between relative totalities as personal identities (as phenomenally apparent, non-substantially based egos) and their matrix of interactive factors be they ego-directed and/or non-ego-directed in complexion!
9.	Moreover, in this complex divine sense of personal identity there can be no absolute personification of evil as evil is the deprivation of the integrated totality of the relatively good. To that extent, therefore, a positive theological difference must manifest itself as relatively ethical! And this forms, in part, the theological nature of all such trans-simple-complex-divine-like entities/entities (in the ideal, hypothetical ‘space’ of this complex argument)!
10.	Such divinity being ‘reflected’ in all forms of agency through holistic meta-transformational treatment (ontologically and/or epistemologically, or, more correctly, in a non-substantial trans-ontological-epistemological format) (through the ‘divine imprint’ being stamped on all aspects of the living-world involving a sense of agency)! Implying, in this qualified sense, that we too must partake of divinity, operate within the Divine!! [(39)] (2)

2.   Commentary

	To conduct this commentary I will look at each verse individually, quoting it at beginning of that section. (3)

	1.	We can envisage a world with some sense of the divine and, in contrast, a world without the same. This is the concept of theological difference!

	As previously noted this simple concept is the difference between the two concepts of the 'world with some envisaged form of the divine' and the 'world without some envisaged form of the divine'. What that form of the divine is or is not is left open in this hypothetical argument. However, the argument does hinge on the rationality of invoking some sense of the divine, i.e., does this open concept of the divine hypothetically possess significance, i.e., sense, meaning and/or meaningfulness. This type of question has already been dealt with in the course of my essays to date on this subject. E.g., in Part I a relative (non-absolute, phenomenally embodied) sense of the divine was argued for as a hypothetical possibility, i.e., as found to possess sense in so far as the life-world in our cultural-intercultural psychic mapping of the same recognized such a category-type regardless of whether we were a non-atheist or an atheist. This line of research, indicated in the title of this series of essays, continuing to the possible relevance this concept might possess. A theologian taking a positive interpretation of this meta-concept. (4)

2.	Both possibilities cannot be absolutely actualized hence the reality of the matter must lie between (and at least one of those possibilities is able to be envisioned, namely, a relative sense of world by itself without going to the trouble of envisaging some sense of the divine in association with the same; therefore, we are presuppositionally starting from a position of actualized/actualizable-possibility.

	Moreover the 'world', read 'life-world', is a concept that is treated as relatively actual since without this presuppositional pre-condition the argument could not be run! E.g., one could imagine a world with 'unicorns with horns' and a world with 'unicorns without horns', but, since unicorns are only mythical creatures that existence is only mythical likewise both in form and in fact (as a mythical 'fact'). Hence as the world is a transcendental given (otherwise we could not run this argument) and the sense of the divine has some degree of sense, etc., we can now sensibly state this tautological meta-concept of theological difference. (5)

	Demarcational/correlative theory states that no concept can be absolutely demarcated and differentiated from its contrary concept as all concepts are determined in a gestalt field as correlatives. Hence the correlatives of possibility and actuality cannot be individually thought a part in a pure form as neither pure actuality nor pure potentiality! As neither correlative could be epistemologically thought in absolute terms of reference it follows that they can neither be met ontologically nor factually (as they could not be recognized, etc.). As a result we must adopt a middle-type of position where some sense of the divine is realizable in its potential-actuality/actual(izable)-potentiality. Now our argument is no longer situated in (the horizontal dimension of the) logical 'space' of a simple theological difference to the extent that the envisaged actual-potentiality and potential-actuality are not regarded simply and/or equally. This is the form of our argument - how that form is to be individually cashed out in a particular theological vision is another matter! Hence the need for the adoption of an individualized vision of the theological in the midst of those open possibilities, a task for the theologian, rather than the philosopher, in this instance; although, a critical transcendental-perspective should still be maintained! (6)

3.	Therefore, the necessary existence in some form or other of both a positive and a negative theological differences; but, a ‘sense of a world with some sense of the divine’ minus a ‘mere sense of world’ gives us a positive theological residue! Hence our ‘horizontal first dimension’!
	
	Already this residue has been argued for as the result of this situation between the impossible to obtain poles of pure potentiality and pure actuality, as neither pole has a precedence, real priority or ‘privilege’ over the other! However, this position is tempered by the fact that the 'synthetic' form that residue will take cannot be determined a priori! (7)

	In the conduct of a transcendental position the exercise of a transcendental suspension is prioritized. Hence no precedence, priority or ‘privilege’ can be accorded to any of the parties and/or the modalities they enter into. Too often in Western Philosophy there is a priority given to potentiality. A possibility must first exist before actuality can be established (epistemologically and ontologically). To balance that form of bias we should note that no form of identity (and self-identity) can come into 'existence' without having its roots in the actuality of the life-world from which possibility is then thematized as a rearrangement of elements culturally accepted as actual or actual in type. Now, if our investigations call for a particular type of bias so be it, but, in a transcendental examination even the relatively 'fundamental' polarity between the epistemological and the ontological is collapsed, ignored, accommodated, overcome, transcended, etc., etc. And the technique to achieve this is through invoking anti-bias, contrary prejudices, etc., the suspension being achieved through their effective accommodation and neutralization therein. (8)

	Now, let me run this residue argument with the mythical category of unicorns in order to indicate the implication of its universal application. One could imagine 'a world with unicorns' and one could imagine 'a world without unicorns'. According to demarcational theory neither of these two pure possibilities can be entertained in a pure form either epistemologically or ontologically (as that relatively more fundamental polarity, in turn, cannot be thought in a purified format and/or in an absolutely pure form). Consequently we must envisage a world where the truth resides between these two 'possibilities'. Hence a world with the residue of 'unicorns' must exist in some form or other! How do we cash out the synthetic reality of such a beastie? First let me run another residue argument to demonstrate what could be involved here, or at least sketch out a likely resolution of this rhetorical question "in what form do unicorns exist in the real world?" Imagine 'a world with unicorns with horns' and 'a world with unicorns without horns'. The residue resolution of this piece of rhetoric would be  a world of unicorns with and without horns in some form or other - again the synthetics would not be cashed out in an a priori manner. Now, 'unicorns without horns' are in fact, in their essential configuration, horses! Horses exist in this world, or certainly at this moment in time on this planet. Do non-mythical horse have horns? No! Those that do are unicorns which exist only in a mythical world of European Mythology - our visualization of unicorns 'coming together' through supplying 'actual horse possibilities' with 'actual horn possibilities', a combination that to the best of our current knowledge does not occur nor has occurred in natural history. What implications does this have for our 'theological residue'? (9)

	For a start forms of identity through having their roots in the real world of the life-world can be cashed out both on a fragmentary 'elemental' basis and on holistic basis. On a holistic basis 'unicorns' 'exist' in European Mythology, and, on a elemental basis actually exist as horses and horns but not in a form that involves their factual conjunction. So problem solved! But where does that leave us as theologically oriented  philosophers or theologians? How does one dialectically finesse this so-called theological residue? And how legitimate is this synthetical treatment wherein the residue is cashed out as a paid up member of the life-world? (10)

	The resolution of this problem must begin with an examination of the manner of the conception of the divine being entertained in order to examine the possible synthetic state of that concept holistically and elementally. In other words we must determine the sense or senses of this expression the 'divine'. (11)

In the course of these papers I have suggested that the divine does possess some form of sense because, as I have argued (in my first essay, etc.) our psychic mapping of the life-world does possess some sense of place for such a concept as it is usual for even an atheist to know what is being meant by such an expression even if their philosophical understanding of the world envisages the proposal of its 'absence' through the 'non-factual presence' of such an identity/entity. As even its 'absence' suggests that this type of concept has a place within our world of culture (even if it were, in turn, it were to be hypothetically denied by that culture). (12)

Of course, as long as we do not constructively thematize the definitive sense of that sense we can only deal with such a concept at the level of its holistic generality. Can this argument still run at this non-specific level of intentional manipulation? To what extent are metaphors, rhetorical devices, etc., allowed to literally exist (in its literal construction)? The divine may be thought of metaphorically as a father, e.g., to what extent could it be a father, or, in what aspects of fatherhood, can the divine find itself functioning for us in the same such manner? Rather than answer my own rhetorical questions in this regard (since I am only giving an example of such specification) let me, at this stage, merely note the form, as here suggested, that this overall (level of) resolution must entertain, noting, in the process, that our theological residue can only be accorded a (forever) provisional treatment at the level of the holistic (until such a time that a theologian were to specify how their concept might be constructed elementally and to what degree metaphors involved in this constructive theology do have a literal resonance for them [and for us?] in the life-world). (13)

	In summary I would like to note, therefore, that as the concept of the divine appears to have sense (in the cultural-intercultural psychic mapping of the life-world) it follows that at least on a holistic level a theological residue is a sensible project regardless of whether it to be found with or without a depth of meaning and meaningfulness for us/for others in this regard. That all attempts to dialectically determine possible syntheticality on an elemental level must wait until such a level of specific construction is attempted by a theologian. That, in the meantime, we can continue in our investigations as long as they are left in a general holistic form and/or format by treating only this overall field of possibility rather than any particular 'synthetic'/non-synthetic specification of the same. (14)

	Hence the establishment of the 'horizontal aspect' of our overall argument through the establishment of a theological residue in the midst of our understanding of theological difference qualified by the fact that we cannot synthetically 'cash out' the synthetic form(at) of such identity or entity except on a general holistic level of examination. In other words through, the existence of the general sense of this cultural expression of the 'divine' we can assume that in some form and/or format such an identity/entity can be granted a provisional existence on a non-elemental synthetic basis. Therefore, the divine must exist in some form/format but in what factual form/format that would take is another matter (being correctly, one for the theologian to construct and/or demonstrate?)! (15)

	Now demonic difference was broached previously. Does this allied concept of a demonic residue make sense and if so in what regard would it impact on a theological residue? (16)

	Assuming this concept of residue is valid then this rhetorical position of a demonic difference and its demonic residue could well undercut the apparent uniqueness of a theological residue. Indeed, open the door to the actuality of anything and everything? But, perhaps, the life-world is just that, in a sense, a meeting of all parallel worlds in the apparent actuality of this one-world-of-life, a realm of existence that is amenable to scientific research, historical research, phenomenological and philosophical research, etc. (without demanding the one hundred per cent realization of an absolutely 'actual' world since pure actuality could neither be thought nor recognized!). Let me therefore explore some of the ramifications of this rhetorically proposed position. (17)

	One can envisage 'a world with a sense of the demonic', say Satan and his minions', and, 'one can envisage a world without some sense of the demonic', i.e., 'the absence of Satan and his minions'. Subtracting these two visions of the world leaves 'Satan and his minions' as an understanding of the expression 'demonic', an expression whose reality of content must inhabit a world between the purely possible and the purely actual. But, as noted previously, if 'demonic' is equal to 'evil in some form or other', then, if 'evil' is perceived as 'the subtraction of the good', or, 'the deprivation of the relatively good' it must follow that absolute evil, as a matter of course, could not exist being then the complete absence of its own existence. Hence 'Satan and his minions' could only have a subsidiary existence and a relative form at that, such specification being only metaphorical, i.e., 'as if there were a devil called Satan with his minions', etc. Whether evil could be actually personified is another matter. On the other hand, gradations of goodness obviously have their place in this vision of the life-world through its attendant concepts of good faith, authenticity of being, etc., along with their correlative counterparts. What overall implications can be drawn from this (counter-)example? Perhaps not much more than the fact that once some concept is able to be visualized then its actuality is in place to some extent in some form and format, etc., along with its non-purified correlatives . That the life-world, essentially, is the dialectical-like resolution of all possibilities, itself the residue of this relative, interdependent, non-absolute 'provisional' ongoing process whose resolve allows us to deal with a sense of the present, as defined through an historical conjunction of past and future. (18)

4.	Because all relationships are themselves in a (presuppositionally necessary) relational context it implies that all relationships are epistemologically-like-oriented in organization (on par with the non-substantial emergence of personal identity [mistakenly reified in the form of an absolutistic sense of ego]). Hence the implication of a vertical second dimension’!

	This 'vertical' argument essentially works like this. (19)

	All situations have a context. Those context too have a context, etc. The greater the degree of epistemological organization the greater the sense of the divine must be present i(f)f the relative degree of epistemological organization is greater than that which would be normally present in the constitution of a person in this world-of-life! Hence the 'implication' of a 'vertical' orientation at this stage of our argument. Let me elaborate. (20)

	A group of individuals come together to form a committee. Those individuals interact in such a manner (through co-authored phenomena) so as to see the effective functioning of that committee and to see that the consequences of its deliberations will take effect even when that committee is not in active conclave. As a 'whole' the committee must be greater than the mere sum of its parts. It cannot be meaningfully reduced to a mere list of its members. Therefore, the committee has a form of life whose epistemological organization must be greater than that possessed by any one member since it is in existence through the functioning of its current members. It follows, therefore, that by definition our committee is, essentially, relatively more divine than any of its meeting participants (since the relatively 'divine' could be defined, in this light, as 'that set of relationships possessing a greater degree of epistemological organization'). Does it follow, however, that we can say that that committee in turn is included in an even greater context from an even wider epistemological point of view? By default, because we are all participants in this one-world-of-life hence this world-of-life must participate in some sense of relative-divine-being/becoming; being even greater than that possessed by our committee, etc., and all subsumed thereunder. The non-definitive, open boundaries or horizons of this argument ensuring its non-absolute, relative localization (otherwise we could argue, e.g., that, say, a 'committee for the oversight of committees' would be, is, a more divine identity/entity in this world than a mere committee subject to the same which would make a general nonsense of this expression the divine since an 'oversight committee' and a 'committee subject to oversight' are practically on the same ontological level of 'existence' [through transformational retreatment] since they could meet in the same room, comprise the same people, etc.). Hence the general drift of this argument (without exactly specifying how the relatively divine might be cashed out so to speak) implies, however, that the relatively divine should possess an epistemological-ontological degree of difference in order to relatively merit such an appellation. (21)

	In essence we could that because of the relative overall unity or integrity of the life-world we could say that all contexts are contextually bound in meta-contexts, etc. which through transformational treatment/retreatment could all be expressed/re-expressed in similar ontologically terms of reference. Yet, on the other hand, what ever epistemological structural-functions were therein subjected to such treatment/retreatment remain in essential form as an imprint of the same, but, that such structural-functions can only be recognized given the right hermeneutic frame of reference and the appropriate degree of fine grain analysis in order to recover an adequate degree of understanding as to the true, full import of that original text qua text! Not that any text is a mere text (including the hypothetical or non-hypothetical existence of the divine) since our experience of ‘text’ is as a ‘living text’ and/or a ‘reliving of that text’. In other words, in the context of the hermeneutic circle of comprehension, without the right pair of ‘spectacles’ we cannot see, could not see those features that would exist in that text and its textual-context, etc. This is an argument that I am merely (re-)introducing here as it will be taken up in later sections. However, to illustrate what I am attempting to suggest here let me recount the following analogy. (22)

	Let us imagine, in some form of an alternative reality, that we were very small entities, say the size of the smallest viral microbes and that if we had a mini-micro-submarine in which we could float around the circulatory structures of the human body and view what passed our micro-miniature windows and sensors, etc. It may well be that on that order of dimension, structures, and object-states found therein, would all look like a cosmic universe with swirling nebulae, etc. The point I am trying to make is, I am sure, that on that level of perception it would be hard to discern relatively vast structures, namely one human body, as not much more than swirling filaments of matter if we were in no position to know that our current context/state was actually inside a human body. That, as an analogy, our seeing the cosmos is on a par despite recognizing a common fractal symmetry implying its integrated self-organization. Our intuition may tell us that there is more than we can currently interpret hermeneutically from our inspection of this cosmic 'text', still, what that (relative, non-substantial, 'empty') ineluctable presence is or is not can only, currently, be made the subject of speculation(?). This metaphor (and analogy) of body, as a metaphor (and analogy) of body, is the only point I am trying to make here. Whether the self-organization of the universe constitutes an effective body for divinity is not being seriously entertained (except as a possibility to visualize in order to make this analogical point that appreciation is dependent upon the right frame of reference with the right degree of textual examination appropriate to the hypothetical nature of that under investigation. Otherwise all else hermeneutically escapes us!). On the other hand, that cosmic text remains a cosmic text with all relevant information essentially imprinted within the relativity and 'psychic' embrace of its relationship within the 'space' of that relationship. Given that same text and the discovery/recovery of the appropriate hermeneutic machinery necessary to appreciate that text in accordance with its true essential nature then, hypothetically, that same text would then be viewed in the light of that essential nature imprinted upon the same but hitherto was not available in a form that previously would have met with our recognition. In the analogy cited, if unaware of the full import of our current context of being in a human body we would float through this 'space' and not recognize it as a body, as a human body, unless we were hermeneutically aware that that interpretation was possible and would be established under an appropriate form of scrutiny as a fact. This essentialist understanding of the life-world implying that the entire cosmos through its interdependent relationship, in and on all of its levels of interaction, would be imprinted on each and every point with that universe be it a grain of sand; a person; an institution; some hypothetical, relative form of divinity, etc., etc. This type of conceptual frame of reference will be examine later in this paper. (23)

	Let me summarize some of the points that I am trying to make in relationship to this sense of the 'vertical', that all relational spaces are contextually bound (and re/treated) within the same. (24)

	That no relationship has an absolutely isolated form of existence. That all relationships are contextually bound, and those contextual frames of reference likewise. That the open-ended-totality of this infinite process of contextuallization is treated/retreated on a par with the text qua text! But what can be read from that text is dependent upon the appropriate level of hermeneutic apparatus being present and the associated degree of texture-recognition in conjunction with the same can be focused upon. Hence the lack of a certain desired form of recognition and encounter thereof does not in and of itself imply the absence of the same only its current lack of recognition which, at the same time, is not a passport for encountering that desired pattern of recognition since the actualization of the potential can only leave open the fact that it takes a form of actualization in some manner or other in some frame of reference as yet not determined or completely determined. Just as 'unicorns' only have a fractured existence through 'horses' and 'horns', and, an integrated form of existence only as mythological entities (and their textual depictions thereof)! So what we are looking for 'exists' but maybe not in the form we desire for its 'existence'. The religious person must, therefore, continually insist on the presence of an overall transcendental suspension (lest that religious person take on a [too prevalent] psychotic complexion in this regard through the absence of the same [as has been argued elsewhere that a psychosis ensures from the lack of an overall transcendental suspension, etc!]). Thus it behooves the truly religious person to adopt an appropriate degree of transcendental suspension, etc., in these matter (as elsewhere too)! (25)

5.	But the possibility of personal identity entailed in this ‘vertical second dimension’ cannot remain as a ‘pure possibility’ hence its possible-actuality in 
some form or other.

