The
Transcendental Dimension Of The Absolute
And
The Absolute Dimension Of The Transcendental

Synopsis of paper

	In this paper the structure of the philosophical and religious concept of the absolute is examined. The sense of the absolute is defined as not some form of exultant phenomenon but rather as a complex tri-partite structure that consists of a double negation through an inwardly directed reflection upon our powers of reflection themselves. This stratification of meaning introduces us to a transcendental interpretation of the absolute. 
	In order to develop an absolute philosophy certain pre-conditions must be met, e.g. a meta-critical approach in its critical treatment of positive religious/philosophical traditions, along with the correct establishment of this tri-partite structure of the essential, judgmental and transcendental. An absolute philosophy was described as analytical, phenomenologically influenced, systematic, critical, transcendental and pre-suppositionally orientated. It was also characterized by the use of the via negativa which through the structure of a double negation was effectively affirmational reinterpreting positive traditional philosophical and religious terminology from a transcendental-absolute point of view. 
	At the end of the paper it was suggested that the pre-suppositional ground of Husserl's philosophical position was effectively that of an absolute philosophy. A comparison between the exercise of the transcendental reduction and the use of the via negativa was briefly outlined to suggest that a strong affinity could be found in this regard.

				   Noël Tointon,(Macquarie University).

The
Transcendental Dimension Of The Absolute
And
The Absolute Dimension Of The Transcendental

Introduction

	In my reading of Husserl I have become intrigued by his use of the terms absolute and transcendental and would like to describe much of his phenomenology as absolute philosophy in the way I would wish to define this term. Currently I am involved in doing research in just this type field for my thesis, being a comparative examination of the contemporaneous Graeco-Roman Neoplatonic and the Indian Buddhist-Wisdom Traditions. Between these two traditions and the philosophy of Edmund Husserl I find many interesting parallels. However, rather than demonstrate this aspect with respect to Husserl I would like to investigate some of the essential features I believe can be found between these two earlier traditions and leave it to some other occasion to demonstrate in detail, successfully or otherwise, an element of isomorphism or symmetry between all three parties. Before concluding this paper I shall merely indicate the grounds for this later investigation that, if illuminating, might throw some light on the type of presuppositional position that would appear to be maintained by Husserl?

