Open Forum: Part I:
How Should Civil Society Deal with Forms of Fundamentalism
Conducive to Terrorism, etc?

Introduction

	In some recently written sections of my Theology, Volume II, I explored the relationship between fundamentalism and superlative economies. I argued there that fundamentalism based itself upon a superlative economy but that the ultimate non-viability of the latter meant that we should be able to neutralize, deconstruct and help dismantle the former… i.e., demonstrate both their defective construction and dangerous dissemination. In the meantime, however, the relative viability of the fundamentalists’ project meant we had to live with the same and that the critical philosopher or theologian would need to formulate strategies to help insulate ourselves from the relatively non-existential, ultimately non-viable nature of such religious projects…. (0)
	
	Let me argue that all projects based on a superlative economy, whether religious or non-religious in orientation, must ultimately fail! When forms of fundamentalism are based on a superlative economy they too must ultimately fail! However, such philosophies appear to endure and their imminent demise may well be only a rumour after all, without substantial foundations… For the critical philosopher, who argues for the ultimate failure of all non-comparative economies, how might they explain this persistence on the part of fundamentalism to endure in the realms of religious discourse and praxis and not meet an early demise and disappearance given this imputed failure of superlative economies to properly, appropriately and validly ground this type of (absolutist) discourse? (1)

	In the first section of this brief outline let me discuss the potentially viable nature of comparative economies versus the ultimately non-viable nature of superlative economies (and the ultimately non-viable nature of ascriptive economies). (2)

	In the second section of this outline let me discuss the nature of the fundamentalistic project and the consequences of the ultimate non-viability of projects operating in the non-comparative economy. (3)

	In a third section let me formulate a plan that might successfully disable the dissemination of this kind of non-existential philosophy. (4)
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1.   Section I: The Relative and Ultimate Viability of the Comparative Economy

	By comparative economy is meant the logico-experiential space wherein a specific comparative economy, particular type of comparative economy, or considerations of the comparative economy in general are situated… a formulation therein being expressed in a comparative economic discourse. Such a discourse if adequately formulated and exercised, i.e., is properly, appropriately and validly formulated; could then be considered to be both relatively and ultimately viable. Viability is established as relatively viable through the ongoing replication of that discourse in such a manner that it be relatively consistent, environmentally coherent (in its field/s of application) and pragmatically useful. Such a discourse being ultimately viable if its replication survives the imposition of an adequate, overall transcendental suspension (in the process preserving its core-isomorphism at the center of that discourse in the course of its evolution). A comparative economy is comparative by virtue of its isomorphic features that remain relatively invariant under transformations conducted in keeping with the nature of a comparative discourse. (5)

	What is a comparative discourse? A discourse that utilizes comparative constructions and is not formulated in a non-comparative mode, i.e., in either a superlative modality or in a monothematic ascriptive modality. A comparative construction is (a is relative to b) is Relative as (x is relative to y). ‘R’, in its central (and essential) relativity, establishes the comparativeness of the equation. (6)

			(a r b) R (x r y)				(F1)

	E.g., this (a) is red (b) as this red colour (b or x) is to the general spectrum of red colours in general (y). If this is true (T) then this a is red (b). (7)

	Why is the comparative economy viable (when adequately formulated and exercised)? And what are superlative and ascriptive economies? Moreover why adopt this expression ‘economy’? (8)

	An ascriptive economy considered qua an ascriptive economy is a degenerate comparative economy or a comparative economy whose final products alone are under cognitive-conceptual examination and/or manipulation. E.g., this (a) is red (b) because a is b. Degenerate in the sense that how we arrive at ‘a is b’ is lost to sight through its extraction from a prior comparative economy. Similarly the truth of that ascription can only be re-examined when re-inserted back into the appropriate comparative economy that allows us to conduct/re-conduct this sort of examination (if analytically-oriented) or investigation (if synthetically oriented). (9)

What are superlative economies? True superlatives are either processes whose terminations cannot be arrived at or are analytically pre-defined standards that can be met and are correctly appreciated in a comparative economy. Let me denominate these two kinds of superlative discourses as superlative and pseudo-superlative. The latter are correctly comparative even if they use superlative language. Let me dispose of this category by noting its two types. Absolutely pre-defined and relatively pre-defined and can be re-defined superlatively. Absolutely pre-defined is like taking a test that involves a set number of multi-choice questions or a set number of calculations that are all well-formed, where each possess one solution that can be obtained in practice. E.g., imagine a mathematics questionnaire that involved one hundred calculations that could be completed, i.e., solved or resolved. The best result would be one hundred correct out of a score of one hundred. Here the term ‘best result’ is predefined as one hundred correct answers out of a possible score of one hundred. The expression ‘best’ is a superlative. The second pseudo-superlative, as a relative pseudo-superlative, would occur, e.g., when the highest score arrived at in the exam was, say, ninety correct out of one hundred. That was the best score in that exam, however, the very best that could have been achieved would have been the absolute one hundred correct (and nothing less). Both types of pseudo-superlatives are not the real object of our attention when we refer to the expression superlative economies. (10)

