Chapter V - The Hermeneutics Of Apparent Disconformity

Introduction

	In this chapter, and the next, two heuristic devices will be briefly outlined and discussed. In this chapter a provisional scheme will be proposed for dealing with the relationship between miscellaneous texts that, although possessing a high degree of structural-functional isomorphism, or commensurability, initially present as non-congruent, or incommensurable. The next chapter will look at a provisional scheme for differentiating, in structural-functional terms of reference, miscellaneous texts that present an absolute-transcendental style of discourse. In my seventh chapter the results of these two previous chapters will be brought forward to assist in a critical comparative analysis of these two traditions in order to differentiate the manner in which they differ in the presentation of their absolute-transcendental styles of discourse.
	It is my belief that no one artifact of mankind, textual or non-textual, could be completely treated as incommensurable to those members of some other tradition, or culture, viewing that deposited intentionally constructed state of affairs. For a start the recognition that that state of affairs under investigation is being regarded as (intentionally) constructed is in itself a sign that we have already started to anticipate, correctly or incorrectly, the significance of that encounter and that being encountered. This is not to imply that the artifacts of one culture won't be misinterpreted by the members of some other for that is, more often than not, at least initially, the lot of our cultural deposits cast upon the face of this planet. It is also the case that a culture can have difficulty in interpreting its own production, a state of affairs exacerbated by the time differential between the moment of production and the moment of its interpreted, or re-interpreted, reception. The controversial aura found surrounding the re-interpretation of earlier forms of music being a good illustration of this observation. Moreover, I also do not rule out the possibility that we might attempt to interpret as intentionally constructed some object whose correct derivation issued from the natural world although, I might add, it is the case that many forms of religious philosophy attempt to do just this feat with respect to the being, and the nature, of the world vis-à-vis the intentional constructiveness of some form of divine power.  However, based upon the necessity for a common phenomenological structural-functioning of the human psyche, and the overall unity of consciousness (to some degree or other) in its integration and self-manifestation of a sense of personality it is my contention that, as human beings, we have the potentiality of at least coming eventually to some degree of understanding of the dispositions of others and the deposited traces of their being even if our current, or immediate anticipations, are going to misapprehend either the dispositions of those persons or the nature of their depositions. On the other hand absolute commensurability can only be assumed to have taken place as it is the nature of our convictions to be in this regard, for all reasonable purposes, only self-assured. Such convictions can always be made the subject of a transcendental suspension, or, in a similar fashion, be skeptically treated as a possible state of affairs that might in the goodness of time be discovered to have been most likely misinterpreted (to some degree or other). Pronouncements made in the natural attitude inhabiting only a non-essential probabilistic sphere of validity.
	The mind is capable of making relationships between diverse forms of phenomena, witness the creativity expressed in the creation of an artwork, e.g. However, the possibility must always remain that the re-viewer of someone, or something, is unable to form a satisfactory connection between the presentation of the phenomenon and the intentional meaning initially connected, or meant to be supplied, to that event. In order for a correct interpretation to be made adequate grounds must come into existence that will allow the interpreter of that phenomenon to pass satisfactorily from the presentation of that phenomenon as a relative presentation to its valid interpretation within the restrictions set by those terms of reference. Essential to this argument is the necessary acceptance that the phenomenal constitution of all people is fundamentally pre-constituted in a similar manner and that this description/prescription be accepted as a minimum requirement for the possibility of human interaction and communication. This argument does not mean that the same type of phenomenal event will be interpreted in the same fashion, only that the intentional machinery is in place for being able to share in a process of interpretation that has essentially the same constitutional form. The transcendental phenomenologist would claim that this fundamental ground can be investigated in transcendentally-orientated consciousness that focuses on essential states of consciousness that in turn highlight this pre-constituted nature of this pre-constitution. Not that this clarification can lead to the  absolute segregation, and reification, of essences but only their essential description in the hierarchical-context of that total pre-constituted constitution. Moreover, the same process can also essentially clarify non-essential experiences as derived through experience either directly (through some form of acquaintance) or indirectly (through some form of communication). In this regard the passive constitution of our sense of being is effectively a fait accompli. The only exception to this state of affairs, or more precisely its constitutional ordering, is the inability of the person to experience directly that type of essential phenomenon. This deficit taking place through either the absence, or the physical malfunctioning, of the appropriate physiological constitution that can pre-establish our recognition of that type of phenomenal event. E.g., the physiological structures of the eye, etc., normally allow us to witness a sense of colour. Any defect in the development of this ability in colour vision, or in the physiological-machinery for the putting in place of this sense of vision, will find itself expressed as a deficit in the corresponding experience of colour. Although this deficit cannot be directly experienced its presence can be demonstrated by showing that there exists an apparent inability for that person to differentiate such a phenomenon ostensively present for some other person. Colour blindness could be used an example of this necessary pre-constitutional input underlying the passive constitutional contribution to the possible expression of some form of essential experience. An inability to see, or to have ever seen, the colour red means that that person can not directly appreciate the way other people see redness (although that deficit itself can, in time, be experienced as some form of deficit).
