Chapter VII - A Comparative Hermeneutical Differentiation

	In this chapter I would like to apply the following three heuristic devices sketched out in this thesis, namely, the expanded hermeneutic circle (Chapters III-IV), the hermeneutics of apparent disconformity (Chapter V) and the hermeneutics of absolute typology (Chapter VI). By the use of these means I hope to differentiate in what fashion, and to what extent, certain distinct features could be assembled to  characterize, in general terms of reference, an essential difference in style between these two traditions. In the first four chapters of this thesis I have looked at, or alluded to, certain characteristic features that appear to be shared by these two traditions that would seem to suggest, on this interpreted surface at least, some reasonable degree of isomorphic structural and functional coincidence, or accommodation. However, in this chapter I shall differentiate, in terms of absolute-transcendental style, in what fashion these two traditions should be demarcated within this accommodation.
	I perceive both the Neoplatonic tradition and the Buddhist-Wisdom tradition to be instances of an absolute style of religious-philosophy in accordance with the trans-phenomenological, or transcendental, definition of the sense of an absolute perspective as previously discussed at various points in this thesis. In this chapter I would like to concentrate my interest on the actual conditional expression of that style, i.e., on the style these two texts take as instances of an absolute genre (in their resolution of various philosophical and religious problems) and in what general manner these two text therein differ.
	In my scheme for the typological differentiation of certain forms of absolute philosophical style, as presented in the last chapter, I noted a section titled Pre-Conditional Considerations with two sub-headings. The first sub-heading deals with historical pre-conditions and demands an historical treatment, and analysis, which is correctly outside the terms of reference of this thesis. The next section concerns the thoroughly applied theoretical shift in attention from a phenomenal (or phenomenological) perspective to a trans-phenomenal (or trans-phenomenological) perspective. A sense of the absolute-transcendental dimension could be defined by any one or more of these attitudes. Rather than systematically discussing these directions that give us an access to the experience of a transcendental dimension, and its descriptive/prescriptive style of discourse, let me note that all involve the putting in place of a transcendental suspension (epoche) as defined under the conditional heading of Type I (as outlined in that scheme). In a sense the transcendental perspective changes the signature, or re-writes what has been bracketed. With our return to the phenomenal dimension via reconstitutional investigation, we should find nothing is lost, rather, we have in fact gained a transcendental perspective upon, or insight into, the possibility, the constitutional structural-function and the apparent actuality of that under examination. In accordance with this transcendental-phenomenological circle we gain our transcendental access via the moment of transcendental suspension and we also make our metaphorical exit from that same point. Therefore, in lieu of such a discussion let me commence this comparative analysis starting with a re-examination of the nature of a transcendental suspension, define its necessity for the instantiation of a transcendental-absolute style of discourse, and, demonstrate instances of its presence, and central importance, in these two texts. That completed I shall then continue this comparative examination using this provisional heuristic device for an examination of textual instances of the genre of absolute-religious philosophy (as opposed to instances of the genre of absolutist philosophy which must individually fail to enter this classificational scheme through their failure to meet the conditions imposed by a transcendental suspension as outlined under the heading of Type I).

A Comparative Textual Examination Of The Conditional Nature Of Absolute Typology  With Respect To The Neoplatonic And 										Buddhist Traditions 

Type I - Centralized Imposition of a Transcendental 							Suspension that is Achieved through...

		a.	Pre-cognitive affective neutralization,
		b.	Balance of cognitive processes,
		c.	Suspension of cognitive content,
		d.	Central placement of this approach.

	As a pre-requisite for the putting in play of a state of transcendental suspension is the need for some form of affective neutralization or emotional balance. If, e.g., our foot had been just chopped off I don't believe that we, or most of us i.e., have the luxury of being able to put in place a calmly detached state of transcendental suspension. This pre-condition of a state of affective balance is, therefore, not correctly a transcendental suspension per se but a pre-requisite for the same. Some one with an unusual sense of (transcendental-)self presence might be able to rise above states of sub-acute, and acute, forms of distress but for those of us without such super-human skills all cognitive forms of pursuit must involve some degree of affective neutralization and balance. In this manner I interpret the association of meditational-like states of calmness, tranquility, emotional repose, etc., that often accompany this style of text, either implicitly or explicitly. It should go without saying that if the person wants to exercise a transcendental perspective upon their cognitive forms of research the same type of affairs must also apply to the agitation of cognitive states of mental experience, and this is recognized in our second sub-heading. This latter state of ongoing cognitive neutralization, I believe, is achieved through a balance of analytical-reduction and synthetical-reconstitution which in turn co-thematizes this state of transcendental suspension (as the necessary preparation for the reduction of cognitive content, or the epoche proper, etc.). The transcendental suspension of cognitive content taking two forms, namely, a suspension of the total sense of a world-thesis as entailed in the natural attitude, and, its subsequent application to particular instances of phenomenal treatment, individual case by individual case. I don't perceive this putting in play of a transcendental suspension of cognitive content as involving the absolute enplacement of a transcendental suspension, rather, there is put in play the necessary relative degree of suspension and reduction that allows the development of sufficient transcendental insight to arise. I.e., there is the thorough application of this method, in principle, to all phenomenal fields of phenomenological research, and within a particular field of research, without involving processes of extreme reductionism. This process of descriptive essential-insight being reinforced, or re-confirmed, through the return to the phenomenal dimension (on a cognitive level of treatment) through the imposition of the cognitive balancing act of transcendental reconstitution (along with its provisional powers of interpretation).
	In summary I noted three interrelated forms of transcendental suspension, namely, affective neutralization, cognitive balance between processes of reduction and reconstitution, and a suspension of cognitive content (involving a de-phenomenalizational treatment of the same, or i.e., an exposure of its transcendental constitution). This latter treatment involved the global suspension of the natural attitude (in terms of all value-structure) and the localized treatment of that particular or general phenomenal event, or situation, under examination. It was noted that this imposition of an overall transcendental suspension and its subsequent reduction was relative to the situation to hand in such a manner as to be sufficient to the productive nature of those transcendental investigations. This last point is important to recognize as it is not necessary, in accordance with this view, to conduct our transcendental research in extreme logical, or more correctly, pre-logical terms of reference. Once the necessary transcendental depth has been supplied it is then not necessary to go to any deeper level of constitutional formation in order to expose the relevant level of structural-functional constitution, or the phenomenal fingerprint, of that under investigation.
	Let me now briefly cite some textual fragments that, in my understanding, indicate that these three aspects of the overall transcendental suspension are indeed in place. 
	Plotinus tells us in the following passage that in the unity of seer and seen there is an overcoming of movement (that accompanies the world of multiplicity), a bypassing of emotion and desire (through a purification of the soul) and a transcendence of cognitive thought in a state of quiet solitude:

He was one himself, with no distinction in himself either in relation to himself or to other things - for there was no movement in him and he had no emotion, no desire for anything else when he had made the ascent - but there was not even reason or thought, and he himself was not there, if we must even say this; but he was as if carried away or possessed by a god, in a quiet solitude and a state of calm.
	In interpreting the nature of this quiet solitude and state of calm a number of contextual considerations must be taken into account, namely, pre-traditional factors, an ethical viewpoint, the Neoplatonic treatment of intentionality, meditational influences, stoical detachment, an emanational-cosmological context, soteriological forms of reversion, self-reflection of the Neoplatonic sense of an Absolute, etc. Before I very briefly note these factors let me point out that collectively a sense of quiet withdrawal permeates the entire Neoplatonic vision of religious-philosophy even though much of this influence is implicit and often left unstated.
	The pre-traditional concept of a calming of the mind has been re-interpreted by Plotinus within the framework of an emanational cosmos. The idea is not novel but its treatment is certainly characteristic of Plotinus' systematic re-evaluation of traditional positive material. 
	In a similar fashion to that as found in the Buddhist-Wisdom tradition the Neoplatonic perspective on ethical matters is one that envisions a harmonious functioning of the person, through the development of virtue, both psychologically and socially, that ensures stable grounds for spiritual insight and self-transformation. Without this prior degree of harmony it would be considered by these two traditions that no religious phenomenological investigations could be fruitfully undertaken.
	The Neoplatonic treatment of intentionality involves the position that the multiplicity of logical subjects, predication, relations, etc., generated by the mind involves an element of movement, divergence, distance, separation, a sense of alienation, etc. A reversal of this is called for so that the soul can re-direct its attention, or orientation, towards the Neoplatonic vision of the Absolute. Hence an emphasis on a withdrawal inwards away from the agitated world of multiplicity in order to experience that which is considered to be relatively more true and more real. Hand in hand with this meditational stance is also a sense of stoic detachment.
	The Neoplatonic emanational scheme also re-interprets this necessity for an affective suspension by investing it with the force of an imperative along the lines that a soteriological dimension demands the reversion of this emanational process that functionally enstructures secular and sacred reality. That to a certain extent by mirroring the  stillness of the One like can know like (through some form of a sympathetic trans-intentional format).
	The systematic complex overlapping of these various senses ensures that an affective suspension is central to the structural-function of the Neoplatonic landscape. Implicated is also an aspect of purification although this concept is also invested with a transcendental re-interpretation as noted elsewhere:

...the soul too, when it is separated from the lusts which it has through the body with which it consorted too much, and freed from its other affections... For, as it was said in old times, self-control, and courage and every virtue, is a purification, and so is wisdom itself.
	Our Buddhist text also has this same flavour that I have defined as a pre-cognitive affective suspension. In a like fashion much of this attitude is implicit and often unstated. Pre-traditional and traditional-Buddhist influences do not mark this aspect out as abnormal but the systematic tenor of this philosophy re-interprets it in a transcendental-absolute frame of reference. The wider structural-functional aspects found implicated in the Neoplatonic text do not easily map onto the type of usage found in our Buddhist-Wisdom text. However, in its core aspect as a form of pre-meditational neutralization of pre-cognitive processes and content I do perceive an essential isomorphic correspondence. In the (root) Verses to this text of The Perfection of Wisdom in 8,000 Lines we find:

But when he does not course in form, in feeling, in perception, in will or consciousness,... his thoughts on non-production - then the best of calming trances cleave to him. Through that the Bodhisattva now dwells tranquil in himself... If, freed from the notion of multiple things, he courses in peace.