	Superlatives are processes whose termination cannot be definitely, i.e., absolutely realized. They are either open or closed in terms of their limit or limitation. E.g., we could envisage a furnace with a temperature of x degrees. We could imagine an even hotter temperature… and imagine an even greater temperature, etc., without a limit (when excepting practical or hypothetical constraints upon realizing such a temperature). A higher temperature could always be envisaged. On the other hand, when moving a material object we can envisage it traveling faster… and even faster. However near the speed of light we meet a closed limit or limitation. As it would take, hypothetically, infinite energy to actually equal the speed of light mass, therefore, can only get close to but never equal the speed of light (for that medium). This type of limit is closed, i.e., is fixed even if it cannot be definitively arrived at in fact. Non-pseudo-superlative economies, therefore, are economies that demand certain limits be met even if they cannot be obtained in theory or in practice. The appearance that such economies are viable is obtained through their refraction through (our unwitting utilization of) a comparative economy even if formulated in language that is absolutist and non-obtainable. E.g., a religious sense of deity is often couched in such impossible language; for instance, the ‘divine’ has been defined along the following lines; as the most perfect being, being absolutely pure actuality, infinitely blessed with goodness, etc., etc. Such a definition is non-viable both ontologically and epistemologically. Ontologically we could not encounter the same, and, epistemologically we could not recognize the same intellectually or conceptually. E.g., ‘pure actuality’ could not be thought since actuality can only arise through its contrast with potentiality. Destroy its contrast, derivation in a comparative economy, and actuality cannot be thought let alone so-called ‘pure’ actuality. What cannot be recognized cannot be encountered! This epistemological-ontological constraint has been previously examined in demarcational theory. In principle this critical principle works like this: identity is thematically focalized in and through the gestalt contrast in a field between the relatively background and the relatively focused. Since neither ‘pure focus’ nor ‘pure background’ can be entertained, only that comparative contrast that arises between the relatively focalized and the relatively backgrounded. Hence the importance and viability of a comparative economy versus absolute superlative economies and ascriptive economies. (11)

	An ascriptive economy arises in and through the truncation or a comparative economy; through the overlooking of a comparative economy. E.g., let us say the best score in a particular exam was one hundred correct out of one hundred, and that was realized. To ascribe that result as the best possible, as one hundred out of one hundred, is to overlook the fact that a deeper interpretation of this situation involves the act of comparison between a pre-defined definition and the actual realization of the same. This was the result because, in accordance with our simple primitive equation, this result is the best that could be obtained and was obtained. In the same vein we could say that the apparent functioning of a superlative economy is arrived at through the same sort of overlooking of the comparative manner in which the existential core of our discourse is conducted (even if treated in a superlative-like mode). All superlative discourses are able to function to the extent they invoke comparative mechanisms. Indeed, all discourses function by virtue of this comparative core. Their apparent viability, however, is dependent upon their relative and absolute viability. In the former apparent function is maintained by exercising this comparative core. In the later absolute viability is realized iff, and only if, the stated economy is well-formed, etc., and survives an overall transcendental suspension. I.e., iff that surviving economy is neither ascriptive nor absolutely superlative (whether open or closed) in orientation. Under such a transformation the preservation of symmetry implies an analytical economy whereas an asymmetric response implies a synthetic economy. Now why do we invoke this idea of an economy? (12)

‘Economies’ are invoked because we are dealing with the dynamic functions involved in the thematization of identity. Through circulation (in the hermeneutic circle between analysis and synthesis/foreground and background, etc.) value is realized through processes of thematization. Only through circulation is value realized. Hence this recognition of an economy in this regard. This economy is expressed (i.e., presented, re-presented and/or represented) through the formation/re-formation of a discourse. Hence the implication of an intentional philosophy, demarcational philosophy, hermeneutic philosophy, gestalt philosophy, phenomenological philosophy, etc., thence their collective inclusion in an economic philosophy in this regard. What is simulated therein is merely simulated as a simulation qua simulation (and not as a simulation qua pre-simulated state prior to simulation or a post-simulated state post simulation). (13)

	What determines the relative or ultimate success or failure of a particular-type of discourse (and specific instances of the same)? (14)