	Because there can be no absolute distinction between the ontological and the epistemological it follows that all structures/functions must be epistemologically organized in some form or other. Moreover, that being the case it implies the implication in some form or other of personal identity in some form or other. Furthermore, as a position that I would argue for, is the existential fact that if the necessary structures/functions are present that would constitute some form of personal identity then, in effect, that sense of personal identity is, already, in some form of personal existence; some sense of personal identity in keeping with the nature of that epistemological organization! So a machine remains a machine, an animal remains an animal, a human a human, etc., without any real absolute dichotomy between levels of epistemological organization other than to note the obvious that such identity may or may not be very 'personal' in its associated level of structural-functioning. Would I be correct to make this sweeping 'observation'; or, would it be correct to believe, as many do, that some form of soul or spirit, etc., must also be present in order to complete the equation? (26)

	'Force', 'spirit', 'soul', what ever…, in the context of embodiment, cannot function if absolutely disembodied. On the other hand if it were embodied it must play by the same rule book so to speak as if embodied, i.e., invoking only those 'conditions' in tune with such a concept and all conventional practices associated with the same. Hence the contribution speculatively made, or insisted upon, by soul et al, is already accounted for through the already current fact of embodiment. Hence those current causal processes, as conditions (and not metaphysical 'causes-and-effects' and all other forms of metaphysical reification), imply that they already operate in and through the fact of that organized form of embodiment. Hence such 'entities' are effectively the reification of processes already necessarily in place and as such can be completely dispensed with in that absolute form or format! Hence the re-establishment of this principle of embodiment that if all the necessary structural-functions are preconditionally present and conditionally integrated then it must follow that such a form of identity, personal or otherwise, must be present! Just as if a clock had all its parts, formed a coherent whole and was integrated in the manner that would allow it to work as a clock and was set up to work as a clock, then that clock would be exactly that - a functioning clock! As the clock can function dependent upon all its conditions that allow that to happen without a need to invoke the soul of that clock or some other metaphysical equivalent it follows that there is just no need for such an unnecessary optional extra. In a similar manner personal identity (and all other hypothetical forms of identity, divine or non-divine ['inherent' divinity being determined through the relative degree of epistemological organization present]) operates (although we must not equate a person with a mere machine since neither can be reduced to the other!) (albeit that those terms of operation dealing with a human individual function in more complex terms of organizational interdependence, i.e. with a richer complexion reflecting such epistemologicalization)! (27)

6.	And this possible-actuality in some form or other not being merely   simple, as simples cannot be thought in a pure form, correctly implies that it must take some form of a trans-simple-complex format! Hence the personal third dimension!

Superficially, the self appears as if a simple entity. However, such 'simplicity' is the result of a process of self-integration, the integrity of the relationship that 'entity' has with respect to itself. In phenomenological fact the self is a nested-cluster of intentional fields (and intentional-like fields in pre-intentional terms of reference, etc.) each with their own senses of self; hence, e.g., a perceptual sense of self, a visual sense of perceptual self, a conceptual sense of self, a judgmental sense of self, an emotional sense of self, etc., along with a concatenation of cultural senses of self, e.g., biological, legal, historical, religious or non-religious, professional, interrelational, etc. The import of this stage of our overall argument being the fact that if we are to invoke a sense of the divine with a personal complexion then we need to account for the fact that the complexion of self, as we know it phenomenologically, is not just a simplistic phenomenon but also a very rich one, i.e., a phenomenon that is enacted and maintained between the necessary degree of complexity on one hand and a degree of relative overall simplicity on the other. (28)

	In other words, given the necessary degree of epistemological-hierarchical stratification of the hypothetical theological phenomenon under investigation within the ambit of its own necessary degree of ongoing integration that, when present, would then allow us to argue that the potential-actuality/actual-potentiality of such a hypothetical phenomenon would then have the necessary density of complexion to allow it to take on the mask of a personality in a non-substantial sense. Again invoking the argument that if all structures of an overall sense of self are present, that if all functions of an overall sense of self are present, and, the necessary interrelation between these two polarities of the structural and the functional are also present then an equivalent sense of self is present too (on the previously argued grounds that if this level of an interrelationship is in place it has already been set up to function in such a manner! Hence, to all appearances, the functioning of an overall sense of self dependent upon that phenomenal form of an embodied history)! (29)

	Thence with the right density of 'complexion' and all necessary factors present an overall sense of self would, should present itself theologically. (30)

7.	But such a ‘non-substantial complex entity’ must be in a relationship with itself hence the implication of a process theological complexion and thence our 'fourth dimension'!

	All identity is treated (and retreated) in non-substantial terms of reference, i.e., non-absolutely and dependent upon all relatively internal factors or conditions (such as body/mind/mental-body or their psychic equivalents) and all relatively external factors or conditions (such as the environmental context of that overall sense of self). I must now ask the question "how can something be in a relationship with itself?" As a meta-question we might like to ask "does this type of question (as just previously noted) have any meaning?" In order to answer this latter question in the affirmative let me go straight to the answer that I would give to the first question, namely, that as no sense of self is neither simply simple nor independently isolated from its contextual environment then an overall sense of self can have a relationship with itself to the extent that its integrity is forged through an ongoing process of self-integration; such a process occupying the middle ground between an intentionally formed process of self-directed deliberation and an involuntary, non-premeditated sense of resolve. Through 'process' our fourth dimension alludes to the implication of a sense of the temporal. Let me examine this aspect a little bit more closely. (31)

	The first dimensional x-axis concerned with itself with theological difference/residue. The second dimensional y-axis concerned itself with the pre-conditions for a sense of self with an epistemological-hierarchical-contextual envelopment. A third dimension of the z-axis invoked a sense of the personal through the implication of the necessary degree of complexion (between simplicity and complexity). To argue for the same through the ongoing process of self-integration invoked an element of the transformational and its involvement of a sense of the temporal. Hence the allusion to a fourth dimension (since to be is to be embodied in some form or other and therein to occupy time-and-space). (32)

	As integrity of being is in evidence, and absolute integrity/non-integrity cannot be thought, it implies that 'integrity' must be realized in a process of integration, and, occupy that territory between simplicity and complexity. Integrity of being is apparently in evidence at all levels of the 'psychic universe' be that epistemological in orientation (from the organizational complexity of the simplest virus to the cultural complexity of an organization of persons) or ontological in orientation (from the simple quark to the vast filament-like expanses of inter-galactic space). Such ongoing integrity is the result of the process of an ongoing resolution of those forces that would disrupt the current integrity of those relationships that allow and maintain this manifestation of enduring identity. (32)

	Such integrity through epistemological complexity and its rich re-invagination of value production must spill over into an ethical dimension! However, just as the person is limited so too the divine, in what ever hypothetical manifestation subsumed for its self, must also be limited between the degree value is given/pre-given and is able to be produced/reproduced through preserving and augmenting the nature of those relationships it finds itself entering into through processes of intentional-like deliberation. Hence, this entrance into this fourth dimension of transformation would also be a given/pre-given affair tempered to some degree by produced/re-produced forms of value realized in and through processes of an intentional-like deliberation along with the consequences of such re-direction (and possible mis-direction?). (33)

	This temporalization of process implying the involvement of that embodied in some manner subject to transformation through the non-ultimate division of time-and-space. Hence the ultimate non-divisibility of these four dimensions! Thence the necessary implication of a process theology given the nature of this type of theological project. (33)

8.	Hence the implication of a holistic ongoing divine conversation(al  two-way 'dialogue') between relative totalities as personal identities (as phenomenally apparent, non-substantially based egos) and their matrix of interactive factors be they ego-directed and/or non-ego-directed in complexion!

	Having constructed this type of general and hypothetical theological 'space' involving embodiment, process, epistemological organization, and, insisting that if egological-like elements are present and integrated in the correct fashion with respect to each other then we must have just that, namely, some sense of divinity/divinities. Moreover, through egological superiority their intentional (and non-intentional) interaction(s) must be, on hypothetical grounds, within themselves, between other egological entities of an equivalent epistemological status, those entities of a greater status, those egological entities of lesser status (like ourselves) and non-egologically directed object-states. The non-absolute possibility of such options implying their collective actualization in some form or other! (34)

	Hence such interaction must take the form of a dialogue, albeit one that is provisional and circumscribed by the limitations imposed upon the nature of that relationship. A metaphorical 'dialogue' by virtue of the fact that all interaction is a two-way process (though not necessarily symmetrical in its power relations). (35)

	Given this hypothetical formation let me address the implications of the same within the limitations of this topic and the limitations imposed upon the limited extent of this paper. (36)

9.	Moreover, in this complex divine sense of personal identity there can be no absolute personification of evil as evil is the deprivation of the integrated totality of the relatively good. To that extent, therefore, a positive theological difference must manifest itself as relatively ethical! And this forms, in part, the theological nature of all such trans-simple-complex-divine-like entities/entities (in the ideal, hypothetical ‘space’ of this complex argument)!

	I have already address this observation by going though its negative implications, namely, that the relatively evil; as the relative deprivation of the 'good', i.e., that which possesses integrity from the point of view of that integrity, could not maintain its existence through the absolute deprivation of its integrity and still maintain that sense of identity. Hence, even though relative evil can exist it can only do so parasitic upon that which is good, i.e., upon that which possesses integrity (in all senses of that term as such integrity [of the epistemologically organized be it theological or non-theological in complexion] spills over into an ethical dimension as previously suggested). Let me instead, therefore, now outline these positive implications. (37)

	As experientially, i.e., epistemologically, "the whole is experienced as greater than the sum of its parts" it follows that integrity is an automatic surplus of value realized through such ongoing resolution of the relatively non-integrated. Therefore, that which is epistemologically greater than us through its incorporation of ourselves, e.g., within its ambit of inclusion, and being theological in complexion because of such over-inclusiveness, must possess a degree of integrity greater than any of its constituents implying, as a result, that theological complexion must include a degree of ethical integrity greater than our own! This pattern of being applying to all forms of theological-like being. Implicating, from its epistemological orientation, a greater degree of ethical resolution as a part of that greater degree of resolution realized through that process-transformation of the relatively non-authentic/non-theological. Hence the hypothetical nature of such divinity in its interaction with the relatively divine/relatively non-divine. (38)

10.	Such divinity being ‘reflected’ in all forms of agency through holistic meta-transformational treatment (ontologically and/or epistemologically, or, more correctly, in a non-substantial trans-ontological-epistemological format) (through the ‘divine imprint’ being stamped on all aspects of the living-world involving a sense of agency)! Implying, in this qualified sense, that we too must partake of divinity, operate within the Divine!!

	In some distinctive measure the relationship embraces the 'space' of that relationship and stamps upon it a trace of that distinctive nature. In our reading of that relational complexion, theoretically, we should be able to recover the overall import of that relationship be it theological or non-theological in the extent of its epistemological(-like) organization. But so much for theoretical simplicity. The ability to read a theological-like trace is another matter. In exploring this topic the concept of a dialogue will be approached in the hope that this task can be adequately started at least  to that degree that it might allow us to determine the actual possibility of this type of hermeneutic practice and the degree such a venture could and/or could not be attempted!? (39)

	Essentially, this stage of our argument suggests that as the distinctive nature of a relationship is forged through its resolution of the relatively non-relational (as dissonance, competition, difference, resistance, obstruction, etc., etc.) it follows that the relativity of this essential nature will form part of the complexion of that relationship, such complexity/complexion being stamped upon the embodied 'space' of that relationship. Hence, it follows, that given our argument for the relatively divine (as that epistemologically greater than us in organization [through its inclusion of us in its enstructured-functioning] such should be discovered, or be discoverable in theory, through the type of trace imparted through such divine 'resolution' upon the 'space', read 'body', of that relationship. Implying our dialogical involvement in any formation of the divine through its incorporation of us and the two-way relational nature of all processes of interaction. (40)

So much for theory! In the rest of this paper let me now explore this concept of a 'dialogue' and the ramification it has for its associated theology along with the possibility of an assessment of the viability of such a theoretical enterprise in non-theoretical, i.e., practical and critical, terms of reference!? (41)

3.   Pre-Exploring the Hypothetical 'Dialogical' Nature of Divine Interaction

	Let me explore a number of interrelated topics, namely, the production/re-production of this hypothetical 'trace' of the divine text as incorporated in and augmenting a non-divine sense of text; hermeneutic implications involved in our attempting to read this hypothetical divine text; what implications we might be allowed to draw in theoretical, practical and critical terms of reference; and the overall cogency of our topic treated in this manner? (42)
	
	In this phenomenological, hermeneutical and existential research we will be investigating types of experience dealing with recognition; the dialogical nature and awareness of a relationship between apparent centres of agency; differences between virtual and non-virtual relationships; the need for a balanced rejection of both provisional a priori formulations and absolute a priori formulations; textual deposition and how to evaluate the epistemological complexity of apparent agency; the non-absolute preservation of relational identity, etc; along with a grappling with the problematic question of the assymmetric nature of direct relational experience. Let me deal with this last topic first. (43)

	Although all relationships invoke a mutual reciprocity, in order to be in a process of relationship (hence our invocation of a hypothetical process  theology in order to theoretically establish our topic with phenomenological sense, hermeneutical meaning and existential meaningfulness) yet all relationships, in practice, invoke a non-symmetrical power relation, therefore, we must ask to what extent reciprocity could be mutually and adequately comprehensible between apparent centres of agency (virtual or non-virtual, subjective or non-subjective) when the quantum of that power relation is relatively non-commensurable for one or more of those parties? With respect to the nature of our topic, as the divine (treated as the Divine through possessing an intentional self-awareness-likeness) could be defined as that apparent centre of agency that possesses a greater degree of epistemological organization than that possessed by a human agent it follows that we must ask how the human 'mind' could be commensurable with the divine 'mind', and vice versa, given this disparity in their power relation. Of course, as an analogically similar problem, we must also ask how it is possible for a object to interact with a human agent, and vice versa. As human agents can interact with non-human intentional objects qua object-states the philosophic problem is, correctly, how this anomaly in power relations is overcome or merely bypassed?! Essentially the problem becomes one of recognition - how are intentional objects recognized as object-states, and, how do we determine the degree of their apparently intrinsic epistemological organization (given even relatively simple particles like protons are the complex interaction(s) of three quarks, gluons, etc. [allied to another deeper problem of calculative complexity, namely, just how can a complex three or more bodied process be calculated in the first place {when the process of 'calculation'  would appear to be impossible in a definitive format other than as a mere approximation?}?])? Put simply how could the human mind recognize divine-presence, divine-intentionality, divine-agency, divine-self-awareness, or their equivalents (non-virtual or virtual, etc.)? Or, even more to the point (in keeping with our current topic) how could the human mind recognize the 'fact' of being in a relationship with the divine, of being in a dialogue with the same, etc? The rest of this essay will attempt to philosophically examine what would be necessary if that phenomenological state of affairs is to be established theoretically as a project that possesses sense, etc., (and is to be further established extra-theoretically, i.e., both in apparent practice and its critical self-examination if it could be established that that option, in practice, is one that is hypothetically open to us)? (44)

	In this hypothetical endeavour I intend to take a course that is transcendental in orientation and steers clear of the twin reefs of realism and idealism (and their inherent self-contradictions through the mistreatment of the preferentially distinctive literalization of their adopted metaphors). I can achieve this latter ambition by virtue of the fact that a transcendental 'positioning' (through a critical, relatively coherent non-literalization of metaphorical intentionality in conjunction with the an ongoing imposition of an overall transcendental suspension) helps us to steer a course between these (non-transcendental) distortions of personal preference. In previous work, in this series of essays, e.g., I have examined the hermeneutic circle as involving three types of moments invoking three distinctive types of suspension (namely, a conjunctive suspension, a disconjunctive suspension and a balanced conjunctive-disconjunctive suspension, all within a balance of all three suspensions producing/re-producing for us an overall transcendental suspension). In this transcendental 're-positioning' though a non-realist-idealist 'non-positioning' I will be re-examining the phenomenological role played by metaphor in our directly engaged relationships between the artificial reifications of intentional objects-states and the object-states-themselves as apparently intended by those intentional acts (be they perceptive, imaginary, re-productive, etc.)  (whether the latter be regarded as intrinsically established, truly established, established from their own side or point of view, really established, established by their own nature or character, etc., in accordance with what meta-metaphor are invoked to explain this middle territory [maintained in a spirit of {Buddhistic} emptiness defined along the following lines as empty of substantial ontological existence(s) and/or empty of epistemological reification(s) and/or purified of existential distortion(s); preferably invoking all three aspects of emptiness - themselves mirroring the three suspended states/moments of the hermeneutic circle in the same order as just previously outlined]). This outlines my intentions in this regard. Let me now in elucidating this (phenomenological/hermeneutic/existential) concept of recognition make a few introductory observations and reflections (of a gestalt nature). (45)

	Recognition is essentially re-cognition! Intentional cognition is the appreciation of an apparent intentional object-state. I say 'apparent' because the intentional object-state is simulated in at least two senses, namely, as a re-iteration of a process of simulation and as a simulation of a simulation as far as the content of that intentional process is concerned. Let me elaborate on this re-simulation of process and re-simulation of (processed-)content. For an intentional process to come to intentional awareness it must be re-iterated (through retention) for a certain length of time in order to come to our conscious awareness (and recognized as a certain type of meta-textual process of protention). For our awareness of the content of that intentional process a process of reiteration must be in place with respect to the content of that process as well. This 'distinction' is not to be understood as dichotomous as "no process - no apparent content, no content - no apparent process". Now, appreciation could be defined as the appreciation of process-content, i.e., as a process of appreciation of the appreciation of a process (per se and/or its content). What this definition is articulating is the fact that appreciation always involves a meta-stratification of levels of awareness in an interaction with each other. The following metaphor will illustrate what I am saying here. If we were to live in a forest of tall trees we could not 'appreciate' the landscape around us except in our imagination if we were well-acquainted with that terrain. On the other hand, if we were to climb to the top of a relatively taller tree we might be able to see the terrain round about within a few seconds with only a few glances. Or, if we lived in a city or on a plain we would be better able to understand its topography by climbing a tall building or a nearby mountain and directly viewing that landscape (which can be 'read' as that relatively lower in meta-status) from this more exalted point of view (which can be 'read' as that relatively higher in meta-status). The dynamics of this meta-level appreciation of a relative object level (in meta-status) has been examined elsewhere as a transformational process of treatment and re-treatment. Invoking a gestalt field of appreciation involving an object-state under examination, an associated field of appreciation and an appreciative-ego (of higher meta-status) in keeping with the nature of that field I would now like to make the following introductory observations and reflections. (46)