The Structure Of The Absolute In Absolute Philosophy

	In this paper I wish to explore and examine the structure of the philosophical and religious concept of the Absolute in so far as it could be indirectly thought and might be directly experienced. Absolute philosophy that correctly deals with the sense of the absolute as an absolute, and not as some form of exultant phenomenon, has I believe slipped onto the stage of human intellectual history around the start of the present era. Although a number of fine thinkers foreshadowed this event this type of complex philosophy necessitates a systematic approach in its critical dealing with the presuppositional ground of philosophical and non-philosophical thought. An absolute philosophical position arises when certain specific preconditions are met, namely, the prior development of an academic-like environment that is able to critically reflect upon a history of controversial topics encountered in its examination of one or more positive theological/religious traditions or backgrounds, the desire to systematize and harmonize the research of such a critical philosophical position, along with an examination of the presuppositional ground that underpins an epistemological framework adopted by that school or tradition. Effectively an absolute philosophy in its intentions is analytical, self-critical, systematic and focuses essentially upon the presuppositional in its fundamental inquiry. Under the light of such a project an interest is entered into with respect to the correlative senses of the immanent and the transcendent, although not necessarily formulated, analysed and exhibited with the same shared degree in emphasis. Conducted systematically critical analysis adopts a profound emphasis upon the use of the via negativa reinterpreting and retranslating traditional religious and philosophical terminology. Under such deconstruction insight is allowed to reconstruct a new way of seeing things, albeit from a transcendental-like point of view. 
	An absolute philosophy that correctly concentrates on the absolute as the ground or grounds of phenomenal existence cannot allow itself to be carelessly transformed into some form of relative phenomenalism or relativity. On the other hand it is also necessary for the absolute philosopher to show the manner and nature of the relationship that should also exist between the Relative and the Absolute. Traditionally the resolution of this philosophical tension is conducted through the use of a number of interrelated techniques the most dramatic of which assumes the form of a grand equation where an equivalence is adopted between all fundamental dichotomies. Under such an arrangement all parties, i.e. all major philosophical distinctions, are treated as equal in their reference, but, where such equality can only be seen from the transcendental point of view, i.e. the absolute point of view. Let us assume for the present that these two terms of the transcendental and the absolute have an identical reference. Other techniques involved in an attempt to resolve this tension between the Absolute and the Relative are e.g. the use of a plurality of descriptively based names that metaphorically try to surround the Absolute but do not of themselves restrict, capture or entail the same. Almost in reaction to this sea of nominatives is the clean and thorough sweep of the via negativa applied in a critical and systematic fashion often denying in the very same breath, in which these exulted names were invoked, that they were ever truly uttered. A relationship between Absolute and Relative can also be suggested through the mediation between these two spheres by essence or i.e. essential structures.
	The presence of this relationship between Absolute and Relative is often indicated through the critical retreatment this type of philosophy places upon its interpretation of essential structures found in traditional pre-absolute philosophical discourse. In this paper I shall begin my investigation into the structural sense of the absolute through an examination of its introduction and mediation via the use of essence and the subsequent transcendence of the same.
	Accompanying this emphasis upon the grounds of the phenomenal appears an interest in the essential structures that phenomenologically seem to constitute all types of general events. Moreover, in a search for the sense of the absolute, or Absolute (when treated in a religious mode), the essence of those essential structures are themselves made the object of a deeper more fundamental inquiry, an inquiry that in effect seeks to answer the question "what is the essence of essence?" In this fashion the plurality of essence is reduced at one stroke to a uniform medium, namely the absolute. The product of this type of reduction traditionally masquerades behind a plethora of names and qualifications that intimate a meaningfulness above and beyond that vigorously and starkly articulated through an exacting use of the via negativa as it negates its passage through this glut of language. Indeed, the systematic application of the via negativa is, I believe, a characteristic feature of an absolute philosophy. In a religious context as a religious-like practice it ceases to be merely a negative exercise in ostensively skeptical or destructive criticism taking on instead the mantel of a method that allows our introduction to a more direct experiential-like encounter and existential response to the very nature of reality itself (as it is able to present itself to us despite the limitations of the finite human condition). Textually we are told that this discovery or revelation of the absolute, or Absolute, is assisted through or effected by the use of meditation, contemplation, prayerfulness, phenomenalistic reduction or some other form of reflection and this aspect is also an important ingredient in the formulation of an absolute philosophy. 