	For the transcendental phenomenologist experiential access to this constitutional dimension can be gained, or more correctly approached, through the imposition of a transcendental suspension(s) followed by a process of transcendental reduction(s) and transcendental reconstitution(s) as indicated earlier in this thesis. Via this transcendental-phenomenological-hermeneutical circle we can interpret the constitutional and pre-constitutional contributions to the structural-meaning and functional-meaningfulness experienced in the individual presentation, and collective experience, of that phenomena. Moreover, the same type of process applies also to the non-transcendental interpretation of phenomenological-presentations in general, and, our hermeneutical anticipations as regards to either the dispositions of others or the depositions of others. This hermeneutical phenomenon can also be experienced, or re-experienced, in dealing with the experience, or re-experience, of our own apparent motivation (to a certain extent) behind our own responses and depositions (whether textual or non-textual in nature). 
	Thus on the grounds of an essentially similar pre-constitutional constitution I argue that it is possible for someone else to re-constitute essentially the intentional expressions of others. That on these pre-constitutional grounds is it possible to erect provisional procedures for the hermeneutic interpretation of the intentional expressions of others and thence the satisfactory fulfillment of our anticipations in this regard whether textual or non-textual in orientation. 
	In this chapter I have constructed a simple scheme for re-interpreting texts that initially present as incommensurable, or as relatively incongruent, assuming that there are both reasonable grounds for conformity and reasonable grounds for that initial appearance of disconformity. Conformity being seen to take place in essential structural/functional terms of reference (considered either on the intersubjective pre-constitutional level of experience or on the subjective constitutional level of experience). Conformity being seen in terms of a reasonable degree of mutual constitutional coincidence, i.e., an assumed coincidence of intentional directedness on a structural/functional level of expression (although correctly that coincidence should be both structurally and functionally co-isomorphic reflecting the correlativity of noema-noesis). Absolute conformity between two texts establishes the effective coincidence of that text as the same text (although the ongoing manufacture and reproduction of the same text is, more often than not, open to a complex multiplicity of divergent variations). 
	Two or more texts can be considered to be partially, or totally, isomorphic when in our transition from one text to some other text, or texts, we find little (eidetic) variation in the structural-function between some part, or the sum total, of those two or more texts under such consideration.
	The following provisional scheme is devised for the  treatment of textual instances of apparent disconformity. A number of these categories, concerning this type of treatment, have come to my attention when dealing with these two texts chosen for this thesis (and from previous work done in the field of religious change). Usually, in our comparative textual analysis we find we need to differentiate texts as different from one another in terms of, e.g., structure and/or function, psychological orientations, intentional direction, stylistic grounds, etc. In this thesis I would like to demonstrate how these two traditions, or rather our two textual instantiations of these two traditions, equally exhibit both forms of essential coincidence and non-coincidence. That on the grounds of the former we can demonstrate a certain fundamental degree of commensurability that allows us both to interrogate simultaneously these two traditions (through the media of their texts) but also allow them virtually to commentate upon the structural-functional expressions of each other. These headings allow us to argue for both the appearance of a relative disconformity and the structural/functional presence of a less obvious degree of greater conformity. The adoption of this provisional scheme generates, as a consequence, a contextual method for hermeneutically unifying each text with respect to itself and justifying, where appropriate, a re-interpretation of their interrelationship on grounds other than the presentation of a sheer contrast whose only interconnection was that it was experienced by the same person. In effect it establishes some ostensive degree of resonance, and the reasons for this harmonization, in a similarity of intent. This type of process usually occurs internally in the context of that tradition but also occurring when a response is necessary, either evoked or provoked, in the interaction between either traditions themselves, or, at the level of a text in its reception under less-traditional constraints within the auspices of some academic tradition or fashion, etc. Hermeneutics is, by necessity, the re-establishment of the imputed meaning and meaningfulness of textual-parts vis-à-vis some textual-totality, and vice versa, under the interaction put in place between that imputed textual-tradition vis-à-vis its contextual umbrella of the same, or some other, tradition, etc., and vice versa. The text encapsulating a crystallization of that textual culture that produced that text and necessitating its essential reproduction in order to re-constitute essentially that text as an intentionally constructed deposition with effectively the same intentional  directedness. The degree of textual, and cultural, integrity present in, and behind, that presentation allows us, in some form of proportion to this degree of intentional crystallization, to re-constitute eventually dispositions and depositions with effectively the same degree of integration in intentional directedness.
	Most of these headings are self-descriptive and appeal to common sense, or, our acquaintance with instances of apparent disconformity. However, let me briefly describe each one in order to clarify the nature of these twenty-six proposals, and, when and where appropriate, let me briefly discuss examples of that particular type of apparent disconformity using general observations taken from those two texts chosen for this thesis. All of these proposals will be unobtrusively used, to varying degrees, in the comparative textual examination, and interpretation, as presented in Chapter VII.

