Finding a Place for the Idea of God – Part IX:
A Possible Ontology of the Divine - How Does the Divine Manifest Themselves??

0.   Introduction

	In this essay, from a hypothetical point of view, a possible ontology of the divine will be explored. What sorts of divinity are impossible, what sorts of divinity are possible, and, what types of divinity amongst the latter might be demonstrable in some manner or other? (1)

	To achieve this end I will first tie up some loose ends introduced rather suddenly at the end of last essay. Then I will run a reversed ontological argument with respect to the content of the divine, treated as the Divine. The form of this category was argued for using this same type of argument in the previous essay. In the process impossible classifications are ruled out, classifications considered possible are ruled in. Lastly, the classifications ruled as possible are re-examined with a view to their demonstration in evidential experience from a hypothetical point of view, i.e., what must be in place transcendentally for 'evidence' to rule in or rule out a classification that has already been deemed fit by other criteria. (2)

1.	Some Loose Ends Tied Up?

That, therefore, we, too, are divine authors writing in the same book, and, in turn, being writ upon?? But, let us now ask “what can be read there?” And, then, let us ask “how should we go about reading ‘what can be read there?’?” In answer let me say, tentatively - “through the spiritual power of the (overall) transcendental suspension (at the very centre of the hermeneutic circle of comprehension).” That through this ‘black-hole’ of apparent being we find an alignment of Being with all beings that allows us to find and centre ourselves within the requisite dialogue in order to continue and extend that particular conversation… in the midst of all our conversations? Well, if that be the case, so be it… let us continue… and see if we can cash out this metaphor of ‘conversation’, and, discover therein with what, or whom, in this regard, we might be conversing with?! (133)

	In this last paragraph of the last essay various statements and various questions are posed, at least presuppositionally. Let me begin this essay by discussing what types of claims and arguments, metaphor and rhetoric are involved here. (3)

	In paragraph VIII.133 let me list its important propositions:

1.	We are divine authors writing in the same book.
2.	In turn we are being writ upon (by the Divine [in all its forms?]).
3.	What can be read there (in this 'book')?
4.	How should we go about reading ‘what can be read there?’?
5.	(This 'book' is read) through the spiritual power of the (overall) transcendental suspension (at the very centre of the hermeneutic circle of comprehension).
6.	That through this ‘black-hole’ (of the overall transcendental suspension) of apparent being we find an alignment of Being with all beings.
7.	(That through the overall transcendental suspension this practice) allows us to find and centre ourselves within the requisite dialogue in order to continue and extend that particular conversation (with the Divine in some manner or other) … in the midst of all our conversations?
8.	(Let us) see if we can cash out this metaphor of ‘conversation’, and, discover therein with what, or whom, in this regard, we might be conversing with?! (4)

The first thing we should note is that all of these propositions in this paragraph are tentatively proposed being under a question mark, sometimes a double question mark. In others words they are individually proposed as proper questions or as statements rhetorically placed under a questioning suspension. In this regard there is nothing dogmatic, in either sense of that term, about their articulation. On the other hand, proposed as the final paragraph in my Epilogue they are meant to be read as a conclusion, and, in that regard, as conclusive, although, weakened considerably by the use of question marks. Indeed, of the six sentences there, there is only one sentence that is without a question mark and that is proposed "tentatively". The other five sentences share a total of seven question marks - so what is going on here? What sort of conclusion do we have here? And what is the role of the final "!"? (5)

	The overuse of these proper and improper questions is to cast a phenomenologically climate over this paragraph and place it under a rhetorical suspension. When we ask a question we create a dis-conjunctive suspension between the questioning either/or. Look at the following question. Is (x) a? Meaning: does the logical subject x possess the predicate (or relation) a? Meaning, presuppositionally, as a possible answer: x either possesses a or does not possess a? (6)

	A rhetorical suspension is a suspension. Metaphor also functions as a suspension but a conjunctive suspension. E.g., 'the moon is like cheese' means: the moon is both like (the phenomenon of ) cheese and not like the (phenomenon of) cheese. The metaphorical and the rhetorical are correlatives and correspond to the levels of the textual and the meta-textual respectively. Furthermore, as previously discussed in this series of essays, they are also the first and second moments of our hermeneutic circle of comprehension. The third moment being defined as a conjunctive suspension of the metaphorical suspension and the rhetorical  suspension (and its formation of the relatively non-textual third moment of the existential suspension). Then, a balance of all three suspensions is defined as the overall transcendental suspension. Hence the theory behind propositions 4, 5, and 6 and implicated in propositions 3, and 7. Let me examine this aspect more closely. (7)

	The metaphor of 'reading' in proposition 3, according to this paragraph, is conducted through the auspices of an overall transcendental suspension. The term transcendental suspension was introduced by the German transcendental phenomenologist Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). Earlier on this term was synonymous with a transcendental reduction. Later this expression was defined differently with the transcendental suspension being deemed as necessary first in order for the process of the transcendental reduction of a phenomenon to its essential characteristics could be undertaken (in eidetic reflections, etc.). In my phenomenological reflections upon the nature of the process of suspension I have perceived the need to recognize a third moment after the invocation of a transcendental suspension and transcendental reduction, namely, a process of transcendental reconstitution wherein the analytical nature of the reduction is reversed through a synthetic reconstitution. In my reflections I have discerned a state of correlatively between all three moments (on par, subject to qualification, to the Husserlian  correlativity between the noetic, as an intentional process, and, the noematic content, i.e., the intentional object). In effect, each party can be defined as the negation of the other two parties. Moreover, by adopting various frames of reference dealing with textuality, harmonic theory, gestalt theory, repetitive states, temporal orientations, etc., these three moments have been given a greater degree of significance in those particular frames of reference. E.g., the metaphorical moment can be regarded as dealing with the intentional object(-state) through its gestalt focus on text; the rhetorical moment can be regarded as dealing with the background intentional field and its sense of meta-textual genre; and, the process between text and meta-text in a state of balance through a suspension of the conjunctive and disconjunctive suspensions, realizes a sense of noetic agency, a transcendental sense of self reflecting the type of intentional field being focused upon, e.g., a visual perceiver when dealing with the visual field, or a conceptual conceiver when dealing with concepts, or a judger of concepts when dealing with acts of judgment (between, within or from concepts, and, hence the judgmental process is trans-conceptually oriented), etc., etc. The fruits of my reflections have led me to formulate a tripartite hermeneutic circle of comprehension, i.e., all meaning, etc., is realized within the ambit of the same - i.e., reductive, phenomenal sense (in our cultural mapping of the life-world), hermeneutic meaning and existential meaningfulness are all mutually co-determined within its ambit and as correlatively dependent upon each other; the thematization of significance, i.e., value, being produced/re-produced between these three ideal poles of the first, second and third moments. That this process has this transcendental tri-partite flavour despite the frame of reference in which it is theoretically examined! Let me now re-introduce the same complex concept but in a simpler format. (8)

	The hermenetic circle, the relationship between parts and wholes, and v.v., has been phenomenologically examined by myself through a tripartite scheme. In a gestalt frame of reference we can see these three moments to mirror, respectively, the object-state focused upon, the gestalt field as a background, and, the sense of agency realized within this type of reference-frame. Each of these three facets or moments is a particular type of suspension. When all three suspension-types are fully operative and balanced with respect to each other we get an overall transcendental suspension through which judgment is more fully able to declare itself in and through the spontaneity of an act of judgment (on 'evidential' grounds pertaining to the nature of that judgment). (9)

	In proposition 3 I state "What can be read there (in this 'book')?" In proposition 4 I ask this further question "How should we go about reading ‘what can be read there?’?" Both these questions are then answered in the proposition 5 "(This 'book' is read) through the spiritual power of the (overall) transcendental suspension (at the very centre of the hermeneutic circle of comprehension)." In other words, the content and method of reading this metaphorical book is claimed to be through the spiritual power of the overall transcendental suspension. Like all analogies this metaphor is not meant to be read literally. So what sort of reading is it if there is no literal reading? The overall transcendental suspension once put in place allows us to enter into the spontaneity of the judgmental process. What is 'read' are conceptualized translations of what ever it is that is being subjected to such discrimination. Out of this calculative preparation we enter the spontaneity of the judgmental process, given an adequate content and an adequate process of reflection, a judgment is discerned (that may be valid or invalid, in part or in whole). And the validity of that judgment? That calls for a meta-judgment… a re-visiting of the original judgment to the extent that that is possible (textually and meta-textually, etc.) along with a re-visiting of the conditions of the truth of that statement to the extent that too is possible. (10)

	What type of truth is being proposed here? Isn't the nature of 'truth' still a controversial issue in this post-Postmodern era of the Contemporary. On one hand that is true, on the other hand we make and live with judgments that must be true in all probability and so this problematic topic is only problematic for the philosopher, and, then, only problematic for other philosophers when a certain philosopher says "they know x is true" and what they claim they can do and what they are entitled to claim there are at total variance with each other. Hence the critique of the representationalist philosopher who claims their ideas of reality, or whatever, match, i.e., correspond with, those things in reality that those ideas are copies of. Of course, they are asking us to do the impossible in accordance with the nature of their own philosophical dictates - this type of 'empiricist' is essentially insisting that we have the 'eyes of God' in order to trans-empirically 'see' that those ideas actually correspond with those things in reality they were truly deemed to be a copy of. If we could actually do that then we would not (need to) be empiricists! This type of 'philosophy' metaphysically invokes a very deceptive metaphor that metaphorically may make sense but which should not be literally since a metaphor cannot be utilized in that manner as its structure is to be 'both like and not like' the rhetorically pre-selected features of the phenomenon or phenomena being alluded to… as previously noted in paragraph 7! In effect, the mistake is to exceed the limits involved in the deployment of that metaphor or set of metaphors (assuming the utilization of the same in that type of metaphysical context is both appropriate and proper, etc.). Unfortunately, most philosophers dance with their metaphors off the dance floor so to speak, if not outside the dancehall! And in this dance there they may or may not delight us with their performance on this pre-assigned stage even if dressed with due propriety and appropriateness. There is a place (in philosophy) for metaphor and that is in the metaphorical arena of the hermeneutic circle (like a circus with three rings)! (11)

	In this light of this type of mistaken project (of the representationalist), and all others like it, I am generally suspicious of metaphysical claims that are all too vigorously pronounced; wherein, correctly, the complex complexion of truth is not realized purely through some simplistic modelling of reality, such as, e.g., in correspondence theories, coherence theories, pragmatic theories, semantic theories, etc., as seen through various lenses like realism, idealism, rationalism, relativism, objectivism, etc., etc! Then, again, if I, or anyone else, should appear to be making metaphysical claims, to be out of court in this regard, we should try to see them, first, as attempting to be merely metaphorical in orientation or being both metaphorical and rhetorical in orientation (when we are looking beyond the text per se). In my own theoretical reflections on this topic of ‘Truth’ I borrow from all of the above placing these strands in an accommodation through a process of interpretative synthesis that tries to capture, through the hermeneutic circle, both the complexity of this topic and its overall simplicity – that, essentially, judgment is properly conducted through the appropriate functioning of an overall transcendental suspension. But let me desist here, at least for the moment, from going over this ground one more time…. (12)

	So by 'reading' is meant making a 'judgment', i.e., making an interpretation whose validity one hopes is valid, correct, proper, appropriate, accurate, useful, beneficial… or however one wishes to model this appreciation of the truth - the way things appear to be, or appeared to have been, in this world-of-life. (13)

	As previously noted what is read is the conceptualized treatment of that subjected to such appreciation. Concepts, as I have argued elsewhere, are the only psychic 'material' that can dialectically operate as both 'many-and-one' in order to allow the mind to resolve non-rhetorically the dialectical dilemma as to whether the relations (logical subject, predicates, relations, operations, accommodations, transformations, et al) inferred actually do inhere or do not inhere, in the relativity of that perspective, in that overall state of affairs subjected to such appreciation. In a conceptual field they can be entertained at the same time as both discrete entities or as vectorial-like resultants, and, in and through this dialectical-like relationship an act of judgment can be delivered. (14)

	In propositions 3 and 4 the questions are asked what can be read and how can that be read. This metaphorical 'book' is what is 'read' and that is the 'book of nature', i.e., the book of reality or i.e., the transcendental fabric of the life-world upon which our intentionally finds itself deposited. 'Transcendental' by virtue of the fact that the world is instituted as a phenomenal-field-constituted-and-interpreted-by-us, without its mis-representationalistic treatment as an impossible 'inner world' and an equally impossible 'outer world' (as a so called 'external world'), and, that is none other than the life-world as the open-ended, non-absolute 'ground' for the actual constitution of all possible life-experience in its transcendental subjectivity, transcendental intersubjectivity and transcendental objectivity (from the very being of its being as centered within ‘Being’, whose transcendental concept is placed under a continual suspension, and our discovery of that being-becoming as that-there-for-us as-it-is in so far as we-are-for-it). That between these three ideal poles or dialectical moments of the hermeneutic circle all transcendental value i.e., sense, meaning and meaningfulness, is thematized. And how should we read that 'book of nature?' Through the auspices of the overall transcendental suspension (as just briefly outlined). What exactly is entailed here methodologically and theoretically? Methodologically by invoking metaphor, by questioning, by maintaining a balance between all content and process inputs the overall transcendental suspension is induced; an ongoing transcendental suspension being kept 'in place' and 'in motion' through a continual focalization of our disinterested-interest/interested-disinterest; the maintenance of this psychic state of attention being maintained to that extent we are finding a dividend or existential excess in value creation suitably above and beyond that merely invested in this process. When this hermeneutic reward is no longer forthcoming our spontaneity of interest then moves on to something else that will do that for us either systematically (in critically-oriented transcendental reflection) or non-systematically (when dictated to by the sway of the everydayness of the natural world in natural reflection). Theoretically the practice of the overall transcendental suspension simulates/re-simulates phenomenal reality and by such means allows us to enter into those relationships under simulation. As there can be no absolute dichotomy between virtual relationships and non-virtual relationships there can be no absolute difference between a simulation ('fixed' in re-simulated phenomenological retension) and the resimulation of the same from a virtual point of view. The transcendental unity of the life-world as one transcendental world-of-life guarantees at least a virtual access for-us to each and every possible relationship that could be entertained within the all embracing potentiality-of-this-one-world-of-life-that-is-there for-us! The difference between a non-virtual relationship and a virtual relationship being a full coincidence of existential descriptors in the former instance. By this reversed ontological argument (that states that there can be no absolute difference between the non-virtual actuality and virtual potentiality) its implies our ability, in theory, to enter every possible relationship if only virtually through 'resimulation' (if not through non-virtual 're-simulation'). What are the theoretical implications of this insight? By the appropriate and proper performance of overall transcendental suspension we can enter into the resimulation of any possible relationship (albeit [initially] from our non-transcendentally embodied point of view). By this act of centering that invoked relationship is simulated as a resimulation. If we are a non-virtual, active or passive participant in that relationship (realized through the necessary degree of coincidence of our existential discriptors) that simulation is then re-simulated both from a [normal] process point of view and an involved content point of view. I have therefore argued that by these means we have allowed ourselves to experience, albeit either non-virtually through total re-simulation or virtually through resimulation, and, consequently, and presuppositionally, in the here and now (hic et nunc), therein find an alignment between the beings that are participating directly or indirectly in that relationship and the being of that particular overall relationship in this one-world-of-life itself. Furthermore, through the Being of the life-world itself in its open-ended, transcendental unity, these alignments must take place within the unity of the same. Hence the Being of this one-world-of-life allows an alignment between all beings and therein and thereby grants us a degree of entry into each and every relationship by virtue of this central transcendental Being of the life-world. Hence, we find an alignment of Being (in the form of the transcendental unity of the life-world and its implication of a theological dimension) with all beings, thence this Dialogue in and through this sea of dialogues afloat within this ocean of ‘Being’! Let me retrace this argument in a more simpler fashion. (15)