	That appreciation always involves higher terms of meta-reference. Hence recognition is constituted in a similar manner (as just outlined). (47)

That the quality of the (simulated) object-state, its degree of thematization, can neither exceed the potential quality of its appreciative meta-field nor closely approach the same. Because it is in the richness of the field a less rich object-state can be thematized (and the field is itself exponentially self-thematized through the collective interaction of its relational event-inputs). The relative richness of the object-state, as a realized or non-realized potential, is therefore directly related to the actual richness of that associated field of appreciation (in such a manner that it can neither exceed nor closely approach the 'actual' richness of that field of appreciation) since the richness of that object-state is a reflection of the relative richness of its associated field of appreciation. Although the quality of the thematization of the object-states discerned within a particular field is non-commensurate with the overall quality of that field the overall quality of those relational events, their potential-actualization, is relatively proportional to the actualized-potential of that field. (48)

	That only with the increasing richness of a field, through the proper and appropriate exercise of that field, can an object-state that falls within that field  be subjected to an increasing degree of maximum thematizational discernment (although discernment itself as a process will increase in time through its repeated simulation, i.e., re-simulation, within it; subject to the same limits as noted above). (49)

	Noting the above observations we can make the following reflections in the context of a hypothetical 'recognition of the divine'. In our looking at the textual simulations of the world found there-for-us as intentionally constituted by-us it follows that if we are to hermeneutically discern the divine within these worldly texts, as essential imprints of the divine, that our degree of thematization in this respect must be adequate to the degree of thematization necessary to intentionally perform this type of task! Moreover, the right sort of field would have to be pre-prepared in order to realize this type of discerment. How could this state of affairs be put in place? If the divine needs to be recognized in order to recognize the divine how could the divine be recognized at all since its recognition must first be realized, etc?! But this type of problem must have some form of resolution since the same argument of an infinite regress would apply equally to our recognition of all types of object-states! As the concept of recognition revolves around a resolution of this dilemma let me note how, in our phenomenological investigations of phenomena, this problem in experience is in fact no real problem at all, notwithstanding the fact that the recognition of the divine/Divine is indeed problematic and even more controversial, (if our thematized engagement with the simulation of certain types of intentional object-states is non-problematic in the natural history of our evolving experience, interpretation and appreciation of this world-of-life). Therefore, to obviate this dilemma, let me proffer the following potted history of how we meet with and recognize the relatively novel. (50)

	First, let me note what exactly is 'given' in acts of appreciation. Metaphor(ical device)s are not only metaphors they also metaphor the life-world, i.e., help to directly simulate the same, or, more correctly, re-simulate it. Unfortunately for some, e.g., idealists and realists, etc., metaphors cannot be entertained in a literal modality. They are not designed to be read literally. On the other hand, they somehow directly mirror the world. So how is this feat achieved without recourse to a literal mistreatment of the same? As discussed elsewhere metaphors are entertained in the first moment of our hermeneutic circle of comprehension; operating in a retrospective, analytical, reductive, focalized gestalt modality or orientation. On the other hand, the metaphorical field is rhetorical in complexion; operating in a prospective, synthetical, background-field gestalt modality or orientation. In neither of these modes can there be a present sense of givenness even if simulated/re-simulated because the first is retrospective in temporal orientation and the latter is prospective in temporal orientation. On the other hand, in our third moment, through a balanced suspension of these former two moments of the metaphorical and the rhetorical we arrive at a sense of the text that is non-textual in complexion, i.e., re-produced in a historical sense of the present. As previously noted elsewhere, this 'non-textual' dimension, in gestalt terms an egologically oriented modality or orientation, is completely overlooked by both textually-oriented modernists (materialists, realists, empiricists, reductivists et al) and meta-textually-oriented postmodernists (spiritualist, idealists, rationalists, monists et al)! Then, through an overall transcendental suspension all three of these historical moments the simulation/re-simulation of the not-textual is 'apparently' given, a state of affairs I would like to interpret as that-given-to-us through simulation/re-simulation as our direct understanding of that relationship, set of relationships, that act of apparent givenness is produced/re-produced for-us. Hence this 'givenness' is simulated, is the mere simulation of a simulation and never as a mere simulation of that prior to the act of simulation (as the non-simulated, pre-simulated, trans-simulated, etc.). Moreover, this 'givenness' is recognized and appreciated as 'given' in and through an act of judgment or a series of acts of judgment that produce/re-produce this phenomenal appearance of a simulated givenness. A 'givenness' which satisfies, for the current time at least, our essential understanding of that which is being understood. Furthermore, once an essential understanding is realized of that particular object-state or set of object-states our appreciation can only be re-confirmed through a re-recognition of the same flavour possessed by that state of affairs. Indeed, once our object-state is located within our psychic mapping of the life-world, as sense, that determination is merely confirmed until such a time it self-demonstrates a need for a re-evaluation of that simulated state of affairs (just as saltiness once recognized is merely confirmed on a repetition of our tasting of that state of affairs, especially if that liquid is being de-diluted or magnified in its saltiness). So a metaphorical understanding within a certain rhetorical setting behaves as a given-for-us once it is subjected to this sequence of suspensions. (51)

	Hence, although we can say that when we are in a relationship we are in a direct relationship with the participants of that relationship the nature of that relationship and the nature of those participants-there-for-us is as a given simulation/re-simulation. Where in this vision of the life-world does the intentional object(-state) figure? Treated as a polarity, as an ideal polarization, coinciding with the metaphorical modality, that under intentional focus and presented as 'text' we should note that pure text cannot be obtained as the interplay of that modality must co-occur with the other ideal polarities of the meta-textual field and the non-textual egological involvement, and, their overall transcendental suspension and its production/re-production of the not-textual (which in turn is subject to a 'final' suspension that allows us to enter into a direct relationship with the same as the not-not-textual, i.e., that of which the textual is an exact simulation of… being an exact simulation of itself through this progressive double suspension/negation…). (52)

	Now, let me return to offering a potted history of what is phenomenologically meant, etc., in our meeting with the relatively novel, i.e., how do we recognize that which is relatively novel and, at the same time, recognize what that might be in the overall scheme of things? (53)

	Of course, that expression "the overall scheme of things" is a clue. For a start the relatively novel is met as that which is relatively different. But that difference can never be absolutely different otherwise there could be no recognition of that as being different. In a gestalt field all sense of difference is provocative, as previously defined by myself elsewhere, in so far as it is a mixture of difference-and-sameness and therefore in the gestalt field it is introduced as produced/re-produced it both invites dissonance and accommodation; dissonance being totally ineffective without the latter. Being presented in a certain field of consciousness (or a set of the same) implies that it must possess something in common with the nature of that field, i.e., it must possess a general determination of sense hence this element of (pre-)accommodation. Sense, or psychic location in this world-of-life, being already defined by the nature of that field, all that follows merely refining, or re-defining, or denying, that sense of appellation. Moreover, all comprehension is also a hermeneutic affair and an existential affair hence the co-determination of meaning and meaningfulness (as noted elsewhere). This same insight of non-absolute incommensurability has been noted by Georg Gadamer - that, in effect, hermeneutically, there can never be a state of absolute non-comprehension of an intentional-state; a recognition of this fact that no item for examination ever enters into consciousness without its accompanying field and hence its pre-determination of sense if only to that extent that it has already been pre-determined by the nature of that field (or set of fields as, e.g., when dealing with an archetypal empirical object-state wherein the empirical object-state is thematized with a plurality of sense-modalities (sight, touch, e.g., etc.) and sub-sense modalities within the same (such as, e.g., linear definition, colour synthesis, shape recognition, etc., in the integration of the overall complexity operating in the visual field). (54)

	Now, as the idea of the divine is not alien to our culture (as argued in previous essays) the interpretation of divine-like experiences or phenomena that lend themselves to that style of interpretation, cannot be absolutely novel. Hence our recognition is pre-determined to some extent merely by noting what field that type of experience finds itself presented, given as a simulation subject to thematizational clarification to the extent that this essential description is found satisfied, etc. With this understanding to hand let me now examine the phenomenon of recognition and how such is appreciated as an apparent act of recognition. (55)

	The first thing I would like to note is that conscious comprehension, be that recognition or what ever, is conducted through the transcendental auspices of our hermeneutic circle as configured by myself in these essays (treated both horizontally and vertically to the extent that it mirrors the epistemological hierarchy). As no moment of this hermeneutic circle can be configured without its indirect reference to the others it implies that no one moment can be given a temporal priority or any other form of priority over any of the other moments and vice versa. From an atemporal perspective one must treat these moments as co-present to each other. Therefore prospective anticipation 'co-occurs' with retrospective givenness. Or, that the balanced suspension of both and its formation of a sense of the present also co-occur with a sense of the having been given and the anticipated as about to be given. Linguistically, we might say that the past passive, the future passive and the present passive co-occur in their mutual co-determination of each other. This is an important point because one would need to wonder then how anticipation could be matched with the retrospectively given, etc., or for that matter how could either meet some sense of the passive present? In this search for value (in its archetypal form of sense, meaning and meaningfulness), without this atemporal conjunction, orientations of the past, future and present could not interact to co-determine each other. But, regardless of this philosophical investigation of the phenomenon of recognition or any other project, all dialectical moments cannot be temporally privileged over each other nor privileged in any other manner. With this dialectical insight to hand let me now continue my phenomenological analysis of recognition. (56)
 
	For a process of recognition to occur it would appear, in my understanding to date, that anticipation needs to be met, more or less, by that found to be given in the act of apparent giving. In other words, in a more technical treatment, one might say that between all three time orientations the 'given' in its simulation/re-simulation there is an isomorphic transformational invariance, i.e., in our psychically moving from one dialectical time orientation to another some aspect of the transitional transformation is preserved. E.g., I see a small bright-red shape travelling across a field - I anticipate that that is a tractor and duly confirm that to be the case on inspection when I put my glasses on for a closer examination being short-sighted. On confirmation of this fact one might say that there is a phenomenological pattern that is preserved between these three time orientations treated as dialectical moments (in a circle of hermeneutic comprehension). In this example my anticipation is met, realized and satisfied. With respect to this topic of satisfaction, etc., let me examine (the ramifications of) this type of position more closely. (57)

	What exactly is involved in this phenomenological process of satisfaction? For although the process is a matching of transformational pathways, through an experience of transformational isomorphism, it is not the mere matching of pathways as in the process there is the creation, release and experience of an existential excess in the phenomenological evolvement of such insight. (58)

	An observation needs to be made that all points in the world-about-us are in essence unique by virtue of the fact that to be at any one overall presents the world from a unique perspective even if, as stands to reason, points in proximity to each other in a similar state of affairs would seem to present a similar if not, effectively, the same point of view. But this need not be the case! E.g., two people on the opposite sides of the same street, even if that street is open to traffic in one direction, cannot find a symmetry in the opportunities they have to cross it. On some occasions the person on one side would be able to cross safely, and, on the other side other occasions will be found by that other person to cross safely. On some occasions they may even both have the same occasions to cross. But because one party can cross safely does not mean the other party has the same opportunity. This observation is an analogy of the point that I am trying to make here. Related to transformational pathways of treatment and retreatment, where the latter mirror the former but in reverse, we must ask ourselves could there be any degree of symmetry? In other words, how could there be any (non-superficial) symmetry when the beginning points of all pathways are totally and absolutely unique? But, if that were the case, absolutely, then there could be no processes of relation by virtue of the fact that reciprocity could not be reciprocal and therein reciprocated in the course of that relationship. But being in the world attests otherwise; a fact brought about through the preservation of transformational isomorphism at the very centre of each and every relationship. (59)

	What is implicated in this understanding of the life-world is the fact that the essential nature of the relationship is preserved in the course of that relationship in and through this core transformational isomorphism. Moreover, as previously noted, when common pathways and/or isomorphic features are found preserved then we have a matching of possibilities that is productive of more than a mere matching, indeed, the production/re-production of an existential excess of value that is experienced as an increased understanding of sense, meaning and/or meaningfulness, and, that this excess of value can then, on reflection, in turn lead to a greater degree of insight. In this scheme insight can be defined as the increased awareness of our psychic position and psychic (re-)positioning in our psychic mapping of this world-of-life. In an understanding of our existential coursing through this world-of-life we become better acquainted with both (retrospectively oriented) intentional motivations and (prospectively oriented) intentional expectations since as both mutually co-determine each other (in and through the hermeneutic circle of comprehension) it follows that both are bourn in a direct relationship with each other even if we were to focus on one or other of these two attitudinal directions (a third being the present/presented existential consequences of the product of both coupled with all existential distortions brought about through an improper maintenance of the overall transcendental suspension and/or its subsidiary suspensions). (60)

	Transformational isomorphism is arrived at when the elements of a relationship discerned in the psychic body of a relationship are maintained between meta-levels of transformation at the central core of those relationships and in that preservation of transformational identity naturally define that relationship essentially even though 'essence' cannot be cashed out either in substantial terms of reference or in ideal terms of reference despite the existential fact that all phenomena are intentionally constituted there-for-us by-us (by-that-there-for-us). Let me elabourate. (61)

	Let us say a stands to b in a relationship r. E.g., let us say that a is a brick in the wall of a house b. In our intentional understanding of this relationship we find that a r b takes place, intentionally, within a process of synthesis, namely, the house b. According to transformational philosophy with treatment or retreatment we have a change in meta-status by one degree; a positive change in treatment and a negative change in retreatment. So a1 r1 b1 is transformed to a2 r2 b2 in a process of synthetic treatment (or analytical treatment, identificational treatment). The reverse taking place in retreatment where the retreated product is returned to the same meta-status this process initially possessed. So the synthetical house re-becomes a physical house from our intentional point of view. Hence a pile of bricks 'creates' a relational house through synthesis, then, through retreatment, that relational house becomes a physical house on par with the materiality of those bricks. The transformation of the treatment, retreatment, and the nature of the relationship between treatment and retreatment being able to be entered into by virtue of the fact that there is a preservation of identity at the centre of these relational phases. So a1 stand to b1 through r1, a2 stands to b2 through r2, r1 stands to r2 and vice versa. In essence, this core transformational isomorphism could be designated A R B. In our realization that:

 r1 R12 r2  is isomorphic with r2 R21 r1 in terms of R12/21 (R) 

Hence the essence of this relationship is defined by R. (62)

	So, even though the pathway 1-2 cannot be equivalent to 2-1, through transformational isomorphism in terms of R (defined through a r b) a relationship is allowed to form in terms of R. Moreover, this relational difference is realized in and through a relational excess when these two pathways of treatment and retreatment are mapped back on to each other. In reflection, then, this insightful excess allows us to appreciate the sense, meaning and meaningfulness of that relationship to a better extent and therein realize some understanding of its relatively intrinsic value without recourse to existential distortions present in its material substantialization and/or its non-materially oriented relational idealization (in our intentional treatment of it through processes of synthesis, analysis and/or identification [wherein we identify the logical subjectivity involved in that relationship in general and/or particular terms of reference, note relatively internal predication and/or relatively external relations]). Hence our experience/re-experience of this relational difference alerts us to the fact that in our mapping/re-mapping of a relationship subjected to treatment and retreatment there is experienced a sense of a relational excess which is experienced as an existential excess of value. This experience of an excess assists us in the discovery and thematization of our insights into the intentional constitution of this world-of-life and, therein, facilitates a sense of being-at-home in this world-of-life (the primary function of insight) (and therein helps us to feel-at-home-in-the-world-about-us)! (63)

	My argument for the directness of a relationship is the resultant of a combination of arguments. For a start, that in a relationship the participants of that relationship are directly participating in that relationship with each other. That through emptiness of identity there is no substantial existence and hence no barriers to their interacting with each other when that is the case. Moreover, we should reify neither the relationship nor its participants (which is another way of stating this theme of emptiness; itself realized through the instantiation of an adequate, overall transcendental suspension). All identity is context dependent (epistemologically, ontologically and trans-epistemological-ontologically). As identity is context-dependent it is relative. Furthermore, the identity of the context-dependent set of conditions is likewise relative to a meta-content-dependent set of conditions (etc.). Defining the identity defines its pre-conditional context dependency, and vice versa, etc. The relationship defines the apparent phenomenal nature of the relational participants. The relationship of all relationships, in effect, is the life-world. There can only be one life-world hence the directness of all relationships with each other and all participants in that respect with in their relational contexts which is the metaphorical 'space' of their relationship. As the 'whole is greater than the sum of its parts' that excess of relational value is re-invested in the 'body' or 'space' of that relationship with the implication that there is no absolute difference between the relationship and its participants…. (64)

	One exception, which seems to prove the point, by default, is the 'problem' of indirect relationships. If all relationships are direct how can we have an indirect relationship? E.g., A knows B who knows C, but A does not know C but knows of C from what B has told them. A has an indirect relationship with C. Or, one might rephrase that and say that they 'directly' have an indirect relationship in so far as they have a relationship at all with each other. In the same vein, one might ask "in looking at the sun do I now have a direct relationship with the same?" The sun is so many light minutes away, how could one have a direct relationship? Or, assuming mutual reciprocity in a relationship, does my looking at the sun somehow effect its regard of me between those moments that I attempt to look at the sun and don't attempt to look at it? For the philosopher such questions are not frivolous! In an attempt to defuse these apparent puzzles let me look more closely at this concept of relational directness. (65)