A Provisional Scheme For The Hermeneutic Treatment Of 									    	  Apparent Disconformity

1.	Emphasis versus De-Emphasis/Non-Emphasis

	An apparent difference in an initial interpretation might take place through the fact that one of the comparative texts has some partial, or overall, feature subjected to a greater degree of emphasis, or, a greater degree of de-emphasis or non-emphasis. By non-emphasis is meant a general lack of emphasis. By de-emphasis is meant that the text for some reason or other deliberately sets out not to emphasize, or actually de-emphasize, some aspect of that text that under proper consideration is found to be held in common.
	In our Buddhist text we find a greater emphasis placed upon metaphors of illusion (and magic) than is the case with our Neoplatonic text. In our former text we also find a greater degree of emphasis on immanent forms of investigation (under the influence of a more thorough use of deconstructive tendencies) whereas with the latter there is a more marked emphasis on transcendent forms of investigation (under the influence of a less thorough use of deconstructive criticism).

2.	Explicit Meaning versus Implicit Meaning

	An apparent difference in an initial interpretation might take place through the fact that one of the comparative texts has some partial, or overall, feature subjected to a greater degree of explicit formulation or declaration, whereas, the other text, or texts, may present this feature in implicit terms of reference.
	To illustrate this particular proposal I would like to remind the reader that the Neoplatonic tradition uses explicit metaphors of depreciation whereas in the Buddhist tradition we must infer that this state of affairs also applies to certain textual elements and the appropriate attitudes to be held towards them.

3.	Ultimate versus Provisional/Conventional Meaning

	Buddhist hermeneutics, in its exposure to a miscellany of potentially conflicting ideas in the sutras, and schools, developed the idea that certain texts could be treated as literally true or definitive (nitartha) whereas others, the vast majority, could be accepted as true if their truth was correctly interpreted, i.e., as requiring interpretation (neyartha). E.g., the line from the Heart Sutra, a text belonging to the Perfection of Wisdom tradition, that states that form does not exist could not be considered as ultimate and therefore was in need of interpretation on the grounds that it was wrong to say that form does not exist when correctly what is meant is that form, from the ultimate point of view, does not self-exist inherently but, for all that, from the conventional point of view does exist when it does exist. On the other hand the line in the same text that states all form is emptiness is literally correct for it is considered by many Buddhist traditions to be ultimately correct and in no need of interpretation (of the kind just stated). Along similar lines Plotinus' treatment of myth as a text in need of interpretation stands in a similar contrast to its interpretation that, once made, then stands as a text in no need of interpretation. Two texts can therefore be isomorphic from this ultimate point of view even though one or both of those texts might stand in need of its interpretation in order to expose this state of ultimate coincidence.

4.	Stated Meaning versus Unstated Meaning

	A state of textual disconformity might be seen to occur if in one text elements of meaning are left unstated and in some other text those same elements are stated. Moreover, all traditions have their inventory of unstated premises and conventions that rarely, if ever, get mentioned, i.e., stated in textual form. Often these unstated conventions get stated only when some newcomer, or some other tradition or perspective, enters into some form of interaction, or dialogue, with this tradition. Then our interest shifts to the background that contrasts that traditions to expose a number of it unstated conventions and premises.

5.	Expected Meaning versus Unexpected Meaning

	Elements of meaning in their contextual meaningfulness within a tradition can be viewed as either expected or unexpected. This element of the unexpected can present grounds for the apparent disconformity between two or more texts. A creative text, to prevent itself from being seen as a series of cliches, and being treated accordingly, will introduce novel features that might create the illusion of an apparent disconformity with more conservative texts.