	Through the imposition of an overall transcendental suspension we enter into the virtual/non-virtual being of that relationship under focus (or, more correctly, we are already immersed in the non-absolute virtual--non-virtual being of that relationship). Within the transcendental unity of the life-world this re-alignment is conducted, thence we find an alignment of Being with all beings that allows us to find that requisite Dialogue in order to extend and continue that Particular Conversation… in the midst of all our conversations (as the 'ground' for all those conversations and thereby implicating a theological dimension in the transcendental unity of the life-world). Or so this argument runs hypothetically? (16)

	Let me look more closely at the major points of this argument:

1.	The overall transcendental suspension centres us in the relationship under review.
2.	This is achieved in the relative, non-absolute space between the virtual-resimulation/non-virtual re-simulation of that relationship.
3.	This is achieved within the imputed theological-like Being of the life-world.
4.	There we find this Conversation (with Being) in and through the midst of all the other conversations.
5.	Hence, we find an alignment between all beings within Being, and, Being with all beings… hence this Dialogue of Conversation (by virtue of the fundamental mutuality of all relational aspects within the scope of their ‘same’ relationship) (17)

By "Being" is meant the ‘Absolute’ treated in a metaphorical non-absolute, non-absolutist mode. Treated metaphorically places it under a conjunctive suspension as just previously noted. The metaphorical itself is determined meta-textually, i.e., rhetorically, and v.v. A metaphor is read within its apparent genre, the correct reading of genre rewarding the reader with an existential excess of meaning (and meaningfulness) that reinforces that reading unless a closer re-reading of its rhetoric is called for. In effect the metaphor is set-up rhetorically to selectively focus upon some predetermined facet or facets of a certain phenomenon. In reverse this rhetorical dimension calls for an answer, in some form or other, and that is the role of the metaphorical to supply this expectation. This 'answer' cannot be treated in a literal mode. Defined between the metaphorical is 'like' and the 'not-like' the text is given a qualified location in our mapping of the life-world. So, the moon is like cheese does not mean that the moon exactly is a cheese or a cheese-like object, but does seem to entail some cheese-like properties, etc., e.g., round, with bubbles (craters), pale in colour, etc. In a similar vein we can note the metaphors of 'authors', 'book', 'writing', 'reading', 'power', 'centre', 'black-hole', 'alignment', 'dialogue', 'conversation'. Treated in this light to an implicit suspension, if not an explicit one, through the use of rhetorical questions, etc., means that this paragraph should be neither perceived as being uttered in a dogmatic manner nor should be interpreted in a dogmatic fashion. Later in this essay I will examine in greater depth the types of role that metaphors appear to play in the formulation and dissemination of a theological philosophy (in theoretical, practical and critical spheres of operation). (18)

	By "Absolute" is meant a certain (transcendental) style of doing philosophy, often, but not necessarily, of a religious persuasion. This type of (phenomenological-hermeneutical-existential) philosophy is essentially transcendental to that extent that everything is continually subjected to an ongoing state of suspension in some form or other, to some degree or other. The transcendental dimension is 'exposed' through the use of a suspension be it metaphorical, rhetorical or existential (the latter being entertained through a balance of metaphor and rhetoric as outlined in paragraph 7). Indeed, each stage of the hermeneutic circle of comprehension is advanced through the exercise of its appropriate suspension. Other features of an absolute philosophy are the peculiar listing of names (often written/translated in English text with capital letters). These names suggest a reference or location in the psychic mapping of the life-world through their psychic intersection and therein found carving out a collective niche for themselves more through the connotational sense of those expressions. In this light the hypothetical dialogical conversation with the Divine is treated as a '"particular conversation" (read as a 'Conversation') and this paragraph leaves open as to whether this is but one conversation among all conversations (between beings) or, perhaps, arises out of those conversations treated collectively, i.e., is both immanent and transcendent to those ordinary conversations… is both their transcendental 'ground' (treated metaphorically and non-foundationally, i.e., transcendentally) and that which develops through some form of an existential excess of value that emerges out the collective interrelationship of ordinary conversations? This paragraph, in effect, simulates the very sort of religious language that would be utilized in the formulation and exploration of this type of content. Placed under a continual balance of rhetorical and metaphorical suspensions the existential suspension is invoked by default… and then re-balanced in and through an overall transcendental suspension… and what we have as a result might best be read poetically… as a form of religious poetry… as a way of doing philosophy in this phenomenological fashion, etc., through the use of an ongoing (overall) suspension…? (19)

	Let me revisit some of these ideas later in this paper. In the next section I am going to run a reversed ontological argument in order to examine the possible theological content of this topic. (20)

2.   Running a Reversed Ontological Argument Re Hypothetical Divine Content

	In the previous paper I explored in depth a reversed ontological argument re Divine form. This type of argument invokes a logical form of necessity (on analytical and/or synthetical and/or transcendental a priori 'grounds'?). But, rather than arguing for Divine perfection, or similar, from the inability to think this impossible type of attribute we arrive at a qualified form of 'actual existence' in between the two impossible to obtain poles of ‘mere potentiality’ and ‘absolute actuality’. Then, ruling out those features that deconstruct some essential aspect of our conclusion, or the entire conclusion itself, we endeavour to arrive at a tentative conclusion that allows us to entertain, by the necessity of default, what others might have tried, and should fail, through the adoption of an ontological argument. (21)

	This distinction between 'form' and 'content' itself is an artificial one and cannot be defined in an absolute non-correlative mode. A recognition of the interdependence of correlativity implies that what works for form in this instance must also work for content in some manner or other, to some degree or other. At the level of form the content of that form is not specified and is, in effect, left open, left blank… So, to date, we have not bothered to spell out what the Divine might be other than to note that the conception, within certain guidelines, possesses sense, meaning and meaningfulness, i.e., value. Tentatively, a few suggestions have been made, such as a phenomenal embodiment in some form or other, the possession of a considerably greater degree of epistemological organization (than that possessed by ourselves), the possession of a concomitant greater degree of an existential excess in value (than that possessed by ourselves), i.e., spirituality or spiritual power, and by implication, a concatenation of other implied properties within certain defined limits vis-à-vis that associated level of epistemological organization. Then, in the paper a Brief Overview, in the Appendix C, four headings were noted as to how content should be approached. But, first, let me run this reversed ontological argument in order to establish, at least hypothetically, the effective possibility of our topic now under review, namely, Divine content, and therein, in turn, just what range of possibilities in our descriptions of the Divine, by type, would be acceptable from a critical-philosophical point of view to the extent that this type of task can be approached(?) (22) 

	What are the essential mechanics of this type of argument I have labelled a reversed ontological argument? It would appear that the argument is advanced in a number of stages. The first stage is the general exploration of the viability of the topic, i.e. its form. The second and subsequent stages realize a movement towards the defining of the content of that topic. Therein that form finds an increasing degree of thematization and thence its sense of 'definition' through this definition of its content (and form, and v.v). This style of argument is dialectical. With some apparent validity, this objection could be raised, namely, that it would appear that we are essentially arguing only for our currently promoted ontological commitments? Therefore, in that light, what is the point of signalling that this process of argumentation is conducted from a hypothetical point of view? To answer that objection let me state that we need ontological commitments, prejudices as pre-judgments, in order to get started in this transcendental process of value discovery and its critical appreciation. Let me elaborate. (23)

	A judgment needs content to be judged. This content is approached in such a fashion that we find ourselves therein located in the life-world dealing with a certain intentional object-state in a certain intentional perspective.  This is inescapable. To chose 'this' and not 'that' in 'such and such' a frame of reference from 'such and such' a point of view is to exercise and appreciate the very nature of the intentional. In this regard we have ontological commitments. Now, as previously argued in my set of psychology papers titled Beyond Therapy, to have ontological commitments that cannot be suspended is to induce a psychotic or psychotic-like state to that degree we could not suspend the same. What needs to be recognized here is the fact that we need commitments, in the form of prejudices, in order to approach the content of an act of judgment prior to that process of judgment, but, in that act of judgment we need to thoroughly suspend all those commitments. By 'hypothetical', therefore, is meant this parallel exercise of commitments in conjunction with their full suspension. By those means we approach and maintain this degree of 'objectivity' necessary for the proper and appropriate functioning of our discrimination. With this insight in mind let me analyze in depth the nature of the reversed ontological argument. (24)

	The first stage of this argument is the formal discovery of terrain upon which we can establish the form of our quest. This is done by noting the fact that once the general conceivability of our topic is established some form of existence of the same 'must' exist in some form or other! This 'fact of existence' is then generally located between the impossible and unobtainable poles of mere potentiality and absolute actuality by default. This 'fact' can neither be merely possible nor absolutely actual! Therefore, it must have some form of actual existence by virtue of the fact that it can be neither mere potentiality nor absolute actuality. So, although this argument can argue for relative actuality of our topic it can also be used to demonstrate a relatively non-actual existence, which, on first appearances might seem to undo with the left hand what has been prepared by the right hand. But, relative non-actuality is, effectively, also relatively actual existence if only to some minor degree. The 'trick' of this type of argument is to establish secondary arguments that support relative existence or (relative non-existence) and additional secondary arguments that support the relative non-existence of its contrary state of affairs (or the relative existence of that contrary state of affairs). E.g., in our hypothetical argument for a positive demonic difference a secondary argument was borrowed from Augustine (who had borrowed it from the Neoplatonic philosophers) and suitably adapted, namely, that as evil is the deprivation of the (relatively) good it follows that the personification of the same must suffer to that degree the degree of evil is insisted upon. The absolutely evil devil or demon could be neither thought nor recognized in reality, that the extremely evil devil or demon was practically non-existent by definition, and, that the mildly evil devil or demon hypothetically barely merited that ascription since they could not be fundamentally evil (despite, hypothetically, this profession being proposed as demonic). Therefore, out this creatively contrived dialectic we are allowed to either promote or demote our ontological commitments; a hypothetical point of view effectively coinciding with one that exercises a full, proper and appropriate overall transcendental suspension of those ontological commitments as manipulated in both primary and secondary arguments. Let me now run this argument for the support of divine content, in this instance Divine content, on the grounds that the ‘divine’ must be considerably greater in epistemological organization than that level of competence that characterizes the nature of human existence since the former must (on transcendental grounds as previously argued) include the latter within its matrix of being). (25)

	Primary argument: The form of the Divine is conceivable (and has relative actuality as previously argued), therefore, the relative actuality of the divine must exist in some form or other (to some degree or other) because, first, 'form' cannot be just absolutely form(al) which implies that its (correlative) content must also possess relatively actuality, and, second, that content is conceivable (as long as that content is not self-contradictory, etc) implies that that content, again, must possess relative actuality…. (26)

	Secondary arguments: If the Divine has relative actuality and is embodied, say in a region of cosmological space like the planet Earth, a galaxy or galactic cluster, etc., it could still possess an effective intentionality by virtue of the self-organizing nature of intentionality (in its epistemological organization and function)… because space shows evidence of a fractal symmetry therefore a self-organizing/organized structure is present (which may or may-not be overtly intentional in nature, but, because it is conceivable therefore its intentional nature must possess some degree of  relative actuality in some form or other (by virtue of this additional reversed ontological argument))…. (27)

	Obviously, other than the primary statement(s), the secondary statements in support of their primary objective, and, their disproof of contrary states, have no set formal formulation (except in their use, in turn, of reversed ontological arguments). Hence the creative nature of this style of argumentation to support certain ontological commitments as the objective of that process of argumentation. Effective objectivity being put in place with the utilization of an appropriate and proper overall transcendental suspension. By such means the implication can be drawn that 'neutrality' or 'objectivity' is realized in a hypothetical perspective, and v.v., in and through that full and valid use of that overall transcendental suspension. We can also argue that transcendental objectivity is equally correlative with transcendental subjectivity and transcendental intersubjectivity. That through the balanced exercise of the hermeneutic circle this transcendental attitude is correctly applied… (and therein productive of transcendental evidence, i.e., a transcendental indication of the form, character and degree of evidential discrimination revealed in such authentically engaged transcendental discrimination). (28)

	Thence, from relative actuality of Divine form we now have arrived at Divine content! Let me now examine, hypothetically, that Divine content under the four headings of the non-self-contradiction of its value, the self-coherence of its value in the ambit of the life-world, its trans-metaphorical nature, and, its possible possession of religious value. (29)

3.   The Analysis of Divine Content Under Four Headings

A:  The Necessary Non-Self-Contradiction of Divine Content

	In the reversed world of ontological reality and its dialectical manifestation of existence pure logical states no longer apply! Therefore, how can something be in a state of contradiction outside this epistemological mistreatment of the logical (in its operation with pure identity in a non-dialectical frame of reference)? In other words, given that there can be no principle of pure identity then the principle of the excluded middle also can no longer apply? That being the case there can then be no pure contradiction! But a distinction between pure contradiction (in its impossible ideality) and non-pure contradiction (as a non-impossible ideality) should be noted. As the principle of identity is still maintained, albeit in an non-pure ideal state, it follows that contradiction can be maintained as long as it is expressed in a non-pure ideal form or format. Thus we arrive at a dialectical sense of a qualified sense of contradiction, and therein, a qualified sense of identity likewise. (30)

	Now mindful of these qualifications how should we address a theological prescription/description of the nature of the Divine in the light of our first requirement for a state of non-self-contradiction. In my opinion we need to classify what is being attempted in accordance with the following scheme and then to addressed the same in accordance with how that type of classification should be dealt with in the light of the type of response prepared by that scheme. These heading are:

1.	Pure Logical Contradiction

2.	Non-Pure Logical Contradiction
a.	Dialectical Contradiction Resolved
b.	Dialectical Contradiction Unresolved
c.	Dialectical Contradiction in a Non-Literal Metaphorical Sense (31)