	The critical phenomenologist has criticized the representational theory of knowledge. The empiricist who insists on being just an empiricist cannot insist that we do something trans-empirical by 'looking at' that which is a representational copy in order 'to see' that the representation is indeed a copy of that of which it is a copy. In its place a phenomenologist might suggest that we find ourselves dealing with the reality of the life-world as we find it presenting itself to us, in and through our constitution of that phenomenon or set of phenomena, when we find ourselves engaging with that phenomenal context when we meet all modalities that one would expect to meet that type of phenomenon or set of phenomena. So a dream apple phenomenon does not engage a full compliment of modalities that one would expect to meet if on were instead to engage with a relatively real apple phenomenon. So a dream apple does not remove pangs of hunger that a real apple would if it were eaten. Meeting a full compliment of appropriately expected modalities is what I call meeting with a saturation of modalities. Moreover, meeting those individual modalities in their expected strength, richness, intensity, etc., I call meeting with a satisfaction of modal expectations. Meeting an appropriate degree of saturation and satisfaction I call meeting an adequate satiation in our engagement with that phenomenon. Then, if overall we have no current doubts in our engagement with that phenomenon or type of phenomenon I call finding an adequate assurance that that phenomenal engagement is apparently proceeding as planned and as expected. Normally, however, our assurance is met through a simple sufficiency of met-expectations in our engagement with a certain phenomenon or set of similar phenomena. In this vision of our phenomenal engagement we might say that an adequate sufficiency is enough to establish for the subject of that relationship that they were indeed meeting with that type of phenomenon as intended (in both sense of that expression, i.e., as an intentional object-state-there-for-us and as a desire to engage with the same). In such a scheme how do we define or describe the phenomenal directness of that relationship (given the additional fact that both objectivity and subjectivity are empty, must exist as 'fictions' if reified, albeit fruitful ones when properly and appropriately engaged?)? For a start we should see no real absolute distinction between 'knowing' and 'knowing of' or 'about' or 'as'. Furthermore, there must be a re-simulation of the constitution of that being related to since without this method of 'epistemological fixing' that being brought to conscious intentional consciousness would escape consciousness without the necessary degree of endurance of that phenomenon through re-simulation. Hence, in this light, one might say that there is only this process of relating since we cannot (non-provisionally) reify either the relationship nor the participating parties. In other words, the simulation of a direct process of relating is a direct process of relating since the relationship is correctly 'between' simulations, through re-simulation! This stands to reason because a relationship is a process of engagement, not a mere meeting of reified, substantial, self-existent entities or states. Hence the simulation of directness, a process wherein we find an assurance that a 'directness' has been adequately simulated/re-simulated through saturation, satisfaction, satiation as met through the representative degree of sufficiency experienced 'therein'. Indeed, through processes of relation, the identities of intentional object-states, the identities of intentional subjectivity and the identities of all intentional environments are met as would be expected from a normal reading of the hermeneutic circle of comprehension as discussed elsewhere. Identities of intentional subjectivity being realized through the apparent 'directness' of relational interaction 'entertained between them'. Hence, in this vision of relating to the reality of the life-world, recognition is realized when all three modalities (of Object, World and Ego)  are in a state of mutual co-dependence; in the process adequately co-defining each other - thence directness through (mutual) co-relativity! Moreover, the nature of a relationship is reflected in and through those modalities that are actually being (non-virtually) engaged. I.e., e.g., in our passage through this world-of-life-with-others we find their co-constitution of us hence the direct evidence of their apparent intentional subjectivity, a sharing of similar meta-textual genres of intentional activity and a mutual space of interactivity, namely this life-world itself, through the basic mutuality of our being-with-others in this life-world. This intentional directness being guaranteed by the very nature of our interaction with other subjects in this world of life and, also through our embodiment, an engagement with object-states, etc. Now this last 'etc.' is very important since if we are to demonstrate at the very least the viability and openness of an element of the divine being met, in what ever form, it must arise through the very mechanisms, processes, etc., as just outlined. Indeed, recognition, as a phenomenon, in some form or other, must be present for the professional or non-professional theologian in order for them to accept (and not 'except') that apparent evidence for the divine being present in the phenomenality of this world-of-life! So, now, let us ask what might count as evidence that the divine in some form or other is present-for-them and co-present-to-others in this world-of-life? (66)

	A philosopher's task is a difficult one, but, let it be said, that the task of a theologian, usually, is even more difficult, more like being between a rock and a hard place so to speak, since they are inevitably paid by a religious fraternity that often sets out impossible conditions in the articulation of ‘their’ collective, orthodox vision of what 'must' constitute the divine. Therefore, with one hand metaphorically tied behind their back, if not two, through a desire to be authentic in making public their philosophical reflections, they should find this type of task an impossible one to conduct, certainly not one that allows them to function as successful, cogent philosophers of the divine, as practitioners of this divine ‘science’ of theology wherein a proper, appropriate and valid exercise is conducted within the natural limits of reason; the type of task that these essays have already shown not to be an unreasonable one (but not necessarily, as yet, a task that can be regarded as one with much profit and insight into the constitution of the life-world when conducted from a theological point of view?). Consequently, handicapped in that fashion, they can only continue to give this ‘discipline’ a bad name and, therein, find themselves doomed to commit one more philosophical failure along with the general consequences that this type of inauthenticity must have on matters of faith, belief, practice, etc., for the genuinely religious person not only for a person inside a particular faith but also outside (since ‘successful’ religious innovations (whether authentic or inauthentic in aspiration) such as novel concepts, practical insights, ritual modus operandi, etc., have no boundaries in that regard through psychically carving out ‘niche markets’ for those innovative ideologies (or memes) through the transmission of the same via the re-simulated creation of cognitive ‘rifts’, as a sense of religious deficit, and their ‘crossing’ through processes of re-transformational adaptation and re-interpreted uptake). (67)
	
	As previously intimated, evidence arises not only through recognition (itself the result of a successful process of transformation wherein there is preserved a core-region of transformational isomorphism) but also the arising of an existential excess of value whose degree to that same extent in excess generally reinforces that interpretation/re-interpretation. Let me now look at this excess of relational value. (68)

	Value arises in and through a process of judgment (in extra-conceptual terms of reference). As previously examined elsewhere judgment is seen to take six distinctive forms, namely, pre-essential essential value, essential-aesthetic value, ethical-deontological value, (perceptual-)pragmatical value, potential-hermeneutical value and actual-factual value. These distinctive forms can be blurred in reality (as in, e.g., a play where we have tensions both between the ethical interactions of characters and the aesthetical considerations of the play itself [which may or may not be dissonant with respect to each other?]). Indeed, one could define the semblance of the 'spiritual' as the degree to which there is a surplus of value on the grounds that this surplus of value cannot be reduced merely to its material basis of origination, hence its non-material/immaterial-spiritual like character (because such excess value, on this level of analysis, cannot be reduced to any particular distinctive field of judgment nor conventional genre-hybrids of the same). This definition operating, as it stands, outside a theological framework (it being one more task of the theologian to link and encompass value within that type of framework, and, in return, find value-for-us in the exercise of such a framework). Of course, as value arises through the hermeneutic circle of comprehension it must arise through some form of suspension; the authenticity of that produced/re-produced therein reflecting the degree to which it was conducted through the balance of an overall transcendental suspension that is properly, appropriately and validly conducted. 'Propriety' being conducted through a proper/appropriate deontological bias or orientation. 'Appropriateness' being realized through appropriate/proper pragmatic considerations. On the other hand validity should entail the mutual cooperation of all six transcendental sense-fields as distinctive fields of value determination in the manner as just noted (i.e., as parallelling my circular ordered analysis beginning with pre-essential essential value considerations, etc.) to the extent that this mutual exercise is in conformity with the type of exercise being reflected upon. Let me look more closely at this emerging concept of validity as being sketched here (and this parallel concept of spiritual value that appears to be associated with the same to the extent that it arises above, and beyond(?),  the totality of the judgmental process as properly, appropriately and validly conducted, etc., in and through the overall transcendental suspension?). (69)

	Implicated in this understanding of validity is a sematic theory of truth (as per Tarski et al) as central to various types of mechanisms that account for distinctive types of truth in our ordered analysis. E.g., pre-essential essential value is dependent upon a correspondence type of situation when we find one definition, identity, meaning, etc., being equated with some other, etc. On the other hand, aesthetic-essential value is dependent upon the collective aesthetic coherence, or harmony, between some part of a field and the totality of that field, etc. Although each of our orders adopts a different type of truth determining mechanism, just as the three moments of our hermeneutic circle utilize different types of suspension, in a similar fashion just as our hermeneutic moments of our hermeneutic circle mutually co-determine each other each in the same fashion the collective input of our six circular orders is to mutually co-determine each other likewise. Moreover, as I have argued that spiritual value is not able to be reduced to any one of our orders, etc., it follows that this value is a reflection of this fact, namely, that thematized degree of value resident in all of the orders simultaneously and that excess of value realized therein…. (70)

	According to Tarski: p is t iff p' [p is t (true) iff (if and only if) p' (i.e., p can be found in the meta-field). This insight of mutual co-determination, as noted in the previous paragraph, implies that validity (and its implication of spiritual value?) implicates all six of our orders (i.e., their non-virtual, actual entry and activation). Indeed, each order (designated by n, where n = 1 …. 6), whatever its mechanism of ordered truth determination, delivers a truth value that is true when pn is tn iff pn'. Moreover, validity demands that n equal 1 to 6 inclusive as just re-noted. Indeed, we could lean on this semantic theory of truth and declare that the passage from one order, say n, to the next, namely, n+1, establishes this meta-transition (since these prior stages have to be successfully entered and left in order to establish this transformational shift in treatment). Hence, ascending our orders is to put into selective effect just these conditions that characterize this semantic theory of truth (when interpreted in the light of these six orders). Now, as our 6th order deals with actual factuals, i.e., true facts, 'facts' considered to be historically true, it therefore follows, if I am correct, that spiritual value must somehow be dealing with our interpretation of actual facts, i.e., facts considered highly likely and treated as true in the everyday reality of the world and by extension as true throughout all time in this world (whether it be treated as one world in the world-of-life or as 'the' intersection of possible multi-worlds within the ambit of this overall life-world). What implications does this have for our hypothetical research? Namely this state of affairs - that all spiritual value is fully expressed, in accordance with this theoretical position, in and through true facts albeit in and through our interpretations of the same! Of course the problem(s) is(/are) how do we interpret 'true facts' in order to read the presence, if any, of the divine/Divine, and, by what means can we determine facts as true in the first place?? Hence an understanding of both evidence and divine evidence needs to take all of these considerations into account, this being done within a transformational reading of semantic satisfaction with the latter, 'divine evidence', being determined, hopefully, through some interpretative lens that allows us to read 'true facts' through a theologically-oriented perspective. Let me offer and explore some tentative suggestions how this type of interpretation might be realized before concluding this section with an examination of the hypothetical dialogical implications inherent in such an analysis. (71)

	Evidence could be defined as meeting with a full compliment of modalities, i.e., recognizing a full satisfaction of modal expectations in that particular regard. So an apple-like phenomena, say as seen in a photo or painting of a bowl of apples, might be recognized as presenting round and green and apple-shaped liked objects, those objects isolated by our selective interest in that field can only be seen to represent apples and not their full phenomenal re-presentation through a non-meeting with all expected modalities associated with apple-presentations like touch, smell, taste, etc. From an ordered perspective we would say that these fifth order phenomenal presentations, of apple-like objects, cannot find a sixth order status as full apple presentations. In our hypothetical hermeneutic appreciation of divine evidence is there any real difference between this project and that of the evaluation of non-divine evidence? From a universal perspective the ostensive answer would be "no" - "there is no real difference between divine evidence and non-divine evidence from a phenomenological perspective". On the other hand, because our evidential topic is different we must expect differences in our fifth order expectations and the likelihood of meeting a sixth order transition with respect to the same in such a manner that might allow us to affirm that some textual trace was indeed divine in nature, origin or orientation when read in that particular light or manner? So, in our hypothetical investigations in this regard our fifth order expectations need to be assembled and coherently evaluated in the light of that type of project and then, hopefully, discerned in our transition from a fifth order of a possible potential factual state of affairs to an 'actual' factual state of affairs. 'Factual' being defined through this concept of satisfaction (and all other ordered stages preconditional to that transition) and not through some form an impossible representational manoeuvre. In looking more closely at this type of transformational transition let me also examine the parallel problematic relationship bourn between potentiality and actuality, as noted previously in this essay, and argued for in our skeleton argument, as to the extent that there can be no pure potentiality and no pure actuality and the consequential leakage between the same and the contamination this poses for us in our determination of evidential status, since, impurity of ordered status in this regard is the raison d'etre for the qualified argument from potentiality to actuality (as a type of ontological argument?). Therefore, let me examine the spheres of both considerations in order to determine to what degree and in what manner such a transition is evidentially open to us with all due regard to an overall propriety, appropriateness, and validity in this transformation of value (between the fifth and sixth orders). (72)

	A first thing we have to note is that each order in itself is an ideality and cannot be reached, only moved towards or away from in the overall functioning of the cognitive aspects of the psyche, placed under individual or collective suspension(s), etc. In our examination of the interrelationship between potentiality and actuality w are effectively investigating the interaction between these two proximate orders of the 5th and the 6th which effectively map hermeneutic value (in the form of genre expectations) and factual considerations (in the form of actual-factuals as realized genre expectations assembled in the format of accurate histories, or rather, histories considered to be accurate, etc.). Now a problem arises in so far as we need a critically prepared language to address this phenomenological/ordered fact that no individual order is absolutely obtainable in a pure form or could be recorded in a pure format. On the other hand such a provisional form, and format, cannot be purely provisional either. What implications should we draw from this strange state of affairs and what ramifications does this re-consideration of this topic have for our skeleton argument in so far as this hybrid state is already recognized albeit without the necessary degree of critical depth? Let me now address this, an allied issues, as much of our preparation will centre on this type of transformation (in our ordered analysis). (73)

	For a start, 5th ordered analysis cannot be conducted in a purely potential or probabilistic manner. Hence all probable a priori-like considerations cannot be conducted in a purely provisional manner. The implication here is that there must be a 6th order (and 4th order, etc.) contamination of the process, and v.v. On the other hand there can be no pure 6th order considerations either! 'Facts' cannot be absolutely actual-facts even though, obviously, in our passage through the life-world we need to treat much of our non-controversial historical-cultural understanding in just such a fashion. Hence in moving to and from a 6th order we need, therefore, to maintain this balance between these 'senses' of the provisional a priori and the absolute a priori. However, despite that fact of our being dependent on our apparent historical place in the world the phenomenal-phenomenological truth of the matter is that we cannot deal with actual-facts except provisionally. Equally, all provisional facts should not be treated as equally provisional - indeed, it is their degrees of confirmation, recognition, etc., that establishes both the standards for truth evaluation, through their collective formation of a truth determining background, and the probable reception of their consonant-dissonant treatment, through their passage through this truth determining background (and their consequent historically 'traced out' input into the same). Now, the implications of this type of consideration are profound. It means that the potential can never be absolutely reduced to a state of mere possibility, and, in some form or other is, indeed must be, 'contaminated' by the actual to that extent that it is appreciated through re-presentations (and not representations). For the 6th order to be positively accessed there must be some sense of a being-there hence this phenomenological process of hyphenated 're-presentation' rather than a mere reconstructed 'representation' of what there might have been. So a first lesson is that a 5th order transformation to a 6th order, and vice versa, involves the transition between a non-pure provisional a priori of potentiality and a non pure absolute a priori of certainty given that the form undergoing such a transition is a priori in structure, i.e., remains invariant in this or some other process of ordered transformation. A second lesson being the 'phenomenal fact' that the world of possibility is contaminated by the world of the apparently actual, and v.v. The recognition of this second lesson deconstructing the Aristotelian prejudice of the priority of the possible over the actual. A third lesson is the fact that the possible cannot be purely potential hence elements or aspects of it must be relatively actual in orientation even if treated in the overall modality of potential. Indeed, it is with direct reference to the life-world that a world of the possible can be indirectly formulated in a provisional format. So, ultimately, apparent actuality must be treated as provisional and the merely potential must be treated as possessing the actualized in some manner or other which stands to reason in so far as possibility is merely an extrapolation from the already discerned as actual-like in our passage through the life-world and its associated  formation of realized, realizable and unrealized genre expectations (and their metaphysical reifications/superimpositions as past, present and future states of affairs as so called 'facts'). Hence our suspension of the potential and its hermeneutical emphasis on the field involved in the rhetorical formation of genre-expectations, in order to transformationally proceed to some other order of cognitive-epistemological formation, cannot be conducted at the expense of say the 6th order and v.v., etc. (74)

	Let me now look into the qualitative difference between provisional-possibility and provisional-actuality. For a start let us consider the fact that I cannot meet Julius Caesar, the famous Roman statesman, as he died around two thousand years ago. On the other hand, I can meet him indirectly when I read his writings albeit translated from the Latin. In doing so I come to some form of an understanding reconstructed from my acquaintance with traces that I believe were left by this great statesman. Hence my distinction of virtual and non-virtual relationships (where the virtual and the non-virtual should not be treated absolutely as 'merely virtual or 'purely actual' respectively for reasons as just previously noted), a distinction that devolves across the difference between 'representation and re-presentation', 'reconstruction and re-construction', etc. As previously intimated, 'representation' is reconstructed from a trace, or set or system of parallel traces; a trace being the intentional deposition of distinctive acts of intentional resolution; the trace being treated as a map or blueprint for how we are to go about interpreting the phenomenon of that textual trace, set of traces and/or system of traces. On the other hand, when we directly engage a phenomenon, or set or system of phenomena, our overall relationship must intersect in time and space, meet a full or adequately representative compliment of expected modalities in keeping with the nature of our phenomenal topic. Furthermore, in the phenomenal fixing of a non-virtual phenomenon, or set or system of phenomena, there is the direct phenomenal/phenomenological re-presentation of that event in our conscious interaction with the same along with an experience of its existential excess of value (and a certain je ne sais quoi through the uniqueness of that event). On the other hand, in a virtual-orientation there is, effectively, the reconstruction of a representation of that which is the object-state of our investigations. Hopefully something of that existential excess would be reconstructed as if we were to be directly engaged with the same? I would argue that once we are on the right track something of that original existential surplus (and its certain je ne sais quoi) would find some degree of reconstruction in that representation (that process itself then subject, of course, to direct phenomenal re-presentation). Metaphorically, we might say, it is a bit like making a bowl and hoping to find within it a reconstructed copy of that which that bowl was meant to have found or poured into it. On the other hand, in directly engaging in a non-virtually oriented relationship we would find it to be a bit like the opposite, namely, a seemingly unmediated 'drinking' of that phenomenon itself (that ‘novel’ experience then being stored in a bowl created to ‘keep’ that experience in a represented form or format {like the negative of a photo?]). But let us not push that simile too far. (75)

	What is entailed in the reviewing of a trace? Indeed, what is involved in the production of an intentional trace and its re-production? Furthermore, how do we know an intentional trace to be an intentional trace when we meet with one? (76)

