Is the Meaning of Life 42? If Not What is it?

Introduction

To sincerely ask the question “what is the meaning of life” assumes, first, that we believe that life has something called “meaning”, and, second, that this meaning can be expressed in some manner or other, i.e., through some form of language. (1)

Most religious philosophies are predicated on this type of assumption. Political philosophy and our philosophical attitudes towards the world are also predicated on this same type of basis, namely, that life has some form of meaning above and beyond the purely obvious and self-evident (in accordance with our roles in society, etc.). This type of philosophical attitude, whether entertained philosophically or non-philosophically, appears to answer a profound need wherein the person desires some form of meaning to be found in their lives – that beyond our successes and failures, beyond our strivings and our sacrifices; that, in essence, the way we lead our lives, rightly or wrongly, still endows us with some form of (transcendent/immanent) value and immortal-like integrity…. (2)

So, first, in contrast, at this important juncture, let us take an opposite tack and ask ‘what would it mean to say that “life has no meaning”?’ (3) 

By ‘life’ is here meant, in [general terms of reference, ‘a life lived by someone or something over the span of their lifetime’. In particular terms of reference as ‘a life lived by some person over their lifetime’, and, in more] specific terms of reference as ‘that life as lived by a specified person over the span of their lifetime’. Now, discounting all forms of absolute intrinsic existence (as impossible states of affairs to either (ontologically) recognize or (epistemologically) comprehend, in and through their treatment of phenomenal (and phenomenological) reality as that which is completely independent, isolated, self-supporting, non-relational, and as unchanging self-dependent entities, etc.), by recognizing the completely untenable nature of such impossible absolutist ideation we must now ask, in a non-absolutist format, “what would it mean for a (specific) life to possess no meaning whatsoever?” Since life is intentionally led, directed by intent towards various forms of intentional objectives, we must assume that life is awash with such value/plurality of values, and, that the only form of life that exercises no specific forms of value-seeking must be that ‘life’ that belongs to a dead person; someone who can no longer possess an embodied sense of intentional direction and/or re-direction. So, dismissing the possibility of a life lived without value in any form whatsoever, let us now redirect our focus on what might be definitively meant by this expression ‘value?’ (4)

	Although an absolutist nihilism has been dismissed (in our dismissal of all forms of absolutist ideation) is it possible for us to be a relative nihilist, i.e., a person whose philosophical appreciation is such that they recognize that the meaning and value of life is found to have no other meaning or value than that already ascribed to it in and through that person’s specific coursing of their own intentional life, i.e., that human life in general has no common intentional objective above and beyond individual intentionalities. Now, Darwinians, or some other form of evolutionist, might counter that there is some form of non-mysterious teleology operating in and through human existence that has brought us to where we are today in terms of our evolution as a human species, and, portends, our continuing existence as a species granted, that this process is still in progress and must remain in play. But would such a position really satisfy this question, this quest in the here and now, for the meaning and value of human existence? Now, for the moment, leaving this type of point undetermined, let us now turn our attention to what value human existence appears to possess or, more to the point, may appear not to possess? (5)

	As argued elsewhere, value is engaged and realized in and through the hermeneutic circle. In relating parts to wholes, and, wholes to parts… relationships are comprehended… such comprehension then assisting us in directing and/or re-directing the intentional coursing of our existence in this-one-world-with-others (i.e., the Life-World). ‘Value’ is that which is being realized in the course of this process. So, if we were hungry and we seek food, then, in finding adequate food, we now find ourselves no longer hungry. The object or objective of this exercise is the appeasement of our hunger. This is its value. The question now becomes “is there a common value above and beyond our existence as realized in and through the resolution of our desires and other forms of intentionally discerned objectives?” If we discount an absolutist position and answer “no” we do so as a relative nihilist. If, on the other hand, we answer “yes” then we must do so as a relative non-nihilist. But, is this latter position tenable? Let me explore the possibility or the impossibility of this type of position in the rest of this paper, in effect, ensuring that we operate under the comprehensive exercise of a transcendental suspension in this regard, i.e., by neither asserting nor denying either the possibility or the impossibility of this position that seeks a value in the value of human existence above and beyond that value as realized in and through the resolution of our own intentional objectives? (6)

	Hence the current problematic concerns the question “is the meaning and value of our existence the result purely of our intentional coursing through this world with others or do we also participate in forms of value that cannot be reduced merely to the coursing of our own intentional existence(s)?” (7)

What is “The Value of Value?”?