	A discourse should be properly, appropriately and validly formed, i.e., (internally) consistent, coherent (in its relevant field of exercise) and validly formed in its truth values (to that degree amenable to such a pursuit). I would like to argue that only comparative discourses properly and adequately formed can be both relatively and ultimately successful and not fail (within the terms of reference supplied). On the other hand, non-comparative discourses can be relatively successful and we would need to ask why? For a start, all discourses are meta-textually controlled and their exercise in order to function implies a comparative matrix. On the other hand the inserted text may belong to a non-comparative text-type and therefore only appear to succeed (but not ultimately when subjected to an overall transcendental suspension). Let me look at this distinction, between the relative and ultimate, in close detail. (15)

	As noted relative success is achieved when a text appears to function as intended. This is accomplished meta-textually and textually presents an apparent façade of normality by virtue of its meta-textual presentation in and through a viable genre if and when enough of the text is adequately formed in order to give this aura of presentation. Hence a relativity of success. E.g., Father Xmas is a mythological figure and not a real figure as presented to young children. The text is generally consistent, and coherent to some degree despite an overweight person being able to descend and ascend chimneys, and is mythologically valid in conformity with the conventions of this tale, however, this person has no real exemplification despite numerable temporary part-time proxies (in department stores, e.g.). We could not produce an ultimately viable  philosophy, religious or non-religious in tenor, if we were to base this construct on the imputed real existence of the same. A viable construct could only be built on their mythological existence. E.g., a study could be done on the manner such a figure is presented in Western mythology. Properly constructed, etc., in contrast (with its non-mythological presentation) such a study could well be ultimately successful as a report on such customs. In the same manner I would argue that textual constructions based on non-comparative textual strategies must ultimately fail! In the same fashion fundamentalistic interpretations and presentations based on absolute superlative forms of treatment must ultimately fail despite their apparent limited degrees of relative success as seemingly possible possibilities inserted into meta-textual formats that appear plausible. (16)

	Let me define these four distinctions formed between ‘relative’ and ‘ultimate’, ‘success’ and ‘failure’. An ultimately successful text is one that is meta-textually and textually adequate in its presentation. The test of ultimate success is to be passed via an overall transcendental suspension and there to be examined for its successful adequacy or otherwise from a transcendental perspective, i.e., testing the adequacy of that presentation in its form from the comparative ideality of its type. Ultimate failure can only have an apparent successfulness from a relative perspective if the presentation is reasonably presentable in a superficial examination. Ultimate success presents with a relative success (if only on superficial grounds with respect to the latter examination). Relative failure is apparent when inadequacy of textual formation is made evident either superficially or non-superficially. Ideally, non-comparatively oriented texts need to be shown to be inadequate in both ultimate and non-ultimate terms of reference, the latter perspective being the more effective in dismantling the presentation and dissemination of fundamentalistic texts! (17)

	What is it about non-comparative texts that is ultimately not successful despite the superficial presentation of a relative successfulness (if this apparent adequacy is evident in a superficial examination)? (18)

	In my opinion an ascriptive text is a degenerate comparative text, a text that concentrates on ends, end products, etc., in effect, a focus on intentional content. In contrast absolute superlative texts concentrate on process without regard to intentional content, in effect, a pre-degeneracy (since degeneracy depends upon a process in order to merely concentrate upon intentional content). In the latter only process is focused upon as if it were content. E.g., the Scholastic or Cartesian description that ‘God is that which could not be more perfect’, or something else to that same type of effect, is an example of this privileging of process. ‘Better’ implies ‘a state of affairs better than some other less good state of affairs’. ‘Best’ is ‘better than better and even better than that or until defined as best’ (in which case the latter is more correctly re-situated in a comparative discourse). On the other hand, the infinite process of better and better, etc., cannot be given an endpoint if defined as open and non-obtainable (logically, epistemologically, ontologically, etc.). Whether open or closed an absolute superlative cannot be arrived at! In the same fashion the Divine defined in such terms can only be treated analogically or as a metaphor. As already noted, e.g., the wholly-other could not be there for us (as a phenomenon that could be encountered phenomenologically). Therefore, the Holy could not be wholly-other. ‘Wholly-otherness’ can only be salvaged as a metaphor (which too cannot be arrived at literally). In that role it could only act as a guide, a pointing out of the way or path, etc., but, however, could not therefore substitute as the goal, etc. (without that substitution in turn being treated metaphorically, etc.)! A true discipline, whether adequate or valid, is presented with a theoretical aspect, a practical aspect and a critical aspect (that collectively stand in need of some degree of mutual harmonization even though it cannot be absolutely harmonized). Theology as a discipline could not be treated as a discipline without a practical aspect! Privileging absolute superlative process as a substitute for the Divine denies a practicalization of this discipline with the important implication that without some basis in the here and now of daily existence no discourse-presentation about the same could have a practical basis and, thus, could not be presented as a discipline. Indeed, having these three facets, and their mutual and critical collaboration, is necessary for the presentation of a discipline though a set of discourses appertaining to the same! Moreover, as argued, viability of the discipline is promoted through the ultimate viability of that discipline and its associated emission of discourses. (19)