	A trace is recognized as an intentional trace when we realize it inhabits a meta-textual space or genre of intentional textual-activity where 'text' is interpreted in as broad as manner as possible so as to include all forms of intentional deposition upon the fabric of the world; be it from 'classical' texts like the writing of a letter to the taking of photographs, from walking along a beach and leaving our footprints to our voluntarily or involuntarily invoking memories of that same day at the seaside, etc., etc. (77)

	A trace therefore is the residue of some form of intentional activity impressed upon the fabric of the world. To recognize that trace as an intentional trace is to see it in the context of its associated genre of formation and therein re-cognize its formation in that context through this process of virtual re-formation as a reformation of the fabric wherein we find that textual trace impressed. This being the same difference between 'representation' and 're-presentation' as just previously alluded to. In other words, the reformation of the textual fabric is seen as a new re-formation that was apparently intentionally directed rather than an accidental alteration of that fabric by natural means (which would have resulted in a new formation rather than a genre accompanied re-formation which then becomes stored, when that experience is no longer directly engaged, as a genre accompanied represented reformation). Let me examine the nature of this intentional process of retrospective differentiation of imputed intentionality in greater detail. (78)

	In order to examine how we come to recognize an intentional trace as an intentional trace and differentiate it from a merely natural configuration let me look more closely at the intentional process and its depositions in the form of a traces. As embodied agents operating in this one-world-of-life we should make no absolute distinctions between bodies and minds. On the other hand, we should be aware that our lives as lived in the life-world operate on many levels of intentional and non-intentional complexity, both subjectively and intersubjectively, and that the complexity of our intentional existences will find this fact of our existences reflected in the traced out productivity of our passages through this world. It is a reflection of this super-imposed complexity upon the material nature of those traces that allows us to state, with varying degrees of assurance, to what degree and in what manner they are depositional traces. Now, how is the intentional formed, or, rather, how might we metaphorically analogue its imputed formation?  In a gestalt frame of reference on a 'horizontal level' we might envisage the orientations of background and object-state under focus in a dialectical-like state of interaction. On a 'vertical level' we might envisage the horizontal interaction as being appreciated by some associated gestalt sense of self on a number of relatively distinctive levels of epistemological organizational complexity, etc; a combining of these two axes then giving us a sense of the personal (and interpersonal). From a harmonic perspective one might like to envisage the intentional process as occurring through the resolution of foreground dissonance. The distinctive nature of that resolutional process within the accommodational structures of the appropriate gestalt backgrounds, etc., accounting for the distinctive nature of that act of intentional 'discharge'. This distinctive process through our embodiment embedding itself upon the fabric of the world in a distinctive fashion to that degree that intentional process was realized in a distinctive fashion. So when I decide to whisper I whisper, and, when I decide to yell loudly I yell loudly - the latter discharge of intentionality impressing itself more upon the fabric of the world. Then again, if I am whispering into someone's ear important information with far reaching ramifications the consequences of this action of whispering will be greater than my merely whispering to myself. Therefore, in this light of this harmonic model, an intentional act is a process realized in a distinctive fashion through the resolution of pre-intentional factors, essential input into such a process being defined by the manner of what difference in intentional effect is realized through the relative absence or presence of that same input – all within the ambit of a genre, or hybrid genre, of intentional activity accompanying the same (for that process of recognition to be a processes of re-cognition). (79)

As previously noted elsewhere, intentional deposition is effectively multi-modal in the nature of its deposition. Intentional formation may be distinctively selective the consequences of that 'discharge' are always multi-modal by virtue of the fact that our embodiment is multi-modal in the passage of its deportment through this world-of-life (in so far as our purportment in this world can never be intentionally unimodal in an absolute sense regardless of its apparent degree of intentional focus). What are the perceived consequences of this fact of our existence. Intentional acts, although mental in orientation, are deposited on all levels of our being. So the decision to walk along a beach, e.g., leaves a trail of footsteps. In the process each grain of sand is minutely and infinitesimally eroded; a trail of bodily scent and sweat is left behind; we find memories of this event are etched upon our brains in some mysterious fashion; we might utilize, at some later date, these beach experiences as the raw material to form a poem; we might have been seen wandering along that beach; we might tell someone about it; we might have been photographed that day; carry sand between our toes, etc., etc. The point being made here is the fact that all intentional deposition is multi-modal in the nature of its deposition. Every intentional act simultaneously deposits itself upon the fabric of the world in a variety of ways. Moreover, as an embodied being in this world we leave an embodied wake though this world that through processes of degradation and/or amplification leaves ultimately, if not effectively, a trail of trails, i.e., traces (which should therefore be seen as trailed and not just deposited on a momentary basis). Now, an examination of these parallel processes of deposition, when and where apparent, can be used in indirectly/directly determining 'apparent' intentional patterns of epistemological activity in conjunction with other hermeneutical procedures that note other forms of repetition, etc., through their harmonization in the context of conjectured narratives, etc., as determined in the context of apparent intersubjectively-predetermined genres of activity, etc. As I have argued elsewhere, this process of hermeneutic appreciation of intentionality, be that of others or institutions or of one's own self, occurs in a dialectical process of progressive thematization that occupies an appreciative ‘space’ that can neither be absolutely non-commensurable nor absolutely commensurable to either ourselves or others. Let me illustrate this point of relative commensurability in the following situation. (80)

	I am passing a person I know on the street. By convention we greet each other, or at least we should greet each other. So I touch the tip of my hat (a convention that is rarely conducted these days in this hitherto relatively hatless society), or I smile, nod my head or if in earshot say "hi" or hello"… the other person responding in similar fashion as expected. We stand relatively transparent before each other! At least translucently! A greeting ritual is a greeting ritual, a conventional act whose exact manner and style of adoption is not absolutely predetermined but remains a greeting ritual in the context of that expectation being met. Even if we may not like the other person, and vice versa, or, we might not know them well enough to follow through on such a full scale degree of recognition of the other. Then, again, we might greet them with 'clenched teeth' so to speak. Still the fact of the 'ritual of greeting' is almost a pre-given in this situation. Even if we ignore them the fact that we are aware of each other is enough to make this absence of a greeting ritual a self-evident fact, through omission, to both parties. Only superimposed upon this ritual state of affairs might we entertain matters of a relatively private nature. What an 'awful hat that person is wearing' we might think to ourselves as we smile to the other person. And they may have similar reservations with respect to ourselves. Such reservations and intentional optional extras being superimposed upon that ritual of greeting in our consciously being aware of our passing each other. We may or may not be aware of these supernumerary considerations but they too are 'present' as our intentionality deposits itself upon the fabric of the world in a multi-modal format appropriate to the nature of that type (read genre) of intentional interaction. Now, these finer points might become obvious to us if we had the skills to determine such things in the entrails, so to speak, of such intentional depositions. Normally, these finer points will escape us. To avoid unnecessary social friction these adventitious elements are usually dissimulated. Moreover, we are not absolutely in control of our own intentionality, such pre-intentional material, etc., will also escape the apparent 'author' or ‘authorship’ of the same. But, be that as it may, our fundamental intentional processes are relatively transparent/translucent to each other as mutually enacted genres of expected activity upon which a host of secondary material will be superimposed that may or may not be obvious to others (by hermeneutic means or otherwise). Therefore, I would argue, that by ignoring the other person in this situation or clenching my teeth and not looking too friendly (or even looking too friendly), etc., does not stop us from understanding what was fundamentally expected in such circumstances. In other words, we stand intentional transparent, to some degree or other, before the other in our fundamental attitudes to them despite what secondary considerations are privately entertained and superimposed upon the same and thereupon simulated or dissimulated! Our intentional existences in this inter-social world being fundamentally apparent to each other even if transplanted before those of other cultures since in our phenomenal-phenomenological humanity some modicum of our being, our-being-with-others, will be appreciated! Indeed, this world of the other is forever with us even if we were to live 'by ourselves' deep in some mountain cave. Only on its ‘edges’ does our parallel running commentary on genre-mediated situations operate and find and/or not find a simulated/dissimulated re-positioning in a frame of reference that we may or may not be adequately aware  (as no-one is absolutely in control of their own intentionality as previously argued for and this and other indeterminate factors need to be taken into account both in our retrospective analysis of an intentional state of affairs whether subjectively and/or intersubjectively, in perspectives that are both theoretical and practical in orientation). (81)

	This discharge of intentional resolution occupies a region between the determined and the non-determined, i.e., thereby involving elements of the chaotic. On one hand, there is the element of apparently making a choice. I intend such and such… I 'stand' before this intentional object/objective in such and such an intentional attitude. On the other hand, one cannot be in absolute intentional control of one's own intentional activity because the very intention to be in control would necessitate a pre-intentional intention to be in control, etc., ad infinitum. Intentionality, more fundamentally, as understood from a deeper perspective, should be 'perceived' to be the result of a process of resolution and not the process of an act of resolution to be resolute in anything other than a relatively superficial level of conscious awareness. The 'when', 'where' and 'what', etc., of thought is truly the result of a relatively indeterminate process of deliberation despite being heavily influenced by genres of activity, personal habits, environmental influences, interpersonal pressures, etc., etc. Its ground and edges are chaotic in nature, excessive degrees of a relatively non-superficial/superficial chaotic/non-chaotic activity being indicative of a mental illness in some form or other like a psychosis, neurosis or stasis. Our intentional depositions reflects this degree of non-chaotic/chaotic functionality which in turn reflects this degree of mental health/ill-health imputed as being present or being absent. (82)

	One objection to this understanding might complain that not all traces are so conveniently tied up with their genres of formation in order to allow us to recognize them as traced out intentionally or inadvertently? E.g., how are we going to ‘decipher’ texts and other artefacts of cultures long lost to us, when there has been a break in cultural transmission, conventional performance, meta-textual commentary, etc? But this exception can be turned around to disprove and effectively deconstruct this same objection! It is, indeed, with a greater degree of difficulty that we set about to decipher such traces and, eventually, find ourselves being able to accurately ‘read’ them. To that extent that point is granted, but, what we must realize is that even culture is a meta-textual artefact of our discrimination of the representations put forward to represent this world and therein and there through make our way in our understanding of the same. Now, in the archaeology of our culture it has thematized itself in and through contrast with other cultures to the extent that that culture appears, metaphorically, to possess this degree of self-awareness. But, in the advent of human language, through the diverting or subverting of other skills of metal differentiation and communication (perhaps one hundred thousand years ago or earlier?) we have acquired the skill to discern ‘texts’ of a more linguistic nature regardless of what culture they are made in and so it is on this basic non-absolute ground that a process of intercultural commensuration is able to begin regardless of its contiguity in time or otherwise, etc! In other words texts deposited by members of other cultures are not absolutely incommensurable and therein offer us a ‘place’ to begin their progressive decipherment; a meta-textual understanding being inaugurated and thematized in and through a progressive understanding of the function(s) of that text, and vice versa, since the meta-textual orientation is essentially just that - a functional understanding of how the text, any and every text, is meant to function in that cultural context. Moreover, we know we are making progress in our commensuration of a puzzling text, assuming its adequate formation, is the progressive discovery of an existential surplus of value though our engagement with that text (and this existential observation will form one avenue for our approaching the vexed question of what hypothetical value, i.e., sense, meaning and meaningfulness, is possessed by this concept of a theological dialogue about to be examined in the latter parts of this essay). (83)

	Therefore, a trace is recognized as an intentional trace by being seen in the appropriate meta-textual context. Then, this ‘reading’ is provisionally confirmed through the release of an adequate degree of excess value that arises through the use of that particular type of meta-textual accommodation. Recognition is reinforced through re-meeting this excess, and, its thematization is advanced through the minimization of non-essential distractions and a focusing on relatively essential features of its phenomenal-phenomenological constitution. That, in this life-world, both text and meta-text co-occur since they are mutually dependent upon each other – thence a recognition of either one automatically ensures the highly probable recognition of the other – even in the event of a disruption of cultural contiguity or ongoing cultural contrast. (84)

	Next, let me argue for a model of agency that does justice to the phenomenal-phenomenological nature of our being in this world-of-life and, from such a model, articulate the outlines of how the divine, as the Divine with some sense of personal agency, would need to be configured in order to pass as such (despite the transcendental illusion perpetrated by all forms of agency, whether relatively Divine or relatively non-divine in the hypothetical complexion/complexity of that traced out state of affairs). (85)

	How does one account for agency? How should one account for agency given that the reification of non-literal, metaphorical, metaphysical superimpositions upon our experience of phenomena and phenomenal situations to be a totally flawed, an adventure into the realms of nonsense given those absolutistic, preferentialistic terms of reference?! In the light of these questions and limitations let me now explore these matters of identity and agency in this framework of intentionally as currently being outlined (as a precursor to our hypothetical understanding of what would necessarily be entailed in the dialogical-like engagement between the Divine and us, and vice versa). (86)
	
	In order to answer these questions just posed I need to re-think these themes of identity and agency within the logical-presuppositional confines of the phenomenal-phenomenological philosophy already in the process of being constructed here as a permanent work in progress. By phenomenal is meant the treatment of identity in terms of its constitution as it appears as a phenomenon, a state of affairs that is realized through the use of the transcendental suspension as discussed elsewhere. By phenomenological is meant the involvement of a mental frame of reference or perspective that adopts the phenomenological point of view through its treatment of the phenomenal via the utilization of a transcendental suspension, etc. Broadly speaking the phenomenological attitude is a phenomenal frame of reference plus a particular epistemological perspective upon the same. (87)

	Within these terms of reference how is identity identified? On one hand we have an essentialist tradition that is inclined to defined things as sharply differentiated from other things and agency as a type of identity that possesses self-reflexivity to some degree or other that equally differentiates it sharply from entities that are not possessed of such agency. E.g., billiard balls move across a billiard table according to pre-determined rules of nature once set in motion whereas the billiard player is not so pre-determined, being an agent possessing free-will albeit circumscribed by predetermined possibilities and limitations of the phenomenal world. In a phenomenal-phenomenological re-reading of this simplistic type of pre-constructed world view in my opinion it would make better philosophical sense to read identity as a qualified differentiation of the phenomenal. On one hand, there is a limited differentiation of a phenomenal field adopted and defined phenomenologically and in this light identity is provisional and non-absolutely qualified. On the other hand, the integrity of the field demands a recognition of its integration at the same time through an integration of the logical space of its confines hence the phenomenological flavour of that field is realized through a selective recognition of that integrity, realized through that selective style of integration adopted. In the same light such integration cannot be anything other than provisional and non-absolutely defined. Hence identity is a product of qualified differentiation of a pre-integrated phenomenologically selective field. E.g., a geologist sees a certain landscape geologically when looking at it in that manner. At the same time or at some other time they might like to review it from an historical point of view, or economically or as an artist about to paint a picture, etc., etc. What do these different visions possess in common if they are ostensively looking at the same landscape? What ever relatively deeper aspects of their differentiation are found that maintain an isomorphic invariance in their transformation from one field to some other then those invariant factors and features therein allow us to transform our point of view from one perspective to some other wherein that maintenance of identity/agency is demonstrated. In such a transformational frame of reference what reality is possessed by such a viewing of those different, yet inter-translatable, 'landscapes'? As argued previously, reality is determined through satisfaction of finding a full modal compliment of expected modalities in the context of a certain adequate degree of an existential excess realized in our engagement with that phenomenon under examination (whether that be selectively phenomenological in nature or inter-transformationally accommodated). Hence these invariant transformational core-regions of identity/agency allow us to perceive both the maintenance of identity across differing 'spaces' of differing phenomenal fields, and, as a preservation of identity/agency through and across periods of time.  (88)

	Hence in this phenomenal-phenomenological attitude identity is a product of both qualified differentiation and integration and never the mere differentiation of identification (whether treated absolutely and/or non-absolutely). What are the implications of this type of stance? For a start identity cannot be considered independent of its context of introduction. Correctly, it is the dialectical product of both differentiation and integration! This balance being necessary for the relative preservation of identity (through an ongoing resolution of forces that would otherwise either completely disrupt that identity through excessive 'dissonance' or not produce/re-produce an identity through a non-differentiation of the same from its background field through excessive 'consonance'. Hence identity should take into account its ongoing apparent harmonic preservation (through an avoidance of disruptive phase changes and/or those forces within a phase that would disrupt its apparent continuity of current identity). (89)

	Traditionally, one might be able to argue for the construction of identity through the maintenance of distinctive boundaries, e.g., defining a particular tree by the limited extent of its roots, trunk, branches and leaves. In this type of scheme we might more effectively also define identity in its integrated, relatively epistemological perspective or orientation, i.e., in and through a sense of its own integrity - in the process invoking the metaphor of a sense of a psychic centre for that identity. Then, from a transformational (set of) perspective(s) we can envisage the apparent continuity of identity, its relative preservation, as the invoking of a deeper transformational isomorphism to a degree necessary for that degree of preservation to be maintained within the limits judged as necessary for the distinctive preservation of that identity as an 'identity in progress'. Hence an identity, say i, maintains that sense of identity within the limits set by I, those limits defined through the integration of i1…. in. To some extent this approach mirrors an eidetic reflection but one also conducted from an ontological and/or factual perspective simultaneously with its epistemological invocation. In other words, maintenance (in 'space') and preservation of identity (in 'time') (within the phenomenality of a certain field, set or system of fields) is realized when an isomorphic-transformational invariance is demonstrated (within that field, set or system of fields). (90)

	I believe this phenomenal-phenomenological approach to be a more sophisticated treatment of both identity and agency, and, the spatial maintenance and temporal preservation of the same. 'Things' are now no longer defined in terms of a reduction (through a process of reductive differentiation) since an integration is also necessary in order to understand the degree to which that identity or agency possesses the degree of integrity necessary for it to maintain and preserve that current degree of identity/agency. In such a scheme reductive processes can never be conducted in an absolute fashion since a degree of integration is always recognized, and, furthermore, absolute reduction is recognized as an impossible state of affairs both to conceive and/or recognize (let alone be thought as existing in a factual-ontological mode). (91)

	Using this scheme, as just outlined, how do we envisage transformations operating between these polarities of differentiation and integration whilst maintaining and preserving a viable sense of identity/agency (and what relationship does this type of research bear on our concept of divine agency and its preservation of identity on the already argued grounds that all relevant sense(s) of the divine must partake some form of a phenomenal-phenomenological 'footprint', 'imprint', sense of 'presence', etc. in the very phenomenality of the life-world itself?)? (92)

