Chapter I - Introduction

I.	Introduction

	This first chapter is an introduction to the subject of my thesis: - a comparative examination of the Neoplatonic Tradition in the Graeco-Roman world and the contemporaneous Buddhist-Mahayanic-Wisdom Tradition on the Indian Subcontinent. The focus of this thesis will be upon what I perceive to be their transcendental-phenomenological nature of textual exposition and the implications and consequences this has in our hermeneutical reading of these two traditions as instances of `absolute' philosophy. I recognize the controversial nature of my treating the Buddhist-Wisdom tradition in this fashion and will address this concern at various point throughout this thesis. For a start I would like to draw the reader's attention to the following definitions in this regard.
	I will define an absolute philosophy, in distinction to an absolutist philosophy, as one that adopts a transcendental-phenomenological attitude towards the appreciation of the intentional constitution of phenomenal presentation (as entailed in the natural attitude). This trans-phenomenal, i.e., transcendental, attitude realizes an absolute style of discourse. That this sense, i.e., meaning, of an absolute perspective, or dimension, is established through the centrally placed imposition, in that philosophical exposition, of a transcendental suspension. That this state of suspension is introduced through a variety of textual mechanisms, e.g., metaphor (especially those that involve some sense of illusion), disvaluation of the natural attitude, negative theological processes, explicit transcendental suspensions.
	I will also argue, although with various qualifications, that both philosophies also treat this sense of the absolute perspective in a religious frame of reference as an Absolute. Hence this distinction between the sense of the absolute  and the sense of the Absolute. I perceive both traditions to have similar views towards this sense of the absolute and some non-incommensurable differences towards this sense of the Absolute (grounded upon the former). 
	Neither of these senses will be treated by these two traditions in an absolutist format which is either senseless (i.e., meaningless, through, e.g., processes of excessive reification, etc.), confused and/or misrepresented through the adoption of non-transcendental phenomenal, or pseudo-phenomenal-like, terms of reference (the metaphorical treatment of metaphor exempted).
	Or, put in more simple terms:

An absolute style of discourse involves the central imposition, maintenance and exercise of a transcendental suspension.

	However, let me discuss elsewhere in this chapter the transcendental-phenomenological and hermeneutical definitions, and dimensions, implicated in this thesis. 

II.	The Initial Motivation Behind This Thesis

	It was my opinion that such a comparison, as entailed in this thesis, was not only possible but would also be, if only for myself, a potentially fruitful and revealing exercise; offering us a way of coming more quickly to appreciate  better both traditions. It was, and still is, my impression that these two traditions were examples of absolute philosophy (in the phenomenological manner I perceive this distinctive genre of philosophical endeavour), and, that it was also my intuition that this form of enterprise was then relatively novel. The innovative design behind this new style of exposition resides not so much in its parts but in the manner of their interaction and integration. The systematic tenor of this type of philosophy takes up a heavily emphasized use of negation without manifesting any real sense of negativity or skepticism. Indeed, quite to the contrary, this type of text seems to be pervaded with an aura of transcendental conviction along with a calm detachment that, at the same time, does not detach the person from their being in the world. Certainly, a philosophic flavour quite different from the textual world, e.g., of Plato and Aristotle, and, the scholastic treatment of Buddhist concepts.
	When I first read the Enneads I noted the emphatic way Plotinus reiterates the unconventional point of view that the world is more like an illusion, e.g., something more like a shadow, etc. without stating that the  world is just an illusion. This emphasis upon the qualified illusoriness of the natural attitude reminded me of a similar direction taken in Buddhist scriptures that were written around the same period in time. In particular, a famous verse from the Diamond Sutra came to mind:

As stars, a fault of vision, as a lamp, 
A mock show, dewdrops, or a bubble, 
A dream, a lightning flash, or a cloud, 
So should one view what is conditioned.
	In comparison we can note the following quotation from Plotinus:

Whatever announcement it [matter] makes, therefore, is a lie, and if it appears great, it is small, if more, it is less; its apparent being is not real, but a sort of fleeting frivolity, nothing but phantoms in a phantom, like something in a mirror which really exists in one place but is reflected in another; it seems to be filled, and holds nothing; it is all seeming. "Imitations of real being pass into and out of it," ghosts into a formless ghost, visible because of its formlessness... feeble and have no thrust; nor does matter thrust against them, but they go through without making a cut, as if through water, or as if someone in a way projected shapes in the void people talk about...
	Plotinus regards matter as practically non-existent, and, anything that moves towards a realm of the material as partaking, by similar degree, in a state of unreality. All form, he argues, proceeds from the One via the forms so that through a process of emanation we arrive at a world of the senses, a world of multiplicity, the embodied. Continuing, he concludes that the end of this process of emanation - matter - must be virtually non-existent, so, as a consequence, our natural attitude towards it must be mistaken.
	Noting the general similarity of metaphors found in these two quotations we can now ask ourselves, in an attempt to appreciate the nature of this apparent coincidence, the more penetrating question as to whether their utilization has the same structure and function? In the following sense I perceive our hermeneutical treatment of these two traditions, as reflected in, and through, their textual remains, to be able to reconstruct, or simulate, an essential and informative understanding of the complex, unique and distinctive phenomenon that produced those textual imprints in the first place. Moreover, in our very ability to relate to, and understand, these patterned codes, or phenomenal imprints, also allows us to find commensurable elements as islands of meaning-coincidence, or contrast, with enough clarity in their thematization to allow us to relate not only to those traditions individually, but, also allow us to relate the various traditions among themselves (without regard as to whether such an interaction could take place, did take place, or, might have taken place in time and space). In this phenomenalistic and structuralist approach I would define a similarity in structure as implying that the meaning of certain key essential components in the construction of a more complex concept, or system, is effectively mirrored in the structural construction, or reconstruction, of some other complex concept or system. Further, I would define a similarity of function to imply that the consequences, or intentional ends, of that associated structure, i.e., its contextually derived meaningfulness, has for all practical purposes the same type of intentional directedness.
	In our dealing with this complex concept of the qualified illusoriness of the world in these two traditions I will note a number of points that demonstrate an adequate degree of coincidence, or isomorphism, in this regard. 
	A similarity in structure would imply that in the formation of our understanding certain elements subjected to a phenomenological description can be found to match the phenomenological descriptions of elements in some other complex concept or system. Moreover, a similarity in function would imply that this concept e.g., of the illusoriness of the world, in its religious-philosophic context, demands or assists, as a consequence, in the performance of similar patterns of activity, behaviour, expectation, etc., with the same type of intentional directedness. E.g., the intentional directedness might include the association, and interaction, of elements of purification, devotion, salvation, revelation, production of insight, etc. Let me note, in passing, that many of these factors just listed do appear to be associated with this concept of illusionism in both of these traditions.
	The mere use of a similar set of metaphorical images does not imply of itself that the metaphorical structure, or structures, associated with it have the same intentional content or function. Indeed religious symbols are notoriously polyvalent and heavily bound by context. Moreover, the dialectical richness of a symbol as a symbol, and not as a sign, must also complicate our search to determine the constitutional nature of their intended sense or meaning.
	However, we are assisted in this comparative research by noting that both traditions subject their metaphors of illusion to the same type of qualification, namely e.g., that illusoriness is not absolute but that the relative world is only an illusion from the ultimate point of view, and, that the phenomenal world as perceived through the natural attitude, from the empirical point of view, possesses a relative validity only. This qualified metaphorical treatment of the phenomenal as illusory, as an attitudinal concept, I shall title illusionism;. This concept is best illustrated from an inspection of the following quotation from the slightly earlier, but effectively contemporaneous Buddhist scripture of The Perfection Of Wisdom In 8,000 Lines:

Just as if a clever magician, or a magician's apprentice, were to conjure up at the crossroads a great crowd of people, and then make them vanish again. What do you think, Subhuti, was anyone killed by anyone, or murdered, or destroyed, or made to vanish?
No indeed Lord.
Even so a Bodhisattva, a great being, leads countless beings to Nirvana, and yet there is not any being that has been led to Nirvana, nor that has led others to it.
	The point of this passage illustrating this concept of illusionism is that between acts of magic, or illusion, and the relative world there is an analogical structure that can be extracted from the former, and extended to the latter, namely, the notion that appearances are deceptive in their phenomenal presentation, and, that their imputed content does not truly describe the situation as it is in reality if that type of situation was to be faithfully described from the ultimate perspective (that constitutes reality). However, the illusion is not treated as a mere illusion, in a nihilistic sense, but as an illusion when it becomes appreciated from this ultimate point of view. In our quotation a crowd can be seen, but, as it is only that which has been conjured up it truly does not exist as a crowd would conventionally be considered to have existence if viewed within the natural attitude. This analogical strand, textually set up to be isolated in the imagery of illusion, is then applied to the world as we perceive it, to the imputed reality of real crowds, people, Bodhisattvas, Nirvana, etc. From this ultimate point of view all this semblance of independent identity is then, in turn, declared to be illusory, empty, (sunya). This gambit does not nihilistically dissolve the relative world but does attack the reputed absoluteness of our interpretation of it. This transcendental form of criticism is thus applied to a phenomenal interpretation, or description, of conventional reality. This treatment of mundane reality as a correlation of consciousness (as a mental consciousness of an intended something) automatically ensures its treatment under both an epistemological-psychological aspect and an ontological-physical aspect without any form of clear cut determinacy between these two natural polarities, or orientations. To a certain extent the phenomenal treatment of an experiential event suspends, i.e., ignores, the subjective-objective polarity discovered in the intentional constitution of the cognitive experience of all experiential events or event-situations.
	Intrigued by this facet of illusionism occurring in these two contemporaneous traditions, and, knowing something about the lengthy controversy on the topic as to whether Plotinus was subject to oriental influences (from Indian sources, e.g.,) I decided to explore ways one might be able to resolve this question.
	One avenue of influence that has been poorly researched in this dispute, and to my mind the most probable influence if there was one, is that stemming from Mahayanic Buddhism. At the start of, or just before, the Christian era, under the influential weight of its own criticism, Buddhism appears to have changed its general philosophical state. In this transformation was developed the Mahayana - a radically critical systematic vision of religious-philosophy with a marked emphasis on the via negativa. Under its polemical onslaught, it appears, three traditional forms of Hindu philosophy disappeared and all surviving traditions were profoundly influenced, and altered, by its critical-dialectical stance. Buddhism was certainly the most cosmopolitan of Indian religions as witnessed by the success of its missionary activity. Further, a considerable degree of Greek influence has been recognized as having entered into the genesis of Buddhist figure-sculpture, and, along with a marked increase in East-West trade, some textual parallels with Gnostic philosophy, etc., this question of influence either way is one that would well deserves our attention. 
	Apart from similar metaphors and some superficial motifs like reincarnation and karma, etc., our two traditions on first appearances would seem to have little in common either stylistically or substantially. However in probing the structural-functioning of our two religious-philosophies I have found a number of elements, and attitudes, that parallel each other. This appearance of a general constitutional isomorphism has allowed me to develop a provisional phenomenological-hermeneutical format for comparing these two traditions, a methodology whereby these two apparently disparate language-games can be treated as effectively commensurate. To this end I have developed three heuristic devices to hermeneutically prepare our comparative phenomenologically-descriptive examination. 

III.	Statement Of Methodology

1.	Treatment of these two traditions as apparent phenomena in their own right. 

	A tradition can be treated as a phenomenon through:

		i.	its apparent intentional integrity,
		ii.	apparent intentional stability along with
		iii.	its apparent intentional-evolution,
		iv.	our ability to describe distinctively their					essential structural-functional nature, 				v.	and, the ability of a tradition to 						reconstitute itself, and reflect upon itself, 			hence i - iv).

	As a phenomenon can be described by noting:

		i.	essential overall structure/ component 						substructures,
		ii.	essential functions of i). being the 						intentions intended, consequences, etc.,
		iii.	the relationship between i). and ii),
		iv.	the limitations of i). - iii),
		v.	through essential-historical description 					hence i - iv).

	Moreover, with regard to the above we find much of the essential nature of the constitution of these traditions reflected in important key texts produced by those traditions.

2.	We are forced to adopt a hermeneutical programme in our comparison of these two traditions because the most import-ant relics of these traditions are textual. As some economy is called for I have chosen one key text from each tradition.

3.	Terms and concepts dealing with absolute philosophy as found in these two traditions, as represented by these two texts, with be given a Husserlian-phenomenological-hermeneutical interpretation, and description, in order to establish a common ground for our comparison. By these means commensurability in our investigations will be established. 

	In this regard an isomorphism will be shown to occur when in our entertainment of one tradition and our movement to the other we find an invariance in essential structures and/or functions (although more correctly both structure and some of its associated function(s) should together remain invariant under this transformation, or translation, of our interest).
	Commensurability being established upon the phenomenological observation that these two religious-philosophies adopt a transcendental-phenomenological attitude, and style of exposition, and, that my hermeneutic treatment of this observation also involves my adoption, and adaptation, of the same type of attitude as an inter-translational medium between these two traditions.