	When we ask “what is the meaning of life” what is normally meant or intended? No doubt some type of formula where “life = x”, and, x does not analytically equal ‘life’; i.e., that this formula says something synthetically interesting. In the humorous title to this paper it was asked “is the meaning of life 42, and, if not, what is it?”  This type of question, in effect, is seeking some form of raison d’être for the existential existence of life and to say it is merely the number ‘42’ is to make what seems to be a joke since we expect life to possess some form of value much more impressive than that merely attendant upon the purely numerical. Indeed, this type of question or questioning expects a response and answer that is not quantitative but qualitative in orientation, furthermore, the tenor of this interrogation is deontological in its ambitions and not merely pragmatical in scope. In this light, to convert the worth of a person into, e.g., dollars and cents, is looked at suspiciously even if the intent is seemingly appropriate, as in e.g., compensatory purposes of insurance for loss of limb or life, etc. But, for the sake of argument, let us assume that the person who seriously promotes and assures us that this formula is correct, that “life, indeed, is 42”, is also capable of explaining to us why they hold such a belief. No doubt they would attempt to offer their explanation in the form “that life is 42 means x” Then, in order to further explain this formula they would need to tell us a story as to what this equation means in trans-mathematical terms of reference (since the whole process assumes that such a formula is not to be dismissed as either purely mathematical or merely mathematical). E.g., the unraveller of this formula might opine that it is their belief that we come from a certain constellation that possesses 42 stars and that at the end of time we are going to return there. Or, some other far-fetched story in a similar type of vein. The overall nature of that type of story told is obviously not being told in a purely mathematical mode although in this instance it does contains, as expected, certain mathematical elements along with certain interpretation rules (as transformation rules) that are constructed to tell us how to interpret those numerical features in the light of this interpretative context. So, in the light of the previous story, ‘42’ refers to a specific constellation (of 42 stars) from which the human race, supposedly, has come from and to where we will return in some form or other… no doubt with some reason as to why we came from there in the first place and another reason as to how we can return to the same all in the context of some more expansive scheme that automatically proffers, in the ‘insightful’ light of the same, rightly or wrongly, an evaluative interpretation of life as it should be lived here and now on this planet Earth. In the process ‘life’ is ostensively supplied with a meaning above and beyond the merely mundane (wherein we find nothing more that the ideation and possible resolution of our intentional objectives)? Is it possible to tell such a story, and if so, does such a story really give life the semblance of an existential value above and beyond its mere mundane forms of expression? (8)

	I have grappled with this type of question and must charitably concede that the telling of such stories do seem to proffer an existential surplus of value above and beyond the mundane versions of life subjected to this type of re-interpretation. But, from a critical perspective, the trick for the discriminating person is to see, in comparative terms of reference, how other ‘stories’ might supply a quantum dimension of value greatly in excess of these relatively more artificially contrived versions of reality (where, more likely, “garbage in equals garbage out plus a smaller existential bonus” that may mesmerize the entertainer of such ‘fictions’ into believing they have some form of a deeper insight into the constitution of the world). (9)

	Now we have two ways of (positively) treating this type of explanation, either literally or metaphorically. In the former we are offered a formula which must be followed exactly. In the latter we are given a myth which should be read metaphorically and hence, in turn, as something that stands in need of a further process of explanation (and some form of experiential insight and/or enlightenment). Intended literally some form of a life-formula is probably being proposed that needs our literal observance (along with some form of a consequential experiential insight formation or enlightenment that is realized as a result of those observances?). (10)

	Now, in a mundane frame of reference, what exactly is the meaning of meaning or value? And, what is valuable about value, i.e., why should it be valued? In my previous analysis of value elsewhere I have argued that value, derived in and through the hermeneutic circle, is divided (tri-modally) between sense (where we are in our psychic mapping of the Life-World), meaning (in relation to other meanings) and meaningfulness (what is the overall existential merit of the same, i.e., how does it augment the mundane values of our existence?). So in the light of this let me now refer to non-technically used expression of ‘meaning’ as ‘value’ (as treated in this technical, complex, composite sense of ‘sense, meaning and meaningfulness’ as it reflects its derivation within the ambit of the hermeneutic circle). Hence our primary question now becomes “what is the value of life?” Re-phrased in that manner allows me now to ask “what is valuable about value?” Or, “what is to be valued about value?” (11)

	Imagine a passenger ship runs aground on a small barren coral atoll and before sinking only a small number of passengers are able to make it ashore. Of these survivors most have raided the master vault and have taken off with a considerable sum of gold coins. Among these survivors the radio operator knows that it will be a week before the closest rescue ship will be in the vicinity of this remote atoll. In the light of this information he packs two large suitcase with a gun and food from the kitchen and makes his escape from this sinking ship by lifeboat. Most of the other survivors have helped themselves to this source of gold coins. Before too long, on this rather barren atoll, with all other food supplies exhausted, the radio operator has estimated how much gold is in current circulation on this atoll and charts the cost of his food in gold coins that he puts up for sale in the hope of completely siphoning off that complete amount of currency in circulation before being rescued a week later. By the end of that week he has amassed a small fortune in gold, paying his small band of friends a few coins each in order to have them protect himself from the other relatively hungry survivors, and secure the accumulated gold he has managed to accumulate along with the remaining store of precious food. Normally, gold is more highly valued than food. However, in this island economy the radio operator was wise enough to perceive that food would have a premium. Gold coins cannot be eaten. So coins were traded for this necessity of life. What is the moral of this story? (12)