	It would appear that this type of philosophy having reduced the particularity of the experience to its essential encountering then goes on to further reduce this essential aspect to its pre-essential foundations. The judgment or the judgmental structures involved become primarily entertained as pure spontaneous acts of consciousness revealing in the process the synthetic uniqueness of its constituted and self-constituting a priori structures. In more simple terms the roots of judgment are exposed to reveal the fundamental presuppositional grounds of the transcendental, that dimension that is absolute and basic to our-living-in-this-world. Let us follow this up in some detail and lighten our labours in this regard through the use of the following analogy to image the manner in which the absolute and relative can be mediated by the presence of essence. The following questions are therefore being posed - "how is mediation possible between the diametrically opposed worlds of the Relative and the Absolute, what is the nature of the relationship between the Absolute and the Relative assuming such a relationship does exist, and can these two spheres be diametrically opposed?"
	Imagine, if you would, an early morning just before the dawn with a heavy frost on the grass beneath the trees. The sun slowly seems to rise above the eastern horizon and in the light of the new day the long shadows of the trees are marked out clearly upon the lawn, shortening as the sun progresses through the first half of the day. At noon the shadows seem to take some shelter beneath the canopy of each tree. 
	Here we have an interesting phenomenon, namely, a three dimensional tree casting a two dimensional shadow beneath each tree. Although the tree in its being in the world exerts itself visibly above the ground (through its trunk, branches and leaves) on the ground is cast a two-dimensional shadow that essentially depicts that tree. Between the shape of the shadow and the shape of the tree itself there is an element of isomorphism just as the shape of the shadow of that tree throughout the day also maintains some form of transformational invariance, i.e. between the trunk and branches with regard to its overall shape. In a similar fashion, metaphorically, we can envisage a relationship between the relatively three-dimensional world of the absolute (or Absolute if we give to it a religious sense of integral self-referentiality) and the lesser world of the relative. Indeed the Relative, i.e. the world of relativity, is often in this type of absolute philosophy itself referred to as a shadow. Interposed between these two worlds essential elements are introduced to mediate and effect some form of relationship, signifying that such a relationship does actually exist between the absolute and relative. Subject to disvaluation the Relative is seen as less real than essential elements, e.g. platonic forms, Buddhist dharmas, etc. whereas these essential structures in turn are treated as less real than the realm of the Absolute itself. Of course it is true to say that what exists either exists or does not exist. Here, the concept of reality has the additional aspect of power attached to it along with a sense of hierarchical stratification and status. In this type of schema the Absolute can be seen to be that which is more powerful, or that which is absolutely powerful. Interestingly enough in this type of world-view essential structures should not be viewed as merely static but also as dynamic and creative. Implicit in such constructions is also a strong connotational aspect of value in so far as that which has a greater proximity to the Absolute being seen as being more valuable, having more value and therefore being able to be declared by such a frame of reference to be more true and more real (with the same type of qualification as outlined above).
	Between these two disparate frames of reference, of the Absolute and the Relative, our metaphor of the shadow allows us to perceive the possibility of such a relationship as that effected through some form of essential mediation. Such an allusion, in the Neoplatonic context, had a long tradit-ion in the celebrated Platonic image of the cave. In the Buddhist context we find similar, and parallel, types of analogical imagery as utilized in the construction of the Neoplatonic world-view, e.g. that as entailed in dreaming, mirror-like reflections, magic, theatre, etc.
	With the advent of a more systematic formulation of the absolute position in philosophy this disvaluation of the relative world in time came to be also either explicitly or implicitly applied to the essential constructions themselves. In the formulation of an absolute position these essential constructions take on a more mediationally orientated role and in the process lost their previously intended absolute-like status. Moving beyond a framework centered on a miscellany of essential structures leads to their essential transcendence and opens up a new moment in the unfolding of philosophical criticism, i.e. that centered upon a transcendental point of view. This transcendental attitude is approached through a critique of that type of consciousness that reviews essential structures in both their static and dynamic aspects. This facet of conscious-ness is none other than that of judgment perceived in the very activity of the judgmental process itself. The exercise of judgmental consciousness necessitates the review and appreciation of comparative structures and the ability to determine the nature or essential character of those structures. The prime candidate for such a task must without doubt be concepts, i.e. conceptual structures or construct-ions. Only conceptual products of the mind can be added together and still remain potentially separable or extractable from the resulting synthesis or conceptual resultant. Most perceptual states cannot be so treated, emotional states merely add to or subtract from an affective state, motor-sensory levels in mental functioning being too primitive or blind in this regard, etc. Furthermore, as conceptual structures or constructions are themselves under review this type of consciousness cannot itself be conceptual in its essential nature. Being in the nature of an appreciation of conceptual processes it must be trans-conceptual in orientation, conceptual states being merely the raw material for the thematization of judgments although those judgmental processes can be conceptually treated post-judgmentally.