2.   On the Ultimate Non-Viability of Non-Comparative Projects

	First, let us re-examine the nature of the comparative economy. (20)	

	Because intentional formation is simulated in a gestalt field its productiveness is a product of an interaction between the ideal polarities of focus and background, and our appreciation of that relationship and its formation of an intentional-perceiver, in keeping with the nature of that intentionality under focus, the economy that best presents/re-presents or merely represents the same is that of a comparative economy. Given this theoretical background, just what is it about a comparative economy that gives it this sense of utilizing comparisons? Indeed, how are comparisons formed? Surely, a in a relationship to b is enough material for a comparison to be formed (in a contra-opinion to the formula supplied as F1)? However, comparisons cannot be meaningfully presented between the proverbial ‘chalk’ and ‘cheese’. Comparison can only be made when the items to be compared have some degree and manner of an isomorphic invariance in the terms of reference concerned. So, e.g., a is hotter than b does not mean a is the same as b because b is hotter than a, yet, at the same time, in terms of heat this comparison can be conducted despite the fact that a and b are also different states. E.g., ‘a is bright’ and ‘b is hot’ could be interrelated if some transformational rules are presented for allowing a to be converted into b and v.v., as when, e.g., a star’s temperature is determined, as a rule of thumb, by reference to its colour (to the extent that red is seen as cooler than blue, and the same rule applying with all the colour in between and either side of red and blue). Our formula F1 establishes this ground for establishing a degree of isomorphic invariance and degrees of difference or similarity within the same in order to also establish comparative difference or similarity. (21)

Our formula F1 is: (a r b) R (x r y). Now rab cannot be equal to rxy unless a = x and b = y. Now, if different, common grounds of isomorphic invariance can still be supplied if rab is related to rxy is related through R. E.g., this ‘x is red’ if ‘that red shade falls within the spectrum normally considered to be ‘red’ in orientation’. Here we have an isomorphic relationship between the cognitive perception of red and its cognitive conceptual treatment. But, if the concept cannot be red what is the nature of this relationship (say between percepts and concepts of the same, and v.v.)? I would like to hazard the guess that the psychic location of redness, in our cosmic mapping of the world, is (more or less) the same location where both concept and percept can coincide (if only isomorphically). We might explain this in the following fashion: the concept of the percept of red has the same psychic coincidence of the concept of red since the meta-textual genre for red-seeing is in effect the concept of red, and, the conceptual translation of specific act of red-seeing, if red, should fall within the conceptual sense of red. In other words, the concept of this act of red-seeing should fall within the overall concept of redness if and only if that perceptual act was an act of red-seeing. Going back to our formula we might say: (a r b) subjected to meta-textual treatment by one degree as (a r b)1 equal (x r y) iff (x r y)-1 = (a r b). In other words, given isomorphic invariance, in terms of the comparative feature in question, an act of comparison can now be entered into. Hence:

	(a r b)n+1 = (x r y)n iff  rab = rxy in the transformations n – n+1/n+1 – n (F2)(22)
	
	A comparative economy, therefore, is conducted between related items subjected to meta-transformational acts of treatment in which the isolated means of comparison are the same or similar. What is this sameness or similarity? The ‘form’ between two or more logical subjects. E.g., the idea of myself sitting on a chair in fact necessitates myself sitting on a chair (in fact). These two logical subject-states are not identical but do possess the same logical form, namely, “‘myself’ ‘sitting’ ‘on a chair’” be those items treated conceptually or perceptually, epistemologically or ontologically, etc. Extending such treatment we have now at our disposal a pragmatic or practical definition of truth, namely:

	(a r b)n+1 is T iff (a r b)n , i.e., if n = 0 then (a r b)1  iff (a r b)    (F3) (23)

	Thus we have isomporphic invariance if  (a r b)s = (x r y)t if the absolute difference between s and t = 1. Hence (I = is isomorphically invariant with):

	(a r b)s I (x r y)t iff !s-t! = 1 & !(a r b)s+1 - (x r y)t! = 0 & s<t 	      (F4) (24)

	In an absolute superlative text we have no true comparative content. On the other hand, in an ascriptive text we have no comparative process. Only with comparative process and content can we begin to argue that we have a comparative text (regardless of its adequacy and successfulness, etc. Obviously, in an absolute superlative text we need to supply an end-product in order to begin to re-treat it in a comparative mode. Similarly, in an ascriptive economy comparative process needs to be re-inaugurated. Given the relative viability of an apparent comparative meta-textual climate a non-comparative text could be inserted or re-inserted and transformed to a comparative modality by supplying either content or process (or even perhaps both in a mixed non-comparative climate). How is this act of transformation to be entertained and achieved (and how, by extension, is a fundamentalistic and absolutistic discourse to be transformed into an ultimately viable comparatively based discourse or merely dismantled and shown to be defective as it stands? Since this is part of our strategy for dealing with a fundamentalist discourse let us now attend to this critical type of performance. (25)