	In the main text itself we find:

She (the Perfection of Wisdom) shows that the world is empty, unthinkable, calmly quiet. As purified of itself she shows up the world, she makes it known, she indicates it.
	The next aspect of this re-defined sense of transcendental suspension involves the psychic balance of analytical-reductive processes with synthetical-reconstitutional processes. In the course of this thesis reconstitution has been defined as equivalent to processes of re-simulation, deconstruction, abstraction, synthetic investigations, etc., and is seen to establish the contextual-functioning meaningfulness of those investigations. Working on the principles that deconstruction necessitates the presence of material to deconstruct; that absolute reduction has neither meaning nor meaningfulness; and, that a suspension allows us to enter a hermeneutic process of examination in keeping with the nature of that suspension, we should conclude that all three aspects are co-thematizationally dependent. That established it would only be necessary to show that all three aspects are explicitly at work in our texts to infer that some form of balance between these three aspects is actually in place (regardless of whether a particular text explicitly notes this necessary fact of textual expression and/or hermeneutical fact of interpretation).
	Reductive tendencies effectively involve a search for, discovery and pre-determined treatment of, essential meaning that distinctively defines the phenomenal event to be of a certain distinctive kind, and, that the participant, or participants, of that specific phenomenal situation to be a specific logical subject (as an exclusive member, or members, of that set defined by that form of logical subjectivity). I.e., I perceive the reductive tendency to define either the general form of a logical subject or the specific nature (or history) of a particular logical subject. Counter-balancing this reductive emphasis on essential definition is the de-definitional tendencies of reconstruction viewed as the deconstruction of definitional essentialization (as an enstructuralization of meaning). Analysis is an analytical reduction of direct, or indirect, experiential meaningfulness and its structural conversion into meaning. Reversal of this process is to create meaningfulness by returning structural meaning into the context of its functioning meaningfulness.
	In the light of this technical explanation we can, I believe, view Neoplatonic forms and Buddhist dharmas as reductive products discovered in, and used as the foundations for, processes of reduction. These two opposing, but counter-balancing processes of reduction and reconstitution, will be textually demonstrated and examined in the next section under the heading of Type II.
	Now let me attend to textually demonstrating the suspension of cognitive content, more correctly the Husserlian form of the epoche. As suggested we can investigate this on a global basis and on an individual phenomenal basis.
	A global epoche involves, in effect, the complete suspension of the natural attitude which in the case of our two texts involves various pre-traditional and traditional forms of positive-theological formularization. The central enplacement of metaphors of disvaluation, e.g., metaphors of illusion, depreciation and magic, I believe, ensures that this form of overall suspension is not only put in place but kept in place (two primary pre-conditions for the transcendental style of discourse). The dialectical power of the metaphor is such that as long as its overall metaphorical sense of indeterminate presence is left in place this transcendental suspensional state of affairs will naturally persist. Any literal treatment of the metaphor must, therefore, also be subjected to a parallel de-literalization of that sub-text. In these two texts we find this process of de-literalization taking place through a variety of devices, a number of which we have already discussed, e.g., qualification of the power of language, (re-)use of paradox, suggestion of silence, restoration of the sense of the analogous, the metaphorical, etc.
	Remembering the inclusive indeterminacy of the metaphor, in its ability to entertain both thesis and counter-thesis, note how in the following two quotations, the first taken from the Enneads and the second taken from the text of The Perfection of Wisdom in 8,000 Lines, that the sense of the natural world (and all its inherent positive theological treatment) is subjected to a state of transcendental suspension. Transcendental through the trans-phenomenal nature of its metaphorical appreciation:

... its apparent being (matter) is not real, but a sort of fleeting frivolity... nothing but phantoms in a phantom, like something in a mirror... it is all seeming. Imitations of real being pass into and out of it...

For all dharmas are empty in their own-being, they have none of the properties of a living being, they have no life, no individuality, no personality, they are like an illusion, a dream, an echo, a reflected image. When you contemplate the true reality of all dharmas... you shall before long go forth into the perfection of wisdom.
	I am not suggesting here that the use of metaphors of illusion by both of these traditions is exactly the same in a broad sense. For a start the Plotinian vision of matter in its emanational context hardly parallels dharmic constructions.  However, in a narrow sense centered on this concept of suspension it appears to me we do find an essential agreement. Suspension could be interpreted as having the following form - although a is of type x let us bracket this ascription, through the carefully balanced application of a phenomenological form of skepticism, in such a manner as to treat a as both x and not-x. In the case of global suspension a is equivalent to the sense of the world as entertained in its entirety in the natural attitude. In line with this definition we can interpret matter or dharmas as indicating this latter sense of the natural-phenomenal world. Close inspection of these two texts should allow us to make this identification. Plotinus criticizes the expression matter taken to mean something corporeal when, in accordance with his analysis, it should correctly be seen as incorporeal. In a like fashion the apparent substantiality of the world should be so treated (in trans-empirical terms of reference). In this Buddhist-Wisdom text the traditional Buddhist interpretation of the world, in terms of fleeting dharmic assemblages, is also to be viewed as mistaken (in trans-empirical terms of reference). In this text of The Perfection of Wisdom in 8,000 Lines the world (loka) is defined as nothing other than the five skandhas of form, feeling, perception, will and consciousness and as the latter are empty the same applies to the former. The skandhas are one major form of dharmic classification. For the sake of simplicity, at this point in my argument, let me say that dharmas, as dharmic constructions, are the essentially identified features of a phenomenal event or situation that are classified, mentally constructed, identified and labelled for the convenience of a variety of conventional-mundane purposes. However, for soteriological purposes, this tradition believes that left in this conventional-relative attitude (or phenomenal world) the person cannot experience things as they really are (yathabhutam) along with the spiritual and salvific transformation this transcendental insight (prajna) has for the spiritual person. Hence the mundane-natural vision of the world is put in a state of suspension. From an empirical perspective the world is not denied, but, from an ultimate-transcendental perspective this natural treatment is viewed as mistaken. Both the Neoplatonic and the Buddhist treatment of the natural sense of the world has the same structural-functional sense of logical form, namely:

that the world is and is not,
and suspension of being is illustrated and reinforced through metaphors of disvaluation, especially those involving comparison to states of illusion. The paradox finding a similar resolution, namely: 

that from an empirical perspective the world is and from an ultimate transcendental-absolute perspective the world as it empirically appears is not so constituted phenomenally, without sacrificing the transcendental sense of the accompanying state of suspension.
	But neither tradition reserves this textual practice of suspension merely for its use on a global dimension and re-applies the same type of process to items both phenomenal and positively theological in complexion (with or without some form of an association with a sense of the numinous). However, without a doubt, this global application centralizes this process of transformation and radically reorganizes, and helps to systematize, the associated positive theological background creating simultaneously a transcendental-absolute style of discourse, transcendental by virtue of its trans-phenomenological perspective.
	Plotinus in the following series of extracts can be observed, either directly or indirectly, to apply this process of suspension to a series of phenomenal attributes in his exposition dealing with the nature of the soul and our knowledge of the same:

But one must not have evil, or any other good either, ready to hand, that the soul alone may receive it alone... and does not speak of itself as in body, not man, or living thing, or being, or all... lifting them so high that they are not in place nor in anything other... the soul does not move then either, because that does not move. Nor, then, is it soul, because that does not live, but is above life. Nor is it intellect, because that does not think either...
	Characteristic of this style of discourse, and exemplified in both of these texts, is the tendency for strings of suspensional negations. On a superficial reading, without at least the implicit adoption of some form of hermeneutic method, this type of text is very confusing to comprehend. As Plotinus, indeed, intimates to the advantage of the (hermeneutical) practitioner:

But the soul sees by a kind of confusing and anulling the intellect which abides within...
	In our Buddhist text we find an even greater use of lengthy lists of negational suspensions. We are also warned about the potentially confusing and frightening nature of the perfection of wisdom but we are also told that the Bodhisattva rises above this particular state of anxiety:

Since I neither find, nor apprehend, nor see a dharma `Bodhisattva,' nor a `perfect wisdom,' what Bodhisattva shall I instruct and admonish in what perfect wisdom? And yet, O Lord, if, when this is pointed out, a Bodhisattva's heart does not become cowed, nor stolid, does not despair nor despond, if he does not turn away or become dejected, does not tremble, is not frightened or terrified, it is just this Bodhisattva, this great being who should be instructed in perfect wisdom... When he thus stands firm, that is his instruction and admonition.
	In the following list of negational suspensions we read (in a section of text that is reminiscent of the compression of the Heart Sutra):

Armed with this great armour, the Bodhisattva should so develop that he does not take his stand on any of these: not on form, feeling, etc., not on eye, ear, etc., not on forms, sounds, etc., until we come to: not on mind-consciousness, etc., until we come to: not on the elements, etc., ...He should not take his stand on the idea that `this is form,' etc., to `this is Buddhahood.' He should not take his stand on the ideas that `form is permanent, or impermanent,' ...that `form is self, or not the self,'...that form is empty, or apprehended as something'...
	In this list we find both direct and indirect forms of suspension. We must assume that it is the phenomenal aspect of meaning that is under negational attack allowing us, therefore, to perceive this suspension to be effectively transcendental in orientation. Moreover, the accumulative consequences of this unrelenting pressure must also ensure an effective centralization of this transformational process. Further, this form of treatment can also be seen to be philosophically systematic in both senses of that word, i.e., thorough and methodical, and, integrating and self-unified.
	Thus I would conclude that both traditions utilize a transcendental suspension in all three senses outlined and that this thoroughly applied textual procedure is centrally placed in the metaphorical heart of that ensuing transcendental-absolute style of discourse. This fact alone would, I believe, also ensure sufficient grounds for a commensurable dialogue between these two traditions, not that any form of fruitful dialogue, real or virtual, is without its inherent difficulties.

Type II - Type I + Exercise of a Transcendental
						Reduction/Reconstitution

	On the understanding that reconstitution, through deconstruction or abstraction, is the de-definitional treatment of prior definitional-reductive forms of treatment, and, the emphasis in this style of text is on reconstitution then our demonstration of the latter could be seen to confirm indirectly the explicit, or implicit, presence of the former. With this understanding in mind let me briefly re-examine only the reconstitutional aspect of our investigations through a comparison of Neoplatonic processes of abstraction and Buddhist-Wisdom processes of deconstruction.
	The Neoplatonic use of abstraction is theoretically exercised in the context of its emanational treatment of reality. However, from the perspective of the One, we might say such structuralization of reality was effectively an illusion. Only the One was real, above existence and non-existence, self-subsistent, etc. Abstraction, as a process of reversion, returning us to this state of primacy. What then, could we ask, experiences this unified state of Being that transcends the epistemological and ontological aspects of our being in the world? Although Plotinus never states that we truly loose a personal sense of being from the phenomenal perspective, it would be correct to say, I believe, in so far as we could use language, that in some trans-intentional intuitive form the One self-experiences its own Being. I will examine this aspect later under the heading of Type VIII but suffice to say that Plotinus walks a tightrope with the philosophical dangers of treating the One as an intentional thinker on one side, and, as a misguided view that the One is a state without thought like the near non-existent nature of matter on the other.
	In our Buddhist text  there are a number of quotations that vaguely suggest a Neoplatonic sense of the One (but this aspect will be dealt with under the heading Type VII). However, from the ultimate perspective all entertained forms of phenomenal reality are declared to be empty without reified foundations (along the metaphysical lines of substance, self, etc.). Prominently included in this blanket assertion are dharmas, all forms of dharmic characterization, construction and identity. Dharmas are a key-indicator that point out some form of explicit, or implicit, reductive analysis is taking place, or has taken place. As previously suggested this analysis is effectively retrospective in orientation, already pre-conducted and at least implicit in this type of text, being implicated as the subject matter for the processes of deconstructional treatment indicated, more often than not, by the use of the expression emptiness (sunyata) or empty (sunya). In effect the structural-functional form of reality, in both traditions, from the transcendental-absolute perspective is essentially flat, itself without depth, mono-dimensional, etc. In this Buddhist text this undifferentiated vision of absolute reality  has the same characterization, or rather non-characterization, namely, sameness (samata). As all this apparent reality is empty it thus has the same non-dharmic characterization of sameness (because even dharmas have the same non-characterization, linking characterization (laksana) with dharmic forms of definitional analysis). In a sense we could say that transcendental foundations are non-foundations, i.e., there are no foundations (equating foundations with reified foundations because with reified foundations reality could not function to paraphrase Nagarjuna). But this Neoplatonic text has the same type of paradoxical position to the effect that its foundations are equally non-phenomenally characterizable. 
	I hesitate to say flat, there are unfortunate connotations in that expression. Perhaps we might prefer to say a plenitude, or like the undifferentiated nature of space, or as an infinite sense of power? However, to link these epithets, and other possible candidates, to both traditions would cause me to stretch my hermeneutical approaches to apparent disconformity to some considerable length for little profit. Let me just say, therefore, that to evacuate excessively the meaning of some term or non-term, as representing the sense of the absolute, through some form of abstraction or deconstruction, is going to present us with the same mono-dimensional, or non-dimensional, type of expression. In this regard the expressions the One and the emptiness of phenomenal reality have little to separate them from each other other than in the mix of metaphors allowed to accompany them. These metaphors taking either a positive negative theologically invested complexion and/or new expressions invested with this radical negative theological background. However, it is my observation that both of these traditions are essentially conservative despite the potentially radical nature of their philosophical-politics and as a consequence prefer to use, and reinterpret, terms with a positive orthodox background.
	The point of this apparent digression is to state my view that from the transcendental perspective there is not much to separate these two philosophies in their use of reconstitutional forms of investigation. For the remainder of this section let me engineer a comparison of these two processes of abstraction and deconstruction at work to illustrate this point.
 	Plotinus in the following quotation tells us that:

But since it is the principle of beauty it makes that beautiful of which it is the  principle, and makes it beautiful not in shape; but it makes the very beauty which comes to be from it to be shapeless, but in shape in another way... Therefore that which participates in beauty is shaped, not beauty.
   Therefore, even when it is called beauty, one must even more avoid shape of this kind; but it must not be set before the eyes, that you may fall out of beauty into what is called beauty by obscure participation. But the shapeless form is beautiful, since it is form, and is so in proportion to the length you go stripping all shape from it... When the intellect thinks one particular thing, it is diminished, as it is also even if it takes together all things that are in the intelligible realm... These beautiful things, then, must be measured and limited, but not the really beautiful or rather the super-beautiful...
	The end of this quotation intimates a sense of the de-definitional, a super-definition that transcends the definition of a thesis and its anti-thesis (as some form of an anti-thetical contrast). So the trace of the shapeless allows that which is shaped to be beautiful. Abstraction, therefore, could also be seen to return the reductively derived definition back to its definitional ground wherein the contrast between the definitional thesis and its anti-thesis (or counter-thesis) can be meaningfully drawn. This reversal also suggesting that the super-definition itself can also be reversed and returned to its super-definitional ground, etc., until we arrive at some sense of an absolute, or, an absolute as the primal ground (as the transcendental possibility for definitional treatment).  The overall nature of this process being a reversal of perceptual and conceptual thinking. Plotinus defines intellection as a movement, in this case abstraction being treated as the movement from an intentional object back to its trans-intentional roots). In this Buddhist text we find an equal emphasis placed on experiential processes that counter, neutralize or avoid intellectualized processes of perception, conception, naming, use of conventional language, etc.
	This shapelessness of the Beautiful in its logical format parallels this Buddhist-Wisdom text when it states:

It is just through their essential nature that those dharmas are not a something. Their nature is no-nature, and their no-nature is their nature. Because all dharmas have one mark only, i.e., no mark... It is thus that all those points of attachment are abandoned.
	Let me demonstrate why I believe this type of argument has a parallel with the Neoplatonic exercise of abstraction (minus its metaphysics). Let us for the sake of the argument, using this argument-format, investigate beautiful dharmas (dharmas of beauty) and dharmas of shape. The argument would then run like this:

The nature of beautiful dharmas (as dharmas of beauty) is that they have no-nature, i.e., are not beautiful (being beautiless, i.e., being beyond the phenomenal expression of beautiful states), therefore those dharmas are beautiful dharmas; the nature of dharmas of shape is that they have no-nature, i.e., are shapeless, therefore, they are dharmas of shape.
	Now I admit that this substitution is stretched but I believe my adaptation of this argument still essentially holds. The paradox created in the equation of nature and no-nature is only apparent on the grounds that this type of transcendental-absolute style deals only with soluble forms of paradox, i.e., paradoxes that have some form of resolution. More often than not a process of resolution is achieved through the use of a transcendental-phenomenal distinction. Let me apply this distinction and re-interpret this apparent puzzle.
	For a start, I believe, we have three clues, besides the overall dialectical format of this type of argument, that strongly suggest that we have the involvement of a transcendental dimension or perspective. The first clue resides in the equation presented by the apparent paradox, an equation that, I might add, only works when conducted from the transcendental perspective. The second clue resides in the sense of transcendental suspension introduced through that equation of a thesis and its anti-thesis. A third clue also presents itself through the strange nature of the negation presented in the form of the anti-thesis (or counter-thesis), a negation that does not appear so much to negate but to ensure the de-definitional transcendence of that collectively embraced under a non-destructive state of suspension. An examination of the nature of the thesis should also reveal its treatment as an essential product of a reductive process that has in effect located a distinctive aspect of the phenomenal by stripping away all that is non-essential to that distinction. Dealing with beauty, e.g., has the implication that we are not dealing with the non-beautiful. 
	The essential characterization of the thesis (in accordance with the traditional treatment of universals adopted by the positive theology) and its association with the transcendental nature of the implicated suspension tells us, via this heuristic device of the transcendental-phenomenological circle, if I am correct, that we are dealing with the product(s)/process(es) of transcendental reduction. The first clue I would interpret as informing us that the definitional process that isolates the essential nature of the thesis is going to be reversed, i.e., de-defined through a process of abstraction or deconstruction. The second clue I would interpret as informing us that a process of transcendental suspension is in play. The third clue I would interpret as informing us that a process of de-definition is actually underway. As all three moments of this heuristic device of the transcendental-phenomenological circle are effectively accounted for then we can assume that a negative theological process is involved. That accepted, along with the metaphorical circular nature of this dialectical process, we now have to hand a variety of ways of interpreting this process of transcendental transformation (to complicate the picture). We could either interpret this dialectical argument format from any one of these three orientations (of suspension, reduction or reconstitution), or, as in transition from any one of these orientations to some other giving us in total nine perspectives upon this device of an apparent paradox. More realistically a blend of these perspectives would surface in keeping with the nature of that under negative theological attack in the context of its metaphysical presuppositions and/or its relatively pre-metaphysical presuppositionlessness. I make this last point to note that the Buddhist perspective is relatively purified of metaphysical presuppositions whilst the Neoplatonic perspective is only partially purified of metaphysical presuppositions. The emanational context, when left intact, is certainly metaphysical in its hermeneutical influence for some one reading that text. As I have argued elsewhere Plotinus may de-define essential definitions, as exercised by the forms, he barely criticizes the hierarchical structure in which this reductive process was exercised within. Although it is a moot point that that hierarchy of definitional exercise could be completely dismantled since the overall transcendental position may criticize reductive tendencies they are also reinstated by the circular nature of the dialectic. Hence my critical qualification that this dismantling is only relative to that level of transcendental critique in question (the exercise of suspension(s) and reduction(s) taking us no further beneath the level of our investigations than that necessary for the successfulness of those investigations). The soteriological importance of this transcendental de-reification is alluded to at the end of the last quotation taken from this text of The Perfection of Wisdom in 8,000 Lines when it states:

It is thus that all those points of attachment are abandoned.
	All these ideas embedded in the linguistic signs of language, from the transcendental perspective, are no longer to be treated as things (as onta) and are to be abandoned and thereby, in the process, assist the person spiritually to remove themselves from this world of desire (through a suspension and neutralization of those desires, and, the transcendental reconstruction of those points of attachment in such a manner that their re-perception is then seen as no more than mental constructs):

What factual entity does the world `being' denote?
The word `being' denotes no dharma or non-dharma. It is a term that has been added on as something adventitious, groundless, as nothing in itself, unfounded in objective fact.

	To stress this point we are also told:

Where there is no perception, appellation, conception or conventional expression, there one speaks of `perfection of wisdom.'
	This is reminiscent of what Plotinus tells us on a number of occasions to the effect that we must:

	Take away everything!
	Hence I would conclude that both traditions utilize similar forms of negative theological treatment with an emphasis on processes of abstraction or deconstruction. If I was forced to make some distinction between these two terms I would probably perceive processes of abstraction as involving a greater degree of metaphysical contextualization and re-interpretation, along with a hierarchical stratification of definitional exercise. But then I would not go so far as to state that the Buddhist use of deconstruction, of the type examined in this thesis, is completely free of metaphysical influences either. One might say relatively free. The moment of transcendental reduction would allow us to re-write, I believe, the traditional positive theological background from a transcendental perspective. Deconstruction deconstructing, but not destroying, such progressively re-interpreted metaphysical `baggage' (or `vestments' that re-define that particular tradition as of that particular tradition). It is certainly one of the points that I would like to make later in this chapter that the text of The Perfection of Wisdom in 8,000 Lines shows increasingly thematized metaphysical influences that could be construed as suggesting that the Buddhist transcendental-absolute style of discourse has the historical potential of aligning itself with a Neoplatonic-like metaphysical sense of the numinous, cosmos, emanation, etc., and vice versa.

Type III - Types I & II + Sense of Religious Framework/
									   Commitment

	The first two type of absolute philosophical style are differentiated without regard to a religious dimension and its aspects of ritual, soteriology, sense of religious commitment, etc. In reading these two texts it is obvious that a religious dimension, and attitude, is being presented and can be quite easily discerned. There is little point, therefore, in my arguing for this sense of religious dimension. Let me note, before moving on, that, philosophical polemics put to the side, both traditions have a rather detached and non-sectarian flavour. This is also reflected in their emphasis upon religious means rather than religious ends. Hence my treatment of their concepts of salvation and devotion, e.g., as a practice of salvationalism and devotionalism. To some considerable extent  religious goals and consequences are left, at best, in a state of positive suspension. A sense of spiritual transformation is affirmed, a complex-systematic methodology is detailed but the consequences of that attitude are not elaborated, except metaphorically, in keeping with the tenor of a negative theological exposition.

Type IV - Type III + Trans-Intentional Intuitive
								Considerations

	Both traditions have an intentional understanding on the nature of consciousness. Moreover, both traditions also display a depreciatory attitude towards intentional thought processes uncritically exercised within the ambit of the natural attitude. We must be careful in our hermeneutical interpretation of this aspect of these two traditions to treat this process of disvaluation as a critical translation of cognitively treated phenomenal events and situations. In this process of translation, into a transcendental-phenomenological format, there is a transformational re-evaluation of the former in terms of a transcendental-absolute vision of reality. That vision takes the form of a transcendental-phenomenological perspective that investigates the constitution of meaning-structures/functions exercised both in a positive theologically influenced natural attitude and its critical negative theological re-construction. Thus we must be careful not to misinterpret this critical re-construction in either an absolutist framework or in some form of a nihilistic (or relativistic) perspective. The latter perspective is very tempting for the repetitive use of negation, suspension, metaphorical forms of disvaluation, etc., all too easily create a superficial atmosphere wherein it would be quite natural to misinterpret intentional thought as either being that which should be denied, or as that which has to be denied, for spiritual insight to have already arisen, or, as a pre-condition for it to arise. If I am correct in this interpretation neither text is instructing the reader to paralyze or stop the passage of their natural existence, make their minds a complete blank, absolutely destroy all processes of intellectual thought, cease to perceive, refrain from naming objects exercised in an empirical frame of reference, etc. This is not only counter-intuitive to religious common sense but quite at odds with statements to the effect that this style of text does not intend that type of interpretation. 