	The implication of this argument just outlined is that an understanding of the psychology of judgment would indirectly give us a better appreciation of the nature of the absolute as it happens to be treated by this type of philosophy. By analyzing the nature of judgmental consciousness we should reach, I believe, a better appreciation of the essential and thence through a contextual appreciation of the essential a deeper insight into the nature of the transcendental can be worked towards. Perceiving that the nature of the transcendental is trans-essential, a transcendence of the essential, we would therefore find ourselves at least heading in the right direction with our phenomenologically-orientated investigation into the nature of the essential. Fundamental to our understanding in this regard is a recognition of the important role exercised by reflection in the execution of judgment and to this task, in the form of a brief explication, we must now apply ourselves.
	Conscious thought is intentionally motivated. The conscious intellectual cognitive process of thought, as I would envisage to it to be, is a bi-polar structuralization superimposed upon the deeper complex construction, on many levels, of the pre-cognitive thematization of the thought itself. Thematization arises between the focalization of an essential component and its appropriately relevant field which in turn acts as an open-ended horizon when the significance giving of that field itself is subjected to a deeper scrutiny. Reflection is an appreciation of the same, as just described, from a trans-conceptual point of view and in turn is a bi-polar structure structured between that reflected upon and that from the point of view of the activity of the reflection itself. Basically we have two levels of apparent conscious psychological functioning, namely, that reflected upon and that level of consciousness that acts as a reflective ego or pole. This division of our mental labour expresses itself in the distinctive nature of reflection. On one hand we have a sense of self absorbed in the subject matter of the reflection and on the other a subjective sense of self detached from the subject matter of the reflection. An inability to be able to psychically stand back from that which we wish to appreciate would ensure that the discrimination of the act of judgment could not take place. Equally our inability to simultaneously be absorbed in the subject matter of our judgment would leave us finding ourselves with nothing to be reflected upon. A delicate balance between these two poles of detachment and absorption must be one of the necessary pre-conditions for the act of judgment to take place.
	At this point, I would believe, the introduction of another metaphorical image might better ground our investigations and demonstrate more easily the essential nature entailed in the terminological concepts of reflection and appreciation.
	I would like you to imagine, if you would, trekking through a tropical rain forest, a vast rain forest in its natural state, much as it has been for thousands of years and not yet devastated or prevented from devastation by the blind greed of shortsighted politicians. Now the geography of our forest is such that it is not perfectly flat, being a gentle rolling succession of small hills but surrounded in the far distance by a ring of high mountains. After a few days, if not a few hours, of pushing our way though its wet tangled mass of vegetation it would be easy to loose our sense of direction and the progress of our passage through it. We find no hill steep enough nor no clearing large enough to let us sight those distant mountains. As things stand we would be left with little information as to where we were. I am sure that we would have little recourse but to pick a relatively larger tree and climb up into its lofty branches in the hope that from its top we might view those distant mountains and thereby redetermine our position and our future path. 
	From the top of the tree we find a different world, a world of vast open spaces, a world of light that lets us put our entangled passage through the forest of the world below into some form of perspective.
	The moral of this metaphor is that to appreciate any particular thing we need to be able to stand back from it in order to contextually understand it. Moreover, appreciation necessitates some form of reflection structured on one hand between our absorption on that to be reflected upon and, on the other, that relatively detached point of view contextually appropriate to the type of reflection that needs to be entered into.
	Armed with such a field of insight we can make the following points of observation. Firstly, appreciation necessitates some form of reduction. In order to concentrate upon what was originally our intention in this matter we need to exclude out all of that which is not relevant to the task of our inquiry. Secondly, our first point implies that we must essentially concentrate as an activity upon that which is relevant to the process of our inquiry and seek out that content that might have some form of relevance within our terms of reference. Thirdly, our first two points imply that we must exclude all types of value-judgments made prior to our investigations so that our investigations may speak for themselves. Fouthly, from our model it is implied that we must balance our attention between that act of appreciation and that subject to that appreciation. That in the act of appreciation this presence of balance, when found to be present, would testify that the act of judgment in this regard was correctly on target. Moreover implicit in such a balance is the related balance between our perception of that being judged and our conceptual appreciation of the same, that in effect an equal freeplay to and from perceptual imagination and conceptual understanding was also being correctly entered into. Lastly, our phenomenological appreciation of the distinctive nature of the act of judgment would, I believe, reveal to us the following facets. That judgments, from the point of view of the judgment itself, are essentially trans-causal, trans-spatial, trans-temporal and trans-egotistical, i.e. manifest themselves as apparently self-willed or self-determined, non-spatially dependent in truth determination, spontaneous and non-historically dependent in truth determination and transcending a sense of self that is materially and conceptually orientated. Overall the essential character of judgment from the point of view of the judgment itself has an existential-like flavour manifesting a sense of the uniqueness of the moment, the intersubjectivity of good taste, the discernment of a critical clarity, the spontaneous creation of value, meaning and action, the discovery of appropriate behavioral responses, the self-determination of the individual, etc.