	In this re-modelling of the phenomenal there is no absolute difference between non-agental identity and agental identity. The only difference being, in relative terms of reference, the degree of epistemological organization present that can be demonstrated from an exhibition of type (as discerned meta-textually) as expressed through its sense of integration (rather than its sense of differentiation). Thence, in this light, agents phenomenally behave as agents, etc. (93) 

Now, let me explore how processes of interaction occur in the light of this re-modelling, and, how relative preservation and maintenance of identity/agency is effectively realized across time and space respectively, etc. (94)

	In this re-modelling we have, in general terms of reference, a set of identities and/or agencies defined though processes of differentiation-integration in a certain field, set or system of fields whose modalities are effectively defined by those features found to be isomorphically invariant within and between those modalities, in effect, those features that are found integrated in the phenomenality of that field as viewed phenomenologically. In the light of this 'list' we have a certain field or set of fields whose modality is defined in terms of the integration modally relevant to that 'expanse'. Therein we differentiate relatively distinctive identities and/or agencies. Now, the maintenance of identity/agency is 'seen' as operating 'spatially' whereas preservation of identity/agency is 'seen' to operate 'temporally'. In phenomenological terms of reference I perceive, generally, the temporal dimension(s) as operating in an inverse relationship to spatial dimension(s) to the extent that we can provisionally and non-absolutely focus on them individually. In gestalt terms of reference we might say that the degree of phenomenological interest is a product of the degree of 'individual' interest shown to both the temporal and spatial dimensions simultaneously since neither of these polar facets can be entertained in a pure fashion. Consequently, an increased interest in one facet is at the expense of the other and that their product reflects the degree of phenomenological interest being shown in that field or set of fields. Furthermore, broadly speaking, the current integration of our current interest must be conducted at the expense of our other interests co-conducted. In this climate of mutual inter-determination what relative basic features do we have therefore? A phenomenal field, set or system of fields is reviewed phenomenologically in a manner in keeping with the nature or natures of that field/those fields, therein certain differentiated identities/agencies and the manner of their interactions, and, the temporal and spatial natures accompanying that field/those fields wherein there is the relative preservation and maintenance of identity/agency. Although in relatively particular terms of reference identity/agency cannot be pre-emptively defined in an a priori fashion, throughout our considerations these phenomenal factors of fields, identities and/or agencies, temporal and spatial considerations and interactive transformational relationships can all be mutually written/re-written, once effectively defined/re-defined, in terms of each other since our phenomenological interest into the constitution of this phenomenal field, set or system of fields is conducted through the auspices of the hermeneutic circle wherein through mtually correlativity all elements can defined each other through their joint inverse negation. So, in this regard, the integration of the field(s) can be defined through the joint negated inverse mutual definition of agency/identity therein found present or defined as being present therein, etc. So if we are dealing with human agency then our field of interest is correspondingly co-defined. Moreover, such integration as present is reflected in the nature of that field and the nature of its temporality. On the other hand such differentiation as present is reflected in the nature of that field and the nature of its spatiality. All relationships therein being defined through the totality of the hermeneutic circle operating phenomenally-phenomenologically therein. The relationship being realized through the resolution of the differentiated dissonance found within the relative integration of that field or set of fields. In this light, we should find a richer understanding of relationships and their relative temporal preservation and their relative spatial maintenance. Hence, in quantum entanglement, e.g., we should note the maintenance of a spatial element and a temporal element as long as those particles remain entangled and the mutual inverse relationship between these two aspects is maintained - entanglement being disrupted through a breaking of that spatial/temporal interrelationship however far apart they were prior to that disruption (of their internal symmetry). E.g., in the interaction of human beings they must do so in the same 'space' at the same 'time' (although 'space' today can be defined in more virtual terms of reference through indirect relationships, cyber space, etc.). E.g., preservation of identity can be re-defined as the maintenance of an 'internal' or 'deeper' isomorphic-transformational invariance as long as the field, set or system of relevant fields are maintained temporally and spatially. In the same manner modification can be re-defined as alteration in part with respect to the same. So, e.g., x used to play tennis but now prefers to garden instead with, as a result, a change in identity whilst still maintaining a maintenance of overall identity. So we can say x used to play tennis but now prefers to garden. Hence alterations and modifications of identity can be incremental, disruptive or phase changes or modal need not be at the expense of overall identity/agency. On the other hand, radical discontinuity essentially signals disruption of identity even if field/fields are maintained in the process from a global perspective through a global preservation of isomorphic-transformational-invariance at the expense of the same occurring on a non-global basis. So, e.g., the country of Australia continues to be a country even though all its citizens will die eventually; as long as there are replacements in place citizens who think of themselves as Australians before the demise of all its inhabitants from a global perspective. (95)

	How do we account for change in this type of scheme? Change is the inevitable ongoing alteration of identity/agency through the momentary illusion of time/alterations in 'space' and through the consequences of interaction itself be they incremental, phase-oriented, disruptive or radical (though a radical reconstitution of the relevant field itself). Let me elabourate. Epistemologically, through integration, there are quantum and quantum-like limits placed upon the thematization of identity/agency. E.g., for a thought process to come to full intentional consciousness a certain length of time must elapse. In a similar fashion, the mutual negative inverse relationship between correlative physical properties cannot be registered below a certain 'measured amount' hence the planck constant 'h' (along with the mutual inverse indeterminacy of measurement between time and space, energy and mass, place and speed, etc. ). Phenomenologically, this type of limit or constraint cannot be overcome within those phenomenal-phenomenological fields hence their momentary nature when treated to such a finely-tuned level of (spatial) analysis and/or (temporal) synthesis (since what occurs within those limitations is not discernible to us and these lacunae manifest as the grain present in the texture of that field or set of fields). Then, from the mere alteration in time, between points in space, and the resulting interactional differences that therein result we are given the appearance of both change and duration in the sense, meaning and meaningfulness of identity and agency (the only difference between these two forms of identity being in their relative degree of the level of epistemological organization present or absent. (96)

	Such a re-modelling of these phenomenal-phenomenological dimensions quite simple defines change as an alteration in the constitution of those entities/agencies, and, duration of identities/agencies as the maintenance and preservation of that constitution. Furthermore, disruption of identity or agency can be defined quite simply as the loss of the requisite degree of isomorphic-transformational invariance deemed necessary to spatially maintain and/or temporally preserve that identity/agency. (97)

	Let me now look more closely at the nature of the interaction between entities/agents in a certain field or set of fields. (98)

	As previously intimated, each identity or agent can be specified by means of its unique characteristics. On the other hand, those characteristics must be seen as provisional and non-absolute in their description and identification. Furthermore, we are dealing with non-metaphysical entities/agencies since such denominations are conditioned by the nature of their fields through the very fact that they possess a relatively unique descriptor(-process) that is part differential and part integral. Hence their phenomenological differentiation is non-absolute and mutually dependent upon the phenomenal-phenomenological nature of that field or set of fields - and this is revealed through their integrated natures as mutually defined within that field or set of fields. Hence interaction is able to take place by virtue of this dual nature possessed by phenomenal entities and agents, the same being expressed by the configuration of that phenomenal field(s) from that phenomenological perspective(s); the maintenance and/or preservation of identity/agency being lost when the prerequisite degree of isomorphic-transformational invariance is no longer found. (99)

	Let me re-state what is being attempted here in his revolutionary redefining of identity/agency. For a start to define any form of identity (be it logically subjective non-agental or logically subjective agental; be it predicative or relational; be it lexically equivalent or lexically non-equivalent; be it concrete or empirical or abstract or non-empirically oriented; be it directly re-presentative or historically representative, etc.) we need to state both its analytically-oriented textual differences and its synthetically-oriented meta-textual/genre commonalities. This gives us a hybrid value evaluation that straddles this territory between difference and identity. Because all identificational difference is also always meta-textually introduced, exhibited, etc., it follows that this sense also includes a genre meaning relationship. As argued elsewhere this also entails an explicit and/or implicit spatial-temporal contrast respectively (generated between these poles of analytical-retrospectivity and synthetical-prospectivity). In gestalt focus we focus on the former in its difference and its consequent sense of  dissonance, and, in a de-focusing we return to the gestalt field wherein the dissonance identity of the former is accommodated by virtue of the fact that dissonance is essentially two-faced, i.e., provocative (as defined elsewhere). So, identity is always a contrasted variable, a set of contrasted variables or a system of contrasted variables, i.e., a simple or complex mix of variables 'written' with two places, i.e., difference or dissonance versus similarity or accommodation. This fact is often overlooked. So, e.g., if we are nominating a certain Joe Bloggs, it might be conducted along these lines - that which possesses certain distinctive features that demarcate a particular Joe Bloggs - being a certain man of such such a race… i.e., a man (universal) denominated as Joe Bloggs (as the unique, particular individual being nominated). In other words, text and meta-text are non-independent from each other and permanently linked in a correlatively relationship with the co-determination of these two aspects of our identity; this identification of a phenomenal sense of a focalized-difference in a meaning relationship of background-accommodation within that appropriate field correctly needing to take into account both facets of that relationship wherein this process of sense-meaning can be realized. That understood we should not stop there. All identity (etc.) being entertained through the auspices of the hermeneutic circle, correctly, a third place should also be noted, namely, the existential moment or polarity that is realized through the suspension of the text versus the meta-text in the realization of the meaningfulness of the existential moment wherein a sense of the present is realized (through this balance of the retrospectivity of the textual and the prospectivity of the meta-textual). The uniqueness of this existential descriptor (in an individuated format or as a set or system of values) being realized through the uniqueness of its spatio-temporal conjunction (to the extent that that identity finds a spatio-temporal instantiation directly or indirectly (and whose status is better determined through an ordered analysis as previously noted in these essays and elsewhere). All three factors (of our hermeneutical circle) (and all six aspects of our ordered analysis) being overlooked in varying degrees but, nevertheless, being present in some manner or other for that identity to find some form of determined or determinable value; an evaluation whose value implicitly or explicitly recognizes this co-determination of sense, meaning and meaningfulness. Such definitive location, as an unique emplacement within the life-world, I would like to call its unique existential descriptor (whether that be individuated, sequences as a set or integrated as a system of values and/or defined in concrete or abstract terms of reference, etc). (100)

	Continuing along this path of an indentificational geography (and its isomorphic topography) let me now discuss how the post-modern concept of a centre-less world gets turned on its head! The recent critique of an absolute sense of centre is both apposite and timely! On the other hand, because all sense, meaning and meaningfulness is realized through the ambit of a hermeneutic circle it follows that circles with centres are absolutely necessary for the determination of apparent sense, meaning and/or meaningfulness. Furthermore, there can be no (meta-textual) 'edges' without this sense of a margin, limits, etc., as defined in relation to this adopted and adapted hermeneutic circle and its implicit/explicit centring. So, some form of a centre is always presupposed! In the same manner as 'outer' and 'inner' can be deconstructed, similarly, 'centre' versus 'edge' can also be treated in a similar manner, i.e., as provisional and relative (but never as 'merely relative' or, i.e., as 'absolutely relative'). But, rather than creating a completely chaotic landscape with no form of commensurability the life-world, in its transcendental ideality, is essentially, absolutely not non-commensurable between and within all regions!(although different forms of accommodation between apparently non-linked regions of the life-world may or may not produce an existential excess of value, or, rather, and adequate excess of existential valuation that would inspire us to continue on that path of identificational/re-identificational accommodation). That by such means the enrichment of our phenomenal presentations/representations/re-presentations can be re-invested through processes of modal activation and enrichment, through different perspectives and multiple use, through a metaphorical ‘folding over’ or re-invagination, etc. E.g., when a theologian attempts to invest their concept of the divine with a greater depth of value, i.e., sense, meaning and meaningfulness, they need to link the theoretical nature of that concept with ethical, spiritual, devotional dimensions, e.g., etc. A task made easier by the fact that there is no textual presentation without a meta-textual accompaniment and therein the 'grounds' for refining such presupposed links must, in some measure, already pre-exist, etc. (by processes of explication, refinement, pruning, transplanting, weeding, watering and other processes of explicative 'gardening') (presupposed intensionally in and through the very being of the epistemological hierarchy and its psychic mapping of the life-world). But this type of explicative project will be examined in my next essay. Processes of accommodational interaction being realized through a transcendental transformation of passage between various regional 'centres' within the 'grounds' of the life-world in its transcendental ideality (in this enrichment of unique existential descriptors, supplemented activation of additional modalities, etc.). The implication that we should draw here is that no part of the life-world is incommensurable with any other transcendental region of the psyche although it is another matter as to whether the psychic investment of intentional energy in a process of accommodation between the same would manifest as a profitable enterprise at that point in time. (101)

	In the light of the above let me now examine how processes of interaction are entered into between various identities and/or agencies. (102)

	All existential descriptors (throughout the six orders of identificational thematization) have an existential footprint in some form or other. So Pegasus, the winged horse, has its footprint, or toehold, in Greek mythology but not in a sixth order state of affairs. On the other hand, the Roman emperor Julius Caesar has sixth order status, albeit as an individual who is now dead. Then, again, the concept of a round-square only exists as a non-integrated concept that cannot be obtained between the universals of roundness and squareness that can find instantiations in the life-world in the form of particular circles and squares (albeit not in absolute conformity with their perfect ideality), etc., etc. Now, we must ask ourselves "how do relationships form between disparate identities/agencies given that all identity/agency have their own uniquely individuated existential descriptors or set of descriptors or system of the same." In otherwords, "how can relationships form between uniquely individuated entities, sets or systems of individuation?" This 'problem' being resolved, when and where possible, through a re-centring of the relationship between those pre-related centres of individuational-accommodation (a process assisted through a recognition of the possible role, when and where relevant, played by genre in this regard).  Thence, through a transcendental transformation of passage the various interactions are interrelated through simulation in such a manner that as simulations they therein enter into process of resolution (through a suspension of their dissonant-consonant interaction entered into through a process of transcendental suspension naturally engendered between textual-dissonance and meta-textual-consonance within that field appropriate to the nature of that interaction. Let me elabourate. (103)

	A relationship is formed when there is an ongoing resolution of dissonance. How are two or more identities/agencies dissonant with respect to each other? By virtue of their uniquely different existential descriptors! A relationship taking effect to that extent that there is/are grounds for transformational isomorphism on a mode by mode basis (within the transcendental auspices of the life-world). In the process a new centre of identity/agency of that relationship is realized… and its own sense of relational identity advanced in meta-status by one degree… which subject to transformational treatment/retreatment is returned to the same basis of its initial origination (through processes of transformational-treatment/retreatment). In this manner a process of engagement is entered into virtually or non-virtually. Let me illustrate this in the interaction between two people whose existential descriptors would allow a process of direct interaction and with an historical figure from the past, say our former 'friend' Julius Caesar. (104)

	In the former situation we can say we are directly engaging another person when our existential descriptors coincide temporally. In a spatial co-incidence we have the possibility of entering into a face to face type of relationship when both parties have recognized each other in that respect. On the other hand, it is possible for two parties to have a direct long-distance interaction, say on the telephone, when not in a state of spatial co-incidence. The nature of the interaction essentially characterizing the nature of that interaction as, in this instance, a telephone conversation. In a different type of situation when we read the works of Julius Caesar we are having a direct relationship only with a disseminated textualized trace from that author that we believe, with good reason in this instance, to be the literary remains, albeit in translation if translated, of this person’s intentional life wherein he is historically recording his contribution to the advancement of Roman politics with what ever agenda and personal perspectives  he, knowingly or not so knowingly, had tried to argue for. Although indirect, we would argue for a direct link via this text between the author and the reader, and vice versa. Despite the fact that there can be no co-incidence of existential descriptors of the same other than by proxy through this apparently non-disrupted linkage across time. (105)

	Let me now look into the nature of a relationship between two non-agental identities and three or more non-agental identities. In the first let us say we are dealing with a sun and one planet (and then one sun and two planets). How do they interact, form the nature of the relationship they have with each other (without going into the metaphor and mathematics exercised by advanced (meta)physics)? We must assume that these two bodies, say A and B, have a gravitational type of interaction since in the first solar system we have one sun A and one planet B. Hence the modality in common is gravitational. I would argue that ‘A in relationship with B’ is isomorphic in its overall act of relation with ‘B in relationship with A’, i.e., there exists an isomorphic aspect of that overall relationship that is found ‘between’ A r B and B r A. Similarly, in a solar system of one sun and two planets. But in the latter instance one cannot assume that the common interactions are isomorphic, i.e., A r B, B r C, C r A, and v.v., are not necessarily isomorphic. Because of the power discrepancy between A on one hand and B, C on the other, and v.v. Then again, the most accurate calculation of this interaction should take all three parties into account. As an effective approximation we could probably ignore one of the other planets when dealing with the nature of each planet’s approximate interaction with that sun A, and v.v., as long as no collision or near-collision perturbation was imminent.  However, in a situation where all three parties are in a state of interaction with each other and there is no great power discrepancy between those parties we must ask ourselves how an accurate calculation of this interaction is at all possible beyond some approximation when the nature of the interaction between these three relatively equal parties is non-determinable and demands some form of an apparent chaotic-like calculation (or, perhaps more to the point, should demand that no process of calculation could do accurate justice to this type of situation [other than perhaps some form of an instantaneous multi-dimensional calculus-integration?]). Do we have an insight here to suggest that nature does not calculate but just ‘is’; that the resultant of interaction is just realized through the process of interaction but never through some form of retrospective analytical practice (or synthesis for that matter, or, even, through a ‘third moment’ of an existential suspension of these other polarities of the focalized and the background-field?). Although within the confines of the hermeneutic circle I would say that resolution as the third-existential moment of our circle is realized in an historical sense of the present the overall effect of the interaction between these three poles would be to realize a state of resolution that is effectively spontaneous in an ongoing, ahistorical, transcendental sense of contemporaneity. From these sorts of reflections I would consider the nature of these types of physical interaction of a gravitational nature to be issuing from the overall centre of that relationship between all the relevant parties and to be the result of all the parties with respect to each other from both their own point of view and the evolving point of view of that relationship itself as it is ongoingly defined through its history and the history of its existential descriptors [and the existential descriptor set/system advanced by that overall relationship itself]) in the relatively unique aspectival light of that relationship being selectively viewed (through a relative suspension of all other possible perspectives). (106)