	We find in the Enneads Plotinus telling us:

Nor is it intellect, because that does not think either; for one must be made like. It does not even think that it does not think.
	The last sentence indicates quite clearly that there must not be a thought that we are not thinking as that is tantamount to entertaining, or trying to entertain, a clear-cut contradiction. Thus we must not conclude from a superficial reading of this type of comment that thought is absolutely lacking or meant to be completely absent. Just prior to this last quotation Plotinus tells us:

And the soul is so disposed then as even to despise intelligence, which at other times it welcomed, because intelligence is a kind of movement, and the soul does not want to move...   Intellect also, then, has one power for thinking, by which it looks at the things in itself, and one by which it looks at what transcends it by a direct awareness and reception, by which also before it saw only, and by seeing acquired intellect and is one.
	This looking at things can be interpreted as intentional; the natural state of consciousness to be a consciousness of something intended. On the other hand the reversal of this directedness is in effect a transcendental consciousness that reverses this process of intentional movement or directedness. But we must be careful here for if we assume a noetic-noematic correlation a reversal of our intentional directedness, on the cognitive level of its formation, merely alerts us to the noetic act, as a process, that is, or was, entertaining its associated noematic content. Plotinus appears to mean a transcendent form of reflection (that looks at the level of the noetic-noematic correlation itself). I.e., a type of reflection that reveals the transcendental constitution of that under investigation. But transcendental constitution is the constitution of that being constituted for consciousness and to remove its cognitive process-content would equally remove all sense of a constitution being reviewed by a transcendental-consciousness. 
	I am reluctant to introduce a transcendental-psychological account of this process, and thereby further complicate the terms of reference for this thesis, but let me state my opinion that a transcendental-psychology runs parallel to a transcendental-phenomenology, and, that this type of experience is essentially that of a trans-cognitive process of judgment (whose a priori constitution is established at the level of our transcendental-phenomenology). I perceive judgment (in its conditional nature) as being experienced as essentially spontaneous. The act of judgment is therefore trans-intentional. The moment we treat it as as an intentional act the moment of judgment has past. We then treat the act of judgment as a judgment. In this light we might like to interpret Plotinus' comment that this type of experience entails a direct awareness (reading direct as spontaneous, and, as an experiential absence of a sense of intentional distance between the intentional subject and the intentional object in the actual moment of judgment).
	In the previous quotation we see Plotinus telling us that we should despise, i.e., disvalue, intentional thinking only in religious or soteriological terms of reference; i.e., when we are not directly involved in our living in the natural attitude. Moreover, we are also told that this disvaluation is only a step in an ascent in which the person mingles his seeing with what he contemplates, so that what was seen before has now become sight in him, and he forgets all other objects of contemplation. My interpretation of this just quoted fragment suggesting a shift from the intentional attitude to the trans-intentional attitude without the destruction of an intentional basis. Hence what was seen before now becomes a sight in him. The accumulative consequences of this translational approach reconstructing a negative theologically inspired re-evaluation of the natural attitude from the trans-intentional perspective of a transcendental-absolute dimension.
	Stripping much of the peripheral Neoplatonic metaphysical implications associated with this attitude can we read, and interpret, this Buddhist text as using the same type of trans-intentional approach? 
	Inevitably when an intentional attitude is involved a trans-intentional attitude is also implicated through some form of disvaluation and/or transcendental translation:

Because the dharmas do not exist in such a way as foolish, untaught, common people are accustomed to suppose...
Foolish, untaught, common people have settled down in them... they have constructed all dharmas... (which do not exist)... Having constructed them, they settle down in the extremes... and construct past, present and future dharmas... they settle down in name and form... In consequence they do not go forth from the triple world... For that reason they come to be styled `fools.'
	The obvious depreciatory tone of this text suggests that the foolish person is only at fault for supposing that dharmas in their ultimate nature actually exist. However, according to this text, this simple fault has important spiritual ramifications. This feeling at home in an intentionally constructed world implies, in these Buddhist terms of reference, an appropriation of dharmas, a grasping after them, a desire for them and an addiction that means that, for these people, they do not go forth from the triple world and therein escape, or transcend, all its potential suffering and inherent unsatisfactoriness.
	If this state of supposition is to be disvalued what is the result of this disvaluational re-interpretation?

That thought is no thought, since in its essential original nature that thought is transparently luminous.
That thought which is no thought, is that something which is?
Does there exist, or can one apprehend in this state of absence of thought either `there is' or a `there is not?'
No, not that.
Was it then a suitable question when the Venerable Sariputra asked whether that thought which is no thought is something which is?
What then is this state of absence of thought?
It is without modification or discrimination.
	In this dialogue we might read modification or discrimination as thought exercised in a non-reflected intentional mode. Seeing through such thought, from a trans-intentional perspective, allows the person to realize its transparently luminous nature; taking the latter expression as a coded term meaning, among other things, our being able to see through intentional constitution as the intentionally constituted construction of mundane forms, and instances, of phenomenal meaning and meaningfulness. 
	But the text asserts that in this state there is an absence of thought? That is correct, but, then we are told that that state, that experientially entails this absence of thought, is entertained in a state of transcendental suspension - a suspension between a `there is' and a `there is not.' Is that entertained suspension of an absence of thought then a complete absence of thought?

Where there arises an act of consciousness which has none of the skandhas for objective support, there the non-viewing of forms, etc., takes place. But just this non-viewing of the skandhas is the viewing of the world. This is the way the world is viewed by the Tathagata.
	When intentional objectivity is not treated as an objective support, in a phenomenal phenomenologically viewed perspective, a trans-phenomenal transcendental-phenomenologically viewed perspective is apparently adopted. In such an attitude the world is still viewed but with the intentionality of that viewing viewed from the transcendental-absolute perspective. 
	Hence with the use of this transcendental-phenomenal distinction it would appear that we can demonstrate that this tradition intends a trans-intentional intuitive appreciation of intentionality; an intuitive appreciation that is not conducted at the expense of cognitive forms of intentionality, but, in an effort to transformationally re-interpret the same from a transcendental-absolute perspective. That in this regard these two texts are essentially isomorphic. 

Type V - Type IV + Trans-Immanent-Transcendent 												  Considerations

	There is a natural temptation to superficially treat an absolute system of religious-philosophy in either transcendent or immanent terms of reference. Only an absolutist system could be adequately interpreted in (their attempt to adopt) such exclusive terms of reference. However, as it happens, a phenomenological examination of the structural-meaning and/or functional-meaningfulness of such terms as pure transcendence or pure immanence must reveal their complete lack of sense (as the logical mis-treatment of an extrapolated metaphor). As an expression transcendent-orientation has sense. Likewise, the expression immanent-orientation also has sense. What does not make sense is the absolute extrapolation, and separation, of a term from its correlative counterpart against which, as a gestalt background, it gains its meaningful significance through the sense of its relational contrast. Thus the treatment of an absolute religious-philosophy, or the interpretation of an absolute religious-philosophy, in such exclusive terms of reference must fail on these two counts. However, this absolute-philosophical genre has either an implicit or an explicit sense of an immanent-transcendent continuum coursing through the metaphorical heart of that style of discourse. Although present this fact does not necessitate its explicit presence, or, its unbiased presentation towards a preference for one or other of these polarized modalities. As an observation we might say that these two traditions have come to reflect, with certain qualifications, and reservations, the nature of their positive theological treatment of universals, albeit on a grand metaphysical-cosmological scale. 
	In the Neoplatonic tradition the One in some considerable measure reflects the nature of the forms, albeit as a super-form left in a carefully maintained trans-literal state of metaphorical suspension. The One is not treated as absolutely real in an absolutist mode of non-transcendental formulation. Negative theological treatment has gone to great pains to treat the One as being beyond both the sense of reality and the illusory, as being beyond existence and non-existence, as being trans-phenomenal, etc. This kind of treatment has a transcendent bias operating in its midst, but, as the platonic forms cannot be treated in a pure mode of transcendence a less well developed immanent strand is also running in parallel with such metaphorical language, etc. The common exhortation to look inwards, e.g., being one form of indication that the presence of this immanent aspect exists in parallel with its more visible sense of the transcendent.
	In the Buddhist-Wisdom tradition ultimate reality is not presented as a bigger and better version of phenomenal reality. On the contrary, it introduces a transcendental sense of an absolute dimension that is trans-phenomenal in its aspiration without at the same time being anti-phenomenal in its stance (in distinction to certain forms of dualism, gnosticism and other forms of absolutist formulation). Taken carefully, with much caution, we might like to, at least initially, treat this absolute dimension of ultimate reality as taking the form of a super-dharma, albeit as a dharmic construction subjected to the same kind of critical negative theological treatment as applied to the positive theological use of dharmas as deconstructed by this tradition. In this provisional light we can treat ultimate reality as without a self-existent sense of substance or sense of self, as empty, signless, wishless, as neither phenomenal reality nor apart from phenomenal reality, etc. In this vein we can treat the declaration that ultimate reality is one single Suchness, not two, nor three. However, the real value of such a subliminal comparison would reside, I would suspect, in its critical qualification and transcendence through deconstruction as exercised within the orbit of this transcendental-phenomenological-hermeneutical circle, or similar. The association of this dharmic-like treatment of ultimate reality has an immanent bias that continually manifests itself in the declaration that the perfection of wisdom is deep, profound, etc. Moreover, the emphasis on the functional, non-static, dynamic, formational aspect of this tradition's deconstructive investigations also suggesting an immanent bias in contrast to the hierarchical-transcendent orientation of reductive forms of analysis. However, a transcendent strand enters through the background connotational-like treatment of ultimate reality as one single Suchness, etc. This is reinforced through the identification of Suchness with the exalted exemplification of the Buddha as the Tathagata (along with the historical development, and insertion into this text, of the increasingly metaphysical-like treatment of the concept of the dharmakaya, etc.). This atmosphere of the numinous nature of spiritual reality, or i.e., the sacred dimension of phenomenal reality, being further highlighted though the textual presence of other miscellaneous Buddhas, Bodhisattvas, divine figures, etc. These senses of transcendent powerfulness over the phenomenal world being reinforced in the iconographical representation, and  personification, of the Perfection of Wisdom, along with her metaphorical treatment, as the mother of the Buddhas, as their instructress, etc.
	To sum up I would like to note the following observations, namely, that the Neoplatonic tradition has a systematic sense of the transcendent, and, an implicit non-systematically presented sense of the immanent. On the other hand the Buddhist-Wisdom tradition has a more or less systematic sense of the immanent, and, a vague fractured sense of the transcendent metaphorically coursing though its textual exposition. However, both traditions conduct, and maintain, their respective expositions, through various forms of transcendental suspension, from a transcendental-absolute perspective, that must rule out an exclusive absolutist interpretation in this regard. Thus I conclude once more, careful qualification accepted, that both traditions are essentially isomorphic, on a deep structural-functional level of exposition, in their formulation of an inherent transcendent-immanent bi-polarization (subjected to the critical treatment, and transformational implications, exercised through the implicit, or explicit, use of a transcendental-phenomenal distinction).

Type VI - Trans-Ontological-Epistemological Considerations

	The phenomenological treatment of the experience of the world as phenomenal has embedded in that attitude an implicit trans-epistemological-ontological translation of those experienced events and situations. Experience is epistemological, and psychological, in orientation. The inherent objectivity of intentional directedness has an ontological-orientation (towards the natural tendency for the reified treatment of that intentional objectivity as onta). The intentional act in a sense straddling these two orientations, the very meaning and meaningfulness of that relationship being generated across this process of noetic-noematic correlation.
	A trans-phenomenological attitude exposes that trans-epistemological-ontological correlational constitution and it does this through a de-phenomenalization of the (type of) phenomenal event or situation under transcendental reflection. That type of investigation is exercised through a de-epistemologicalization and a de-ontologicalization of the meaning structures/functions under examination. Put simply, phenomenal experience is treated in non-mental (i.e., trans-cognitive/affective) and non-empirical (i.e., trans-empirical) terms of reference with an emphasis on the constitutional construction of that under investigation. 
	The implication to be drawn from this argument is that an absolute philosophy, in distinction to an absolutist formulation, de-phenomenalizes both the sense of the epistemological-psychological and the ontological-empirical. Its trans-phenomenal, i.e., trans-intentional, investigations, in theoretical and practical terms, must in effect present a trans-epistemological-ontological perspective that can be neither pro-epistemological nor pro-ontological (or, for that matter, neither anti-epistemological nor anti-ontological). The inference to be drawn from this stance is that this type of philosophic style can not promote a vision of reality that adopts  either an idealistic or an empirical perspective in non-transcendental terms of reference. Moreover, this type of style cannot adopt some form of Mind, or Being, as the center-piece of its religious-philosophic exposition. That in the advent of the apparent adoption of these tendencies, or entities, that exposition must treat these relative practices, or fictions, as provisional from the absolute-transcendental point of view, to what ever extent they are allowed to manifest themselves from, or for, a phenomenal point of view. 
	Plotinus on a number of occasions discusses the nature of Nous (Intellect, or, Mind) but this relative semi-fiction (from the perspective of the One) is most certainly not the center of his systematic exposition being transcended, and eclipsed, by the infinite effortless power of the One. Consequently this trans-intellectual sense of the Absolute takes center-stage. However, Plotinus also agonizes over how to define the self-experiential nature of the One. On one hand the One cannot be driven to enter a world of multiplicity through some form of its own intentionally constructed intuition. On the other hand it cannot be inert like the practically non-existent nature of matter.
	In keeping with this inherent trans-epistemological-ontological nature of the transcendental-absolute dimension Plotinus also equates, and then transcends, nominally separated senses of the epistemological and the ontological:

... by the continuity of his contemplation he no longer sees a sight, but mingles his seeing with what he contemplates, so that what was seen before has now become sight in him...