	An appreciation of the transcendental dimension is, I believe, discovered phenomenologically through a transcendence of this ability to appreciate essence, i.e. through an appreciation of our ability to conduct judgments, judgments seen from the point of view of the spontaneity of the judgmental process itself. The results of such a type of reflection, or double reflection, i.e. that reflection turned in upon the activity of reflection itself, would produce and reveal that more fundamental ground of self, other and world and their collective sense of unity as being, or indicating the sense of, the unconditioned absolute itself? Above all the unity and the sameness of the absolute are emphasized along with the sense of ground or grounding of the relative upon the absolute although this dependence is not one that can be directly described in positive terminology. What is the nature of this dependence? Can it highlight for us then by negative means the structure of the absolute as it is allowed to be appreciated before the conceptual understanding? To investigate these further questions let me introduce for examination a third analogy, that of ground as a metaphor for the absolute itself.
	In the metaphor of the three dimensional transcendental tree casting a two dimensional shadow the tree was symbolically given a priority of emphasis in ontological importance. In the following reversal of this image let us instead review the ground beneath the tree as being of a greater importance and having a priority over the vegetation upon it.
	Imagine, if you would, the expanse of the land is before us. Imagine that all is very dry and that above the land finally returns, after many years, a pattern of daily rains. In the soil a nascent seed springs to life and quickly grows to reveal a mighty tree. In due course it seeds, and in the goodness of time a forest makes for itself a home upon the face of the earth. However, after the course of some time, the rains once more fail, and the brittle stamp of death makes for itself a vast clearing letting the roaring sands of the desert wear away this once mighty forest, leveling it, grinding it down to the level of the plain itself. 
	As much as each tree exerts itself upon and above the ground in the final analysis the ground will see returned to itself what was taken from it in the first place. 
	The idea of ground in absolute philosophy, whether it be stated explicitly or left implicit, is worth examining. Embedded in such a concept are a number of symbolic aspects that analogically represent the nature of the relationship  between absolute and relative. The following aspects seem to be intended in such metaphorical language, namely, an ontological support for the relative, a basis for life, a material affinity in some form between the immanent nature of the relative (the things that grow) and the ground (upon which things are able to grow or be structured), the unity and infinity of ground, its transcendent structuralization, the featurelessness of the ground in itself, that a reduction of the relative eventually reveals, or moves us closer to a revelation of, the absolute as ground, etc. In the Buddhist Tradition this reduction can be expressed by the following formula as the realization that all is emptiness; an emptiness of the substance of self as an unchanging substructure to the personality, and an emptiness in non-personal reality of an unchanging substance or substances underlying the phenomenal flux of reality. For Plotinus reality is one, namely the One, that above all number, before all predication, etc. Both traditions affirm that reality has but one nature, an aspect that ordinary language cannot deal with. Systematic use of the via negativa analytically de-describes the basis upon which relative reality is structured (and constructed) by mind for mind. The result of such exhaustive negation would appear to confront us with some form of encounter with reality. This encounter is described as an experiential-like realization and recognition of the basic nature of reality, i.e. that reality prior to structuralization. This pre-structuraliz-ation is claimed to be re-discovered through a de-construct-ion of the natural structuralization imposed upon conscious processes and products. This does not dispose of a world of structure, construction, predication, relation, logic or value, etc. but brings to the mind's attention the funda-mental ground of just-being-in-this-world without dichoto-mously dividing it up into various forms and degrees of intellectual division. If all those items of our intellect-ual discrimination were truly distinct and separate then the sense of a world could not possibly present itself along with a distinctive sense of self and other. Therefore the very existence of this world of relativity is also a guarantee of the fact that the world cannot be purely conditioned, merely relative, but must be at root essentially the unconditioned as well. Comprehension of such an idea also recognizes the epistemological fact that it is through the very process of negation itself that discrim-ination can confront and affirm a world of relativity and all therein that appears to be conditioned. In a sense the systematic utilization of a via negativa is an essential recognition of this fact that only a via negativa can allow us to participate in this world through its discrimination of a-world-for-us-in-this-world. The Buddhist concept of emptiness recognizes this affirmational role of negation or double negation. 