3.   The Conversion or Dismantling of Non-Comparatively Based Discourses, etc.

	Effectively, in order to do this, i.e., defuse a fundamentalist project, we need to convert or transform a seemingly superlative economy into a comparative one! Or merely dismantle the same! How is this type of manoeuvre to be performed? (26)

	I have already examined this type of process in the following fashion: First, there is a refusal to entertain an absolute dichotomy between the relatively Divine and the relatively non-divine since a comparative economy must existentially underlay an already existent religious economy. Second, we (phenomenologically) focus upon the (phenomenal) type of that relationship in question through an examination of the metaphor/s that express the form of that relationship. Third, we examine processes of identity that are instigated/re-instigated through such forms of (transcendental trans-phenomenal) appreciation therein conducted. Lastly, through suspending this process of (an overall) suspension(s) we allow ourselves to be projected back into the world as lived with-others with a greater sense of response and responsibility, i.e., with a greater semblance of authenticity (through an ensuing and ongoing rectification of all our relationships)! Hence the following formula: non-exclusion, inclusion, conclusion and re-inclusion, etc; as exercised through its repetition, etc. Let me examine in detail the course of this process of conversion. (27)

	How is this conversion or transformation to be achieved? Let me outline an archetypal approach to this type of a non-absolute project (in religious ‘therapy’). Essentially, we are going to supply the need for an overall transcendental suspension without directly addressing it in those terms of reference, in that style of philosophical and phenomenological representation. The first manoeuvre is that of non-exclusion. Superlatively based fundamentalistic texts, among others, have the habit of creating an infinite space between the sense of the Divine and the existentiality of the reality of the person. As argued elsewhere, an absolutely exclusive theology is not practical! Hence this psycho-religious need for a process of non-exclusion, etc. How might this process be initiated and appropriately enacted (given the potentially dangerous nature of some forms of fundamentalistic forms of dissemination)? (28)
	
	First, we need to defuse all sense of an absolute dichotomy between the sense of the Divine and all senses of the non-Divine (in what ever manner that sense of the Divine might be defined in a particular culture or tradition under such interrogation). We could ask “does your vision of the Divine bear a relationship in some form or other to the world?” If there is no such relationship then ‘that vision of the Divine is not there for-us’ and, consequently, ‘we need not be there for-it’! Then, that possibility of a relationship not accepted, there would be no need for that particular religious philosophy as ‘the Divine therein could not be there-for-us’, and v.v! Therefore, there must exist in some form or other a relationship between the Divine and the non-Divine, and v.v., in order to maintain a religious economy (along with a religiously viable theological difference in this regard). In other words, by some means or other, the Divine is in ‘touch’ with us (and, in the same form or some other, wittingly and/or unwittingly, we can be in ‘touch’ with the same be that episodically or continually or continuously or through some form of transformation, etc.). In this (in a viable theology) there can be no wholly-other, only a sense of the holy-other that cannot be wholly other! Metaphorically, and non-literally, the concept of the wholly-other could be exercised through some form of qualification as a distinctively different realm of being, but not as an absolutely different realm of being; viable forms of mediation as a consequence being automatically affirmed in some appropriate phenomenological frame/s of reference. That being the case, then it behooves the religious person to realize that a superlative economy makes no religious sense and convert to a comparative one (if only by default, or, at least, cognitively if not emotionally, etc.) (given that a superlative economy makes neither epistemological sense nor religious sense and that its ontological formation could be neither formed nor recognized even if it were said to exist hypothetically or by fiat!)! (29)