	“What is valued, what is deemed valuable?” is not determined through some form of evaluation that determines ‘intrinsic worth’ but a determination of the nature of its circulation in a currency of valuation in an economy of desire(d intentional objectives holistically determined). Food was more desired given its necessity and its current scarcity on that island. In a similar fashion the intrinsic value of existence cannot, indeed, should not be searched for in absolutist terms of reference since value can only be determined in and through an economy of circulation. Similarly, an ideal absolutistic search for the intrinsic value of human existence is a pointless and impossible objective to entertain both in theory and in practice. Rather, what should be asked is “to what extent the possible or actual existence of value can be determined in the light of its current circulation or economy of valuation?” (13)

	Lastly, I would like to note that this investigation is being conducted under an overall transcendental suspension. In such an investigative frame of reference we neither assert nor deny any of the possibilities that currently confront us in the course of those investigations (and correctly leave that type of investigation only through a suspension of that suspension). What I am implying here is the fact that we should, in the course of these philosophical investigations, neither assert nor deny either of these non-extreme, tenable positions of the relative nihilist versus the relative non-nihilist. Having dismissed extreme absolutistic types of position we should recognize the situation that personal identity is formed neither intrinsically nor extrinsically in any form of an absolute sense. This attitude of openness now presents us with the fact that personal identity could well be formed both intrinsically and extrinsically in a non-absolutistic sense. Personal value in this non-exclusive vision of the world would then be seen to be formed in and through all of our distinctively entered into relationships whether we were aware of that aspect of metaphorical ‘entry’ or not. In such an open-ended scenario personal identity would then be the net emergent summation of all our relationships whether accounted for or not accounted for. This sense of value would, theoretically, coincide with the actual value of that person-in-this-World-of-Life from their point of view and would include not only the value that arises from the resolution or non-resolution of their own intentional objectivities but also the net emergent existential excess that arose from the nature and manner of the resolution or non-resolution of the intentional objectives of the relationships they wittingly or unwittingly are members of. The person would then share in the value that arises in and through their groups and communities in which they participate in and all others forms of communal relationship including the possibility of theological forms of value if we were to posit our being positioned within the ambit of a theological process. Of course we are not asserting that this is the case, but, then, neither are we denying such a possibility. As a result, the invocation of a critical form of transcendental detachment does not hypothetically remove us from the possibility of that type of value-formation and the way is left open for the philosophical theologian, among others, to explore their types of possible discourse(s) (although to establish the transcendental-empirical reality of the same some fraction of the experienced overall existential excess of value experienced in our existence would need to be traced back to such a relational source. In lieu of such a demonstration this possibility can only remain a hypothetical one?!)? In such a light we can neither both assert or deny the position of the relative nihilist nor both assert or deny the position of the relative non-nihilist. This type of open acceptance to the dialectical nature of the overall transcendental suspension I would be inclined to view as a positive form of nihilism, i.e., as a positive nihilism (as long as this position recognizes and is recognized as being subjected to an ongoing, appropriate, proper and validly constructed form of an overall transcendental suspension!). So, in view of this ‘open-juncture’ let us conclude by exploring the following questions. (14)

An Individually Explorative Conclusion?

	To conclude we should ask ourselves where do we personally stand on the following set/s of interrelated questions:
1.	Can value exist outside its currency in an economy (of desired intentional objectives)?
2.	Is value only relatively intrinsic to its circulation? Is the concomitant sense of ‘world’ then seen as that open frame of reference in which all circulations of value, and circulations within circulations, etc., are able to circulate?
3.	What value is sought in seeking for a sense of value beyond its associated economy. Should not all forms of value be treated as dialectically multi-aspectival and pluralistic in nature? Processes of identification never being able to exhaust ‘identity’?
4.	If absolute nihilism is not accepted should we be either relative nihilists and/or relative non-nihilists or neither (without some form of a definitive transcendental empirical demarcation one way or the other)? Is the only viable position and path in this regard that of a critically exercised positive nihilism (wherein the transcendental dimension [as a suspension of the immanent/transcendent] is allowed to fully and effectively function in conjunction with the relatively non-transcendental or mundane)?
5.	What role could the metaphorical (and mythical) play in this search for value? And what ‘literal’ value is allowed to arise from the application of the metaphorical (and mythical) as long as it is not invoked in an absolutistic frame of reference?
6.	If value is determined through the experience of an existential excess of value what need is there for a search for value above and beyond the richness of its manifestation in an economy/economies of circulation (wherein the ongoing resolution of a complex set of intentional objectives is already being met?)?
7.	In what sense could the metaphorical/mythical augment the existential quality of human existence?
8.	If you believe that life has meaning, life has value above its mundane circulation and resolution of intentional objectives please inform us as to what you might think it to be? Or, is a parallel transcendental reading the only viable exception here?
9.	Is it not the case that we cannot deny the most probable involvement of the theological in the formation of emergent value, but, perceive at the same time that all senses of the divine could play no substantial part in the formation of personal identity and apparent self-value? How would we argue for/against this type of interpretation?
10.	Just what is the meaning/value of life when it might be the case that its true meaning/value is that it has no meaning/value (above and beyond a full transcendental description/prescription of the mundane)? (15) 	    Noël Tointon, Sydney, 6.12.05.