6.	Literal Meaning versus Metaphorical Meaning

	A state of apparent disconformity might occur when one text treats a certain philosophical idea in metaphorical language whilst another text may discuss the same type of idea in literal non-metaphorical language. Under this heading I see the use of metaphors of illusion, e.g., as paralleling more direct literal forms of negative theological discourse, or, for that matter, other forms that use a via negativa (or processes of transcendental suspension and deconstruction).

7.	Metaphor: Metaphysical versus Non-Metaphysical Meaning

	Metaphor may, or may not, be explicitly associated with  some form of metaphysical treatment (in its literal-metaphysical thematization of the metaphorical imagery used or implied by a text, a collection of texts or a textual background).
	As a general rule the Neoplatonic tradition is more interested in overt metaphysical exposition, whereas, the Buddhist-Wisdom tradition is, in the course of time, increasingly infiltrated with a covert metaphysical concern. In my opinion I don't see how it would be possible for a philosophic text to avoid metaphysical presuppositions in the exercise of its metaphorical language, or, how it would be possible for a philosophic text to avoid the use of metaphor, analogy, etc. However, a text could be considered to be relatively metaphysically-presuppositionless if it was cast in a transcendental format through the use of some form of transcendental suspension, etc.

8.	General Meaning versus Specific (Encoded) Meaning

	Some texts create an aura of incommensurability through their specific use of language , e.g., in the use of code (as present in tantric texts or veiled allegory, etc.).

9.	Actual Meaning versus Potential Meaning

	By potential meaning is meant that interpretation that can historically be extracted, correctly or incorrectly, from the actual statement of meaning presented in some earlier period of time. The point of this classification is to note that a certain earlier position, through the richness of intervening historical treatment, has the potential of being interpreted, or misinterpreted, from a selective unwinding of the metaphorical, unthematized, non-polarized spirit of that earlier text or texts. That left to its own devices, or under the influence of other traditions or controversies, the essential nature of a tradition can explicate aspects of its own position that may be seen to be at variance with the original position left relatively unthematized with respect to its own potential. Often some controversy, or schism, merely polarizes a previously unpolarized ground that is perhaps best left, by that tradition, unpolarized. Controversial exposition being seen to de-center both the relatively orthodox and the relatively unorthodox in their appreciation of their pre-controversial traditions. In this light we might like to see later forms of the Madhyamaka fighting over how they would like to interpret Nagarjuna and shifting the center of his style from what I would regard as a transcendental-empirical phenomenology to various degrees, and shades, of a transcendental-idealistic phenomenology. This same type of process occurs within the Buddhist tradition as a whole vis-à-vis metaphysical issues, devotional trends, practices of ritual, psychological investigations, etc. Similar (contemporaneous) trends also apparently being found at work in the Neoplatonic tradition?

10.	Cognitive Meaning versus Affective Meaning

	Differences between denotational language and connotational language being found to mask forms of underlying cognitive isomorphism.

11.	Cognitive Meaning versus Transcendental Meaning

	Differences between the cognitive use of language and the transcendental use of language being found to mask forms of underlying cognitive isomorphism. The transcendental use of language being established through the invocation of a transcendental suspension and exercised through processes of reduction-deconstruction, etc. 
	One cognitive form of language is that which is polemical in the style of its expression. In comparison, I believe, a transcendental language could not directly take a simultaneous polemical-cognitive stance even though the critical nature of the transcendental format could be exercised vis-à-vis some non-transcendental exposition. Hence an ostensively transcendental exposition with polemical overtones must be treated with caution; these elements of the text being carefully segregated. In this regard I would make a general textual differentiation between the Buddhist-Wisdom tradition and the Madhyamaka. In a sense both of these traditions exercise a different sense of the critical. Both aspects, to a certain extent, being found to occur in these two texts chosen for this comparative examination.

12.	Polemical Meaning versus Non-Polemical

	A text that has a polemical flavour, or orientation, might take a more logically-cognitive stance towards non-polemical issues (that might be non-cognitive, or trans-cognitive, in orientation).

13. 	Pre-Traditional Meaning versus Traditional Meaning

	Similar religious-philosophical concepts might be shared between pre-traditional religious traditions and current religious traditions which at a textual level might not be clearly appreciated. An inspection of the concept of purification in both the Neoplatonic and the Buddhist-Wisdom traditions with respect to their pre-traditional roots might present us with a good example of an apparent disconformity in this regard?