4.	That absolute philosophy, as a philosophical genre, in distinction to an absolutist format, will also be considered as a phenomenon in its own right through:

	i.	its intentionally distinctive presentation,
	ii.	possession of a minimum number of pre-conditions, 		conditions and post-conditions that distinctively				characterize it,
	iii.	the presence of distinctive textual indicators,
	iv.	the presence of a trans-phenomenological attitude 		in its appreciation of phenomena in general.

	Textual indicators to note will be the centralized imposition of a transcendental suspension, the exercise of a transcendental attitude, the use of a via negativa, the adoption of concepts of disvaluation, illusionism, etc.

5.	Through the phenomenological recognition of the constitution of an absolute philosophy it too can be made the subject of a comparison with another instance of the same on these commensurable grounds of the phenomenological, 										and...

6.	Allows us, via 5., to draw up a typology of absolute philosophies, through the addition (or subtraction) of certain distinctive descriptive features, and, in the midst of this hermeneutical process allows us to fine tune our differentiation of these two traditions.

IV.	Transcendental Phenomenolgy

	In this section I would like to introduce a number of phenomenological concepts that will be used in the hermeneutic interpretation of these two traditions. Through the integrated use of three heuristic devices, founded upon my re-interpretation of the Husserlian transcendental-phenomenological project, I intend to interpret, and describe, both of these tradition in such a manner that will allow me to entertain their comparative examination. Essentially, I perceive these two traditions to adopt a transcendental-phenomenological attitude towards the intentional constitution of the phenomenal world as entertained in the natural attitude. In my adoption, and adaptation, of the same type of project it is my hope that this neutral and commensurable territory will allow me to translate, interpret and describe, certain prominent structural-functional features in the textual exposition of these two traditions. With that parallel interpreted translation in place it should then be possible to demonstrate in what respect, and to what degree, whether or not these two traditions could be considered to be isomorphic under those nominated terms of reference.
	Central to the phenomenological project is an intentional interpretation of the phenomenon of experience as the experience of phenomena. In this intentional attitude all conscious experience is interpreted as an experience of something. This object of thought (noema) is entertained in a mental process (as an act of noesis). In a metaphorical mode we might say the conscious act is directed towards the mental object intended by that act of intentional directedness. However, these two poles of noesis-noema are ideal and essentially correlations of each other, i.e., the noetic act gains its sense from the nature of its intended reference, and the intended reference gains its sense from the nature of that noetic act. The phenomenon is both an experiencing (noesis) and an experienced something (noemata). The constitution of that phenomenon being realized through this noetic-noematic correlation. 
	To be noted that the intentional existence of that intentional object is a phenomenological fait accompli, and that the factual existence, or non-existence, of that object is irrelevant to the necessary fact of its intentional existence. Consciousness, by phenomenological description and/or prescription, is just constituted by this noetic-noematic correlation! Hence this phenomenological understanding of the phenomenal qua phenomenal should be exercised regardless of the possible factual correlation that might be entertained for that intentional objectivity.
	Following up this insight Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) then decided that to focus our attention upon the phenomenal nature of that brought forward for investigation, in order to examine its intentional constitution, necessitated, for the transcendental phenomenologist, the removal of all non-intentional considerations from the immediate area of their concern. To achieve this state of investigational purity he devised the method of the transcendental suspension or epoche. Under this transcendental attitude only the phenomenological constitution would be considered consequently all non-constitutional phenomenal considerations would be put psychically to the side, bracketed, ignored, judgmentally suspended. Under this trans-phenomenal de-phenomenalization matters of a spatio-temporal, causal and egotistical nature are ignored and only treated as aspects of sense, as meaning structures, in the constitution of that phenomenon under investigation. Under these terms of reference in an investigation of sense the factual existence or non-existence of that intentional object, or state of affairs, is completely irrelevant to those constitutional investigations.
	Applying this transcendental suspension on a global basis to the thesis of a posited world in its entirety, a world we take for granted as always being there for us, converts the uncritical nature of this natural attitude into a transcendental attitude. In this purification only sense, or i.e., meaning-structures, are under direct consideration. Once this transcendental suspension is put in place we are then free to investigate, and describe, the essential meaning of those intentional structures (e.g., via eidetic variation in which we are free to alter in our imagination the presentation of that phenomenon without actually altering the essential nature of that phenomenon and by these means discovering what is essential to its description). That this focus upon the essential takes place in a state of transcendental reduction. 