Pure logical contradiction/s in the formulation of classical theistic conceptions of the Divine can be and should be completely dismissed! The formulation of such an impossible theology can bear no positive fruit for at no stage could it be understood and its misunderstanding equally can do it or the 'believer' no real positive service in this regard. The Divine is directly and/or indirectly implicated in a phenomenological printing/imprinting in the phenomenological world hence its direct and indirect embodiment(s) in the life-world in some form or other. Thence the necessary adoption of a qualified point of view and the rejection of 1.) Pure Logical Contradiction. (32)

	Non-Pure Logical Contradiction can be dealt with under the three sub-heading as noted. (33)

If qualified contradiction can be resolved dialectically, through processes of accommodation, then such resolution can assist in the formulation of that qualified 'vision' of the Divine. This formulation then being critically assessed as either fruitful and/or non-fruitful in this type of task. That critique being dependent upon the terms of reference of that type of appreciation being invoked. (34)

If qualified contradiction cannot be resolved dialectically, through inadequate process of accommodation, then such resolution cannot assist, to that same degree, in the formulation of that qualified 'vision' of the Divine. In the same manner as we have treated the classical theist in the formulation of their vision, or lack of it, so too should we dismiss such efforts to that same extent there is no effective resolution being attempted and therein  realized! (35)

	Lastly, we need to be alert to the implications of this last classification, namely, the metaphorical treatment of the Divine through metaphors, similes and analogies (and metonyms, etc?). In this task we need to be aware of a fork on our route to 'understanding' to the extent that metaphor (paradox, dilemmas, aporias, and other dissonant-like devices) are meant to provoke an active form of understanding (through re-presentation) rather than being used to invoke a merely mixed, passive-like form of comparison, etc. (through representation). But, as promised, this important aspect of our topic will be taken up later in this essay. (36)

	To sum up we can note the following injunction: if we insist on a pure logical contradictions then we can be ruled out of court on two counts, or, if we insist on qualified contradiction without resolution we can be ruled our of court on one count, and, if we insist on a metaphorical interpretation of resolution then the manner of the dialectics involved needs to be presented to the court and/or the effectiveness of that type of dialectic needs to be argued for! Essentially, we cannot think without contradiction, but, the trick is in how we resolve such provocation!! Like two sides of a coin we meet somewhere, somehow, in the middle… in a coin that has currency (being neither illusory nor counterfeit!)? (37)

	If neither pure contradiction can be thought in experience nor pure non-contradiction, and, what is approached is a qualified state of affairs between these two ideal impossibilities, then how is this non-absolutisitic state of contradiction dealt with in those provisional, relative terms of reference? In and through processes of accommodation processes of resolution therein naturally realize a state of affairs that is relatively less contradictory through such processes of harmonization. It is through this (complex) concept of harmonization that we can now link the resolution of qualified contradiction with qualified coherence! Let me explain. (38)

	Resolution is the third moment of our hermeneutic circle. It is the harmonization of the provocative-dissonance of the textual within the accommodation of the meta-textual field. This level of harmonization establishes the relative, qualified resolution of self-contradiction within a concept, between a set of concepts or 'internal' to a conceptual system. On a higher level in the hermeneutic circle it is through ongoing resolution that the existence of a relationship is continually-continued. This aspect of the 'relationship' is transcendentally within the live-world and not in some (logically impossible to conceive) internal-world and/or external-world. At this level of a progressive harmonization, through an unfolding of a resolutional process, a state of localized coherence is instigated; reinforced by the fact that no relationship can exist outside, or independent of, a relational context, i.e., ultimately implicating, therein, the world (or 'ground') of all relationships, i.e., the life-world! Hence it is through ongoing harmonization that we have both the resolution of relatively 'internal', qualified self-contradiction and relatively 'external', qualified localized coherence and, thence, the existential manifestation of value! (39)

B:  Relatively Self-Coherent Content (in the Theoretical Context of the Life-World) 

	Internally, the concept of the Divine needs to make sense, etc., before it can possess value! Externally, the same concept needs to make sense, etc., within the ambit of the Life-World before (that) value can be discovered! Furthermore, the concept of the Divine, as all-encompassing, would have no meaning if it was construed to purely mean something like that! Sense is determined through locating the sense of the location of that concept, set or system of concepts, within our psychic mapping of the life-world. But sense is dependent upon a sense of differentiation-within-accommodation. Without differentiation there can be no sense. Then, the interrelationship between two or more locations or senses is acceptable as long as there is a proper, adequate and appropriate process of accommodation that links all nominated 'facets' within some form of accommodation and its realization of a meta-sense (which through processes of transformational treatment-retreatment can then be accepted as on a par with the meta-status of those pre-accommodated senses. Indeed, by this process the same can then, provisionally, be given an existential descriptor/s that uniquely locate(s) the same in a distinctive phenomenological perspective within the ambit of its associated hermeneutical meta-frame of interpretative reference). (40)

	But, if there can be no external worlds and no internal worlds how can we talk of coherence?! As "all significance is generated through dependence" it follows that as all concepts are limited from the perspective of those limitations can we talk about what is contained within those limits and what must exist without! On the other hand, as internal worlds and external worlds make no sense beyond the vaguely metaphorical, and that granted, we are still left with a problem dealing with this topic of coherence if the totality of the life-world is seen as coherent pure and simply. What sense, meaning and meaningfulness, i.e., value, can attach to this concept of coherence when we are told "the whole being of the life-world, within the potentiality of all of its horizons, is in a state of absolute coherence in and through the transcendental unity of the life-world"?! Could such a statement have meaning beyond the metaphor of 'coherent unity' embedded in this vision of reality? (41)

	Coherence can be obtained without the absolute disappearance of identity, thence, the value of this concept. So "coherence", in a non-absolutist mode, is "relative-difference-in-the-midst-of-identity", i.e., qualified identity! (42)

	What meaning and meaningfulness is possessed by this concept of a qualified improvement in the localized coherence of the life-world? That to that degree coherence can be promoted then to that degree, to that extent and in that manner this differential process is implicitly, if not explicitly, sanctioned! Directly implicated is the manner of the relating in an act of relationship because it is through the improved quality of the relationship that this facet of coherence is extended, improved upon, augmented, etc. What exactly is involved here? (43)

	All relationships are interrelated through the medium of the life-world. Hence this pervasion of an indiscriminate universal coherence. Thence the non-existence of external worlds and internal worlds. On the other hand, the individual coherence of a particular relationship within the ambit of the life-world is the result of a relatively distinctive ongoing process of resolution localized in scope. Improve the quality of that act of relating and its coherence is augmented to the same degree, and v.v. Can this approach be transplanted to a theological setting? Yes - because we are not talking about a universal degree of coherence being augmented, but, how the non-divine can positively alter, hypothetically, the quality of their interaction with the Divine, v.v., through their respective forms of embodiment. How, hypothetically, might this qualitative improvement (or, conversely, relative loss) be realized? By invoking the ramifications of this concept of a divine conversation (albeit treated 'metaphorically' [where even the metaphorical is being treated as metaphorical, or, i.e., meta-metaphorically]). Again, what is involved here? Nothing less than a qualified improvement in the ongoing resolution of the provocative dissonance centred within the course of that relationship at that moment of time, etc! The mutual nature of that dialogical interaction dictating something akin to a 'conversation'. Let now me look more closely at this type of phenomenon or phenomena (from a transcendental perspective realized in and through individual and collective phenomenal, hermeneutical, existential inputs and perspectives). (44)
	
	Another way of approaching this concept of localized coherence is to try to understand the existential richness of identity in the identification and examination of a particular logical subject when that logical subject is agentally oriented in its epistemological organization, i.e., it is an egological subject in some form or other. Just how does an individual find value in their passage through the life-world, what is that valuation of self-identity, and, how is such value augmented and lost (assuming a transient differential in this regard?)? In this research I will argue that through an existentialization of the relatively non-existential there is augmentation of value that is reflected in the richness of personal identity experienced by that person at that moment (or period) of time. That in effect, an increasing existentialization is reflected in an existential sense of self-value whether that self-assessment be derived through processes of reflections and/or non-reflection, and, that this increased degree of existentialization directly reflects the extent that there has been an increased degree of localized coherence between that individual and their passage through this world-of-life. That, essentially, this coherence is proportional to the extent that that individual has enriched the overall net value of their relationships. Let me examine this problematic question of identity and, in the process, come to some understanding as to how this spiritual aspect of the psyche, through this existential excess of value, is realized in general terms of reference, and, what relation it might possibly possess, hypothetically, with respect to some concept or other of the Divine. (45)

	An insight recently examined is the existential fact that "existentialization is the existentialization of the relatively non-existential and not the existentialiation of the relatively existential!" Because, quite simply, existentialization, in its relational enrichment of the relationship, is realized through an existentialization of the relatively non-existential, i.e., the relational enrichment of the relatively non-relational nature of its pre-relational ‘material’. This 'observation' can be accounted for on the grounds that the process of existentialization is the degree that the relationship, as the context under examination, is in a state of relationship that is productive of an existential excess (i.e., its relational facticity; the extent the relationship is greater than the ‘mere’ sum of its relational components [as a relationship in relationship with (the ‘ground’) of all other relationships, i.e., the life-world]); this excess being quantified through an evaluation of the relative degree to which there is an existential excess. As all wholes, read 'relationships', are (psychically) greater than the (mere) sum of their parts (read 'relational participants') it follows that all relationships have an existential excess that would be experienced given the simulation of the same. So, in effect, what is at stake here, is the assessment of the relative degree to which there is an existential excess, an excess which can be evaluated either with respect to itself over time, or, with respect to other relationships at that same time or in some other period of time. How is this phenomenological aspect of that existential surplus, present in each and every relationship in varying degrees and forms, appreciated and quantified? Through a process of simulation, i.e., resimulation. The question to be now asked is thus: how is the simulation of a relationship conducted in such a manner that allows us to divine this state of affairs from an existential point of view, i.e., a relationally oriented point of view? Precisely through this process of simulation through a resimulation of the essentials that constitute that relationship to the extent that they closely mirror that relationship. In this regard an essential input should be considered an input whose presence or absence causes a marked difference in the overall essential nature of that relationship qua relationship, i.e., from a holistic point of view of the overall character of that relationship. (46)

	In practice how is this evaluation of a comparative existential excess conducted? Essentially through intuition derived from an essential simulation of that relationship in question. This intuition is not sensory in character, as would be found in a perceptual relationship, but intuition of a transcendental nature, i.e., that psychic material that appertains to the epistemological level of organization that enters into judgmental forms of discrimination, i.e. acts of judgment. Therefore, to realize the same, the psychic material for this act of transcendental discrimination to take place, as thought to be essentially involved in that relationship, must be put in play first, and, this state of affairs is derived from putting in place all phenomenal, hermeneutical and existential inputs essential in the reconstructive simulation of that relational state of affairs. Then, from this resimulation, the powers of our transcendental discrimination should be able to alert us to the relative success that that relationship appears to possess in the apparent magnification of its own sense of a self-presence above and beyond the psychic materiality of that relational basis re-presented there for judgmental discrimination. In other words, our natural powers of transcendental discrimination will naturally alert us to a comparative awareness as to the degree that that relationship is in a state of existential excess. But, in practice how is this put into effect? Through an essential resimulation of that relationship our carefully reconstituted conceptual appreciation of that relationship is then subjected to a process of transcendental reflection through the very psychic being of the hermeneutic circle itself subject to an overall transcendental suspension which is none other than the very dynamics central to the functioning of that hermeneutic circle! (47)

	However, we first must confront one problem in this regard, namely, as a relationship is interpreted through a particular lens, set of lenses or a system of lenses, how are we going to know we have an essential understanding of that relationship if our approach towards that relationship is only through the interpretative lens or lenses adopted for this task? Are we not going to miss the greater reality of that relationship through not being able to source all the essential frames of reference through which to view that relationship? But this problem is not as problematic as it might first seem! Our viewing of a particular relationship is never without the implication of a meta-textual dimension. For a start, our phenomenological appreciation can never be conducted without a meta-textual interpretative component being present (along with correlative existential aspects). Second, our very being able to view that relationship implies the presence of an adequate range of hermeneutic frames of reference are already present in the overall presentation of that phenomenon, in what we need to know, and that, therefore, all we need to do is attend to the same more closely to recognize both their inputs as based in ‘genres’ and the relative degree to which that input of genres is being put in from of us in that overall point of view. Lastly, in the light of the above and the fact of the holistic nature of the relationship itself, the sheer presentation of that relationship under what ever ostensive frames of reference adopted in reference with it, an essential picture will have been obtained if only implicitly (and therein only in need of further explication). Hence, in our review of a particular relationship an essential understanding has already, in part, been obtained. (48)

	Now, in the light of the above 'observation' (of a co-metatextual implication), we also need to note that through the holistic nature of relationships we already have to hand an essential understanding of that relationship by virtue of the fact that can entertain the same directly through re-simulation and indirectly through resimulation. This holistic essence being properly 'entertained' though the imposition of a proper, appropriate and adequately conducted overall transcendental suspension. In effect, a relationship need not be fully explicated in a 'concrete' sense for it to be adequately appreciated. That an essential snap-shot is all that is necessary for us to obtain, through a process of transcendental reflection, in order to attain an essential understanding of the same. That this is already put into effect through the transcendental auspices of the hermeneutic circle itself. (49)

	How do we evaluate an apparent-essential-understanding in order to determine if our understanding (of that relationship) has been properly resimulated? This is an important question because on it hinges the possibility of our being able to essentially evaluate whether “our essential understanding of a particular relationship is actually a reasonably accurate assessment of the same?” In answer, I would like to propose two considerations that, I believe, overcome the potential difficulties that would be presented if we were able to adequately make this assessment/re-assessment. The first consideration is that we can reconstruct the essential matrix of a relationship by adding and subtracting potential participatory candidates for that role and noting the changes in the complexion of that artificial synthetic, i.e., analytically reconstituted version (or ‘vision’) of that relationship versus its non-artificially received synthetic version (or ‘vision’). By starting with the later we can define an essential component as relatively essential if through its subtraction we radically alter the nature of that relationship and then through its addition we return that 'relationship' to a complexion it possessed prior to this process of subtraction and addition. The second consideration is that through a repeated process of overall transcendental suspension, i.e., transcendental reflection, the relationship constituted within that process should effectively be identically re-constituted without too much difference in complexion. Indeed, through repetition in such a manner the quality of our production should take on an increased sense of definition to the extent that that definition is capable of being obtained with the current understanding of its essential nature already to hand. This process of definitive repetition naturally ceasing when the return on this psychic investment ceases to be delivered in the form of an adequate additional existential excess. In summary, then, an adequate essential understanding of a relationship is granted us when we recognize (through re-cognition) that the more important meta-textual hermeneutic frames of reference are already given to us in our examination of the constituted text of that relationship; that the holistic nature of the relationship will grant us an adequate representation of that relationship given its proper, appropriate and adequate re-presentational examination; that the adding and subtracting of essential candidates allows us to verify this essential configuration as understood to date; and, that a repetition of the very 'viewing' of that relationship will help to confirm this provisional understanding not so much being worked for as being confirmed/re-confirmed. That, basically, our transcendental intuition is already operative beneath these manoeuvres and, in the process, merely being made more explicit, and therein less implicit, until such a time we cease to deal with this topic or our topic naturally disengages us through a diminishing return on the re-investment of our psychic 'interest'. (50)