	And in a similar vein on a grander scale:

But whoever has become at once contemplator of himself and all the rest and object of his contemplation, and, since he has become substance and intellect and "the complete living being," no longer looks at it from the outside.
	In the Buddhist-Wisdom text we might like to draw the same kind of parallel with this Neoplatonic text minus the metaphysical connotations of the latter. In a similar fashion the ontological and the epistemological are brought together, equated, suspended and transcended? In one form we see this in the trans-phenomenal treatment of each one of the skandhas as the same (samata), namely, as empty (sunya) and then their equation, in the form of a suspension, with the perfection of wisdom, or suchness, the Tathagata, or what so ever, and the implicit sense of transcendence therein entailed:

This perfection of wisdom cannot be expounded, or learned... by means of the skandhas... This is a consequence of the fact that the skandhas are isolated, absolutely isolated. Nor can the perfection of wisdom be understood otherwise than by the skandhas... For just the very skandhas... are empty, isolated and calmly quiet. It is thus that the perfection of wisdom and the skandhas... are not two, not divided. As a result of their emptiness, isolatedness and quietude they cannot be apprehended.
	The skandhas are a reductive device to differentiate all forms of phenomenal identity either with respect to all aspects of embodied personal identity, or, all aspects of physical non-embodied reality. The traditional Buddhist treatment of personal embodiment is that through the reduction of phenomenal being of a person, exclusively to the five skandhas of form, feeling, perception, will and consciousness, there is demonstrated in the process that personal identity can not be dependent upon, and is not dependent upon a sense of self-existent personal identity, as in the form of a soul,  e.g., etc. The world can also be reduced in the same manner to demonstrate that form is without a dependence upon some self-existent sense of the substantial, e.g., etc.
	Thus I would like to conclude that both texts develop, and demonstrate, some form of a trans-epistemological-ontological transcendence, an attitude that is correctly implicated in the trans-phenomenal nature of absolute philosophy. I would like to add at this point my observation that both traditions spend a considerable proportion of their textual space developing and maintaining such an attitude. Although essentially isomorphic in this regard the metaphysical and metaphorical influences that are associated with the literal treatment of these two texts, plus a difference in historical backgrounds, tend to blur the coincidence between the relatively deep structural-functions of these two traditions. However, it becomes manifestly obvious that neither tradition wishes to erect some form of transcendent Being or Mind, or some unqualified form of immanent self or elements (whether as forms or dharmas). In the same measure neither religious-philosophy could be dismissed as (simple) forms of idealism, or empiricism.

Type VII - Type VI + Mono-Referential Non-Intuitive 											Considerations

	By mono-referential non-intuitive is meant the unification and integration of a sense of the absolute producing a sense of the Absolute without a consideration of the intuitive potential, or nature, that might be exercise by that sense of the Absolute. By sense is meant the meaning and not the reference of that term. Whether or not there is a reference for this term Absolute is, in this thesis, not under consideration. What is under consideration is an investigation into the phenomenon of what meaning-structures could be found to invest this neutral term absolute in its hermeneutical interpretation of these two textual-traditions, and, the nature of the relationship that could be entertained between these two processes of investment.
	At this point in our Typology we shift from a sense of the absolute to a sense of the Absolute. It is also about this point of transition that we can at last, with various forms of qualification and reservation, discover fundamental forms of differentiation between these two traditions (although, I might add, within the established accommodation of Types I-VI. Not that the latter classificational headings are without their fair share of related accidental non-essential differences in metaphysical, metaphorical, literal, historical and functional forms of association, etc.).
	By Absolute is meant some form of an integrated sense of transcendental presence. That presence, however, must be treated in transcendental terms of reference, i.e., as trans-phenomenal, trans-intentional, pre-constitutional, etc. In the current classification, Type VII, this sense of the Absolute is treated without regard to some form of trans-intentional self-intuition being exercised by that form of an Absolute presence under textual investigation; entertaining the significance of a text, or texts, that describe and/or prescribe in transcendental terms of reference such an abstract state of affairs. 
	In our Neoplatonic text we should have, I believe, little difficulty in isolating this type of feature that represents this sense of the Absolute. The concept of the One is one aspect of this text that appears to identify this particular type of sense; a miscellany of other names can also be found linked to this expression, e.g., the Good, Father, the Solitary (Alone), the First, Himself, the All, etc. Most of these names having their origins as descriptive expressions; these expressions being converted into names within the critical framework of a transcendental philosophy and its negative theological treatment of traditional positive material.

There exist certainly both the true All and the representation of the All, the nature of this visible universe. The really existent All is in nothing: for there is nothing before it. But that which comes after it must then necessarily exist in the All, if it is going to exist at all, being as much as possible dependent upon it  and unable to either stay still or move without it.
	In this quotation the key denoting expression used by Plotinus is the expression All. Reading the sense of this term to be equivalent to the sense of the Absolute we find in making this translation, that accepted, that this sense of the Absolute is invested with pre-phenomenal pre-spatial (and pre-cosmological) terms of reference suggesting an adherence to those types of transcendental conditions that define an absolute dimension or perspective. Plotinus certainly does not want us to see this All as just the totality of all phenomenal things within the universe. Through a de-phenomenalization of this expression, in the midst of a transcendental suspension, our emphasis is transferred to the constitutional meaning, and meaningfulness, of that term although not without accompanying it with various metaphorical-metaphysical overtones retranslating the totality of these structural-functions from a transcendental perspective. In this quotation we find the visible universe being treated as a dependent representation upon this prior true All. Even though we might ask ourselves where the description ends and the name commences, or, the metaphorical-metaphysical tension finishes and the `to be taken as literal' portions of the text begin, the central region of this dialectical generation of meaning is kept focused within an absolute-transcendental perspective. Hence the strange language, the stress put upon it, the de-phenomenal transcendental critique and endless qualifications to center, and preserve, the ongoing dialectical, pro-constitutional nature of this genre of discourse. That a transcendental perspective is maintained through the continual re-imposition of processes of transcendental suspensions, transcendental reductions and transcendental reconstitutions.
	This style of philosophy could not be subjected, except on a superficial level, to a process of critical treatment in the style of this Buddhist-Wisdom text (or for that matter in the style of Nagarjuna, e.g.). In accordance with my understanding just such a process is already underway! Where the Neoplatonic text opens itself up to a process of transcendental-critique is in those regions of its discourse where its transcendental programme has not been imposed, is imposed incorrectly, or, having been imposed correctly has now been incorrectly re-continued. This would concern these areas where unnatural processes of reification have occurred both within the natural attitude or outside the same, mis-treatment of metaphorical/metaphysical forms of language, on practical question on the transcendental transformation of that natural attitude, etc., i.e., on essential points of technique.
	In this particular classification the area of potential controversy will focus itself on the question does, or can, this Buddhist-Wisdom text support a sense of the Absolute in our critical hermeneutical reading of it? Let me, therefore, focus much of the remainder of this comparative analysis on just this question. Admittedly it would be easier just to argue for the current consensus on this type of issue, but, I don't believe an honest response, on my part, could be that clear cut. Positions one way or the other must be qualified. However, fortunately, the main thrust of my critique is not so much to dismiss current scholarship as to qualify some of its rather black and white attitudes in this field. For a start to describe this Buddhist tradition, and allied traditions, e.g., the Madhyamaka, as relativist is inappropriate, or at best, misleading. It is true that this type of Buddhist philosopher argues against the absolutist philosopher with a unrelenting tenacity equal to the degree of devastation wrought. But the certainty in which the doctrine of emptiness is exercised is an indication that an utterance of this kind is not emitted by a relativist. The transcendental exercise of this critique does not establish a form of relativism, an attitude prevalent in various fashionable disguises in the West. On the contrary, although the relative dependence of reality is recognized (pratityasamutpada) this recognition is exercised from a transcendental-phenomenological perspective. This involves a sense of the absolute put in place through the critical exercise of transcendental suspensions, reductions and reconstitutions (as discussed in this thesis). As a result philosophical topics become translated into a constitutional language from a trans-phenomenal trans-constitutional perspective. From such a perspective positive material, along with its invested sense of the natural attitude, is subjected to various styles of negative theological treatment re-investing, or rewriting, that material with a transcendental vision of meaning and meaningfulness. In subjecting the positive theologically interpreted world, in its natural attitude, to processes of transcendental suspensions, etc., realizes a transformation of meaning where nothing is lost and full mundane and religious forms of value are totally regained. What is lost, that which could never have been obtained in practice, is an emphasis being placed upon instances of meaninglessness (and meaningfullessness); e.g., philosophical exercises in reification and/or non-sense, projects of metaphorical/metaphysical mis-treatment, non-productive kinds of religious practice, modes of inauthenticity, aspects of alienation, non-existential tendencies, un-productive secular practices; or, i.e., in essence non-salvific attitudes, etc. In my interpretation of this close practical association of instructions, on how to live in the world, in texts with a transcendental-absolute style of religious-philosophic discourse we might say that from the transcendental perspective the world gains a clarity of expression that gives the person the opportunity to purify the manner of their response therein; allowing them to develop an authenticity in value-creation? Or, put more simply, from the trans-constitutional perspective meaning is clarified allowing the person to realize a greater sense of value (in addition to the salvific consequences claimed by that type of text).
	Associated with this practical re-writing of value traditional positive theologies are also re-written and the internal implications of that re-investment allowed historically to actualize themselves. I would affirm that a sense of the absolute is established in this type of text. However, does this sense of an absolute (perspective) re-write itself along traditional and/or radical lines in the form of a transcendental-sense of the Absolute, i.e., a sense of the absolute that has a religious aura of integration and self-unity about it?
	The psychic shift from Platonic forms (and the super-form of the Platonic Good) to the Neoplatonic sense of the One is, I believe, a clearly defined example of the above progression. Could we propose some parallel state of affairs in the Buddhist world vis-à-vis this particular Buddhist tradition of the Perfection of Wisdom? To be honest I wish I could say no and thereby short circuit the following defense, or rather, qualification of an equivocal form of no and an equivocal form of yes. In the historical genesis of this text of The Perfection of Wisdom in 8,000 Lines a metaphysical element increasingly infiltrated the body of that text that to a certain measure reflected then current trends in religious-philosophic development on the Indian Subcontinent. We find these trends in other texts, artforms that reflected those texts, eye-witness accounts, documents discussing polemical considerations, textual instances of commentorial divergence, etc. In this text, we find, I believe, some evidence for a re-writing of metaphysical elements in transcendental terms of reference that suggests an implicit, but vague, sense of an Absolute. Reading this text against this general religious background would, I feel, open up this more or less unstated background without, I might add, an undoing of that transcendental-absolute style of discourse.
	At this point I might be able to cast some light on this topic by re-introducing an analogy for which I was criticized in the first presentation of this thesis, namely, the comparison of an absolute philosophy (in distinction to an absolutist philosophy) to a black-hole. I do not wish to give an introduction to these now familiar astronomical entities other than to say that a certain distance from the center of these extremely dense objects the rotation of gases about this event horizon allows us to infer indirectly the presence, and nature, of such a star. Now, it seems to me, using this image, that Plotinus is an absolute philosopher who would like to put all that which is real, i.e., ultimate reality from a transcendental-absolute perspective, within this event horizon. In this analogical interpretation all outside, namely, the visible universe, e.g., is essentially an illusion, although not-absolutely  an illusion, from the perspective of the interior of that black-hole. On the other hand the critical Buddhist philosopher might say, in metaphorical terms of reference, that inside that event horizon there is nothing, i.e., from the ultimate point of view all this manifestation of phenomenal reality is empty from the transcendental perspective of ultimate reality. However, once that is done, we might like to ask ourselves if there is indeed any real difference between these two apparently different absolute positions when we go back to the texts and compare what these two kinds of philosopher appear to say in this regard? Plotinus goes to considerable trouble to qualify his transcendental position. E.g., in the last quotation we are told that the All is not equivalent to the totality of phenomenal reality. Then, with respect to the critical Buddhist position we would be told that that nothing, or no-thing (in an anti-reificational mode) is not a nihilistic vision of emptiness. In effect the transcendental perspective of both philosophies entertain, in a similar fashion, a de-phenomenalization of phenomenal reality, and, the dangers of metaphorical language accepted, we would be hard pressed, I am sure, to find a real difference between them on this central point. Where a difference is automatically apparent is that found in the use of metaphorical/metaphysical language each tradition associates with this type of perspective (along with the tendency to re-write transcendentally such traditional positive baggage or vestments).
	In this text of The Perfection of Wisdom in 8,000 Lines we find littered throughout references to the perfection of wisdom, Tathagata(s), Suchness, Nirvana, Buddhahood, the Unproduced, etc., and, a miscellaneous series of epithets in association with the former, e.g., the inexhaustible, immeasurable, unthinkable, infinite, pure, unequalled, incomparable, etc. This use of language suggests a negative theological re-writing of the traditional positive religious-philosophy in the same manner to that exercised in the Enneads. It would also suggest that the translation of the definite article in its attachment to these miscellaneous proper names (of this sense of the Absolute), when used, has some form of significance beyond the purely grammatical, implying some sense of integration, integrity and self-unity. However, this sense of logical subjectivity is not to be misconstrued along absolutist lines. With that in mind we find we cannot treat it as something that is phenomenally real, or as psychologically mental, as ontologically ontic, as constitutionally constituted, as subject to temporal, spatial, causal, egotistical forms of determination, as metaphysically literal, etc.
	To reinforce this transcendental-sense of unity the text suggestively speaks of one single Suchness which is not two, not divided (in a manner very similar to Neoplatonic pronouncements):