	Second, once we have argued, successfully or otherwise, that the Divine cannot be there-for-us and wholly-other at the same time, let us now proceed to concentrate on the perceived/re-perceived nature of this relationship. Although we have operated to date as meta-theologians or philosophical-theologians let us in these circumstances operate in the terms of reference supplied by the tradition of that religionist or community or culture in question. Let us look into this concept of being ‘touched’ by the Divine (or our being able somehow to be ‘in touch’ with the same) or adopt and adapt any other metaphor of interaction or contact proffered by the same (once the possibility of such a relationship is affirmed/re-affirmed). Let us note that we are defined in and through our relationships, e.g., as parent, sibling, friend, lover, etc., and, that no relationship need be exclusive of others (as long as there is no inherent unresolved/unresolvable contradictions in that articulated list). That being the case let us then declare that tentative provisional definition/s of the Divine should only concern those relationships directly or indirectly available to us. Through this re-focusing upon (hypothetical) relationships (with the Divine) we have in effect commenced a phenomenological approach to our topic. This has a number of consequences for our program of transformation (from a non-viable superlative religious economy to a potentially viable and non-fundamentalist comparative religious economy). By focusing on a potential relationship we are focusing on it as a possible phenomenon, i.e., as that constituted in intentional consciousness for-us by-us (regardless of the hypothetical actuality or otherwise of that sense of the Divine in their participation with ‘us’ in that equation, and v.v.). Moreover, through a focusing on the form of that potential relationship qua its relational form we are in effect beginning to concentrate on it ideal structure as a type of function (of possible experience in our passage through this world with-others). Furthermore, this shifting of our attention from the phenomenal qua phenomenal to an appreciation of the ‘form’ of the phenomenal is effectively creating a (shift towards a) transcendental perspective upon the same; the ‘appreciation of the phenomenal’ being ‘trans-phenomenal’ in orientation and thence ‘transcendental’ in orientation. In addition, this transcendental shift in perspective is both inductive of and conducive for the implementation of an overall transcendental suspension in the pursuit of our topic whether the implementer of this program is aware of this transition/transformation in progress. Hence by concentrating on the identity-defining nature of relationships we have commenced a program involving a de facto overall transcendental suspension (as well as a transcendental translation and potential transformation) whether instigated by default or by intent! Through such treatment we automatically transform an absolutist superlative religious economy into a non-absolutist comparative religious economy. So, let us re-direct this attention upon the nature of relationships in so far as they are intended to define/re-define the non-religious/religious person in accordance with this treatment of that tradition. The existential viability of that tradition in question, as evidenced through its survival as a tradition across time, guaranteeing that this aspect of a comparative economy is already present and must already be present within prior and current expressions of the same be they textual in a classical sense or non-classical (in the form of performances of ritual, aesthetic criteria for worship, the formulation and practice of spiritual exercises, pursuit of moral decisions, etc.). (30)

	Third, let us refine and thematize this embryonic transcendental phenomenological approach in order to complete this process of de-fundamentalization in this project of a radical de-fundamentalism. Covertly, or overtly, we re-directing attention towards the religious relationship in question (in accordance with that tradition as re-seen through a comparative economic approach). In this process, religious-identity is seen to arise through the exercise of that relationship be that envisaged as a possibility or an actuality. Moreover, this production/re-production of value is focused through our attention, wittingly or unwittingly, being placed upon its phenomenal form, and, that focusing upon its phenomenal form effectively creates/recreates a shift towards the transcendental, and, all this is inductive of and conducive for the exercise of overall transcendental suspensions wherein beliefs, etc., become bracketed and therein non-superlative in orientation. That by such transformations a radical de-fundamentalism should be able to be put into effect if the individual, community or tradition in question is cooperative with such a re-visioning of their tradition or traditions. All this, hopefully, is to be achieved with a minimum of jargon or theory, etc. Even without mentioning words like ‘phenomenal’ or ‘transcendental’ or ‘suspension’, etc! (31)

	Then, lastly, by breaking the suspensions achieved in and through this program the power of the metaphor committed to by that religious fraternity in question should then unleash and release a greater degree of value than that hitherto had through having supported non-viable features of a superlative overlay of that original underlying comparative economy in comparison to potentially viable features of a well-constructed/well-reconstructed comparative economy. This type of value, on the whole, supporting an integration/re-integration within the psyche of that individual or fraternity in question and between other individuals and fraternities be they identified with nor non-identified with the same. In all of this, I would like to observe, that fundamentalism grows out of a comparative economy and not the other way, and, that just as this growth grows upon this type of body politic it can also be excised through a reversal of that prior trend. Just as weeds grow in a garden so too can that garden be weeded! Indeed, a garden being a space that has been weeded implies it can be weeded again! That this type of pursuit is to be conducted across the whole spectrum of religious, political and cultural practice in this regard. (32)

	Now, let me summarize these four main stages in this process of de-fundamentalization. First, there is a refusal to entertain an absolute dichotomy between the relatively Divine and the relatively non-divine since a comparative economy must existentially underlay an already existent religious economy. Second, we (phenomenologically) focus upon the (phenomenal) type of that relationship in question through an examination of the metaphor/s that express the form of that relationship. Third, we examine processes of identity that are instigated/re-instigated through such forms of (transcendental trans-phenomenal) appreciation therein conducted. Lastly, through suspending this process of (an overall) suspension(s) we allow ourselves to be projected back into the world as lived with-others with a greater sense of response and responsibility, i.e., with a greater semblance of authenticity (through an ensuing and ongoing rectification of all our relationships)! Hence the following formula: non-exclusion, inclusion, conclusion and re-inclusion, etc; as exercised through its repetition, etc. I.e., non-exclusion from the sense of the Divine (in what ever comparative form it might be formulated); discerning the potential meaning of our inclusion therein; realizing what form of a conclusion we should make from our investigations; and, finding a process of re-inclusion through the suspension of the suspension and our existential projection back into the world-of-the-other as we make our passage through this World-of-Life and discover/re-discover a process of meaningfulness-for-us therein as the religious person finds themselves situated/re-situated before their vision of the Divine! (33)