	Identity is realized through relationships! Our identity is realized through our relationships!! Relationships are realized through the ongoing resolution of dissonance as realized in the context and condition of their relational presentation. The existential manner of a relationship being manifested though its ability to harmonize the relatively non-harmonized, i.e., existentialize the relatively non-existential. As an essential understanding of a relationship is guaranteed to some extent or other it follows that we are now in a position to appreciate the nature of identity as it pertains to an agent, or a group of agents or an institution, and, hypothetically, some form of divine agency by virtue of our being able to appreciate the essential constitution of a relationship through its repetitive resimulation. At this point let me now explain what I mean by this expression 'essential'. Then, let me examine what is meant by an essential examination of the identity of a relationship, and, what is meant by a transient differential in the context of its relational integration. (51)

	The expression 'essential' is a problematic description from a philosophical point of view. The problem being which 'philosophical point of view'. We have Aristotelian essences, Platonic essences, Husserlian essences, etc. (besides possibly borrowing from non-Western traditions like Buddhist philosophy where, e.g., the near synonymous expression dharma [usually meant in the plural] is given a bewildering degree of over-lapping and conflicting treatment/mistreatment). So let me, therefore, briefly describe my own re-vision of this topic as transcendental phenomenological in style and, in practice, as centred in the hermeneutic circle whose concept and methodological implications have been developed in these essays and elsewhere. (52)

	To begin and anchor this brief description I would like to start with the Husserlian technique of eidetic reflection. This phenomenological technique looks at a particular type of experience and through imaginative reflection explores the scope or range of possible particularized forms that that type of universal could appear to inhabit without transgressing the distinctive typology of that under examination in its generality. So with ‘triangularity’, e.g., we imagine the gamut of triangles from, say, equilateral to isosceles to scalene, and through this maintenance of topological invariance we imaginatively explore what is essential to a three sided plane figure. In this exploration of a particular (type of) essence we find, or should find, that matters of a distinctive type fall around a certain psychic centre in our intersubjective mappings of the life-world (and nested in a hierarchy of meta-essential states, meta-meta- essential states, etc.) about which whose boundaries have a degree of definition that allows us to some extent, usually with reasonable clarity, to declare whether we have transgressed those relatively distinctive boundaries (as limiting conditions on that identity in order for it to remain an instance of that type). In our translocation across essential boundaries we usually find a distinctive process of transformation that allows us to recognize our distinct translocation (in a locative sense) in this intersubjective mapping of the life-world. E.g., slowly adding small pinches of salt to a glass of potable water and then getting someone else to taste the same without an awareness of our adulteration of this water would usually produce a re-evaluation of the taste of that water once recognized as salty wherein all extra inputs of salt would merely confirm that new understanding with an increasing degree of confirmation. This sudden transition in our understanding being merely re-confirmed with an increasing degree of surety once this recognized boundary has been crossed. That complex phenomena are merely the complex concatenation of these relatively simple, but hierarchically nested, types of essential determination. That the very agglutination of the same is controlled by the manner of this hierarchical nesting, e.g., an empirical object-state that occupies perceptual space and time in a material-like fashion usually possesses a phenomenological experience of weight, form, colour, etc., as already predetermined in our intersubjective mapping of the life-world (and our individualized adoption of the same whilst maintaining an overall isomorphic invariance of those 'genres' adopted and therein adapted to that extent allowable within this essential mapping of subjective-intersubjective experience). (53)

This phenomenological vision of essence therefore implicates the following conceptual aspects, namely, a sense of essential centre definitively located in our hierarchically mapped vision of the life-world that essentially reflects how the constitution of the human psyche is itself ordered in its interpretative experience of this world-of-life. Hence, used in this manner, the essential has, phenomenologically, a relatively definitive sense of essential centre and a relatively slightly less definitive sense of an essential boundary as located within our hierarcically pre-constructed subjective-intersubjective 'genre' mappings of the life-world and that this generally reflects the essentially pre-constructed nature of the human psyche in this regard. That this division of the life-world is further reflected in natural language although not without some surface distortions of these relatively distinctive deeper structures. Appreciated in and through transcendental reflection via the use of an overall transcendental suspension as centred within a hermeneutic circle this intuitive appreciation of essence configures all forms of experience and guarantees, in part, the intersubjectivity of that experience at the same time! Now, most importantly, because the transcendental suspension is in full play in our determination of the essential, whether in a relatively simple experience or in a relatively more complex experience, at no time are our considerations of essence being cashed out in a realistic manner or an idealistic fashion et al. No material-scientific claims of any kind are being made, and, equally, no ideal-mentalistic claims are being put forward either. Likewise, for all ontological and epistemological claims, other than these 'suspended' prescriptive-descriptive expressions uttered in our articulation of their apparent essential form in our existentially interpreted phenomenological experience of those apparent phenomena in question. That, what locations of sense, meaning claims and claims of meaningfulness are present duly encapsulated or insulated within their suspension (through entertaining a parallel formation of anti-essences). Hence, it is within these guide-lines that this concept of the essential is carved out - within the overall transcendental suspension as centred within the ambit of the hermeneutic circle of comprehension! Thence, although not here argued, from an ultimate transcendental point of view even essence is without essence as this phenomenological vision of the essential is not to be cashed out in an epistemological and/or ontological frame of reference(s), etc! Hence this 'vision' of essence should not be reified through some form of an interpolated extrapolation beyond the frame of its presentation/re-presentation because to do this would be to commit a transcendental mistake and produce/re-produce therein a transcendental illusion (through going beyond the level and manner of deployment appropriate to our critical experience of the phenomenal qua phenomenal, etc., as would be realized in and through the utilization of the overall transcendental suspension)! (54)

	The concept of a transient differential assumes that a relationship, certainly one that could be directly engaged in the life-world, possesses a degree of localized existential coherence whose value is either augmented or diminished in time. Hence its differentiation can, in theory, be conducted in that moment of time or over a certain period of time. This is distinct from its textual differentiation wherein essential characteristics are expressed in particular terms of reference. Then, the existential nature of our existential descriptor is the result of a balanced suspension of textual differentiation and meta-textual integration. The context of the relational integration of a relationship is the extent that a relationship, theoretically, is a relationship above and beyond its mere materiality (even though, as previously argued, mere materiality cannot be envisaged in absolute terms of reference). This relational integration is essentially its relational facticity and the change in this state of affairs is measured by its transient differential, i.e., the extent that that relationship is becoming enriched or impoverished in the value of that degree of relational facticity as its degree of localized coherence or relational integration. Let me examine now what is implicated in this concept of relational integration asking ourselves how a relationship can become relatively impoverished or enriched (given that the factual existence of a relationship, at some moment or period of time, is either in a state of existence or not in a state of existence, and, that some short-sighted philosophers have no truck with so-called 'degrees of existence'). (55)

	For a start let us be sure what is being dealt with here, namely, the epistemological quality of existence and not its factual (sixth order) status! Hence the degree of existence a relationship exhibits, and its differentials/integrations of the same, is correctly the degree to which it finds itself epistemologically ordered hierarchically. This can be approached by investigating its harmonization, localized coherence or integration, the degree to which that state of affairs has been vaginated or re-invaginated, or, modally enhanced or diminished. Let me examine what is meant by these various headings. Harmonization is necessary for the existence of a relationship because it is only through the ongoing harmonization of that relationship that that relationship comes into existence in any form or format! In the context of our hermeneutic circle this occurs in the third moment of the existential wherein the provocative-dissonance of the text and the integrative consonance of the meta-textual field of presentation/re-presentation is allowed to resolve on an ongoing basis. The balanced suspension of all three moments facilitating the existential functioning of this hermeneutic circle whose value is determined through phenomenological-sense, hermeneutical-meaning and existential-meaningfulness. Hence the relationship comes into existence, and is maintained in that state of existence, through this ongoing process of harmonization. The effectiveness of the resolution determining the degree that that relationship is allowed to come into existence in and through that relation process of harmonization. The product of the (modal) 'quantity' of the materiality of that relationship and the 'quality' or effectiveness of its resolution, in effect, producing/re-producing its specific facticity as a relationship above and beyond the 'materiality' of that relationship within the (transcendental ambit of) the life-world. As this aspect of the relationship changes hence its transient differential. The value of its relational facticity disclosing the degree to which it is harmonized, integrated and regarded as coherent in this world-of-life. One way of trying to understand this value or 'quality' of the relationship is through the concepts of vagination/re-invagination. Vagination is the folding over of the relationship upon itself in an enriching of its modal footprint in the world. E.g., a golf course is a golf course, but if that golf course were to also become a beautifully landscaped koala sanctuary, a pleasant and safe place for people to walk, a plantation, a botanical gardens, etc., then the multi-usefulness of that golf-course has resulted in its enrichment as a public space. Re-invagination being the multiple metaphorical folding over/unfolding of a relationship upon itself, etc., and the enrichment of value that results from a repetition of this type of process. Modal enhancement/diminishment is the degree the modal mix of a relationship is activated or deactivated. Collectively, at the level of the overall relationship itself, the localized coherence of a relationship is the result of a progressive harmonization of that relationship. In our search for identity, as an existential process of re-valuation, we now have, to hand, a theoretical understanding of this topic that should assist us in this task. Let me now look, hypothetically, at the concept of Divine content in the light of this topic of the localized coherence of value as presented/represented/re-presented between agents and agental-like entities, and, between the same, within the ambit of the life-world. (56)

	In our hypothetical investigations of Divine content our second heading is "the self-coherence of the value of Divine content in the ambit of the life-world". Implicated in this aspect are a constellation of concepts devolving around relational interaction between entities possessing a considerable difference of power, etc., in the light of our concept of identity. Essential imprinting, chaotically determined intervention, hermeneutic re-textualization, mutual de-localized advancement, mutual localized advancement, modal activation, integral coherence and enrichment, etc. (57)

	The relationship between a Divine form of agency and a personal, non-divine form of agency, in the form of a person, can, hypothetically, be provisionally defined as a conversational-like interaction in some form or other between agents with a considerable difference in their epistemologically organized intentional manifestation of power. This difference in power, as a power-differential, has its analogical illustration and exemplification though a number of different paradigms, e.g., mother and child, pet-owner and pet (e.g., between that of a person and a dog or cat), and, from the other side of this power differential, the relationship between some institution and an individual found operative therein. I will invoke these paradigms to illustrate the following list of concepts that a theologian and/or a philosopher might wish or not wish to supply to their integrated concept of Divine content. Let me now examine some of these hypothetical concepts listed above that could be useful in this task of giving hypothetical flesh to the concept of the Divine. (58)

	Essential imprinting is the recognition that the nature of a relationship is holistically and essentially imprinted on the entire 'body' of that relationship and, is, therefore, to be found on any part of that relationship considered in relative isolation, albeit from its own point-of-view in that complex relationship (and correspondingly limited by those restricted hermeneutical terms of reference). The implication to be drawn here is that in the conjectured existence of the Divine, its presence and/or absence, should be imparted to the fabric of that relationship, as a relationship in this one-world-of-life, despite the inevitable presence of hermeneutic limitations in the recognition of the same should its represented/re-presented presence be found present as passively imprinted/actively imprinting. An example of this imprinting can be found between that of an institution and the individual that operates in that institution, say a hospital. Working in that organization all textual documentation is often letter-headed with the insignia of that institution along with other forms of semiotic repetition in signage. By this means, and others, the hyper-agent-like nature of an institution can materialize itself on a par with its agent and agental-like members. Then again, through committees acting on the behalf of that organization, 'it' can collectively make decisions that, in turn, become materialized in the form of new forms, new ways of interpreting old forms, the instigation of new procedures and the re-modelling of old ones, etc., etc. (59)

	Chaotically determined intervention… if the world is deterministically operating in a conditionally based, non-metaphysically oriented causal manner then how could the Divine overrule these so-called laws of nature… in reply… by, it could be hypothetically conjectured, intervening in and through points of chaotic indetermination (attractors, conditional conjuctions and other points of bifurcation) and similar. Therein instigating phase-changes, changes of behaviour, exhibiting an apparent degree of choice… in a similar manner to how the human individual operates in the demonstration of their intentionality… through processes of intentional resolution through a resolution of provocative dissonance wherein dissonance is not only dissonant but also provocative in its predetermination of possibilities for resolutional harmonization. E.g., in due course an organization can make a certain decision through the deliberation of a committee or a set of committees or the installation of a certain mechanism that will allow for that type of a resolute 'response'. (60)

	Hermeneutic re-textualization… by the valid explication of an implicit meta-textual lens what was not able to be seen before can now be made apparent through this process of valid explication. Because, as previously argued, all texts come with their meta-texual forms of presentation it follows that through an explication of this implicit meta-textual dimension new ways of seeing can be put into effect purely through the consequences of such further processes of explication. The implication here, hypothetically, is that the Divine text is there for us to unravel once we have a better handle on its meta-textual terms of reference. This process of relative explication being an explication of the relatively implicit! An example we might like to consider in this regard is what can we know about the greater world by merely looking at some smaller portion of it, say, the advertizing in a newspaper on the grounds that all parts of the world mirror each other and that this must also occur within the confines of a newspaper too (wherein each section of the newspaper in varying degrees mirrors all the other sections; a process of correspondence directly enhanced by the authenticity of its manufacture)! With the right techniques and lenses to conduct this type of research we could, e.g., determine the relative state of the economy by noting the quantity of advertizing, its quality or character, its range and current differential with respect to previous periods and what this reflected at those times with respect to the state of the economy. So, e.g., an increased number of advertizements might suggest that the economy is improving. On the other hand, if most of those new jobs are part-time then this fact might considerably alter our perception of this previous 'interpretation' of apparent growth. Then again, an increased number of ads for 'help wanted on building sites' might be re-construed as an improvement of the economy, etc., with the potential for ripple-on effects for the greater economy despite an overall differential increase in part-time vacancies, etc. (61)

	Mutual localized advancement… is the ability of a relationship to enrich itself within its own limited confinement through some form of a mutual agental-interaction that helped to facilitated this sense of enrichment. In effect, a phase shift is entered into through either of those agental parties regardless of their status in intentional power. E.g., an institution could come to make a certain decision that effects those that work or operate within that institution, or, an individual in an institution could make a certain decision or not make a decision that would radically effect the operation of that institution (as when a trusted bank fails as a consequence of rogue trading, etc.). (62)