	In summary then what points should be noted in order to account for the transcendental nature of interaction in general? Succinctly, in general terms of reference, how is interaction realized, how is engagement put into effect? To address this philosophical issue let me make the following metaphorical observations. Engagement is essentially, but simulataneously, on a mode by mode basis. The most important modality in this regard describing the most significant existential nature of that interaction. That interaction is realized through a relevant metaphorical cancelling of modal descriptors that realize some form of non-virtual and/or virtual spatial-temporal co-incidence and potential difference within those most significant modalities in this regard (guaranteed by virtue of the uniqueness of all existential descriptors with respect to each other). This process of metaphorical cancellation creating the relative ontological/epistemological centre of that relationship and describing, therein, the dominant essential nature of that evolving relationship (in its movement towards and about the ‘centre of that relationship’ as selectively focused upon). Now, can we take up these metaphorical ideas of cancellation, etc., and re-apply them to the psycho-dynamics of a personal interaction between two agent, e.g., and then, by extrapolation, re-apply them to the hypothetical nature of divine engagement?? (107)

	In some measure the strength of a personal relationship is reflected in this degree of existentially co-incident interaction; or at least the presence of a disposition that would desire to achieve that state of co-inciding coincidence. Each relationship creating its own sense of space and time from within which it operates given the net effect of all other relationships being wittingly or unwittingly entered into. That, in effect, the life-world is the net interaction of all interactions in an ongoing state of interaction within the life-world without the sense of an absolute centre but with a provisional sense of provisional centres, and, therein forming for us a hypothetical provisional centre of all centres (without absolute limits) realizing/masquerading as some form of divinity or hierarchical sequence of divinization?? That, in effect, a provisional, partial cancellation of the forces described by a set of existential descriptors creates the nature of that interaction. (108)

In this relational act of consumption a relationship comes into virtual/non-virtual effect, by default so to speak. That in accordance with this type of model (invoking the partial provisional cancellation of co-incident forces held in common) a relationship is automatically put into effect when there is this semblance of ongoing resolution, cancellation, etc. What we have in effect here is the semblance of a suspension! A suspension seen in both an ontological light and in an epistemological light. In the former we have the nature of that relationship determined in our/its psychic mapping of the life-world. In the latter the epistemological status of that relationship is declared from an hierarchical point of view, i.e., an exhibition of its relative epistemological degree of organization. Then, at the psychic centre of that relationship the exhibited exchange mechanisms characterize the overall or apparent complexion of that relationship. But, let me further explore the apparent usefulness of these types of metaphor in the context of a hypothetical examination of the archetypal nature of divine engagement, and, hypothetically examine the possible nature(s) of the interrelational involvement or 'dialogue' one might expect from that type of perspective in order to determine what general features must be transcendentally present in order to declare that some form of a meaningful engagement could meaningfully take place between those relatively divine and non-divine participants in that unequal, or asymmetric, type of relationship. This research forming a preparation for the theologian in their non-critical and/or critical explorations of the metaphor involved in the introduction, exhibition and possibly fruitful demonstration of the divine (for themselves, their congregation, other theologically oriented fraternities, the philosophical world and the world at large noting that each one of these spheres will demand different approaches, levels and degrees ‘evidence’ in their re-treatment of this, or any other, topic). (109)

4.   Exploring the Hypothetical 'Dialogical' Nature of Divine Interaction

	Effectively, at this state of my research, the nature of the concept of the divine is left open (indeed, I might add, as a necessary prerequisite for transcendental-phenomenological reflection and research). However, as already noted, the divine could be defined as that which is relatively more organized epistemologically. That being the case we now must re-consider how agents can interact as agents despite relatively great differences in their degree of embodied epistemological organization; this relative difference in power and its problematic nature already being noted earlier in this paper. In this pursuit let me look at the interaction of a ‘mother and child’ as an archetypal example of this difference in power in order to see what lessons we might find from such reflections and therein learn to re-adapt for other considerations such as pre-determining what the hypothetical nature of divine engagement would need to entail in order to merit that type of ascription? (110)

If the divinity of the divine could be defined as that which is relatively more organized epistemologically then it would be natural to ask the question - how do we determine to what degree the epistemological orientation of a certain state of affairs is  organized? Surely, e.g., the complexities of the atom or nucleus equally demand an hierarchical organization of structure that could also merit this attribution of divinity (through epistemological complexity by virtue of that repetitive hierarchicalization)? But, then, as all matter is so organized there can be no relative difference in this regard! No, this greater degree of relative complexity must be on a psychological level of organization (and beyond?). Then the question becomes - how do we determine psychological complexity and how do we determine when psychological complexity is greater by the necessary degree to be labelled 'divine'. If, e.g., Joe Bloggs is a member of both a committee x and a supervisory committee y that overseers and supervizes the former does his participation in the overseeing committee contribute to an elevated spiritual status compared to his participation in committee x.? My intuition, in this regard, tells me that in the total imputed scheme of things the effective difference between these states of epistemological organization barely warrants such a distinction and hence this definition needs to note that there should be a few quanta of emergent phase-differences before this epithet gets appropriately applied to a certain distinctive type of agency that correctly merits such an appellation? So, how are to discern and estimate this degree of relative complexity? For a start, as there is no absolute demarcation between the epistemological and the ontological it follows that all complexity in one aspect is reflected automatically in the other so a determination of any one aspect should, properly conducted, reveal the equal complexity of the other. Hence this proposal of an epistemological-ontological correlativity. Since epistemological function, structurally reflects its ontological basis, the determination of the former can be determined through noting the complexity of structure interpreted as necessary to instigate that higher level of function, and v.v. Therefore, it follows that a valid determination of one is a valid determination of the other (when properly interpreted). Hence the formulation of an embodiment rule that states, more or less, that epistemological complexity is an equal correlative product of both function and structure and that a valid determintion of one is a valid and equal determination of the other. So, e.g., we could look at a brain and determine the equal complexity of its organization and/or its function and therein discover the degree of complexity to which that state of affairs is indeed able to enter into as a possibility if not always as an actually. (111)

	Obviously a bag of wet sand scooped up on a beach and placed in a plastic bag is not as complex as, say, a brain (human or otherwise) dissected from its body, if we were to imagine ourselves contemplating both at the same time. Similarly, this sort of comparison can be imagined when a number of different brains from different species were to be compared. Then, we needn’t go to the trouble of actually attempting this type of comparison when we could do it via research already done in this regard. Moreover, on the assumption of brain functional potential we can observe, again hypothetically on the basis of our acquaintance with the necessary information, the intentional and quazi-intentional abilities of those subjects. Again, a similar type of comparative experiment could also be run with various computers to see how they rate with respect to each other in terms of computing function, in order to determine some understanding of their power and therein their implicit complexity necessary to accomplish tasks in keeping with that quazi-intentional ability. (112)

	Intentional complexity, a product of structural-functional complexity can also be phenomenologically examined (through a contextual examination of intentional traces) in an attempt to discover and re-affirm the degree of structural/functional complexity interpreted as being present in that type of presentation. Furthermore, a phenomenological-hermeneutical-existential correlativity can also be 'measured' to confirm either one of these parties of the structural-functional complexity and/or intentional complexity. Then, an ordered examination and determination might be able to demonstrate the degree to which there is also an equivalent ordered level of complexity. Each level of complexity producing/re-producing a distinctive phenomenological character and therein, in this type of research, an implicit, eventually explicable metaphorical thermometer for measuring this degree of complexity thought to be present within a certain presentation under examination. (113)

	But, it might be argued that as the entire life-world is reflected within its ambit equally from all points with the same degree of complexity, being a reflection of the life-world in its apparent totality (as the relational ‘ground’ of all relationships in its ongoing totalization), that the thorough determination of any segment of the life-world would not produce a great degree of difference in this regard? However, one can get around this philosophical observation by noting another, namely, the distinction of active complexity invoked versus the maximum complexity entailed in the very potential passivity of the life-world expressed intentionally as its net passive complexity. This latter aspect taking the same generic expression with what ever type of presentation under review and a universal range in complexity of character when phenomenological type is taken into regard in our evaluation and/or estimation of the same, and, a specific index of complexity in the entertainment of a specified phenomenal object-state. What is meant here? Let me elabourate utilizing this idea of a passivity-activity continuum. As the ongoing unity of the life-world is holistically reflected equally from all points within the life-world we find therein a general level of equal generic potentiality which could be 'read' as its universal background passivity in general. Against this passive background 'intentionality' is actively formulated hence its activation is engaged on the basis of this passive background. The level of complexity involved producing/re-producing a distinctive type of intentional-like formation within a specific range of complexity, i.e., its active foregrounding or distinctive intentional activity becoming specifically ‘fixed’ in provisional terms of reference in the particular uniqueness of that type of intentional object-state. The degree of such activity present reflecting this degree of complexity through to be present and found evidentially supported by this degree of relatively ‘fixed’ distinctively specified intentional activity realized in the specific formation of that intentional object-state. Hence, intentional particularity is realized through a transition from background passivity to a foregrounded activity; a transitional process that can never be absolutely transformed into ‘pure activity’ (since activity is the activation of the necessarily present relatively non-active material-to-hand (that constitutes the embodiment of that being activated) [with the implication that background passivity is never in a ‘pure’ state likewise]). (114)

	This degree of complexity is also a direct measure of the degree of existential excess created in the relational nature of that under examination. All things are in dependence upon all other things, and v.v. The ground of our being-in-this-world-of-life-with-others is in and through this realm of dependence (upon all the conditions necessary for the existence of that under examinational focus). On the other hand, the relational complexity of that state of affairs is also the degree of psychic-freedom created in and through the depths of those interrelated dependent conditions that support the existential manifestation of that state of affairs and thereupon projecting it beyond that relatively fundamental basis. Through the progressive emergence of relational properties the object-state 'experiences' a(n increasing) degree of freedom to that degree such independence cannot be reductively reduced to its underlying basic conditions of existence. This excess, therefore, being equal to this non-reducible residue! E.g., we are born in dependence upon the surface of the Earth but it is now almost feasible for an astronaut to leave this planet and migrate to Mars. We have the potential freedom to escape our roots in just such a manner! Indeed, everyday thousands of people take to the air in the course of their travelling by such a medium. Hence, although we might say we are grounded in the dependent conditionality of the life-world we are also a product of our intentional freedom to escape, in part, some of those limiting conditions to some degree or other. That our net freedom is a direct reflection of the degree of existential excess actively available to us, and, that, in turn, is a direct reflection of our degree of existential complexity of being an agent in this world-of-life! A state of affairs augmented by the existential manner we purport ourselves in our coursing through this world-of-life! So, although we are dependent upon the (culturally pre-determined) ‘ground of our being’ in this world-of-life the advancement of our intentional horizons also brings with it a paradoxical degree of freedom to just be, just be-ourselves, or, better, to more closely realize our own degree of relative divinity; such status being reflected in the degree and depth of relationships infused with this level of existential excess (through their existential transformation or spiritual revitalization). (115)

	An existential excess is that sense of psychic expansion and activity entertained in the course of our relationships that cannot be reduced to the mere embodiment of those relationships. It is, in effect, the psychic sense of any relationship minus the body or relative substance of that relationship as found operating within this life-world. The net existential excess of all our currently engaged relationships characterizing that degree of existential freedom that marks the current nature of our being as a being-in-this-world-of-life-with-others. All forms of an existential excess are experienced as spiritual by virtue of their relatively non-material orientation. That expression 'orientation' implying that the spiritual cannot be realized apart from our embodiment but is dependent upon the existential nature of the relationship which in turn is a product of the existentialization of the relatively non-existential which is none other than our embodiment. In this light, the spiritual is, essentially, that degree we are enmeshed in our relationships with an excess of value realized in and through the being of those relationships to the extent they collective transcend their own limitations. Hence, although we are rooted in the world we need not be of the earth, so to speak. (116)

	In processes of judgment, in our simulated/re-simulated experience/re-experience of a relationship, this semblance of an existential excess is made evident to us. Hence there can be no absolute difference between the bona fide spiritual experience, what ever they might be, and the quazi-spirtual experience, e.g., like walking across a sublime landscape, examining a beautiful poem, reading a great novel, engaging some one whom we are particularly fond of… because all such experiences have, for the reflective person, the exhibition of an existential excess of value by virtue of the fact that they are all distinctive relationships (as phenomena or fields of phenomena) and cannot be reduced merely to their embodied footprint or field of potential embodiment! Moreover,  because the simulated experience of a relationship, in acts of judgment, reveals to us this existential excess of the whole over the parts of that relationship regardless of the nature of that relationship, regardless of whether we regard that relationship to be spiritually oriented or non-spiritually oriented! Therefore, all relationships have their inherent degree of spirituality simulated for us through their re-simulation. The distinctive nature of this excess being irreducible to the material nature of its matrix of embodiment can therefore be declared to be "spiritual". Furthermore, because of its distinctive nature (as reflected in the uniqueness of its existential descriptor(s), i.e. the manner of its instantiation in time and space directly as a particular state of affairs and indirectly as a universal region of potential instantiation) it phenomenologically presents itself with a distinctiveness bourn of its 'location' in this world-of-life. Hence the meaningfulness (and value) of this expression of the 'spiritual', or, more correctly, 'spiritual orientation', as an irreducible existential excess, phenomenologically constituted as distinctive in type and as relatively unique in experience; and an experience experienced with a certain degree of freedom whilst still in line with the limitations placed upon that state of affairs by various phenomenal and phenomenological constraints embedded in its 'embodiment', etc. (117)

	Related to this concept of the spiritual, but different, we could define the numinous as a religious-like experience without defining the apparent or real intentional object of that experience. On the other hand, an experience of the divine is a numinous experience with a more pronounced sense of agency, namely, divine agency. Finally, we can call the former an experience of the ‘Divine’ (rather than the 'divine') when we feel we have entered into an experience with the divine whose epistemological status is greater by a considerable quanta than the experience we have with our own sense of self as an agent (i.e., whose complex sense of activity and agency is relatively greater than our own). This greater sense of epistemological organization implying, if only hypothetically, a Divine sense of self whose complexity is a number of orders of magnitude greater than that of our own. Hence our definition that "the divine is an expression of greater epistemological organization" easily implies a hypothetical transition in our thinking from a sense of the divine to a sense of the Divine, i.e., God. Both expressions being now treated as interchangeable even though the content of this topic has yet to be define and can, in apparent experience, still be treated as numinous or numinous-like (rather than as Numinous in nature). (118)

	Am I entitled to declare that there is no ultimate difference between a quazi-religious-like experience, say the reading of a beautifully written poem, and, a trully beautiful and profound religious experience, should such an experience exist, when the latter has not been phenomenologically established, etc. (in the course of these essays, e.g.)? All judgments, I believe, utilize the same transcendental machinery! So if we are attending to a wonderful poem, determining the ethical course of a relationship, resolving a philosophical problem, etc., the same transcendental dynamics are invoked. Moreover, all relationships are simulated in a relational mode, the same modality in which they find judgement regardless of the transcendental field they invoke such as the essential, aesthetic, ethical, pragamatical, hermeneutical, factual (i.e., that associated with our six orders with or without hybrid combinations of the same). The sense, meaning and meaningfulness, i.e. value, of the spiritual invoking the considerable degree this experience of a distinctive transcendental excess is experienced. On hypothetical grounds, given the experience of a relationship with the divine or Divine (qua a self-reflectively self-conscious version of the former in its engaged activity of agency) the same modality of the relationship must be invoked (on transcendental grounds)! Hence, ultimately, there can be no real difference between a quazi-religiously-like experience and a truly religious experience (the manner and degree of its presentations excepted), hypothetically, since both must be attended to in the same psychic terms of reference, namely, in and through the sense, meaning and meaningfulness of the relational which can only be attended to in trans-cognitive/trans-conceptual terms of reference, i.e., through that part of the psyche that entertains relationships in a relational mode in and through acts of judgment. Hence this identification is not a frivolous claim (despite the fact that we have, as yet, staked no claim for the existence of true bona fide spiritual experiences). Therefore, this hypothetical 'gap' between quazi-spiritual states and hypothetical spiritual states can have no valid currency given that all relationships are experienced as relationships in and through the overall modality of judgment without exception and that to engage the divine, in truth or hypothetically, must involve the same transcendental machinery as operative in acts of judgment! Hence we must accept in any inferred engagement with some semblance of the divine, given the non-quazi-spiritual nature of the same, a higher degree of transcendental activity must be involved re the same (in the light of our definition of complexity, etc.) and that, given transparency of access, would involve quantum degrees of difference between secular and sacred experiences (assuming non-quazi-spiritual-like experiences are able to be experienced directly and that we can truly appreciate the intensity, and activity, of the same under normal conditions) ! (119)

	Now, let us examine the mother-child relationship to see if we can borrow those insights that we might be able to find there that could help us to understand, analogically, the possible nature of the relationship between a divine entity and human agent/s from a hypothetical point of view. The theologian indeed must successfully face and overcome this final theoretical difficulty, namely, what religious value could such a concept of the divine possess if its existence(s) were granted given this excessive differential in epistemological power and intentional-like activity? Rhetorically, in a traditionally oriented religious mode, we might ask "Why should we worship God?" and "Why should God feel the need to be worshipped?" It makes no sense for worms to worship the rampaging bull nor for the amorous bull to desire to be worshipped by mere worms rather than an appropriate member of its own species? (120)

	In the mother-child relationship we have to hand a visible paradigm where a relationship between entities of disparate levels of intentional power can not only relate but also can do so mutually? Whatever motivates a mother she usually finds in the exercise of looking after her young, whether suckling or feeding, etc., some degree of satisfaction. At the same time, a baby that is being appropriately mothered is usually a contented one. Between both entities a bond of affection usually grows. In this relationship a mother discovers her abilities as a mother. In the same process, the baby develops as a human being in an appropriate environment for its development. How is this achieved? Both parties seem to be slotted together, i.e., made for each other like two adjacent pieces of a jigsaw puzzle despite such intentional disparity. What can we note in this regard. Baby is thirsty or hungry and cries out its discomfort in this regard (or some other). Mother suckles the child and finds satisfaction in its obvious signs of expressed relief. The cycle repeats. The child is weaned. More subtle forms of gift-giving are imparted between the two, the child imparting other tokens of its affection for its mother by smiles and its development of language, etc. The mother desires the succour of the child and finds satisfaction in the realization of this ongoing objective. The relationship experiences an ongoing transformation that further reinforces this desire for the realization of a satisfaction of such goals experienced by both parties along with the addition of new ones and, in turn, the transformation of that relationship. Is this analogy an apt one for the theologian to borrow from? (121)