And, being empty, they [dharmas] are also inexhaustible. And what is emptiness, that is also immeasurableness. Therefore then, according to ultimate reality, no distinction or difference can be apprehended between these dharmas.

"Deep,"..... of Emptiness that is a synonym, of the Signless, the Wishless, the Uneffected, the Unproduced, of No-birth, Non-existence, Dispassion, Cessation, Nirvana and Departing.
.....It is a synonym of all dharmas. For form, etc. is deep. How is form, etc,. deep? As deep as Suchness, so deep is form, etc. As deep as the Suchness of form, etc.,so deep is form, etc. Where there is no form, etc., that is the depth of form etc.

	Likewise for Plotinus we can note the following quotations that imply that this special type of negation, as entailed in the via negativa, is in the final analysis affirmational (i.e., affirms the existence of the absolute without stating it exists in the same way a thing in the everyday world of relativity might be so considered)....

It [the source of beauty and life] can be no shape, no power, nor the total of powers and shapes that have had the becoming that has set them here; it must stand above all the powers, all the patterns. The origin of all this must be formless - formless not as lacking shape but as the very source of even shape Intellectual.

A first must transcend its derivatives;

	For Plotinus the realm of predication is the realm of multiplicity and the same, by virtue of its derivation from the One, is to that extent equally deficient to that degree it be a derivative.
	I would like to assume that central to the sense of the absolute, as a philosophical concept in this type of tradition, we would find a complex stratification of meaning that mirrors this aspect of double reflection, i.e. this turning around of reflection that makes the process of reflection itself end up reflecting upon itself. If we were able to perceive with some degree of clarity the psychological structure behind this type of intellectual process, assuming that we were not mistaken in this matter, we would find in the upper reaches in the thematization of such activity a three tiered structure. First, there is that essence, or essential structures, being reflected upon. Second, there is that reflection reflecting upon that essence. Third, there is that reflection reflecting upon that reflection that was reflecting upon that essence.
	No doubt the complexity of this approach can explain the difficulties associated with this type of philosophy when inadequate preparation is involved in its explication or examination. The correct pre-stratification of meaning must be laid down to be negated and transcended before the next layer can be correctly developed. Then that layer is in turn negated and transcended in order to construct the correct appreciation of this concept of the absolute. Without this special process of double negation language can, only meaninglessly, be found or be seen to negate or contradict itself. Moreover, those psychological characteristics present to consciousness at these various levels must also be able to present themselves as facets attached in some manner to the sense of the absolute. The ongoing and simultaneous absorption and detachment found within the process of judgmental reflection, and in the mind's attempt to reflect upon the same, would be one of the very complex and contradictory facets found to confront the reader of texts dealing with the psychology or epistemology behind this type of position and its encountering. The abstract tenor to this transcendental-like attitude has only metaphorical language to philosophically account for itself or that mediation effected by essential structures. On a practical level, however, this intellectual level of appreciation is stated to be complimented through the experiential consequences attending upon various forms of meditation, analytical reflection, instances of revelation or insight, processes of phenomenological-like reduction, etc. The question can be posed, "Can our philosophical appreciation of this triple-layered structuring embedded in the sense of the absolute meaningfully translate for us the significance of those relatively abnormal language statements, ostensively paradoxical and meaningless, found all too often in the texts representative of this type of tradition?" As a challenge can we make sense of the following, e.g.?

All dharmas are indeed unknowable and imper-ceptible. Because they are empty, and do not lean on anything. It is thus that all those dharmas have, thanks to perfect wisdom, been fully known by the Tathagatas (Buddhas).... And how does perfect wisdom show up the world for what it is? She shows the world is empty, unthinkable, calmly quiet. As purified of itself she shows up the world, she makes it known, she indicates it.

	In the previous quotation we can note the following three dialectical moments in the movement of the argument, matching this triadic structuring (of the essential - judgmental - transcendental). The word dharmas indicates essential structures in general that are to be reviewed. Under review they are declared to be unknowable and imperceptible and this indicates the second stage or moment in the argument paralleling the second level in the structuring of the complex sense of the absolute. The final moment reveals that it is in just this fashion, as outlined in the argument, that the perfection of wisdom (the absolute) indicates, makes known this world of non-ultimate dharmic organization. The result of this double negation, through the contradiction of the contradiction, is re-affirmational but an affirmation heavily qualified through the prism of this complexity that is made to iterate this sense of the absolute.
	This tripartite argument is repeated many times in this type of Buddhist text. Sometimes the argument is partially constructed with a transition between the first two moments or the latter two moments. Contradictions are not avoided but are heavily qualified. Continual repetition of this type of argument and the use of contradiction are happily seized upon by this tradition and through our constant acquaintance with this type of dissonance the paradoxical nature of the argument becomes less noticeable, allowing a transcendental-like point of view to establish itself more easily in this regard. The Neoplatonic Tradition on the other hand is less happy with the repetition of the paradox and spends more time trying to reduce the dissonance of the argument through lengthy processes of qualification. In this respect it would appear that the Buddhist view point is more process-orientated and less being-orientated and as a consequence perhaps less concerned with the dissonance of the paradox, being more prepared to accept shifts in meaning or clashes in meaningfulness?
	Let us now deal with the following quotation from Plotinus....

....think of the Life coursing throughout some mighty tree while yet it is the stationary Principle of the whole, in no sense scattered over all that extent but, as it were, vested in the root: it is the giver of the entire and manifold life of the tree, but remains unmoved itself, not manifold but the Principle of that manifold life.

	On one hand we have the image of Life coursing throughout some mighty tree and on the other its existence as some form of Principle that transcends the possibility of motion, something that remains unmoved itself. Normally we consider motion to be a translational phenomenon, to come about through the influence of some other moving body. However, this concept of motion is to be put aside. A model of motion that centers itself on the concept of the conversion of potential energy into some form of kinetic energy must also be ruled out as it states that this Principle has and is the stationary Principle of the whole (potential energy necessitating the prior conversion of kinetic energy to potential energy at some point in time and space). Similarly its location centered in the root but affecting the totality of the tree implies that Life is by nature unconditioned, not relative, i.e. absolute. The argument, at this point in the text, is basically two tiered with the negation shifting us from the essential level to the judgmental. With this shift, or transformation in meaning, we find a transcendence of the spatial and the temporal and by implication the causal if by causal we restrict ourselves to the domain of translational motion. This transcendence is also applied to the sense of self (Soul) for the text in continuing notes....