	Mutual de-localized advancement… is the ability of an agent or group of agents or an agental-like force to effect decisions and processes beyond the immediate confines of their embedded relationship. So one institution could effect change in another even though they do not have, normally, a direct influence on that other relationship or meta-relationship (or hyper-relationship). Changes in medical practice in one institution or country could be adopted by some other institution or country (either directly or indirectly with respect to that originally innovative institution or country. (63)

	Modal activation… is a concept that recognizes that the modal repertoire of an individual agent or agent-like entity is never completely actualized and equalized. Therefore, there is always the possibility of advancing the same either directly or indirectly through various forms of advancement that take these forms of potential advancement in to consideration. Hence the concept of relatively mutual and/or not-mutual processes of enrichment (or de-enrichment). An examination of the transient differential of the existential descriptor(s) of that agent, agent-like entity or institution, etc., being able, in theory at least, of determining that aspect of this state of affairs. Thence the instigation of a process of relative, localized/non-localized integral coherence or de-coherence, etc. E.g., a child may have the potential of going to university and getting a degree in a certain topic or set of topics, but, first, they have to go to a primary school or attend its equivalent, and all through all stages of education necessary to adequately complete that type of life-task, etc. (64)

	Discussed, and illustrated, a number of mechanism have been demonstrated that could be adopted by a philosopher or theologian in order to deal with this problematic issue of a considerable difference in power status between the relatively divine and the non-divine, although, a similar, but resolvable, problem is also in play between the non-divine and the relatively less non-divine, as e.g., in the relationship between the owner of a pet and their pet. So a dog looks at you and wags it tail with anticipation in the hope that you realize that it wants x… be that food, a drink or go for a walk… Then, when you have worked out what it 'so obviously wants' it duly 'rewards' you for being so intelligent…. Here we have the same sort of hypothetical situation and hopefully this range of mechanism-types can be successfully utilized in cashing out this type of topic both hypothetically and non-hypothetically…? (65)

	The value of value resides in this existential excess. Passively, this is value of the relationship minus the value of its contributing participants. Actively, this is the value realized in a relationship minus its investment of psychic interest. This type of differential is, basically, the extent that a relationship is able to assert an identity above and beyond the relativity of its material basis. This differential is also experienced as power, relational power, the powerfulness of its identity to alter the fabric of the life-world. Hence this power differential is the power of the relationship that extends beyond its material basis and is expressed through the emergence of that identity in accordance with its epistemological organization. Thus can be now linked the emergence of identity, the manner of its expression, its value, its power to alter the intentionally (re-)constituted fabric of the life-world as it actively and passively manifests itself in our experience. So in this quest to understand the relationship between localized coherence of the life-world within a particular relationship in this world-of-life and these isomorphic concepts of value, identity, relational power, relational expression, etc., we are now in  a better position to examine the same (as in, e.g., the hypothetical relationship between some form of the Divine and the relatively non-divine, etc.). (66)

	Let me now re-examine the concept of relational power more closely in order to understand its implication in identity, value and localized coherence of that relational 'space' as expressed through the epistemological organization of that relational identity. For a start we need to re-think this concept of power (as expressed through a relationship in and through the life-world). To refine this understanding we can think of power as being able to be phenomenologically described on at least three different levels of explanation (if not more). Let me elabourate. Power can be simply seen as merely the mass times its acceleration or some other similar equivalent (in either ontologically oriented or epistemologically oriented terms of reference). But this level of explanation has no place for 'the potentiality of power to be realized' and for this state of affairs to exist in a hybrid state of both activated and potentialized forms. Further more, there is the concept here of enabling in so far as power can be transformed from a potential state of affairs to an actively expressed state of affairs, and, a state of disenabling when the reverse is put into place. But, we need to go even deeper in this analysis to realize that power is not just the switching from potential forms of energy to actual forms of energy, and v.v., but needs a deeper concept of permission to occur (and super-permission to allow that occurrence to then be realized, etc.). Let me elabourate. (67)

	No relationship is an island unto itself! Every relationship occurs in a field of relationships and thence the very matrix of the life-world itself. Furthermore, a relationship or some dominant factor therein, even within its own relational confines, needs forms of cooperation between contributing factors before any kind and degree of power could be expressed therein and therefrom. Power is not the mere application of brute force! Let me illustrate this point in an examination of slavery, using this analysis as a proto-typical model for the transmission of power. A slave is relatively powerless but not absolutely powerless. If all slaves were to down tools and refuse to work those slaves would no longer be 'slaves'. Of course they might be replaced or given inducements to change their minds. They might even die for their efforts. But this possibility that they might refuse to labour, to be a slave, adequately makes the point that some form of permission by the slave is necessary before they will work as a slave. In a society that is dichotomized along the lines of slavers and slaves this 'fact' of permission may well be academic and never formally asked for. But, that aside, there is this ground of tacit permission upon which the power of the slaver is put into effect over each of their slaves. Without it there would be no exercise of power in the form of enslavement. Moreover, the mere fact that a slave might wish they were not a slave and could imagine they were the master themselves is a guarantee that this tacit permission must be continually forthcoming through the continual acceptance by the slave of their role to be a slave. In no other way could the slaver exercise their power except through this form of permission, or no non-permission, whether it be tacit or otherwise. This is the basic analogy that I am now going to apply to all forms of power transmission. In this light I would like to propose the following distinctions. Within the ambit of each relationship power is only discharged through the appropriate forms of pre-conditional/conditional cooperative permission. Then, for power to be discharged and transmitted in a multi-relational setting we need a more epistemologically organized form of permission , i.e., super-cooperative permission since the same dynamics that occur within a relationship are essentially the same as occurs between relationships. Because of this need for cooperation and super-cooperation I will propose the following concepts. In general terms of reference I would like to call this process of cooperative permission-seeking a co-re-complexification, playing on the word 'complex' as involving both 'a more complex situation in view of that transmission of power' and 'the fact that this is done through the unity and integrity of a 'complex' qua as 'a' complex'. In reverse, this could be seen as a relative de-complexification as this process can never be absolute (by virtue of transcendental necessity wherein the life-world must guarantee only the effective integrity of each and every relationship). On an intentionally aware level of consciousness I would like to propose the concept of a co-re-enfranchisement of that relationship/set of relationships when the power in a relationship/between a set of relationship is 'allowed' to discharge itself through a process of deliberate intent. On the other hand, the non-existential, non-authentic utilization of that power realizes an effective non-absolute dis-enfranchisement of that relationship in that regard. On an intentionally non-aware level of consciousness I would like to propose the concept of a co-re-collusion of pre-intentional forces for the non-intentionally aware processes at work that 'allow' through 're-collusion' the formation of a power transmission. In reverse, this could be called a de-collusion of pre-intentional forces. That all forms of value and their expression operate in the light of the above and that all forms of recognition, as a transmission of information, must operate in the same manner. Hence this third order (and fourth order) analysis of power takes into account a recognition of the existential fact that power can only be discharged through forms of cooperation and not otherwise! That, ipso facto, all transcendental theological investigations and all theological speculations must take this limited, mutual complexification of power into account whenever dealing with matters of identity, localized coherence, value, recognition, etc., in essence the complete entirety of any topic, whatever the nature of its domain, must be constituted in this fashion (and interpreted in a similar manner)! That the extent of the power transmission in a relationship or super-relationship cannot extend beyond the boundaries of that preconditional/conditonal basis of 'permitted' cooperation/super-cooperation exercisable within the ambit of that relationship or super-(set of) relationships, hence its limited nature (as a reflection of the extent to which this form of cooperation can extend). As all relationship are two-way/multi-faceted in the manner of their processes of interaction hence this epithet of mutual in its continually re-constituted nature. (68) 

	Above, I referred to a relationship as a form and process of complexification - the extent that a relationship 'allows' the ('apparent') transmission of information, read "power transmission", and, that, therefore therein, the relationship is acting as 'a' complex. The extent of that relationship/super-relationship, as just noted, is a reflection of this degree of preconditional/conditional organization that 'permits' this transmission of information, i.e., its self-organization. Although in the physical space of an (embodied) relationship information discharged in a power transmission would travel at the speed of light, the differential transition between the preconditional and the conditional is, correctly, put in place spontaneously, or effectively, in a moment or on a momentary basis. The extent of a relationship being defined, therefore, as the extent it is preconditionally organized as a complex (in its potential-actuality and actualized-potentiality and all transitions there between). (69)

	However, in this scheme of preconditional/conditional cooperative complexification how is a relationship constituted if there is no apparent transmission in information? There may well be no apparent transmission of information, but, for that relationship to persist it must continually/continuously be re-constituted as a simulation that persists. Therefore, the very persistence of a relationship in time (and the temporal changes in its existential descriptor by virtue of its differences realized through 'imperfect' replication over time, however subtle) means that the very duration of a relationship is realized through a continual/continuous transmission of power/information, i.e., as realized in its ongoing simulation qua re-simulation. "Continual/continuous" by virtue of the consequence that this information is re-constituted in on ongoing fashion but that as the 'texture' or 'grain' of that process as reconstituted in experience cannot be appreciated below a certain momentary quantum of experience the process of reconstitution (of the process under examination, of its interpretation and the interaction between these two poles) must then take on a discrete momentary-like appearance on what ever level of direct or indirect performance and/or examination. Hence the momentary nature of this process of re-constitution is an artefact of its appreciation on what ever level of examination this takes place - thence this continuum between these two ideal poles of the continual and the continuous. (70)

	Again, the extent of a relationship resides in this extent that it is subject to this level of reconstitutional cooperative complexification, i.e., this ability to re-constitute itself/be re-constituted as itself albeit as one relational aspect in an hierarchical sea of relationships. Such non-absolute localized coherence being, in effect, the existential excess possessed by that relationship in being that relationship, i.e. 'a' complex above and beyond its mere complexity (in detail). How, in this scheme then, do we account for the relative enrichment of a relationship (or the converse in a process of de-existentialization)? By fluctuations, a sense of the differential, being observed in this process of re-constitution. What are the ramifications of this insight? That enrichment is realized through quantitative and/or qualitative forms of augmentation.  Quantitative forms of augmentation could include an enlargement of the effective boundaries of that relationship and/or an intensification of its modal intensities currently being re-constituted. Qualitative forms of augmentation could include an enlargement of the modal repertoire and/or the instigation of transitional phase changes realized in those current or additional modalities (along with the apparent exchange of apparent novel information therein by means of those exchange mechanisms).  (71)

	Now let me look into the nature of interaction from an exchange point of view? As the interaction in all relationships is a two way affair and a multi-denominational process at the same time how do we account for this absence of an absolutely passive recipient in a relationship, or, rather, how do we account for this level of direct interactivity? And by what types of mechanisms could this take place? Essentially we are asking how is cooperation entered into in the constitution of that relationship? Again let us return to our slaver-slave relationship as an archetypal model in order to explore what might determine the nature of this exchange mechanisms? (72) 

	Imagine the following scenario. A large plantation, numerous slaves and a slaver with a small band of overseers. If all relationships are mediated by exchange mechanisms then we must ask what is being exchanged in this type of situation? Essentially, we have here an economy - even in the relationship these slaves have to each other this economy is taking place through exchange phenomena or events. The slaver issues their commands and the slaves obey accordingly conducting their transactions in order to facilitate this economy. In this regard the slaver is active but his activity cannot be isolated from the compliance of the slaves. Likewise the slaves are relatively passive but in accepting, through reservation or default, the will of the slaver they will comply with their instructions. They are cooperating and this cooperation extends to their fellow slaves whenever the work they do for the slaver, or each other, is required by them. This 'cooperation' produces an excess of value greater than that invested in their labours hence the expression 'economy'. This value is expressed in virtual and non-virtual forms. A non-virtual format is an obviously perceptible instance of value (and value creation). A virtual format is one is which the tokens, either non-virtual or virtual in themselves, equal in value are co-exchanged. Tokens can be accepted as virtual when they are not obviously apparent in a perceptible frame of reference. E.g., if an overseer orders two slaves to cook identical meals and they then each eat an equal portion of each other's food the net result is the virtual transaction of non-virtual 'tokens'. If our two slaves instead merely swapped certain obligations with each other of approximately the same value then the net transaction is essentially the virtual transaction of virtual 'tokens'. Overall, though, this 'visibly productive' economy is, on this slave-dependent plantation, one of unequal non-virtual transactions of non-virtual tokens. As an example of an economy of non-virtual transaction of virtual 'tokens' we could suggest the relationship between two slavers one of whom grows sugar and the other who grows cotton and both of whom decide to swap some their produce according to a certain formula agreed upon by both parties - these arbitrary virtual values being swapped to an equal value and therein destroyed. In the context of this scheme we can also consider, in theoretical terms of reference, whether those transactions are basically authentic or inauthentic in the nature of their being transacted, and whether there is win-win, win-loss, loss-win, or, a loss-loss type of scenario being realized in the appreciated context of that transaction? Inauthenticity could be defined in this scheme as the production of a loss for either party or as an excessive win by one of those parties at the expense of the 'win' by the other party or parties. Looked at from an intentional point of view one could then argue that authenticity or inauthenticity of intent is reflected in the intent to achieve an outcome as defined by that consequential scheme as just outlined. On the other hand, inadvertent authenticity or inauthenticity is realized by default when and where it can be demonstrated (through deconstructive analysis and other forms of hermeneutic practice, etc., to that extent it is thought possible to achieve this type of interpretative aim) that those particular consequences were not desired intentionally. (73)

	What import has this scheme? That, it would appear, that we now have to hand a format for phenomenologically dealing with all types of exchange transactions, events that constitute the very simulated/re-simulated 'fabric' of that relationship or set of relationships under examination! (74)

	Now, re-examining this distinction between 'authentic' and 'inauthentic', as just noted, we can now make a refinement in the definition of the same by adding the 'phenomenological observation' that authenticity of spirit (as the spirit of an authentic process of judgment) is only realized to that extent an overall transcendental suspension is effectively engaged (through the refinement of those core-existential processes already to hand) when our 'neutrally-involved' interpretation is being constituted/re-constituted. Hence 'refinement' is exactly that, the refinement of intentional experience through the augmentation of the overall transcendental suspension, etc., necessarily present to some extent, already in situ in that relationship/set of relationships. Moreover, as there can be no absolute distinction between the epistemological and the ontological it follows that what goes for intentional experience also applies, to some degree or other in its own fashion, to the relatively non-intentionally constituted, albeit still epistemologically organized but on a less organized basis. What are the implications of this 'conclusion'? Before I even try to attempt a resolution of that type of question let me re-consider a more complex concept of the virtual and, following that, let me then re-look at the nature of the relationship between localized cooperation in the orbit of a relationship and de-localized cooperation in the sub-regional asymmetric breaking of that pre-conditional symmetry and the relationship this causal-like process seems to entail between quantumatized and non-quantumatized versions of the same regions of interrelated and interconnected causal histories (wherein the interrelational relationships could be treated as aspects of a causal set?)? (75)