	For a start, the mother's satisfaction is reinforced by the signs of imputed contentment emitted by the child. Without the ability to feel and mentally simulate what the baby is experiencing the mother would be unable to be a mother. The role is, to a certain extent, a teleological one. In the mutual unfolding of that relationship both parties appear to discover an increasing mutual contentment. Gift giving, forms of reciprocity are never purely one way. Expressions of discomfit, signs of contentment, smiles, the advent of language, participation in the home by the child, etc., reinforcing, the teleological outcomes apparently inherent in that relationship; certainly inherent in its harmonious functioning and unfolding? (122)

	From a philosophical perspective one might say that the relationship has certain teleological imperatives that in being 'obeyed' find satisfaction for those parties that do the 'obeying', and v.v. ‘Obeying’ being not quite the right metaphor here since both parties ‘elect’ to participate in that relationship both in decision and in default, i.e., both actively and passively. The successfulness of that relationship being measured in the growth of that relationship and this existential fact finds an expression in the transformation of the gift-giving, reciprocity, etc., that takes place between them. As an analogy one might conclude, therefore, that the distance in power between these two types of agents is one that is meant to be diminished (and often reversed when the child, as an adult, then looks after their ailing elderly mother). But, is the theologian allowed to adopt this analogy when the nature of the relationship between mother and child is that between two human beings intersecting in the same time and space as inhabited by each other and where the child is potentially an 'embryonic adult'? In comparison, the being of the divine is not often interpreted/re-interpreted as evident, and, even if the being of the same was granted its power differential could well be considered too great to cross, and, therefore, too great for the divine to meaningfully interact with us and we with it!? What hypothetical reply might a theologian make to this complex objection? (123)

	Furthermore, the theologian might argue that the mere lack of apparent evidence is no evidence to argue for the non-existence of their idea of divine existence. Science deals with many things that are not evident, or, at least directly evident, and, yet, it can engage with them by some means or other. In rejoinder, the atheist, e.g., could enquire by what means the theologian is privileged in this regard? In their defence they could argue that there does exist a type of ontological argument that positively argues for the qualified actuality of the divine as per the theological theorem exhibited in my Brief Overview, e.g., etc. Then, they may wish to adopt and adapt other styles of argument (say from ‘their interpretation’ of 'revelation', etc.) to elaborate upon this type of speculative territory. Then, in an attempt to demonstrate their vision/version of the divine they may try to argue what might actually count as evidence in this regard. As for the other half of this type of objection, the argument from an excessive and unbridgeable power differential, they might argue that the human party in this relationship might have by some means or other an inkling of the divine delivered, directly or indirectly, through analogies, etc., or that the divine has imparted the means for it to be seen in a less divine form, etc., etc. Again, we might pause, and give the theologian time to define their vision of the divine in order to allow them and us to realize how we might indeed be able to relate to the same, and v.v. Let me attend to this, hypothetically, in the next essay operating within the guidelines as established, e.g., in my Appendix C in my Brief Overview where I stated the need for the divine to be 'defined' non-self-contradictorily; coherently within the ambit of the life-world; in a trans-metaphorical modality, or, set or system of metaphorical modalities; and, as a concept that possesses religious value. As for overcoming this relatively unbridgeable power differential the theologian has one powerful argument that can provisionally operate without an immediate need for an adequate or competent definition of what the divine is, namely, a holistic argument that states to the effect that the divine is holisitically present everywhere and is forever currently engaged in this phenomenal world of the life-world, and that we too, by default, are forever currently engaged likewise, wittingly or unwittingly, in this regard! To conclude this essay let me critically examine this type of argument and the range and style of argumentation subsumed within it. (124)

5.	Conclusion: Our Inescapable Engagement with the Divine, and Vice Versa?

The argument could run like this: The divine is embodied in and through the very being of the world, world-as-lived, i.e., the life-world. The life-world through ongoing processes of self-unification is hierarchically stratified and in this stratification simulates a sense of the epistemological, i.e., the psychic. Any part of this process of self-interactive-unification is realized in a distinctive sense of being with the requisite degree of self-awareness, etc. In this process of divine hierarchicalization the intentional-like passivity of the life-world is progressively transmuted into an intentional activity wherein an agent is manifested in a manner appropriate to that level of psychic complexity. The complexity of the divine, this divine-process, being holistically deposited upon the embodied being of this world (in its ongoing, open-ended self-totalizational self-thenatization of process) and this is reflected, in part measure, upon the embodiment of those beings thematized within its all-embracing matrix. Sharing in this existential excess all forms of agency find themselves in a similar position if not to the same degree vis-à-vis this centre/centring of each relationship within the ambit of the life-world from this ‘open-ended divine process point of view’. The relative freedom of any agent actively reflects the degree to which they seem to have transcended the materiality of their own basis. In this state of affairs, therefore, they would find themselves in communion, wittingly or unwittingly with these higher (and lower) dimensions of being as incorporated from ‘their embodied point of view’. In such a state, passage of reciprocity would be in play regardless of whether one were aware or not aware of this process taking place whereby one is immersed in this overall realm of the spiritual and its transcendental sea of excess value and ongoing self re-evaluation…. Therefore, in this view of the life-world, engagement with the divine, as the Divine, would be an inescapable fact of our very being in this World-of-Life. On the other hand, this state of affairs can be progressively thematized, in theory, by various stratagems that assist in this transmutation of an all-pervasive background passivity into a more self-aware foreground-activity along with the horizons of expanded awareness concomitant with the same. Therefore, we are 'forever' engaged with the divine, as the Divine, and vice versa!? Or, so some might wish to argue…? (125)

	What are the implications of this type of philosophical-theological manoeuvre? (126)

	Hypothetically, this type of position argues for a transition from a potentiality of insight to a progressive and adequate actualization of insight, hopefully obtainable in reality in this regard by virtue of the power of the insight unleashed in the its re-interpretation of the relatively non-spiritual natural world. That, that engagement between the relatively divine and the relatively non-divine is inescapable! Whether we are aware of this 'fact' or not is another matter. That, essentially, engagement is already a 'fact of life' and that its progressive realization is a spiritual possibility already being exercised to the extent that the quality of our relationships, in our understanding of them, are subjected to processes of existential transmutation and self-enrichment in the very course of living-our-lives-with-others…? (127)

One problem with this type of theology is attempting to determine the dialogical nature and awareness of a relationship between apparent centres of agency, in this case between an actual agent and an imputed one, namely, the divine in and through its embodiment within this world-of-life? In this regard, such ‘research’ quietly demands that the concept of our topic be better defined in order to be able to discern what would actually count as a relatively spiritual act, response, etc., versus a relatively non-spiritual act, response, etc as we course in our daily lives through this sea of the life-world awash with spiritual value? So, let me re-visit this problem of what might exactly count in this quest to understand the nature of a dialogical engagement especially between apparent centres of agency whose relationship is characterized by a marked difference in power. (128)

	Once this holistic argument is better understood, but not necessarily accepted, one can understand that there then can be no absolute ontological demarcation between apparently interacting and non-interacting agencies, and agencies and non-agencies, by virtue of the fact that this vision of the life-world sees all subsumed within its embrace, within the horizons of its transcendental ambit. And therefore there can be neither absolutely non-interacting centres of apparent agency nor instances of absolute non-agency – all being epistemologically embraced, to some extent or other, within the ambit of the life-world! The problem then shifts to “how can this be cashed out in such a manner so as to deliver a viable theory of inter-agental interaction, and, therein, the (theoretical, practical and critical) ‘grounds’ for a viable theology?” To this end let me run the following type of argument. (129)

	In my practical understanding of the world if one were to have a pet cat or a pet dog one would be involved in a relationship characterized with a marked differential in intentional power, assuming of course that that pet cat is not a tiger or a lion or that that dog is a rabid wolf (in which there could well be a reversal of power). Now, even though both the dog and the cat can most likely run faster than me there is a still a marked differential in power to the extent that the dog or the cat cannot culturally involve themselves in my world-of-life, that their existences are dependent upon me, are limited by the restrictions I place upon them, etc., etc. But, being like a god to these beautiful creatures, and so markedly different, how, one must ask, can I relate to them, and, they to me? The cat looks invitingly at me and I divine it is time to stoke its silky fur, especially behind the ears. The dog looks straight at me and in a crouching position is tentatively wagging its tail in order to tell me that we should be going for a walk at this time of the day….  Both animals seems to be ‘reading my mind’, treating me as an agent and trying to communicate a certain need on its part it would like me to understand and understand now. For my part, in this type of interaction, I perceive an intentional-like existence and the communication of certain desires that when I am perceptive enough, and actively engage in their instantiation, will find myself being rewarded for being so actively perceptive. We say the cat or the dog ‘has a mind of their own’ and we act as if we are dealing with these apparent centres of agency by either interacting with them or avoiding them, by granting them or not granting them the instantiation of our perception of their desires currently being communicated. So we stroke the cat or we don’t stroke the cat, or, we walk the dog or we don’t walk the dog. What is not in dispute (except to a narrow minded Cartesian philosopher, perhaps) is that it is obvious that the cat ‘wants to be stroked’, or, that the dog ‘wants to go for a walk’. That the pet is not just personified but treated as if a person or like a person, as if an agent with an intentional life of its own. So, in this light, we could treat agency as that entity that appears to possess certain intentional desires, etc., and an intentional hope for them to be actively realized in that desired form, more or less, in their part of the life-world. Therefore, agency cannot be purely intentional, i.e., epistemological! That, this is in tune with this insight that agency is the means for converting relative passivity into relative activity (in a non-deterministic causal/conditional frame-work)! Now, let us examine how this might can come into effect and what light this might cast on the relationship between agents with a marked differential in intentional power, i.e., a marked degree of difference in intentional complexity? (130)

	One could argue that the intentional life of the human emerged over many, many aeons through evolutional change. Part of that change subsumes, in some part or other, what emerged for, say, cats and dogs. That, in essence, our intentionality is merely an extension of the very processes and/or conditions that ensured an intentional-like existence for the cat and the dog. We are able to communicate with either, and v.v., by virtue of the fact that we share, from a transcendental perspective, enough transcendental machinery to establish this degree of intentional rapport. That, to use a crudely cast metaphor, the epistemological hierarchy of the cat or the dog in its ideality could, more or less, be poured into the lower sections of the mould that characterizes the human epistemological hierarchy without too much loss of detail… that in virtue of this ‘common material’ we can communicate intentionally with a cat and a dog and they, in their own fashion, with us. Then, by extension, or so a theologian might wish to argue, we can enter into a dialogical engagement with the divine, and v.v., by virtue of the fact that both apparent centres of agency share the same basic epistemological machinery, albeit, only as a fraction (for both parties with respect to each other?)? That, as this holistic reflection of the divine is stamped on each and everything, albeit taken up from its own point of view, then it follows that not only is the divine engaged with us, and v.v., but, as, that this possibility cannot be a mere possibility, by virtue of our reversed ontological argument, this possibility must also be an actuality for us in some form or other. Of course, the sting in the tail, is the devil in the detail – just what could the theologian, etc., discover as ‘wrapped up’ in this expression “in some form or other”? And would that unfolding too be qualified by this expression “in some form or other” in an endless infinite regress or vicious circle…? Or, are we saved by virtue of the fact that this existential excess created and re-created on every level of the epistemological hierarchy and re-invested in the material being of our embodiment is able to liberated us from such relational isolation? Indeed, as active members of one world we are but members in the same divine choir, albeit, only able to sing those parts created for us and able to be created by us…? (131)

6.	Epilogue

But, let us move on and examine the possible content(s) of the divine, which being epistemologically greater than us (through its very inclusion of our own being-within-it, etc.) implies we must now regard it from now on as the ‘Divine’, and, whose form being guaranteed “in some form or other” implies that its content must also be guaranteed on the same type of grounds (of this extended reversed ontological argument) - that, likewise, there can be no absolute dichotomy between ‘form’ and ‘content’. Hence, the content of the Divine must too be actual, albeit qualified as “in some form or other”!? This being the case, if this can be the case, implies that our philosophical understanding of Divine should recognize ourselves as apparent centres of agency who ‘stand before’ the Divine “in some form or other” in a process of holistic dependence and independence and that therein we are engaged, wittingly or unwittingly, in a dialogical process of interaction “in some form or other”? That, it is quite valid to argue, metaphorically, etc., that in all that That might entail, that we are already engaged in a dialogical conversation with the Divine, and v.v., and that it behooves us to ponder how we might be able to recognize and extend that “divine conversation” “in some form or other” through processes of theoretical, practical and critical thematization to put ourselves in a position to ‘move us’ from relatively being passive bystanders to becoming more active participators in this process of spiritual ‘unfolding’… spiritual ‘opening’, ‘revelation’ and ‘embrace’?? That, not only does the concept of the Divine possess phenomenal (and phenomenological) sense, but, hypothetically, must also act as both a possibly valid field of hermeneutical meaning and also as a source of existential meaningfulness!? Thence, their incorporation, and embodiment, in a hermeneutic circle of theological comprehension! That, hopefully, the theologian can rise to this challenge to articulate what might be meant in this hypothetical concept of ‘the continuing and extending of the Divine conversation’ “in some form or other” in what ever form that That might adopt, and adapt, in the course of our passages through this World-of-Life awash with an excess of spiritual value (because of its non-reducible nature)..?? (132)

That, therefore, we, too, are divine authors writing in the same book, and, in turn, being writ upon?? But, let us now ask “what can be read there?” And, then, let us ask “how should we go about reading ‘what can be read there?’?” In answer let me say, tentatively - “through the spiritual power of the (overall) transcendental suspension (at the very centre of the hermeneutic circle of comprehension).” That through this ‘black-hole’ of apparent being we find an alignment of Being with all beings that allows us to find and centre ourselves within the requisite dialogue in order to continue and extend that particular conversation… in the midst of all our conversations? Well, if that be the case, so be it… let us continue… and see if we can cash out this metaphor of ‘conversation’, and, discover therein with what, or whom, in this regard, we might be conversing with?! (133)

							   Noël Tointon, Sydney, 21.9.03.

A Summary of the Major Points Presented by this Essay

1.	In a reversed ontological-like argument the existence/non-existence of the divine is realized by default through the impossibility of both mere potentiality and pure actuality in our consideration of theological difference. (2-40)
2.	That demonic difference essentially self-deconstructs the more it is personified (through a deprivation of the relatively good). (16-18)
3.	That mythological difference can only establish a sixth order of factuality as a myth qua myth, and, in so far as its bits and pieces in that myth have a presupposed cultural basis in the factual inventories of the world. (9-10)
4.	That the relatively divine could be defined as possessing a distinctively greater epistemological complexity than that of human agency or society. (44, 110)
5.	The theological theorem being, essentially; (x-axis) theological difference, implication of relative theological actuality existing in some form or other; (y-axis) implication of relationships in meta-relational contexts, hence their hierarchical-epistemological nesting; and, (z-axis) the implication of divine agency because such agency must be greater than human agency through the latter being subsumed within its transcendental ambit. (2-40)
6.	That recognition is essentially re-cognition (and that, therefore, divine-recognition is essentially divine-re-cognition) (whether treated as an objective genitive or as a subjective genitive). (45-60)
7.	The phenomenologist disposes of the representational theory of reality through an explanation of re-presentational re-cognition (assisted by an understanding of the concepts of satisfaction, satiation, assurance, sufficiency and adequate sufficiency) in the context of a theory of direct perception through re-simulation. (65, 66)
8.	Evidence is demonstrated in a full satisfaction of modal expectations. (72-74)
9.	That there can be no absolute distinction between virtual relationships and non-virtual relationships, the distinction coming into provisional effect through an examination of existential descriptors in comparison with the existential descriptor(s) that characterize the nominated subject(s) of that investigation. (75, 100)
10.	That a trace is read as a trace by virtue of a re-cognition of its co-intentionally, multi-modally deposited meta-textual context. (84)
11.	That there can be in the life-world neither absolute commensurability nor absolute non-commensurability, and, that interconnection through accommodation is realized in this middle territory through a transcendental transformation of passage within the transcendental ambit of the life-world. (101)
12.	That all processes of relationship are realized, engaged and centred through a transcendentally suspended metaphorical (or virtual) cancellation of the specific unique existential descriptors of the participants/participators that therein and thereby constitute the specific uniqueness of that relationship. (106-109)
13.	That epistemological complexity can be determined through a careful examination of correlatively determined ‘intentional’ complexity of ontological embodiment, functional epistemology, phenomenal/phenomenological, hermeneutical, existential, general ordered complexity, etc. (111-115)
14.	That the ‘realm’ of spiritual value can be defined as a distinctive existential excess, that emergent residue that cannot be reduced to its embodied basis. (75, 115-117)
15.	That complexity is realized in a progressive transmutation of the relatively passive into intentional activity, i.e., through an activation of the relatively embodied. (114)
16.	That disparity in intentional power between agents and/or non-agent can be overcome through an effective co-incidence of relatively basic epistemological functions. (131)
17.	In our coursing through the life-world we discover our freedom through this non-reducible residue of value experienced as an existential/relational/spiritual excess. (115-117, 125, 128, 131)
18.	The establishment of the relative actuality of the divine by a reversed ontological-like argument allows us to establish from such ‘form’ the relative actuality of its speculative content by a similar type of reversed ontological-like argument. (132)
19.	That, holistically, we are already engaged in a dialogical conversation with the divine, which, being considerably greater in epistemological complexity, must be the Divine! (?) (132) 
20.	That, not only does the concept of the Divine possess phenomenal (and phenomenological) sense, but, hypothetically, must also act as both a possibly valid field of hermeneutical meaning and also as a source of existential meaningfulness!? (132)
21.	Thence, the incorporation, and embodiment, of the phenomenal/phenomeno-logical, hermeneutical and existential facets of relational experience in a hermeneutic circle of theological comprehension! (132)
22.	That, therefore, we, too, are divine authors writing in the same book, and, in turn, being writ upon?? (133) 
23.	The sense, etc., of the Divine being read through the spiritual power of the (overall) transcendental suspension (at the very centre of the hermeneutic circle of theological comprehension. (132-133)
24.	That through an alignment of Being with all beings re-cognized in and through the overall transcendental suspension we find ourselves allowed to find and centre ourselves within the requisite dialogue with the Divine in order to continue and extend that particular conversation… in the midst of all our conversations(?) (133)
25.	Let us, therefore, ponder how we might theoretically re-cognize this Divine-conversation and how it might be practically extended through our existential purportment in this world-of-life in order to critically ascertain, through reflection, the value and consequent merit of this speculative theological treatment of the life-world (as the embodiment of the Divine?)?! (80, 132-133)