Now when we reach a One - the stationary Principle - in the tree, in the animal, in Soul, in the All - we have in every case the most powerful, most precious element:....

	The text continues and a transition to the third level of our three tiered structure to the sense of the absolute now becomes apparent....

Certainly this Absolute is none of the things of which it is the source - its nature is that nothing can be affirmed of it - not existence, nor essence, not life - since it is That which transcends all these. But possess yourself of it by the very elimination of Being and you hold a marvel. Thrusting forward to This, attaining, and resting in its content, seek to grasp it more and more - understanding it by that intuitive thrust alone, but knowing its greatness by the Beings that follow upon it and exist by its power.

	The words the very elimination of Being introduce a second level of negation that is both transcendental in orientation and open to an experiential-like encounter. Although Being is to be eliminated its re-affirmation follows on in almost the same breath that uttered its need for elimination. The re-introduction of positive traditional terminology occurring in the third phase, or transcendental level, of the argument but now retranslated from the absolute point of view.

Is Transcendental Phenomenology An Absolute Philosophy?

	During the course of my research in this field of absolute philosophy I have found the work of Edmund Husserl, quite by chance, to be most influential. His formulation of the phenomenological attitude and his interest in the transcendental implications that seem to underpin his philosophical position have given me a deeper appreciation of that type of philosophical development found, more or less simultaneously, in a number of religious-philosophical traditions around the start of the present era. In an attempt at some form of repayment for the work of this eminent twentieth century philosopher I would like to conclude this paper by briefly noting some of the isomorphic features I have found to be present between these two contemporaneous Neoplatonic and Buddhist Traditions in the hope that this type of research might cast some future light on the presuppositional nature of Husserl's own phenomenological enterprise?
	In retrospect I would be inclined to define an absolute religious and/or philosophical tradition of the kind I have researched to fall under the following headings, namely, that such a style of philosophical thinking is analytical, systematic, phenomenological, trans-essential, transcendental, presuppositionally-orientated, critical and meta-critical. That such a type of thought should reveal textually a marked emphasis on some form of via negativa and its encapsulation through various means of qualificational accommodation being attempts to transcend language through a variety of linguistic stratagems that collectively are interrelated through a double-negational three tiered-like structure (as noted in the articulation of a sense of the absolute as previously outlined). 
	Your comments in this regard will be most welcome. Time, however, does not permit me to follow up this comparison here in some detail but let me briefly take up one aspect crucial to my argument, as noted above, namely, the necessary presence of some form of via negativa to transformationally structure and indicate that a variant of an absolute philosophy is indeed present.
	Distinctive in this type of absolute philosophy is the characteristic presence of the via negativa along with its encapsulation through lengthy forms of qualification that attempt to accommodate the complications and limitations introduced through its exercise of paradox, negation, contradiction, disvaluation, reduction, metaphor and the general use of language, etc. In Husserl the transcendental reduction and the suspension of the natural attitude concomitant with its exercise has effectively the same consequences as the systematic and analytical exercise of the via negativa. Let me briefly elaborate this point.
	For there to be a valid argument to the effect that an equivalence existed in practical-functional terms between these two terms of the transcendental reduction and via negativa it would be enough to show that one of these two terms, in functional terms of reference, matched those of the other. I believe that an analysis of the consequences stemming from the exercise of a transcendental reduction, in the light of this research into the nature of the via negativa, would demonstrate that just such a parity does exist. For a transcendental reduction to be conducted correctly a suspension or bracketing of all value judgments is necessary. Judgment is then left to be conducted in essential terms of reference. As a consequence all value judgments are put out of action. This does not mean that they are rejected within a world of relativity but are denied a voice, as they stand, in their being treated as the subject matter for an absolute point of view. By investigating the essential raw material of a value judgment or some judgment of essential structure the genetic constitution of the judgmental process under review can be better examined and allowed to speak with its own spontaneity of self-expression given an adequate pre-conditional preparation and the correctly conducted exercise of the condition of the act of judgmental reflection itself. Phenomenologically this would imply an adequate understanding of both the process of essential description (and preparation) and the psychology of the judgmental exercise. Lastly, a post-conditional appreciation of the consequences of our subject matter would finally help to decide for us one way or the other as to the depths of understanding realized in the totality of the process of such transcendentally-orientated reflection. 
	The systematic suspension of a world of value judgments in a transcendental reduction has the same results as that conducted and realized through the systematic exercise of a via negativa. Systematically the via negativa negates the essential understanding of each item of traditional religious/philosophical terminology that collectively constituted a positive theology or philosophy. Not rejected but treated from the point of view of an absolute perspective the resulting analysis reveals that the negation of the essential unlocks the judgmental process related to such phenomenolgical-like description which through being made subject to a further negation effectively allows us to reflect upon our appreciation of this process therein demonstrating to us the pre-conditional, conditional and post-conditional structures along with the urgency of all judgmental responses therein discerned or rediscovered. An essential analysis, however, cannot truly negate an essential analysis and through such reduction remain an essential analysis hence such an action, or reflection, on our part can only affirm the essential clarity, if present, of the judgmental argument involved. Stripping the leaves off a tree reveals the structural support of the underlying branches beneath those leaves giving a greater clarity to the nature of that tree as it enters into thematization before the world of conscious experience.
	The systematic and analytical exercise of the via negativa suspends, puts out of action, brackets the entire world of value judgments in the same productive fashion as the exercise of a transcendental reduction. In a similar fashion a transcendental reduction through the negation of the essential demonstrates its judgmental roots which through further phenomenological reduction doubly negates the entire process, as a process of judgment, to reveal the affirmation of that which transcendentally constitutes the same. Demonstration of the absolute and/or transcendental grounds of the phenomenal can only affirm in the final analysis the equivalence of the Relative and the Absolute from the absolute-transcendental point of view, an equivalence between Transcendental and Absolute, etc. The via negativa and the transcendental reduction in functional terms of reference are both claimed to be able to give us insight into the nature of the world, delivering an experiential appreciation of the same. It would appear, therefore, that we have a prima facie case to answer in this regard, that a transcendental reduction in its exercise is a type of systematic and analytical via negativa indicating that a transcendental phenomenology is an absolute philosophy with a common similarity in its presuppositional ground to that type of absolute philosophy as previously outlined?