For the Suchness of the Tathagata, and the Suchness of all dharmas, they are both one single Suchness, not two, not divided. A non-dual Suchness, however, is nowhere, is from nowhere, belongs to nowhere. It is because it is a Suchness which belongs no-where that it is non-dual.
	It is interesting to note the transcendental style of qualificational language used in this quotation. This non-dual Suchness is non-dual because it belongs nowhere, i.e. is pre-phenomenally pre-spatial. In a like fashion, in my last quotation from Plotinus, we are told in this Neoplatonic text that the real All is in nothing: for there is nothing before it.
	The same equation involving the Suchness of dharmas is drawn in the following quotation:

The Suchness of these dharmas and the Suchness of all dharmas, and the Suchness of the Tathagata are simply this one single Suchness. There is no division within Suchness. Just simply one single is this Suchness, not two, not three. Suchness has past beyond all counting, because it is not.
	To be noted again is the negative theological treatment of Suchness. In the last sentence we read Suchness has past beyond all counting implying some form of an affirmation in regard to the (now complex) logical subject Suchness being beyond counting and the quick undercutting of this proposition by the rider that it is so because it is not. Here negation is suspensional in nature and suggestive of a transcendental sense of transcendence (beyond the conceivability of this expression of Suchness) through some form of conceptual deconstruction.
	This beyond counting has a strong resonance with the following quotation from Plotinus:

And it (the One) must be understood as infinite not because of its size and number cannot be measured or counted but because its power cannot be comprehended.
	Suchness is beyond measure because it is unthinkable, etc., something that thought cannot know because it is beyond its comprehension, beyond its power of comprehension.
	Does this Buddhist text present, or support, an interpretation that a sense of the Absolute is textually presented? Certainly an absolutist reading is not supported, indeed, argued against and vehemently denied. On the other hand I find it difficult to say an unequivocal no, or an unequivocal yes, to this question. I find on many issues an essential isomorphism between these two traditions. On the other hand this resemblance can be deceptive when we take into account the use of metaphorical/metaphysical language associated with the sense of this resemblance. For sure there is not the same degree of emphasis in this Buddhist text on a sense of the One as stressed in the Neoplatonic tradition. Hence my equivocal answer of no. However, the constant reiteration of a sense of the absolute, its personification and exemplification (about to be discussed in the next section), its analogical and religious treatment, its series of negative (and positive) ascriptions undermine the definitiveness of this response the more correct, or more appropriate, response might be to leave this question (-ing sense of the epoche: is there the textual presentation of a sense of the Absolute?) to a state of suspension in order to continue on and ask: does this (suspended) sense of the Absolute demonstrate a potential for a trans-intentional self-intuitive sense of (its own sense of) Absoluteness? Putting this question temporally to the side how do we interpret the following Buddhist quotation?

And why is it an unthinkable enterprise? Because unthinkable are Tathagatahood, Buddhahood, Self-existence, and this state of all-knowledge. And on these one cannot reflect with one's thought, since they cannot be an object of thought... Because Tathagatahood, etc., is immeasurable... is incalculable. And why is it an enterprise which equals the unequalled? Because nothing can be equal to the Tathagata, to the fully Enlightened One, to the Self-existent, to the All-knowing, how much can anything be superior to him?
	Taken out of context, in regards to the exulted treatment of the Self-existent; among other things, one might suspect some non-Buddhist absolutist, or, absolute philosopher, inserting a few lines of text that set about to deconstruct Buddhist deconstruction. Surely the concept of the self-existent (svabhava), in the form of a substance or an ego, is virtually a red rag to a critical-polemically minded Buddhist purist (e.g., Nagarjuna)? So this flagrant flying in the face of tradition, whether absolute or non-absolute-orientated, presents an ostensive puzzle, or paradox (in the form of paradoxical behaviour - asserting one thing and then denying it, or vice versa, as in this particular case). However, in common with the Neoplatonic tradition, there is, as a general rule, the presentation of no hard paradoxes, no blatant contradictions without some form of an implicit resolution. Might I be correct then to interpret the above passage in a transcendental frame of reference along the following lines?
	Treatment of these described names as not a suitable object of thought places this type of discourse immediately in a trans-intentional, or pre-intentional, transcendental framework. Moreover, we could read this enterprise that equals the unequalled as putting in place a transcendental suspension further reinforcing the transcendental flavour of this text. Given, in recognizing the fact that most apparent paradoxes can be defused by applying a transcendental-phenomenological distinction, we might like to treat this sense of the Absolute, in its nomination as the Self-existent, as a transcendental claim that is re-written in transcendental terms of reference and therein immune from a critical-polemical attack; a critique that would have been deserved if that fragment of the text was written in cognitive-phenomenal terms of reference. 
	Interestingly, this (provisional) sense of the Absolute enters into an equation with the Tathagata, Buddhahood, the fully Enlightened One, the All-knowing suggesting an ostensive acceptance of an exulted sense of religious personality (being written in transcendental trans-intentional terms of reference). But let me discuss this observation in the next section. In the meantime let me leave this tentative response to this question, is there a sense of the Absolute being exercised in this text of The Perfection of Wisdom in 8,000 Lines, to a state of temporary suspension?

Type VIII - Type VII + Trans-Intentional Self-Intuitive 											 Considerations

	Earlier in this chapter I introduced the concept of attempting a background reading of this text in terms of (a reconstruction of) the synchronic influences belonging to the Indian Subcontinent to which the authors, and readers, of that text would be exposed. This background is essentially unstated or implicit, connotational (unless connotations are under denotational thematization), affectively-orientated, tacit, expected (any unexpected dissonance would project that background into the region of cognitive focus), pre-suppositional, potentially pre-traditional, non-literal in metaphorical/metaphysical-orientation, etc. 
	Often these background influences collectively crystallize as background conventions for the reading of a text whose gestation was brought to fruition in that particular context. All phenomena, and their interpretation, necessitate the reconstruction of their context, or horizon, appropriate to the nature of that task, in order to re-construct the intended intentional meaning, and meaningfulness, of that under investigation. In this interpretive and phenomenological task, whether exercised in a natural mode or a critically-reflected mode, the same applies regardless of whether we are dealing with texts or non-texts. 
	What I am suggesting here is that, in some measure, texts can, or should, (also) be read as if musical scores, as works of art. Moreover, a text that has style is provocative! Underlying the superficial exposition of intentional intent is an ongoing pattern of background-consonance... thematic-dissonance... and the accommodational-resolution of the consonant-dissonant interaction. 
	Philosophical, and religious, texts often appear to follow this format setting up various problems... The resolution of those problems is then supplied otherwise the reader will feel in their reading of that text that there is something missing. Likewise, if the solution is felt to be unsatisfactory, i.e., incomplete, inadequate, ambivalent, indecisive, inapplicable, meaningless, etc. The text that has style being provocative on two, or more, counts. First, by creating the dissonance of the problem it alerts our attention to the nature of that problem (and therein sets up the desire for a resolution of that state of stress). Then, by setting up the solution we are forced to follow along with it in accordance with the apparent successfulness, or power, of that resolution. In some texts the solution itself should also be viewed as provocative and the transcendental-absolute style of discourse can certainly be seen in this light. Such unremitting provocation perpetuating the text (and negative theological tracts are notoriously long. The notable exception to this being, I believe, summaries which reinforces the nature of my initial observation, e.g., the summarized format of the Heart Sutra).
	Let me extend this musical comparison, if I may, by asking ourselves to imagine the provocative consequences of this Buddhist text if it were to be interminably chanted? The text has already, among other things, long sequences of negative ascription. To experience the continual suspension, deconstruction and reconstitution of these long lists of names, epithets, their mutual equation, denial, assertion, transcendence, etc., must be provocative to say the least; either creating a state of confusion (recognized by this text) or creating a transcendentally engineered resolution. As already noted hard paradoxes are not intended in this type of text. In a like fashion I do not believe a state of unremitting confusion is equally intended. On the contrary I feel that the provocative nature of this transcendental-absolute style of discourse, with certain qualifications and reservations, finds a resolution in a sense of the absolute and that the continual naming, etc., of this sense realizes an accompanying religious sense of an Absolute. However, the transcendental nature of this discourse also treats our cognitive retreatment of this transcendental understanding as a form of transcendental-illusion reinforcing this transcendental experience of a sense of the Absolute from a trans-intentional transcendental perspective. Put simply, a transcendental sense of an Absolute is intended but not in cognitive terms of reference! Not only a sense of the Absolute but also as a reference, as a religious reference (as long as that reference is experienced in non-absolutist transcendental terms of reference). To a certain extent the dissolution of this transcendental illusion of an Absolute establishes an Absolute (as a non-absolutist Absolute). These apparent cross purposes in the text allowing one school of interpreters to see an Absolute, and, another school of interpreters to deny any sense of an Absolute. Surely, the correct solution would be, in the final analysis, to leave the whole question of an Absolute in a permanent state of ongoing suspension, etc!?
	How else are we to listen to this type of Buddhist text when we read these interminable equations of names and epithets, etc., when we hear unrelenting suggestions of personification, exemplification and an experienced personalization of religious experience along with the positive numinous-like nature of phenomenal reality in our constant textual introduction to panoramas of the Tathagata(s), incalculable buddha-fields, multiple buddha figures, innumerable Bodhisattvas, multitudes of divinities, etc., etc?
	Throughout this type of text, Neoplatonic or Buddhist, as a general observation there is to be found, I believe, a sense of conviction reinforced through this textual device of equation (and quite at odds with the interminable use of negation). A sense of non-dogmatic transcendental conviction, which I might add, is not founded on the successful observation and treatment of empirically realized states of affairs (although not apparently divorced from a phenomenal sphere of action) but, in my reading, founded on a transcendental-phenomenological empirical-interpretation of phenomenal reality. The nature of phenomenal constitution is discovered. Treatment of this transcendental-empirical discovery in the light of a transcendental ideality, to some degree or other, transmitting the transcendental-unity of consciousness to a sense of the absolute, and, shifting that treatment towards a sense of the Absolute. The traditional positive theological nature of the pre-traditional foundations of that tradition either supporting, or retarding, this process of negative theological re-evaluation. The transcendental nature of that style of absolute discourse always treating the language of that re-evaluation as provisional, under suspension, as mere words, etc., but for all that not undermining the resultant effect this text has in this regard. This sense of conviction being described as inperturbable, unshakable, etc.