	The point of this four-part exercise is this: if a theology is being presented as a pattern for living-in-the-world-with-others then let us critically assess whether such a scheme is viable or not viable, i.e., is existentially amenable with an ensuing enrichment of our existence with-others before-others! By ‘existential’ is meant a (transcendentally suspended) privileging of the surplus richness engendered in and through our relationships in a manner determined by the ‘life’ or integrity of our relationships; such assisting our collective path through the Life-World through a dialectical harmonization of our collective intent in this regard. (34)

	If a certain theology is being presented then let us at least insist that it augments ‘our’ existence as-we-stand-before-others! The fundamentalist’s project is contrary to such aims, especially when life is taken. Death is the destruction of a relationship that embodied individual has with other embodied individuals and communities, etc., being a change of state in its expression of that embodiment (without our needing to invoke the substantialization of soul or person in some form or other). This loss of such potential existential richness, and, the non-expressive realization of the same, being effectively non-existential and, consequently, inauthentic in tenor. (35)

	Now, conversion or dismantling are two options that deal directly with the apparent relative viability of an inauthentic project. However, since ultimately non-viable projects can manifest or be manifested as viable from a relative point of view then non-immediate conversion or dismantling demands that we also need to proactively insulate society from such non-existential projects/projections of cultural power, or, rather mis-projections. Let us look at this type of task, in a consequential analysis, from pre-conditional, conditional and post-conditional time-frames. (36)

	Pre-conditionally, a religious ecology should be advanced that is not amenable to fostering forms of religious extremism. This would entail both direct debate with such proponents in a skillful, non-combative mode, and, a removal of those pre-conditional features from the cultural environment that would foster the same. (37)

	Conditionally, such fundamentalistic projects should be exposed as ultimately non-viable, and either converted or dismantled (in a manner as just outlined). (38)

	Post-conditionally, the consequences, whether probable or those that have actually occurred, should be publicly examined in the hope of preventing that type of pattern from occurring and/or re-occurring through an emotional-spiritual identification being obtained through the simulation of the consequences of those types of projects (subjected to adequate processes of transcendental suspension). (39)

	How this counter-project of neutralization should be conducted is perhaps best left to the society and/or communities themselves concerned with this need for proactive insulation from the inauthentic consequences of this type of project (in its more extremist forms and formats). However, let me proffer a few guidelines given that, often, non-democratic means have been utilized by democratic societies ostensively to this end, namely, the so-called preservation of civil society. (40)

	Given that it could be argued, as I would argue, that democracies function better with greater degrees of transparency, therefore, I would argue, generally, that increased degrees of transparency are needed, not less! Then, if terrorists are actually thought to be found in our midst then let us treat them as ‘terrorists’ with the full force of the law in all its full transparency. Furthermore, let us be open to the idea that extremists that have acted in such a manner or have appeared to set out to act in such a manner should be open to the persuasive power of remonstration (in the hope that they in turn might further remonstrate with new or recalcitrant converts to the dark ways of terrorism. Let them see the actual or potential consequences of their actions; e.g., ensure, with the permission of survivors and the relatives of the same and the relatives of victims, that they witness directly the actual or potential damage perpetuated by such actions and/or such ideas, etc. That modes of compensation and retribution also be envisaged by all parties concerned. Moreover, let their (religious and/or communal) peers determine punishments, prohibitions, modes of rectification, etc. Hopefully, with an eye upon a true change of heart since extremist thinking is attractive to adolescent-like mentalities; which upon maturation might well regret their more foolish youthful acts. Moreover, our engaged and re-engaged living-in-the-world and experiencing its complexity of values, etc., in time hopefully should assist a maturation in such a hitherto arrested development. (41)