14.	Theoretical Meaning versus Practical Meaning

	Differences between theoretical and practical orientations might give rise to apparent disconformities or anomalies, etc.

15.	Deep Meaning versus Surface Meaning

	Deep meaning may remain essentially invariant between a number of texts but their surface meaning inscriptions may give rise to a superficial semblance of disconformity. This appearance of disconformity being reinforced through stylistic differences, differences between traditional perspectives, cultural differences, language differences, differences in hermeneutic approach, etc.

16.	Structural Meaning versus Functional Meaning

	Although I am inclined to make no absolute difference between structural meaning and its correlative functional counterpart (through a reciprocity between noema-noesis) some degree of difference does exist if only through differences in their nature, selective interest and the direction of their intentional expectations behind their usage. In this fashion some degree of disconformity might possibly be created, or be only apparently manifested, in a state of relative non-mutual thematization.

17.	Contradictory Meaning versus Resolved Meaning

	The use of paradox, metaphorical ambivalency, suspensional indeterminacy, deconstructive illumination, etc., could contribute to the presence of disconformity if otherwise not resolved adequately. Both texts, it seems, avoid the use of unresolved paradox, etc.

18.	Sense-Orientated Meaning versus Referential Meaning

	The mistaken use, mis-use or oversight of the Fregean sense-reference distinction could also contribute to the general experience of disconformity. Note the (transcendental) phenomenological-hermeneutical use of this distinction (the text being taken as the point of reference).

19.	Uni-referential versus Multi-referential Meaning

	Items that might have, or be given, multiple meanings potentially disconcealing uni-referential coincidences, etc.

20.	Intentional Meaning versus Accidental Meaning

	Mistaken identification of accidental meaning, incidental to central intentional identity, being found to blur the congruence of textual meaning if present.

21.	Convergent Meaning versus Divergent Meaning

	Meaning set in a divergent tangential setting being found to blur the congruence of ground focused upon in a convergence of meaning, if present, between texts.
	In this regard, e.g., commentorial annotation either assisting a convergence of meaning or ensuring a divergent shift in focus. In the temporal development of a text this same type of process might also be able to be demonstrated.

22.	Normal Meaning versus Abnormal Meaning

	Revolutional treatment of normal meaning being found to distort the congruence of essential meaning if still present, and vice versa (the differences in normal meaning concealing the congruence of revolutional meaning if present).

23.	Traditional Meaning versus Radical Meaning

	Similar religious-philosophical concepts might be shared between traditional religious traditions and current radical religious traditions which at a textual level might not be clearly appreciated. The further inspection of the concept of purification in both the Neoplatonic and the Buddhist-Wisdom traditions might present us with a good example of an apparent disconformity in this regard?

24.	Hierarchical Interpretation versus Mis-Interpretation

	The mistaken differences in the use of the genus-species distinction being found to create a logical-hierarchical difference in the location of textual information that should have been regarded as isomorphic, etc.

25.	Provoked Meaning and Evoked Meaning

	The power of some style's dialectical unfolding being found to induce a difference between intersubjectively-provoked meaning and meaningfulness and subjectively-evoked meaning and meaningfulness.
	I.e., the dialectical structures/functions of a text might, through the creation of various forms of cognitive dissonance, provoke an intentionally directed process of resolution dictated by that text read correctly. On the other hand the power of the text might (also) subjectively evoke forms of meaning and meaningfulness not intentionally open either for the author(s) of that text, or those texts, or, for other reader(s) of that text, or those texts. Hence the potential power of a text, through the dialectical establishment of its style, to generate apparent disconformity (through its subjective mis-interpretation).

26.	Transcendent-Analytical versus Immanent-Deconstructive

	Differences in bias, traditional and/or personal, exaggerating the exercise of a transcendental discourse, being seen to influence either an analytical bias towards the hierarchical, the transcendent and conservative, or, a bias towards the de-hierarchical, the immanent and the radical.

Conclusion

	What works one way may work the other way through a fundamental reciprocity at the center of meaning. Needless to say these distinctive categories just listed could just as easily work in a contrary fashion and thereby establishing for us a hermeneutics of actual disconformity. Be that as it may let me end here by noting the provisional and incomplete nature of this classificational scheme.
	This scheme will be quietly adopted in my comparative interpretation exercised in Chapter VII. Reference to these distinctions can be found through noting key-concepts taken from these headings, or their description and discussion, as presented in this chapter.

Endnotes V - Hermeneutics of Apparent Disconformity