This perfection of wisdom is free from impediments, because it rises completely above all mental attitudes to dharmas. This perfection has no mental attitude, because it is imperturbable. This perfection of wisdom is unshakeable, in consequence of the stability of the realm of dharma.
	Previously I noted the presence in this Buddhist text (and which can also be found in this Neoplatonic text) of instances of personification, exemplification and an experienced personalization of religious experience. This type of feature, on the surface of the text at least, also appears to reinforce a trans-intentional self-intuitive sense of an Absolute, i.e., an Absolute possessing some transcendental-form of personality.
	In parts of this text we find the perfection of wisdom personified in female form, e.g., as a mother, as an instructress:

It is thus that perfect wisdom acts as an instructress in the world to the Tathagatas. And how does perfect wisdom show up the world for what it is? She shows that the world is empty, unthinkable, calmly quiet. As purified of itself she shows up the world, she makes it known, she indicates it.

	And in a similar vein we find:

The perfection of wisdom gives light, O Lord. I pay homage to the perfection of wisdom! She is worthy of homage. She is unstained... She is a source of light... Most excellent are her works... She is the mother of the Bodhisattvas...
	Without doubt a process of personification is intended, a fact reinforced through the specific iconographical representation she is given. However, this use of metaphorical personification does not imply that the perfection of wisdom is literally a woman, an instructress, a mother of the Bodhisattvas and the Buddhas, etc.
	On the subject of exemplification we find many instances of allusions to the historical Buddha, and Tathagatas in general (or some other spiritual figure), where a noble skillful action is intended - from actions performed in the mundane world to those effortlessly conducted in fantastic circumstances (and described in exulted, psychedelic detail). Certainly great feats were meant to induce a state of awe and inspire a sense of worship. However, on a more mundane level acts of compassion, love, skillfulness (treated in general) are to be emulated. In this sense the personality, and activities, of a Buddha are to act as an exemplar. A tension can also be found to exist between descriptive and prescriptive levels in this aspect of the text. How are these heroic acts to be interpreted in mundane terms of reference? Moreover, in what sense recollecting, and enacting, this type of heroism establishes a relationship with the original exemplars of those archetypal activities? I am sure devotional currents cut across this text at this point. The emphasis on buddha-fields being created for the very purpose that the devotee can eventually come before a Buddha, or a Bodhisattva, in their particular buddha-field, as a reward for good karma (and therein receive instruction in the perfection of wisdom and obtain enlightenment). The historical actualization of this devotional trend re-writing an emphasis on faith (a tendency that becomes explicated in the later Tathagatagarbha literature).
	How a sense of the Absolute can be associated with a sense of personality is, in itself, at first-sight, an apparent puzzle? How could trans-intentional transcendental terms of reference be re-written to include a transcendental sense of personality? We could short circuit this problem by placing any (experience of a) sense of personality in phenomenal terms of reference only, or, create some form of mediation that can interact with both the transcendental dimension and the phenomenal dimension. In this latter regard of mediation we might be able to treat the Neoplatonic concept of Intellect (nous) and the Buddhist concept of the Trikaya (in the relationship between the Dharmakaya and the other bodies of that triadic formulation)? 
	Another solution is to see certain forms of experiential testimony as being experienced as personalized for that person (by that person) who experiences that instance of religious experience. Then the same trend can be continued by others in their accounts of that testimony, and then in accounts of those accounts, and so on, etc. 		
	A fourth solution could be presented, by the transcendental-phenomenologist, through interposing a sense of the transcendental ego between subjective and intersubjective polarities in the constitution of the transcendental-possibility of meaning and the transcendental experience of that meaningfulness. The Buddhist solution emphasizing a sense of transcendental-ego, certainly not written in transcendent or immanent terms of reference, orientated more towards the sense of the subjective. On the other hand, the Neoplatonic solution implying some sense of a transcendental-ego orientated more towards the sense of the inter-subjective (and objective).
	Throughout this Buddhist text there a tension between experiencing the perfection of wisdom, and, the fact that this perfection of wisdom is unthinkable, cannot be experienced, etc. However, despite these persistent disclaimers to that effect, there seems to be no loss in the conviction that the perfection of wisdom can indeed be experienced (in transcendental-absolute terms of reference). Who, or what achieves, or performs, this transcendental experiencing?
	The same type of problem surfaces in the Enneads. After a superficial reading of that text, in a quick reply, we might answer - the One. But Plotinus labours and agonizes over the nature of self-experience possessed by the One. For Plotinus, as a transcendental philosopher, intentionality produces an apparent duality between the experiencer and the object of thought:

And it is clear also from the following that intellect cannot be first... And if intellect itself is what thinks and what is thought, it will be double and not single and so not the one... But, if it looks both to itself and to what is better than it, in this way also it is second.
	Plotinus tentatively suggests that an object that thinks itself, as opposed to an object that thinks of something else, is, to some degree, successful in its ability to escape this intentional dilemma. However, the more or less final position for Plotinus in this regard is that the One does not think but effortlessly experiences itself, beyond thought, through some form of self-intuition, self-identity between activity and will. Could this type of resolution be proposed in this Buddhist-Wisdom text? The following question, concerning this topic, is proposed:

How should a Bodhisattva, who courses in perfect wisdom, achieve the complete conquest of emptiness, or how should he enter into the concentration on emptiness?
He should contemplate form, etc., as empty. But he should contemplate that with an undisturbed series of thoughts, in such a way that, that when he contemplates the fact that "forms, etc., is empty," he does not regard the true nature of dharmas [i.e., emptiness] as something, which, as a result of its true nature [i.e., emptiness] is a real entity... He does, however, not contemplate that "I shall realize," or "I should realize"...
	Adopting a transcendental-ego that transcends subjective and intersubjective terms of reference we would find, I believe, that both traditions subjected to this translation; and its inherent suspension of bias on this subjective-intersubjective polarity, we would discover a general solution of this dilemma formulated in the same, or similar, transcendental terms of reference? In the above quotation we find the presence of a trans-intentional perspective in the testimony to the effect that a Bodhisattva does not entertain an intentional state of affairs along the lines "I shall...," or "I should..." 

	The above quotation continues and we come to the line:

Taken hold of by perfect wisdom he does not realize the reality limit.
	Suggesting that the perfection of wisdom is not obtained but takes hold of us spontaneously if the necessary preconditions are put in place, e.g., the contemplation of emptiness, or the contemplation of the signless, the wishless, etc. 
	We might like to interpret the following comments by Plotinus along the same lines?

Perhaps there might be one [a charm] in what we have said already, if we sang it over and over again. And what other charm can we find which has a sort of newness about it... for discursive thought, in order to express anything in words, has to consider one thing after another... One must believe one has seen, when the soul suddenly takes light... How then can this happen? Take away everything!
	Seizing on Plotinus' comment on the singing it over and over again we might return to this background-contextual reading of this text, as if it were a musical score, as suggested earlier. Surely the repetition of names and epithets (and their mutual equation), the use of personification, exemplification and acceptance of the personal personalization of trans-intentional intuition is going to influence eventually how this text is going to be religiously read? On a number of counts a sense of the Absolute, complete with a trans-intentional self-intuition, can be heard thematizing itself in the background of this type of text; a facet that appears to have been progressively instantiated in the historical unfolding of the overall Buddhist tradition. However, such a theme is written in transcendental-absolute terms of reference and can correctly only be referred to as a transcendental-ego in some form or other. In that form the sense of the subjective and the intersubjective is placed in a state of transcendental suspension. However, in an intuitive reading of that suspension, this does not stop a particular tradition from adding its own bias to this topic. Certainly Plotinus can be seen to stress the intersubjectivity of the One (if we read it along the lines of a transcendental-ego) whereas the Buddhist-Wisdom tradition might be interpreted as taking a subjectively-orientated stance. 
	The Neoplatonic sense of the Absolute can certainly be described as having a trans-intentional self-intuitive sense of self-appreciation along with all the qualifications supplied by Plotinus. However, such a description is difficult to impose, and maintain, in the reading of this Buddhist text without treating that particular sense of an absolute dimension as entailing a transcendental sense of ego replete with its transcendental suspension of subjectivity and intersubjectivity.
	Consequently, to declare an unqualified unequivocal no or yes to the question, is there in the Buddhist-Wisdom tradition a sense of the  Absolute (?), I find difficult to envisage for all the suggested reasons. Yet, despite this apparent state of indecision, I find that along with the repetitive naming of (this already established) sense of an absolute, its personification and worship, its emulation and apparent reciprocity, its personalized treatment and sense of personal response an equivocal answer no in conjunction with an equivocal answer yes might make a better reply? However, under these circumstances, the more appropriate reply might be to leave this whole question itself in a state of suspension, in keeping with the transcendental style of this type of text, but in doing so recognizing the fundamental stylistic differences that do surface between the presentation of these two texts? For example, discerning their distinctive mix of associated metaphorical language, distinguishing the nature of the overall subjective-intersubjective bias in their transcendental formulation of a sense of the Absolute (rewritten in the form of a transcendental sense of ego) and recalling the repetitive manner in which transcendental suspensions, reductions and reconstitutions are orchestrated in the performance of that genre in general, and, in that instance of style in particular.
	But, if we adopt this last response we are, in effect, subjecting this type of question (is there a Neoplatonic and a Buddhist sense of an Absolute?) to a transcendental translation through a transcendental suspension, and, in the process we should find ourselves presenting ourselves with a resolutional pathway that can only produce, under those transcendental terms of reference, an unequivocal Yes to this question! Whereas, re-translating those terms of reference back to the phenomenal mode of being in the world, under those circumstances, we can, with an equal sense of commitment, only answer with an unequivocal No! Problems, and differences in response, can only re-surface when we investigate the nature of the interaction between the phenomenal dimension and this Absolute perspective and I will briefly look into this aspect in the next section. 
	It is tempting to think that the safest response to this type of question would be to just nod one's head, or laugh, or remain silent, or smile... Unfortunately, I don't have that economy of means.

Type IX - Type VIII + Treatment of their Sense of World

	This will be jointly conducted under four heading:

		i.	An Emanational Mode and/or,
		ii	Creational Mode and/or,
		iii	Presentational Mode and/or,
		iv	Interventional Mode.