	One should also recognize that the terrorist economy is also an industry and that there can be no lone terrorist in this regard! Disseminators of such a philosophy are also to blame and should also be held responsible for the closed environments they provide that promote such forms of behaviour that are almost always contra established religious practice. Normal theologies are life-supporting and should be life-enhancing (in their existential augmentation of the individual’s richness of relationships with others and themselves in society). Such individual and communities that promote that type of inauthentic religious practice should be made fully accountable in public for that type of stance and allowed to explain why they take such mis-guided positions in this regard. Such demonstrations always being contrasted with vigorous debate and balanced commentary that also explores the possible consequences of such an extremist position (with respect to both extreme performances and expected cultural reactions towards the same). In this regard established religions and their professional exponents and practitioners should make it explicit that the extremist manifesto is contra-religious and as such should be condemned. Such established religious traditions, moreover, at no time should not be alienated but supported in this regard. Moreover, democratic forces are assisted when processes of demonization are not allowed to occur! Furthermore, democratic responses are better focused and integrated if a bipartisanship is enlisted in this regard and enacted in full transparency of process (be it political or legal, etc.). Hopefully, the presence of a full transparency will be able to thwart those individuals, communities and political operatives who wish to capitalize on threats or perceived threats for their own partisan goals and objectives. In all of this prevention is better than a cure; since treatment of the situation at some later point in time is always a much harder task to do (since acts of extremism more often than not are intended to set attitudes and reactions in ‘psychic concrete’. Moreover, as extremists must eventually alienate their own traditions it better behooves us to not alienate such overall traditions in the first place since it is often in their best interests to ensure such extremist thinking is not put into practice and discontinued. Furthermore, it is probably more effective if debate with such extremists is conducted in and through their own traditions, and, that a dialogue with other religious traditions also be there to in order to support such a process of conversion and/or dismantling of such projects! Conditions that support extremism (such as poverty, alienation, racial and religious discrimination, unemployment and under-employment, etc.) also support the same type of reactions in other religious traditions (hence the importance of inter-faith dialogues, etc.) (in order to see incipient forms of terrorism developing in parallel in our own traditions). (42)

4… Provisional Conclusion

	Extremist positions are situated in the ultimate non-viability of non-comparative economies (usually superlative economies). However, such philosophies can have a relative successfulness by virtue of their utilization of an apparently successfully functioning religious genre of practice (usually appealed to through quotation and precedent along with an inauthentic repetitive recitation of the same). (43)

	As philosophies they need to be engaged and neutralized and deconstructed or dismantled through exposing their inauthentic consequences for the traditionally accepted spiritual life of individuals and communities (as situated within their better established parent traditions). (44)

At the same time society needs to be proactive in insulating society in general from extremist performances. In this counter-reaction demonization of the relative other should not be allowed to flourish. Moreover, it is claimed by myself that a greater degree of democratic transparency would ensure a better adaptability by society in this process of a counter-extremist counter-reaction. Furthermore, it would expose political forces that seek to inauthentically gain though such acts of counter-terrorist behaviour. Moreover the rule of law should be augmented in this regard and not subverted (though, e.g., a suspension of habeas corpus, detention without adequate access to courts, use of torture, non-transparency of detainment, etc!)! (45) 

	In adopting our four part program of non-exclusion, inclusion, conclusion and re-inclusion we should recognize that this formula also implies a social dimension, namely, non-exclusion in society, inclusion therein, the conclusive consequences of the same in the form of authentic responses to be made by all parties concerned, and, an existential re-inclusion of all parties back into our communities, cultures and our collective sense of a place in world-culture! (46)

	As this paper was prepared for an open forum let me now proffer a brief guideline for a debate on this topic. (43)

 Noël Tointon, Sydney, 30.12/07

Open Forum:
How Should Civil Society Deal with Forms of Fundamentalism
Conducive to Terrorism, etc?

A list of possible guidelines that might be able to achieve this end?

1.	Recognize the relationship between absolute superlative economies and terrorist economies (noting the viability of comparative economies versus absolute superlative economies and ascriptive economies). 
2.	In a debate with extremists demonstrate the ultimate impossibility of their types of projects…
3.	Explain why, superficially, they might be attractive and seem to be viable relatively (as relatively viable only, i.e., possess only the semblance of possibility).
4.	And either convert such projects to comparative economies or dismantle the same.
5.	Insist critically on the viability of theological or theological-like projects.
6.	Utilize the four part program of non-exclusion, inclusion, conclusion and re-inclusion when and where appropriate.
7.	Isolate the consequences of such a potential threat through neutralization and insulation.
8.	Demand democratic processes of rectification in a full transparency of process.
9.	Insist on political bipartisanship and 
10.	Non-demonization of associated communities and individuals, etc.
11.	Diffuse pre-conditionally, etc., conditions that promote extremism.
12.	Support open inter-faith dialogues and modes of mutual support, etc.
13.	Adopt a direct consequentialist position with perpetrators, potential perpetrators, potential victims, survivors, and relatives and friends of the same.
14.	Seek localized and broad-spectrum changes in attitude, etc.
15.	Insist that all religious-traditions be responsible for their membership to the extent they can take such ownership.
16.	Seek an overall resolution of this type of condition (rather than concentrating merely on individuals in this regard).
17.	Insist that communities in question actively and positively debate extremist projects.
18.	Recognize also the social dimension of our four part formula of non-exclusion, inclusion, conclusion and re-inclusion!
19.	Collectively seek paths of resolution, compensation, retribution, re-education, remonstration and rectification, etc!
20.	Other suggestions……………………………………………………… (44)