	The concept of the virtual has been a preoccupation of mine and some progress in this field was conducted in my set of papers titled Beyond Therapy, especially with respect to co-authored phenomena. In paragraph 73 two senses of virtual were utilized, namely, first, the neutralization of interactions, and, second, the relative non-observance or observability of tokens of exchange (such as, e.g., obligations, promises, etc.). To this I would like to add two more definitional possibilities. A third sense, I believe, involves the mere framework, essential description of a certain state of affairs, such as, e.g., a brief sketch of the existential descriptor that might adequately denominate a unique individual person, or, the code of a software program, or, the digital code on an audio CD or even merely its musical score in conventional notation. A fourth sense could involve the simulated promise or potential vision/version of a state of affairs that is not able to be directly engaged except as an envisaged promise or possibility, albeit experienced within the direct engagement of the world (since the virtual 'space' of say a computer game is still experienced in a non-virtual form of space, i.e., in front of a monitor, etc., i.e., never in a purely ideal virtual form or format). With these various senses now to hand all future discussions involving some sense of the virtual, the potential, and similar, etc., can now note in what particular sense or senses that expression is being used (and whether additional senses need to be defined or re-defined in this regard?). (76)

	For a relationship to endure over a certain period of time I have argued for its continuous-continual re-constitution. In this I have taken a quantum point of view (in conjunction with a simultaneous relativistic perspective through treating the relationship as an existentially ‘distinctive’ quantum in its own right). The relationship appears to continuously persist in front of us if it is that type of observable relationship. The same sort of hypothetical ‘observation’ being made with respect to relatively non-observable relationships (regardless of whether they are abstract or non-abstract on the grounds of their epistemological engagement through direct re-constitution in some form or other, to some degree or other). But, on a bare quantum level of description we find this process of re-constitution to be very much that type of a re-constituted phenomenon-for-us. On this apparent level we can theoretically, if not practically, spell out an exact-like existential descriptor of that particular phenomena and/or phenomenal field (as the relational field of a phenomenon or set of phenomena). This existential descriptor (as a causal set) would then note the unique causal sequences that 'grow' from that particular object-state and/or relational field treated in a non-metaphysical conditional frame of reference. Through localized coherence, derived from relational cooperation, and which articulates the relational extent of that particular relational field, an overall existential descriptor could be used to describe the same state of affairs albeit from this more 'relative', non-quantum point of view. Now, we have a problem as to how the localized coherence of the relationship, realized through relational cooperation, is related to the de-localized coherence/de-coherence that issues forth in unique causal sequences within that relationship (through forms of broken asymmetry and the release in that direction of a non-virtual process of causal constitution/re-constitution from the de-coherence of the virtuality of the re-constitutional processes that previously maintained and still maintain to a lesser degree, the semblance of an ongoing identity). Obviously they must be related! But how? On one hand, we have the entire self-organized re-constitution of the relational field, and, on the other we have the unique causal sequences that conditionally grow from within, but appear in this aspect to be separated from, that self-organized field. In the former we have no non-virtual information being apparently transmitted other than to that extent that entire relationship could be treated as a one-pointed-like existential descriptor in its own right. The connection, I believe, that is taking place is a conditional de-localization of information when self-organization to some extent partially breaks down in that regard. We could envisage the relationship, i.e., the entire relational field, as simple through a vast quantum-like entanglement. Then disruptions in that simplicity merely establish(ing) the unique descriptor facets that still belonging to that relationship and that have grown relatively apart within that still self-organized relational field. Conditional causal contiguity is called for through de-localized coherence and that information cannot travel faster than the speed of light. On the other hand, the continuous-continual reconstitution of that relational field as certain type of state, would seem to necessitate information travelling at instantaneous speeds or near instantaneous speeds. Is this a right interpretation or it the transition taking place at the self-organized centre of that relationship qua relational field, and, thence in this regard, there needs be no non-virtual transmission of information across immense reaches of space. What does our intuition say in this regard? Then, again, these transitions and phase changes may well be taking place on different levels of the epistemological organization of that object-state(s) within the overall ambit of that relationship and thence reflect disruptions on these specific levels of intentional-like organization (and therein maintaining this mixture of diversity-in-the-midst-of-relational-unity). Then, dependent upon whether our point of view is 'internal' to the relational space of a relationship or 'external' we could then adopt a Multi-World point of view or Copenhagen-style of quantum interpretation. Say, e.g., we have an entangled a polarized couplet where both parties are a great distance from each other we could interpret this type of situation form an external-like point of view by saying that only in destroying that relationship can we say this particle here has this polarization and that particle there has other the opposite polarization. On the other hand, taking a hypothetical internal point of view, we could say these particles took a distinct polarity before parting that can only be determined through 'interviewing' them and therein destroying that relationship, or, an unequal probability function has already pre-determined the probable likelihood that this particle here will have this polarization and that particle there will most likely have the opposite. Taking this internal/external distinction as not absolute do we really need to chose then between them? So, in this regard, we have to blend these relatively internal-external distinctions? The import of this analysis being that through the cooperation of localized coherence we have within the physical extent of a relationship the equal pervasion of its relational information established through re-constitution/re-simulation, and, on the other hand, through a de-localized coherence/de-coherence we have the creation and/or preservation of a unique existential descriptor whose constituted/re-constituted information is propagated at the speed of light. Therefore, we have the relationship in its 'totality' in possession of its relatively unique existential descriptor and each quantum element/moment in that relationship also possessing its own unique existential descriptors and through a recognition of this we can overcome the ontological-epistemological rifts between a quantum point of view and a relativistic non-quantum point of view, internal-external points of view, etc. In effect, perceiving every relationship and every sub-relational facet as possessing their own relatively unique existential descriptors! That, in our examination of the content of the Divine this aspect of coherence within the life-world needs to be taken into account in order to understand the 'apparent' quantum/relativistic dichotomy central to all relationships in their directly engaged manifestations, and, the nature of value and the implications this has for determination of the real or factual, the ideal or essential, the aesthetical, ethical , practical and interrelational or environmental, etc., along with value forged from a more overall perspective of the spiritual (defined, previously, as an existential excess of value)! (77) 

	Let us now look at our third consideration of the content of the Divine under the heading of the metaphorical (itself intimately connected with processes of re-constitution qua re-simulation!). (78)

C:  The Trans-Metaphorical Nature of Divine Content

	Although some philosophers and theologian might wish to do theology through the use of analogies and other metaphorical devices no sense of the Divine, if postulated as actual, can be itself merely metaphorical if such gentlepersons wish their concept to do some form of religious work (i.e., be both argued for as 'present' in actual existence and 'able to present itself' by some means or other in the life of the person and/or the community)! I don't believe that we would find many theologians who would subscribe to the view that the Divine was only a metaphor. However, in this section I will advance just that type of argument, despite, and in the light of, the fact that the Divine is usually treated as trans-analogical. Then, I will look at the use of metaphor as a means of introducing a concept like the divine. Lastly, I note that all processes of simulation are metaphorical-like in orientation and what complications and implications this has for my initial argument that the Divine must, ultimately, be trans-metaphorical in character. (79)

	"What exactly is the nature of the metaphorical?" has been a question that has preoccupied a large proportion of my philosophical investigations, especially over the last decade. My latest thinking is that it is one moment in the hermeneutic circle, usually treated as the first, and is considered to be phenomenologically oriented, reductively oriented, retrospectively oriented, etc. It is contrasted by the rhetorical and the existential (and the overall transcendental suspension realized through the collective integrity of the hermeneutic circle). The metaphorical is seen as a type of suspension that is conjunctive in nature, i.e., the sense of likeness is captured through a "both like 'and' not like". The context of the metaphor, in its focusing on a certain aspect of a certain phenomenon as the centre of its 'likeness', is set up meta-textually and through regular use becomes a genre which through over-use then becomes a cliché. Usually the point of the metaphor, its aptness, delivers a degree of literary surplus in value greater than the degree of psychic interested invested in its initial entertainment. We should note that a metaphor cannot be subjected to a process of complete literalization of its text because 'like-ness' cannot be cashed out through the identity of 'is-ness'. On the other hand, even though all phenomena are read literally as 'texts' the metaphorical cannot be read literally, yet, the role of phenomenal simulation is to be simulated through re-simulation and that is none other the role of the metaphorical to simulate. In this light metaphor simulate, i.e., 'metaphor' and hence allow us direct access to this phenomenal world of re-simulation because of the trans-linguistic nature realized through the collective-integrity of the hermeneutic circle. When we read a book, say a novel, that novel is simulated for us as a trans-linguistic entity in a trans-linguistic world of value because we can entertain what we think about that novel in its entirety without having to re-trace our reading of it once again through the totality of its text page by page, etc! (80)

In an historical nutshell I would say that the modernist, in their close readings of a text, could not see beyond the text to the meta-textual dimension of genre, etc. Then, in turn, the postmodernist could not see beyond the meta-textual dimension  of genre, introductions, conclusions, definitions, footnotes, marginalia, etc., to an existential realm of the non-textual and thence to the not-textual dimension of the life-world as simulated and viewed through the entire compass and integrity of the hermeneutic circle. So the role of the metaphorical is to simulate the life-world through this lens of the hermeneutic circle, and, as a result, we must ask ourselves the crucial question "What is the difference between metaphorical simulation and the simulation of the life-world as realized through the collective embrace of the hermeneutic circle?" (81)

	In due course I will be forced to confront this question in greater detail. To what extent does the metaphorical actually metaphor this world-of-life, directly simulate/re-simulate it? In a short answer let me suggest that this is a matter of intent: when we are being metaphorical then the selective likeness between comparatively treated phenomena comes to the fore, otherwise, at the level of the hermeneutic circle the metaphorical is only one ingredient in this process of simulation/re-simulation of the possible-actual configuration of the life-world. A sense of reality being a multi-modal meeting of expected modalities and our circumvention, in this regard, of a representational world of correspondences between the so-called worlds of the 'external' and the 'internal'. But let me examine this subtlety of intent later in this same section of this essay and now concentrate my attention on the role of metaphor in the more traditional metaphorical depiction of the Divine. (82)

	Should we see the Divine, through the eyes of a theologian, as some form of personification writ large or as an institution seen through a lens of personification? Just as we might say an institution has 'a life of its own' do we need to treat this existential observation literally and go on to speculate about the Divine as a Person?. It was argued that the Divine, through its incorporation of human minds within its ambit, could not escape therein being institutional in nature, and, just as an institution is run by individuals in a corporate fashion so too we must dismiss therein all sense of a literal personification. That to do so would result in a metaphorical mistake through deploying the metaphorical in a manner both beyond the level and nature of its metaphorical deployment? On the other hand, the very sense of human agency itself could equally be dismissed as merely corporate in nature being, similarly, the emergent result of various faculties cooperating within the epistemological hierarchy (such a physical embodied sense of self, an emotional sense of self, visual sense of self, a perceptual sense of self, a judgmental sense of self, an ethical sense of self, etc., etc.). Thence, we should, perhaps, take a middle position in this type of question. Let me look more closely, therefore, in this regard, at the use of theological metaphor (to describe some sense of the Divine as a Divine Person or otherwise). (83)

	Various metaphors are used in traditional theologies in order to 'define' the sense, meaning and meaningfulness of the Divine. Some of them are ostensively non-personal in nature, e.g., like a rock, like light, like the air, like a tree, etc. But a closer examination should reveal, more often than not, a personal-like dimension being articulated through the use of metaphor that reinforce that type of perception. E.g., we could examine the use of a metaphor using a 'rock' image set up to be construed as a solid place to place your faith, build your trust, etc. But in putting our trust in this objective the metaphor is not just suggesting that this 'support' is merely dependable but is also a sense of 'refuge' that is 'aware' of your existential predicament and can return that trust as trust qua trust! E.g., we could examine the use of a metaphor using a 'light' image which could well be set up to be construed to mean that it is a party to truth, wisdom, insight, revelation, enlightenment, etc., and, on further extrapolation, to imply that the same can be a 'giver of truth' and through revelation, in some form or other, can 'assist a person' to realize this same realizer of truth from whom such insight has been donated, supplied, facilitated, etc., by this donor of 'light'. Or, a personalization and personification of the metaphor may be intended without being taken too literally (as in Buddhist philosophy in its treatment of such terms like nirvana. But that seems to be more the exception? In time subverted by such personification to be read in a more literal manner?). (84)

	Although some metaphors could be used in a non-personal, non-personified manner overall the tendency is for the metaphorical to be construed as analoguing the divine equivalent of a person and/or a group of people and/or a collective sense of a religious institution and/or a trans-personal sense of deity, i.e., some non-metaphorical sense of personality. In a non-absolutist, Absolute philosophy this metaphorical process of ascription is recognized as analogical in nature and analogical in extent. Often strings of epithets, often of a negative theological flavour, but also positive, surround their theological topic and therein define almost through induction the sense of that expression in their religious mapping of the life-world without, at the same time, being treated literally. On the other hand, in an absolutistic vision of religious reality the metaphorical is literally cashed out to mean non-metaphorically what appears to be introduced metaphorically. But this type of abuse must fail! A metaphorical device is a metaphorical device and should not be treated otherwise (without advancing good and cogent reasons). On the other hand, in the context of the hermeneutic circle metaphor appear 'to directly metaphor' the very nature and reality of the life-world. How are we to deal with this apparent contradiction between the metaphorical nature of metaphor and the direct access we appear to be given through them, in the context of the hermeneutic circle, to the phenomenal fabric of the life-world whether inspired religiously or non-religiously?? (85)