	However, no essential description could be discovered consciously without it also taking place in an act of intentionality. Moreover, this intentional objectivity could never be focused upon without it being introduced through its associated field of presentation. This horizon of thematizational possibility, like all other horizons, always surrounds the intentional object how ever far we may metaphorically wish to pursue it.
	Phenomenologically we discover meaning is realized through the right kind, and the right degree, of relational contrast. Too much contrast - no meaning, no contrast - no meaning likewise! Thus the complete concentration of our attention upon the immanent objectivity of an intentional act is an impossibility. No noesis - no noematic correlation, no noema - no noetic act! Consequently the performance of an absolute transcendental reduction, in an extreme reductionist mode, is an impossibility. Thus the investigational delivery of meaning, i.e., sense, necessitates its continuing correlational involvement with its appropriate horizon. That in essence the meaningfulness of the meaning focused upon is discovered through a re-direction of our attention to the mode of its presentation, i.e., towards the corresponding section of the horizon that introduced us to that event, or in other words, the psychic location in which that event was situated. In such re-direction we also discover the dynamic function, i.e., the meaningfulness, of that meaning structure fixed in the essential enstructuralization of the transcendental reduction. Consequently the full meaning of sense is recovered when there is a de-enstructuralization, i.e., deconstruction, of essential-reduction. The result of this process of deconstruction is a transcendental reconstitution of the phenomenal event under investigation, which as a reconstruction of the event, is in effect a simulation of that phenomenon. Moreover, as this particular noetic act continually preserves its intentional objectivity through retention this simulation is, effectively, a continual re-simulation.
	In this re-interpretation of the Husserlian project I perceive structural-meaning and functional-meaningfulness as being generated through these three circular moments of transcendental suspension, transcendental reduction and transcendental reconstitution. Moreover, the significance of any one moment can be seen to reside in the contrast presented by the other two moments. In this light we can also define the moment of transcendental suspension as the synthesized contrast of the product of the other two transcendental moments of reduction and reconstitution, i.e., as a balance between reduction and reconstitution. We could say a transcendental suspension is put in place, and takes place, when there is a balance between all mental processes that constitute a noetic act.
	The form of this definition can also be extended, in my opinion, to the elements that constitute the noematic content. I.e., all forms of noematic value are likewise suspended through a state of non-destructive counter-balance. Thus, e.g., in an aesthetic act the entertained aesthetically evaluated object of that act in a transcendental suspension would be considered to be both beautiful and not beautiful, etc. The same applying to ethical forms of evaluation, pragmatical forms of evaluation, all forms of essential evaluation (e.g., logical, identificational, mathematical, etc.), etc. Thus I would rewrite the transcendental suspension as a psychic balance imposed between all processes that constitute the noetic act, and, all those elements that constitute that noematic content, in conjunction with their non-destructively entertained counter-balanced negations.
	These three transcendental moments of suspension, reduction and reconstitution constitute my first heuristic device titled a transcendental-phenomenological-hermeneutical circle, otherwise often referred to in this thesis as - the expanded hermeneutic circle.
	The difference between a phenomenology and a transcendental phenomenology is that the latter adopts the critically careful and thorough, imposition, maintenance and exercise of a transcendental suspension (on both noematic and noetic levels of performance). Because phenomenal constitution is interpreted as intentionally constituted it follows that the trans-phenomenal transcendental attitude must be trans-intentional in orientation. This transcendental orientation, or attitude, establishes in textual and hermeneutical terms of reference an absolute style of exposition. Entailed in such an exposition is a sense of the absolute that correctly must be trans-phenomenal, trans-intentional and trans-constitutional, etc., in its interpreted-description and described-interpretation. The phenomenological-orientation can be seen to focus its attention on a clarification of structural-functional description, whereas, the hermeneutical-orientation can be seen to focus on a structural-functional prescription, or interpretation. The former promotes essential-reduction and the latter promotes deconstructional-reconstitution. However, both of these attitudes must correctly cooperate before being able to re-direct their energies one way or the other. Hence the necessary cooperation between hermeneutical-interpretation and phenomenological-description.

V.	Conclusion

	To conclude this introduction let me briefly recapitulate the following points:

i.	That, as I consider both the Neoplatonic tradition and the Buddhist-Wisdom tradition adopted a transcendental-phenomenological attitude, I believe we have commensurable grounds for this comparative examination.
ii.	That in adopting the same transcendental perspective in my heuristic device of the expanded hermeneutic circle I perceive the possibility of explicitly, or implicitly, translating both of these traditions into a similar transcendental format and thereby establishing the means to interpret hermeneutically the nature of their virtual interaction.
iii.	That the trans-phenomenal, trans-intentional and trans-constitutional attitude of this type of religious-philosophy establishes its absolute-transcendental style.

Endnotes I - Introduction