Conclusion

	Overall, in this type of absolute philosophy, a vision of the World is entered into that perceives the absolute in transcendental terms of reference, and vice versa. Through the transcendental unity of such a fundamental dimension the absolute, as the Absolute, is treated as a religious reality open to being encountered. Revelation of this dimension is claimed to issue forth from our involvement in processes of analysis, reflection, meditation, reduction, etc.
	Generally this type of philosophical enterprise is motivated by a desire for insight into the nature of reality. As an attempt to investigate the transcendent-immanent structuralization of the phenomenal it seeks an experiential encounter that self-validates the process and content of the revelation entailed. Entered into through some form of double reflection the complexity of this type of philosophical treatment ultimately presents a highly qualified re-affirmation of the world, albeit from a transcendental point of view, attempting to overcome the dichotomization and controversy created through its cognitive intellectualization. In this light it would appear that terms such as the One, The Good, The Father, Suchness, Perfection of Wisdom, Tathagata, and phenomenalistic concepts such as Transcendental Subjectivity, Life-world, the Absolute, etc. are like leaves from the same tree. Like children born from the same flesh, each conceived through the same desire, being brought forth to heal a world torn apart through the bitter divisions and limitations ensuing from those apparently interminable historical philosophic and religious controversies that seem to characterize that short-sighted aspect of the human condition that today we come to know only too well. The crisis that concerned Husserl is, without doubt, the same type of crisis that motivates, or rather provokes, the absolute philosopher. Like a strange mid-wife, or more someone who acts as a catalyst, this type of person as a philosopher can be seen to exercise their considerable time, energy and thought in their desire to help their fellow traveller facilitate their passage through this world. With the necessary degree of stoic-like detachment to counter balance our absorption in our laboured travails in our confinement therein the absolute philosopher proffers both a way out of this world and a re-entry back into it. Taking on an acceptance of an absolute vision of reality would restructure our perception of the world helping us, it is claimed, to overcome and transcend the apparently painful and willful nature of existence. In this process of transformation or transmutation existential meaningfulness and value is found for our existence when otherwise this-world-for-us would be naught more than the nihilistic emptiness of a dream or shadow cast upon a flat landscape, a bleak and clouded terrain full of despair.
  Noël Tointon,(Macquarie University,26-28/88