	In the wake of the historically successful deconstruction of the representationalistic view of the world the literalization of the inherent metaphor of correspondence has been shown to be patent nonsense. Along with it the ideas of an ‘external world(s)’ and ‘internal worlds’ have also been shown to be philosophically untenable! Such metaphor may appear to work metaphorically they cannot be treated literally in a critical philosophical inquiry! Critically conducted transcendental phenomenological, hermeneutical and existential styles of research should show why such non-coherent notions were misunderstood and utilized beyond the limits of their metaphorical deployment. For instance, although all forms of perception are conducted in and through an embodied state from a certain point of view or points of view this fact does not entitle us, however, to adopt the apparent reality of an ‘external world’ of perceptual object-states versus an ‘internal world’ inhabited by some sense of self and that other sentient states inhabit their own ‘internal worlds’ in their own right for in this form of mis-treatment we have literally over-extended the metaphor involved in this ‘picture of the world’ and have also claimed more than we should be entitled to in the solipsistic light of this mis-treatment of the metaphorical. What we are entitled to argue for is the one transcendental world of the life-world wherein all forms of relational engagement take place despite the fact that all intentional acts of perception are necessarily aspectival in their phenomenal nature. Furthermore, from this guarantee of “the life-world being-there-for-us” there can be no absolute dichotomy between subjectivity versus intersubjectivity and v.v., and, between subjectivity versus objectivity, and v.v., and, between objectivity and intersubjectivity, and v.v. Indeed, being in one world-of-life means there can be no absolute barriers within and between intentional subjects and the world of intentional object-states as they appear to present-themselves-there-before-us! This lack of an absolute barrier does not mean, however, that particular forms of resistance or a relative opaqueness/translucency cannot interpose themselves between us and that of which the intentional object-state directly intends. Being transcendentally immersed in one sea of the life-world means that all intentionality is directly engaged with its intentional objectivity, and, it follows from this fact of our swimming in this one world-of-life that all forms of subjectivity are also equally transparent, or more correctly, translucent before us and each other! Furthermore, in light of the phenomenological fact that this simulation in intentional consciousness has to be re-iterated for some moments in time in order to arise before our conscious awareness it follows that such simulation, indeed, all forms of intentional simulation, must be forms of re-simulation! But, that being the case, how can we discriminate between mere processes of an indirect re-iterated resimulation and the novelty of directly engaged processes of re-simulation? The point of this concern is to inquire how we can discriminate between processes of resimulation where we have no current 'direct' access to the intentional object-state under re-focus and the direct intentional objectivity that was experienced in processes of re-simulation wherein novel processes of simulation are once again being currently re-simulated in order to appear before current intentional awareness; a discriminative state complicated by the facts that processes of resimulation are also being re-simulated before current intentional awareness, and, that processes of re-simulation also involve the exercise of meta-textual forms of genre invocation, and therein processes of textual resimulation, in order to make sense of those intentional processes. With processes of direct re-simulation also investing in meta-textual/textual processes of resimulation, and, processes of indirect resimulation being exercised in and through processes of currently experienced re-simulation, one must ask if such a distinction between 'direct' re-simulation and 'indirect' resimulation could actually be entertained (theoretically, practically and critically)? It is my belief that in transcendental intuition (discerned in transcendental reflection, i.e., a critical phenomenological-hermeneutical-existential treatment of judgmental processes of reflection) we can, indeed, make this distinction between the 'direct' and the 'indirect' (and in the process obviate the need for a correspondence type of philosophical position in this determination of 'reality'). To this end let me propose and explain the following four-part scheme to assist us in these types of determinations. (86)

         Direct Re-Simulation		                     Indirect Resimulation

	1.  Virtual					3.   Virtual

	2.   Non-Virtual				4.   Non-Virtual

	Let me introduce, explain and argue for the following types of discrimination as present by the above scheme. 

1.	In virtual direct re-simulation we have the experience of a presently iterated phenomenological construct (or set of constructs) being re-simulated in the currency of actual consciousness and its processes of re-simulation. As all phenomenological constructs are reconstructed through the adoption and adaptation of genre or genres of intentional activity it follows that in their being resimulated that from the retrieval of their currently reconstituted sense, their location in our subjective-intersubjective psychic mapping of the life-world must also be apparent. Therefore, we should be aware (on transcendental examination through critical reflection upon processes of discriminative judgment) of the present current/ past origins of their original re(-)simulation now currently being subjected to re-iteration and closer scrutiny. In meeting with virtual constructs the promise of their ostensive genre is not satisfactorily met. In other words our modal expectations as normally pertain to that genre, set of genres or hybrid genre are not fully or adequately realized. E.g., in reflective thinking during a current dream experience of eating an apple the virtual experience of that dream (through an inability to fully satisfy all modal expectations normally associated with apple eating) one is able to ascertain, given this degree of necessarily present degree of psychic gestalt-integrity (for there to be this relatively ‘vivid’ image) that one is only directly dealing with a virtual apple-like experience and not directly with a non-virtual apple experience.
2.	In non-virtual direct re-simulation we have the experience of currently iterated phenomenological constructs (or set of constructs) being re-simulated in the currency of actual consciousness and its processes of re-simulation. In this determination of sense we find we recognize that we are dealing directly with the intentional object-states currently being re-simulated as fully intended. E.g., I am thinking about and enjoying this apple that I am currently eating.
3.	In virtual indirect resimulation we have the experience of previously iterated phenomenological constructs having been resimulated once more as ‘currency’ of a  contemporary consciousness without transcendental evidence of those intentional object-states meeting a full or adequate modal satisfaction that would have been expected if those phenomenal states of affairs were true to their apparent face-value (as a meta-textual genre of expected activity). E.g., in my thinking about that time when I dreamt I was riding a bright pillar-box red alpha romeo knowing perfectly well at the same time, at the time of this dream, that I was merely dreaming and hence my current memory of this past occasion has defined this experience as a virtual resimulation. Hence the resimulated nature of those virtual constructs. Furthermore, I am aware in re-imagining this dream that I am dealing ostensively, in the light of this awareness, with the origins of this set of experiences; that, in effect, I recognize that I am only dealing with virtually indirect resimulations (that would not have met a full modal satisfaction of expectations - e.g., any attempt on my part to sell ‘this car’ in the 'real' world should meet with a complete failure, etc.). I.e., I am dealing with the past passive content of a process of intentional consciousness that then only directly dealt with a virtual intentional state of affairs (as realized through the recognition of an inadequate, unsatisfactory meeting with a full complement of modal expectations normally associated and expected with that genre or genres of activity under examination).
4.	In non-virtual indirect resimulation we have the experience of a previously iterated non-virtual phenomenological construct (or set of constructs) having been re-simulated in the currency of a then actual consciousness and its processes of re-simulation. E.g., I remember last week that I successfully sold my second-hand alpha romeo for a small profit. This intentional object was experienced in a non-virtual manner and as then being resimulated in the imaginative consciousness of memory as a (sixth order) fact - our understanding being currently aware of those non-hybrid or hybrid 'origins' normally associated with that genre or hybrid genre. 
Hence in this scheme classifications 1. & 2. are process-orientations dealing respectively with virtual and non-virtual intentional object-states, and, classifications 3. & 4. are dealing with the past passive content of processes initially belonging to the first two classifications as just noted. (87)

	This scheme prepared and applied within a theological setting can now be used to re-examine those types of religious experience involving the interaction of some form of divine personality being interpretatively experienced by that religious aspirant apparently entertaining the same (or, for that matter, any other type of experience whether religious or non-religious in classification). By these means allowing them to determine, hopefully, the compositional orientation of that phenomenal object-state as either direct or indirect in its simulated origins, and, virtual or non-virtual in the phenomenal nature of its content. Of course, as previously noted, hypothetically, the experience of a sense of divine personality need not imply the fact of their being a divine person being non-virtually experienced in that relationship nor, at the same time, impugn the religious nature of that experience  (since, hypothetically, a valid religious experience with a sense of personal interaction could still be obtained without their being a person-to-person style of interaction taking place; as might be envisaged in a monistic style of philosophy, e.g.). (88)

	How do we determine this matter of intent, the nature of our intentionally re-directed consciousness? When we focus on the metaphorical qua metaphorical we are focusing meta-textually upon the metaphorical. It is that particular genre of activity that is being re-adopted and re-adapted hence the re-direction of our intentionality to this new type of intentional state of affairs currently tracing out and depositing that type of intentional text and its set of parallel co-textual depositions. So, if I am thinking about the metaphorical qua metaphorical I an concentrating a greater proportion of my intentional consciousness on that meta-textually determined type of text and its set of parallel co-textual depositions. E.g., I am looking at the full moon and thinking – yes it does look like a pale, round cheese. My perceptual thinking is changing its complexion and taking on an increased metaphorical nature. Then, in this shifting of attention, I am thinking about a certain text, a poem about the moon… how I would like to write one too on this topic… and decide to take a photo of the same to remind me my memories of this beautiful full moon… entertaining certain feelings, moods and emotions… later writing a poem about this very moment. In other words, our intentionality creates a set of parallel texts of an unequal import to us and never the mere deposition of a unique text even though, for the most part, we overlook this abundance of parallel co-texts. (89)

	The recognition of this matter of intent, determined meta-textually, then allows us to ask these questions as to whether our intellectual or perceptual processes, etc., are merely in conformity with habit or striking out into new territory, and, then, are those meta-textual modal expectations adequately met on an object/textual level? By these means determining overall intentional constructive re-simulation and/or resimulation. Carried on in a religious investigation, from an examination of its deposited co-texts, we can then ask ourselves was the interpretation put forward satisfactory in itself and satisfactorily met in the meta-textual nature of its expected modal experience or set of interlinked expectations along with such differential questions of virtuality/non-virtuality, directness/indirectness (etc.)? First however, we need to map out a topology of divinity in order to more correctly ascertain under what classification/s our modal expectations might find themselves at home to some degree or other. Before I do this let me sum up the nature of the relationship between the metaphorical and the re-simulation of the life-world, i.e., just what trans-metaphorical value has metaphor as we make our way though this one-world-of-life? Then, let me articulate in a systematic theological scheme, to that extent currently possible, just what types of divinity might exist in order to ascertain the appropriate set of modal expectations one should expect hold with respect to the type of classification being entertained… in the process determining what sort of ‘theological work’ would (need to) be done within (and between) these various theological classifications (and what evidential conditions must met in the transcendental and non-transcendental constitution of experience in order to confirm the non-ideal nature of such a classification assuming its apparent exemplification can be validly engaged) . (90)

	It should be realized that there is no ultimate distinction to be made between the merely metaphorical and the simulated nature of re-simulation. Only in matters of intent do we focus our attention on one aspect of our topic… the other aspect or aspects… or something else…. Hence, metaphor do actually ‘metaphor’ the life-world. On the other hand, if our intent is intently directed upon the metaphorical then this phenomenal/phenomenological aspect of the hermeneutic circle is being focused upon at the expense of the other two moments of the hermeneutical and the existential. The implicit loss of a critical transcendental suspension at this juncture opening us up to the full distortions of the non-critical nature of the natural attitude. Only through an overall transcendental suspension being critically put in place at the centre of the hermeneutic circle can we properly and appropriately re-simulate this one-world-of-life and therein directly engage the same effectively without the psychotic and/or psychotic-like distortions attendant upon the egological proclivities of that subject (entertained with respect to that topic under review)! Hence it is through the egological purification of intent in and through the ongoing overall transcendental suspension that all research should be advanced whether theological or non-theological in orientation! The ongoing overall transcendental suspension guaranteeing both the directness of our mission and the accuracy of its critical self-validation to that extent our powers of comprehension within the hermeneutic circle can be critically exercised with all due respect to the limitations imposed upon us by virtue of our being human…! On the other hand, being able to question means we should also be able, in the fullness of time, to also ascertain those natural limitations to be found imposed upon the very constitution of our being as a person-before-others in this one-world-of-life… and, from the perspective of a theologian… as a person-before-the-Divine (in what ever form or forms both that objective and relationship might take or might not take!)..!? (91)

	In an examination of the possible surplus of theological value generated above and beyond the merely metaphorical let us now investigate the full range of modal expectations that would sensibly be expected with each classification if treated as non-virtual and directly obtainable in intentional consciousness. In the process, hypothetically, no longer treating the concept of the Divine, and experience of the Divine, as a mere concept, as a mere analogy or set of analogies. (92)

D:  On the Possibility of Finding Theological Value? – Doing Theological Work!

	Hypothetically, the range of possible	theological options would fall within a relatively pre-determined set, in number, of classifications ranging from a highly personal-like account to the utterly impersonal whilst still remaining theological in orientation. Also, using our observations on the institutional-like nature of some forms of reality let me suggest the following ad hoc scheme in order to exhibit this rather natural typology for closer examination, e.g.:

1.	A sense of person with an overall sense of personality,
2.	A set of persons with their own senses of personality
3.	An institution that possesses a sense of personality/personalities
4.	An institution with no sense of personality
5.	A set of institutions with a sense of personality/personalities
6.	A set of institutions with no sense of personality
7.	A monistic collectivity with a sense of personality/personalities
8.	A monistic collectivity with no sense of personality
9.	A collectivity with no overall sense of personality (92)

	A more systematic presentation noting the following options:

Namely…

1.	A non-personal concentration of epistemological organization
2.	As a full sense of person
3.	As a set of persons
4.	As an institution
5.	As a set of institutions
6.	As a monistic collectivity

With…

a.	No sense of personality
b.	A sense of personality
c.	A set of personalities

Giving us in total 18 ‘possible’, non-absolute options. (93)

	I use the expression “non-absolute” to note that these categories need not be exclusive of each other, indeed cannot be! E.g., as the Divine must be phenomenal in some form or other in order to directly and/or indirectly participate and engage in this one-world-of-life it follows that ‘they’ must be embodied and that the same could be treated, in that perspective, as a non-personal concentration of epistemological organization in this regard. Similarly, the Divine could manifest as like a person, indeed as the very people we meet around us or could meet around us, but, that does not rule our the Divine also taking a more corporate and/or collective nature at the same time. Indeed, by a reversed ontological argument, namely, that as the individual possibilities of each category cannot be dismissed as ‘a mere possibility’ it follows that they each must take up existence in some form or other, and, that as the same can never be treated as a mere possibility it follows, therefore, rightly, that one should insist that each individual theologian should formulate their vision of a theology taking every possible category positively into account in this regard! However, in this type of task it would be natural for different theologians to privilege different formulations at the relative expense of others in the light of facing different priorities, problema, different ways of seeing the multiform roles of the Divine, etc. Thus, this necessary recipe does not necessarily imply the uniform production of a monotonously repetitive monolithic theology! (94)

	In the cut and thrust of theological formulation what is one allowed to propose and what is one not allowed to propose? (95)

	In this section of this essay, in working my way through these types of issues, I would like to summarize the following points. First, the concepts behind what ever theological proposals being put forward need to be non-self-contradictory, or if apparently contradictory they would stand in need of a process of resolution; some way of circumnavigating, logically and/or dialectically, those paradoxes, aporias, dilemmas, contradictions, crossed-purposes, etc. Second, these same proposals also need to cohere within our greater cultural and trans-cultural understanding of the phenomenal nature of the life-world. Third, although this formulation cannot be reduced to a mere metaphorical simulation, still, at the same time, the reality depicted by its representation will be expressed in that same form and format, which, if reviewed through the auspices of an appropriately conducted overall transcendental suspension, should critically determine for us as to whether it is virtual or non-virtual in the re-presentation of that content as viewed in the light of our meeting with the expected fulfillment of modalities as dictated by the nature of its meta-textual genre if and when they should find an adequate re-simulation in experience. Fourth, all theological formulations should promise a satisfactory degree of theological work or value, i.e., sense, meaning and meaningfulness, in and through the import of those formulations. Moreover, this theological work cannot be restricted to univocal vision of the Divine despite any desire on the part of that formulator to privilege or discount various co-aspects of the overall concept of the Divine as conceptually schematized in the course of this essay along with any other generally non-contradictory, coherent, metaphorically entertainable conceptions of the same. In this manner ruling in all viable concepts of the Divine and ruling out all non-viable variants. (96)