	In this section, for the sake of completeness, I will briefly look at the distinctive overall manner in which these two traditions treat the relationship between the sense of the absolute/Absolute and the sense of the phenomenal. With this in mind I have proposed the following four headings.
	An emanational mode is the treatment of the world as an emanation from a sense of the Absolute as described/prescribed in either Type VII or Type VIII.
	A creational mode is the treatment of the world as created, by some sense of an Absolute, at some point in time, in some period of time, or, continuously/continually throughout time.
	A presentational mode is the treatment of the world as a continuous/continual presentation without recourse to emanation, creation or some other form of non-self-presentation. 
	An interventional mode is one where the natural laws are suspended, over-ridden, or, manipulated through some form of an intervention in that world (treated in an emanational and/or creational and/or presentational mode or modes).
	The Neoplatonic text clearly appears to adopt an emanational mode and, also, an interventional mode along with a rejection of creational and presentational modes. In sharp contrast this Buddhist-Wisdom text appears to adopt a presentational mode and an interventional mode with the possibility of a creational and/or emanational mode(s). Let me elaborate on the apparent fundamental differences entailed in these two traditions in this regard and the manner in which both texts appear to rewrite transcendentally their differences in heritage.
	The Neoplatonic text stresses the emanational position on almost every page of the text. Its use of abstraction is exercised on a number of overlapping levels, and includes e.g., epistemological, ontological, metaphysical, cosmological and, importantly, soteriological dimensions. On the other hand Buddhist treatment presents some degree of hierarchical differentiation in its community of spiritual beings but no reason to interrelate, and differentiate, this assembly other than through spiritual ability, or, on lesser levels, the degree of merit earned. There is some suggestion that these more exulted religious figures can create, intervene within, and purify, their buddha-fields, but, no explanations on how these types of feats are accomplished are ever spelt out in this regard?
	This feature of a transcendental sense of community found in this Buddhist text, and other Buddhist texts should not be overlooked. In this vast panorama of the Buddhist cosmos this text is forever informing us that through the perfection of wisdom all these numinous-like figures of the Buddhas, Bodhisattvas, etc., are continuously working, on our behalf, for our weal. All this non-discriminating skillfulness is exercised in a harmonious fashion. We don't find multitudes of exulted figures fighting over the salvation of individuals, or, all descending upon them at the same time. On the other hand the text suggests no mechanism for this degree of spiritual and communal harmony other than through the auspices of the ever present perfection of wisdom.
	This Neoplatonic text rejects the concept of creation. This Buddhist text essentially ignores this possibility. Questions on the creation or non-creation of the world, the nature of the Buddha after death are left suspended (as antimonies) in the traditional manner. However, there is a sense in which the phenomenal world is also seen as a construction constructed by mind, as a creation of the mind, a fabrication, etc. To this extent Plotinus might also be seen to be in agreement (through his views on the relatively non-existent nature of matter).
	This Neoplatonic text through its stress on the emanational point of view could never accept that the world is a phenomenal presentation that just presents itself. In contrast this Buddhist text just seems to take the phenomenal world for granted, as a presentation, without any discussion on why that is the case other than its (transcendental-empirical) arguments for the interdependent nature of that phenomenal presentation.
	This Neoplatonic text indicates some qualified acceptance of the idea that the unfolding of the world can be influenced through ideas, rituals, moral practices, etc., and vice versa through e.g., astrological influences to a minor extent? Equally vague on this type of subject this Buddhist text suggests possible forms of intervention through the skillful interaction of Bodhisattvas, etc., accumulation of merit, and other religious practices, etc.
	All in all we have a few correspondences e.g., on the aspect of intervention, and, a greater number of divergences, e.g., between the Neoplatonic concept of emanation and the Buddhist tendency just to accept the world as a phenomenal presentation (that is empty of all forms of mental reification). Certainly, in this aspect of our Typology, we have more than adequate grounds to differentiate the style of these two traditions although this differentiation must not be treated in phenomenal non-transcendental terms of reference.

Type X - Type IX + Treatment in a Pre-Phenomenal Mode

	Under this aspect of this typology, for the sake of completeness, we ask the question what is the origin of the Absolute? Translated into a transcendental format does this question have sense? In some measure this origin is the origin of sense itself and in this regard both philosophies just accept the presentational possibility of sense as just given, as a fact of existence, an unthinkable state of affairs.
	On the other side of the coin the origins of phenomenal existence, more specifically the origin of our present relatively `unsatisfactory state of affairs,' is given a vague answer by both traditions on more traditional grounds. For the Neoplatonic philosopher phenomenal existence is nearly, if not practically, at the bottom of an emanational chain of existence, hence its mixture of relative-perfection and imperfection. In this regard personal existence, through some sense of metaphorical fall, is only a few rungs higher with the potentiality of going higher, or, even transcending this type of scheme (while still maintaining a place within it). With some similarities, and dissimilarities, the Buddhist-Wisdom perception of the world, in line with the traditional Buddhist point of view, perceives personal existence as motivated through misdirected desire (tanha) founded on an ignorance (avidya) of how the world is (transcendentally) constituted (yathabhutam). Salvation residing, likewise, in an enfreeing transcendence (Nirvana) of this type of scheme (while still maintaining a place within this world of samsara). Both traditions maintaining a dialectical tension between, a transcendent escape from, and, an immanent remaining within, this world of the phenomenal appearance suggesting that from the transcendental-absolute point of view there is no real difference between the transcendental and the phenomenal, between the Absolute and the Relative. As Plotinus puts it:

...deliverance from the things of this world, a life which takes no delight in the things of this world, escape in solitude to the solitary

Conclusion

	Quietly working in the background of this chapter my second heuristic device on the hermeneutics of apparent disconformity has attempted to offer miscellaneous reasons why these two traditions, in a number of topics, might appear to be non-coincident without a loss of a more central isomorphism (this same method also working in the opposite direction to disentangle non-substantial appearances of structural-functional conformity). As a conclusion let me first briefly reconstruct, and integrate, the important arguments that constitute this thesis. Second, let me note a number of the more important general findings that were demonstrated, or indicated, in the transcendental-phenomenological-hermeneutical treatment developed in this chapter. Third, and last, for the sake of convenience, let me list the specific points of stylistic differentiation, I believe, can be made in regard to these two traditions from a comparison of the two texts chosen for this examination.

A.	Brief Reconstruction of Arguments Used In this Thesis

1.	That the textual presence of a transcendental suspension establishes a transcendental-absolute style of discourse.
2.	That a transcendental suspension is one of the operative mechanisms at work in:
	i	Negative theological processes,
	ii	Non-literal treatment of metaphor,
	iii	Disvaluation of the natural attitude,
	iv	The use of certain forms of paradox/contradiction,
	v	Processes of abstraction/deconstruction, etc.
3.	That both texts demonstrate the use of the mechanisms listed in 2. - therefore the presence of a transcendental suspension.
4.	The central imposition, and maintenance, of a transcendental suspension, and other associated transcendental processes of reduction and reconstitution, establishes a sense of the transcendental, i.e., a sense of the absolute. Hence 1.

5.	But both philosophies are religious-philsophies hence their religious treatment of this sense of the absolute.

6.	The progressive explication of this sense of the absolute exposes a sense of transcendental subjectivity, i.e., a transcendental ego.
7.	Religious treatment of this sense of transcendental ego as trans-intentional, trans-immanent-transcendent, trans-ontological-epistemological, self-referential and trans-subjective-intersubjective establishes a religious sense of the Absolute.
8.	That a transcendental philosophy has the power to re-write a positive theology in transcendental terms of reference through various forms of bias, qualification, metaphor, suspension, etc.
9.	Re-introduction of a qualified subjective-intersubjective (-objective) bias has the power to establish a positive theological accommodation of that sense of the Absolute, and vice versa.
10.	A religious sense of the Absolute taking various re-treated forms, e.g., from a sense of Super-Monadism to a sense of monadic community.
11.	This sense of the Absolute establishing a numinous, or divine, focus for devotional attitudes, etc.
12.	The soteriological goal(s) of this genre of religious-philosophy being rewritten in the form of a transcendental insight into the constitution of the phenomenal from the point of view of this religious sense of the Absolute.

B.	General Findings

1.	Under the typological categories of Types I and II it was demonstrated that both traditions entertained the prominent, central, thorough imposition, and maintenance, of a transcendental suspension, and, its exercise through transcendental processes of reduction and reconstitution.
2.	As a consequence of 1. it was demonstrated on phenomenologically-descriptive and hermeneutically-prescriptive (or interpretive) grounds that both texts generally exercised, and maintained, a transcendental-absolute style of discourse, and, therefore, could be considered as instances of an absolute genre in religious-philosophy hence the presence of commensurable grounds for the comparative research undertaken in this thesis.
3.	As a consequence of the overall transcendental-absolute style of discourse exercised by these two traditions any questions, descriptions and/or interpretations on the topic of the phenomenal nature of their textual presentation concerning transcendental topics should, correctly, be translated into transcendental terms of reference.
4.	In adopting a transcendental format (as suggested in 3.) for questioning, describing and/or interpreting the constitutional formation of this type of tradition it was felt proper that in investigating the possible sense of an Absolute dimension, or perspective, that such considerations be translated through the mediation of the transcendental concept of a transcendental ego (although the same device could be (re-)treated with a subjective-intersubjective bias).
5.	As Types IV - VIII progressively exposed, in effect, the positive co-occurrence of this implication of religiously treated transcendental subjectivity, i.e., a transcendental sense of ego; a religious sense of the Absolute in both traditions as a consequence was affirmed in transcendental terms of reference, but, not (directly) affirmed in phenomenal non-transcendental terms of reference (along with the following qualifications and reservations expressed in the comparative use of this typology).
6.	Although a general consensus was reached between Types I - VII, and, a partial consensus was affirmed between Types VIII and IX, this did not necessarily imply a strict isomorphic conformity, within each type, between these two traditions in this regard type by type.
7.	As a general rule the structural-functional distance in a bias imposed on each one of these ten types should reveal greater degrees of differentiation as we advanced through this typology.
8.	These differences in typological bias accepted (as suggested in 7. and noted under Specific Findings, section C.) the overall textual styles of these two traditions, as presented by these two texts, could be interpreted, and accommodated, within this genre of absolute philosophy.
9.	Our findings in 8.) suggesting that these two traditions (all historical, traditional and cultural differences accepted) to be philosophically closer to each other than to other contemporaneous genre, e.g., forms of absolutism, gnosticism, dualism, theism, empiricism, idealism, nihilism, relativism, etc.
10.	These transcendental-absolute terms of reference presenting a type of religious-philosophy, which through the transformational nature of its transcendental perspective, systematically integrates those implicit/explicit indicators of its absolute status, e.g., metaphors of disvaluation; negational forms of transcendence; negative theological processes; transcendentally conducted suspensions, reductions and reconstitutions; soluble paradoxes; transcendental senses of conviction, empathy, purification, responsibility, harmony, etc.
11.	That relatively non-essential differences between these two traditions could be noted between the Neoplatonic use of abstraction and the Buddhist use of deconstruction; between the Neoplatonic use of metaphysical presuppositions and the Buddhist use of a relatively presuppositionless metaphysics; between a Neoplatonic position of a community of monads in communion with a primal Monad, and, the Buddhist position of a transcendental community of monads in a general state of harmonious communion with itself.
12.	That relatively essential differences between these two traditions could be noted more easily in this comparative examination through an investigation of the differences in bias exercised by those two traditions between those features outlined in 11, etc; hence these differences could be treated more as differences in style (regardless of the magnitude discovered in this respect) in the respective formulations adopted by these two traditions in their transcendental vision of the Absolute (- as ultimate reality treated from the perspective of ultimate reality) in this religious genre of absolute philosophy!

C.	Specific Findings

Specific points of stylistic differentiation noted:

1.	The Neoplatonic use of abstraction...

	i	not thoroughly deconstructive, 	
	ii	preserving a sense of metaphysical 						hierarchicalization;
	iii	exercised ontologically and epistemologically,
	iv	with a bias towards the transcendent.

	The Buddhist-Wisdom use of deconstruction...

	i	thoroughly deconstructive, 
	ii	not exercised in any real sense of metaphysical 				hierarchicalization;
	iii	not exercised in such a manner ontologically nor 				under such overt epistemological terms of 					reference; in a general metaphysically 						presuppositionless environment,
	iv	with a bias towards the immanent.

2.	The Neoplatonic tradition explicitly emphasizes a sense 	of the Absolute, whereas...
	
	The Buddhist-Wisdom tradition explicitly emphasizes a 			sense of the absolute.

3.	The Neoplatonic sense of the Absolute emphasizing an 			intersubjective sense of a Super-Monad with which is 			found, in an emanational association, a hierarchically 	structured community of monads, whereas...
	
	The Buddhist-Wisdom sense of the Absolute is centerd on 	a loose, hierarchically constructed, presentation of a 	world and community of transcendental monads creating 			the sense of a transcendental community.

Endnotes VII - The Hermeneutics Of Absolute Typology