	Having outlined, in essence, where a theologian must end, with a recognition of due limitations attendant upon the difficult and controversial nature of this topic let me ask “where does the aspiring theologian begin?” (97)

	To answer such a rhetorical question let me briefly respond in the following fashion. The philosopher, theologian and/or layperson should begin, as in all processes of research, with what can be found to hand, namely, traditional formulations of this topic whether positive and/or negative in an appreciation of their expectations, i.e., beginning with their own religious prejudices as forms of pre-judgment and anticipation. So, the Christian should begin with traditional Christian formulations as reflecting their own denominational point of view, and, the Moslem with traditional Islamic formulations in a similar vein, and, in turn, the Buddhist, etc., etc. Even the agnostically-oriented should begin on that same ground as found familiar for them. Much of private religious thinking is not only a reflection of cultural prejudices but also of their emotional and intellectual makeup and background, etc. as experienced by that particular individual. A journey of exploration always begins beneath one’s own feet and undergoing this type of task in this regard, metaphorically, is no different! (98)

	In subjecting private interpretations of religious cultural thinking and cultural interpretations of private religious thinking to such an open-ended scrutiny will, in the goodness of time, expose them to even greater subtleties of philosophical thought and value in this regard, and hopefully, those experiential grounds, should they exist, that would allow us to refine and re-define (the methodology of) this approach and therein allow us to further appreciate what evidential grounds might exist or not exist for matching this or that reasonable idea of the Divine with that directly entertained in current non-virtual experience. Or, so, hypothetically, as argued, this task by a reversed ontological argument, must find itself open to us to some degree or other, in some format or other… as already witnessed in prior formulations of the Divine (as overtly and/or covertly found present in more traditional beliefs to that extent with the four transcendental conditions as sketched in this section!)! (99)

4.    Conclusion

	Hence the apparently provocative nature of my subtitle: A Possible Ontology of the Divine - How Does the Divine Manifest Themselves?? This essay arguing, from a hypothetical point of view, that no theologian could argue for a non-equivocal, uni-vocal perspective and formulation on this topic for the above reasons! That, essentially, a religious philosophy would need to take into account some form of a complex theological complexion by virtue of the fact that this topic can no longer be dismissed as ‘merely hypothetical’ (although a neutral, hypothetical-like position of the overall transcendental suspension is still critically called for phenomenologically, hermeneutically and existentially!)! On the other hand, what one privileges and what one discounts in this regard is still the prerogative of the individual theologian, the philosopher and/or layperson. Although, it should also be noted, that from an ultimate point of view, to the extent that that can be envisaged, and it can be envisaged by the effective guarantee of the fact that there can only be one-world-of-life, all concatenations of power in this world have, must have, a theological-like flavour, and, at the same time, an absolute non-existence because it is only through the relativity of existence that phenomenal identity can emerge… thence even the divinity of divinity partakes of no absolute divine form… that the Divine is empty… nothing, or rather, Absolute Nothing!!! That, just as the human personality is without absolute substance so too must the Divine Form, in all its richness of complexion, be without an absolute substance! In the next essay let me discuss the ramifications this ultimate ‘death’ of God will have for the very authenticity of a religious consciousness (even in the very midst of this world-of-life with its apparent multi-form theological-like complexion!)…

for what is given with one hand is also taken away by the other…! (100)

							       Noël Tointon, Sydney, 26.10.03.

A Summary of the Major Points Presented by this Essay

1.	That, hypothetically, through this practice of the overall transcendental suspension, we find ourselves allowed to centre ourselves within the requisite dialogue as intentionally desired in order to continue and extend that particular conversation with the Divine [or non-Divine] in some manner or other … in the midst of all our conversations?? (4, 15)
2.	The thematization of significance, i.e., value (in and through an ongoing transcendental suspension) being produced/re-produced between the three ideal poles that constitute the hermeneutic circle(s) involved in all engaged relationships between parts and wholes, and v.v.,. (8)
3.	When all three suspension-types (operating at these three ideal moments within the hermeneutic circle) are fully operative and balanced with respect to each other we get an (ongoing) overall transcendental suspension through which judgment is more fully able to declare itself in and through the spontaneity of an act of judgment (on 'evidential' grounds pertaining to the nature of that judgment). (9)
4.	By "Absolute" is meant a certain transcendental style of doing philosophy, often, but not necessarily, of a religious persuasion wherein all theoretical, practical and critical ‘work’ is done under the auspices of an ongoing overall transcendental suspension. (19)
5.	A reversed ontological argument re Divine form. This type of argument invokes a logical form of necessity (on analytical and/or synthetical and/or transcendental a priori 'grounds'?). But, rather than arguing for Divine perfection, or similar, from the inability to think this impossible type of attribute we arrive at a qualified form of 'actual existence' in between the two impossible to obtain poles of ‘mere potentiality’ and ‘absolute actuality’. Then, ruling out those features that deconstruct some essential aspect of our conclusion, or the entire conclusion itself, we endeavour to arrive at a tentative conclusion that allows us to entertain, by the necessity of default, what others might have tried, and should fail, through the adoption of an ontological argument. (21)
6.	Hypothetically, that Divine content is to examined under the four headings of the non-self-contradiction of its value, the self-coherence of its value in the ambit of the life-world, its trans-metaphorical nature of its value, and, its possible possession of religious value. (29)
7.	In the reversed world of ontological reality and its dialectical manifestation of existence pure logical states no longer apply! Given that there can be no principle of pure identity then the principle of the excluded middle also can no longer apply? That being the case there can then be no pure contradiction! But a distinction between pure contradiction (in its impossible ideality) and non-pure contradiction (as a non-impossible ideality) should be noted! As the principle of identity is still maintained, albeit in an non-pure ideal state, it follows that contradiction can be maintained as long as it is expressed in a non-pure ideal form or format. Thus we arrive at a dialectical sense of a qualified sense of contradiction, and therein, a qualified sense of identity likewise. (30)
8.	Pure logical contradiction/s in the formulation of classical theistic conceptions of the Divine can be and should be completely dismissed! The formulation of such an impossible theology can bear no positive fruit for at no stage could it be understood and its misunderstanding equally can do it or the 'believer' no real positive service in this regard. (32)
9.	Non-pure logical contradiction is either resolved, left unresolved or conducted in a non-literal metaphorical mode. (31)
10.	Essentially, we cannot think without contradiction, but, the trick is in how we resolve such provocation!! Like two sides of a coin we meet somewhere, somehow, in the middle… in a coin that has currency (being neither illusory nor counterfeit!)? (37)
12.	It is through this (complex) concept of harmonization that we can now link the resolution of qualified contradiction with qualified coherence! Let me explain: …it is through ongoing harmonization that we have both the resolution of relatively 'internal', qualified self-contradiction and relatively 'external', qualified localized coherence and, thence, the existential manifestation of value! (38, 39)
13.	Coherence can be obtained without the absolute disappearance of identity, thence, the value of this concept. So "coherence", in a non-absolutist mode, is "relative-difference-in-the-midst-of-identity", i.e., qualified identity! (42)
14.	The concept of a localized coherence of the life-world is a way of describing the nature and limitations imposed upon that relationship under investigative focus. On the other hand a non-discriminating universal coherence established the all encompassing transcendental nature of the life-world. (43, 44)
15.	Another way of approaching this concept of localized coherence is to try to understand the existential richness of identity in the identification and examination of a particular logical subject when that logical subject is agentally oriented in its epistemological organization, i.e., it is an egological subject in some form or other. Just how does an individual find value in their passage through the life-world, what is that valuation of self-identity, and, how is such value augmented and lost (assuming a transient differential in this regard?)? In this research I will argue that through an existentialization of the relatively non-existential there is augmentation of value that is reflected in the richness of personal identity experienced by that person. (45)
16.	This phenomenological vision of essence therefore implicates the following conceptual aspects, namely, a sense of essential centre definitively located in our hierarchically mapped vision of the life-world that essentially reflects how the constitution of the human psyche is itself ordered in its interpretative experience of this world-of-life. (52)
17.	This 'vision' of essence should not be reified through some form of an interpolated extrapolation beyond the frame of its presentation/re-presentation because to do this would be to commit a transcendental mistake and produce/re-produce therein a transcendental illusion (through going beyond the level and manner of deployment appropriate to our critical experience of the phenomenal qua phenomenal, etc., as would be realized in and through the utilization of the overall transcendental suspension)! (54)
18.	The concept of a transient differential assumes that a relationship, certainly one that could be directly engaged in the life-world, possesses a degree of localized existential coherence whose value is either augmented or diminished in time. (55)
19.	The degree of existence a relationship exhibits, and its differentials/integrations of the same, is correctly the degree to which it finds itself epistemologically ordered hierarchically. This can be approached by investigating its harmonization, localized coherence or integration, the degree to which that state of affairs has been vaginated or re-invaginated, or, modally enhanced or diminished. (56)
20.	Within the ambit of each relationship power is only discharged through the appropriate forms of pre-conditional/conditional cooperative permission. Then, for power to be discharged and transmitted in a multi-relational setting we need a more epistemologically organized form of permission , i.e., super-cooperative permission since the same dynamics that occur within a relationship are essentially the same as occurs between relationships. (68)
21.	In general terms of reference I would like to call this process of cooperative permission-seeking a co-re-complexification, playing on the word 'complex' as involving both 'a more complex situation in view of that transmission of power' and 'the fact that this is done through the unity and integrity of a 'complex' qua as 'a' complex'. In reverse, this could be seen as a relative de-complexification. (68)
22.	That, all transcendental theological investigations and all theological speculations must take this limited, mutual complexification of power into account whenever dealing with matters of identity, localized coherence, value, recognition, etc., in essence the complete entirety of any topic, whatever the nature of its domain, must be constituted in this fashion. (68)
23.	Now, re-examining this distinction between 'authentic' and 'inauthentic', as just noted, we can now make a refinement in the definition of the same by adding the 'phenomenological observation' that authenticity of spirit (as the spirit of an authentic process of judgment) is only realized to that extent an overall transcendental suspension is effectively engaged (through the refinement of those core-existential processes already to hand) (75)
24.	In effect, perceiving every relationship and every sub-relational facet as possessing their own relatively unique existential descriptors! That, in our examination of the content of the Divine this aspect of coherence within the life-world needs to be taken into account in order to understand the 'apparent' quantum/relativistic dichotomy central to all relationships in their directly engaged manifestations, and, the nature of value and the implications this has for determination of the real or factual, the ideal or essential, the aesthetical, ethical , practical and interrelational or environmental, etc., along with value forged from a more overall perspective of the spiritual (defined, previously, as an existential excess of value)! (77)
25.	Metaphor simulate, i.e., therefore from the verb ‘to metaphor’ they 'metaphor' and hence allow us direct access to this phenomenal world of re-simulation because of the trans-linguistic nature realized through the collective-integrity of the hermeneutic circle. (80)
26.	To what extent does the metaphorical actually metaphor this world-of-life, directly simulate/re-simulate it? In a short answer let me suggest that this is a matter of intent: when we are being metaphorical then the selective likeness between comparatively treated phenomena comes to the fore, otherwise, at the level of the hermeneutic circle the metaphorical is only one ingredient in this process of simulation/re-simulation of the possible-actual configuration of the life-world. A sense of reality being a multi-modal meeting of expected modalities and our circumvention, in this regard, of a representational world of correspondences between the so-called worlds of the 'external' and the 'internal'. (82)
27.	Indeed, being in one world-of-life means there can be no absolute barriers within and between intentional subjects and the world of intentional object-states as they appear to present-themselves-there-before-us! This lack of an absolute barrier does not mean, however, that particular forms of resistance or a relative opaqueness/translucency cannot interpose themselves between us and that of which the intentional object-state directly intends. (86)
28.	In transcendental intuition we are able to relatively discern processes of direct re-simulation of the virtual and the non-virtual, and, the content of indirect resimulation of the virtual and the non-virtual (where by ‘non-virtual’ is meant the full or adequate meeting of modal expectations normally associated with the genre of activity under examination, and, where ‘virtual’ means those conditions have not been satisfactorily met). (87)
29.	A more systematic presentation of a (traditional) topology of the Divine noting the following options: Namely…

1.	A non-personal concentration of epistemological organization
2.	As a full sense of person
3.	As a set of persons
4.	As an institution
5.	As a set of institutions
6.	As a monistic collectivity…

With…

a.	No sense of personality
b.	A sense of personality
c.	A set of personalities…giving us in total 18 ‘possible’, non-absolute options. (93)
30.	All theological formulations should promise a satisfactory degree of theological work or value, i.e., sense, meaning and meaningfulness, in and through the import of those formulations. Moreover, this theological work cannot be restricted to univocal vision of the Divine despite any desire on the part of that formulator to privilege or discount various co-aspects of the overall concept of the Divine as conceptually schematized in the course of this essay along with any other generally non-contradictory, coherent, metaphorically entertainable conceptions of the same. In this manner ruling in all viable concepts of the Divine and ruling out all non-viable variants. (96)
31.	Where does the aspiring theologian begin?” To answer such a rhetorical question let me briefly respond in the following fashion. The philosopher, theologian and/or layperson should begin, as in all processes of research, with what can be found to hand, namely, traditional formulations of this topic whether positive and/or negative in an appreciation of their expectations, i.e., beginning with their own religious prejudices as forms of pre-judgment and anticipation. A journey of exploration always begins beneath one’s own feet and undergoing this type of task in this regard, metaphorically, is no different! (97, 98)
32.	Hence the apparently provocative nature of my subtitle: A Possible Ontology of the Divine - How Does the Divine Manifest Themselves?? This essay arguing, from a hypothetical point of view, that no theologian could argue for a non-equivocal, uni-vocal perspective and formulation on this topic for the above reasons! That, essentially, a religious philosophy would need to take into account some form of a complex theological complexion by virtue of the fact that this topic can no longer be dismissed as ‘merely hypothetical’ (although a neutral, hypothetical-like position of the overall transcendental suspension is still critically called for phenomenologically, hermeneutically and existentially!)! On the other hand, what one privileges and what one discounts in this regard is still the prerogative of the individual theologian, the philosopher and/or layperson. Although, it should also be noted, that from an ultimate point of view, to the extent that that can be envisaged, and it can be envisaged by the effective guarantee of the fact that there can only be one-world-of-life, all concatenations of power in this world have, must have, a theological-like flavour, and, at the same time, an absolute non-existence because it is only through the relativity of existence that phenomenal identity can emerge… thence even the divinity of divinity partakes of no absolute divine form… that the Divine is empty… nothing, or rather, Absolute Nothing!!! That, just as the human personality is without absolute substance so too must the Divine Form, in all its richness of complexion, be without an absolute substance! 

for what is given with one hand is also taken away by the other…! (100)